May 1995

Occasional Paper No. 43

Urbanisation in China's Fujian Province Since 1978

香港亞太研究所

Wing-shing Tang

Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, New Territories
Hong Kong

Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies

The Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies was established in September 1990 to promote multidisciplinary social science research on social, political and economic development. Research emphasis is placed on the role of Hong Kong in the Asia-Pacific region and the reciprocal effects of the development of Hong Kong and the Asia-Pacific region.

HK$30.00
ISBN 962-441-043-7

Urbanisation in China's Fujian Province Since 1978

Wing-shing Tang

Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, New Territories
Hong Kong

About the author

Mr. Wing-shing Tang is an Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Geography, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Acknowledgements

Thanks must be due to Miss Joanna Lee for her research assistance in preparing the manuscript. The financial support of the Lippo Urban Research Fund for funding the fieldwork in December 1993 and the research assistantship is also gratefully acknowledged.

ISBN 962-441-043-7

Urbanisation in China's Fujian Province Since 1978

Abstract

Urbanisation in Fujian since 1978 has been basically unknown to the western world. This paper attempts to unveil it by understanding this issue within a framework emphasising both the causal mechanisms and the spatial relations. The government of a shortage economy and the society in a frontier position before 1978 had produced an urban legacy of low urbanisation level, mainly in a small number of cities and towns. The coastal-interior divide in urban development had also been pronounced. A new rationality of government has emerged since 1978. It reflects a recognition of the relative autonomy of the economy and the population nature of society. Concomitantly, a new role has been assigned to cities and towns. The latter serve to put the economy and society under some forms of state regulation. Some cities and towns, especially those in the coastal region, have benefitted most from the new state policies of stimulating economic growth via the intervention of the spatial contingent effects and boundary effects. The outcomes are: the "urbanisation" of the countryside and the "ruralisation" of cities and towns. At the regional level, an urban growth corridor along the coast has thus been formed. By explaining the process within this framework, the paper offers an informed understanding of urbanisation in Fujian to the western world.

Introduction

Fujian province (Figure 1) is one of those prospering coastal regions of China that have undergone remarkable physical and socio-economic transformation since the economic reform started in 1978. Yet unlike Guangdong, its counterpart in the country's first batch of regions with special policies and privilege treatment dating back to 1979, the development of Fujian has received scant attention.[1] This is especially the case of urbanisation and urban development.[2] While the Chinese literature, though small, is

Figure 1 Administrative Divisions of Fujian, 1993

growing by leaps and bounds (Chen Jiayuan, 1991; Fu and Chen, 1990:170-92; Guo, 1992; Hou Jianwen, 1990; Hou Xiaohong, 1992; Hou and Liu, 1993; Li, Chen and Yu, 1988; Liu, 1992; Xing, 1990; Yao et al., 1990; Yao and Liu, 1994), the English literature has stagnated (Chu and Zheng, 1992; Li and Zhao, 1992). More importantly, the former usually adopts a descriptive analysis of the contemporary urbanisation, whereas the latter consists of piecemeal studies of individual cities. At most, the literature points out the impact of Fujian's frontier position on its urban development, without fully understanding how it really works. In other words, the literature on Fujian's urbanisation and urban development during the post-reform period is still wanting. It is the objective of this paper to make a modest contribution to this literature.

I have argued earlier (Tang, 1993) that Chinese urbanisation must be understood in terms of causal mechanisms deriving from structural forces and spatial relations. The former refer to those features inherent to the Chinese political economy and socialist state. The role of spatial relations in accounting for urbanisation can be captured by the three types of effects: spatial contingency effects, spatial boundary effects and locality effects. This framework together with its analytical concepts is argued here to be equally useful to understand urbanisation of a region within China. Fujian, as a frontier coastal province facing Taiwan, has followed a twisting urbanisation path that is the product of both structural forces common to all regions in China, and spatial relations between Fujian and other provinces, on the one hand and, on the other, between the coastal and interior regions of Fujian. In particular, I want to argue that the urban legacy by 1978, in the form of regional variations in development potentials, was the context in which the nature of foreign investment during the 1980s, national economic reform policies and province-wide spatial boundary effects such as the development of the Xiamen Special Economic Zone, Fuzhou open coastal city and many coastal overseas Chinese villages (*qiaoxiang*), interacted to produce a pattern of urbanisation heavily biased towards the coast. (One can refer to Massey's (1984) concept of layers of accumula-

tion for a justification of the discussion of the urban legacy before 1978.)

The next section starts with a brief review of the pre-reform urban development in Fujian. The causal mechanisms and then the way they interacted with the local spatial setting to produce the Fujianese specific pattern will be outlined. The coastal-interior variation will be another topic covered in this discussion. These accounts serve as the background to the third section, which is to examine the post-reform scenario. It outlines a modified set of causal mechanisms as a result of a different attitude towards the government of the economy and the society. These mechanisms will be discussed in the language of the three types of spatial effects. Finally, the salient features of the resulting pattern of urbanisation will be described in the fourth section.

The Urban Legacy by 1978: Regional Variations in Development Potentials

Introduction

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Fujian had undergone urban transformation such as increasing urbanisation in a few selected places. However, thirty years of development had not altered much the spatial differentiation left from 1949 — the domination of the coastal region. Such regional variations in development potentials were the product of the interaction of both spatial relations and aspatial mechanisms. Since Fujian was part of China, the mechanisms that had caused urbanisation in China as a whole were also seen to be in operation in Fujian. Thus a brief description of these mechanisms is in order. This section then examines how these mechanisms interacted with the spatial relations to define more concisely how the mechanisms operated in Fujian. Finally, regional variations in urbanisation will be outlined and discussed.

The Causal Mechanisms and their Operations

The Chinese Model

China before 1978 was characterised by a police-*cum*-sovereignty state with a shortage economy. The object of police was to develop those elements of the lives of individuals in such a way that their development also fostered the strength of the state. Thus the state intervened into all realms of life by techniques of hierarchical observation, normalisation and examination to produce governable socialist persons. The state also intervened into the economy by owning almost all production enterprises and administering their investment, production, distribution and consumption activities. The economy so produced exhibited the characteristics of a shortage economy: the prevalence of paternalistic relations between enterprises and their administrative superiors, soft budget constraints, investment hunger, expansionary drive and shortage and suction problems (Tang, 1993, 1994).

As I tentatively outlined in an earlier paper (Tang, 1993:27), "urbanisation is the mediator as well as the outcome of the process of extending the state's control over the economy and the society." To produce governable persons and economy, the police state divided the territory into urban and rural spaces. In the former, persons and their economic and social activities, which were subject to the techniques of hierarchical observation, normalisation and examination, were also the ones receiving state-regulated investment. This was not the case for rural spaces, where state control was less secure and residents therefore had to live on their own. The processes of city-ward movement of population and of increasing designation of urban places over time in fact represented the extension of the state's control over space, and in its territory. But when the problems of the shortage economy reached the tolerance limit, the state stopped temporarily the process of extension. Concomitantly, the urbanisation process was halted administratively.

The spatial differentiation that existed at the founding of the People's Republic was also found to be influential in effecting the

urbanisation process (Tang, 1993:45-6). China was forced to continue using the then advanced productive facilities along the coast while setting up almost from scratch new resource extraction and industrial plants in the interior, thereby producing a costly form of urbanisation. The more decentralised administrative system, or in Qian and Xu's (1993) concept, M-form hierarchy, was noted to have caused the widespread emergence of more "sporadic," but functionally more isolated, urban settlements. The outcome was a more chaotic urbanisation process.

These arguments are now found wanting, at least because they have not provided a persuasive reason why the state had adopted the very drastic measures of de-designating existing urban places and sending urban residents to the countryside. Simply attributing it to the requirement of the shortage economy is not adequate, as there were other less drastic measures available to the state. I suggest that the solution can be found in the other power of the Chinese state. Besides these techniques and concerns of police, the Chinese state practised those pertaining to a sovereign state. The latter, under the competition of other nation states, was interested in the territory that must be supervised and given a harmonious order. The sovereign power "was exercised mainly as a means of deduction, a subtraction mechanism" or "was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself" (Foucault, 1978:136). No wonders that public torture or even execution of anti-revolutionary figures such as the "rightists" and drug traffickers, a means to show off the sovereign power, was, and still is, an occasional scene being staged in the country. The implication for urbanisation was that the state would not hesitate to deploy the right of seizure and take away the urban status of a settlement and/or the urban household registration status of a person if the sovereign's very existence was in jeopardy. This helps to account more accurately for the prevalence of the more drastic urbanisation policies in China during the pre-reform period.

The above represent the mechanisms that have caused the observable Chinese urbanisation policies, pattern and process. It

is in light of these mechanisms that we interpret the urbanisation process in Fujian before 1978.

The Operation in Fujian

The main source of investment in Fujian came from the state, not from the private sector, and was allocated by administrative organs, not by the market. As a resource constrained economy, China at the beginning of the 1950s had been forced to allocate her resources to certain priority programmes so as to ameliorate the shortage problems. Regrettably, Fujian on the whole had not received priority in development. Due to its proximity to Taiwan, Fujian had long maintained a military frontier outlook. Therefore, Fujian had been before 1978 in a disadvantageous position as regards acquiring state investment. During this period, China treated Taiwan with enmity and hostility. Given Fujian's frontier position, it was sensible that the state would refrain from investing in Fujian so as to minimise the extent of destruction in case of any renewed civil war. The fact that Fujian did not possess a large reserve of raw materials and energy resources (Chen Jiayuan, 1991:243, 256)[3] further weakened its position as the recipient of state investment (Xing, 1990:33). Thus, before the 1980s, not a single key-point project had been located in Fujian (Xing, 1990:134). For the period 1950-1985 — a few years longer than our study period here — the total capital investment in the province made up only 1.7% of that of the country (Xing, 1990:21). Even the money spent in Fujian had been selective, as reflected in the fact that all investments from the state during the First Five Year Plan had gone to the construction of the Ying-Xia railroad and a few highways for national security purpose (Xing, 1990:135). While there was meagre central state direct investment, Fujian received some "indirect investment" from the state. By means of its redistributive function, the state requested the more developed provinces and regions to relocate some plants to their less developed counterparts as a catalyst for growth. Under this policy, Fujian succeeded in obtaining light industry plants from Shanghai and located them in cities such as Fuzhou and Sanming (He

Shaochun, 1991a:129, 354; 1991b:357, 436; Shao, 1989:44). Helpful though these plants may have been, they were not big enough to make a quantum change in the economy. Therefore, the motor of growth had to be generated locally. On this aspect, the provincial investment was not only limited but also unevenly distributed, sectorally and spatially. Most of the local investments on new fixed assets during the First Five Year Plan had been highly concentrated in coastal cities such as Fuzhou, Xiamen and Quanzhou. Priorities had been given to them because they had had more advanced productive (especially light industry) and infrastructural facilities and development potentials (Shao, 1989:44; Xing, 1990:15). Induced by investment hunger and expansionary drive, these cities began to grow on their own. To resolve the shortage problems in energy and heavy industrial products, investment priority had also been given to resource extraction industries during the Second Five Year Plan. In Fujian, most of the valuable resources had been concentrated in the inland areas. It was then not surprising that the policy of developing resource extraction industries, aided by the construction of the Ying-Xia railroad in 1958, gave birth to some small cities in the interior such as Sanming and Nanping. However, given that their investments were induced from outside, these cities lacked intimate interaction with their surrounding hinterlands. Their investments instead induced the province to invest in plants in the coastal cities so as to capture forward linkages (Shao, 1989:45, Xing, 1990:136). Finally, the aforementioned M-form hierarchy had led to the mushrooming of small scale industries all over the province, including the coastal region. In other words, the mechanisms at work in Fujian from 1949 to 1977 had rendered inert the uneven spatial distribution of cities in favour of the coastal region, a pattern inherited from the Guomindang period and earlier.

Regional Variations in Urbanisation

Introduction

Having outlined the causal mechanisms and their way of operation in Fujian, it is time to describe in detail their uneven effects on urbanisation and urban development. Three levels of analysis have been adopted: the province, the region and the city. The level of urbanisation and urban hierarchy for the whole province between 1949 and 1977 will be discussed first. Their performance will be compared with China's to highlight the outcomes of uneven operation of the nation-wide causal mechanisms over space. As the causal mechanisms also operate unevenly within Fujian, the latter may be divided into the coastal and the interior regions to facilitate the discussion on regional variations in urbanisation. This discussion will be supplemented by an in-depth comparison of how two cities had developed over time. Fuzhou, from the coastal region, and Sanming, from the interior region, were chosen to highlight the different ways in which various causal mechanisms had interacted with spatial relations to produce two divergent patterns of urban development in two different regions. It is hoped that by the end of this discussion, we shall understand how Fujian's urban legacy had been produced.

Urbanisation Level and Urban Hierarchy

With meagre foreign and state investments, the obvious outcomes were a lower level of urbanisation together with a slower growth of cities. Figure 2 shows the urbanisation level of Fujian from 1954 onward.[4] There are two series to reflect the differences in the statistical yardstick adopted for urban population: total population of cities and towns (TPCT) and non-agricultural population of cities and towns (NAPCT).[5] In China, the practice was to consider TPCT as urban population before 1964 and NAPCT since then. Accordingly, the level of urbanisation of Fujian climbed from 18.82% in 1954[6] to the peak value of 23.75% in 1960. It then dropped to 20.20% in 1963 and abruptly to 13.45% a year later, due



Figure 2 Urbanisation Levels in Fujian, 1954-1992

Sources: Fujiansheng Tongjiju, 1993; Fujiansheng Tongjiju and Fujiansheng Gonganting, 1989.

to a shift in the statistical yardstick adopted. Since then, the level had declined to 11.08% in 1977.

This pattern of ups and downs resembles the one for China as a whole. It reflects the cycle of expansion of control by the state: (1) designation of urban residents and places; (2) investment in these economies; (3) expansionary drive as a result of investment hunger; and (4) the resolution of systemic problems by ameliorative measures including a halt in investment, population re-classification and rustication, and de-designation of urban places. This pattern can be more vividly illustrated by the annual growth rates of the different components of urban population: NAPC (non-agricultural population of cities) and NAPT (non-agricultural population of towns) (Figure 3). The curve of NAPC recorded a big jump during the Great Leap Forward and, conversely, an abrupt drop during its aftermath. The other big drop was recorded immediately after the Cultural Revolution, when thousands of youth and cadres were sent to the countryside (Fu and Chen, 1990:171). The curve of NAPT also experienced drops after the implementation of a more stringent definition of towns in 1963 and during the Cultural Revolution. The number of designated towns dropped continuously from 225 in 1956 to 127 in 1963, 98 in 1966 (Yu Ming, 1988:746) and slightly above 30 in the mid-1970s (Fu and Chen, 1990:184). Thus, urban population in Fujian had grown and declined as a result of state intervention into the economy and the society.

