The Ambivalence of Local Level Political Elites

Views of the 1994 District Board Election Candidates

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Abstract

The Hong Kong polity is marked by the dire situation of the "poverty of political leaders" as expounded by Lau Siu-kai. Such poverty is not merely manifested in terms of their number and their lack of a favourable nurturing environment. The political leaders' poverty also lies squarely upon their intense ambivalence in striking an appropriate position amidst the various contending forces of, namely, the existing British-Hong Kong government with its administrative dominance and its bureaucracy, the Chinese government which is to restore sovereignty over the territory in the years to come, the political parties backing up the leaders themselves, and last but not least the increasingly volatile constituents who pay heed to pragmatic rather than idiosyncratic concerns. The author is basing his arguments on his survey findings from a study of the 1994 District Board Election candidates. It is put forward that a remedy for such poverty of the leaders hinges upon several crucial factors: (1) conciliation between the British-Hong Kong and Chinese governments, thus eradicating the conflicting claims to political allegiance from the leaders; (2) the leaders' own self-selection of a vocation to politics, which may shield them from wavering amongst short-run, opportunistic, individualistic concerns of their own as well as of their volatile constituents; and (3) the local people's increasingly explicit demonstration of their desire to aspire to a liberal democratic environment, which would help to foster a more open and democratic government; this, in turn, would provide the leaders with room for actualizing their political roles of interest articulation and holding the administration accountable.

Elite studies are relatively rare in Hong Kong.[1] As contrasted to the study of the masses, elite studies prove to be more difficult to launch and easier lead to failure. There are formidable obstacles to conducting elite studies.[2] Notwithstanding these, there is a compelling need to investigate the elite community in general and individual elite members in particular, as a counterpart to studies

of the masses, in an attempt to configure the elite-mass relationship in the political development of a polity. It is such a driving force that sustains the interest of the present study to investigate the views of a group of political leaders in Hong Kong — that of the 1994 District Board (DB) election candidates — and their positions on the Hong Kong polity.

The 1994 District Board Election and its Political Context

The 1994 District Board election, which was the final one at this level before the turn of the territory's political destiny, that of resumption of sovereignty by the People's Republic of China, came to a close on September 18, a date which carries the reminiscence of contemporary Chinese history[3] and a futuristic outlook of the territory's further politicization. Nonetheless its inception was made under an atmosphere of mixed political blessings. The election was a misgiven one, and the candidates turned out to be a group of misguided politicians awaiting the possible eventual termination of their limited political career. Such a transient premium still invited the enthusiasm of the territory's record-breaking number of candidates standing for this "sun-set" election. It is from this point of departure that we proceed to contextualize the 1994 District Board election.

Heated Controversy between British and Chinese Governments: Couched upon Governor Patten's Political Reform

The British-Hong Kong government had come to a direct confrontation with the Chinese government over the territory's political structure in the transitional period, in view of the (im)possible transition in 1997. In June 1994, the Legislative Council (Legco) had finally passed the controversial "Patten Proposal." The pro-

cess had been marked by fierce political antagonisms amongst the various factions, exhibiting subtle political manoeuvres and trade-offs, scepticism and mutual mistrust, etc. In its specificity, the "Patten Formula" was, so to speak, the most advanced for the level of democratization, unprecedented in the territory.[4] With the institution of the new political structure, the shelved arrangement of indirect election to the Electoral College will be re-instated in 1995. This instilled an extra, though not entirely novel, element in the 1994 DB election, that of promising a second order "bonus" for the batch of candidates, i.e. the possibility of entering the territory's uppermost power echelon, the Legco. However, it was this reformulation of the government structure that sired the impossibility of "direct through-train" of the territory's political institutions beyond July 1997. The Chinese government had hastened to expound its resentment by staging a high profile establishing of the Preparatory Committee vested with the authority to lay the groundwork, both in personnel and structural terms, for the future SAR government. This also signified the short-lived nature of the pre-1997 political institutions and in corollary the incumbents of the various levels of the government machinery. All the more, political disputes also spilled over into other arenas of the diplomatic interface between China and Britain and the Hong Kong administration. The new airport and its financial arrangements and other local administrative issues had all been tabled because of fierce debates in the various official and unofficial channels as well as in the media. Diplomatic embroilments between the governments had also stirred up repercussions in the local political arena. Politicians of the contesting political factions in the territory had hastened to use the controversies in order to explicate their political stance in view of appealing to their respective supporters. Thus, the Hong Kong people had therefore been subjected to the baptism of intense political crossfire and admonitions amongst the various political figures.

Lowering of Civil Service Morale

In Hong Kong, where the coinage of the "administrative state"[5] has been upheld, the government officials have long enjoyed a relative autonomy of performance as political engineers in formulating and implementing policies. However, with the advent of the representative legislature since the mid-1980s, their privileged position has been challenged with the ascendancy of popularly elected political figures. Especially since the 1991 direct election in the Legco, the increased activity and high profile taken by the new cohort of political figures have subjected the senior civil servants to intensified political pressure which they have never experienced before in their policy-making process. Such political pressure has even trickled down to the lower levels of government officials in the policy implementation process.

On the other hand, the civil service as a whole, and the senior "administrative class"[6] in particular, are being pressured on two fronts in meeting with the elite-challenging[7] confrontations from the masses and the haunting encroachment from the Chinese authority. The increasingly interventive role assumed by the Chinese government officials and the New China News Agency (NCNA) staff have brought forth an ambivalence on the part of the civil servants in simultaneouly serving the out-going and incoming political masters. Furthermore, the recurrent political debates espoused by the British and Chinese governments have created excessively high political "noise" around the civil servants. This might account for the dwindling effectiveness of the civil service, in public perception at least, if not in actuality. The resultant has had a damaging effect upon civil service morale.[8] Notwithstanding these, the Hong Kong government has at best made a half-hearted effort at democratizing the local polity. Dominance of the administration is still the prevailing rule of the game of the day.

Political Parties[9] at a Crossroad

Elections in Hong Kong are at most a battle over gaining the relatively prestigious or advantageous position of being the major opposition against the administrative-led government. Such an opposition party, so to speak, is at best serving a watchdog role in holding the bureaucratic administration more accountable. Notwithstanding this, some might conceive that elections held before the 1997 turnover would amount to setting the stage for formulating the *de facto* political structure and rule of the game, which might be used to put pressure on the future SAR government.

However, parties or political groups in the territory have been at best immature in the political arena: Meeting Point (MP) was established in 1983, while the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) was in 1990, the Liberal Party (LP) in 1993, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) in 1993. Their image has not yet been strongly evolved with respect to the general public's perception at large. Nor has it been anchored within the parties themselves with regard to members' loyalty and party discipline. Thus, the parties might have become only an instrument, or worse still, a temporary vehicle for winning an election, which is to be disposed of eventually. It is not uncommon to witness bitter hostility when members of some political party are expelled from membership or voluntarily quit after elections. This phenomenon is grounded in a variety of factors. In the first instance, the local people are far from partisan in the strictest sense, and some might even attach a negative connotation to parties *per se*.[10] Having a party label is not necessarily a blessing, it may even be a liability, for the political figures. On the other hand, the parties are indeed largely incapacitated, unable to offer substantial assistance to their political figures, given the limited resources secured through donations and membership subscriptions. Stripped of control over the resources of the members, the parties are also denied the effective use of the party whip in disciplining those who diverge from the party line. Thus, there

can be situations where individual members differ on issue positions from their affiliated parties.

The ascending political parties are indeed faced with a straining dilemma. The changing political rule of the game requires the formation and consolidation of political organizations in order to win popular elections. This does not deny the room for the independent candidates to manoeuvre on the political stage. Yet, it is undeniable that, given the relative advantage of such organization resources, candidates backed by political parties might probably excel the independents. However, the political parties are confronted by the Chinese government's rejection, given that such parties might possibly crystallize into a considerable adversary confronting the government authority. The Chinese government's position towards political parties might enhance or suffocate the further development of the political groups; this hinges upon its official proclamation on the functions and activities permitted by such groups in the future SAR. Indeed the Chinese government has been adopting a selective strategy in granting its blessings upon the different political factions. The liberals have been kept at bay by the Chinese government. This has resulted from their explicit adversarial stance against the Chinese government, precipitated by the 1989 Beijing Incident, as well as their scepticism about the Chinese authoritarian governance.

On the other hand, the capitalist-conservatives and pro-China factions have tendered the grace of the Chinese authority. Ironically, the self-acclaimed socialist Chinese regime would give its benediction to the capitalists who had once been regarded as counter-revolutionary in the mainland's context. This might perhaps be perceived as the full cognizance of the Chinese political wisdom of "One Country Two Systems" in tolerating or even nourishing capitalist interests in Hong Kong.

A brief investigation of the situation of the three major forces in the territory is in order.

Competition between Factions of Liberals and Conservatives cum Pro-China Political Organizations and Leaders

In view of the intensified competition, the various political factions aligned themselves into two major camps. The liberals finally reduced their internal antagonisms by staging a united front and establishing the "Democratic Party," constituted of the UDHK and the MP. Nonetheless, the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL) still met difficulty at compromising with the other two liberal factions; it was therefore left aside. To complicate the matter further, there emerged several other liberal factions, distinguishing themselves from the "mainstream" liberal-democratic front. For instance, the "1-2-3 Democratic Front" and the "Civic Power" were two of such new groupings, whose memberships largely were former members of the UDHK or the MP.

