

*Japan's Cultural Diplomacy
and Cultivation of
ASEAN Elites*

Anny Wong
Kuang-sheng Liao

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Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies

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Anny Wong
and
Kuang-sheng Liao

Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, New Territories
Hong Kong

About the authors

Anny Wong is with the Department of Government and Public Administration, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Kuang-sheng Liao is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and Public Administration, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

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Japan's Cultural Diplomacy and Cultivation of ASEAN Elites

Abstract

Japan may be an economic dynamo but dire poverty of energy and natural resources makes the country heavily dependent on a peaceful and stable international environment for economic exchange. Thus, to promote its national security, the Japanese government under the banner of its Comprehensive National Security Strategy stresses economic and cultural cooperation to strengthen ties with foreign nations in addition to bolstering the country's diplomatic and defense capabilities.

The Southeast Asian region, specially the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are vital to Japan's security because of their strategic location and abundance of natural and human resources to facilitate Japan's economic prosperity and hence its national survival. One important determinant to the continuing cooperation of Japan and ASEAN is the attitude of ASEAN peoples, particularly the elites, toward Japan. In the past decades, Japan has attempted to cultivate a new generation of ASEAN elites more open to cooperation with Japan through cultural diplomacy involving educational, cultural, and athletic exchanges and technology transfers with the region.

Despite these efforts and recent improvements in these exchanges, there are still strong criticisms from Southeast Asian recipients. Their grievances are rooted in many bureaucratic and policy shortcomings of the Japanese government. A sincere and genuine effort to improve its cultural diplomacy toward ASEAN is significant in promoting Japan-ASEAN cooperation and Japan's national interests.

PEACE and prosperity in Southeast Asia is crucial to Japan. Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) straddle vital sea lines of communication in the region through which crude oil and material imports flow into Japan. Southeast Asia itself is richly endowed with natural and energy resources, and the rapidly expanding ASEAN economies have become important markets for Japanese capital and commodities. The desire of ASEAN states to acquire foreign investment and

technology has served to facilitate Japan's domestic industrial restructuring. In addition, securing ASEAN diplomatic support would bolster Japan's regional status and international standing among developed countries.

Their cooperation is mutually beneficial. Domestic developments and dramatic global changes encourage both sides to foster closer economic and security ties. However, their complementary economic interests will not guarantee the relationship in future, at least not in harmony. In particular, the attitude of ASEAN power elites toward Japan threatens to hinder Japan-ASEAN cooperation.

Most Southeast Asians welcome the surge of Japanese aid and investment in the region in recent years and are eager for more. Nevertheless, many hold deep-seated fears that neo-colonial domination of Southeast Asia is the real motive behind Japanese policy. This sentiment is the strongest among the top-level government, army, corporate administrators and leaders of other public and private institutions who make up the region's power elites. Their suspicion of Japan originated with the Second World War. Then, as young children they witnessed or personally suffered from the effects of Japanese aggression when Southeast Asia was part of militarist Japan's vision of a "Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere" in Asia. Even the younger generation of ASEAN power elites, those now in their thirties and forties, harbor their own suspicions of Japanese intentions. They were the young people who opposed Japan's indiscriminate dumping of consumer goods in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. They grew up learning about Japanese war atrocities from the stories of their parents and elders.¹

The ASEAN power elites are essential to Japan. They form part of the society's inner core, welding the power to influence and decide the course of their country's economic, political, and social development.² Their attitude and opinions toward Japan will significantly determine the development of Japan-ASEAN relations. The Japanese government recognizes their importance and is now making intense efforts to cultivate a new generation of ASEAN power elites with no bitter memories of Japan. If this policy succeeds, this group will be more sympathetic to Japan's interests and dedicated to improving their country's ties with Japan. This paper first examines the importance of Southeast Asia to Japan's overall

national security interests. Then it traces the development of Japan's "Cultural Diplomacy" and the cultivation of ASEAN elites. In addition, the paper investigates Japan's interests in the cultivation of an ASEAN elite and the problems and successes thus far.

Japan's Security and the ASEAN

Japan-ASEAN relations grew tremendously over the past decade. ASEAN is now Japan's third largest trading partner after the United States and the European Community (EC).³ The region supplies nearly all of Japan's natural rubber imports and 95 per cent of its tropical lumber imports. It fills a substantial portion of Japan's energy, zinc, copper, bauxite, and nickel needs, and much of its vegetable oil and other foodstuffs.⁴ From 1951-1988, net Japanese direct investment in ASEAN economies exceeded US\$18 billion or over half of Japan's foreign direct investments in Asia.⁵ From ASEAN perspective, the significance of Japanese investment is further magnified. Japanese capital constitutes over half of all foreign capital flowing into the region.⁶ From Japan's point of view, ASEAN's importance extends beyond mere economics to occupy a prominent position in safeguarding and promoting Japan's national political, economic, and defense interests.

Economic prosperity remains Japan's foremost priority in the 1990s. Japan also wants to raise its international status to a level commensurate with its economic strength. To realize these goals Japan is reorienting its economy and is pursuing its political objectives under a policy umbrella called the Comprehensive National Security Strategy (CNSS).⁷

The essence of this strategy is that the country's economic security should no longer solely depend on domestic industrial expansion. Rather, Japan should restructure its economy and diversify its sources of raw materials and markets. The strategy calls for the expansion of "clean and knowledge-intensive" industries in Japan and relocating "resource-prone," "labor-intensive" and "space-demanding" industries to countries where these resources are cheaper and more abundant.⁸ Japan should diversify its sources of energy and raw materials to minimize the impact of sudden price fluctuations and supply disruption. To complement this,

the Japanese government encourages investment and technical assistance from both private and public sectors to develop overseas resources for Japanese economic needs. In recent years, this diversification strategy also included investment in Western industrialized countries to overcome tariffs and other trade barriers aimed at Japanese goods.⁹

ASEAN economies are the primary target of this diversification strategy due to their abundance of cheap labor and raw materials and their geographic proximity to Japan. Japanese investments in energy and resource development in the region soared after the oil crises of the early 1970s. Today, the largest proportion of Japanese direct investment in the region is still in natural resources and energy development. Nearly half of Japan's foreign investments in this critical sector concentrates in South-east Asia.¹⁰