Nevertheless, since Fujian received meagre investments from the state, the growth of cities, the major recipients of state investment, was slower than the nation as a whole. Table 1 has collated a few sets of urban population statistics to support this point. It clearly shows that the urbanisation level, expressed in TPCT / TP, of Fujian was higher than China as a whole before the economic reform. But, if it is calculated on the basis of non-agricultural population only (i.e., NAPCT / TP), urbanisation level of Fujian was below that of China. Both these messages are true if and only if Fujian's cities were smaller in population size. By disintegrating NAPCT into NAPC and NAPT, it becomes obvious that NAPC

Figure 3 Annual Growth Rates of Urban Population, Fujian, 1955-1992



Urbanisation in China's Fujian Province Since 1978

Table 1 Comparing Fujian's and China's Levels of Urbanisation, 1954-1977

Unit: %

Year*	TPCT/TP		NAPCT/TP		NAPC/NAPCT		NAPC/TPC		TPC/TP	
	Fujian	China	Fujian	China	Fujian	China	Fujian	China	Fujian	China
1954	18.82	13.69	na	na	na	na	na	na	6.77	9.57
1956	16.24	14.62	12.19	na	50.32	na	80.77	na	7.60	10.10
1957	16.31	15.39	12.05	na	50.16	na	74.73	na	8.09	10.68
1958	20.23	16.52	na	na	na	na	67.60	na	10.04	15.60
1961	22.72	17.33	15.24	na	52.16	na	63.03	na	12.61	16.64
1964	20.42	18.37	13.45	14.02	52.67	70.25	59.08	74.53	11.99	13.22
1970	19.20	17.38	11.96	12.14	49.88	66.13	53.96	53.96	11.05	11.32
1977	18.96	17.55	11.08	12.10	50.08	66.16	50.19	50.19	11.06	11.65

Notes: na Not available.
* The years are so selected to accommodate the data availability problem and the necessity to reflect the dates of important events.

Sources: For Fujian, the data are compiled from Fujiansheng Tongjiju and Fujiansheng Gonganting (1989) and Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1993); for China, see Xu (1986).

made up a smaller proportion of NAPCT in Fujian. Besides, in Fujian cities, the proportion of non-agricultural population in total population (NAPC / TPC) was smaller. Finally, total population of cities made up a smaller proportion of the total population (TPC / TP) of Fujian. These calculations in totality tend to provide some evidence in support of the statement that Fujian had experienced a slower growth in cities.

Another evidence can be furnished by the number of designated cities in Fujian. There were only two designated cities in 1950, consisting of the provincial capital of Fuzhou and the long-standing commercial city of Xiamen. A year later, two new designations were made for Quanzhou and Zhangzhou in the special districts (*zhuanqu*)[7] of Jinjiang and Longxi, respectively. An additional city, Nanping in Jianyang special district, made the list of cities in 1956. Finally, Sanming, of Sanming special district, was designated in 1960. The number of cities had remained at six until the early 1980s (Fu and Chen, 1990:181; Fujiansheng Tongjiju and Fujiansheng Gonganting, 1989:76). Two points are worth noting. First, only four cities were designated during the whole study period. It is not so much the small number of designations as the lack of variation that matters. For China as a whole, the number of designated cities fluctuated over the study period. Specifically, the number increased sharply during the Great Leap Forward but felt equally abruptly during its aftermath. There were 16 new designations in 1958, 20 in 1960 and 10 in 1961. While there was no designation in 1962, 1963 and 1964, the number of de-designation were 14, 16 and 11, respectively (Guojia Tongjiju Chengshi Shehui Jingji Diaochadui 1990:7). This pattern reflects, first, the phenomenon of investment hunger and, then, the implementation of measures to curb the expansionary drive. Since Fujian had not received much investment from the state, its pattern of designation diverged from the nation's. Secondly, with the exception of Fuzhou and Xiamen, those newly designated cities were one way or other the administrative centres of their corresponding special districts (Lin Longhai, 1993:16-7; Zhang and Lu, 1986:215, 649, 893). In other words, they were designated to facilitate the state's control of development.

Regional Variations

The aforementioned urban development pattern was unevenly distributed over the province. It has already been highlighted that the underlying mechanisms were operating unevenly in the first place. That state investments between 1949 and 1957 had been concentrated in the coast had accentuated the dominance of the coastal region (including, according to the administrative divisions in 1992, the six city-regions of Fuzhou, Xiamen, Quanzhou, Putian, Zhangzhou and Ningde) inherited from the Guomindang era. In terms of gross value of industrial output (GVIO), the coastal region captured 79.75% of the province's total (Shao, 1989:64). Due to the shift in investment away from it since 1958, the coastal region experienced a drop in its share of the province's GVIO. By 1978, this share had declined to 64.3% (He Shaochun, 1991a:321; Xing, 1990:135-6). However, given the well-known problems of socialist economies such as success indicators and quantity drive and the more specific problems related to the resource-processing industries, the actual economic strength of the interior region (the rest of the province other than the coastal region) might not have developed at the pace somewhat misleadingly implied by the figures (from 20.25% to 35.7%).

The uneven urban development can be illustrated by Tables 2 and 3. First, we look at the definitions of the coastal and the interior regions. We have here delineated the coastal region according to the concept of Open Coastal Region. The latter consists of the city-regions of Fuzhou, Putian, Quanzhou, Xiamen and Zhangzhou and only the coastal portion of Ningde prefecture. The latter includes Ningde city, Fu'an city, Fuding county and Xiapu county. In other words, the more inland portion of the Ningde prefecture has been excluded from this new definition of the coastal region. This shift in definition has been rendered necessary due to the application of another set of data for calculation and illustration.

Table 2 shows that the coastal region had already been dominant in terms of the urban scene. Because of the dominance of cities, be it in terms of the total number or the history of development, the coastal region had overshadowed the interior region in the few urban statistics. This had been especially the case in the mid-1950s, when the former had accounted for 80% of the province's total number of cities, 94.38% of TPC and 94.07% of NAPC. It became less dominant over time, as its shares in these urban indicators in 1977 had declined to 66.67%, 79.04% and 82.05%, respectively. The coastal region was comparatively less dominant if the town component was also taken into consideration, as revealed by the statistics on TPCT and NAPCT. It made up only three-quarters of the province's totals in 1956 and less than 70% in 1977. In short, although the margins had narrowed over time, the coastal region had maintained its dominance of the urban scene since the mid-1950s.

Table 2 The Percentage Shares of the Coastal Region in the Province's Totals, 1956-1977

Unit: %

Year	No. of cities	TPCT	TPC	NAPCT	NAPC
1956	80.00	75.91	94.38	77.86	94.07
1957	80.00	76.54	94.74	77.72	93.60
1961	66.67	71.32	79.68	72.61	83.14
1964	66.67	73.19	82.12	73.23	86.15
1970	66.67	70.23	79.13	69.52	82.25
1977	66.67	69.51	79.04	67.50	82.05

Source: Calculated from Fujiansheng Tongjiju and Fujiansheng Gonganting (1989).

It is apparent from Table 3 that, although the interior region had recorded a lower level of urbanisation in 1956 (in case of NAPCT, 13.31% vs 9.47%; and for TPCT, 17.25% vs 13.7%), its difference with the coastal region had narrowed substantially by

1977. For TPCT, the difference was reduced to less than 1% (19.62% vs 18.67%). Whereas for NAPCT, the interior region had in fact surpassed its counterpart by 0.5% (11.07% vs 11.57%). This uplift in the level of urbanisation had partly been due to the addition of two designated cities (Nanping in 1956 and Sanming in 1960) in the interior region.

Because of fewer cities, the interior experienced the continuously smaller shares of NAPC in NAPCT than the coastal region during the study period. The share in the coastal region, which had been 60.69% in 1956, had risen to 61.83% by 1977. Those shares for the interior region were 13.45% and 28.09%, respectively. Although the latter was twice that of the former — i.e., the growth had been tremendous — it is still beyond dispute that the regional difference in the share was still big. If we interpret the development of an urban system by the share of NAPC in NAPCT, it becomes obvious that the urban system in the interior region, with fewer cities, was still less well developed than its counterpart on the coast.

Table 3 Regional Variations in Urban Population Statistics, 1956-1977

Unit: %

Year	TPCT/TP		NAPCT/TP		NAPC/NAPCT		NAPC/TPC	
	Coast	Interior	Coast	Interior	Coast	Interior	Coast	Interior
1956	17.25	13.70	13.31	9.47	60.69	13.45	80.51	85.20
1957	15.84	13.29	11.88	9.32	60.41	14.40	73.84	90.80
1961	23.12	21.79	15.79	13.96	59.72	32.11	65.77	52.28
1964	21.15	18.75	13.94	12.33	61.97	27.25	61.98	45.74
1970	19.41	18.73	11.96	11.94	59.01	29.05	56.09	45.88
1977	19.62	18.67	11.07	11.57	61.83	28.09	52.10	42.97

Source: Calculated from Fujiansheng Tongjiju and Fujiansheng Gonganting (1989).

The internal composition of cities' urban population (in terms of NAPC / TPC) also differed between the coastal and interior regions. When Nanping was first designated, the interior region recorded a share of 85.20%, almost 5% higher than the coastal region. This superiority increased even further a year later. These two higher shares could be explained by a more relaxed practice towards the allotment of non-agricultural household registration in the interior. When this practice was tightened after the Great Leap Forward, the interior fell more than 10% below that of the coast. This gap was even widened slightly when only the non-agricultural population was considered as the urban population and the criteria of town designation were refined in 1964. By 1977, the gap was still there, illustrating that cities on the coast had a larger urban population.

A Tale of Two Contrasting Models: Fuzhou and Sanming

Situated at the agriculturally rich estuary of Minjiang, Fuzhou city (*shi*) (excluding its leading counties) had been one of political centres of the region dating back to ancient times [see Chu and Zheng (1992:201-4) for an account of this history]. Because of this "geo-political" position, Fuzhou had all along maintained intimate relationships with its surrounding hinterland (Xing, 1990:254-5). By the time it became the provincial capital in 1949, Fuzhou was one of the most developed areas in the province. Its economic activities and spatial organisation at that time were the result of layers of accumulation of both Chinese sovereignty and world colonialism (Britain, Russia, Japan, etc.).

Fuzhou was able to capitalise on its status as the provincial capital in the Fujianese specific socialist development model. That it made up approximately 14% and 17% of the province's and the coastal region's GVIO in 1950, respectively, also lent Fuzhou sufficient support in capturing a higher share of the total capital investment (13% of the province's total and 81% of the coast's).[8] In 1952, Fuzhou accounted for 45% of the province's total capital investment and 51% of the coast's total. By 1957, when the First Five Year Plan officially had come to an end, these figures had

been 27% and 19%, respectively. With these capital investments, Fuzhou was able to expand its productive capacity during the First Five Year Plan, contributing to 14% and 18% of the province's and the coast's GVIO. Since most of these investments had been concentrated in the light industry, the proportion of GVIO in light industry had increased slightly from 70% in 1950 to 79% in 1957. This growth in productive capacity, together with the transformation of ownership of existing plants from individuals to state, had led to the increase in staff and workers in state-owned enterprises from 15,700 in 1950, 34,200 in 1952 to 87,700 in 1957. Finally, NAPCT of Fuzhou had increased gradually from 379,000 in 1950, 395,000 in 1952 to 496,000 in 1957.

When a few Shanghai plants were relocated to Fujian from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, Fuzhou managed to obtain a fair share. Out of the eight relocated textile factories, two went to Fuzhou. The rest went to cities and counties in the interior region (He Shaochun, 1991a:354).[9] Fuzhou also received plants producing transformers, switchers, light-bulbs, etc. (He Shaochun, 1991b:357). These Shanghai inputs undoubtedly broadened the light industrial base of Fuzhou. Besides, this relocation programme brought into the province a total of approximately 5,000 staff and workers and their dependents (He Shaochun, 1991a:354). A considerable number of this total, of course, stayed in Fuzhou, thereby increasing its NAPCT.

At the end of the First Five Year Plan, the province decided to ameliorate shortages in energy resources and heavy industrial products by constructing new plants in the interior region. Fuzhou, more than other coastal cities, was again able to take advantage of its position and rendered these interior plants its industrial hinterland. Aided by the construction of the Ying-Xia and the Wai-Fu railroads, the heavy industrial base at Sanming, the construction material and timber processing base at Shaowu and the agricultural raw material base of the Jianxi river basin were now further opened up to Fuzhou (Xing, 1990:322). They provided not only the necessary raw materials but also the intermediate products for further processing. In this way, the expan-

sionary drive of Fuzhou was resolved by extending its spatial influence.

Later, during the mass campaign of developing Fujian's own third front (*sanxian*),[10] many heavy industry and military supplies plants were set up in the interior region. That the latter's share in the total capital investment had increased over time, from 37% in 1962 to 52% in 1965 and 46% in 1976, may be partly attributable to this shift in spatial emphasis. However, because these plants were built totally from scratch and in areas with little industrial base, their construction did not reduce the importance of Fuzhou in the provincial economy, as revealed by its shares in total GVIO: 18% in 1962, 21% in 1965 and 21% in 1976.[11] Thus, by early 1978, Fuzhou had still maintained its supreme position in the province's economy and urban hierarchy.

Sanming city, because of its different historical path, exhibited a pattern of urban development divergent from Fuzhou. The Sanming county, from which the city originated, was only formed in 1956. With such weak foundation, Sanming could not have relied on its internal dynamics for growth; they had to be induced from outside. There were three induced waves of industrial development with both contributions and side-effects to the urban development of Sanming.

The major impetus of growth in its history came in 1957, when Fujian decided to ameliorate shortages in chemical fertiliser, iron and steel and other heavy industrial products by setting up these plants in the province. The Sanming prefecture was chosen for its favourable physical settings, high relative accessibility and rich natural resources. Capital investments [0.07 million *yuan* in 1957, 5.53 in 1962 and 20.88 in 1965 (Zhang and Lu, 1986:247-8)] were poured into Sanming city to construct one plant after another, thereby transforming it into one of the heavy industrial bases in the province.

The second impetus was the relocation of Shanghai light industry plants to Sanming. A total of 13 enterprises and more than 40,000 staff and workers were moved to Sanming between 1960 and 1970 (He Shaochun, 1991b:436), thereby furnishing it with the

light industrial sector that the city otherwise would not have developed by itself.

Finally, during the programme of constructing the third front, a set of plants was relocated from the coastal region and a few brand-new military supplies plants were set up. These developments attracted ten of thousands of staff and workers to the Sanming region.

Due to these industrial developments, Sanming had grown from a small town to a small city. When industrialisation had started in 1957, its NAPCT had reached 5,600 and GVIO 1.09 million *yuan*. Figures for these two indicators had jumped considerably since then. They were 110,500 and 310.26 million *yuan*, respectively, in 1976 (Zhang and Lu, 1986:247-8).

Given that they were induced from outside, these three impetuses — heavy industrial development starting in 1957, the relocation of light industries from Shanghai and the third front development — had directed industrial development into a particular form. Since its heavy industrial plants had originally been set up to ameliorate the coastal plants' shortages in energy and heavy industrial resources, there had, from the province's point of view, been no big incentive to develop Sanming's light industry, other than those plants relocated from Shanghai. One therefore finds that heavy industry had been dominant in Sanming's industrial structure. When the industrialisation process had commenced in 1957, the proportion of heavy industry in the total GVIO had been 49%. It had climbed to 58% in 1962 and 77% in 1965 and had then dropped back to 56% in 1976.[12] These proportions were, as quoted earlier, way higher than those of Fuzhou.

Because its industrial development was induced from outside, Sanming lacked intimate connections with its immediate surroundings. The iron and steel and chemical engineering industries set up since 1957 produced merely to meet the requirements of the coast; and the textile and plastic industries relocated from Shanghai relied on the coastal agricultural base for raw materials. It is thus not surprising for Xing (1990:251, 322) to remark, on the one hand, that Sanming was an industrial hinterland of Fuzhou

and, on the other, that its industries seldom interacted with its surrounding counties. Finally, the industries built during the third front, due to their nature, were never meant to have close interactions with existing production plants. In other words, unlike Fuzhou, industries in Sanming never developed into an interconnected whole with its own growing dynamics.