On the side of the conservatives, the Pro-China factions also gathered their force in meeting with this front battle of 1994, rehearsing for the final battle of the 1995 Legco election. The DAB was formed in 1993 signifying the unification of the leftist camp in staging a collective front. However, such a political move of the local leftists was once placed in an ambivalent situation. The Chinese authority persistently indicated its aversion to the new political structure proposed by Governor Patten. Participation in the 1994 DB election and the 1995 Municipal Council (MC) and Legco elections would amount to showing support to the "three-against"[11] proposal of the British-Hong Kong government. However, the local leftists had to establish as well as consolidate their own political strength in view of counteracting the liberal-democrats in the various levels of the government machinery. Particularly, they had previously faced serious defeats in the 1991 Legco election. They were going to regain their lost ground by placing more of their new breed of politicians onto the front stage in view of gaining political experience and public exposure, and to gather their political momentum. Thus, it was understandable that there

existed some strain on the part of these leftists in striking a balance between a local outlook and one showing allegiance to the Chinese official line.

With respect to the capitalist camp, they underwent quite a bitter journey in their striving for an appropriate strategic position in the local polity. In the past, they had long been privileged with a share in the territory's political decision-making process. They had been appointed to the various levels of the government machinery, both central and advisory institutions.[12] Thus, there had been no urgent need for them to unite and organize themselves into a visible political platform. However, with the advent of representative government since the mid-1980s, and more strikingly, with the ascendance of the Patten Administration in which the liberal-democrats seemed to have gained more favourable positions, the capitalists had come to the astonishment of losing their privileged positions. It apparently made for a typical case of "circulation of elites" in which the turnover of ruling elites had not been engendered by the elites' own excellence but had been arbitrarily superimposed by the political patron — the Governor. Thus, the capitalist conservative factions hastened to organize themselves into some, albeit loosely organized, political front. Thence, the Liberal Party, a somewhat misconstrued party name in the local context, stepped onto the political stage in June 1993.

The two major forces of the Pro-China and the capitalists shared the same fate of fending the liberal-democrats' advance in the local polity. There appeared to be some hidden compromise or at least some sort of mutual understanding between the two in staging a united front, though not immune from internal latent strains, in counteracting the liberal-democrats in the 1994/95 elections.[13] Eventually, it resulted in a crystallization and polarization into two major camps: the Democrats and Pro-China/Conservatives.

Apart from targeting Legco seats through the DB electoral college election, the various political factions would also like to test out their political clout through electoral mobilization. This implies two possible aspects: the mobilization of factional affili-

ates, personal and organizational, and the thermometric testing of public receptivity of their respective political image and inclinations. This virtually amounts to a vote of confidence from the local people for the various political lines: whether the Hong Kong people are still aspiring for further democratization; whether they prefer to show allegiance to the future sovereign Chinese state; or whether they are merely pragmatic enough to defend the preservation of prosperity and stability which might perhaps imply conceding more to the Chinese stance. Admittedly, there might be some compromises among these political stances which are not inherently mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, the test lies inevitably with the number of votes secured from the constituents.

The Masses: Dwindled Enthusiasm, Escalated Disillusionment, Increased Parochialism

The 1994 DB election was also one which came not at the right time for the Hong Kong populace. The general public had been strained by intense political embroilments between the British-Hong Kong government and Chinese government, as well as amongst the various political parties and their attendant political figures. The public interest in the constitution of a fair, open, and acceptable political structure had been dwindling.[14] The sentiment precipitated by the June-Fourth Incident resulting in a siding with the liberal democratic political forces and searching for fortifying Hong Kong's autonomy had also diminished. Increasingly, people were turning to a more pragmatic stance of readily compromising with the Chinese regime by refraining from openly expressing their resentment. The forceful assault by the Chinese government on its British counterpart had intimidated the Hong Kong people into lowering the aspiration for further political liberalization. This had further led to self-censorship by various sectors, ranging from the media to the political groupings and figures.

The high profile taken by the Chinese authority and its local delegates, namely the NCNA officials, had further pushed the

Hong Kong people towards adopting a distancing stance towards it. It had scared the local people so as to cast serious doubts upon the Chinese authority's pledge of granting a high degree of autonomy to Hong Kong. Nonetheless, the people were also at pains to admit the very fact that the Chinese were ultimately their future political master. The strategy people adopted was to strive towards their own psychological balance, out of which ambivalence was again the resort to self-censorship or restraint, or to accept cognitive dissonance at the irreconcilable positions. Such ambivalence was also displayed towards the local pro-China political groups and figures. People were sceptical about their integrity and sincerity at grounding their allegiance either to the Hong Kong people or the Beijing regime. On the other hand, people also took full cognition of the need to invest a certain amount of expectation upon these pro-China leaders to channel their views to the Chinese authority. This boiled down to a general atmosphere of ambivalence amongst the Hong Kong people.

In a period of intense uncertainty, political manoeuvring and antagonism, coupled with economic restructuring bringing forth economic insecurity, particularly to the group of low-income citizens, the masses were specially susceptible to a mood of scepticism and cynicism towards public affairs. The escalating sense of political inefficacy and helplessness amidst the prolonged diplomatic hostility between the two governments, eventually precipitated into people's anger and frustration. Worse still, it even turned out to become a displacement of hatred upon the readily available scapegoats in the territory, namely the welfare recipients, the chronic patients, the ethnic minorities (filipino domestic helpers, for instance)[15] or grossly, the "minority communities" in the territory. These were manifested by the people's overt discrimination against such victims, fending off the perceived intruders into their vested interests. Such a parochial sentiment found amongst the masses provided opportunities for politicians to further agitate people in supporting extremist, emotionally-charged issue positions. It was such a phenomenon of "mobilization of

bias" that allowed the opportunistic politicians to manoeuvre to their own advantage.

Politicians Flocking for Political Career

Individual political figures, be they experienced or amateur, were puzzling over the (im)possibility of their future political career. Some might be opportunistic enough to grasp the last chance of starting (continuing) their political career under the British (colonial) regime, given that a more liberal political climate would allow more room to manoeuvre than a more constrained political environment. Thus, in view of the ascendancy of the political groups, which was virtually shrinking the political space for independent politicians, some swiftly joined the various parties in a rush just before the election was held, thus adding a party label as their back-up. As the parties were not showing much political "muscle" in holding tight their members, these political leaders were still somewhat individualistic and autonomous.

While some intent political figures rushed onto the bandwagon by joining political parties, some chose to remain "independent," without any party labels.[16] Their independent status logically allowed them absolute freedom in offering various issue positions and/or political rhetoric.

Given that the DB was merely a local level consultative body vested with limited administrative power and lacking political substance, the candidates standing for a DB seat did not have to bear much political responsibility and its correspondent consequences and were therefore more free to manipulate or mobilize parochial issue-positions to appeal to their restricted constituencies. More spectacularly, since the new Patten formula had restructured DBs into small, single-seat constituencies, it engendered an easy return for the winner who merely needed to secure a small amount of votes.

All these factors in combination encouraged political figures' tendency to take an individualistic stance especially those who were not particularly amenable to some specific political masters,

be they parties, constituents, the existing (British-colonial) governing regime and its counteracting (Chinese) shadowy enemy lying out there, or even the Hong Kong community at large. It was therefore within such a socio-political context that the 1994 DB election was held, with the configuration of the intent political figures vying within the web of various discordant forces. It was also the point of departure of the present study to provide some empirical substance along these lines in the attempt to supplement local elite studies.[17]

The Study and its Findings

Survey Research on all Candidates

The present study is based upon a survey research on all the candidates standing for the 1994 DB election. Structured, self-administered questionnaires were sent to all the 757 candidates using postal mail and/or facsimile. There were two rounds of sending the questionnaires. The first round was sent with the assistance and cooperation of the various political groups/parties by dispatching through the respective headquarters or their regional/district sub-offices. The second round was sent by direct mail to the registered correspondence address published in the *Supplementary Government Gazette.* In addition, telephone calls were made to all the candidates to remind them of returning the completed questionnaires.

As a result, a total of 256 returns were obtained, giving a response rate of 33.4 per cent. After weeding out four incomplete questionnaires, a total of 252 cases were finally put to analysis.[18]

Profile of Respondents

Respondents of the present study basically reflect the general profile of the candidates standing for the 1994 DB election, in terms of age, sex, constituencies and incumbent/new contestant

distribution. Table 1 provides the comparisons between the profiles of the samples and all the candidates in these aspects.

Table 1   Profile of Respondents (%)

	Respondents	Actual
Sex		
Male	89.6	86.9
Female	10.4	13.1
(N)	(241)	(757)
Age		
21-30	8.0	9.0
31-40	43.7	35.8
41-50	34.9	39.4
51-60	9.2	10.6
Above 60	4.2	5.3
(N)	(237)	(757)
Constituency		
Urban	56.1	53.5
Rural	43.9	46.5
(N)	(228)	(757)
Council/DB experience		
Incumbents	35.7	31.6
New contestants	64.3	68.4
(N)	(249)	(757)

The respondents' profile in terms of educational attainment and occupation cannot be ascertained whether or not it mirrors those of the population of all candidates. Reference can also be made to Table 2.

Table 2   Profile of Educational Attainment, Employment Status and Organizational Affiliation (%)

Education	
Below primary	0.4
Primary	3.8
Secondary	38.4
Tertiary or above	57.4
(N)	(237)
Employment	
Full-time politician	7.1
Full-time job	92.0
Housewife	0.9
(N)	(234)
Number of group affiliation	
0	17.3
1	47.8
2	20.1
3	10.4
4	3.2
5	1.2
(N)	(249)

With respect to political organizational affiliation, 17.3 per cent of the respondents reported to have no affiliation with any types of organizations, ranging from mutual aid committees, trade unions, to the political "parties." The others, a majority of 82.7 per cent, had affiliations with various types of organizations. Most of them (47.8 per cent) had membership in one organization, while 20.1 per cent were affiliated with two organizations and 10.4 per cent had three organizational memberships.