The region's rapidly-growing economies have also become important markets for Japanese goods.¹¹ Japan hopes this export growth will offset some of its controversial trade surpluses with the West, and finance its huge import bill from ASEAN itself. Trade protectionism in Europe and the U.S., EC integration in 1992 and its close ties with Eastern Europe, as well as free market arrangements between the U.S. and Canada, Mexico and potentially other American economies put more pressure on Japan to move closer to ASEAN. Today, Japan ranks as the first or second trading partner of all six ASEAN members.¹²

Japan reckons that economic development will strengthen South-east Asia's political stability, thus consolidating the security of Japan's economic interests. To complement its direct investment and trade, Japan has consistently injected nearly two-thirds of its global aid budget into the region.¹³ Although China has become the primary beneficiary of Japan's largess since 1982, donations to ASEAN as a whole take up the largest portion of Japan's aid budget. Japan remains the most important Official Development Aid (ODA) contributor to ASEAN.¹⁴

Table 1. Japan's Bilateral ODA (1989) (by region, in millions of US\$)

Region	Official Development Aid					%
	Grants			Government Loans	Total	
	Capital Aid	Technical Aid	Total			
Asia	762.40	613.29	1,375.69	2,863.83	4,239.52	62.5
Northeast Asia	58.53	189.63	248.16	670.95	919.11	13.6
Southeast Asia	330.98	343.63	674.61	1,551.88	2,226.48	32.8
ASEAN	270.22	335.77	605.99	1,526.18	2,132.17	31.5
Southwest Asia	372.89	76.75	449.64	641.00	1,090.64	16.1
Others	—	3.28	3.28	—	3.28	0.0
Middle/ Near East	97.53	83.22	180.75	187.73	368.49	5.4
Africa	518.59	113.46	632.05	407.59	1,039.64	15.3
Cen./South AM.	119.20	181.27	300.47	262.86	563.33	8.3
Pacific Region	54.20	30.07	84.27	13.98	98.26	1.4
Europe	1.08	5.03	6.11	5.25	11.36	0.2
Uncategorized	3.05	454.86	457.91	—	457.91	6.8
Total (Bilateral)	1,556.06	1,481.20	3,037.25	3,741.25	6,778.50	100.0

Source: Japan's Ministry of Trade, *Economic Cooperation: Present Status and Problems*, 1987.

Japan's economic interests now extend widely overseas as a result of economic diversification and restructuring. Therefore, CNSS aims to increase Japan's capacity to use international leverage to promote its overseas interests. Japan hopes to take advantage of its economic strength to expand its global influence in the post-Cold War era, a time when commercial and technological capabilities are increasingly overshadowing military might in the exercise of state power.

CNSS eagerly promotes internationalization, a reflection of Japan's increasing acceptance that its membership in the global community demands greater involvement in all world affairs. Japan is breaking away from its traditional policy of non-involvement based on inactive endorsement of the American or Western policies on important global and regional issues, as well as in international organizations. Instead, it seeks to define an independent position coherent with the policies of the Western industrialized democracies. However, to strengthen its credibility and bargaining position against other industrial and military powers, Japan also has to seek support from other members of the international community.


Japan already has a predominant economic presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The end of superpower rivalry in Asia provides Japan a golden opportunity to establish a regional political leadership role. ASEAN has become an influential and respected force in many regional issues, especially enduring conflicts in Indochina, a major unresolved issue on the international political agenda. Cooperation and diplomatic support from ASEAN would facilitate Japan's participation in solving the Cambodian question and other regional issues, rendering credibility to Japan's regional economic and peace initiatives.¹⁵ There is already some success. Japan was the only foreign dialogue partner invited to the Third ASEAN Summit in Manila in December 1987. It volunteered to speak for ASEAN interests in the G7 summit meetings of the industrialized countries and in international economic development agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank.

Defense of Japan relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and American forces stationed in Japan and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the decline of U.S. military presence in the region in response to Soviet military cuts in Asia and the gargantuan U.S. budget deficit are a worrying concern.¹⁶ Japan hopes to protect itself by ensuring that the vacuum left by the U.S. is not filled by forces hostile to Japan's interests. Its immediate response has been to improve relations with all neighboring states while simultaneously strengthening its own defense capability.

Although the likelihood of an attack by the Chinese or the Soviets is now extremely remote, there are other reasons for expanding the

Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). First of all, it is a matter of self-preservation. Secondly, Washington has been putting pressure on Japan to bear greater responsibility for its own defense. Thirdly, as Japan expands its international role, the government feels that Japan must be prepared to assume international peace-keeping responsibilities befitting a major world power. The Japanese government demonstrated this desire in two separate incidents. During the Iran-Iraq war in 1987, then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone proposed sending Japanese minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to help multilateral forces keep the waters open for shipping. More recently during the Kuwaiti Crisis, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu suggested dispatching unarmed troops to Saudi Arabia. However, both proposals were scrapped because of strong domestic protests.

There is a significant external opposition to a larger military role for Japan as well. Fortification of the JSDF is very difficult without arousing resentment and animosity from neighboring Asian states, all of whom were victims of Japanese armed aggression and colonialism during World War II.¹⁷ Consequently, Japan is using economic aid and cooperation to build warmer ties in the region, thereby dampening their opposition to JSDF expansion. Also, Japan feels friendlier ties with ASEAN are essential to safeguard Southeast Asian searoutes of communication against interdiction by littoral states and other foreign aggression. Approximately 85 per cent of the country's crude oil imports, as well as 40 per cent of Japan's total world commodity imports pass through the Malacca and Lombok Straits, making them crucial to Japan's security.¹⁸ Disruptions at these bottlenecks would require re-routing around Australia, increasing shipping distance by as much as 78 per cent.¹⁹



Cultivation of ASEAN Elites

Therefore, cooperation from the ASEAN states is essential to successfully carry out Japan's diversification and globalization strategy. The ASEAN leaders enthusiastically welcome Japanese investments to finance their national development. Some even openly advocated schemes to emulate Japan, such as Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir's "Look East Policy" and Singapore's "Learning from Japan Movement" in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Nonetheless, ASEAN elites and masses alike still do not totally trust Japan.²⁰

Because of colonial encroachment, ASEAN elites want to guard against any attempt by foreign powers to compromise their national sovereignty. Such sentiment has given rise to speculations of ulterior motives behind Japanese investments and assistance, that is, the belief that Japan is now using economic means to incorporate these Southeast Asian economies into its "Greater Co-Prospersity Sphere," something it failed to achieve militarily during the last war.