Perhaps it should also be mentioned that the impacts of many ameliorative measures taken to curb the expansionary drive, as during the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, and the turmoils caused by the Cultural Revolution, on Sanming's industries were serious. During the three years of economic readjustment, capital investment was curbed everywhere. The construction of many plants in Sanming, which had just started, was forced to stop. Those plants that had just commenced production were called upon to reduce their output targets. Again, during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath, many plants were forced to stop production. In other words, because its industries were in their embryonic stage, Sanming might have been hurt more by these measures than, say, Fuzhou had experienced.

In sum, the development paths of Sanming and Fuzhou have reinforced our perception that urban development in the coastal and interior regions had taken different forms and produced different patterns.

Summary

I have argued in the above that urbanisation in Fujian before 1978 must be understood in the context of socialist causal mechanisms and spatial relations. While the former refer to the behaviour of the socialist state together with its shortage economy, the latter refers to the fact that Fujian was a frontier province of China and that within Fujian the coast dominated the interior even before 1949. As the main source of investment, the state concentrated, sectorally, first on light industry and, then, on heavy industry and, spatially, first on the coast and, then, the interior. Nevertheless, due to its more favourable infrastructures and advanced productive capacities, the coast benefited either directly from the state investments or, if this did not happen, indirectly from these investments in the form of forward linkages. As a result of meagre state investments, the urbanisation level in Fujian remained low. It only reached 11% in 1977. The growth of cities was slow too. However, for the same reason, it did not experience the drastic ups and downs in urbanisation of the nation as a whole experienced over time. Due to the interaction of the causal mechanisms and the spatial relations, urbanisation and urban development within Fujian were uneven. The dominance of the coastal region was not interrupted by the socialist development. By 1977, the coastal region made up 67% of the number of cities in the province, 69% of TPCT, 79% of TPC, 67% of NAPCT and 82% of NAPC. In other words, the urban system in the interior region was less well developed. The above analysis has also shown how the different socio-historical backgrounds of Fuzhou and Sanming interacted with the causal mechanisms to produce two divergent models of urban development. The former was more oriented towards the light industry and maintained more intimate relationships with the rural surroundings, while the latter was heavily biased towards the heavy industry and was isolated from its surroundings. It is the objective of the next section to show how this urban legacy — lower urbanisation level with uneven urban development in favour of the coast — has affected urban development during the reform period.

Urban Development After 1978: The Process

Introduction

Economic reforms since 1978 have brought about many changes in China. China has not only opened its economy to the outside world but has also reformed many of its administrative practices in managing the economy. These changes are seen as new elements in the causal mechanisms, the operation of which will affect

urbanisation and urban development in all parts of China. But the urban legacy in Fujian is an important force intervening into the operation of the causal mechanisms. The existing spatial differentiation does not only produce spatial contingency effects but also spatial boundary effects, therefore causing Fujianese specific forms and patterns of urbanisation. Urban development during the reform period, therefore, is seen as the outcome of the operation of these effects.

The Underlying Mechanisms and their Urban Implications

The New Chinese Model of Development

By the end of the 1970s, the Chinese state had begun to recognise that total administration had been malfunctioning or had even been on impossible objective. The previous practice of total administration of the economy and the society, that is its implicit refusal to recognise the autonomy of the economy, the society and the city, had to be discontinued. Instead, it was partially admitted that the economy had its own logic and that the state was going to govern it not so much by direct surveillance as by indirect mechanisms. Then, the reform measures tried to separate the state and the economy and re-define the relations between them. In the urban industry, one observed the implementation of enterprise reform measures to promote entrepeneurship in state-run enterprises. Besides, some mandatory planning techniques of the state were replaced by those of guidance. A dual regulation system (*shuangguizhi*) in planning — the co-existence of the plan and extra-plan modes of operation — started to emerge. Local governments were even granted more power in maintaining their own budgetary positions under a fiscal responsibility system (*fenzao chifan*). Furthermore, banks were increasingly used to regulate the flow of investment and credits instead of the sole reliance on administrative allocation. In the rural sector, the state allowed the peasants to manage their fields on the household responsibility system and sell the quantity of their products beyond procurement in the market and at prices above those fixed by administrative practice. In its relations with the outside world, the Chinese state transformed the trading enterprises into economically independent entities and opened the country to investors from all over the world, at first restrictively to the four Special Economic Zones, then almost everywhere in the country.

In contrast, the society did not experience the magnitude and pace of reform found in the economy. Because the state recognised no autonomy for the social, disciplining the population was still widely practised. Examples of this practice included the one-child policy (more strictly practised in the urban areas), the administrative allotment, to a large extent, of university and college places, jobs and medical services, and the disciplining of individual citizens. Nevertheless, the social was considered more in terms of the population than, as in past, in terms of household. The happiness of the population then captured the attention of the state, and this took the form of measures to improve the standard of living in both the urban and the rural areas, including the re-opening of the free markets for agricultural produces and the construction of housing.

Because of this "model" of reform — a big stride in economic reform and a tiny step in social reform[13] — the Chinese economy has been growing at a tremendous pace. The GNP grew at an average annual rate of 8.7% between 1979 and 1991, a rate never heard of in the history of economic reform in Eastern Europe (Qian and Xu, 1993:541). This remarkable economic growth is the outcome of investment hunger generated by all kinds of urban and township and village enterprises. In the urban areas, the enterprise reform, the fiscal responsibility system of the local government, bank reform, preferential treatments for foreign investors, etc., have induced the enterprises to expand. In the rural areas, the situation leading to the emergence of rural enterprises has also provided these enterprises with the conditions to pursue expansion.

Implications for Rural-urban Relations

The investment hunger so experienced had profound impacts on the role of cities and rural-urban relations. Even during the early stage of enterprise reform, it was realised that simply granting more autonomy to state-owned enterprises would not lead to economic improvement as desired. Due to the administrative barriers erected by the famous sectoral vs territorial (*tiaotiao kuaikuai*) divisions within the administrative system, there was little horizontal and vertical linkage between enterprises of different subsystems. These administrative barriers were considered a hindrance to rapid economic growth, especially when there were still shortages of inputs. The sensible solution was to break down the administrative barriers and let enterprises tap each other's resources through some kinds of cooperation and capture the agglomeration economies of cities and towns.

Administrative barriers existed not only among urban enterprises but also in enterprises between the urban and the rural areas. During the pre-reform period, the urban and the rural areas had been regulated by two separate set of institutions: urban and rural institutions. Thus by the late 1970s, China had been characterised by a clear spatial divide between the urban and the rural, and "at least in the countryside, state power had not been so much weakened as deeply compromised and fettered by the forces of localism" (Shue, 1988:147). It was then difficult to exchange goods in need. Worse still, the rural enterprises, propelled by their own expansionary drive, competed with the urban enterprises for agricultural raw materials, natural resources and semi-skilled labour. In addition, the rise of productivity in agriculture had released from the field a considerable number of labourers, who demanded non-farm jobs. All these meant a great challenge to the urban institutions on all fronts.

There were not too many options open to the state to meet this challenge. First, with the return of the rusticated youth to cities at the end of 1970s and the early 1980s, the demand for jobs by youth born during the baby boom of the 1950s and the pressure built up

in the rationing system due to the potential increase in urban residents, it was deemed difficult to open the gate of existing cities, especially the big ones, to the peasants. Besides, the booming rural economies could not be allowed to grow spontaneously. Instead, they had to be regulated as much as possible. In contrast, the urban enterprises, supposedly the backbone of the national economy, could be given more opportunity to grow efficiently and effectively, even at the expense of their rural counterparts. Finally, as a result of the operation of the prevailing urban institutions, cities were equipped with both agglomeration and urbanisation economies. The latter could be fully developed and utilised to foster the growth of the national economy. Given these "constraints," the alternative that would still ensure the state's control was to recognise and promote the city's role in facilitating the growth of the national economy and the urban institutions' role in regulating both the urban and the rural societies.

This alternative consisted of a new rationality of the role of cities (and towns) and a set of measures to govern the economy and the society. A new rationality of cities was finally formulated after a process of debate during the transitional period from the mid-1970s to the very early 1980s. The dominant view had become not so much whether China should urbanise or not as how should it urbanise [Zhao, 1988:405; see also He Yu (1990:96-114)].

Cities are now seen to possess the "central functions" (*zhongxin zuoyong*) imperative to the efficient and effective organisation of economic activities. With a strong industrial base, cities can stimulate economic growth of their surrounding areas via production linkages. Equipped with the necessary infrastructures and facilities for distribution, cities can enhance exchange of producer goods, services and consumer commodities. With a concentration of capital, cities can supply enterprises in need, both within and outside them, with credits and loans, direct investment, compensation trade, etc. Packed with cultural and educational facilities and services, cities are the ideal places to train scientists, technicians, artists and teachers for the society, and so on. By letting these central functions to develop fully, national

economic growth will be stimulated. More importantly, this growth is achieved without undermining the dominance of urban enterprises and institutions in the national economy. In fact, this arrangement allows their influence to spread over areas beyond the city boundary. As they are under some forms of regulation from the state, the booming rural as well as urban economies will be less likely to run away. What is then meant by central functions is the organisation of economic activities with the cities as the centre of consideration. But unlike in the past, the rural areas are no longer basically restricted to grain production. They are allowed to actively and openly participate in non-farm activities including industrial production, which must, however, be organised sectorally and spatially under the leadership of the cities. In short, by the early 1980s, there were already calls for modified urban-rural relations to perpetuate the dominance of the urban over the rural, perhaps with the latter actively participating in that perpetuation process.[14]

This rationality was put into practice in the form of administrative reforms. The administrative barriers were broken down to allow the formation of horizontal and vertical production linkages with the key industries or products in the cities as the growth poles (*longtou*). Besides, there was a rationalisation of the urban and rural industries, at best, to foster cooperation between the two and, at worst, to allow the urban enterprises to expand into the rural areas and make the rural enterprises subordinate to them. Furthermore, there were attempts to streamline the distribution system in the cities as well as to extend the urban distribution network into the rural areas. To achieve this objective, more attention was paid to the development of the tertiary sector in cities. Morever, there were repeated calls to improve the urban physical infrastructures. Given the limited availability of resources, the state emphasised that urban construction must be paid by sources other than the state such as by society, "the people's city is built by the people" (*renmin chengshi renmin jian*). The original intention of reforming the urban land use system was to furnish the city governments with the necessary revenues to cover expenses on urban

construction. Later, foreign investors were invited to participate in the provision of urban infrastructures.

The most noteworthy measure of all was the implementation of a modified regional administrative system of city-leading-counties (*shiguanxian*) in November 1992. This system abolished the representative agency at the prefecture level, thereby subordinating many counties to the administrative control of prefecture-level cities and provincial capitals. Some other counties were also converted into county-level cities with the relaxation of the criteria of designation in April 1986. This had the effect of putting the peasants under another form of regulation within the urban administrative hierarchy. Once the rural settlements have reached a certain population threshold and economic performance criteria, they are also encouraged to convert into designated towns, forming the lowest level of the urban hierarchy. The relaxation of criteria for town designation in November 1984 has expedited this process of conversion. In short, the implementation of this modified regional administrative system has put a larger portion of the rural economy and society under some forms of state regulation.[15]

Before the economic reforms, administrative measures of de-designation, re-classification of household status and sending-down cadres, youth and former peasants were practised to regulate the urban population. They are now considered unacceptable to the society. Nevertheless, the urban population must still be regulated, though not necessarily at the individual level. Individuals, who are still classified on the basis of their household registration status, are allowed a greater mobility by the implementation of the identity card system. While urban households remain entitled to food rations and other privileged services and facilities, peasants are now allowed to work in cities and towns under a new form of employment contract (contract workers, or *hetong gong*) and/or to live in towns under a new household category (households with self-supplied grains, or *zili kouliang hukou*). Of course, these measures have created the problem of floating population, something the state has been forced to tackle since the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, these measures can be seen as a

pragmatic remedy to ease the employment problem of rural surplus labour, on the one hand, and to stimulate urban economic growth, on the other. In terms of the government of the economy and the society, they enable the state to achieve maximum order of development with minimum responsibility.

This new rationality of the role of cities later developed into other similar reform measures. The first was the promotion of central cities (*zhongxin chengshi*) within economic zones (*jingjiqu*). There was a group of cities which could, due to their more powerful central functions, extend their spatial fields of influence to cover other inferior cities and regions. These cities were called central cities, and the areas defined by their spatial fields became the economic regions. Some central cities with separately listed national planning accounts (*jihua danlie chengshi*) in parity with those of the province represented another attempt to put this rationality into practice.[16]

The concept of open coastal cities (*yanhai kaifang chengshi*) was an application of the central city rationality into the open door policy framework. It recognised the fact that some coastal cities — there were 14 of them (including Fuzhou) in 1984 — did possess better urban basic infrastructures than their interior counterparts. By granting these cities more privileges in order to attract foreign investment, their central functions could develop more thoroughly, thereby stimulating national economic growth. A year later, coastal economic regions, of a larger scale (including the Zhujiang Delta, the Changjiang Delta and the Minnan Triangle), were implemented for a similar purpose.

To summarise, the above has outlined the way the Chinese specific causal mechanisms have interacted with the spatial relations to cause a change in the urban-rural relations. Changes in some administrative practices have triggered off the expansionary drives in both the urban and rural economies. It had become impractical to ignore the booming rural economies, while the expansion of the urban economy required the pooling of more resources. The measure adopted was to fully develop the cities by relaxing the many administrative barriers and incorporating the

rural economy into the orbit of the urban. While people are still classified on the basis of their household registration status, peasants are allowed to work and live in cities and towns on a newly devised household status and employment contract. As a result, one sees the booming of cities and towns and the influx of the floating population. These are the processes and patterns of urbanisation that one observes in China today. What about Fujian in particular? This is the topic to which this paper now turns.

The Operation of the Causal Mechanisms in Fujian

Spatial Differentiation in Fujian, 1978

The nation-wide causal mechanisms were operating in a set of spatial relations pertaining to Fujian at the end of the 1970s to produce both spatial contingency effects and province-wide spatial boundary effects restricted to some areas rather than to others. A few characteristics of spatial differentiation are particularly highlighted for later discussion. They include: economic performance of the urban industries, *per capita* arable land and overseas connection.

To begin with, the regional variations in development potential at the beginning of the economic reform were very great (Table 4). Although cities (excluding counties under their jurisdiction) made up only 11.12% of the total population in the province in 1978, they dominated the provincial economy by almost all standards. For example, they accounted for 48.97% of the total industrial staff and workers, 50.04% of the GVIO and 49.25% of the total amount of profits and taxes. Cities were also more efficient in terms of outputs by one unit of input of industrial capital or fixed assets.