In accordance with the widely used categorization of differentiating between various political stances, the present study demar-cates between grossly defined "Democrats" and "Pro-China/ Conservatives" as the two major groups, whilst the rest will be lumped into "Other Groups." Table 3 helps to clarify the classification used in this study.[19]

Table 3   The "Democrats" and "Pro-China/Conservative" Camps

Democrats	Pro-China/Conservatives
United Democrats of Hong Kong	The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
Meeting Point	Liberal Party
Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood	Liberal Democratic Federation
1-2-3 Democratic Alliance	Federation of Trade Unions
People's Council on Public Housing Policy	Kaifong associations
Hong Kong Democratic Foundation	Rural Committees
Professional Teachers' Union	Reform Club
	Civic Association

The Democrats were the largest group amongst the respondents: 42.2 per cent of all respondents or 50.7 per cent of respondents having political affiliations. The Pro-China/Conservatives constituted 21.3 per cent of all respondents and 25.6 per cent of those having political affiliations. The rest who reported to have organizational backing were affiliated to such groups as Kaifong associations, mutual aid committees, and other locality-based organizations. Though such groups might have their respective affiliations with or inclinations towards either the Democrats or the Conservatives, it is difficult to tell their actual stance from the surface evidence of the names of such groups. Such groups constituted 19.7 per cent of all respondents and 23.7 per cent of those having organizational backgrounds.

Table 4   Profile of Political Affiliation (%)

Affiliation	%*	Adjusted %†
Independent	16.9	–
Democrats	42.2	50.7
Pro-China/Conservatives	21.3	25.6
Others	19.7	23.7
(N)	(249)	(207)

Notes: * % of all respondents;

      † % of respondents with organizational affiliations.

Political Attitudes[20]

Views on the Government in Transition and the Future

The antagonism between the British-Hong Kong and Chinese governments hinges largely upon the controversy over the design of the political structure in the transitional period. As revealed in the present study, the majority of the respondents (69.9 per cent) agreed to the new political arrangement of abolishing all the appointed membership in the DBs. However, upon closer examination, there appeared to be a discrepancy between the Democrats and the Pro-China/Conservatives camps. Here, it was evident that the Patten Proposal was greeted with mixed receptivity.

Table 5   Agreement to Abolition of Appointed Membership by Political Inclination (%)

	Political Inclination			
	Democrats	Pro-China/Conservatives	Others	Independent
Agree	99.0	34.0	44.9	71.4
Disagree	1.0	66.0	55.1	28.6
(N)	(105)	(53)	(49)	(42)

χ^2=89.502, d.f.=3, p=0.000; lambda=0.236.

The majority of the respondents (77.2 per cent) thought that the credibility of the Hong Kong government had been jeopardized in the transitional period. To add to such a negative assessment, most of the respondents (72.1 per cent) seemed to be worried about the possible deterioration of the morale of civil service in the transitional period. There was overwhelming unanimity on these two issues amongst respondents of various political groups as well as amongst incumbents and contestants. It seemed to indicate a "confidence crisis" prevalent amongst such a group of local level politicians. Notwithstanding this pessimism towards the transitional government, more respondents (72.1 per cent) said that they were optimistic about the preservation of the way of life of Hong Kong people, and economic prosperity and stability in the future. The Pro-China/Conservatives respondents were most positive in this regard, proportionally speaking; while the Democrats were having the lowest proportion casting such optimism.

Although the respondents were weary of the possible deterioration of the morale of the civil service in the transitional period, they still took full cognizance of the very fact of administrative dominance. For instance, more respondents (57.9 per cent) agreed that, in the work of the DB, government officials had more influence than the Board members. In addition, more respondents (71.5 per cent) agreed that in the work of the representative institutions, even though the representatives could express their views, the final decision rested with the government officials. It was not to deny that there might be the possibility that the officials were attentive to the representatives' ideas. As revealed in the present findings, more respondents (49.2 per cent) agreed that most officials whom they had come across were willing to accept the representatives' opinions. The Democrats and Independents were more inclined to disagree to this than the Pro-China/Conservatives and "Other Groups" respondents. Perhaps, they had adopted a more critical and demanding stance regarding the officials' receptivity of the representatives' opinions. Admittedly, the DBs are supposed to have advisory functions only. Nonethe-

less, the sense of inefficacy was still apparent amongst the respondents. On the issue whether or not citizens should file their complaints with the officials or the representatives, there was a tie on views: 41.7 per cent opted for the representatives while 42.6 per cent took the officials as the appropriate target. Upon closer examination, the Independents and Democrats were more inclined to channel citizen complaints to the officials, while the Pro-China/Conservatives and "Other Groups" candidates were more ready to take up the role of handling citizens' complaints. This might invite the speculation that the Democrats were more mindful of the administrative dominance of the Hong Kong government.

Orientation towards the Chinese Government

In view of the eventual transfer of sovereignty to the Chinese government, the issue of political allegiance becomes increasingly acute. The coinage of "pro-China" induces controversial connotations in the special context of the Hong Kong polity. It applies to a range of possible interpretations, namely, nationalistic appeal, opportunistic posture, pragmatic orientation, and the like. The present findings seemed to reveal the politicians' ambivalent position in view of the public's perception of the representatives' political inclination in the defense and/or furtherance of public interest in light of the change of regime. Generally speaking, it was apparent that more respondents tended to adopt a rather sceptical stance towards the Chinese government. As revealed in the present study, more respondents (76.2 per cent) agreed that most Hong Kong people were generally lacking confidence in the Chinese government effectively governing Hong Kong. In addition, more respondents (80.5 per cent) agreed that the Chinese government should avoid interfering with the Hong Kong government before 1997. The Democrats were most vocal on these two issues by having the greatest proportion showing agreement with the propositions.

There seemed to be a slight indication that more respondents would favour distancing themselves from the Chinese regime. This was further grounded upon the finding that more respon-

dents (56.0 per cent) indicated that they did not like people labelling them as "pro-China." Yet, the Pro-China/Conservatives respondents were less resentful of such labelling. In contradistinction to this, on the issue of criticizing the Chinese government, the majority (70.4 per cent) disagreed that local politicians should refrain from criticizing and/or embarrassing the Chinese regime. The Democrats were especially rejecting such a posture of self-censorship.

With special attention to the issue of party development, though most of the respondents had a positive assessment of local citizens' receptivity of political parties, they were more sceptical about China's position on this issue. More respondents (66.1 per cent) agreed that the Chinese government did not like to see the emergence of many political parties in Hong Kong. If this divergence between the local people and the future government is valid, this certainly exerts considerable strain upon the local politicians in positioning themselves in relation to the political parties.

Orientation towards Political Party

Recent developments seem to depict a picture whereby the political parties have gradually gained acceptance from the ordinary people. In this study, more respondents (60.7 per cent) disagreed that the Hong Kong people were generally not supportive of the emergence of political parties. The Democrats were especially optimistic about the citizens' receptivity. However, the respondents were also wary of the fact that the Chinese government might think otherwise.

With respect to the relationship between the politicians and their parties, views seemed to be rather divided on the issue whether the representatives did need the support of political parties in their work in the representative institutions. Overall, 50.5 per cent agreed and 44.4 per cent disagreed. On closer examination, it was the Democrats who agreed more while the others held contrary views.

In the development of political parties, loyalty of the party members to the party is a critical element of their effective func-

tioning. Nonetheless, the issue of elite-mass concurrence[21] also addresses the problem of whether the elites attend to the masses. In the present study, it was found that more respondents (54.1 per cent) alleged that they would attend to representing the constituents instead of adhering to the position of their respective political groups, should there be any conflict of stances between the two. If this is the case, it invites further study of the issue of elite-mass concurrence on issue positions as well as that of party discipline in the context of political development of Hong Kong.

Assessment of Citizens' Political Aptitude

Most respondents (73.9 per cent) agreed that the voting rate of Hong Kong citizens in elections was very low. In addition, most (79.5 per cent) agreed that people did not know much about the work of the DBs. As a corollary, most (65.2 per cent) agreed that since the work of the representative institutions was complex, the ordinary citizens could not understand. Suffice to say, more respondents (65.8 per cent) agreed that Hong Kong citizens had not yet the capability to exert control over the work of the representative institutions. All these seemed to depict a negative assessment of Hong Kong people's political aptitude. However, the Democrats were less unfavourable on these aspects than their Pro-China/Conservatives counterparts. This apparently reflected their having more liberal and positive aspirations regarding the masses.

On the other hand, more respondents (57.6 per cent) disagreed that citizens in their respective constituencies were very concerned about the work of the DB. This seemed to reflect that the respondents were rather disappointed about the inactivity of the Hong Kong citizens in general and of their constituents in particular. Nonetheless, they seemed to have felt the pressure from the constituents for them to have a good performance, since more respondents (51.6 per cent) agreed that the people showed high expectations of the work of the DB.

With respect to the assessment of citizens' political orientation in general, more respondents (58.7 per cent) agreed that Hong

Kong people were very pragmatic, and that politics for them was not very important. Furthermore, more respondents (56.1 per cent) agreed that most Hong Kong people had the view that "politics is dirty." The Democrats were divided only on this issue and were even repudiating the first proposition; while respondents of other political backgrounds agreed more. Such an apprehension on the part of the respondents was perhaps related to the conventional perception of the Chinese adopting an attitude of avoidance of politics. Based upon such an assessment, it was logical that most of the respondents had a negative perception of the Hong Kong people's political aptitude.