Indeed, past Japanese militarism, its notorious trade practices, and traditional aloofness from regional interests have sustained Japan's negative image as a self-centered economic animal. Its aid practices only reinforced the image. Japan's economic assistance in the 1960s and 1970s were generally inferior to Western aid,²¹ and Japan's official assistance was strongly biased toward exports promotion and excessively tied. Until 1969, about half of its total transfer of aid resources to the developing countries was in the form of deferred-payment export credits.²² Trade relations were also severely strained. Japanese firms dumped goods in Southeast Asian markets and were reluctant to transfer technology to upgrade the productivity and efficiency of Southeast Asian manufacturing operations. Finally, Southeast Asian resentment toward Japan exploded in the street riots protesting against Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's 1974 ASEAN tour.²³

Many advocates of closer diplomatic and economic ties with Japan are also wary of Japanese remilitarization. This is especially true for those of the older generation who lived through the war. America's military presence in the region is seen as increasingly necessary to check JSDF expansion. When the JSDF announced expansion of its perimeter of

patrol to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan's coast, the ASEAN states, particularly Indonesia and the Philippines, vociferously objected. They argued it would bring Japanese maritime forces into their territorial waters, undermining their national sovereignty. In 1989, Singapore offered to host a larger military presence as U.S.-Philippines Base Treaty talks reached a deadlock.²⁴ Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew openly stated his unease over JSDF expansion. More recently, an independent proposal by former Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan for joint JSDF-ASEAN military exercise was vehemently rejected by fellow ASEAN members who were not consulted prior to the invitation and are fearful of encouraging Japanese military expansion.

So, to ensure that long-term cooperation between Japan and ASEAN will not be harmed by distrust and latent fears of Japanese ambition, Japan has taken measures to improve mutual understanding. The Tanaka Riots had the strongest impact on Japanese policy makers. Immediately after Tanaka's return to Japan, the government initiated several new exchange and training programs. The Japanese government hopes that such exchanges with Southeast Asians, especially the elites, would engender better understanding of Japan and erase the negative images of Japanese as "militarists" and "capitalist exploiters." As more and more Japanese capital enters ASEAN economies, an ASEAN population more familiar with Japanese culture and sympathetic to Japanese objectives would promote smoother and more productive cooperation.

These exchanges between Japan and Southeast Asia and other developing nations could also have significant domestic impact. They could make the Japanese population more conscious of the outside world and win wider popular support for Japan's aid programs, thus affording Japanese leaders greater domestic leverage in pursuing their comprehensive security goals.

Early Contacts

Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, almost all of Japan's personnel exchanges were with ASEAN countries. However, these programs were severely limited in scope and scale. The lack of Japanese commitment,

the Japanese government says, was due to its lack of experience and the inadequacy of personnel necessary to implement large-scale projects.

Japan took part in the Colombo Plan and some United Nations technical assistance programs in the 1950s. This was the first time in which Japan extended official assistance, and not indemnity payments, to developing countries.²⁵ These assistance activities mainly centered on technology transfer. Technical aid constituted a substantial proportion of Japanese assistance during this period because it did not need significant transfers of financial resources. Japan was still engaged in its war reparations program, which had begun in 1951, and competing domestic demand for financial resources was intense.²⁶

However, indemnities were dominated by commodity and service grants. In effect, Japan was developing markets for its exports. This growing influx of Japanese commercial and capital goods, financial institutions and styles was the beginning of the region's future dependence on Japan. There were some cultural exchanges, but other kinds of coordinated people-to-people contacts were practically non-existent.²⁷

In the 1960s, Japan started a number of education exchange programs with ASEAN states. Malaysian, Thai, and Filipino scholars began studying in Japan with Japanese government scholarships.²⁸ The Japanese government sponsored Japanese studies programs at the University of Malaya (Malaysia) and Ateneo de Manila University (Philippines), providing them with office automation equipment and books, and Japanese instructors.²⁹ An Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS), funded entirely by the Japanese government, began training workers from developing countries. Other personnel contacts included an exchange program for Japanese and Philippine journalists, several Southeast Asian youth goodwill missions to Japan and under the Colombo Plan, study abroad schemes for Japanese students to attend Southeast Asian universities. On the cultural and athletic side, dance troupes, specialists on traditional arts and judo and boxing experts took part in exchange programs.

By the end of 1986, AOTS had sent some 13,559 Southeast Asians to Japan.³⁰ In the same year, Japan made plans to establish a Japanese study center in Thailand's Thammasat University for research on Japan-related subjects.³¹ In 1974, the Japanese government created the Japan

International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to conduct feasibility studies for aid programs and handle all government-based technical assistance, and operate the Japanese Peace Corps.³² Educational, cultural and athletic exchanges expanded, but the main focus was on technical transfer as ASEAN governments were most eager to obtain Japanese technology. At the same time, this emphasis on technology transfer was part of Japan's national economic strategy in the 1970s. Since Japan was making large capital investments in the ASEAN economies, especially in the budding ASEAN oil industry, Japan taught a large number of Southeast Asians the technical know-how for running Japanese industries.

From the 1950s to the early 1970s, growth and expansion of the scope and scale of exchanges between Japan and ASEAN were considerable. The ASEAN economies benefitted from the transfer of technology and skills from Japan through education and training programs. Nonetheless, Japan too advanced its economic interests through these exchanges, so much so that Japan was often sharply criticized for transferring technology and conducting exchanges only when they served Japanese economic pursuits. For instance, the AOTS training programs only taught Japanese industrial practices to ASEAN trainees. Such training would not effectively enable them to find jobs in non-Japanese industrial enterprises in their home countries. In effect, these programs were training workers for Japanese business operations in ASEAN. More often than not, ASEAN requests for more advanced technology were either turned down or ignored because they were deemed unnecessary for the largely labor-intensive Japanese enterprises in the region.

Little was achieved in promoting genuine mutual understanding between the peoples of Japan and ASEAN. Cultural contacts emphasized the unilateral transfer of Japanese culture and work ethics to the ASEAN countries, and showed little tolerance and respect for Southeast Asian cultures, traditions, values and customs. Cultural and athletic exchanges were sporadic and usually only for promotional purposes. Language barriers and the fear that they might be unable to find employment in their own countries afterward restricted the number of ASEAN students keen on studying in Japan. Job offers from Japanese firms were readily available, but the prospect for career advancement was very low as high management positions were always occupied by Japanese nationals.

Gradually, dissatisfaction and contempt for the Japanese grew among these strongly nationalistic and proud Southeast Asians, culminating in the ugly riots that greeted Tanaka in 1974.