The variations among cities were equally wide. As summarised in Table 4, coastal cities especially Xiamen and Fuzhou performed far better than the interior cities of Sanming and Nanping in a few economic indicators. Fuzhou and Xiamen alone accounted for 31.29% of the province's GVIO and 29.97% of profits and taxes. One hundred *yuan* of industrial capital in Xia-

Table 4 Regional Variations in Economic Performance in Fujian, 1978

	Province	All cities	Fuzhou	Xiamen	Sanming	Nanping	Quanzhou	Zhangzhou
TP ('000)	24,527.7	2,727.2	1,027.5	473.5	185.2	384.5	385.9	269.6
NAPC ('000)	2,755.2	1,389.4	614.9	275	117.2	132.6	125.1	124.6
GVIO ('000 *yuan*)	6,418,000	3,211,360	1,323,440	684,840	445,930	303,260	203,360	250,560
PT ('000 *yuan*)	1,221,000	601,300	210,110	155,830	67,930	84,540	25,160	57,730
PT *per* 100 *yuan* of IC (State enterprises)	23.69	26.80	25.28	39.43	15.19	28.18	18.73	41.34
GVIO *per* 100 *yuan* of IC (State enterprises)	100.99	121.32	132.44	144.60	93.66	92.47	125.74	153.89
PT *per* 100 *yuan* of GVFS	27.23	32.70	34.37	49.56	16.94	29.18	25.31	46.93
GVIO *per* 100 *yuan* of GVFS	123.68	159.28	194.59	198.97	103.61	96.97	184.06	190.53
GVIO *per* NAPC	2,329.41	2,311.33	2,152.28	2,490.33	3,804.86	2,287.03	1,625.58	2,010.91
GVIO *per* ISW	7,116.88	7,272.10	7,096.19	7,270.06	9,026.92	7,658.08	7,135.44	5,773.27

Table 4 (Continued)

PT *per* NAPC	443.16	432.73	341.70	566.65	579.61	637.56	201.12	463.32
PT *per* ISW	1,353.96	1,361.64	1,126.60	1,654.25	1,375.10	2,134.85	882.81	1,330.18
GVFS *per* NAPC	1,627.47	1,323.44	994.19	1,143.31	3,420.73	2,184.92	794.56	987.32
GVFS *per* ISW	4,972.28	4,163.93	3,277.91	3,337.69	8,115.59	7,316.16	3,487.72	2,834.56

Notes: PT Profit and tax.
IC Industrial capital.
GVFS Gross value of fixed assets.
ISW Industrial staff and workers.

Sources: Figures for individual cities are calculated from Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1985), whereas those of the province are from Shao (1989).

men made approximately 2.5 times of Sanming in profits and taxes and 1.5 times in GVIO. In terms of gross value of fixed assets, Xiamen was almost their double in both profits and taxes and GVIO. In other words, the coastal cities especially Xiamen outperformed their interior counterparts in input-output analysis.[17]

The variations in the development potential of the rural sector were great too. To begin with, due to the increase in population, the *per capita* arable land in Fujian dropped from 1.43 *mu* in 1958, to 1.09 in 1966, 0.83 in 1976 and 0.79 in 1978 (Chen Jiayuan, 1991:119; Fujiansheng Tongjiju, 1993:173). While cities on the whole registered 0.4 *mu per capita* in 1978, or only 50.63% of that province, the variations among them ranged from 0.2 in Fuzhou to 0.79 in Nanping. Zhangzhou was the coastal city with the highest score of 0.52 (Fujiansheng Tongjiju, 1985:45, 47). The countryside around the coastal cities also varied considerably. As data for 1978 are not available, those of 1984 are used as a substitute. The *per capita* figures for Changle, Lianjiang and Pingtan counties of Fuzhou were 0.48, 0.43 and 0.36, respectively. In contrast, Jianyang and Pucheng counties of Nanping, two of the grain producing areas of the province, both had a high score of 1.58 (Zhang and Lu, 1986:23, 52, 119, 662-3, 690-1). These figures tend to show that the pressure for non-farm employment was greater in the coastal region than in its interior counterpart.

The other variation was overseas connection. According to an estimate around 1949, one-fifth of the dependents of ethnic Chinese staying in China lived in Fujian, while the Fujianese origin represented the second largest group of overseas Chinese in the world, only after the Guangdongese. By the early 1980s, there were, among others, around 6.3 million Fujian ethnic Chinese in ASEAN countries, 0.5-0.6 million in Hong Kong and Macau and 0.01 million in Japan (Fu and Chen, 1990:144-5). This strong overseas connection is, however, unevenly distributed in terms of the ethnic Chinese's home-town or home-village. A careful compilation of data scattered over the book by Zhang and Lu (1986:22, 50, 77, 92, 105, 119, 136, 152, 168, 185, 199, 216, 288, 423, 452, 476, 489, 510, 526, 543, 570, 587, 602, 615, 774, 792, 820, 894, 924, 962, 973, 986, 1009, 1019) tends to confirm our intuitive thinking that overseas connection was stronger in the coastal region than in the interior one. The difference may be as big as (almost) nil in Nanping prefecture and 3,260,000 in the Quanzhou city-region. Forty per cent of Taiwanese ancestors were said to have originated from Quanzhou. In Nan'an county, Quanzhou, for example, there were 842,500 overseas Chinese with local roots, and 642,200 overseas Chinese and their dependents returned to settle in the county. The latter accounted for 57.9% of the county's total population (Zhang and Lu, 1986:587). Another significant example in Quanzhou would be the then Jinjiang county, where 1,100,000 overseas Chinese contributed more than 40 million *yuan* to the construction of the county in the past thirty years (Zhang and Lu, 1986:615). The Zhangzhou city-region, another important centre, had 700,000 overseas Chinese with roots in the region, more than 200 of them with capital assets above 10 million *yuan*. Longxi area of Zhangzhou was also the origin of Taiwanese (Zhang and Lu, 1986:894). For the interior regions of Sanming and Longyan, counties with numerous overseas connections were restricted to those closest to the coast. In short, various parts of Fujian were endowed with different degrees of overseas connection, thereby, providing diverging potential resources for development.

The Operation of the Causal Mechanisms in the Fujianese Spatially Differentiated Setting

It was within this context of regional variations that the causal mechanisms were operating. Capital investment from the state — still the major mechanism that shaped urbanisation in Fujian — was allocated under criteria that in the end favoured city-ward concentration of economic activities. The quest for output value, the hallmark of a planned economy, had not really been slowed down despite the repeated calls for economic efficiency. This was partly caused by the expansionary drive of production enterprises following the enterprise and financial reforms. This was partly the only option open to Fujian given its comparatively poor industrial base. But the implementation of the fiscal responsibility system

since 1980 had meant that not only would Fujian receive less investment from the central state, but be also required to generate local revenues to fund all expenses. One practical measure to ameliorate the shortage in capital resources was to extend the fiscal responsibility system down the administrative hierarchy to the county-level government. It was also in the interest of Fujian, and its lower level governments too, to invest in sectors and areas with high potential for raising the GVIO as well as profits and taxes. Light industry was one of the sectors with these potentials. Our earlier discussion of the regional variations in economic performance revealed that the coastal cities, especially Fuzhou and Xiamen, had generated in 1978 more GVIO and profits and taxes *per* unit of industrial capital than their interior counterparts. In absolute terms, light industries in the coastal cities also out-performed their counterparts in the interior. By concentrating investment in light industry and in the coastal cities, Fujian would then be able to achieve economic prosperity quickly. Accordingly, one would expect a growth of capital investment in these cities.[18]

Both Fuzhou and Xiamen received a big push in capital investment in other ways too. Fuzhou was designated as one of the 14 open coastal cities in 1984, whereas Xiamen was designated as a special economic zone in 1980. The designation of Fuzhou could, as argued earlier, be interpreted as another attempt to tap its "agglomeration economies," or to fully realise its central functions. There was another force besides the realisation of central functions that led to the designation of Xiamen. When China decided to open its door to the outside world, it meant to select sites that would successfully attract outside investment. Xiamen was chosen because of its long history of commodity trade and rich overseas connection. The former equipped Xiamen with personnels who were culturally more inclined to commodity trade and prepared to take risk, whereas the latter provided the resources for development through remittance, direct investment and information diffusion. These two policies had the effects of inducing more capital investment to Fuzhou and Xiamen.

The nature of these effects requires a few words of clarification. These two policies stipulated that both Fuzhou and Xiamen possessed privileges not open to other cities and regions. A greater degree of economic autonomy than usual was granted to these economic zones. They could hire workers on contract terms and sack them during low season of production. Enterprises were allowed to import goods and machineries on their own terms. Besides, tax exemption and tax holiday were given to foreign investors, and so on. The implementation of these privileges tended to divide the cities and regions into two separate groups. And as a result, different institutions were formed, producing spatial boundary effects within the province.

Because Fuzhou and Xiamen were favoured in many ways to attract investment, it is not surprising to see that they captured a significant proportion of the state capital investment both for infrastructure construction and for production facilities. Table 5 shows that, in 1978, Fuzhou and Xiamen had captured 26.46% of Fujian's total capital construction investment. The percentage had soared to a record high in 1984, when the development of the Xiamen Special Economic Zone had slanted the balance towards the group. By 1992, they had still accounted for 48.24% of the total. In other words, the uneven distribution of capital investment towards Fuzhou and Xiamen had even worsened over time. As a result, these cities had become foci of both economic and urban growths.

To some extent, the spatial boundary effect mentioned was not restricted to Fuzhou and Xiamen, as the whole coastal region was gradually granted some special privileges. The first move was made in 1985, when the State Council approved the setting up of the Minnan Triangle as an open coastal economic zone. At that time, this zone included the cities of Xiamen, Quanzhou and Zhangzhou and their surroundings only, or a total of 11 counties/districts. The coverage expanded to 30 counties/districts in January 1988. Three months later, two more counties — Ningde and Xiapu of the Ningde prefecture — were added to the list (Lin Jian, 1990:9-10). Finally, by the end of 1992, even Fu'an city and

Fuding county had also been included, thereby designating all counties and districts along the coast as an open zone. In other words, in terms of special treatment, there had been a clear coastal-interior divide. This policy had the effect of adding fuel to the already more developed and dominating coastal economy.

Table 5 Distribution of Capital Investment in Fujian Since 1978.

	1978	1984	1988	1992
Provincial total ('000 *yuan*)	699,660	1,457,080	6,727,940	7,085,530
All cities* ('000 *yuan*)	275,540	1,056,280	2,800,130	4,795,230
Fuzhou city ('000 *yuan*)	132,340	288,510	1,522,580	2,048,700
Xiamen city ('000 *yuan*)	52,790	419,210	594,920	1,369,050
Cities as a % of province	39.38	72.49	41.62	67.68
% of coastal cities	30.64	54.05	35.24	57.87
% of Fuzhou and Xiamen	26.46	48.57	31.47	48.24

Note: * Excluding their led counties.
Sources: 1978: Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1985); and
1984, 1988 & 1992: Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1985, 1989, 1993).

The other mechanism that shaped urbanisation in Fujian was rural industrialisation. Like other provinces, Fujian experienced a growth in the rural economy. The gross social value of agricultural output increased from 4,966 million *yuan* in 1978 to 77,216 million *yuan* in 1992, or a 15-fold increase over time. Parallel to this tremendous growth was a restructuring of the rural sector. First, farming reduced its share in the agriculture sector from 71.02% in 1978 to 41.53% in 1992. In contrast, other components like animal husbandry and fishing gained in importance over time. Secondly, at the end of 1978, while agriculture had accounted for 73.2% of the total gross social value of rural output, industry had made up only 16.3%. These percentages had changed to 38.9% and 45.8%, respectively, in 1992. This shift in importance was caused by the upsurge in activities of township and village enterprises. The

number of enterprises increased by 15.6 times from 34,247 in 1978 to 534,885 in 1992, the number of employees by 3.9 times from 0.87 million to 3.37 million and the gross value of output by 59.3 times from 918 million *yuan* to 54,425 million *yuan* (constant prices) (Fujiansheng Tongjiju, 1993:181, 183, 200).

Rural industrialisation, however, took different forms depending on the spatial differentiation. As noted earlier, regions varied in the level of rural development, *per capita* arable land and overseas connection. These regional variations represented different contexts in which rural industrialisation took place. Township and village enterprises in Fujian could be roughly divided into two models: township- and village-run in contrast to non-collective (household, individual and "co-operative"). The former was to some extent a continuation of the former commune and brigade operation. Unlike in the Su'nan area, Jiangsu province, where a high level of economic development had already been achieved before the new round of rural industrialisation started in the late 1970s, some rural enterprises in Fujian were organised on the basis of former communes or villages due to the lack of resources for investment. The commune or village form of organisation was the best for raising funds and managing production activities. The countryside of the interior region was dominated by this model. Most of the enterprises started to make simple commodities out of their rich natural resources. For example, township and village enterprises in the then Jianyang prefecture increased their gross output value from 200 million in 1980 to 600 million in 1985 by adopting this strategy (He Shaochun, 1991a:301). In contrast, the coastal region was dominated by the non-collective mode of operation. To overcome the job availability problems caused by low *per capita* arable land, people in the region fully utilised their rich overseas connection to develop labour-intensive non-farm activities. People pooled their resources, such as remittances, information, know-how, donated machines, business contacts, etc., to process imported materials, assemble imported parts and engage in compensation trade. This type of non-collective rural enterprise was first found in Jinjiang and Lianjiang counties, Quanzhou, in

1980 and then diffused to the countryside of Putian, Xiamen and Zhangzhou. Shishi city, formerly a village in Jinjiang county, is the classical example of enterprise-induced development. While gross value of agricultural output (GVAO) of the city increased 7.8 folds from 1978 to 1989, GVIO increased 16.2 folds. Township and village enterprises accounted for 82.9% of the city's GVIO. The amount of foreign currency generated by the exports of these enterprises also increased by 12.8 times (Zhuan and Guo, 1990:41). The economy grew so rapidly that this village was designated as a county-level city in December 1987. This example clearly shows that due to the more favourable conditions, the countryside in the coastal region developed more rapidly than that in the interior.

It is necessary to note in passing that there are exceptions to this rather clearcut coastal-interior divide. The possible examples are Fuzhou and the Ningde prefecture from the coast, where there were predominantly township and village enterprises. It is not to say that household and non-collective enterprises were absent from these two areas. Rather, the latter did not dominate the total — only 20-40% (He Shaochun, 1991a:299). This complication means that the coastal region was internally divided in terms of the dominant mode of operation of the township and village enterprises. The Minnan sub-region, which includes Zhangzhou, Xiamen, Quanzhou and Putian, and the Mindong sub-region, which includes Fuzhou and Ningde prefecture, define two slightly different contexts for urbanisation.[19]

The different forms of rural industrialisation had different implications for urbanisation, first on enterprises in the interior region. Since their growth depended largely on natural resources and their operation was commune- or village-based, they tended to be dispersed over the countryside. In contrast, their counterparts in the coastal region, due to their little reliance on local raw materials and natural resources, could be more foot-loose. This led to the formation of some kinds of agglomeration in the countryside. Yu et al. (1987) find that rural industrial districts had already sprung up like mushrooms in Jinjiang county by the mid-1980s. Each district included tens or even hundreds of rural industrial

enterprises specialising in the manufacturing of a small set of industrial products. This agglomeration had the advantage of inducing a speedier diffusion of technologies and R & D, stimulating capital accumulation and then investment, promoting low-level specialisation and cooperation, forming specialised markets and being a source of capital. As these districts continued to prosper, they developed into somewhat independent industrial structures, paralleling, if not in direct confrontation with, the existing urban industrial systems.

The other effect induced by the non-collective rural enterprises was the migration of the labour force. Since they could offer higher income, itself the outcome of high capital accumulation and then investment, these enterprises attracted agricultural surplus labour from less developed rural economies. For instance, out of a total of 170,000 workers in the rural industrial enterprises in Jinjiang county, 30,000 came from other counties, and even from other provinces. While the rest came from within, as many as 80,000 of them worked in villages or hamlets other than their places of residence (Yu, et al., 1987:102). Most of them formed the now famous households with the self-supplied grains or floating population, depending on the status of their household registration. This simple example clearly shows that the development of these rural enterprises had the effect of accentuating the townward movement of the labour force and population.

