Who Would Change Their Vote and Why?
A Case Study on the 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections

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In the 2000 Taiwan presidential election, James Soong (宋楚瑜), an independent candidate, and Lien Chan (連戰), the Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT) candidate, received 4,664,972 and 2,925,513 votes respectively; but in the 2004 president election, Lien and Soong in a joint ticket received only 6,442,452 votes, less than the sum of their votes in 2000. Votes for the Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨, DPP) candidate, Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), increased to 6,471,970 in 2004 from 4,977,697 in 2000. In 2008 KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) won the presidential election with 7,659,014 votes (Central Election Committee, 2009). It is reasonable to assume that many electors did not vote the same way in all three elections and that their decision to change their vote had a determinant impact on the electoral results. A study on this shift in vote would help to clarify the matter.

One can think of voting as a series of political acts or as a trend in voting choice among elections, instead of as the choice made in a particular election. There is no doubt that many electors have changed the way they vote among elections. It makes for an interesting research question: Why do voters change their vote? Many scholars in the fields of sociology and social psychology have argued that some voters are more likely to be influenced by short-term factors and are therefore more open to changing their vote. For instance, Robertson (1976) pointed out that people who are more likely to be affected by party platform are more likely than those who are not to change their vote. Bartolini (1999) proposed an interesting and useful concept — voter availability, concerning individuals who tend to change their choice of vote. This leads to another question: Who are the people that tend to change their vote? Answering this is the first step to understanding voting change.
The paper seeks to identify who in Taiwan tend to change their vote and to explain why they would do so, through an empirical study on the 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections. This study draws on data from the Survey of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections in 2006 (TEDS2006C), provided by Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS).

**Voting Change and Its Theories**

The concept of voting change came from studies in the United States on changes in votes for political parties and on the party system. In the 1950s, Key (1955, 1959) discussed party realignment by investigating long-term trends in electoral results based on the aggregate-level approach. These studies on trends in electoral results stimulated further studies on the consistency of the voting choices of electorates. It is necessary to clarify that a change in electoral result and voting change are two related but not equivalent concepts. Voting stability refers to the situation in which a person votes for the same party at successive elections. In other words, voting change occurs when the elector votes for a different party from that in the last election, casts invalid votes, or even chooses to be absent from an election. To be brief, voting change is a change in individual voting choice but a change of electoral result is a change in an aggregation of the voting choices of the electorate.

The sociological approach, one of three major approaches to studying voting behaviour, focuses on group rather than individual voting. This approach stresses the view that members of the same social group share similar experiences and interests, and so have common beliefs and values, leading to similar voting preferences and behaviour. The social background of an electorate has long been considered a key determinant of political choice. In the 1950s, Campbell and Cooper (1956) explained voting behaviour in the United States through an examination of many socio-demographic characteristics including the density of the population, income, age, sex, race, and religion. Pomper (1975) further argued that occupation and education are also correlated with voting choice in that a person’s occupation has a direct influence on his/her income and lifestyle and
a voter’s level of education would have some bearing on that person’s knowledge of the way government operates and what politics means. The influence of these factors on voting choice has been confirmed by many studies conducted in the United States and elsewhere (Berelson et al., 1954; Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Langton, 1969).

Socio-demographic factors are not only valuable predictors of voting choice, but also are correlated with voting change. Many socio-demographic factors have been shown to be significant explanatory variables of voting change.

First, it has been substantiated that older voters are less likely than young people to change the way they vote across elections, because older people have stronger political preferences. The elderly are more set than young people are on a particular political party because experienced adults have come across many more incidents in life and these incidents have normally contributed to the formation of their political attitudes and preferences (Campbell et al., 1960). Moreover, class mobility becomes lower when people get older. Class identity and class interests then become much more distinctive than they are at an earlier stage in life, and party identity would therefore be much more durable (Abramson, 1983). The durable class identity of the elderly makes their political choices much more stable than those of young people. In addition, differences in political attitudes and values among different generations would lead to differences in their voting behaviour (Binstock, 1972). In short, the likelihood of a shift in vote would vary across different age groups.

Second, education is not only related to voting choice but also to the issue of who are more disposed to change their vote. More educated electorates are believed to be more likely to be better informed and more broadly based in terms of ideology, partisan attachment, satisfaction with democratization, and policy distance. Less-informed electorates tend to vote solely on the basis of partisan attachment (Kuan and Lau, 2002). This means that short-term factors such as the evaluation of candidates and parties, the performance of the government, and political discourse would have a greater impact on the decision making of highly educated voters than of those with a lower level of education, and therefore the former are more likely than the latter to change the way they vote.
Lastly, gender is also a key predictor of voting choices. Males are more likely than females to believe that they are able to understand the political discourse. They tend to have a stronger interest in political discourse and information than females, and consequently are in receipt of more political information and have a higher political participation rate than females (Campbell et al., 1960). Like highly educated voters, male voters are better informed and their voting decisions are more broadly based. Females tend to base their choice solely on partisan attachment. Male voters are more likely to be affected by a change in political information. Hence, the voting choices of males would be less stable than those of females.

Unlike the sociological approach, the identification approach emphasizes the individual characteristics of electorates. This approach was developed from the party identification model, sometimes called the “Michigan model”, which was devised at the University of Michigan in the 1950s. Campbell and Kahn (1952) pointed out the influence of party identification on voting behaviour in United States. Campbell and Cooper (1956) defined party identity from a psychological perspective, stating that the concept of party identification implies a personal sense of belonging to one or another of the major political parties. According to the model, group membership and family influence contribute to party identification, which affects voting behaviour indirectly through the electorates’ attitude towards three things: the candidates, policies, and group benefits. These three attitudes have an independent impact on voting choice, especially in the short term (Harrop and Miller, 1987). When voters strongly identify with a particular party, they will be loyal to that party. Short-term factors will have a weaker effect on their understanding and evaluation of that party and therefore on their choice of vote. Therefore, voters who strongly identify with the party they voted for last time would be unlikely to shift to support another party.

Identification with a particular social and political group is one of the key independent variables in studies on voting behaviour. Group identity refers to a person’s recognition of social stratums and a sense of belonging to a particular stratum. It is a primary component
of group consciousness. It involves identification with a group and awareness of the politics and ideology regarding this group, along with a commitment to taking collective action aimed at realizing the group’s interests (Miller et al., 1981). It is argued that electorates with a strong group identity are less likely to vote for parties supported by other groups, especially opposition groups. Even if voters have a low level of party identification and would therefore be inclined to change their vote, a strong group identity would limit their choice to members within the group. Similar to party identification, group identification has a significant influence on both voting choice and voting change.

In contrast to the identification approach, which sees voting as an expression of loyalty to a party and a social group, the rational choice model assumes that the act of voting is a means of achieving the goals of the electorate. Downs (1957) argued that voters will evaluate all of the candidates and parties, and calculate what these candidates and parties would provide them with in terms of utility if they were elected. After comparing the different candidates, voters will vote for the person who can maximize their utility. Many studies have supported Downs’s argument (Brody and Page, 1973; Kelley and Mirer, 1974; Markus and Converse, 1979; Stewart and Clarke, 1992). Therefore, if electorates have a poor evaluation of the candidate of the party that they voted last time, they would be more likely to change their choice of vote, and vice versa.