Into the 1980s: Venturing into “Cultural Diplomacy”

Japan’s venture into “cultural diplomacy” could be said to have begun in 1972 with Tanaka’s creation of the Japan Foundation. The organization was the first of its kind to receive strong government support to promote Japanese studies and personnel exchanges with foreign countries.³³ Japan was anxious to increase exchanges immediately after Tanaka’s ASEAN visit, but the Oil Crisis and the ensuing recession impeded all efforts.

So, it was in the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine by then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda that the Japanese government initiated its first wholesale effort at improving cultural and social ties with ASEAN.³⁴ The Fukuda aid program designated US\$5 million for an ASEAN Cultural Fund.³⁵ Succeeding administrations continued to increase personnel exchanges between Japan and ASEAN. Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira added an ASEAN Youth Scholarship Program in 1980. In 1981, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki promised “human resources development” during his ASEAN tour and committed US\$100 million to ASEAN to build training centers in their own countries and extra funds for a main training center in Okinawa.³⁶ Suzuki also set up a Regional Studies Promotion Program the following year.³⁷ In 1984, Prime Minister Nakasone announced the 21st Century Friendship Program to boost personnel exchange in culture and education.³⁸ Nakasone’s successor, Noburo Takeshita, unveiled his Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Exchange Program at the Third ASEAN Summit in 1987, an effort to expand technical, academic, research, athletic, and cultural exchanges between ASEAN and Japan. It also stressed greater financial assistance for foreign students, the promotion of intra-ASEAN technical exchange and the creation of a Center for the Promotion of Cultural Exchange between Japan and ASEAN.³⁹ Nakasone’s 21st Century Friendship Program was extended for another five years after its expiry in 1989 and will send an additional 4,000 ASEAN youths to Japan. ASEAN has become the primary target of

Japan’s exchange program. The region has received a major share of Japan’s International Exchange Fund financing for such activities as Japanese language training and Japan studies, personnel exchanges, exhibitions, and donation of audio-visual equipment.

Table 2. International Exchange Fund, Activities by Region (%)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
East Asia	} 37.1	14.2	13.8	13.1	14.9
Southeast Asia		18.8	19.1	16.5	16.7
Southwest Asia		3.7	3.9	7.0	3.9
Pacific Region	4.7	4.0	3.9	4.2	3.8
North America	14.3	13.9	15.0	13.2	13.7
Central and South America	9.3	9.7	8.3	7.6	9.4
Western Europe	13.9	17.0	14.9	14.6	14.3
Eastern Europe	3.5	2.7	2.8	4.5	3.7
Near and Middle East	6.9	5.1	3.9	3.8	5.2
Africa	2.6	1.2	2.0	1.6	3.9
Others	7.7	9.7	12.4	13.9	10.6
Total (Millions)	¥4,552	¥4,703	¥4,775	¥5,501	¥5,346

Source: Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Green Paper on Foreign Affairs*, 1990.

Since the Tanaka Riots Japan has shown greater sensitivity to the need to compensate for its past callousness. This is particularly evident in cultural exchanges in recent years. The emphasis is now on “equal partnership” in cultural cooperation in contrast to its former practice of unilateral transfer of Japanese culture to ASEAN. Last year Japan held its first-ever ASEAN film festival and many ASEAN artists were invited to perform or hold exhibitions in Japan.⁴⁰ Even aid from the private sector has become less self-centered. Matshushita Corporation’s PHP Institute is now offering post-graduate scholarships to ASEAN students without obliging them to write papers on Japanese themes or to do the study or research in Japan.⁴¹

Japan set up a US\$700,000 scholarship for the Asian Development

Bank (ADB) to satisfy ASEAN need for more management personnel. In selection, individuals are chosen by the ADB's developing member countries and recipients may study in any international institution in the area of management, technology, and other development-related fields.⁴² Also, Japan has financed several study tours to Japan for ASEAN executives working in the insurance, finance and banking businesses, including the Japan-ASEAN Cooperation Promotion Program's tour for ASEAN insurance officials to Japan in 1988.⁴³

ASEAN has been sending the largest number of technical exchange trainees to Japan through JICA. From 1954 to 1986, Japan received 24,281 ASEAN trainees with Japanese government sponsorship and a total of 26,943 Japanese experts went to ASEAN countries in the same period. Since JICA handles only government-based exchange programs, the total number of experts and trainees sent and received by Japan is probably much higher.⁴⁴

Table 3. Personnel Sent by JICA to ASEAN

ASEAN Country	1984	1985	1986	End of 1986	Specialization
Indonesia	1,033	919	842	9,557	Transport, Agriculture, Infrastructure Development
Malaysia	350	237	359	2,957	Transport, Industry, Agriculture, Infrastructure Development
Philippines	527	480	630	5,681	Industry, Transport, Agriculture, Infrastructure Development
Thailand	746	655	793	7,755	Medicine & Health, Transport, Welfare, Agriculture
Singapore	130	120	156	993	Personnel Training, Management, Industry
Total	2,786	2,411	2,780	26,943	

Source: Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Economic Cooperation: Present Status and Problems*, 1987.

Table 4. ASEAN Students Received by JICA

ASEAN Country	1984	1985	1986	End of 1986	Specialization
Indonesia	565	586	523	6,737	Transport, Industry, Agriculture
Malaysia	465	452	521	3,680	Management, Agriculture, Industry
Philippines	416	441	441	4,825	Agriculture, Industry, Management
Thailand	533	542	574	6,739	Management, Agriculture, Medicine
Singapore	305	258	269	2,300	Personnel Training, Industry, Management
Total	2,284	2,279	2,328	24,281	

Source: Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Economic Cooperation: Present Status and Problems*, 1987.

To overcome the language barrier that discourages foreign students from studying in Japan, Japan and ASEAN governments are working closely to promote the study of Japanese. Results have been very encouraging. The Singapore Education Ministry's Foreign Language Center holds intensive Japanese courses for junior highschool students. Singapore National University's Department of Japanese Studies and the Japanese government plan to jointly develop the center into an international center for Japanese studies in Southeast Asia.⁴⁵ In Malaysia, Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir designated Japanese as the third foreign language in the country's highschool curriculum after English and Chinese. Japanese instructors teach at the National University of Malaya, the National Administration Institute, and other education institutes. The Japan-Malay Society and other private organizations are also setting up Japanese language courses to meet the sky-rocketing demand for Japanese studies.⁴⁶

This dramatic increase in interest in Japanese language study in Southeast Asia in recent years is largely attributable to expanding economic relations with Japan, increasing the need to communicate with Japanese trading partners and employers. Another reason is the desire to

master Japan's technology. Japan is a world leader today largely because of its technological strength. The country's leading-edge technology will power economic growth in the years ahead as Japan undergoes structural transformation towards high-tech manufacturing and service industries. Consequently, Japanese language skills will be an essential tool for these rapidly developing Southeast Asian states to catch up with Japan.