The recent land reform represented another mechanism that caused the rapid transformation of Fujian's urban landscape. The housebuilding activities and, to some extent, the rural industrial activities marked only the beginning of land conversion in the countryside. Due to the limited availability of resources to cover the costs incurred, the sizes of population and of land area involved in the early 1980s were comparatively restricted by today's standards. But given Fujian's low *per capita* arable land, the problem of land conversion was already alarming. A survey of three counties (Longhai in Zhangzhou city, Jian'ou in Jianyang prefecture and Xiapu in Ningde prefecture) in early 1985 indicated that 2.86% of the total arable land had disappeared in the previous six

years. This problem was, as expected, more acute in the coastal region. A village near Zhangzhou lost approximately 6.4% of its total area within the same period, thereby lowering the *per capita* figure from 0.66 *mu* to 0.61 *mu* (Fujiansheng Nongcun Shehui Jingji Diaocha Lingdao Xiaozu, 1988:227). This caused some concerns at the decision-making level, as illustrated by the various measures taken to curb this development.

The situation worsened with the implementation of a series of land reform measures starting in the mid-1980s. Now the right of owning a plot of land and the right to use it was separated. Accordingly, although urban land was still owned by the state, its right to use could now be transferred from one user to another. Or, in the usual parlance, land parcels may be bought and sold in the market. This changed the rules of the game altogether. It has now become openly recognised that land is a resource exchangeable for other resources in shortage. The peasants want to improve their standard of living by selling themselves their land to the highest bidder. Some urban land users would try to make a profit out of re-selling their administratively allocated land parcels.[20] The city government wants to enlarge the public purse by selling land[21] or obtain some planning gains from land and property development.[22] In other words, it is to everyone's interest to get involved in land development. This has the effect of increasing the scale of land development and magnifying the degree of social transformation. In particular, the magnitude of the transformation has increased with the gaining popularity of the practice of large-scale land development (*tudi chengpian kaifa*). This practice amounts to the granting of the development right to a developer — usually foreign — who transforms a large tract of raw land and then either subdivides the serviced land into smaller parcels to be re-sold in the market or sells the housing units built. Since the demand for land and property in the coastal region has always been higher, one expects a larger amount of land development activities there. According to an incomplete survey of ten coastal cities, 732 tracts of land had been approved for this mode of development by the end of 1990, amounting to a total land area of

1,978 hectare (Cai and Lin, 1992:40). In another survey, it was found that Quanzhou and Zhangzhou accounted for 60% of the province's total number of large-scale development projects (Cai and Xie, 1992:37). All these land development activities have transformed the economic and social life of tens of thousands of peasants and provided a favourable investment environment, thereby hastening the pace of urbanisation.

The above discussion has clearly shown how the causal mechanisms interact with the Fujianese specificity to cause urban growth in the coastal region at the expense of the interior region. It is the task of the following sub-section to outline the exact pattern of urbanisation and of coastal domination.

Summary

This section has argued that China has adopted a new model of development based on a different attitude towards the government of society and economy. While the economy is recognised as something autonomous, the society is seen as a population still dependent on the state. This new rationality calls for a new conception of using urban places to regulate development. Because there are many non-state investments, cities and towns must be used to put these "spontaneous" developments under as much state control as possible. This new conception is usually couched in terms of central functions of cities, and later, central cities, cities as economic zones, open coastal cities, etc. Residents have been granted freer movement to support non-state investments, but they are still regulated by the household registration system.

Because of its urban legacy, Fujian has very much been divided into a coastal and an interior regions. The former is endowed with richer overseas connection and better economic performance, some things that are lacking in the latter. These differences have made the former more favourable for the attraction of foreign investment and the development of non-collective rural enterprises and, concomitantly, urbanisation.

The Pattern of Fujianese Urbanisation Since 1978

A Few Characteristics

The interplay of an influx of foreign investment and the investment hunger of local urban and rural enterprises in production and land development, on the one hand, and the measures to keep these dynamics still under some forms of state regulation, on the other, resulted in a peculiar urbanisation pattern in Fujian.

There was an increase in the level of urbanisation. Figure 2 shows that the ratio of NAPCT / TP had increased gradually from 11.23% in 1978 to 16.37% in 1992. If the ratio of TPCT / TP is employed as the statistical yardstick, which increased from 19.08% to 77.10%, one will come up with the similar observation that urbanisation level had increased over time. This increase must, however, be interpreted together with a few other features. First, as also indicated by Figure 2, the TPCT series had recorded a more rapid growth path since 1984, thereby enlarging tremendously its difference with the NAPCT series from 7-8% throughout the 1960s and 1970s to 60% in 1992. This wide margin was something unheard of in the pre-reform period. Secondly, a disaggregated analysis of NAPCT reveals that although annual growth rates of NAPC had always been positive since 1978, those of NAPT had negative signs on a few occasions (Figure 3). This is again a divergence from the pre-reform period, during which there were negative annual growth rates of NAPC. Thirdly, Figure 4 captures vividly that, although TPT was smaller than TPC before 1983, this order was reversed after that year with TPT being much larger than TPC. It implies that a larger proportion of the total urban population would have come from town population. What we observed in the pre-reform period was a reverse pattern. TPT, which outnumbered TPC at the beginning, was overtaken later due to the dwindling number of towns. Finally, this growth in TPT had not, as pointed out in Figure 4, been accompanied by a parallel growth in NAPT. In sum, this pattern of urbanisation — a consistent increase in urbanisation level with a quantum jump in



Figure 4 Growth of Urban Population in Fujian, 1978-1992

the total population of towns — was clearly different from what had been learnt about the pre-reform period.

This pattern was the outcome of the state's reaction to foreign, commune- and village-run, and non-collective investments. In recognising the importance of non-state activities, the state had taken the necessary steps to promote the expansion of the urban system. In the first place, it did not impose any restrictions on the number of urban places, especially that of towns. In fact, Fujian followed the national decree of relaxing the criteria of town designation in 1984 and of city designation in 1986. This helps to account for the increase in the number of designated cities from 6 in 1978 to 10 in 1984, and to 18 in 1992 and of designated towns from 68 to 200, and to 344, for the respective years. Because of this upgrading process, there was a re-classification of some residents as non-agricultural households. Accordingly, the total of NAPC increased continuously, ensuring that the annual growth rates were always positive. It is difficult to deny that NAPT also benefited from this upgrading process (and the addition of households with self-support grains). But its size might be reduced due to the very fact that some towns had been upgraded into cities. In other words, the occasionally negative growth rates of NAPT were not so much caused by such drastic measures of de-designation as by the upgrading of some towns into cities. Besides, since the new criteria of town designation in 1984 allowed settlements with smaller number of NAPT to be upgraded as designated towns, NAPT had not increased at a pace comparable with that of TPT. Although this was also an issue for cities, the margin between total population and non-agricultural population was less wide. In short, the growth of urban places had effected a more rapid increase in the total population of towns.

Another measure to promote the growth of the urban system was to permit cities and towns to expand areally. In one case, this areal expansion led to the expansion of the total population while leaving the non-agricultural population comparatively intact. In other cases, where the city-leading-counties system was implemented, some cities extended their influences without even

changing the population size. In 1983, Fuzhou increased the number of led counties from one to eight. After shedding some counties, Putian prefecture was abolished and then designated as Putian city with two led counties only. In the same year, Sanming prefecture was abolished. As a substitution, Sanming city started to lead 10 counties. A similar system was implemented in Quanzhou and Zhangzhou two years later. Finally, there were cases where county-level cities were stipulated to be province-administered cities (*sheng zhixia xingzheng danwei*). They included Yong'an, Shishi, Fuqing and Jinjiang. Their economies, mostly predominated by non-state mode of operation, had been growing rapidly for sometime before they were designated as cities. By granting these cities the administrative status of province-administered cities, the province in fact put these cities under its direct control. However, having gained this status, these cities were to able to obtain more resources and run their economic activities over larger territories.

These administrative attempts allowed the state to expand its control over an increasing population. In recognising the insufficiency of maintaining order by merely controlling the number, the state permitted the cities and towns to expand in number. With the relative autonomy of the economy, it became necessary to pay heed to the growth of the society. Besides, in recognising the impossibility and impracticality of disciplining everyone by entitling them to all sorts of welfare, the state permitted cities and towns to expand areally. It is well known that NAPCT represents the population under stricter state surveillance (via the regulation of job, education, housing, birth control, etc.) and TPCT merely the total population under some forms of control of the city and town administrations. Areal expansion of cities and towns would allow the state to expand its control over an increasing population (i.e., TPCT) without enlarging the population enjoying entitlement (i.e., NAPCT).

A few characteristics can be summarised from this trend of increasing urbanisation induced by the unproportionally rapid increase in town population. First, cities were increasingly

"ruralised," as represented by the drop in the proportion of non-agricultural population over time. Table 6 shows that the ratio of NAPC / TPC dropped from 50.96% in 1978 to 35.52% in 1992, with some hiccups during the mid-1980s. Secondly, towns were also "ruralised," but at an even faster rate. The ratio of NAPT / TPT dropped from 69.93% to 12.92% during this period. As noted in the previous paragraph, this faster rate could be attributable to the relaxation measure implemented in 1984. Although the ongoing procedure of city designation together with a similar relaxation measure in 1986 was also held responsible for lowering the ratio, they had not been able to pull it down at a rate comparable to that of the towns. Thirdly, the countryside was increasingly "urbanised," as represented by the increasing number of designated towns and the increasing proportion of town population in the total population. Besides the usual denotations, TPCo stands for the total population of the countryside or areas other than cities (excluding their led counties). The ratio of TPT / TPCo climbed from 8.96% in 1978 to 68.29% in 1992, or an almost eightfold increase in 15 years.

These characteristics can be further elaborated by a disaggregated analysis of the working population by economic sectors. Given the nature of the analysis, we resort to the fourth Population Census for data. A few cautionary notes must be sounded before examining the results of the analysis. First, the statistical yardsticks employed by this census differed from those used so far. Population in a city included (1) the entire resident population for cities with urban districts (excluding the led counties), and (2) the resident population of street neighbourhoods only for cities without districts. Population in a town comprised the resident population of resident committees only. These definitions had the effect of reducing the sizes of TPC and TPT. In other words, we shall expect a larger TPCo. Besides, that the households with self-supplied grains were excluded from the non-agricultural population further reduced the size of NAPT, especially. Furthermore, there was a major difference between China and the West in the way the economic sectors were classified, namely that mining

and quarrying was included in industry in the former but not in the latter (Guojia Tongjiju, 1993:77).[23] Thus, there is a slight problem of comparing directly the distribution of working population by economic sectors in China with that of, say, the USA and Britain. Finally, as data on the 1982 Population Census is unavailable at the time of writing, it becomes impossible to undertake a temporal analysis of the variations in distribution. The analysis of the 1990 Population Census performed here, however, serves to illustrate what we exactly mean by "urbanisation" of the countryside and "ruralisation" of cities and towns. With these cautionary notes in mind, we can proceed to describe the results of the analysis.

Table 6 Some Indicators of Fujianese Urbanisation, 1978-1992

Unit: %

Years	NAPC/TPC	TPT/TPCo	NAPT/TPT
1978	50.96	8.96	69.93
1979	52.06	9.29	70.79
1980	52.86	9.62	70.17
1981	50.72	9.54	69.40
1982	51.06	9.63	69.27
1983	47.72	9.35	69.11
1984	47.91	25.48	27.45
1985	49.15	32.08	23.73
1986	49.64	33.11	23.36
1987	50.08	35.21	22.18
1988	47.17	39.12	20.02
1989	46.85	42.09	19.04
1990	42.73	45.04	17.34
1991	38.00	45.96	17.21
1992	35.52	68.29	12.92

Source: Calculated from Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1993).

It is apparent from Figure 5 (A) that "ruralisation" of cities was restricted to APC (agricultural population of cities), and to some extent OPC (other population — those without or with pending household registration — of cities), if "ruralisation" refers to the proportion of working population involved in agriculture (i.e., the primary sector in Chinese parlance). Almost 60% of APC and 16% of OPC worked in agriculture. In contrast, less than 2% of NAPC were involved. In totality, approximately 30% of the total working population of cities worked in agriculture, or the rate of "ruralisation" was 30%.

This is a high percentage in comparison with that of towns. No one will consider this finding surprising once having read Figure 5 (B). The latter gives the impression that the percentages in agriculture for both APT and OPT are lower. With roughly 14% and 6% lower in APT and OPT, respectively, the rate of "ruralisation" in towns reaches 17% only. This lower percentage is partly due to the fact that the population outside residential committees, who usually belongs to non-agricultural population, is excluded from the total of town population.

This lower rate of "ruralisation" aside, there are some other differences between NAPC and NAPT in the distribution of economic sectors. More NAPC than NAPT worked in the secondary sector, and *vice versa* in the tertiary sector. The former partly reflected the ever-concentration of state investment in cities, the latter the growth of collective and non-collective industrial and service enterprises. Towns had a few more percentages of their working population in retail and restaurant services.

In terms of agricultural population, towns had almost two times more of their working population in these services. I would suspect that a high proportion of this population was households with self-supplied grains. Many of them, who moved to towns, worked in restaurants and retail outlets or even set up these services themselves. The percentage in industry was also higher as these households took up contract employment in collective and non-collective enterprises in towns or even set them up.

We mentioned earlier that the other characteristic of urbanisation after 1978 was "urbanisation" of the countryside. In NAPCo, the percentage in non-agricultural activities was almost 88% [see Figure 5 (C)]. The percentages for APCo and OPCo were 14% and 36%, respectively. Then approximately 18% of the total population in the countryside were involved in non-agricultural activities. Or the rate of "urbanisation," represented by the percentage of working population in non-agricultural activities, was 18%. This percentage is certainly smaller than the one calculated by the ratio of TPT / TPCo.

For the countryside, industry and retail and restaurant services represented almost the two most "popular" sectors among the non-agricultural population, be it NAPCo, APCo or OPCo. Once again, the non-state source of investment had the effect of distributing a higher proportion of working population to these production and service sectors. The percentage in education, culture and broadcasting services in NAPCo was exceptionally higher — 21% — because these services were desperately required in the countryside.

Finally, one sector that occupied a prominent position among non-agricultural population in cities, towns and the countryside was the state agencies and social organisations. And the percentage in towns was higher than those in cities and the countryside. These figures tend to support our earlier finding that the state has relied on the promotion of urban places, and lately towns in particular, to regulate the population.

Figure 5 Distribution of Working Population in Fujian by Economic Sectors, July 1990



Note: The numbers in parentheses are percentages of the working population in particular household categories.

Source: Fujiansheng Renkou Pucha Bangongshi (1992).

This new form of urbanisation can also be detected in China as a whole, albeit with some minor differences. Like Fujian province, China has experienced a higher level of urbanisation, which has been largely caused by the growth of town population (see Table 7). The following statistics can be quoted as evidence to support this observation. While the percentage share of TPCT in the total population has registered an annual average growth rate of 15.96%, that of NAPCT has reached 3.64% only. The non-agricultural component has clearly increased at a slower rate than its total. The ratio of TPC / TPCT, an indicator of the share of city population in the total urban population, increased from 69.17% in 1978 to 74.18% in 1983, the highest level ever recorded in the 1980s, and then dropped abruptly to 59.26% one year later. After some ups and downs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ratio settled down at a comparatively low level of 52.75%. Finally, another indicator of the increasing importance of towns is the ratio of TPT / TP, which recorded an annual average growth rate of 27.96%. Thus, on the whole, it is possible to say that there has been in China a rising urbanisation level together with an increasing share of town population since 1984.

Similarly, the processes of "urbanisation" of the countryside and "ruralisation" of cities and towns were also present in China.[24] The proportion of non-agricultural population in the total population of cities declined gradually from 70.46% in 1978 to 44.29% in 1992. The percentages for towns were 75.98% and 20.11%, respectively. These figures clearly show that the "ruralisation" process was more prominent in towns than in cities. Town population also made up an increasingly larger share of the total population of the countryside over time, from 6.30% to 28.41%. Judging from these figures, it is difficult to deny that the countryside has already been "urbanised."