It was interesting to find that the majority (83.7 per cent) of the respondents disagreed to the statement "Since there is a representative machinery, the citizens should refrain from using social action to redress their grievances." The Democrats were especially resentful at such a notion, as evidenced by their having a greater proportion of disagreement to the proposition. Perhaps, this was another illustration of their perception of the futility of the representative institutions in handling citizen grievances. More specifically, the Democrats were showing their grassroots orientation, background and linkages, which rendered them more sympathetic to and supportive of grassroots mobilization. This finding to a certain extent related to the debate on the possible mutual exclusivity of formal and informal channels of citizen participation. This was especially relevant in the context of the development of representative institutions which apparently had exerted pressure upon or even had frustrated grassroots mobilizations.[22]

Orientation towards the Role of Representatives

On the question of elite accountability to the masses, the respondents of the present study tended to adopt a "trustee" role,[23] i.e. they prefered to have wider scope of autonomy in formulating their own stance in performing their role as people's representatives. For instance, more respondents (67.8 per cent) agreed that a representative should keep his/her own position if it is different from that of the constituents. However, in contradiction to this,

more respondents (52.0 per cent) disagreed that under certain circumstances, there could be mutual compromises among the representatives, even though it might violate the interests of the constituents. Here lies a potential source of strain upon the politicians' own pivotal positions.

With regard to defending the interests of the constituents, the present study reflected that more respondents tended to adopt a "cosmopolitan" orientation rather than a "parochial" one. For illustration, it was found that more respondents (66.4 per cent) disagreed with the idea that a DB member should try his/her best to protect the interests of his/her own constituency, even though it might conflict with those of other districts. However, the "Independents" were less prone to disagree with this than the respondents having various organizational affiliations. It seemed to reflect the individualistic and autonomous character of the independent candidates. Also, more respondents (54.3 per cent) disagreed that, in the situation of conflicting interests between one's own constituency and the larger society, a DB member should position him/herself to safeguard the interests of his/her own constituency. However, if such interest or position of their respective constituents should come into conflict with their affiliated parties, more respondents (54.1 per cent) tended to side with their constituents. On the other hand, more respondents (50.5 per cent) agreed that the representatives did need the support of political parties in their work in the representative institutions. However, the margin was so small (44.4 per cent disagreed) that it actually indicated a divided view.

This conflicting evidence seemed to show that the respondents were quite ambivalent towards positioning themselves in the midst of conflicting interests between their constituents, their political organizations and the larger society.

In modern representative democracy, elected political representatives are vested with the responsibility of safeguarding the interests of the citizens *vis-à-vis* the possible excesses of the government machinery. Thus, it is of prime importance whether these politicians can effectively carry their mission or not. In the present

study, it was found that more respondents (58.5 per cent) disagreed that if a representative was not working full-time, it was difficult for him/her to monitor the government effectively. On the other hand, 58.5 per cent of the respondents disagreed that members of the representative institutions should work full time. Such a greater proportion of disagreement was found across respondents of different political backgrounds, incumbents and new contestants alike. From these, it was apparent that the respondents were only ready to work on part-time basis as the local level political representatives. This might adduce the proposition that this batch of local level politicians were not totally committed to their political role. Understandably, as the DB was not carrying much political weight, it seemed not critically necessary for the political figures to invest full-time commitment in their role performance.

If political representatives are to realize their role of interest articulation of the masses, it is imperative for them to sustain a viable linkage with their respective constituents to solicit views and mobilize support. As mentioned in the previous section, respondents of the present study apparently favoured playing a "trustee" role, having wider latitude or discretion. On the issue of elite consultation of the masses, views of the respondents seemed to be rather divided: 45.2 per cent agreed and 50.6 per cent disagreed respectively with the question "technically speaking, it is difficult for a representative to have sufficient consultation with his/her constituents." The Democrats were having greater proportion of disagreement to this proposition. This might indicate their grossly liberal stance in striking the elite-mass linkage. However, another finding showed that more respondents (60.1 per cent) disagreed that "if a representative consults his/her constituents before formulating his/her stand in the representative institution, this will adversely affect the efficiency of the institution." Thence, it seemed that more respondents opted for a positive stance on the issue of consultation. To supplement this finding, more respondents (68.6 per cent) disagreed that "politics should

be left to a few able people." The Democrats were most prominent on such position.

Compared with those depicted in the previous section on interest representation, these findings seemed to underline a grain of ambivalence amongst the respondents; namely, they would prefer to rely upon their own political judgement of citizens' interest, yet they would still maintain a certain level of consultation of the masses. Put in another way, the political leaders' elitist inclination was somewhat strained by a democratic or populist aspiration.

Only a small proportion of the respondents (15.3 per cent) had the ambition to enter into the legislature by standing for the electoral college election held in 1995. About one-third of them (32.9 per cent) seemed to be satisfied with serving as district level politicians. This pattern held irrespective of the political background of the respondents. On the other hand, half of the respondents (51.4 per cent) were yet undecided.[24] One said that it would be determined by the party he/she belonged to. Although most respondents indicated not to have the ambition to stand for the 1995 Legco election, the incumbents were proportionally more inclined to have such a plan.

Respondents of all types of political background, incumbents and contestants alike, showed their preference for continuing their political career beyond 1997: 56.2 per cent were determined to stand for elections at any level after 1997. On the other hand, 4.8 per cent seemed to be quite pessimistic or unmotivated to continue their political career beyond the 1997 threshold. A considerable portion of respondents, 38.6 per cent, were still undecided at the moment of the survey. Notably, the same respondent who alleged to rest the decision to stand for the 1995 Legco election upon his/her party responded similarly on this issue. This seemed to provide a prototypical case for individual politician's party loyalty. The findings on the respondents' propensity to continue their political career is to be cross-examined from the respondents' tendency to stay or quit. Amongst the respondents, 10.9 per cent had foreign citizenship. Only one respondent af-

firmed that he/she would emigrate from Hong Kong after 1997, all the others seemed to have decided to stay in Hong Kong. It apparently reflected their having sustained interest in politics.

Apparently, most of the respondents were willing to conciliate the Chinese regime, notwithstanding the fact that there had been tensions between the British-Hong Kong and the Chinese governments over the past few years: 64.6 per cent of the respondents would accept the invitation from the Chinese government to become District Consultants, while 26.7 per cent would decline such an offer.[25] Three said that they would leave the decision to the political parties they belonged to. Spectacularly, upon closer investigation, it was found that the Democrats were the least inclined to accept such offer, which starkly reflected their reproach of the Chinese regime.

Table 6   Acceptance to Invitation to be District Consultants by Political Inclination (%)

	Political Inclination			
	Democrats	Pro-China/Conservatives	Others	Independent
Accept	48.9	93.6	83.7	76.3
Reject	51.1	6.4	16.3	23.7
(N)	(88)	(47)	(49)	(38)

χ^2=36.747, d.f.=3, p=0.000; lambda=0.021.

Discussion

This study has depicted a vivid picture in which the local level political leaders standing for the 1994 DB election are showing ambivalence and are trapped in a web of contending, staggering forces within the Hong Kong polity at this particular conjuncture. Such ambivalence has indeed resulted from the multiple sources of strains; these in turn have been expressed by the controversies

affecting the various forces, ranging from the British-Hong Kong and the Chinese governments, the political parties, and last but not the least, the local populace.

In the first instance, it is questionable whether the optimism regarding the future as expressed by the respondents is solidly grounded. On the one hand, these local level political leaders are worried about the diminishing government legitimacy and the civil service morale. On the other hand, they are conscious of the citizens' distancing stance towards the Chinese government. Yet, they still allege they keep their optimism. This might underline a latent source of ambivalence among political figures striving for a cognitive balance.

The issue of the leaders' perception of decreasing government legitimacy deserves further discussion. Perhaps, it is due to the very fact that elections in Hong Kong are totally divorced from assuming a ruling position in the government; the political leaders standing for elections to the various government institutions are at most identifying themselves as watchdogs or the opposition. They might not perceive themselves as part and parcel of the government *per se*. Thus, when they take so lightly the issue of dwindling government credibility, they seem to hold on the belief of preserving their adversarial position against the administration. It deserves serious thoughts on the part of these leaders whether their political position can be so secured if the government's legitimacy rests on shaky grounds.

As revealed in the present study, political leaders were divided in their positions with respect to the controversial Patten political reform. Their choice of whether or not to support the new political structure is not entirely grounded upon the extent of their aspiration to democratic governance. Their choice apparently amounts to the siding with either side of the British-Hong Kong administration or the Chinese authorities; which equally invites criticism from the contending forces. The underlying crux of the matter is indeed the tiring question whether to strive for an appropriate position *vis-à-vis* the Chinese regime. Politicians are weary of the fact that the local populace, or a considerable portion of it at

least, is showing serious scepticism towards and reservations about the Chinese government. Yet, their own political career is not built solely upon mass support from within the territory; it also hinges upon the blessing of the Chinese authorities across the border. Their ambivalence is also demonstrated by their willingness to accept the "United Front" blessing; that of being appointed as District Consultants, on the one hand and, conversely, their forestalment of the encroaching intervention of the Chinese authorities, on the other. Their allegiance to the two political masters seems to be called into serious question.

Apart from the strain from the Sino-British disaccord, these political leaders are also ambivalent about administrative dominance in the local context. They are dreading official dominance of the government machinery, which is apt to frustrate their political role of interest articulation. Moreover, such political reality will still endure after 1997, given that the Chinese government has clearly spelled out its endorsement. On the other hand, strain has also been experienced with respect to the weakening of civil service morale, which might adversely affect the administrative efficiency couched upon bureaucratic dominance. Their ultimate position towards such a political reality is best conceived as one of "approach-avoidance."