Unlike Downs, whose model focuses on the evaluation of candidates, some researchers examined the electorate’s evaluation of the performance of the government (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981). Retrospective voting is when the electorate will vote against the incumbent government if its performance is poor, and vice versa. In other words, a good performance by the incumbent government will mean that their original followers are likely to support them again in an election. It is probable that followers of opposition parties will switch to voting for the incumbent government if they are satisfied; otherwise, they will be more likely to be stable in their choice of candidate in the election.

The theory of strategic voting is derived from the rational choice
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model. Strategic voting refers to a vote by an elector for a party that is not his/her preferred one, in order to achieve an expected outcome in an election. Duverger (1959) established the relationship between a single majority single-ballot system and the rise of a two-party system by pointing out that followers of minor parties will gradually shift their votes to major parties in order to avoid wasting their votes. In order to achieve an expected electoral outcome, electorates will change their choice even though they still prefer the party that they voted for last time. Many studies have further validated the view that strategic voting works not only in a single majority single-ballot system but in other systems as well (Franklin et al., 1993; Fieldhouse et al., 1996; Cox, 1997; Alvarez and Nagler, 2000). Voters will change their vote in order to prevent an undesirable outcome when it appears probable that the party they voted for last time will have no chance of winning in an election.

In short, to a certain extent, all three approaches contribute to the analysis on voting change, but they address different aspects of the subject. Both the sociological approach and the identification approach aim to identify the electorates who tend to change their vote

Figure 1: Theory of voting change

- **Socio-demographic factors:**
  - Age
  - Education
  - Gender

- **Identification:**
  - Party identity
  - Group identity

- **Rational choice:**
  - Political evaluation of candidates
  - Retrospective voting
  - Strategic voting

- **Voting change**
between elections, by exploring who are most affected by short-term factors in their voting behaviour. The rational choice model, on the other hand, focuses on how people make the decision of whether or not to change their vote. Miller and Shanks (1996) classified eight explanatory variables on voting behaviour and assigned them to six successive stages of time. Each stage is located closer and closer to the date of the election, and later stages have a shorter-term influence on voting than the earlier ones. The first variable is based on the sociological approach. The last three variables are related to key elements of the rational choice model: evaluation of the current government and candidates. The middle variables are consistent with the identification approach.

**Background of the 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections**

The KMT, originally a revolutionary party in China, was the ruling party in Taiwan until 2000. The KMT government had long been perceived as a “quasi-Leninist” party/state authoritarian regime with a highly centralized leadership and party organs that had deeply penetrated the state apparatus and society (Kim, 2001). There were no opposition parties before President Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) launched a series of liberalization measures in the second half of the 1980s, including the repeal of marital law and acknowledgement of the formation of political parties. In 1986, the opposition established the DPP, the first new opposition political party in postwar Taiwan. There are two major parties in Taiwan, divided into two camps: the Pan-Blue Coalition (泛藍陣營) under the leadership of the KMT and the Pan-Green Coalition (泛綠陣營) under the leadership of the DPP. They differ in the stance that they take on the Cross-strait Policy. Generally, those who are considered mainlanders are more likely to vote for the KMT and the Pan-Blue Coalition, while those who are considered Taiwanese Min-nan people tend to support the DPP and the Pan-Green Coalition (Hawang, 1995; Shyu, 1995, 1998). In addition, voters who identify themselves as Chinese would tend to support the KMT and who identify themselves as Taiwanese would tend to support the DPP (Wang, 1998).
In the 1994 Taipei mayoral election, the DPP’s candidate Chen Shui-bian captured 43.67% of the total votes and became the first mayor of Taipei from an opposition party (Central Election Committee, 2009). Chen went on to win the 2000 presidential election because of a split in the Pan-Blue’s votes between two major candidates: Lien Chan of the KMT and James Soong, who had left the KMT over the issue of who would be the party’s candidate in the presidential election. In order to win back power for the Pan-Blue Coalition, Lien and Soong formed a joint ticket to run in the 2004 presidential election, but lost. Hence, the 2008 presidential election was a critical time for the Pan-Blue Coalition.

As with the presidential election, the Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections operate on a “winner-take-all” system. Moreover, Taipei is the capital of the Republic of China and some of its former mayors were later elected as president. This position has a significant role to play in the election of the president. The current president, Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT, had been mayor of Taipei for two terms. The 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections were pretests for the 2008 presidential election. The KMT nominated Hau Lung-pin (郝龍斌) as their candidate for mayor of Taipei in the 2006 election. For this part, James Soong, an experienced politician of the Pan-Blue Coalition and the leader of the People First Party (親民黨，PFP), registered as a “non-partisan” candidate; that is, as a candidate with no party affiliation. Compared with Ma and Soong, Hau was less experienced and popular. There were rumours that the KMT would change their support to Soong instead of to Hau. With the support of Ma, Hau finally overcame the difficulties and won the election with 53.81% of the votes, compared to the 40.89% received by his main opponent Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) of the DPP (Central Election Committee, 2009).

The DPP has dominated the post of mayor of Kaohsiung for a long time. However, due to the corruption scandals surrounding President Chen Shui-bian and other DPP politicians and to challenges from other Pan-Green Coalition candidates, Huang Chun-ying (黃俊英) of the KMT, the only candidate from Pan-Blue Coalition, led the DPP candidate Chen Chu (陳菊) in several public opinion polls
conducted before election day. In the end, Chen won over Huang by only 1,114 votes (Central Election Committee, 2009).

**Operationalization, Methodology, and Models**

To address the subject of voting change between the 2002 and 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections, I analyse data from the Survey of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections in 2006 provided by the TEDS. For the 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections, the TEDS conducted post-election face-to-face surveys from January to March 2007 involving 1,235 and 1,262 citizens aged 20 or above in Taipei and Kaohsiung respectively. To compare voting choices between the 2002 and 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections, interviewees in the dataset who were ineligible to vote, did not vote, or who had cast an invalid vote in 2002 were excluded from this paper.²

Wu and Wang (2003) discussed the impact that the electorates’ awareness of a divided government had on voting change in Taiwan by comparing voting choices in the 2000 presidential election and the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections. Unlike their study, this paper is concerned with voting change in elections involving the same political position, in order to eliminate variations arising from different elected positions and voting systems.

The operationalization of voting change and methodology in this paper is also different from that of Wu and Wang. In Wu and Wang’s study, voting change was operationalized as a four-category variable: (1) stable followers of the Pan-Blue Coalition, (2) stable followers of the Pan-Green Coalition, (3) new followers of the Pan-Blue Coalition from the Pan-Green Coalition, and (4) new followers of the Pan-Green Coalition from the Pan-Blue Coalition. Only the last category was used as baseline in multinomial logistic regressions. Because this extension of the concept of “voting change” to the political camp level from the party level not only fits Taiwan political situation but also contributes to our knowledge of voting change across political camps, this extension was retained in this paper. However, because Wu and Wang’s study ignored the comparison between stable and
unstable Pan-Blue followers, they did not offer a good explanation of why the followers of the Pan-Blue Coalition did not continue to support the Pan-Blue Coalition in the 2001 election.