Obstacles and Problems

Despite these expansions and improvements, all is not well in Japan-ASEAN personnel and cultural exchanges. In Japan's view, it is trapped in a very awkward situation. On the one hand, ASEAN states complain that there is not enough cultural contact with Japan. On the other, they seem to have only lackluster interest in learning about Japanese culture or in teaching the Japanese about their cultures. Rather, they are more keen on obtaining Japanese finance and technical know-how. Even interest in learning the Japanese language is linked to this goal, and not to a wider interest in Japanese culture. Not infrequently, new exchange projects and channels are initiated by Japan only to receive lukewarm response and criticism from ASEAN when the results do not meet their sometimes unreasonably high expectations.

Japan is expanding cultural contacts, but the country is physically and mentally ill-prepared for it. On the physical side, there are both quantity and quality problems with Japanese aid officials. JICA is in charge of dispatching all official technical experts and assistance, but it has only a staff of 980 officers and 47 overseas offices for all its operations worldwide. (The U.S. Agency for International Development has a staff of over 5,000 officers and runs 122 overseas offices.) From 1977 to 1988, Japan's three major governmental agencies responsible for aid administration: the Economic Cooperation Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, and the Office for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have only increased their staff from 1,324 to 1,503 persons, while in the same period total Official Development Assistance (ODA) jumped sevenfold.⁴⁷ Japan's International Exchange Fund best illustrates this personnel problem. Each of the International Exchange

Fund's 177 staff members has to disburse ¥68.05 million compared to ¥7.7 million for his counterpart in the West German Goethe Institut and ¥14.9 million for a British Council officer.⁴⁸ Hence, each aid staffer oversees far more resources than his counterpart in other governments and international agencies like the World Bank, which is itself considered over-stretched.⁴⁹

Table 5. A Comparison of Japan's International Exchange Fund with Exchange Agencies of Britain and FRG (1989)

	British Council (UK)	Goethe Institut (FRG)	Int'l Exchange Fund (Japan)
Total Budget (Million)	¥70,512	¥23,299	¥12,045
Staff Size (Persons)	4,710	3,026	177
Overseas Offices	145	152	12

Source: Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Green Paper on Foreign Affairs*, 1990.

This shortage of personnel hampers aid disbursement as each employee is confronted with more foreign requests and more resources to dispense than ever before. To make matters worse, current efforts to cut the government budget deficit have caused various departments to withhold expansion or to streamline their staff, thus further compromising the effectiveness of Japanese aid programs and efficiency in resource distribution.⁵⁰

Qualitatively, aid officers are often not adequately trained to effectively evaluate aid requests. Many of these consultants in aid administration are either "loaned" from other governmental agencies or ministries, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for a few years or are rotated to new posts every two to three years. This means that just when these consultants have accumulated enough experience to better oversee a certain aspect of aid administration, they are transferred to another area which they are not familiar with. Simultaneously, their former posts are occupied by other officers likely to be unequipped with the necessary background and expertise to implement that aspect of an aid program. Albeit many of the officers are graduates of top universities in Japan, they often

lack understanding or are unaware of the structural and cultural environment in the recipient countries, such things as management organization and finance. This significantly undermines the efficacy of Japanese aid. Worse, there is apparently no urgent attempt to rectify this problem by the Japanese government.

Beside personnel problems, segmentation of agencies in handling aid and the absence of a coherent legal framework to coordinate the efforts aggravate weaknesses in the aid administration structure. Aid agencies operate almost totally independently of each other. Inter-agency communication is rare. It is not common for agencies to jointly discuss and carry out aid projects. As a result, either efforts overlap and money and manpower are wasted, or some projects are neglected.

Since aid and personnel exchange are now key components of Japan's foreign policy, OECD and JICA have become high-profile government agencies. However, these agencies have only limited authority. Financial resources are controlled by the Ministry of Finance, while utilization is strongly influenced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in tandem with foreign policy objectives.⁵¹

With regard to education and cultural exchange programs in Japan, there are not enough human resources or facilities to handle large number of foreign students. In recent years, some respectable graduate exchange programs in business studies have emerged, and top Japanese universities have opened their doors to foreign students, but severe domestic competition for slots in most prestigious institutions like Tokyo and Kyoto University means most foreign scholars are still placed in second-rate institutions. Furthermore, it is difficult for aliens to adapt to the intensely vigorous and rigid education system of Japan. Hence, very few foreign scholars complete their university studies in Japan compared to other popular destinations for overseas studies like the U.S. and Australia. Most are in Japan only for one to two years of Japanese language training or three months to two years of technical training.

ASEAN elites continue to complain about Japan's reluctance to transfer technology to Southeast Asia. Although Japanese technology transfers amounted to US\$193 million in 1988 or the fourth largest contribution among the 18 Development Assistance Committee members (after France, the U.S., and West Germany), technology transfers consti-

tuted only 12 per cent of its total Official Development Assistance in comparison to the DAC average of 21 per cent. This puts Japan in fourteenth position well behind other DAC members.⁵²

Southeast Asian critics of Japan also readily chastise Japan for its discriminatory policy toward Southeast Asians and scholars from other developing world countries. They cite as evidence the location of training centers for Third World students in remote places like Okinawa, which is far removed from the major cities. The government justifies this policy by saying that since most trainees come from tropical places like the ASEAN region, South Asia, Latin America and Africa, weather conditions in Okinawa would suit them better. Japan's motivation for keeping foreign students away from the major urban centers, particularly the Third World students whom the Japanese often regard as "inferiors," are unclear. Perhaps the Japanese government does not feel that the majority of Japanese are mentally prepared for an influx of foreigners, but then, when would be the right time? Another possibility could be the prohibitive price of real estate in major cities. Land is incredibly expensive in Japan. A few hundred square feet to house and train foreign students in downtown Tokyo or Yokohama or even neighboring cities would cost several hundred million dollars, which would have to be paid for by the Japanese government. Besides, almost all real estate in these big cities are owned or controlled by major conglomerates and businessmen who might see no purpose in letting or donating their properties to non-profit generating activities.