The leaders' relationship with the ascending political parties presents yet another critical hurdle for them to overcome along the political career. They may have taken full cognizance of the trend: possibly irreversible, if not halted by some arbitrary forestalment by the future SAR government, the increasing role of parties in the local polity. However, they should also beware of the incongruent positions taken by the local citizenry and the Chinese authorities regarding the receptivity of party functioning. Leaders are pragmatic enough to solicit tangible support from their respective parties. Yet, they are also resentful of the constraints the parties exert on them if such amounts to limiting their autonomy and individualistic stance. On the other hand, if the political parties are to survive in the Hong Kong polity, they must prepare themselves to face the audience of the entire territory,

thus address society-wide issue positions rather than parochial interests. Nonetheless, political leaders who are individualistic, or worse, opportunistic, tend to attend to their limited constituents given that the DB is characterized by small constituencies. Thus, the strain derived from caring for either wider social concerns or limited parochial interests seems also tenable for such a group of local level political leaders. This may perhaps account partly for the strategic position of the so-called "independent" candidates in local level elections.

With respect to the various contending forces, the present study seems to have clearly demonstrated the existence of genuine differences between the two major political camps in the territory, namely the liberal-democrats and the pro-China/conservatives factions. Political leaders from the two camps diverge quite substantially on various issues raised in the present study, ranging from acceptance of the Patten formula, their perception of citizens' political aptitude, and the like. Nonetheless, their ultimate difference seems to lie squarely upon their relative stance towards the extent of conciliation of the Chinese regime. In corollary, their difference is also manifested in their receptivity to broadly conceived liberal social policies for the tangible benefit of the populace. The liberal-democrats' more sympathetic stance on citizens' welfare contradicts head-on the conservatives' business interests. The latter not infrequently assault the liberals for damaging the foundation of the buoyant economy, which rightly appeals to the Chinese who emphasize economic prosperity.

In striving for a position *vis-à-vis* the local citizenry, political leaders are also at pains to recognize the peculiar political culture of the Hong Kong people. People are in general pragmatic: they look for some benevolent political patrons whom they expect to provide the needed political goods, such as the preservation of stability and prosperity, yet they are not ready to pay the cost of active participation. Their high expectations of the political leaders, coupled with their passivity, make those leaders somewhat frustrated in their attempt at mass mobilization. Nonetheless, given that the leaders are individualistic or even detached from their affiliated political organizations, such inactivity of the citizens may provide a greater latitude of manoeuvre.

Conclusion

As Lau Siu-kai has pointed out, the peculiarity of the Hong Kong polity has created a desperate scenario affected by the "poverty of political leaders."[26] The present study has attempted to provide empirical support for such a thesis, as evidenced by the stark ambivalence of the local level political leaders in positioning themselves amidst a web of contending political figures and forces. The author contends here that such "poverty" is grounded upon their lack of a self-direction of political mission and of the essential knowledge and skills critically needed in the political arena. It is such poverty that makes them vulnerable to the ambivalence revealed in this study.

In envisaging the future development of the Hong Kong polity — one that is marked by the absence of independence but the nurturance of a relatively liberal democratic political environment under the auspices of an essentially (socialist) authoritarian regime — the overarching question is: what is to be done?

The root of the the problem, as Lau has rightly pointed out, lies both in the political environment as well as in the political leaders themselves. Thus, the following concluding remarks address these two major domains in view of relieving the leaders' ambivalence and, thereby, helping the leaders out of the impasse of poverty.

Concordant Political Atmosphere Grounded upon Mutual Conciliation between the British and Chinese Governments

The overwhelming issue evolves around the ultimate encompassing political environment of the diplomatic relationship between Britain and China. As proved time and again in various episodes of the diplomatic negotiations between the two governments on

the various issues pertaining to the future, the smooth transition and the running of the territory's political, economic as well as social domains, the voice of the local populace (albeit quite aloud at times) have been frustrated. The actual dealings and the subsequent settlements have always been limited by the two sovereign states to themselves, one out-going and the other in-coming. The futility of local political efforts criticized by politicians from both the conservatives and liberals, as well as from the general citizenry at large, is nonetheless evident. Thus, it comes to the point that reinstating a smooth conciliary relationship between the British and Chinese governments provides the ultimate resolution of the confusions, strains and antagonisms; this should thereby eradicate the source of ambivalence of the Hong Kong people in general and the political leaders in particular.

There are strong and favourable grounds for such a positive trend of development. The pivotal leverage lies upon the common concern of the two governments in preserving Hong Kong's strategic economic position. The Chinese economy has undergone enormous development. Though the economic machine of the mainland has gathered its own momentum, it still needs the indispensable role of Hong Kong in fuelling a sizeable inflow of foreign exchange into the mainland's gigantic economy.[27] Although there have been speculations that the Chinese regime, or more accurately the leftist factions within the Party-state, has laid down plans to make Shanghai a substitute for Hong Kong in playing such an economic role of channelling foreign investment, financial transactions, information processing, etc., such allegations seem to be founded on unreliable grounds.[28] Thus, the Chinese government would tend to take a more pragmatic stance towards Hong Kong in preserving its economic functions in the Chinese economy in general and in the Southeastern provinces in particular.

On the other side of the table, the British government is also striking a concordant tone by adopting a pragmatic approach in taking heed of economic concerns rather than focusing on ideological and political issues. The political rhetorics are coloured to a large extent by the reminiscence of the June-Fourth Incident and

the faded glory of Britian in safeguarding her colonial subjects' interests upon her retreat. Taking full cognizance of the increasingly high profile of diplomatic as well as economic linkages between China and other western powers, namely, Germany, Canada, Australia, and not the least the United States, the British government just cannot afford to lag behind; it must also jump onto the wagon and follow suite. Britain is fully aware that the gradual loosening of political sanctions precipitated by the 1989 events by various countries is essentially a prelude to a fully fledged reinstatement of economic linkage with China. The enormous market of China is another New World of treasure that no capitalist country can afford to miss. This is perceptible in the recent conciliatory stance taken by the British government in handling Sino-British diplomatic relations and in dealing with practical issues related to Hong Kong. The settlement of the new airport financial arrangement and its corresponding land allocation are clear evidence of this.

Both governments having recognized the compelling need to re-construct a favourable political climate for future transactions, we can foresee a less antagonistic and thereby less confusing political atmosphere for the Hong Kong polity in which to continue its functioning. It is also under such a good weather that the boat of sustained stability and prosperity can sail through the pacified ocean of Sino-British relations. As a corollary, the local political organizations and political leaders can have a more buoyant political environment in which they can wade and strike a more secure position amidst the various contending forces.

A More Enlightened, Articulated Local Citizenry Demanding More Open, Accountable Governance

The political reality of advancing representative government is irreversible, the forestalment of which would elicit mass resentment and resistance, given that the local citizenry has already been baptized and enlightened, in quite a haphazard manner indeed, to aspire to grossly conceived democratic propositions.

Thus, civil servants have to adjust themselves to the changing democratic political structure and rules of the game. The excessive autonomy and wide latitude of bureaucratic discretion[29] they enjoyed previously should be kept at an appropriate level and within confines. The paradigm of New Public Administration[30] propounded by liberal political scientists in the 1970s should be called forth in fostering a more open, accountable and responsive governance. It is upon such a new foundation that the political leaders can obtain more room to articulate their role in interest representation. If the civil servants are more prepared psychologically and technically to answer to more public queries on their performance, the administrative efficiency engendered by accumulated past experience would not be seriously dampened.

On the other hand, the local populace is all too pragmatic and short-sighted in pursuing immediate tangible benefits from daily livelihood concerns, instead of heeding to idiosyncratic aspirations. The people are also too volatile and changeable, so a politician is led to camouflage him/herself against such wavering political demands. Furthermore, their assumption to be a free-rider in passively receiving the benevolence of some paternalistic political patrons is also a source of frustration for the political leaders. It favours the emergence of opportunistic political figures in kindling extremist issue positions which might possibly threaten the interests of the wider Hong Kong community. Moreover, their passivity also enables the political leaders to enjoy wide discretion in their role performance, assuming a trustee role in interest articulation. Thus, the crux of the matter signifies basically the modification of such a deferential, utilitarian and passive political culture of the Hong Kong people, in view of fostering a more viable mass-elite relationship, which is also a cornerstone of an open, democratic polity.

Politicians' Commitment to "Politics as Vocation"

It is imperative for the politician in Hong Kong, in this transitional period and unprecedented political change,[31] to have the Weber-

ian vocation in politics. Only when equipped with such dedication and a Nietzschean "will to power" can a politician position him/herself to protect and advance the interests of local people *vis-à-vis* the government, present and future. A politician with the people's mandate should strive for a course of action which is not subjected to his/her own shifting loyalty to the various changing political patrons of the ruling regime, or to the mercurial "diffused consciousness" of the masses,[32] or heeding to individualistic, opportunistic self-interests. He/She should strive for a pivotal point whereby the elitist reliance upon one's own political judgement, and the populist adherence to "mass line" could come to a balance. The notions of "strong democracy" and "discursive democracy"[33] expounded in recent literature might provide answers for the political leaders to make both ends meet. That is, they should sustain viable elite-mass linkages for soliciting constituents' demands, on the one hand; and concomitantly provide enlightened insights to the masses, on the other.

Apart from commitment to a cause, politicians in Hong Kong, who are largely amateur given their limited experience and short political career, should also equip themselves with the essential political knowledge and skills from participation in politics in general and government administration in particular. Familiarity with policy analysis and the capacity to put forward constructive and alternative policy proposals are direly needed to replace mere criticism and scepticism void of substance. To substantiate such positive actions, politicians should also enrich their political repertoire and attain a more sophisticated level of competence in lobbying, negotiation, mass mobilization, organizational development, and the like.

The Hong Kong polity is rightly a peculiar case of a juxtaposition of multiple factors. Its further evolution is founded upon the stark reality of "decolonization without independence." All the more, the transition from a liberal-democratic (albeit strained) and capitalistic social order to one haunted by the possible encroachment of an authoritarian and socialistic (also strained by "Chi-

nese"-ness) regime, proves to be critically problematic. The institutional structure and the malleable masses, coupled with inherent problems in the elite community, have resulted in a poverty of political leaders. To salvage the leaders from such poverty, both the systemic factors of the political environment and the leaders themselves have to make necessary adjustments, in order to bring forward a smooth transition for Hong Kong.