In this paper, voting change is still operationalized as a four-category variable. First, those who voted for the same party in the 2002 and 2006 mayoral elections for the cities of Taipei and Kaohsiung are identified as stable voters. Second, it is necessary to separate those who voted for parties belonging to the political camp associated with the party that they voted for in 2002 and candidates with a neutral background, from those who voted for parties belonging to another political camp. The former category is classified as “change within the same camp/neutral” and the latter as “change to the opposition camp”. Lastly, those who were absent from the 2006 election and those who had cast an invalid vote have been included in this study. Unlike the other two groups of unstable voters, these people did not shift their vote to other political groupings. Hence, these two groups of people are combined into one category of voting change.

In order to test the impact of factors of socio-demographic background, only the sociological approach is applied in Model 1. In Model 1, age, gender, and education have all been included. Age is the most important factor because many studies have pointed out that the elderly in Taiwan are more stable in their voting behaviour than the youth (Hung, 1995; Hu, 1998). Ethnic background has also been added to the model. In Taiwan, ethnic background is one of the key determinants in voting choice. As mentioned before, many studies have shown that mainlanders are more likely to vote for the KMT and the Pan-Blue Coalition and Taiwanese Min-nan people to support the DPP and the Pan-Green Coalition (Hawang, 1995; Shyu, 1995, 1998; Wang, 1998). Compared with Taiwanese Min-nan people, mainlanders have deep-seated political attitudes and a strong group consciousness (Hu, 1998). Therefore, the mainlanders would be less affected by short-term factors than the Taiwanese Min-nan people and thus their voting pattern would be more stable than the latter’s. Other ethnic groups including Hakka and Aboriginals have also been combined into one category for comparison.

In Model 2, both the sociological approach and the identification
approach have been applied to test the impact of identification. By comparing the coefficients of the socio-demographic factors in Model 1 and Model 2 (i.e., under the control of identification), it is also possible to examine whether socio-demographic factors affect voting change indirectly through identification. Therefore, all of the variables of the sociological approach used in Model 1 were retained in Model 2.

There is no doubt that party identity has an important effect on voting behaviour in Taiwan (Niou and Paolini, 2003). Wu and Wang’s (2003) finding supported the view that party identity was a significant factor in voting stability in Taiwan. The variable “degree of identification with the party for which the electors voted in the 2002 election” (degree of party identity; 1 = no identity, 2 = weak identity, 3 = strong identity) has been added to the model for the identification approach.\(^4\)

Moreover, identification with a political camp is one of the key group identities in Taiwan. There are two major political camps in Taiwan: the Pan-Blue Coalition and the Pan-Green Coalition. It is supposed that those who voted for parties of the Pan-Blue Coalition last time and who strongly identify with the Pan-Blue Coalition are less likely to switch to voting for parties of the Pan-Green Coalition, and vice versa. The variable “degree of identification with the camp with which the party that the electors voted for in the 2002 election is associated” (degree of camp identity; 1 = no identity, 2 = weak identity, 3 = strong identity).\(^5\) I believe that party identity and political camp identity are not only predictors of who would tend to change their vote but also predictors of their probable choice when they do make the change. When people with a strong party identity and weak camp identity decide to change, they will tend to be absent or cast an invalid vote because they are more concerned about the party’s interests than about the political camp’s interests and will see voting for others as a betrayal. However, people with a weak party identity and a strong camp identity will be concerned about the camp’s interests rather than only a party’s interests. They will tend to vote for another party of the same camp to fight against the opposition camp and may see being absent and casting an invalid vote as actions favourable
to the opposition camp. If their party identity is stronger than camp identity, they will be absent or cast an invalid vote. Otherwise, they will switch to voting for another party in the same camp. There is no big difference in probability between “change within the same camp/neutral” and “absent or invalid vote” for those who have both a strong party identity and camp identity and those who have both a weak party identity and camp identity (Table 1).

Apart from political camp identity, ethnic identity is one of the group identities affecting political behaviour in Taiwan. Voters who identify themselves as Chinese would tend to support the KMT and those who identify themselves as Taiwanese would be more likely to support the DPP (Wang, 1998). Based on this premise, those who voted for the KMT last time and who identify themselves as Chinese are less likely to switch to voting for the DPP, and vice versa. Therefore, the variable “consistency of ethnic identity with the party that the electors voted for in the 2002 election” (consistency between ethnic identity and party; 1 = opposite, 2 = neutral, 3 = consistent) has been added to the model.\(^6\)

In Model 3, all of the independent variables in Model 2 were retained. Factors of the rational choice model, including the political evaluation of candidates and incumbents and strategic voting were added as key explanatory factors. With regard to political evaluation, it was found that candidate evaluation has a significant influence on voting choice in Taiwan (Hawang, 2005). Therefore, “likeability of the candidate of the party that the electors voted for in the 2002 election” (likeability of candidate; 0 = hostile, 5 = neutral, 10 = very

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Table 1: Party identity, camp identity, and probable forms of change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong camp identity</th>
<th>Weak camp identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong party identity</td>
<td>Absent or invalid vote;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change to the same camp/neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak party identity</td>
<td>Absent or invalid vote;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change to the same camp/neutral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
favourable) has been added. “Satisfaction with the former mayor” (1 = very dissatisfied, 2 = not very satisfied, 3 = somewhat satisfied, 4 = very satisfied) was selected to test the influence of retrospective voting on voting change.\(^7\) The supposition was that the evaluation of the former mayor would have a different effect on the followers of different political parties with regard to voting change. The voting patterns of electorates who voted for the incumbent government last time are more likely to be stable when they are satisfied with the government, while those who voted for opposition parties last time will be more likely to change their vote when they are satisfied with the government. Therefore, I added the interaction between “satisfaction with the former mayor” and “the former mayor is a member of the opposition camp” (former mayor is opposition camp member; 1 = yes, 0 = no).\(^8\)

As mentioned before, strategic voting may lead to voting change. Unlike the Legislative Yuan elections, the voting system for the Taiwan mayoral election is a “winner-take-all” system. Under this simple system, the failure of opposition parties is the most preferred electoral outcome when the success of the first preferred party is improbable. For that reason, voters will switch their choice to obstruct the success of opposition parties when they believe that their preferred party has no chance of winning. The low probability of winning of the party that electorates voted for in the last election would lead to voting change. The chance of success of the party that the interviewees voted for in 2002 (chance of success; 1 = no, 0 = yes) is included in the model.

Since the influences of the variables on “voting instability” (whether electorates change) and “voting change” (how they change) may be different, the regression analyses for voting instability (1 = change, 0 = stable) and voting change are done separately.\(^9\)

**Preliminary Analysis**

As shown in Table 2, voting choices were stable in both Taipei and Kaohsiung. Rates of electoral stability were 73.50% and 80.03% in Taipei and Kaohsiung, respectively. “Absent or invalid vote” was the
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for selected variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Taipei</th>
<th>Kaohsiung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting change (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>73.50</td>
<td>80.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change within the same camp/neutral</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change to the opposition camp</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>8.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent or invalid vote</td>
<td>12.75</td>
<td>9.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting instability (%)</td>
<td>26.50</td>
<td>19.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Taipei</th>
<th>Kaohsiung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-demographic background</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (mean, SD)</td>
<td>46.63</td>
<td>46.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16.84)</td>
<td>(15.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (%)</td>
<td>47.77</td>
<td>50.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (%)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>15.02</td>
<td>19.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>46.12</td>
<td>55.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>38.86</td>
<td>24.86</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>1259</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic background (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mainlander</td>
<td>22.73</td>
<td>14.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Min-nan</td>
<td>69.03</td>
<td>80.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>1237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of party identity (%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>39.23</td>
<td>38.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>43.94</td>
<td>44.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
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<td>16.67</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>701</td>
<td>696</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree of camp identity (%)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>35.64</td>
<td>44.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>47.03</td>
<td>39.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>16.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>808</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency between ethnic identity and party (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposite</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>59.22</td>
<td>44.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consistent</td>
<td>25.12</td>
<td>47.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>824</td>
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</table>
Who Would Change Their Vote and Why?