Japan projects itself as a teacher of Southeast Asians by setting the rules and terms for educational and cultural exchange. Rarely does it ever make amendments or adopt new ways to make exchange more productive. An example is Japan's chauvinistic attitude toward its language. The Japanese government does not make any serious effort to improve foreign language proficiency of Japanese officials overseas for better communication with local communities. Neither are the Japanese government nor private corporations actively promoting the study of the languages of the developed countries by Japanese, let alone the languages of the developing ones with whom Japan wants to foster warmer relations. Instead, it makes available more financial and human resources to teach Japanese overseas, urging more Southeast Asians and peoples of other developing

and developed countries to learn Japanese. Ironically, Japan loses out because of its own rigidity. Since Southeast Asians are generally more familiar with English, they prefer to study in the U.S., Australia, Britain, or other English-speaking countries, leaving Japan as a poor fourth or fifth choice for overseas study.

Table 6. International Exchange Fund, Activities by Categories (%)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Japanese Language and Japan Studies	40.1	39.2	37.9	38.4	38.6
Personnel Exchange	27.4	28.3	28.5	24.9	27.1
Exhibits and Shows	16.0	15.3	13.0	14.1	14.1
Audio-Visual Equipment Donations	8.3	6.9	8.4	7.7	7.5
Data Collection	6.6	5.6	6.2	5.4	6.2
Overseas Offices	1.6	2.7	2.5	4.9	3.0
Others	—	2.0	3.5	4.6	3.5
Total (Millions)	¥4,552	¥4,703	¥4,775	¥5,501	¥5,346

Source: Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Green Paper on Foreign Affairs*, 1990.

Japanese chauvinism is built upon the populace's island-country mentality, reinforced by the meteoric rise of Japan in the post-war years. These forces contributed to the creation of a generation of Japanese elites in their forties and fifties who regard themselves as superior to Asians, a category in which they do not include themselves.⁵³ However, Southeast Asians regard the Japanese as Asians and equals because of shared physical characteristics and Japan's geographic location. Southeast Asian elites, whose region takes pride in its ethnic and cultural diversity, express annoyance at frequent Japanese assertions of their people's "uniqueness" and "cultural oneness." Japanese residing in Southeast Asia and elsewhere often distance themselves from the local community, confirming foreign perceptions of Japanese aloofness and clannishness.

The vast majority of ASEAN elites prefer post-secondary degrees from American and British institutions. Japan is not a first choice among Southeast Asians who wish to study abroad for very practical reasons.

Employment opportunities are now more readily available for graduates of Japanese institutions because of increased Japanese presence in banking and manufacturing, but prospects for career advancement remain grim. Other foreign or indigenous businesses might hire them for their knowledge of the Japanese language and familiarity with Japanese culture, which are helpful when trading with Japanese firms, but promotion prospects are also poor as most of these graduates lack adequate management training in Japanese institutions to prepare them for higher managerial positions. Holders of Japanese degrees face another disadvantage: Japanese degrees are still less well regarded than those from Western institutions or from top academic and technical institutes in ASEAN countries.⁵⁴

Finally, despite Japan's efforts to build trust, some Southeast Asian elites continue to suspect Japan's political and economic motives for cultural exchange. They consider the onslaught of Japanese businesses, products, fashion, language studies, and music a Japanese "cultural invasion."

Conclusion

The attitude of contemporary ASEAN elites toward Japan is marked by contradictions. Most ASEAN elites acknowledge the fact that their country's economic development is inextricably linked to cooperation with Japan. However, they balk at Japanese hegemonic ambitions as Japan expands its presence in Southeast Asia. Many accept that they, as much as Japan, would benefit from Japan assuming a greater regional and world role. Yet, there are also fears of Japanese rearmament as a consequence of Japan's expanding global responsibilities.

At present, there is no strong visible opposition to Japan's economic predominance in the Southeast Asian countries. However, anti-Japanese sentiments might surface if Southeast Asians see their national sovereignty seriously threatened by Japan's ambitions. Already there are critical remarks from some ASEAN elites that Japanese investments could destroy incentives for indigenous economic development and aggravate competition against infant local industries.

So far Japan's efforts at fostering better mutual understanding have scored only limited success. Inconsistencies in its exchange and aid programs have raised questions in ASEAN countries about Japan's sincerity and commitment, contributing to their lukewarm response to Japanese initiatives. Japan is improving and expanding its exchange programs. It is now more responsive to ASEAN demands, although there is still much room for improvement in both administration and quality of its exchange programs. Yet Japan could go much further. In addition to improving government programs, the Japanese government should enlist private participation, possibly even transferring the center of initiative from the government to the business sector. Japanese corporations have more ready resources for technology transfer and management and technical training, including their factories, offices and research departments. In exchange, Japanese companies would benefit from more direct participation in efforts to cultivate ASEAN elites. Many investment plans are hampered by the shortage of Japanese personnel for overseas posting.⁵⁵ Many Japanese are reluctant to work overseas even with the attraction of bigger houses, cheap food, and travel. They worry about the unsafeness of foreign countries compared to Japan, which is almost crime-free. The fears are fueled by events like the kidnaping of Japanese executives in the Philippines by the New People's Army communist guerrillas in recent years. Also, Japanese executives are reluctant to go overseas because it is difficult afterward to re-introduce their children to the rigorous Japanese educational system. For a successful career in Japan's corporate world and bureaucracy, a Japanese highschool diploma and university degree are essential. With these barriers to attracting Japanese staff, Japanese firms must employ in the long-run more ASEAN management personnel for their overseas operations in the region. Simultaneously, these Japan-trained ASEAN elites could become liaison agents to lobby for Japanese government and business interests in their own countries, particularly in light of increased competition from such foreign investors as Taiwan, South Korea and the United States.

The Comprehensive National Security Strategy depends on Japan-ASEAN cooperation, while Japan-ASEAN cooperation depends on successful cultivation of a new generation of ASEAN elites more understanding of and sympathetic to Japanese interests. This is more likely to

happen if Japan demonstrates it seeks a balanced, mutually beneficial relationship with the peoples of Southeast Asia and the region's elites in particular. Immediate amendments to Japan's current ASEAN policies are necessary. Japan must not miss this opportunity to cultivate ASEAN elites both for its own sake and the sake of its relations with this strategically important region.