Notes

1. Lau Siu-kai documented rather extensively the evolution and configuration of the political elites in Hong Kong. See Lau, (1990) *Decolonization without Independence and the Poverty of Political Leaders in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and (1992) "Colonial Rule, Transfer of Sovereignty and the Problem of Political Leaders in Hong Kong," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 223-42. Other scholars have also attempted to study some particular sector of the elite community. See P.K. Kam, W.W. Fung, L.C. Leung, and H.L. Mok (1991) "A Survey of the View of District Board Candidates on the Issue of Political Accountability." (unpublished research report) Hong Kong: City Polytechnic of Hong Kong; and Chui, E.W.T. (1993) *Elite-Mass Relationship in Hong Kong: A Look into the Perception of Local Level Political Representatives*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

2. G. Moyser and M. Wagstaffe (eds) (1987) *Research Methods for Elite Studies*. London: Allen and Unwin; W.A. Welsh (1979) "Blending Substance and Methods: Some Issues in Research on Leaders and Elites," in W.A. Welsh (ed.) *Leaders and Elites*. New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston Press, pp. 165-90.

3. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese invaded China northeast (Manchuria), which preceded by six years the commence-

ment of the Sino-Japanese War in contemporary Chinese history.

4. Understandably, this conception of deriving a yardstick for democracy in the Hong Kong context is merely based upon the proportion of directly elected seats in the various political institutions. This assertion is not immune from dispute in both the academic and political spheres.

5. P.B. Harris (1978) *Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics*. Hong Kong: Heineman; N.J. Miners (1986) *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

6. M. Muskhat (1982) *The Making of the Administrative Class*. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong.

7. R. Inglehart (1983) "Changing Paradigms in Comparative Political Behaviour," in A.W. Finifter (ed.) *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, pp. 429-69.

8. Studies by local academics revealed that the civil servants had been subjected to intense political pressure so that there emerged damaged morale, resulting in "brain-drain" of senior civil servants. See T.L. Terry and T.L. Cooper (1990) "Hong Kong Facing China: Civil Servants' Confidence in the Future," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 155-69; and I. Scott (1988) "Introduction," and "The Hong Kong Civil Service and Its Future," in I. Scott and J.P. Burns (eds) *The Hong Kong Civil Service and Its Future*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-13, 229-43.

9. Such a coinage of "parties" deserves some clarification. Some scholars cast reservations on the usage of such a term to denote political groups in the Hong Kong context, given that Hong Kong has yet no legislation upon the formation and functioning of parties as conceived in the western democracies. See J. Leung and R. Kwok (1992) "Electorate's Perception of Political Groupings in Hong Kong," in J.C.Y. Lee, W.N. Ho and J.T.L. Lam (eds) *A Report of the Conference Proceedings on*

Politics and 1991 Elections in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, pp.106-16.

10. According to various survey findings, there had been a change over time in terms of the local people's perception and receptivity of emerging political parties. See S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan (1988) *The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese.* Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press; S.K. Lau (1992) *Public Attitude toward Political Parties in Hong Kong.* Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; J. Leung and R. Kwok, op. cit. and A. Yeung and E.W.T. Chui (1992) "The 1991 Elections: A Citizen's Perspective," in J.C.Y. Lee et al. (eds) op. cit., pp. 54-82.

11. The "three against" here refers to the Chinese official line of critique against the British government in failing to keep to the agreements reached between the British and Chinese governments in the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and the subsequent diplomatic negotiations.

12. Leung's investigation of the composition of the Executive and Legislative Councils provided empirical support for such an assertion. See B.K.P. Leung (1990) "Power and Politics: A Critical Analysis," in B.K.P. Leung (ed.) *Social Issues in Hong Kong.* Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, pp. 13-26.

13. The two forces of the capitalist and Pro-China factions strategically compromised or even became allied to support candidates in the DB election, especially in the old urban areas like the Kwun Tong district, Kowloon City district, and the New Territories where they even secured the support of the traditional forces of the Rural Committees.

14. Results of various polls indicated that the support for Governor Patten and his political structural reform had gradually diminished since he first came to Hong Kong with an unprecedentedly high political profile. See Social Science Research Centre (SSRC), University of Hong Kong, Public Opinion Programme (POP) *Special Report on Popularity Ratings,* January 14, 1994. Overall, support for Governor Patten had been fluctuat-

ing, yet it dropped from an initial 65.5 points in May 1992 to 57.99 in December 1993. On the other hand, the SSRC also launched a "referendum" by means of a telephone survey on November 17-18, 1993 and revealed that the Patten Proposal would fail to meet the 50 per cent support threshold.

15. In a private housing estate, the Laguna City, where a rehabilitation centre for the discharged mental patients was to be instituted, heated rejection was staged by the residents. Another incident which involved the provision of special accommodation for several patients in a public housing estate, the Wah Kwai Estate in Pokfulam, was also a vivid illustration of community intolerance. On another occasion, the government's proposal for establishing social centres for the filipino domestic helpers also met with resentment from residents of the concerned districts. In these cases, there had been some agitation and mobilization by standing DB candidates firing at the government's policy on rehabilitation and municipal services.

16. In the 1994 DB election, the ratio of party-supported to independents was 52:48. Nonetheless, it should be cautioned that some candidates preferred not to disclose their affiliation to some particular groups or parties, in the speculative attempt to conceal the perceived negative effect borne by such party labels.

17. The author is going to launch a similar survey research upon the candidates standing for the 1995 MC and Legco elections, respectively. It is hoped that these studies, though separate in themselves, constitute a systematic investigation of the configuration of political elites emerging or enduring in this transitional period of Hong Kong.

18. The statistical package of SPSS-PC has been utilized to perform univariate analyses which provide descriptive statistics of distribution, dispersion and bivariate analyses of cross-tabulations which provide correlational statistics. Since most of the variables are nominal or ordinal ones, the statistics of

gamma, lambda, phi and Cramer's V have been used to examine the strengths of various possible correlations.

19. It is acknowledged that such a classification carries some arbitrariness in putting a gross label upon the various groups or organizations. However, reference is made to similar classifications used by the media, as well as the image portrayed by spokesmen of these organizations on relevant issues in favour of a generally liberal propositions and a pro-China stance, respectively.

20. In the following section, the figures on degree of agreement or disagreement are aggregated, disregarding the fine differences between "strongly agree," "agree" and "slightly agree" and the like. It is acknowledged that such a treatment suppresses and reduces the quality of the data obtained. For a detailed breakdown of degree of agreement, please refer to the Appendices.

21. S.B. Hansen (1975) "Participation, Political Structure and Concurrence," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69, pp. 1181-99; I. McAllister (1991) "Party Elites, Voters and Political Attitude: Testing Three Explanations for Mass-Elite Differences," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 237-68.

22. Local social work professionals have been alarmed at the encroachment by political groups and figures in taking up the role of people's vanguard especially at the community level, which have apparently displaced the original role of community workers in grassroots organizing. See P.K. Kam (1992) "Community Work and Party Politics," in Hong Kong Council of Social Services (ed.) *Community Development Resource Book 1991-92*, pp. 10-13 (in Chinese); N.K. Kwok (1992) "The Development of Political Parties and the Impact on Community Organizing," in Hong Kong Council of Social Services, op. cit., pp. 31-40 (in Chinese); E.W.T. Chui (1994) "The Challenge to Community Work," in P.K. Kam et al. (eds) *Community Work: Theory and Practice*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, pp. 303-16 (in Chinese).

23. H. Eulau et al. proposed a three-fold schema of the roles of political representatives: "trustee," "politico" and "delegate." The three are in a decreasing order of autonomy and discretion vested with the representatives. See H. Eulau, J.C. Wahlke, W. Buchanan, and L.C. Ferguson (1959) "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 53, pp. 742-56.

24. A survey conducted by a local newspaper, the *Hong Kong Daily News*, revealed that 38 (9 per cent of a total of 420 respondents) candidates indicated that they would stand for the 1995 Legco electoral college election. Amongst them, 31 per cent of the Democrats and 18 per cent of the Conservatives indicated such an ambition. See *Hong Kong Daily News*, August 25, 1994.

25. In the same survey by *Hong Kong Daily News*, 42 per cent of the respondents indicated their willingness to accept the invitation to become District Consultants. The Democrats were less inclined than their Conservative counterparts to align themselves with the Chinese regime.

26. Lau has analyzed the socio-political context for the resultant problem of "poverty of political leaders." His major theses are: most leaders are concerned more with personal elevation of status rather than policy goals; most are amateuristic, mercurial and opportunistic; there is a lack of strong, mass-based and coherent political organizations serving as nurturing grounds for the emergence of leaders; and there prevails among the Hong Kong people a general acceptance of the *status quo* and thence the resultant narrowing of ideological divisions rendering the parties incapable of distinguishing themselves with sharp identities. See S.K. Lau (1990) *Decolonization without Independence and the Poverty of Political Leaders in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

27. The strategic economic position and role of Hong Kong for China is widely accepted. See Liu Tong-shun (1993) "Asia-

Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Mainland China-Hong Kong-Taiwan Economic Partnership," in K.S. Liao (ed.) *The New International Order in East Asia*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

28. Such speculations can easily be found in journalistic discussions on the economic relation between China and Hong Kong. See for example P. Han (1994) "Shanghai Planning to Replace Hong Kong," *The Contemporary*, No. 42, pp. 19-22.