most common form of change, comprising 12.75% and 9.92% of total votes in Taipei and Kaohsiung respectively. Meanwhile, the other two forms of change comprised 13.75% and 10.06% of total votes in Taipei and Kaohsiung respectively, slightly higher than the figures for “absent or invalid vote”. This has two important implications: (1) studies on voting change in Taiwan that fail to examine absent voters or those that cast invalid votes would be missing a key element of the process; (2) it does not seem to be easy for other parties within the same camp to get the votes of the unstable electorates. In both cities, a “change to the opposition camp” was more common than a “change within the same camp/neutral”. Parties of the same camp do not have any advantages over parties of the opposition camp in obtaining votes from unstable electorates.

Table 3 is a brief analysis using a chi-square test and ANOVA of the influence of selected socio-demographic factors on voting change. Age and education have a significant influence on voting instability and voting change. In both Taipei and Kaohsiung, the mean age of stable electorates is higher than that of unstable electorates and electorates exhibiting three other forms of change. This is consistent with the literature showing that the elderly tend to be more stable
Table 3: Age, education, gender, ethnic background, and voting change in the 2006 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age (mean, SD)</th>
<th>Education (%)</th>
<th>Gender (%)</th>
<th>Ethnic background (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taipei</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>50.49 (15.51)</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>68.43</td>
<td>77.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>46.02 (14.76)</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>31.57</td>
<td>22.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change within</td>
<td>13.272***</td>
<td>10.200**</td>
<td>2.455</td>
<td>5.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the same camp/neutral</td>
<td>48.55 (17.35)</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change to the</td>
<td>44.94 (14.56)</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>6.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposition camp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent or invalid vote</td>
<td>45.83 (13.88)</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>14.39</td>
<td>12.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F ratio/χ²</td>
<td>1.064 1.119</td>
<td>1.064</td>
<td>1.064</td>
<td>1.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Kaohsiung**  |               |          |           |           |          |          |            |          |        |
| Stable         | 50.44 (13.90) | 91.16    | 77.71     | 76.13     | 78.59    | 81.57    | 83.33      | 79.44    | 82.93  |
| Unstable       | 42.98 (13.18) | 8.84     | 22.29     | 23.87     | 21.41    | 18.43    | 16.67      | 20.56    | 17.07  |
| F ratio/χ²     | 14.393***     | 1.064    | 1.064     | 1.119     |          |          |            |          |        |
| Change within  | 42.91 (9.92)  | 0.68     | 2.16      | 0.00      | 2.52     | 0.27     | 0.00       | 1.82     | 0.00   |
| the same camp/neutral |           |          |           |           |          |          |            |          |        |
| Change to the  | 46.45 (14.02) | 4.76     | 9.96      | 8.39      | 8.56     | 8.67     | 9.65       | 8.46     | 4.88   |
| opposition camp|               |          |           |           |          |          |            |          |        |
| Absent or invalid vote | 39.97 (12.21) | 3.40     | 10.17     | 15.48     | 10.33    | 9.49     | 7.02       | 10.28    | 12.20  |
| F ratio/χ²     | 14.725***     | 7.081    | 5.127     |          |          |          |            |          |        |
| n              | 766           | 147      | 462       | 155       | 397      | 369      | 114        | 603      | 41     |

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
in their choice. In Kaohsiung, the mean age of those who were absent or cast an invalid vote was 39.97, considerably lower than the figure for the other forms of change. It seems that elderly people are particularly less likely to change their voting behaviour to that of absence or casting an invalid vote. With regard to education, those with a primary level of education tend to exhibit more stable voting behaviour than those with a secondary or tertiary level of education. In both cities, over 80% of voters with a primary level of education demonstrated stable voting behaviour. From the perspective of ethnic background, in both cities there were no significant differences among ethnic groups with regard to voting instability. In Taipei only were mainlanders less likely than other groups to switch their support to the opposition camp. Voting choices in the 2002 election provide us with a hint of how voting patterns differ in Taipei.

Table 4 shows that there was a big difference between Taipei and Kaohsiung in the voting choices of Taiwanese Min-nan people in the 2002 election. Over 66% of Taiwanese Min-nan people in Taipei voted for the KMT in the 2002 election, while nearly 70% of Taiwanese Min-nan people in Kaohsiung voted for the DPP. In 2006, only 46.37% of Taiwanese Min-nan people in Taipei voted for the KMT and nearly 60% of Taiwanese Min-nan people in Kaohsiung supported the DPP. Taiwanese Min-nan people shifted to supporting the DPP from the KMT in Taipei and still mainly supported the DPP in Kaohsiung in both the 2002 and 2006 elections. Given that Taiwanese Min-nan people are more likely to support the Pan-Green Coalition than mainlanders and that many of them voted for the KMT in Taipei in 2002 but most of them supported the DPP in Kaohsiung in 2002, Min-nan background is correlated with changing to the opposition camp in Taipei only.

Table 5 lists the results of analyses using chi-square tests on the relationship between identity and voting instability and voting change. Regarding party identity, in both cities, electorates identify strongly with the party that they voted for last time, and their voting choice tends to be stable. In addition, in both cities, a greater proportion of those with no identification with the party that they voted for last time switched to voting for the opposition camp than those who have
such an identification. Moreover, “change to the opposition camp” replaced “absent or invalid vote” as the chief form of change for voters who do not identify with the party that they supported last time. This implies that voters with a party identity would tend to be absent or cast an invalid vote, while those without a party identity would prefer to switch to supporting the opposition camp when they decide not to continue voting for the party that they voted for last time.