Notes

1. Rodney Tasker, "Wedded to Success," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 3, 1990, pp. 49-50.
2. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 270-277, 296-298.
3. Trade with ASEAN economies accounted for 8.1 per cent of Japan's international trade in 1988, see "Japan's Leading Trading Partners (1986-88)," in *Japan 1990: An International Comparison* (Tokyo: Keizai Koho Center, 1989), pp. 40-41.
4. In 1988, 17.4 per cent of all Japanese crude oil imports came from Southeast Asia. Indonesia is the third largest supplier of crude oil to Japan after the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Japan also buys natural gas from Malaysia and Indonesia. See "Crude Oil Imports into Japan by Country of Origin (FY1980-1988)," in *Japan 1990: An International Comparison*, p. 66; Japan Tariff Association, *Foreign Trade Almanac* (1987); and Hideo Matsuzaka, "Future of Japan-ASEAN Relations," *Asia-Pacific Community* (Summer 1983):13.
5. The total sum should be much higher if it includes investments made by local Japanese subsidiaries, see "Japan's Direct Overseas Investment by Region and Country," in *Japan 1990: An International Comparison*, p. 56; and Jon Woronoff, "Japan in Asia: Reviving up Japan-ASEAN Relations," *World Executive's Digest* (June 1990):46.
6. "Flight of a Lame Duck," *TIME*, May 8, 1989, p. 18.

7. The Comprehensive National Security Strategy was introduced in the early 1970s. National political, economic, and defense interests are linked and promoted through "non-military" means, with heavy emphasis on utilizing Japan's global economic clout, and supplemented by non-economic activities, such as, educational, cultural and athletic exchanges, and active international participation. See Suelo Sudo, "From Fukuda to Takeshita: A Decade of Japan-ASEAN Cooperation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 10 (September 1988):131; and *White Paper of Japan, 1983-84* (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p. 45.
8. See *White Papers of Japan, 1983-84*, p. 45; and K. S. Liao, "The Japanese Experience: From a Defeated Nation to an Economic Superpower," (Ri Bun Jin Yen: Chung Jian Bai Pei Chang Kuo Tao Jin Ji Dai Kuo), *Chiao Liu Yue Han*, No. 47, January 15, 1991, pp. 57-58.
9. In 1988, Japanese businesses spent about \$16.5 billion on U.S. real estate and nearly \$13 billion in acquiring ownership interest in various American companies. Across the Atlantic in the European Community, Japanese combines are investing aggressively to prepare for the Community's integration in 1992. Japanese firms have either entered into joint venture agreements or independently set up manufacturing operations in the European Community; for example, Toyota will build a \$12 billion assembly plant in Britain and Nissan has been producing cars there since 1986. See "Japan Goes Hollywood," *Newsweek*, October 9, 1989, p. 10 and "Battle-ground," *Newsweek*, 2 October 1989, p. 11.
10. See Suelo Sudo, "From Fukuda to Takeshita: A Decade of Japan-ASEAN Cooperation," p. 131; and K. S. Liao, "The Japanese Experience: From a Defeated Nation to an Economic Superpower," pp. 47-50.
11. The ASEAN region now purchases nearly 10 per cent of all Japanese exports. This may seem trivial compared to the U.S. and European purchases from Japan, but the region's demand for Japanese consumer and industrial goods is expected to strengthen with the

- increasing dynamism and affluence of these economies, see Muthial Alaggapa, "Japan's Political and Security Role in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 10 (June 1988):20.
12. Jon Woronoff, "Japan in Asia: Reviving up Japan-ASEAN Relations," p. 45.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. Bilateral aid, loans and infrastructural construction remain the major components of Japan's aid program, though today only a small fraction of Japan's aid remains tied. Grants and technology transfer are assuming larger proportions of Japan's aid to the Third World, see Jon Woronoff, "Japan in Asia: Reviving up Japan-ASEAN Relations," p. 46; Alan Rix, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity for Leadership," *Pacific Affairs* 62, no. 4 (Winter 1989/90):466; and Eileen Marie Doherty, "Japan's Expanding Foreign Aid Programs," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* (Fall 1987):138.
 15. In the past two years, Japan actively mediated between the different forces in the Kampuchean conflict. Tokyo hosted a conference in June last year for the various Cambodian factions to set up a framework for a United Nations-sponsored plan to end the Cambodian conflict, see "Learning to Drive a Car for Four," *Asiaweek*, September 21, 1990, p. 22.
 16. Also of concern is the domestic public sentiment toward military fortification and the existence of Article 9 of the country's post-war "pacifist" constitution which renounces the right to belligerence and the maintenance of air, land, and sea forces. For a discussion of the Japanese public sentiment, see Cheng Chin-wee, et al., eds., *Korea and Japan in World Politics* (Korea: Korean Association of International Relations, 1985), pp. 104, 106-107.
 17. See Alan Rix, *Japan's Economic Aid: Policy Making and Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 39.
 18. William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr., "Japan's Foreign Economic Assistance," *Asian Survey* 25 (March 1985):325; and Robert

- Guillain, *The Japanese Challenge* (New York: L. B. Lippincott Co., 1970), pp. 242-243.
19. Japan Cabinet Research Office, *Chosa Geppo* (Research Monthly) 14, no. 12 (December 1969):14; and for more detailed discussion of the importance of these sea routes of transport to Japan's security, see Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Response to threats of Shipping Disruption in Southeast Asia and the Middle East," *Pacific Affairs* 59, no. 2 (Summer 1986):255-277.
 20. Hoong Khong-kim, "Malaysia-Japan Relations in the 1980s," *Asian Survey* 27 (October 1987):1095-1108.
 21. For instance, the average interest rate on loans from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) throughout the 1970s was only 2.6 per cent with an average grace period of 7.5 years and a repayment period of 29.7 years compared to the Japan Export-Import Bank's 6.5 per cent, and the repayment schedule was also much tighter. See Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *Japanese Imperialism Today: Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia* (London: Penguin Books, 1983), pp. 29-30; and F. C. Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1973), p. 171.
 22. *Ibid.*
 23. These street riots came to be known as the "Tanaka Riots." These were a series of demonstrations that occurred in Indonesia during Tanaka's ASEAN tour in 1974. Rotten vegetables, stones and other objects were thrown at Tanaka, and at least one student was killed in the melee.
 24. See "Singapore," *FEER 1990 Yearbook*, p. 215.
 25. Japan joined the Colombo Plan in 1954. The Plan's objective was to engender cooperation in economic development in South and Southeast Asia. See Kernial Singh Sandhu and Eileen P. T. Tang, eds., *Japan as an Economic Power and its Implications for Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1974), pp. 50-51.