29. With the advent of the ascendancy of bureaucratic dominance which amounts to endangering the foundations of western representative democracy, scholars are alarmed at the need to exert control over the government. See E. Etzioni-Halevy (1989) *Fragile Democracy*. New Jersey: Transaction Publications; P. Hillyard and J. Percy-Smith (1988) *The Coercive State*. London: Pinter Publication; J.E. Gruber (1987) *Controlling Bureaucracies*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press; L.V. Carino (1983) "Administrative Accountability: A Review of the Evolution, Meaning and Operationalization of a Key Concept in Public Administration," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 118-48. On the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians in representative democracy, see J.D. Aberbach, R.D. Putnam and B.A. Rockman (1981) *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

30. The New Public Administration school proposes the more open type of government administration which emphasizes such aspects as decentralization, delegation, and democratic organization. See F. Marini (1971) *Toward a New Public Administration*. San Francisco: Chandler; H.G. Frederickson (1976) "The Lineage of New Public Administration," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 149-74.

31. I. Scott (1986) "Policy-making in a Turbulent Environment: The Case of Hong Kong," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 447-69, and (1989) *Political

Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

32. It is a Durkheimian notion of diffused consciousness found within the masses that denotes the parochial, fragmented interests in the society, which makes the crystallization of a General Will difficult. See Durkheim (1957) *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

33. See B.R. Barber (1988) *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. Berkeley: University of California Press; N. Bobbio (1987) *Future of Democracy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; and J.S. Dryzek (1990) *Discursive Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Appendix 1   Political Views (%)

	V.A.	A.	S.A.	N.O.	S.D.	D.	V.D.
Assessment of Hong Kong citizens							
Hong Kong citizens do not know much about the work of the DB.	8.8	38.6	32.1	0.4	11.2	8.0	0.8
The work of the representative institutions is complex, ordinary citizens cannot understand.	9.3	31.2	24.7	3.6	11.7	17.8	1.6
The voting rate of Hong Kong citizens in elections is very low.	6.0	40.6	27.3	3.2	12.9	8.8	1.2
Hong Kong citizens have not yet the capability to exert control over the work of the representative institutions.	10.9	35.5	19.4	2.8	14.9	12.5	4.0
Citizens in my own constituencies are very concerned about the work of the DB.	2.4	10.9	18.1	10.9	26.6	27.4	3.6
Hong Kong citizens are having high expectations of the work of the DB.	2.8	21.8	27.0	8.0	21.0	18.1	1.2
Hong Kong people are very pragmatic, politics for them is not very important.	7.7	30.8	20.2	4.5	13.0	17.8	6.1
Most Hong Kong people have the view that "politics is dirty."	7.7	19.8	28.6	11.7	14.5	15.7	2.0
Hong Kong people are generally not supportive of the emergence of political parties.	1.6	10.1	13.0	14.6	14.6	35.6	10.5
Since there is a representative machinery, citizens should refrain from using social action to redress their grievances.	0.0	6.9	6.5	2.9	18.0	45.3	20.4

Attitudes towards the Chinese government

Most Hong Kong people generally lack confidence in the Chinese government in effectively governing Hong Kong.	23.8	33.4	19.0	8.1	6.5	6.5	3.2
The Chinese government should avoid interfering with the Hong Kong government before 1997.	35.2	34.0	11.3	6.9	4.5	5.3	2.8
The Chinese government does not like to see the emergence of many political parties in Hong Kong.	16.9	41.1	8.1	17.7	4.0	8.9	3.2
I do not like people labelling me as "pro-China."	16.9	29.6	9.5	27.2	3.3	8.6	4.9
Local political figures should refrain from criticizing the Chinese government or its policies.	2.0	11.9	7.4	8.2	13.5	34.8	22.1

Attitudes towards political parties

The representatives do need the support of political parties in their work in the representative institutions.	10.6	23.2	16.7	5.3	11.4	23.2	9.8
Hong Kong People are generally not supportive of the emergance of political parties.	1.6	10.1	13.0	14.6	14.6	35.6	10.5
If there is conflict between the position of my party/political group and that of my own constituency, I will choose to abide by that of my group.	2.1	14.9	8.7	20.2	16.5	27.7	9.9
The Chinese government does not like to see the emergence of many political parties in Hong Kong.	16.9	41.1	8.1	17.7	4.0	8.9	3.2

Perception of government officials

	V.A.	A.	S.A.	N.O.	S.D.	D.	V.D.
In the work of the DB, government officials have more influence than the Board members.	12.6	26.3	19.0	5.3	12.6	22.3	2.0
Among those officials that I have come across, most of them are willing to accept the representatives' opinions.	1.2	13.0	35.0	13.4	22.0	13.8	1.6
If citizens have complaints, they should go to the representatives instead of the government officials.	6.4	26.9	8.4	15.7	18.9	19.3	4.4
In the work of the representative institutions, even though the representatives have already expressed their views, the final decision rests upon the government officials.	15.1	33.1	23.3	3.7	11.0	11.4	2.4

Perception of role of representatives

	V.A.	A.	S.A.	N.O.	S.D.	D.	V.D.
If a representative consults his/her constituents before formulating his/her stand in the representative institution, this will adversely affect the efficiency of the institution.	2.4	12.9	18.1	6.5	21.8	33.1	5.2
Technically speaking, it is difficult for a representative to have sufficient consultation with his/her constituents.	4.0	20.6	20.6	4.0	17.4	26.3	6.9
A representative should keep to his/her own position if it is different from that of his/her constituents.	9.8	35.1	22.9	8.6	10.6	11.4	1.6
Under certain circumstances, there can be mutual compromises among the representatives, even though it might violate the interests of the constituents.	2.4	18.3	17.5	9.8	17.9	26.4	7.7

	V.A.	A.	S.A.	N.O.	S.D.	D.	V.D.
A DB member should try his/her best to protect the interests of his/her own constituency, even though it might conflict with those of other districts.	4.0	9.7	12.6	7.3	21.5	36.4	8.5
In the situation of conflicting interests between one's own constituency and the larger society, a DB member should position him/herself to safeguard the interests of his/her own constituency.	4.9	17.4	15.8	7.7	23.9	25.9	4.5
If there is conflict between the position of my party/political group and that of my own constituency, I will choose to abide by that of my group.	2.1	14.9	8.7	20.2	16.5	27.7	9.9
If a representative is not working full-time, it is difficult for him/her to monitor the government effectively.	5.2	21.8	10.5	4.0	17.3	32.3	8.9
The representatives do need the support of political parties in their work in the representative institutions.	10.6	23.2	16.7	5.3	11.4	23.2	9.8
I am optimistic about the preservation of the way of life of Hong Kong people, and economic prosperity and stability in the future.	11.7	43.1	17.3	6.5	8.9	9.3	3.2
I think that politics should be left to a few able people.	2.8	12.5	10.9	5.2	12.5	35.5	20.6
Local political figures should refrain from criticizing the Chinese government or its policies.	2.0	11.9	7.4	8.2	13.5	34.8	22.1
I do not like people labelling me as "pro-China."	16.9	29.6	9.5	27.2	3.3	8.6	4.9

Notes: V.A. = Strongly agree, A. = Agree, S.A. = Slightly agree,
N.O. = No opinion, S.D. = Slightly disagree, D. = Disagree,
V.D. = Strongly disagree.

Appendix 2   Political Views by Political Affiliation (%)

		Political Affiliation			
		Independents	Democrats	Conservatives	Others
Assessment of Hong Kong citizens					
Hong Kong citizens do not know much about the work of the DB.	Agree	82.9	76.2	88.7	75.5
	Disagree	17.1	23.8	11.3	24.5
	(N)	(41)	(105)	(53)	(49)

(χ^2 = 4.2548, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.131)

The work of the representative institutions is complex, ordinary citizens cannot understand.	Agree	73.8	59.6	82.4	63.0
	Disagree	26.2	40.4	17.6	37.0
	(N)	(42)	(99)	(51)	(46)

(χ^2 = 9.146, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.196)

The voting rate of Hong Kong citizens in elections is very low.	Agree	85.4	61.4	88.2	87.5
	Disagree	14.6	38.6	11.8	12.5
	(N)	(41)	(101)	(51)	(48)

(χ^2 = 21.664, d.f. = 3, p<0.001; Cramer's V= 0.300)

Hong Kong citizens have not yet the capability to exert control over the work of the representative institutions.	Agree	75.6	58.4	78.0	69.4
	Disagree	24.4	41.6	22.0	30.6
	(N)	(41)	(101)	(50)	(49)

(χ^2 = 7.635, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.178)

Citizens in my own constituencies are very concerned about the work of the DB.	Agree	30.6	35.5	28.6	46.5
	Disagree	69.4	64.5	71.4	53.5
	(N)	(36)	(93)	(49)	(43)

(χ^2 =3.694, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.129)

Hong Kong citizens are having high expectations of the work of the DB.	Agree	47.4	60.4	55.8	55.3
	Disagree	52.6	39.6	44.2	44.7
	(N)	(38)	(91)	(52)	(47)

(χ^2 = 1.886, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.091)

Hong Kong people are very pragmatic, politics for them is not very important.	Agree	69.0	48.0	75.0	68.8
	Disagree	31.0	52.0	25.0	31.3
	(N)	(42)	(98)	(48)	(48)

(χ^2 =13.352, d.f. = 3, p<0.005; Cramer's V= 0.238)

Most Hong Kong people have the view that "politics is dirty."	Agree	71.1	50.0	73.7	76.6
	Disagree	28.9	50.0	26.3	23.4
	(N)	(38)	(96)	(38)	(47)

(χ^2 =13.657, d.f. = 3, p<0.005; Cramer's V= 0.250)

Hong Kong people are generally not supportive of the emergence of political parties.	Agree	45.7	6.2	44.2	55.6
	Disagree	54.3	93.8	55.8	44.4
	(N)	(35)	(97)	(43)	(36)