From the perspective of camp identity, in both cities, voters who identified with the camp that they had supported last time tended to exhibit stable voting behaviour. It was also found that a strong camp identity made it less likely that a person would switch to voting for an opposition camp. More than 18% of the electorates that did not identify with a particular camp voted for the opposition camp, but in both cities less than 3% of those with a camp identity did so. For those with a camp identity, being absent or casting an invalid vote was the most common form of change, but for those without such an identity, changing to the opposition camp replaced being absent or casting an invalid vote as the most common form of change in voting behaviour in both cities. In Taipei, switching to the opposition camp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Taipei</th>
<th>Kaohsiung</th>
<th></th>
<th>Taipei</th>
<th>Kaohsiung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mainlander</td>
<td>Min-nan</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Mainlander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2002</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>97.06</td>
<td>66.42</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>74.76</td>
<td>76.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>33.58</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>25.24</td>
<td>17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>(204)</td>
<td>(548)</td>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>(828)</td>
<td>(125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>88.35</td>
<td>46.37</td>
<td>57.69</td>
<td>57.24</td>
<td>91.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>44.86</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>34.44</td>
<td>8.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>(206)</td>
<td>(593)</td>
<td>(78)</td>
<td>(877)</td>
<td>(147)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Others” includes invalid votes.
Table 5: Party identity, camp identity, ethnic identity, and voting change in the 2006 elections (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Consistent</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Opposite</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taipei</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>87.83</td>
<td>83.22</td>
<td>55.02</td>
<td>84.89</td>
<td>84.43</td>
<td>54.31</td>
<td>86.87</td>
<td>73.33</td>
<td>52.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>12.17</td>
<td>16.78</td>
<td>44.98</td>
<td>15.11</td>
<td>15.57</td>
<td>45.69</td>
<td>13.13</td>
<td>26.67</td>
<td>47.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>70.538***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83.258***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.402***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change within the same camp/neutral</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change to the opposition camp</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>23.29</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent or invalid vote</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td>14.86</td>
<td>10.07</td>
<td>9.02</td>
<td>18.35</td>
<td>7.58</td>
<td>13.98</td>
<td>16.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>104.755***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>115.527***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68.733***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kaohsiung</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>98.26</td>
<td>89.87</td>
<td>59.18</td>
<td>96.83</td>
<td>88.26</td>
<td>64.22</td>
<td>82.27</td>
<td>77.91</td>
<td>84.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>40.82</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>11.74</td>
<td>35.78</td>
<td>17.73</td>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>15.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>109.070***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82.113***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.739</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change within the same camp/neutral</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change to the opposition camp</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>23.67</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>18.85</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent or invalid vote</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>7.52</td>
<td>14.69</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>15.02</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>129.865***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94.409***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.388</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
was the least common form of change for those who identified with a particular political camp.

There is an inconsistent finding with regard to the relationship between ethnic identity and voting stability between the two cities. In Taipei, voters whose ethnic identity is more consistent with the party that they voted for last time were more likely to show stable voting behaviour. In addition, those whose ethnic identity is more consistent with the party that they voted for last time were less likely to change to supporting the opposition camp and to be absent or cast an invalid vote than those whose ethnic identity is the opposite of that represented by the party that they had previously voted for. “Change to the opposition camp” replaced “absent or invalid vote” as the most common form of change for those whose ethnic identity is the opposite of that represented by the party they had previously supported. But in Kaohsiung there is no significant correlation here with voting instability and voting change. A further assessment of the situation in Kaohsiung is given below.

Table 6 shows the results of analyses of the influence of political evaluations and strategic voting. It is significant that a poor evaluation of a candidate contributes to voting instability. In both Taipei and Kaohsiung, the mean score of stable electorates for “likeability of candidate” was higher than that of the unstable group and the three other unstable sub-groups. People will continue to support the party that they voted for last time if they appreciate the party’s candidate. Even if they do not continue to support the party, they will tend to be absent from the election or to cast an invalid vote rather than vote for other candidates.

Like the evaluation of a candidate, the evaluation of the performance of a former mayor is also correlated with voting change. As expected, this relationship varied with the followers of different political parties. In Taipei, among KMT followers, the stable electorate was much more satisfied with the performance of the former mayor than the unstable group and the three other unstable sub-groups. DPP followers who switched to supporting the opposition camp were much more satisfied than the unstable followers and two other unstable sub-groups. Given that the former mayor of Taipei was a
Table 6: Likeability of candidate, satisfaction with the former mayor, chance of success, and voting change in the 2006 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Likeability of candidate (Mean, SD)</th>
<th>Satisfaction with the former mayor (Mean, SD)</th>
<th>Chance of success (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KMT supporter</td>
<td>DPP supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taipei</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>7.59 (1.77)</td>
<td>3.00 (.55)</td>
<td>1.75 (.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>5.96 (2.13)</td>
<td>2.73 (.64)</td>
<td>1.89 (.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F ratio/χ²</strong></td>
<td>116.860***</td>
<td>26.847***</td>
<td>.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change within the</td>
<td>5.73 (2.14)</td>
<td>2.81 (.57)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same camp/neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change to the</td>
<td>5.42 (1.89)</td>
<td>2.53 (.65)</td>
<td>2.40 (.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposition camp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent or invalid</td>
<td>6.42 (2.21)</td>
<td>2.83 (.63)</td>
<td>1.59 (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F ratio/χ²</strong></td>
<td>43.679***</td>
<td>12.307***</td>
<td>4.731*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n</strong></td>
<td>781</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kaohsiung</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>7.64 (1.86)</td>
<td>2.42 (.71)</td>
<td>3.29 (.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>5.82 (1.94)</td>
<td>2.63 (.74)</td>
<td>2.94 (.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F ratio/χ²</strong></td>
<td>112.723***</td>
<td>2.204</td>
<td>34.244***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change within the</td>
<td>5.64 (1.57)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.00 (.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same camp/neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change to the</td>
<td>5.72 (1.90)</td>
<td>2.93 (.62)</td>
<td>2.82 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opposition camp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent or invalid</td>
<td>5.93 (2.04)</td>
<td>2.31 (.75)</td>
<td>3.02 (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F ratio/χ²</strong></td>
<td>37.688***</td>
<td>3.733*</td>
<td>12.571***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n</strong></td>
<td>738</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
KMT member, a high evaluation of the performance of the incumbent would tend to encourage original voters to maintain their support and opposition party followers to change to voting for the incumbent party. The finding in Kaohsiung further validates this argument. The former mayor of Kaohsiung was a DPP member. Therefore, KMT followers who switched to supporting the opposition camp were much more satisfied with his performance as mayor than were the stable electorates and the two other unstable sub-groups; while for DPP followers, the stable electorates were much more satisfied with his performance than were the other groups. This demonstrates that in Kaohsiung a good performance from the former mayor can sustain original electoral support and attract votes from followers of the opposition party.

People tend to shift their vote when they assume that the party they voted for last time has no chance of winning in the current election. In both cities, about 90% of voters who believed that the party they voted for last time would win exhibited stable voting behaviour, a figure over 15% greater than for those who did not share this belief. However, all of these analyses do reveal differences among the voting population of Taipei and Kaohsiung.

Findings and Discussion

Voting Instability

The data for Taipei and Kaohsiung were combined and logistic regressions for voting instability were run for selected variables. Three different models were used for the analysis.

The regression analysis in Table 7 reveals that young people and males are more likely to change their vote. In Model 1, age is negatively correlated with voting instability at the .001 significance level. Older people are less likely to change the way they vote in the next election. This correlation becomes insignificant in Model 3, where the variables of political evaluation and strategic voting are controlled. This is because the political evaluations of older people are not so likely to be affected by short-term factors. Compared with young people, older people tend to have greater appreciation for the
### Table 7: Coefficients of the logistic regression for voting instability on selected variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographic background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.032***</td>
<td>-.032***</td>
<td>-.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.292*</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (primary)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>.337</td>
<td>.569*</td>
<td>1.084*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>-.140</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.292</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ethnic background (mainlander)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min-nan</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.888*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>-.260</td>
<td>.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>-1.446***</td>
</tr>
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<td>Degree of camp identity</td>
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<td>-.684***</td>
<td>-.524*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>identity and party</td>
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<td>-.280*</td>
<td>-.429</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Rational choice</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likeability of candidate</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.479***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the former mayor</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.674**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Satisfaction with the former mayor × Former mayor is opposition camp member (no)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.715**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic voting</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chance of success (yes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former mayor is opposition camp member (no)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-5.502***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei (no)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1541</td>
<td>1248</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
party that they voted for last time and for the candidate whom the party supports. This makes them exhibit much more stable voting behaviour in elections than younger people.\textsuperscript{10} Gender is correlated with voting instability at the .05 significance level in Model 1. Males are more likely than females to show unstable voting behaviour. They have a stronger interest in politics and participate more in political activities than females. They tend to consider the ability of the candidates rather than the identity of the party when deciding how to vote. How likeable they consider a candidate to be is highly affected by short-term factors such as the performance of the candidate and political scandals. Therefore, they would be less likely than females to consider a political party’s candidate likeable simply because that person was the choice of that party.\textsuperscript{11} This is why gender turns out to be insignificant in Model 3, where identification and the variables of political evaluation and strategic voting are controlled.