26. See Norton S. Ginsberg and James Osborn, "Japan and Southeast Asia: The Geography of Interdependence," in *Japan, America and the Future World Order*, ed. Morton A. Kaplan and Kinhide Mashakoji (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 244-245.
27. Japan's war reparations program disbursed a total of \$1,152.8 million in damages and \$737.5 million in loans to the Southeast Asian states and Burma. The Philippines received the lion's share of the payments, but out of the total \$780 million received only \$30 million was in cash for war widows and orphans. \$500 million was goods grants, and the rest was relatively low-interest commercial loans over a period of twenty years. Indonesia received \$223 million over a twelve-year period and commercial loans of up to \$400 million. Thailand received a total of \$41.7 million worth of shipping vessels and capital goods, while Singapore was allotted \$17 million in grants and loans. Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *Japanese Imperialism Today: Co-Prosperity in Greater East Asia*, pp. 21-23; and Norton S. Ginsberg and James Osborn, "Japan and Southeast Asia: The Geography of Interdependence," pp. 244-245.
28. University of Malaya, *Japanese Economic Influence in Southeast Asia* (Malaysia: University of Malaya, 1970), pp. 208, 210-211, 297.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 213, 215.
30. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, *Economic Cooperation: Present Status and Problems*, 1987, pp. 175, 198, 211, 215, 231.
31. University of Malaya, *Japanese Economic Influence in Southeast Asia*, pp. 207-208.
32. "Coprosperity by Peaceful Means," *The Economist*, 17 June 1989, p. 16.
33. See Patya Saihoo, "Problems in ASEAN-Japan Cultural Exchange," *Asia-Pacific Community* (Summer 1979):1.
34. The Fukuda Doctrine outlined several points delineating the future

- course of Japan-ASEAN relations and Japan's role in the region: (1) that Japan will not become a military power; (2) that Japan intends to expand cultural, social, political ties with the ASEAN along with their economic ones; (3) that Japan wishes to cooperate with the ASEAN as "equal partners" while working for stable relations with the Indochinese states; and (4) that Japan will double its aid to the ASEAN in five years, and raise imports from and investments in the ASEAN. See Donald G. Hellmann, "Japan and Southeast Asia: Continuity Amidst Change," *Asian Survey* 19 (December 1979):1195-1196; and William W. Haddad, "The Fukuda Doctrine," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 2 (June 1980):23-29.
35. Patya Saihoo, "Problems in ASEAN-Japan Cultural Exchange," p. 2.
 36. William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr, Jr., "Japan's Foreign Economic Assistance," *Asian Survey* 25 (March 1985):331.
 37. Suetō Sudo, "From Fukuda to Takeshita: A Decade of Japan-ASEAN Relations," p. 134.
 38. *Ibid.*
 39. *Annual Report of the ASEAN Standing Committee, 1987-88* (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1987), p. 126.
 40. *Proceedings of a Conference: 21st Ministerial Meeting and Post-Ministerial Conferences with the Dialogue Partners* (Bangkok: ASEAN Secretariat, 1988), p. 94.
 41. "PHP Scholarship," *Japan Foundation Newsletter* 16, no. 4 (March 1989):11.
 42. "Asian and Pacific Organizations," *FEER Asia 1989 Yearbook*, p. 63.
 43. *Annual Report of the ASEAN Standing Committee, 1987-88* (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1987), p. 23.
 44. See Nukazawa Kazuo, "Japan-ASEAN Trade Relations," in *ASEAN-Japan Relations: Trade and Development*, ed. Narongchai Akrasanee (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983),

- pp. 172-174.
45. Toba Reijiro, "ASEAN Development Strategy and Japanese Cooperation," *Asia Pacific Community* (Spring 1984):80.
 46. *Ibid.*
 47. See "Focus on Foreign Aid," *Japan Echo* 16, no. 1, (Spring 1989):7.
 48. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Green Paper on Foreign Affairs*, 1990, p. 135.
 49. "Coprosperity by Peaceful Means," *The Economist*, June 17, 1989, p. 16.
 50. *Ibid.*
 51. Mera Koichi, "Problems in Aid Program," *Japan Echo* 16, no. 1 (Spring 1989):16-17.
 52. *Green Paper on Foreign Affairs*, 1990, p. 94.
 53. "Coprosperity by Peaceful Means," p. 18.
 54. For an evaluation of Japanese training programs through the eyes of ASEAN trainees, see Lyn G. Valladores, et al., "ASEAN trainees of JICA view Japan," *Asia Pacific Community* (Spring 1983):103-105.
 55. Ibarra C. Gutierrez, "Japan in Asia: Japanese Investments in ASEAN," *World Executive's Digest*, June 1990, p. 52.

日本文化外交與東協精英培訓

黃子君 廖光生 著

(中文摘要)

日本雖然是一個經濟強國，但由於極度缺乏能源及天然資源，使它需要一個和平、穩定的國際環境進行經濟合作以取得它所需要的經濟物資。所以，為了確保國家安全和穩定，日本政府在「綜合國家安全策略」政策之下，非常重視與外國進行經濟及文化的交流與合作，以及促進這些合作來支持日本的外交及國防能力。

東南亞地區，尤其是東南亞國家協會（簡稱為「東協」）的會員國對日本國家安全及穩定是極度重要的。因為東協會員國的地理條件、天然及人力資源非常豐富，它們的合作可以減輕日本經濟發展的困難，使日本得以繼續成長。然而，日本與東協會員國能否繼續互相合作的一個因素是東協國的人民，尤其是精英份子，對日本的態度。在過去數十年內，日本已利用文化交流，包括教育、文化、體育及技術轉移的活動，嘗試培養新一代東協會員國的精英份子，使他們對日本有友善及合作的態度。

雖然，近年來日本已作出許多努力改善雙方交流活動，但是東協會員國仍然對日本有強烈的批評。日本政府本身的問題，例如官僚作風、政府架構、政策的漏洞等等是東協會員國批評的根源。

日本誠懇及認真的努力去改善與東協會員國之間的文化外交活動是非常重要的，因為它可以推動日本與東協會員國之間進一步的合作以增進日本本身的利益。