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Reconstructing the Democratic Discourses in Taiwan

A Q Methodological Approach

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Reconstructing the Democratic Discourses in Taiwan

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Introduction

The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has witnessed rapid democratization in the past decade. Since the martial law was lifted in July 1987, direct elections have been progressively implemented for the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, the governor of the Taiwan province, and the President of the ROC. In fact, after the 1996 presidential direct election, Taiwan's central and local regimes have been fully democratized. Parallel to the unfolding electoral process, has taken place the reorganization of many old constitutional structures through a series of four waves of successive constitutional reforms conducted by the National Assembly between 1990 and 1997.[1] The reform process, however, is by no means completed because it touches upon the extremely sensitive issues of relations across the Taiwan Straits and local ideological and political struggles over Taiwan's national future.[2] Both the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have agreed to hold another wave of talks to further amend the constitution in the summer of 1999. As a national constitution embodies a country's total political build-up, the unfinished process of constitutional reform in Taiwan reflects democracy as a political system is still in a process of construction and reconstruction subject to influence of various political forces with different democratic and national ideals. In fact, such tidal waves of reforms are both driven by and contribute to the spread of the idea of democracy among the Taiwan people, which is

increasingly seen as natural in Taiwan.[3] Political leaders, unificationists, separatists, critics and activists alike must use the same language of democracy to give justification to the form of government and state they advocate.[4] At the same time, owing to Taiwan's unique historical setting, there are various theories of democracy in competition. Guardians of the ROC Constitution, advocators of a new independent Taiwanese state, parliamentarists, presidentialists, liberalists, communists, communitarians and others, each has its own preferences over the forms of democracy. And, because of this, real democracy is hard to find.

It is not the aim of this study to construct a real democracy for Taiwan. Instead, it attempts to reconstruct the different discourses of democracy in Taiwan using a method called Q methodology, a subject matter that has remained totally unexplored so far. We believe that it is not important whether there is a universal theory of democracy. What is important is how the proponents of democracy in Taiwan use similar democratic languages to construct their discourses of democracy and cast their political roles and competences in such discourses. In other words, our interest lies in the subjectivity manifested in the discourses of the Taiwan people in their pursuit of democracy. To "reconstruct" means to explain and analyse these political discourses on democracy borne out by the people in Taiwan. We believe the reconstruction can facilitate our understanding of the complexity and differences involved in the discourses of democracy in Taiwan and demonstrate how individuals construct their cherished form of democracy on the basis of their recognized criteria and competences of democracy.

Q Methodology and Subjectivity

We adopt Q methodology because it can address our main concern — the content and structure of democratic discourses that Taiwan people have formulated in the process of democratization unfolded a decade ago.[5] Q methodology, initiated by psychologist William Stephenson in 1935,[6] has been well established.[7] Procedurally, Q methodology can be divided into four steps. First, a concourse is drawn which literally should include all opinion statements or ideas on a specific research topic.[8] Theoretically, these statements can be logically linked and developed into several discourses. Here, a discourse indicates the ability to assemble "words, phrases, and sentences into meaningful 'texts'."[9] Secondly, an operational and representative sample is selected from the concourse, independent of the researcher's own value preferences. Thirdly, under the condition of instruction on a continuum with a central neutral category, respondents are asked to sort the sample.[10] The result is called a Q sort. Finally, Q sorts are normally correlated and factor analysed so as to identify patterns of subjective viewpoints (i.e., discourses) among the respondents on which the discursive structure in the concourse can be modelled.[11]

Unlike the operationalism emphasized in the conventional R methodology, the subjects' viewpoints in Q methodology are not dependent upon the researcher's conceptual definitions fixed *a priori* and according to which all else is then measured. The hallmark of Q methodology is that it lets its subjects speak for themselves from "within." Q methodology insists, first and foremost, that all opinion statements must "be drawn from those actually made by individuals involved with the concourse."[12] It also places confidence in the subjects' ability to order and organize their experiences and, thus, respects them as highly autonomous meaning-makers. The essence of Q sorting is that it allows individuals, on the basis of their judgements and understanding, to (re)construct the discourses embedded in a sample of statements regarding the research topic. Moreover, in Q methodology, whether the statements are true or false is meaningless. The meaning associated with statements is not located at the logical meaning of isolated words or phrases; rather, it is largely dependent upon the whole "behavioural contextuality."[13] In Q methodology, the importance is the process of reconstructing the discourses through which the inextricable, symbiotic relationship between subjectivity and theorization is unfolded.

Research Design

The present study closely follows the research design laid out in a study published by Dryzek and Berejikian in 1993.[14] In the study, Dryzek and Berejikian selected 300 statements from media reports, quotations, ethnographic studies and discussion groups on democracy to form the concourse of democracy. To accommodate the principles of diversity and comprehensiveness in the sampling of the concourse, Dryzek and Berejikian made use of the theory of political discourse analysis in setting up their sampling framework. According to them, political discourse analysis consists of two major dimensions: the elements of discourse and the types of claims. The elements of a political discourse include: (1) an ontology, or set of entities, which is recognized as existing, such as individuals, classes, nations, genes and interests; (2) degrees of agency assigned to these entities — for example, in the Marxist theory, class is an independent subject, while state is an object completely under the control of the ruling class; (3) motives of agents, such as material self-interest, civil virtue, impartiality and survival; (4) conceptions of natural and unnatural political relationships, including taken-for-granted hierarchies based on age, education, gender, wealth, social classes and so on. The types of claims are four: definitive, designative, evaluative and advocative. Combining these two dimensions forms a four-by-four matrix for sampling a concourse as shown in Table 1. The function of the matrix is to some extent similar to the factorial design involved in the process of sampling selection. After eliminating statements with no clear fit in any cell, Dryzek and Berejikian took four statements from each at random, yielding 64 Q-statements for the Q sample.