Identity, especially party identity and camp identity, has strong explanatory power for voting instability, independent from other variables in the models. In Models 2 and 3, party identity is negatively correlated with voting instability at the .001 significance level. People who identify strongly with the party that they voted for last time are less likely to change their vote than those whose identification is not as strong. Camp identity is also negatively correlated with voting instability at the .001 and .05 significance level in Models 2 and 3, respectively. Those who identify strongly with the political camp that they supported last time are less likely to be unstable in their voting behaviour. This is comparable with the preliminary analysis showing that consistency between ethnic identity and party is negatively correlated with voting instability at the .05 significance level in Model 2. The insignificant coefficient of the consistency of ethnic identity in Model 3 and a significant negative correlation with the likeability of candidate further indicate that inconsistency of ethnic identity with the party that the voter voted for last time leads to a poor evaluation of the candidate of this party and, accordingly, to voting instability.\textsuperscript{12}

It was found in Model 3 that the “likeability of candidate” is negatively correlated with voting instability at the .001 significance level. Voting behaviour is less likely to be unstable when the electorate appreciates the candidates of the party that they voted for in the last
Who Would Change Their Vote and Why?

The evaluation of the former mayor also has certain level of explanatory power on voting instability. While its interaction with whether or not the former mayor is a member of the opposition camp is controlled, the variable “satisfaction with the former mayor” refers to the effect of the evaluation of the former mayor on the voting instability of people who voted for the incumbent party in the 2002 election. Satisfaction with the former mayor is negatively correlated with voting instability at the .01 significance level. This means that voters will continue to support the incumbent party when they are satisfied with the mayor. A good performance from the incumbent can lead to the party retaining the support of those who voted for it in the last election and, at the same time, cause voting instability among followers of the opposition camp. The interaction is positively correlated with voting instability at the .01 significance level. Followers of the opposition party are more likely to change their vote when they are satisfied with the incumbent than when they are not satisfied.

With regard to the aspect of strategic voting, “chance of success” is statistically significant at the .001 level. The electorate is less likely to continue to support a party when they assume that this party will not win the election. As mentioned in the section on operationalization, validating its relationship with voting instability is the first step in measuring the impact of strategic voting. The next step is to find out the new voting choice of those who assume that the party will not win the election. The impact of strategic voting is further studied by examining the relationship between “chance of success” and “change within the same camp/neutral”. Lastly, that people will exhibit more stable voting behaviour when the former mayor is a member of the opposition camp is significant at the .001 level. They will tend to continue to support the same party even when this party lost in the last election. The failure of the party can cause its followers to become more united.

**Voting Change**

Table 8 is the result of a multinomial logistic regression for voting change on selected variables. The first two models are the same as
those in the previous section. Since the survey did not ask those respondents who were absent from the 2006 election which candidate would win in the 2006 election, Model 3 was broken down into two models. In Model 3a, the variable “chance of success” was dropped. In Model 3b, all of the variables including “chance of success” were kept but the category “absent or invalid vote” of the dependent variable “voting change” was excluded from the regression.

With regard to socio-demographic factors, in Models 1, 2, and 3a age is further shown to be correlated with particular forms of voting change. The elderly are the least likely to change to being absent from an election or to cast an invalid vote because a long life experience has provided elderly people with a lot of political information and experience. Therefore, their psychological involvement in an election tends to be stronger and their political participation higher than that of young people (Lipset 1981; Conway 1985; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The second least preferable choice is to change to the opposition camp. There was no statistically significant difference between remaining stable in voting behaviour and changing within the same camp or to a neutral group. It is important to note that the coefficient of age becomes insignificant for “change to the opposition camp” in Model 3a, where political evaluation is controlled. The elderly are less likely than younger people to switch to voting for the opposition camp because they tend to give a higher evaluation of the candidates of the party that they voted for last time.

Gender is significantly correlated with voting change at .001 level in Model 1, .01 in Model 2, and .05 in Models 3a and 3b — males are more likely to change to supporting candidates of the same camp or of a neutral group than to continue to vote for the party that they had voted for last time. Males participate in political activities more than females do, and so have a broader network within a political camp. This close connection with the different parties of a political camp makes it more likely that they will shift their vote to another candidate within the camp.

Compared with mainlanders, Taiwanese Min-nan people seem to be more likely to switch to voting for an opposition camp. In Model 1, ethnic background is correlated with voting change at the .05
significance level. As mentioned before, it is because of deep-seated political attitudes and the strong group consciousness of mainlanders. According to the dataset, in Taipei, 66.42% of Taiwanese Min-nan people voted for the KMT in 2002, but in the 2006 election the figure had decreased by 20 percentage points to 46.37% (see Table 4). Of Taiwanese Min-nan people who voted for the KMT, 16.61% changed their support to the DPP and only 8.65% switched to supporting others. Of the DPP followers who are Taiwanese Min-nan people, 93.87% continued to support the DPP. This trend partly explains why Taiwanese Min-nan people are more likely to change to supporting the opposition camp in Taipei. The important implication is that Taiwanese Min-nan people will be more likely to support the Pan-Green Coalition in the future, so KMT followers who are Taiwanese Min-nan people will be more likely in future to change their choice of vote.

The empirical analysis indicates that identification is the chief predictor of voting change in Taiwan. First, it shows that party identity is a key determinant of voting change. It is statistically significant and negatively correlated with all forms of voting change in all models, except for “absent or invalid vote” in Model 3a. For people who strongly identify with the party they supported in the last election, “change to the opposition camp” is the least probable choice of change, followed by the option “change within the same camp or neutral”. This segment of the electorate is most likely to be absent or to cast an invalid vote if they do not continue to support the party.

Second, camp identity is negatively correlated with “change to the opposition camp” at the .001 significance level in Models 2 and 3a, but is uncorrelated with “change within the same camp/neutral”. This suggests that camp identity has a significant impact on voting change at the political camp level but not at the party level. It is difficult for parties of the opposition group to get the electoral support of those with a strong camp identity, but parties of the same camp can do so. Moreover, camp identity is negatively correlated with “absent or invalid vote” at the .01 significance level in Model 2 and the .05 significance level in Model 3a. This supports the view that those with a strong camp identity would not be absent from an election and not
Table 8: Coefficients of the multinomial logistic regression for voting change on selected variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographic background</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.190***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education (primary)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>.306</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>-.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic background (mainlander)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min-nan</td>
<td>-.107</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>.585</td>
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<td><strong>Identification</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of party identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of camp identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency between ethnic identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rational Choice</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likeability of candidate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the former mayor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with the former mayor ×</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former mayor is opposition camp member (no)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic voting</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chance of success (yes)</td>
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<td>Former mayor is opposition camp member (no)</td>
<td>1.500***</td>
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<td>Taipei (no)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>McFadden Pseudo R²</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
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</table>