A cautious reading of Table 7, however, informs us that there are subtle differences between Fujian and China. The first difference to note is that the countryside of China has been "urbanised" at almost half the rate of Fujian. While the annual average growth rate of the former is 23.38%, that of the latter is 44.15%. Besides,

Table 7 Comparing Urbanisation in Fujian and China, 1978-1992

		1978	1980	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	GR*
TPCT/TP	China	17.92	19.39	20.81	23.42	31.63	36.13	40.70	45.84	48.86	50.91	52.31	53.43	60.79	15.96
	Fujian	19.08	19.78	21.05	22.65	37.28	42.84	43.74	45.52	50.07	52.90	56.61	59.27	77.10	20.27
NAPCT/TP	China	12.93	14.04	14.48	14.79	15.99	16.98	17.22	17.79	18.38	18.78	19.01	19.25	19.98	3.64
	Fujian	11.23	11.93	12.28	12.52	13.45	14.19	14.39	14.54	14.91	15.27	15.17	15.32	16.37	3.05
Number of cities	China#	191	217	239	271	295	324	347	381	432	446	461	475	507	11.03
	Fujian	6	6	7	9	10	10	10	11	12	14	16	16	18	13.33
Number of towns	China+	2856	2874	2819	2781	6211	7511	8464	9121	8614	9088	9115	9308	10587	18.05
	Fujian	na	68	125	na	200	209	214	220	245	270	283	344	na	na
TPC/TPCT	China	69.17	70.26	70.62	74.18	59.26	56.51	53.45	52.76	56.05	55.57	56.02	56.10	52.75	-1.58
	Fujian	58.26	56.84	60.03	64.77	42.16	36.97	36.33	34.98	35.92	35.30	37.21	41.56	36.03	-2.54
TPT/TP	China	5.53	5.77	6.11	6.05	12.89	15.71	18.95	21.65	21.47	22.61	23.00	23.46	28.72	27.96
	Fujian	7.96	8.54	8.41	7.98	21.56	27.00	27.85	29.60	32.09	34.22	35.55	34.63	49.33	34.65
NAPC/TPC	China	70.46	70.26	67.84	60.08	58.60	56.68	53.68	50.30	47.27	46.83	45.81	45.38	44.29	-2.48
	Fujian	50.96	52.86	51.06	47.72	47.91	49.15	49.64	50.08	47.17	46.85	42.73	38.00	35.52	-2.02

Table 7 (Continued)

TPT/TPCo	China	6.30	6.68	7.20	7.16	14.34	17.08	20.07	22.48	22.45	23.46	23.81	24.16	28.41	23.38
	Fujian	8.96	9.62	9.63	9.35	25.48	32.08	33.11	35.21	39.12	42.09	45.04	45.96	68.29	44.15
NAPT/TPT	China	75.98	77.55	73.66	71.97	38.88	34.40	29.27	25.96	25.30	24.46	24.28	24.06	20.11	-4.90
	Fujian	69.93	70.17	69.27	69.11	27.45	23.73	23.36	22.18	20.02	19.04	17.34	17.21	12.92	-5.43

Notes: * Annual average growth rate.
The numbers refer to designated cities with population statistics, thereby excluding in the total a few cities with missing statistics. For instance, there were 479 designated cities in 1991, but the figure recorded in this table is 475.
+ The numbers refer to county-administered designated towns and exclude city-administered designated towns.
na Not available.

Sources: For China: Guojia Tongjiju Renkou Tongjishi (1989:155; 1993:374).
For Fujian: Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1993).

towns in China have been "ruralised" at a slower rate than Fujian. Or, the proportion of non-agricultural population has dropped at an average negative rate of 4.9%, which is about 0.5% slower than Fujian. Thirdly, in contrast to the slower rates of "urbanisation" of the countryside and "ruralisation" of towns, China has experienced a slightly higher rate of "ruralisation" of cities. To begin with, a higher proportion of China's total population of cities in 1978 belonged to the status of non-agricultural population. Although at the end of the study period, the proportion in China is still higher than Fujian, the margin has been narrowed. In the end, a faster rate of decline is recorded in China (-2.48%) than in Fujian (-2.02%). These are some of the differences in urbanisation between Fujian and China.

These differences can be interpreted as the outcome of the spatial contingency effect: the differences in the level of state investment in the past and the mode and the level of rural industrialisation in the present. As argued earlier, fewer state investments have produced a group of economically weaker cities as well as a lower urbanisation level. In comparing the urban systems of Fujian with other coastal provinces in southeast China (including Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang and Guangdong) in 1987, Xing (1990:5-7) finds that Fujian's urban system lacks economically powerful central cities. Fuzhou, the largest city in the Fujianese urban system, is not comparable with other central cities like Guangzhou and Nanjing, in terms of population size and GVIO. As a result, Fujian has found it difficult to fully develop its agglomeration economies, which has in turn attracted fewer non-agricultural population and rural activities from the countryside. Xing's finding, though couched in a different terminology, tends to reinforce our argument that because of its weaker cities, Fujian has experienced a slower rate of "ruralisation" of the cities. In contrast, the dominant non-collective mode of operation of Fujian's rural enterprises and land development, especially in Putian, Quanzhou, Xiamen and Zhangzhou, has stimulated a faster pace of "urbanising" the countryside and "ruralising" the towns. These differences between Fujian and China can, according to the framework of this paper, be seen as the outcome of the interplay of causal mechanisms and spatial contingency effects, etc.

Regional Variations in Urbanisation

Introduction

The interplay of spatial contingency and spatial boundary effects has made regional variation in urbanisation a necessary outcome. We have noted earlier that the coastal and the interior regions differ in their urban legacy, their ability to attract state investment, their overseas connections, the dominant mode of operation of rural enterprises. Because of these differences, some urban processes, such as those related with overseas connections, the non-collective mode of rural enterprises, the designation of Open Coastal City, the Special Economic Zone and the Open Coastal Region are found only in the coastal region. In other words, spatial differentiation has affected the operation of the causal mechanisms, causing spatial contingency effects and spatial boundary effects. As a result, two different models of urbanisation have been experienced.

Regional Variations

One observes great regional variations in urbanisation in terms of the indicators employed above (Table 8). The level of urbanisation, as represented by NAPCT / TP, has been lower in the coastal region than in the interior, partly due to the fact that the total population of the latter is smaller. If calculated in terms of TPCT / TP, it is apparent that urbanisation level in the coastal region has been higher, especially since the mid-1980s. This is supported by the evidence that "ruralisation" of cities in the coastal has been faster since 1986. The rate for the coastal region has dropped by 37% from 1986 to 1992, while that of the interior region by 15% only. Similarly, towns in the coastal region have experienced a faster rate of "ruralisation" than its interior counterpart, as their rates of change between 1978 and 1992 have been -83.6% and

Table 8 Regional Variations in Fujianese Urbanisation, 1978-1992

		1978	1984#	1986#	1992
Number of designated cities	Coast	4	5	5	10
	Interior	2	5	5	8
Number of designated towns	Coast	na	113	131	355*
	Interior	na	80	83	154*
TPCT/TP	Coast	19.16%	36.12%	44.93%	85.44%
	Interior	18.89%	39.95%	40.96%	55.72%
NAPCT/TP	Coast	11.00%	12.88%	13.94%	16.43%
	Interior	11.76%	14.75%	15.45%	17.27%
NAPC/TPC	Coast	52.84%	53.74%	55.62%	35.07%
	Interior	43.84%	39.52%	38.98%	33.00%
NAPT/TPT	Coast	66.36%	23.69%	19.21%	10.90%+
	Interior	74.60%	35.26%	36.61%	28.78%
TPT/TPCo	Coast	7.44%	25.37%	35.54%	79.34%
	Interior	12.22%	28.92%	27.17%	37.45%

Notes: * The data refer to June 1993.

+ There seems to be a mis-print in the total town population in Tong'an county, Xiamen (Fujiansheng Tongjiju, 1993:437), as it has assigned all population in that county to town population. This is mysterious, since Tong'an county had not been designated as a city by the end of 1992. As a result, an adjustment has been made to the total town population. The non-agricultural population increased from 39,600 in 1991 to 45,900 in 1992, or a difference of 6,300. Since it is difficult to estimate the growth in agricultural population, we assume that it did not happen anyway. Thus, the total town population in 1992 increased only by 6,300, giving us the total of 247,600 rather than 527,200 as recorded in the statistical yearbook.

na Not available.

Only 1984 and 1986 were selected to reflect the effects of the relaxation measures on the designation of cities and towns.

Sources: Population percentages calculated from Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1993) and Fujiansheng Tongjiju and Fujiansheng Gonganting (1989).
City figures from Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1993) and Fujiansheng Tongjiju and Fujiansheng Gonganting (1989).
1984 town figures from Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonganbu Sanju (1985); 1986 figures from Bianji Weiyuanhui (1987); and 1993 figures from Li (1993).

-61.4%, respectively. Regarding "urbanisation" of the countryside, the difference between the two regions has been even bigger, with the coast registering almost a ten-fold increase and the interior only a two-fold increase. In other words, a larger proportion of the population in the coastal region has been subject to state regulation.

Fuzhou and Sanming Re-visited

In 1978, Fuzhou was, as argued earlier (see also Table 4), *the* most favourable city for investment. It generated the largest GVIO and profits and taxes in absolute terms. Besides, its population, be it TP or NAPCT, was almost half the size of all cities in the province and approximately 2.5 times as big as Xiamen, the second largest city. Moreover, Fuzhou was far superior, in absolute terms, in public infrastructures, education and community facilities (Fujiansheng Tongjiju, 1985:45-53). Being a city full of agglomeration economies, Fuzhou captured a substantial proportion of the province's capital construction investment. Table 5 shows that this had been the case, with the possible exception being the early years of the 1980s when Xiamen received a big push in infrastructure investment.

Fuzhou's position in attracting investment was enhanced by her administrative status as the province's capital. Thus Fuzhou was able to attract, as Xiamen did, foreign investment at the beginning of the 1980s even without the status of a special economic zone. In fact, the first joint-venture investment in the province, between Japan and Fujian, was found in Fuzhou in 1981 (Shao, 1989:48). Fuzhou also managed to upgrade its electronics, food, machinery, plastics, and other industries through some kind of co-operation with the outside world (He Shaochun, 1991b:358-9). Its ability to attract foreign investment was further enhanced when Fuzhou finally received its official recognition as one of the 14 open coastal cities of China in 1984. As a result, Fuzhou received more autonomy in economic decision-making than other cities in the province (with the possible exception of Xiamen). This recognition led to the establishment of the Fuzhou Economic and

Technological Development Zone (*jingji jishu kaifaqu*) at Mawei in May 1984. The preferential treatment at Mawei promoted foreign and local — Fujian and China alike — investments, thereby expediting the economic restructuring process. As a means to facilitate economic development, there was construction of physical infrastructures and industrial districts in Mawei and other local centres (He Shaochun, 1991b:362-4). These developments had the effect of enlarging Fuzhou's field of influence along Minjiang to Yong'an, Sanming, Nanping and Shaowu, eastward along the coast to Ningde and westward to Putian (Xing, 1990:254-6, 322).

The other propelling force is rural industrialisation. On the one hand, in 1978, Fuzhou had the smallest arable land area *per capita* among cities in the province. On the other hand, it had the largest NAPC and a net population increase (Fujiansheng Tongjiju, 1985:45, 47). The obvious solution was to transfer the surplus labour force into non-farm activities. By 1985, there were 24,700 rural enterprises with a work force of 431,000, or one-third of the total rural labour force in Fuzhou and its leading counties. The gross output value of rural enterprises accounted for 52.6% of the gross value of rural social output (He Shaochun, 1991b:360). Seven years later, the number of rural enterprises increased to 77,539. These enterprises, the gross output value (current prices) of which accounted for 79.1% of the gross value of rural social output, employed 35.22% of the rural labour force, or 643,944 in absolute numbers (Fujiansheng Tongjiju, 1993:452, 459, 461).

As argued earlier, this growth was partly due to the presence of rich overseas connections. In 1983, there were 0.43 million overseas Chinese and their dependents settling in Fuzhou and its leading counties and 0.75 million overseas Chinese with local roots. These overseas connections, though fewer in comparison with Quanzhou and Putian, were responsible for stimulating the growth of non-collective rural enterprises. The latter (i.e., excluding townships and village-run enterprises) made up 21.32% of the gross value of output in 1985 (He Shaochun, 1991b:349, 360-1).

This growth in economic activities, which must be regulated, was accompanied by administrative changes. At one level, there

was the enlargement of Fuzhou's administrative jurisdiction over time. In 1978, Fuzhou city included four city districts and one rural district (a total land area of 1,043 sq km) and led one county (Minhou, with an area of 2,129 sq km). In April 1983, partly in response to the national campaign of restructuring the regional administrative system and partly to the on-site requirement of extending its control over the surrounding areas, Fuzhou was permitted to expand. A total of seven counties from the then Putian and Ningde prefectures was included into its jurisdiction. The total land area of the city-region was suddenly increased from 2,129 sq km to 10,968 sq km (Zhang and Lu, 1986:4). In December 1990, Fuqing, one of its counties, was granted the status of a designated city, thereby reducing the number of counties within its administrative jurisdiction to seven. Nevertheless, the influence of Fuzhou on Fuqing was still prevalent due to its spatial proximity and the fact that Fuzhou was the capital of the province.

At another level, there was a continuous process of converting rural settlements into designated towns. In June 1980, there was one designated town in both the rural district and Minhou county (Fujiansheng Cehuiju and Fujiansheng Minzhengting, 1982). In December 1984, slightly over a year after the administrative reform, the number in its leading counties was raised to 33, while that in the rural district remained the same (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonganbu Sanju, 1985:34, 92). Four years later, one more designated town was added to both the rural district and the counties (Bianji Weiyuanhui, 1989:18). Finally, in June 1993, the number in the rural district increased to 13 while that of counties to 81 (Li, 1993).[25] In other words, the growth in the number of designated towns in the early 1990s was shockingly fast.

The extension of administrative control at these two levels had increased the size of the "urban" population. TPCT of Fuzhou city-region increased from 1.08 million in 1978, to 2.29 million in 1984 and to 4.58 million in 1992, while that of TPC from 1.03 million, to 1.16 million and to 2.41 million. Simple subtraction of the former from the latter informs us that, besides the expansion of territory, the major cause of the growth of the urban population

was due to the expansion in the number of designated towns. Evidence to support this statement can be furnished by an examination of some other indicators of urbanisation. The rate of "urbanisation" of the countryside (i.e., TPT / TPCo) increased from 10.50%[26] in 1978, to 30.72% in 1984, 30.90% in 1986 and 71.39% in 1992. The other typical features of the coastal model of urbanisation can be found in Fuzhou: while both cities and towns have been experiencing "ruralisation," the rate in towns has been much faster than that of cities. In 1978, the rates of "ruralisation" for city and towns in Fuzhou were 59.84% and 34.96%,[27] respectively. Nevertheless, their difference widened to a big margin in 1992. While the rate of city was 41.61%, that of towns was 12.14%. In short, the above has shown that Fuzhou has managed to include more population under some forms of state control, first, through spatial "annexation" and, then, through the designation of towns.

The development of Sanming has taken a different model. One can attribute it to its urban legacy and physical environment. The past 20 years of development had transformed Sanming city into a heavy industrial base with large- and medium-sized state enterprises. In 1978, state enterprises accounted for 44% of the total number of enterprises and 92.6% of GVIO. The heavy : light industry ratio in GVIO was 62.8 : 37.2 (Fujiansheng Tongjiju, 1985: 45).[28] Regarding the size of these enterprises, one statistic reveals that, even by 1990, there were 33 large- and medium-sized enterprises in the Sanming city-region, which accounted for one-fourth of the total in the province (Chen Yongting, 1992:9). These state enterprises, due to their administrative subordination and their heavy industrial orientation, had made fewer contacts with the surrounding agricultural base.