(χ^2 =44.500, d.f. = 3, p=0.000; Cramer's V= 0.496)

Since there is a representative machinery, citizens should refrain from using social action to redress their grievances.	Agree	23.1	1.9	20.8	25.0
	Disagree	76.9	98.1	79.2	75.0
	(N)	(39)	(103)	(48)	(48)

(χ^2 =21.966, d.f. = 3, p<0.001; Cramer's V= 0.304)

Attitudes towards political parties

The representatives do need the support of political parties in their work in the representative institutions.	Agree	28.9	81.4	50.0	14.9
	Disagree	71.1	18.6	50.0	85.1
	(N)	(38)	(102)	(46)	(47)

(χ^2 =69.386, d.f. = 3, p=0.000; Cramer's V= 0.450)

Hong Kong people are generally not supportive of the emergence of political parties.	Agree	45.7	6.2	44.2	55.6
	Disagree	54.3	93.8	55.2	44.4
	(N)	(35)	(97)	(43)	(36)

$(\chi^2 = 44.500, \text{d.f.} = 3, p=0.000; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.496)$

If there is conflict between the position of my party/political group and that of my own constituency, I will choose to abide by that of my group.	Agree	21.9	37.3	40.9	17.6
	Disagree	78.1	62.7	59.1	82.4
	(N)	(32)	(83)	(44)	(34)

$(\chi^2 = 7.406, \text{d.f.} = 3, \text{n.s.}; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.196)$

The Chinese government does not like to see the emergence of many political parties in Hong Kong.	Agree	83.3	81.2	75.0	81.4
	Disagree	16.7	18.8	25.0	18.6
	(N)	(36)	(85)	(40)	(43)

$(\chi^2 = 0.996, \text{d.f.} = 3, \text{n.s.}; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.070)$

Attitudes towards the Chinese government

Most Hong Kong people generally lack confidence in the Chinese government in effectively governing Hong Kong.	Agree	84.2	93.1	70.5	68.9
	Disagree	15.8	6.9	29.5	31.1
	(N)	(38)	(101)	(44)	(45)

$(\chi^2 = 18.052, \text{d.f.} = 3, p<0.001; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.281)$

The Chinese government should avoid interfering with the Hong Kong government before 1997.	Agree	92.1	84.1	76.6	74.4
	Disagree	7.9	5.9	23.4	25.6
	(N)	(38)	(102)	(47)	(43)

$(\chi^2 = 15.435, \text{d.f.} = 3, p<0.005; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.260)$

The Chinese government does not like to see the emergence of many political parties in Hong Kong.	Agree	83.3	81.2	75.0	81.4
	Disagree	16.7	18.8	25.0	18.6
	(N)	(36)	(85)	(40)	(43)

$(\chi^2 = 0.996, \text{d.f.} = 3, \text{n.s.}; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.070)$

I do not like people labelling me as "pro-China."	Agree	91.2	76.6	66.7	72.7
	Disagree	8.8	23.4	33.3	27.3
	(N)	(34)	(77)	(33)	(33)

$(\chi^2 = 6.161, \text{d.f.} = 3, \text{n.s.}; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.187)$

Local political figures should refrain from criticizing the Chinese government or its policies.	Agree	36.1	7.0	44.4	27.9
	Disagree	63.9	93.0	55.6	72.1
	(N)	(36)	(100)	(45)	(43)

$(\chi^2 = 30.018, \text{d.f.} = 3, p=0.000; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.366)$

Perception of government officials

In the work of the DB, government officials have more influence than the Board members.	Agree	65.0	61.2	64.0	54.3
	Disagree	35.0	38.8	36.0	45.7
	(N)	(40)	(98)	(50)	(46)

$(\chi^2 = 1.136, \text{d.f.} = 3, \text{n.s.}; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.075)$

Among those officials that I have come across, most of them are willing to accept the representatives' opinions.	Agree	47.2	48.9	68.2	68.9
	Disagree	52.8	51.1	31.8	31.1
	(N)	(36)	(88)	(44)	(45)

$(\chi^2 = 8.608, \text{d.f.} = 3, \text{n.s.}; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.201)$

If citizens have complaints, they should go to the representatives instead of the government officials.	Agree	48.6	40.5	59.6	57.1
	Disagree	51.4	59.5	40.4	42.9
	(N)	(37)	(84)	(47)	(42)

$(\chi^2 = 5.637, \text{d.f.} = 3, \text{n.s.}; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.164)$

In the work of the representative institutions, even though the representatives have already expressed their views, the final decision rests upon the government officials.	Agree	84.2	72.5	75.5	68.1
	Disagree	15.8	27.5	24.5	31.9
	(N)	(38)	(102)	(49)	(47)

$(\chi^2 = 3.092, \text{d.f.} = 3, \text{n.s.}; \text{Cramer's V} = 0.114)$

Perception of role of representatives

If a representative consults his/her constituents before formulating his/her stand in the representative institution, this will adversely affect the efficiency of the institution.

Agree	41.0	27.3	41.7	43.5
Disagree	59.0	72.7	58.3	56.5
(N)	(39)	(99)	(48)	(46)

(χ^2 = 5.496, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.153)

Technically speaking, it is difficult for a representative to have sufficient consultation with his/her constituents.

Agree	53.8	40.2	60.0	43.5
Disagree	46.2	59.8	40.0	56.5
(N)	(39)	(102)	(50)	(46)

(χ^2 = 6.241, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.162)

A representative should keep to his/her own position if it is different from that of his/her constituents.

Agree	69.2	68.5	72.5	91.1
Disagree	30.8	31.5	27.5	8.9
(N)	(39)	(89)	(51)	(45)

(χ^2 = 8.766, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.198)

Under certain circumstances, there can be mutual compromises among the representatives, even though it might violate the interests of the constituents.

Agree	55.3	26.9	47.9	58.1
Disagree	44.7	73.1	52.1	41.9
(N)	(38)	(93)	(48)	(43)

(χ^2 = 16.710, d.f. = 3, p<0.001; Cramer's V= 0.274)

A DB member should try his/her best to protect the interests of his/her own constituency, even though it might conflict with those of other districts.

Agree	52.6	16.3	31.3	31.1
Disagree	47.8	83.7	68.8	68.9
(N)	(38)	(98)	(48)	(45)

(χ^2 = 18.358, d.f. = 3, p<0.001; Cramer's V= 0.283)

In the situation of conflicting interests between one's own constituency and the larger society, a DB member should position him/herself to safeguard the interests of his/her own constituency.

Agree	47.4	32.6	45.1	50.0
Disagree	52.6	67.4	54.9	50.0
(N)	(38)	(95)	(51)	(44)

(χ^2 = 5.201, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.151)

If there is conflict between the position of my party/political group and that of my own constituency, I will choose to abide by that of my group.

Agree	21.9	37.3	40.9	17.6
Disagree	78.1	62.7	59.1	82.4
(N)	(32)	(83)	(44)	(34)

(χ^2 = 7.406, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.196)

If a representative is not working full-time, it is difficult for him/her to monitor the government effectively.

Agree	37.5	40.4	27.5	50.0
Disagree	62.5	59.6	72.5	50.0
(N)	(40)	(99)	(51)	(48)

(χ^2 = 5.416, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V= 0.151)

The representatives do need the support of political parties in their work in the representative institutions.

Agree	28.9	81.4	50.0	14.9
Disagree	71.1	18.6	50.0	85.1
(N)	(38)	(102)	(46)	(47)

(χ^2 = 69.386, d.f. = 3, p=0.000; Cramer's V= 0.546)

I am optimistic about the preservation of the way of life of Hong Kong people, and economic prosperity and stability in the future.

Agree	77.5	63.7	92.3	85.7
Disagree	22.5	36.3	7.7	14.3
(N)	(40)	(91)	(52)	(49)

(χ^2 = 18.110, d.f. = 3, p<0.001; Cramer's V= 0.279)

I think that politics should be left to a few able people.

Agree	47.5	8.0	46.8	33.3
Disagree	52.5	92.0	53.2	66.7
(N)	(40)	(100)	(47)	(48)

(χ^2 = 36.571, d.f. = 3, p=0.000; Cramer's V= 0.394)

Local political figures should refrain from criticizing the Chinese government or its policies.	Agree	36.1	7.0	44.4	27.9
	Disagree	63.9	93.0	55.6	72.1
	(N)	(36)	(100)	(45)	(43)

($\chi^2 = 30.018$, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V = 0.366)

I do not like people labelling me as "pro-China."	Agree	91.2	76.6	66.7	72.7
	Disagree	8.8	23.4	33.3	27.3
	(N)	(34)	(77)	(33)	(33)

($\chi^2 = 6.161$, d.f. = 3, n.s.; Cramer's V = 0.187)

地區政治領袖的矛盾

一九九四年區議會選舉候選人觀點

徐永德

（中文摘要）

　　香港社會呈現「政治領袖匱乏」的現象。這「匱乏」不僅是政治領袖的數量不足，又或是欠缺理想的培育環境，亦源於政治領袖廁身於多種不同政治勢力之中的矛盾，這些勢力包括：港府的行政主導官僚體系、行將體現主權的中國政府、支持政治領袖的政黨，以及那些常變而又持現實和非意識形態取向的選民。本文基於一項有關一九九四年區議會選舉候選人的調查研究資料，對彌補政治領袖匱乏作出如下論點：（一）中英港政府之間要透過洽商，以減低其對政治領袖於不同政治效忠的矛盾。（二）政治領袖須懷有韋伯所倡議的「政治使命感」，以免受到常變的選民的影響，或淪於個人化機會主義。（三）香港市民須表達其對自由、民主的訴求，以建立較開放和民主的政府，從而讓政治領袖體現其表達政治意願及監察政府運作的角色。