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Notes: Change 1 = Change within the same camp/neutral; Change 2 = Change to the opposition camp; Absent = Absent or invalid vote.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3a</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3b</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change 1</td>
<td>Change 2</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Change 1</td>
<td>Change 2</td>
<td>Absent</td>
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<tr>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>-.025*</td>
<td>-.040***</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>-.036***</td>
<td>-.015</td>
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<td>1.082**</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.234</td>
<td>.990*</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.988*</td>
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<tr>
<td>.479</td>
<td>.898*</td>
<td>.385</td>
<td>.643</td>
<td>.819</td>
<td>.361</td>
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<td>.557</td>
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<td>1.485***</td>
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<td>-33.179</td>
<td>-4.005**</td>
<td>-.583</td>
<td>-40.295</td>
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<td>1248</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Who Would Change Their Vote and Why?

cast an invalid vote to avoid wasting their vote. In Kaohsiung, the top two candidates, Chen of the Pan-Green Coalition and Huang of the Pan-Blue Coalition, shared a similar number of votes in the 2006 election. Under this situation of keen competition, members of the electorate with a strong camp identity would see being absent from voting and casting an invalid vote as actions favourable to the opposition camp.

Table 9 shows the impact of camp identity and party identity on forms of voting change. The result is consistent with the hypothesis in Table 1. For those with both a strong party identity and camp identity the odds ratios of “change within the same camp/neutral” and “absent or invalid vote” are similar and are higher than that of “change to the opposition camp”. For those with both a weak party identity and camp identity, there is no great difference in odds ratio between “change within the same camp/neutral” and “absent or invalid vote”. Compared with the other types of electorate, those with a weak party identity and camp identity are more likely to switch to voting for the opposition camp, although the odds ratio of this is still largely lower than that of the two other forms of change. Those with a strong party identity but a weak camp identity are more concerned about the party’s electoral result than the camp’s electoral result and define

Table 9: The impact of party identity and camp identity on forms of voting change (odds ratio)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Change within the same camp/neutral</th>
<th>Change to the opposition camp</th>
<th>Absent or invalid vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong party identity + strong camp identity</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong party identity + weak camp identity</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak party identity + strong camp identity</td>
<td>.342</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak party identity + weak camp identity</td>
<td>.342</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
voting for other parties of both the same camp and the opposition camp as political disloyalty. So they tend to be absent from elections or cast an invalid vote rather than vote for other candidates of the same camp. By contrast, “change within the same camp/neutral” is the most probable form of change for those with a weak party identity but strong camp identity. These electorates believe that being absent or casting an invalid vote will reduce the votes of their camp and might contribute to the success of the opposition camp.

The results for Taipei support the hypothesis here on ethnic identity that people whose identity is inconsistent with that of their party will be more likely to change to supporting the opposition camp. The inconsistency of ethnic identity is significant at the .05 level for “change to the opposition camp” in Model 2. However, it becomes insignificant in Models 3a and 3b. This is because inconsistency of ethnic identity with the party that the electorates voted for last time leads to a poor evaluation of the candidate of this party and, accordingly, to voting instability.

The result for political evaluation is consistent with that discussed earlier. It was found that the likeability of candidate is negatively correlated with voting instability (Table 7). Table 8 further illustrates that the likeability of candidate is negatively correlated with all forms of change at the .001 significance level. In Model 3a, it is significant at the .001 level with regard to “change within the same camp/neutral” and “change to the opposition camp”. This is similar to the case of identification with the party, where “absent or invalid vote” is the most probable form of change, “change within the same camp/neutral” is the second most probable, and “change to the opposition camp” is the least probable.

On the other hand, satisfaction with the former mayor has a significant impact on “change to the opposition camp”. The variable “satisfaction with the former mayor” and its interaction are significant at the .05 level and .01 level respectively in Model 3a. It was found that the good performance of the incumbent does not only help a party to retain its original electoral support but also attracts the support of followers of the opposition camp. Most importantly, the satisfaction with the former mayor has a stronger effect on followers
of the opposition camp than on a party’s own followers in that the coefficient of the interaction is greater than for that of “satisfaction with the former mayor”.

This further validates the view that strategic voting is correlated with voting change. “Chance of success” is correlated with both “change within the same camp/neutral” and “change to the opposition camp” at the .001 significance level in Model 3b. People will not continue to support the same party, but will vote for others when they believe that the party will lose in the election. The coefficient of “change within the same camp/neutral” is greater than that of “change to the opposition camp”. People prefer to vote for candidates of the same political camp or of a neutral group rather than that of an opposition camp. Other than the success of the preferred party, the loss of the opposition camp is the second most favourable political outcome. Thus, when they believe that their preferred party has no chance of winning an election, people will not vote for the opposition camp, but will tend to vote for candidates of the same camp or of a non-opposition camp. This finding is compatible with the logic of strategic voting.

As mentioned previously, electorates will exhibit more stable voting behaviour when the former mayor is a member of the opposition camp. Table 8 shows that a party’s loss in the last election discourages voters from betraying that party in the next election. That electorates are less likely to vote for the opposition camp when the incumbent is a member of that camp is significant at the .01 level in Model 3a. However, it is insignificant with regard to the other two forms of change. Therefore, rather than resulting in sustained electoral support, it is more accurate to say that a loss in an election discourages voters from shifting to the opposition camp.

Conclusion

It is detrimental for three reasons to define voting change simply as change in vote from one party to another party. First, different forms of change have different political meanings and lead to different political outcomes. “Change to the opposition camp” implies that
people are dissatisfied with the party that they voted for last time or with its candidate but “change within the same camp/neutral” does not. Second, “absent or invalid vote” is the most common form of change in Taiwan, so this form of change should not be overlooked. Lastly, many variables are significantly correlated with a particular form of change. For instance, gender is correlated with “change within the same camp/neutral” and age with “absent or invalid vote”. Combining all forms into one category would create misunderstandings.

An empirical analysis of the Survey of the Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections in 2006 demonstrates that Taiwan electorates, especially young people, prefer to absent themselves from an election or to cast an invalid vote rather than vote for other parties when they do not continue to support the party that they voted for last time. Males tend to switch to supporting a party of the same camp or candidates with a neutral background rather than vote for the opposition camp, be absent from the election, or cast an invalid vote. Identification with the party and camp that the electorates voted for last time is positively correlated with voting stability. Its effects on forms of change are different. People with a stronger party identity prefer to be absent or to cast an invalid vote to shifting their support to a candidate within the same camp or to a candidate with a neutral background. By contrast, people with a stronger camp identity prefer to change their support to a candidate within the same camp or to candidates with a neutral background. Political evaluation is a key element of voting behaviour in Taiwan. Electorates evaluate the performance and ability of candidates, parties, and officials when making a voting choice. The good performance of a politician can reduce losses in original electoral support and attract votes from followers of the opposition camp. Finally, it was found that people will switch their support to candidates of the same camp or to candidates with a neutral background when they assume that the party that they voted for the last time cannot win the election.

Notes

1. The eight explanatory variables are: (1) social and economic characteristics, (2) party identity, (3) policy-related predis-
position, (4) current policy preferences, (5) perception of current conditions, (6) evaluation of current government, (7) impression of the candidate’s personal qualities, and (8) prospective evaluation of the candidates and the parties.