Besides, located in the mountainous part of the province, Sanming lacked the overseas connection enjoyed by the coastal cities. One source indicates that Datian county in the Sanming city-region housed 946 overseas Chinese returnees and their dependents and 304 Taiwanese relatives in the early 1980s. There were about 15,000 overseas Chinese with roots in the city-region

(Zhang and Lu, 1986:288, 216). These were small numbers in comparison with, say, those of Fuzhou. Thus, there had been fewer outside resources to stimulate economic development.

It had become necessary to rely on the state industrial sector as the driving force of economic development. There were then repeated calls to fully utilise the potential of the large- and medium-sized state enterprises (e.g., Chen Yongting, 1992:12; Hou Jianwen, 1990:39). In fact, Sanming was chosen as one of the medium- and small-sized cities in the country to experiment with integrated economic system reform. These reform measures were meant to grant the state enterprises with greater autonomy in economic decision-making (He Shaochun, 1991b:438-9). Many enterprises took advantage of this greater autonomy by either investing in light industries that could generate more revenues or job opportunities, or merely expanding the scale of the original production. Because their products remained at the lower value-added pole, these attempts to increase production required a greater input or more exploitative extraction of natural resources (Hou Jianwen, 1990:39). These requirements could be partly met by extending Sanming's administrative jurisdiction.

The administrative boundary of Sanming expanded over time. In 1978, Sanming city had still been a county-level city of the Sanming prefecture. The latter had also administered a total of 10 counties. In April 1983, Sanming prefecture was abolished and Sanming city upgraded to a prefecture-level city leading the 10 counties. Formerly covering an area of 1,177 sq km, Sanming suddenly expanded its spatial boundary to 22,959 sq km (Zhang and Lu, 1986:215, 238). The fact that Yong'an county was designated as Yong'an county-level city about one and a half years later, did not really change Sanming's spatial boundary.

This spatial expansion of boundary, at one level, was accompanied by an expansion of the number of designated towns, at another level. At most, every county had had a designated town in 1980 (Fujiansheng Cehuiju and Fujiansheng Minzhengting, 1982). The total number in the city-region increased to 24 in 1984 (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonganbu Sanju, 1985:34, 92).

Four years later, this number rose to 26, including two from the two districts of Sanming city itself (Bianji Weiyuanhui, 1989:18). Finally, in June 1993, the number of the districts increased to three, while that of counties (and Yong'an city) to 35 (Li, 1993). This growth in the number of designated town, especially in the last few years, was much slower than that of Fuzhou. This could be explained by the more sluggish growth in rural non-farm activities in the Sanming city-region. Fewer overseas connection was one reason, a lion's share of these activities being concentrated on the extraction of natural resources and their primary processing was another.

The expansion of the spatial boundary and the designation of an increasing number of towns increased the "urban" population. The rate of "urbanisation" of the countryside (i.e., TPT / TPCo) increased from 12.73% in 1978, to 23.13% in 1984, 24.31% in 1986 and to 35.27% in 1992. This was a substantial increase, but somewhat still below the one experienced in Fuzhou. On the other hand, the rates of "ruralising" cities and towns in Sanming were slower. The ratio of non-agricultural population in cities had dropped from 63.29% in 1978 to 53.15% in 1992, whereas that of towns had dropped from 78.33% to 32.05%. These drops were less serious than those of Fuzhou, partly a reflection of smaller catalytic potential of the less dynamic Sanming and Yong'an cities.

To summarise, the development model of Sanming produced a few characteristics of urban development different from that of Fuzhou. While both cities expanded their spatial boundaries over time, they did it for different reasons. Sanming did it because its state industries required such "annexation." Fuzhou expanded so as to control the foreign-induced investment and the ever-growing countryside. Secondly, because of its more sluggish rural economy, the number of designated towns in Sanming increased at a much slower rate. This was especially the case in the last few years when foreign investment reached its climax and non-collective rural enterprises experienced the fastest growth. Thirdly, as a consequence, Sanming experienced a slower rate of "urbanisation" of the countryside as well as slower rates of "ruralisation" of cities and towns.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has proposed to examine urbanisation in Fujian since 1978 within a framework that requires situating urbanisation within the contexts of causal mechanisms applicable to China as a whole and of the spatial specificity of Fujian. It has argued that the spatial specificity in 1978 had been the outcome of the operation of causal mechanisms of the socialist state and shortage economy before that date. As a resource constrained economy, China had been forced to allocate her resources to priority programmes to ameliorate the shortage problems. Given her frontier position, the state had refrained from investing in Fujian. Even for investment from the provincial government, there had been a tendency to concentrate in the more advanced coastal cities. The later heavy industrial drive had not really corrected this spatial imbalance. The paper has employed much statistical evidence to support this point. It has shown that, by 1977, the end of the pre-reform period, the urban system in the interior region had still been less well developed than its counterpart on the coast. This argument has been further elaborated with the comparison of development models of Fuzhou city on the coast and Sanming city in the interior. The light-industry oriented Fuzhou had been argued to have had a much more articulated urban network than the heavy-industry oriented Sanming.

This urban legacy, as argued, has intervened into the operation of a new set of causal mechanisms created after 1978. As the state recognised the difficulty of subordinating the economy to complete control, there emerged a new rationality allowing non-state investments in the economy and a greater role to play for cities and towns. As a result, the level of urbanisation in Fujian has increased tremendously since 1978. This can be attributable to the

growth of designated towns and their total population. This new development model has shown to favour the coast again. Due to better economic performance, richer overseas connections, etc., the coastal region has attracted both state and non-state investments. In contrast, lacking these favourable conditions, the interior region has lagged behind. In statistical terms, one has experienced faster rates of "urbanisation" of the countryside and "ruralisation" of cities and towns in the coastal region. Again, Fuzhou and Sanming have been used to illustrate how two different models of development have produced contrasting urban development patterns.

This paper has made a small contribution to the theory of urbanisation in China. It has shown how the causal mechanisms have changed from the pre-reform period. Increasing urbanisation represents the outcome of another state's attempt to regulate the population. Instead of relying on more assertive, but drastic, administrative measures of banning population from migrating to urban places or de-designating urban places and urban population, the state has been forced to deploy more "soft" and less overt measures in the light of a greater autonomy of the economy. By allowing designated towns to grow and channelling the growing non-state economic activities to these places, it can still regulate the population. This argument challenges the prevailing argument in the literature that increasing level of urbanisation represents a more liberal development from the past.

Its emphasis on spatial relations has provided more insights into the process and pattern of urbanisation in Fujian. It is not simply the reforming or open economy that accounts for the observed urbanisation. Space matters too. It is difficult to understand why the interior region lacks behind the coastal region and why Fujian as a whole falls behind China. Resorting to concepts such as spatial contingency effects and spatial boundary effects allows us to come to terms with the process of operation. Nevertheless, by blending the spatial relations with the causal mechanisms, the paper is in a better position than empty arguments such as the "frontier position of Fujian" to understand how Fujian's

urbanisation was produced. As argued in the introductory section of this paper, these arguments failed to describe how its "frontier position" had shaped Fujian's urbanisation. It is only by bringing in the causal mechanisms that we are in the position to substantiate the "frontier position" argument.

This emphasis on spatial relations has important policy implications too. First, the importance of urban-rural relation in affecting economic development has been highlighted in the text. Fuzhou performed much better than Sanming, because the former's urban-rural relation was more conducive to the present form of economic development. In other words, by managing the urban-rural relation, we might be able to shape the final form and pattern of development. Secondly, and related to the first point, the urban-rural relation has become much more complicated. With investments coming from many different sources, the urban sector is no longer a static object. Neither is the rural. A better comprehension of the urban and the rural sectors and their urban-rural relations becomes a must for any meaningful policy recommendation. Thirdly, any urban policy must have a spatial dimension. The literature on Chinese urbanisation policy has begun to learn that it is harmful to generalise the pattern and problems of urbanisation across space. Interior and coastal provinces vary tremendously. This paper has argued emphatically that such spatial differentiation even exists within a province. The coastal region of Fujian and its interior counterpart are two different worlds, and, therefore, they deserve different treatments. It is difficult to expect the interior region to benefit equally from an urban policy derivative of the local situation of the coastal region. Although any Fujianese urban policy needs to take the whole Fujian as the point of reference, it must take into consideration the two different urban realities. Otherwise, the coastal-interior divide will be reinforced.

Notes

1. The literature on Guangdong consists of, among others, Yeung and Chu (1994). One may cite Howell (1993) as an example of the literature on Fujian. For a comparison of market reforms in Fujian and Guangdong, see Chen Liguan (1992).
2. One may refer to Guldin (1992), Johnson (1992), Lin, G.C.S. (1993), Ma and Lin (1993), Siu (1990) and Woo (1994) for a glimpse of the literature on urbanisation and urban development in Guangdong.
3. Although Fujian was rich in marine resources, they were not exploited due to its frontier position.
4. The series of data used here does not include data before 1954.
5. For different definitions of urban population, one may consult, for example, Chan (1994:20-33). From 1949 to 1981, TPCT referred to the total population within the administrative jurisdictions of designated cities (*jianzhishi*) and designated towns (*jianzhizhen*). The Fourth National Census in 1990 introduced another concept of TPCT based on residents' committee (*jumin weiyuanhui*). As a result, a new series of TPCT starting in 1982 was constructed (Guojia Tongjiju, 1993:81). However, since no comparable series is available for Fujian, the analyses done in this paper will, unless otherwise specified, adhere to the old conception of TPCT.
6. All population figures are year-end figures.
7. Special districts were renamed prefectures (*diqu*) in 1967.
8. The percentages in this paragraph are calculated from various tables in Zhang and Lu (1986). Due to the slightly different accounting systems adopted by the various city-regions, the percentages must be treated with caution. Nevertheless, their presence still serves the purpose of illustrating some relationships quantitatively.
9. Xiamen's new textile plant, which was constructed in 1958 with Shanghai aids (He Shaochun, 1991a:354), has been excluded from this calculation.

10. Basically the coastal region was designated as the first front (*yixian*), whereas the interior region was further divided into two parts, with the land bordering the Ying-Xia railroad (including Nanping city, Sanming city, Yong'an county and Zhangping county) as the second front (*erxian*) and the rest as the third front (He Shaochun, 1991a:126).
11. The percentages quoted in this paragraph are calculated from tables in Zhang and Lu (1986). For further remarks, see note 8.
12. These percentages were derived from tables in Zhang and Lu (1986). See note 8 for more comments.
13. Besides the voluminous Chinese literature, one may consult Brus (1993), Griffin and Khan (1994), Lardy (1991), Lee (1993), Lin, C.Z. (1989), Nolan (1993), Qian and Xu (1993), Ronnas (1993), Solinger (1991a), Walder (1994) and White (1993) for a glimpse of the English literature on the Chinese specific model of reform.
14. The English literature (e.g., Chan, 1994:103-8; Kirkby, 1985: 222-8; Solinger, 1991b) has failed to make the conceptual distinction between the central functions of cities, on the one hand, and, something to be introduced in the next few paragraphs, its derivative concepts of central city (*zhongxin chengshi*), economic centre (*jingji zhongxin*), etc., on the other hand. The latter concepts are also interpreted narrowly in neutral economic terms only. As argued in the main text, the central functions of cities carry the connotation of extending the state control in a difficult time and reinforce the bias towards the urban industry in the face of challenges from the rural sector.
15. The English literature favours the term liberalisation when interpreting the reforms in the rural economy. Accordingly, it jumps to the conclusion that the peasants have obtained more freedom and benefited positively. In contrast, I tend to side with Shue (1988) and argue that the various measures of rural "liberalisation" including the city-leading-counties system have put more peasants under some forms of state regulation.

16. The other administrative measure was, of course, the formation of economic regions such as the Southwest Five-province Economic Region.
17. The *per capita* figures tend to suggest otherwise; Sanming and Nanping performed much better on *per capita* terms (GVIO, profits and taxes and gross value of fixed assets *per* non-agricultural population and industrial staff and workers). If investment decisions were made merely on the basis of economic calculations, these cities should be preferred over Fuzhou and Xiamen. But the fact is that investment decisions were never made on that basis.
18. According to Hu (1988) and Yang (1987), the similar logic was held responsible for the continuous growth of big cities in China, despite numerous attempts to restrain their growth.
19. There are differences even within a city too. According to a survey carried out in the mid-1980s (Yu et al., 1987), variations in the form of operation and economic performance occurred between Jinjiang and Anxi counties, both within Quanzhou city-region.
20. Examples of this kind of activities in Fujian can be found in Huang (1992).
21. For instance in Xiamen, more than 100 million *yuan* of revenue from land transaction were returned to urban construction from June 1988 to June 1989 (Zhuan, 1990:18).
22. Wang (1992:261-4) has provided examples of planning gain in Fuzhou.
23. The three economic sectors were classified as follows:
    Primary: Farming, animal husbandry, fishing and forestry;
    Secondary: Industry; geological survey and prospecting; construction; and
    Tertiary: Transport and communication; retail, material supplies and storage, and restaurants; real estate, public utilities and personal services; health, recreational and social services; scientific research and integrated technical services; financing and insurance services; state agencies and social organisations; and others.
24. For analyses of these processes at the national level, one may also consult, for example, Gu (1993a:185-93; 1993b).
25. This total includes 17 designated towns of Fuqing city.
26. If we use the 1992 administrative jurisdiction of the city-region as the basis and adjust the population size of 1978 accordingly, the TPT / TPCo ratio was 8.74%.
27. For the purpose of standardisation (see note 26), the ratio was 55.12%.
28. As a comparison, the figures for Fuzhou were 12.2% and 69.3%, respectively, and the ratio 37.7 : 62.3. They show clearly that Fuzhou was a light industrial structure with fewer state enterprises.

Reference

Bianji Weiyuanhui (1987) *Fujian Jingji Nianjian 1987* (*Fujian Economic Yearbook 1987*). Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, Fuzhou.

Bianji Weiyuanhui (1989) *Fujian Jingji Nianjian 1989* (*Fujian Economic Yearbook 1989*). Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, Fuzhou.

Brus, W. (1993) Marketisation and democratisation: the Sino-Soviet divergence. *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 17, 423-40.

Cai, Deqi and Xie Daoyong (1992) Fujian tudi chengpian kaifa xianzhuang fenxi he jidian jianyi (An analysis of the present situation of large-scale land development in Fujian and a few suggestions). *Fujian Luntan* (*Fujian Forum*) 7, 37-9.

Cai, Jiayuan and Lin Zhuoluan (1992) Guanyu wosheng tudi chengpian kaifa de ruogan sikao (A few reflections on large-scale land development of our province). *Fujian Luntan* (*Fujian Forum*) 7, 40-4.

Chan, K.W. (1994) *Cities with Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 China*. Oxford University Press, Hong Kong.

Chen, Jiayuan (1991) *Fujiansheng Jingji Dili* (*Economic Geography of Fujian Province*). Xinhua Chubanshe, Beijing.

Chen, Liguan (1992) Dui Fujian he Guangdong shichang bijiao fenxi yu sikao (Markets in Fujian and Guangdong: a comparative analysis and reflection). *Fujian Jingji* (*Fujian Economy*) 8, 13-6.

Chen, Yongting (1992) Shanqu jingji fazhan ruogan wenti tantao — Sanmingshi jingji diaocha yanjiu baogao (An inquiry into a certain number of problems of mountainous economic development — a report on the survey and research of Sanming city's economy). *Fujian Jingji* (*Fujian Economy*) 4, 9-12.