2. In Kaohsiung, apart from KMT and DPP candidates, there were other candidates in the 2002 election. Of the interviewees, 29 had voted for non-KMT and non-DPP candidates in 2002, so this group of interviewees was also excluded.

3. People who changed to voting for a candidate from the same political camp and those who switched to voting for a neutral party and not for someone in the opposition camp have been combined into one category.

In Taipei, with regard to those who voted for Li Ying-yuan (李應元) of the DPP in 2002, people who voted for Clara Chou (周玉蔻) of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (台灣團結聯盟, TSU) in 2006 are classified as “change within the same camp/neutral”; and those who voted for Hau Lung-pin of the KMT, James Soong, Li Ao (李敖), or Ke Tsi-hai (柯賜海) in 2006 are classified as “change to the opposition camp”. With regard to those who voted for Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT in 2002, people who voted for James Soong, Li Ao, or Ke Tsi-hai in 2006 are classified as “change within the same camp/neutral”; and those who voted for Frank Hsieh of the DPP and Clara Chou of the TSU in 2006 are classified as “change to the opposition camp”.

In Kaohsiung, with regard to those who voted for Frank Hsieh of the DPP in 2002, people who voted for Roger C. S. Lin (林志昇) of the Taiwan Defense Alliance (保護台灣大聯盟, TDA), Lo Chih-ming (羅志明) of the TSU, or Lin Ching-yuan (林景元) in 2006 are classified as “change within the same camp/neutral” and those who voted for Huang Chun-ying of the KMT in 2006 are classified as “change to the opposition camp”. With regard to those who voted for Huang Chun-ying of the KMT in 2002, people who voted for Lin Ching-yuan in 2006 are classified as “change within the same camp/neutral” and those who voted for Chen Chu of the DPP or Lo Chih-ming of the TSU in 2006 are classified as “change to the opposition camp”. Since other
candidates in the 2002 Kaohsiung election received less than 4% of the vote, those who voted for them have been excluded from this study.

4. Voters who do not think of themselves as leaning towards any parties or who lean a little more towards one party than towards any of the others, or who lean towards parties other than the one that they voted for in 2002 are classified as having “no identity”. Those who responded that they lean “somewhat”, “just a little”, or “it depends” towards the party that they supported in 2002 are grouped as having a “weak identity”, and who lean very strongly towards one party are considered as having a “strong identity”.

5. The variable “degree of camp identity” has been recoded from the variable “some people think they belong to the pan-green camp, while others think they belong to the pan-blue camp. Do you think of yourself as closer to the pan-green camp or the pan-blue camp?” (1 = strongly lean towards the pan-green camp, 2 = somewhat lean towards the pan-green camp, 3 = neutral, 4 = somewhat lean towards the pan-blue camp, 5 = strongly lean towards the pan-blue camp). Given that the KMT and the DPP are members of the Pan-Blue Coalition and the Pan-Green Coalition respectively, for those who voted for the KMT in the 2002 election, values 1, 2, and 3 have been recoded in the new variable as “no identity”, value 4 as “weak identity”, and value 5 as “strong identity”. For those who voted for the DPP in 2002, values 3, 4, and 5 have been recoded as “no identity” in the new variable, value 2 as “weak identity”, and value 1 as “strong identity”.

6. It was recoded from the variable “ethnic identity”. The response “both Chinese and Taiwanese” was recoded as neutral. “Chinese” was recoded as “consistent” if the interviewee voted for the KMT in 2002 and as “opposite” if he voted for the DPP in 2002. “Taiwanese” was recoded as “consistent” if the interviewee voted for the DPP in 2002 and as “opposite” if he voted for the KMT in 2002.

7. For “the likeability of the candidate of the party that the interviewees voted for in 2002 election”, in Taipei, the likeability
of Hau Lung-pin was adopted if the interviewees voted for Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT in 2002, and the likeability of Frank Hsieh was adopted if they voted for Li Ying-yuan of the DPP in 2002. In Kaohsiung, the likeability of Huang Chun-ying was adopted if the interviewees voted for Huang Chun-ying of the KMT in 2002, and the likeability of Chen Chu was adopted if they voted for Frank Hsieh of the DPP in 2002.

8. In Taipei, since the former mayor was Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT, those who voted for Li Ying-yuan of the DPP in 2002 are grouped under “yes” and those who voted for Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT in 2002 are grouped under “no”. In Kaohsiung, since the former mayor was Frank Hsieh of the DPP, those who voted for Frank Hsieh of the DPP in 2002 are grouped under “no”, and those who voted for Huang Chun-ying of the KMT in 2002 are grouped under “yes”.

9. This was recoded from the variable “voting change”. The category “stable” was kept and the other three categories of forms of change were combined to form the one category of “change”.

10. The correlation between age and the likeability of candidate is .163 at a .001 significance level.

11. The correlation of males with the likeability of candidate is -.057 at a .05 significance level.

12. The correlation between consistency of ethnic identity with party and the likeability of candidate is .167 at a .001 significance level.

References


Who Would Change Their Vote and Why?

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify who in Taiwan would tend to change their vote and to unveil their reasons for doing so, through an empirical study on the 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections. Here, voting change is classified not simply as a change in an elector’s choice of vote from one party to another party but more particularly as any one of the following three categories of change in voting action: (1) “change within the same camp/neutral”, (2) “change to the opposition camp”, and (3) “absent or invalid vote”. An empirical analysis indicates that young people and males are more likely to change their choice of vote. Identification is the chief predictor of voting change in Taiwan. Weak party identity and political camp identity contribute to voting instability. People with a stronger party identity prefer to abstain from voting or to cast an invalid vote rather than change within the same camp or to a neutral group. By contrast, people with a stronger camp identity prefer to change within the same camp or to vote for candidates with a neutral background. A poor evaluation of a candidate would lead to a shift of vote to other candidates. A good performance from an incumbent can lead to the retention of support from the original electoral base and also attract votes from followers of opposition camps. Strategy voting would lead to a change in vote to a candidate within the same camp or to a candidate with a neutral background.
台灣的投票變遷
2006年台北市及高雄市市長選舉個案分析

黃子為
(中文摘要)

本文分析台灣選民在2006年台北市及高雄市市長選舉中的投票行為，藉以識別較大機會轉變投票抉擇的選民，以及解釋其變遷因由。投票變遷是指選民在不同選舉中沒有投票給相同的政黨，可分別為三種不同的變遷：（一）「改投給其他相同政治陣營/中立的候選人」、（二）「改投給敵對政治陣營候選人」和（三）「不再參與投票或改投廢票」。研究顯示年輕人及男性較大機會轉變其投票抉擇。身份認同是影響台灣投票變遷的主要因素，微弱的政黨認同及政治陣營認同導致投票變遷。如果選民決定不再投票給上次選舉支持的政黨，有較強政黨認同的選民傾向不參與投票或投廢票，而有較強政治陣營認同的選民則傾向投票給其他相同政治陣營/或中立的候選人。除此之外，如果選民對上次選舉支持的政黨候選人評價不高，便有較大機會改投給其他候選人；相反，現任者的良好工作表現不但有助保持原有選民的支持，還能吸引敵對陣營支持者的選票。最後，策略性投票亦可能令選民改投給其他相同政治陣營/中立的候選人。
Who Would Change Their Vote and Why?
A Case Study on the 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung Mayoral Elections

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