Chu, D.K.Y. and X-Z. Zheng (1992) Fuzhou: capital of a frontier province. In Y-M. Yeung and X-W. Hu (eds), *China's Coastal Cities: Catalysts for Modernization*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 199-220.

Foucault, M. (1978) *The History of Sexuality*. Volume 1. Pantheon Books, New York.

Fu, Zude and Chen Jiayuan (1990) *Zhongguo Renkou: Fujian Fence* (*Population in China: Fujian Volume*). Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe, Beijing.

Fujiansheng Cehuiju and Fujiansheng Minzhengting (1982) *Fujiansheng Dituce* (*The Atlas of Fujian*). Fujiansheng Ditu Chubanshe, Fuzhou.

Fujiansheng Nongcun Shehui Jingji Diaocha Lingdao Xiaozu (1988) Fujiansheng nongcun shehui jingji dianxing diaocha zonghe baogao (An integrated report on the typical survey of rural social economy in Fujian). In Zhonggong Zhongyang Shujichu Nongcui Zhengce Yanjiushi Ziliaoshi (ed.), *Zhongguo Nongcun Shehui Jingji Dianxing Diaocha* (*Typical Survey of Rural Social Economy in China*). Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, Beijing.

Fujiansheng Renkou Pucha Bangongshi (1992) *Fujiansheng 1990 Nian Renkou Pucha Ziliao: Dianzi Jisuanji Huizong* (*The 1990 Population Census Materials: Computer Tabulations*). Volume 1. Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.

Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1985) *1984 Nian Fujiansheng Tongji Ziliao: Chengshi Bufen* (*1984 Statistical Materials of Fujian Province: City Section*). Fujiansheng Tongjiju, Fuzhou.

Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1989) *Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1989* (*Statistical Yearbook of Fujian 1989*). Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.

Fujiansheng Tongjiju (1993) *Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1993* (*Statistical Yearbook of Fujian 1993*). Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.

Fujiansheng Tongjiju and Fujiansheng Gonganting (1989) *Fujiansheng Renkou Tongji Ziliao Huibian* (*A Collection of Population Statistical Materials of Fujian*). Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.

Griffin, K. and A.R. Khan (1994) The Chinese transition to a market-guided economy: the contrast with Russia and Eastern Europe. *Contention* 3, 85-107.

Gu, Shengzu (1993a) *Feinonghua yu Chengzhenhua Lilun yu Shijian* (*De-agriculturalisation and Urbanisation: Theory and Practice*). Wuhan Daxue Chubanshe, Wuhan.

Gu, Shengzu (1993b) Nongcun chengzhenhua yu chengzhen nongcunhua yanjiu (Research on the urbanisation of the countryside and the ruralisation of cities and towns). *Renkou yu Jingji* (*Population and Economics*) 6, 17-20 & 9.

Guldin, G.E. (1992) Urbanizing the countryside: Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and the Pearl River Delta. In G.E. Guldin (ed.), *Urbanizing China*. Greenwood Press, New York, 157-84.

Guo, Qiyou (1992) Fujiansheng xinxing chengshi fazhan wenti tantao (An inquiry into the development problems of Fujian's newly established cities). *Fujian Jingji* (*Fujian Economy*) 7, 18-20.

Guojia Tongjiju (1993) *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1993* (*Statistical Yearbook of China 1993*). Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.

Guojia Tongjiju Chengshi Shehui Jingji Diaochadui (1990) *Zhongguo Chengshi Sishinian* (*China: The Forty Years of Urban Development*). Zhongguo Tongji Xinxi Zixun Fuwu Zhongxin, Beijing.

Guojia Tongjiju Renkou Tongjishi (1989) *Zhongguo Renkou Tongji Nianjian 1989* (*China Population Statistical Yearbook 1989*). Kexue Jishu Wenxian Chubanshe, Beijing.

Guojia Tongjiju Renkou Tongjishi (1993) *Zhongguo Renkou Tongji Nianjian 1993* (*China Population Statistical Yearbook 1993*). Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.

He, Shaochun (1991a) *Dangdai Zhongguo de Fujian* (*Fujian of Contemporary China*). Volume 1. Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, Beijing.

He, Shaochun (1991b) *Dangdai Zhongguo de Fujian* (*Fujian of Contemporary China*). Volume 2. Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, Beijing.

He, Yu (ed.) (1990) *Dangdai Zhongguo de Chengshi Jianshe* (*Urban Construction in Contemporary China*). Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, Beijing.

Hou, Jianwen (1990) Fujian gongye buju tiaozheng yu chengzhen fazhan qushi fenxi (An analysis of industrial distribution adjustment and urban development tendency in Fujian). *Fujian Luntan* (*Fujian Forum*) 4, 36-9.

Hou, Xiaohong (1992) FuXia chengshi qunti de fazhan yu kongjian jiegou (The development and spatial structure of the Fujian-Xiamen megapolis). *Jingji Dili* (*Economic Geography*) 3, 72-7.

Hou, Xiaohong and Liu Ta (1993) Yanhai kaifang diqu chengshihua guocheng de yingxiang yinsu yu zuoyong jizhi — yi Fujian yanhai chengshi weili (Factors and causal mechanisms of the process of urbanisation in the open coastal region of China — an illustration from Fujian's coastal cities). *Redai Dili* (*Tropical Geography*) 1, 29-34.

Howell, J. (1993) *China Opens Its Doors: The Politics of Economic Transition*. Harvester Wheatsharf, Hempstead.

Hu, Zhaoliang (1988) Chengshi fazhan guilu yu duice (Laws and counter-measures of urban development). In Ye Weijun, Zhang Bingchen and Lin Jianing (eds), *Zhongguo Chengshihua Daolu Chutan — Jianlun Woguo Chengshi Jichu Sheshi de Jianshe* (*A Preliminary Investigation of the Chinese Road to Urbanisation — Together with a Discussion on the Development of Urban Infrastructural Development of Our Country*). Zhongguo Zhanwan Chubanshe, Beijing, 113-36.

Huang, Xinwen (1992) Wosheng tudi yinxing shichang de xianzhuang, wenti yi duice (Our province's black land market: its present situation, problems and counter-measures). *Fujian Luntan* (*Fujian Forum*) 7, 45-8.

Johnson, G. (1992) The political economy of Chinese urbanization: Guangdong and the Pearl River Delta region. In G.E. Guldin (ed.), *Urbanizing China*. Greenwood Press, New York, 185-220.

Kirkby, R.J.R. (1985) *Urbanisation in China: Town and Country in a Developing Economy 1949-2000 AD*. Croom Helm, London.

Lardy, N.R. (1991) Is China different? the fate of its economic reform. In D. Chirot (ed.), *The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left: The Revolutions of 1989*. University of Washington Press, Seattle, 147-82.

Lee, C. (1993) China's transition towards the market: "socialization" of the safety net. *China Economic Review* 4, 169-80.

Li, Lijin (1993) *Fujiansheng Dituce* (*The Atlas of Fujian Province*). Fujiansheng Ditu Chubanshe, Fuzhou.

Li, Qixiang, Chen Jian and Yu Ming (eds) (1988) *Fujian de Xiaochengzhen* (*Small towns in Fujian*). Fujiansheng Ditu Chubanshe, Fuzhou.

Li, S-M. and L-X. Zhao (1992) Xiamen: regional center and hometown of overseas Chinese. In Y-M. Yeung and X-W. Hu (eds), *China's Coastal Cities: Catalysts for Modernization*. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 221-39.

Lin, C.Z. (1989) Open-ended reform in China. In V. Nee and D. Stark (eds), *Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 95-136.

Lin, G.C.S. (1993) Small town development in socialist China: a functional analysis. *Geoforum* 24, 327-38.

Lin, Jian (1990) Dui Fujian kaifang moshi jiqi keju de yanjiu (Research on Fujian's open model and its pattern). *Fujian Luntan* (*Fujian Forum*) 2, 8-14.

Lin, Longhai (1993) *Quanzhoushi Jianzhizhi* (*The Development Annals of Quanzhou City*). Haixia Wenzhu Chubanshe, Fuzhou.

Liu, Shizhong (1992) Jiakuai chengshihua jincheng cujin Fujian jingji zaishang xintaijie (Expedite the process of urbanisation and advance Fujian's economy to a new level). *Fujian Luntan* (*Fujian Forum*) 6, 32-5.

Liu, Wenxing, Lin Jinzhang and Chen Jianguo (1992) Shixian chengxiang guanxi helihua yu guomin jingji xietiao fazhan zi duice (Counter-measures to materialise the rationalisation of urban-rural relationships and the coordinated development of national economy). *Fujian Jingji* (*Fujian Economy*) 3, 24-6 & 20.

Ma, L.J.C. and Chusheng Lin (1993) Development of towns in China: a case study of Guangdong province. *Population and Development Review* 19, 583-606.

Massey, D. (1984) *Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production*. Macmillan, London.

Nolan, P. (1993) China's post-Mao political economy: a puzzle. *Contribution to Political Economy* 12, 71-87.

Qian, Yingyi and Xu Chenggang (1993) The M-form hierarchy and China's economic reform. *European Economic Review* 37, 541-8.

Ronnas, P. (1993) Economic diversification and growth in rural China: the anatomy of a "socialist" success story. *The Journal of Communist Studies* 9, 216-44.

Shao, Zhengyuan (1989) *Fujian Fenjian de Sishinian* (*Fujian's Vigorous Forty-Years*). Fujian Kexue Jishu Chubanshe, Fuzhou.

Shue, V. (1988) *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic*. Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Siu, H.F. (1990) The politics of growth: Pearl River Delta experience. In R.Y-W. Kwok, W.L. Parish and A.G-O. Yeh (eds), *Chinese Urban Reform: What Model Now?* M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 197-212.

Solinger, D. (1991a) *China's Transients and the State: A Form of Civil Society?* USC Seminar Series No. 1, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.

Solinger, D. (1991b) The place of central city in China's economic reform: from hierarchy to network. *City & Society* 5, 23-39.

Tang, W-S. (1993) *A Critical Review of the English Literature on Chinese Urbanisation*. Occasional Paper No. 26, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.

Tang, W-S. (1994) Urban land development under socialism: China between 1949 and 1977. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 18, 392-415.

Walder, A.G. (1994) The decline of communist power: elements of a theory of institutional change. *Theory and Society* 23, 297-323.

Wang, Yukun (1992) Zhongguo chengshi tudi kaifa guochengzhong de shiwu dizu (Rent in kind in the process of land development in Chinese cities). In Guowuyuan Fazhan Yanjiu Zhongxin "Zhongguo Chengshi Fazhan Yanjiu" Ketizu (ed.), *Zhongguo: Shiji Zhijiao de Chengshi Fazhan* (*China: Urban Development towards the Year 2000*). Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, Shenyang, 253-89.

White, G. (1993) *Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China*. Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Woo, E.S.W. (1994) Urban development. In Yeung and Chu (eds), *Guangdong: Survey of a Province Undergoing Rapid Change*. The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 327-54.

Xing, Wenxin (1990) *Fujiansheng Chengzhen Fazhan yu Buju* (*The Development and Distribution of Cities and Towns in Fujian Province*). Fujian Kexue Jishu Chubanshe, Fuzhou.

Xu, Xiaoli (1986) Quanguo chengzhen renkou zhan zongrenkou bizhong (Total population of designated cities and towns as a proportion of the country's total population). *Zhongguo Chengzhen* (*China Cities and Towns*) 11, 48.

Yang, Chongguang (1987) Dachengshi de chengzhang jizhi yu guimo kongzhi lilu (Theory to control the growth mechanisms and size of big cities). *Chengshi Wenti* (*Urban Problems*) 4, 8-12 & 33.

Yao, Shimou and Liu Da (1994) *Waixiangxing Jingji yu Kaifaqu Jianshe Zonglun — Yi Fujiansheng Yanhai Diqu Weili* (*An Integrated Discussion on the Foreign-Oriented Economy and the Construction of Development Zone, with the Coastal Region of Fujian Province as An Example*). Zhongguo Kexue Jishu Daxue Chubanshe, Hefei.

Yao, Shimou, et al. (1990) *Minnan Quyu Jingji Fazhan yu Kongjian Buju* (*Economic Development and Spatial Distribution of Minnan region*). Zhongguo Kexue Jishu Daxue Chubanshe, Hefei.

Yeung, Y.M. and D.K.Y. Chu (eds) (1994) *Guangdong: Survey of a Province Undergoing Rapid Change*. The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong.

Yu, Ming (1988) Fujian xiaochengzhen de fazhan (The development of Fujian's small towns). In Li, Chen and Yu (eds), *Fujian de Xiaochengzhen (Small towns in Fujian)*. Fujiansheng Ditu Chubanshe, Fuzhou, 745-54.

Yu, Zuyao, et al. (1987) Fujian Jinjiang xian yu Anxi xian xiangzhen qiye fazhan de duibi kaocha (A comparative investigation of the development of township and village enterprises in Jinjiang and Anxi counties, Fujian). In Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Jingji Yanjiusuo (ed.), *Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye de Jingji Fazhan yu Jingji Tizhi (The Economic Development and Economic System of Township and Village Enterprises in China)*. Zhongguo Jingji Chubanshe, Beijing, 77-123.

Zhang, Ruiyao and Lu Zengrong (1986) *Fujian Diqu Jingji (The Regional Economy of Fujian)*. Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, Fuzhou.

Zhao, Yinqing (1988) Zhongguo chengshihua daolu lilun shuping (A theoretical review of Chinese road to urbanisation). In Ye Weijun, Zhang Bingchen and Lin Jianing (eds), *Zhongguo Chengshihua Daolu Chutan — Jianlun Woguo Chengshi Jichu Sheshi de Jianshe (A Preliminary Investigation of the Chinese Road to Urbanisation — Together with a Discussion on the Development of Urban Infrastructural Development of Our Country)*. Zhongguo Zhanwan Chubanshe, Beijing, 398-423.

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonganbu Sanju (1985) *Zhongguo Chengzhen Renkou Ziliao Shouce (Handbook on Chinese City and Town Population Information)*. Ditu Chubanshe, Beijing.

Zhuan, Mingyan and Guo Baoshen (1990) Qiantan Shishi shi waixianxing xiangzhen jiye de fazhan (A preliminary discussion on the development of the foreign-oriented township and village enterprises in Shishi city. *Fujian Luntan (Fujian Forum)* 12, 41.

Zhuan, Zhijie (1990) Tequ tudi shiyong kaifa moshi fenxi — guanyu Xiamen tudi shiyong kaifa de diaocha (An analysis of the land use and development model of special economic zones — a survey of Xiamen's land use and development). *Fujian Luntan (Fujian Forum)* 6, 17-9.

中國福建省自七八年以來的城鎮化

鄧永成

（中文摘要）

西方鮮有報導自七八年以來福建省城鎮化的情況，本文擬從因果機制和空間關係的角度來探討這個問題。七八年以前，發展的前提是如何管治好一個在前哨位置的短缺經濟和社會。城市發展模式的特點有二，一是以少數城鎮組成的低度城鎮化，另一是內陸與沿海的顯著差別。七八年以後，新的一套管治方法開始兼顧到經濟的自主性及社會發展的整體性，城鎮亦因而擔當了一個新的角色——把經濟及社會納入國家的管理範圍。這個轉變使一些城鎮，尤其是沿海的城鎮，最爲受惠，此等城鎮以空間相連及空間邊界等方式，享受國家鼓勵經濟發展的優惠政策，形成農村的城鎮化及城鎮的農村化。在區域層次，某種城市走廊的形態開始在沿海形成。以上的分析，爲西方提供了一個更全面的理論框架去認識福建省的城鎮化。