Our study strictly replicated Dryzek and Berejikian's Q sample and administered it to Taiwan.[15] We did so principally because we wanted to adopt a definitely international perspective for the purpose of cross-national comparison later.[16] While theories of democracy originated and developed in the West, we know that

Table 1 Matrix for Sampling a Concourse

Type of claim	Discourse element			
	Ontology	Agency	Motivation	Natural
Definitive	1	2	3	4
Designative	5	6	7	8
Evaluative	9	10	11	12
Advocative	13	14	15	16

Note: The numbers identify the cells from 1 to 16. See Dryzek and Berejikian, "Reconstructive Democratic Theory," p. 53.

the discursive practices of democracy in different countries may display different characteristics in relation to their special political, social, economic and cultural settings. Using Dryzek and Berejikian's Q sample can provide us a basis for cross-national comparison in the future.

What must be resolved is methodological relevance. We believe our replication is justified on three grounds. First, it is true that Dryzek and Berejikian's concourse was collected from the United States, but the collection was grounded on examining American people's subjectivity toward democracy in general instead of emphasizing the uniqueness of American politics, economy, society and culture. Therefore, when applying the same sample to studying the democratic discourses in Taiwan (and the other countries as well), the potential bias that may arise from cultural and other differences between the two countries should be quite trivial. Secondly, as democracy both as a notion and as a political system is an import from the West, Taiwan people's understanding and knowledge of democracy simply cannot be immune from Western influence. In other words, statements in Dryzek and Berejikian's concourse of democracy, albeit collected in the United States, should not be unfamiliar to Taiwan people.

Thirdly, Q methodology identifies and reconstructs discourses hermeneutically on the basis of the discourse's internal logical structure as a whole. The interpretation of individual words and phrases must be positioned against the meaning structure of the entire discourse. The same statements may designate different meanings in different discourses, not to mention in different cultural contexts in which such meanings are continuously produced and reproduced. As the interpretation of the meaning of the statements cannot be fixed *a priori*, the sources for the selection of the statements thus become relatively unimportant.

In early August 1998, 35 subjects were asked to put in order the 64 statements according to their own understanding.[17] Our guiding principle in selecting these subjects was diversity. This principle is important, since previous studies show that social characteristics, such as age, sex, education, ethnicity and party affiliation, have various degrees of influence on people's democratic attitudes. Yet, despite the principle of diversity, we do not want to claim that the 35 subjects are statistically representative of some larger population. This is not the focus of Q methodology. What Q methodology attempts to analyse is the discourse patterns, not the relationship between the subjects' views and various social and political variables. Hence, "all that is required are enough subjects to establish the existence of a factor for purposes of comparing one factor with another."[18] In other words, the generalizations that can be drawn are not based on the subjects but rather on the discourse patterns, as the unit of analysis is the latter, not the former. As Dryzek and Berejikian aver, the discourse patterns can be "expected to intimate the opinion structure in some larger population of subject."[19] Q methodology does not tell us the proportion of people holding any particular discourse, nor does it ascertain the relative importance of each discourse through statistical means. It also does not guarantee that it has exhausted all existing discourses.

Discourse Reconstruction

The 35 Q sorts were analysed through centroid factor analysis and varimax solution. Five discourses (factors) were identified. The subjects' loadings and demographic variables are presented in Table 2.[20] There is no observable significant correlation between the two.[21] The factor arrays of an idealized Q sort for each discourse are shown in Table 3.[22] The interpretation of each discourse does not simply involve editing and passing Q statements but, more importantly, combining them in an internally coherent manner.[23] It is a deliberate, intensive meaning reconstruction which is linked to relative factor scores. The factor scores, indeed, can facilitate our hermeneutical imagination as well as minimize the risk of over-interpretation.

Discourse A: Democratic Pragmatism

Discourse A interprets democracy from a pragmatic point of view, embracing the notion that democracy is hard to define and its meaning changes with time, place and circumstance (2).[24] It holds that democracy should go hand in hand with a pluralist (14) and equalitarian society (3, 64), but in view of the present reality, it maintains that people are not born equal (15, 61) and does not embrace absolute equality (62). In addition, the discourse holds that present-day societies cannot boast equality (30), for there are always people who are not represented and whose voices are not heard (23). Furthermore, Discourse A believes that democracy and freedom are inseparable (1). Not only does freedom need protection (38, 51), but such protection must also be legalized (49). This pragmatic view is partly influenced by the present development of democracy in Taiwan, which is often criticized for emphasizing too much individual freedom and paying insufficient attention to the rule of law.[25] Those who identify themselves with Discourse A believe that the development of democracy in Taiwan is heading in the wrong direction (40) and the rights of people have been systematically encroached upon (41). They also

Table 2 Factor Loadings and Socio-economic Backgrounds

Respondent	Factor					Age	Sex	Education level	Party affiliation	Ethnic origin	Religion
	A	B	C	D	E						
5	**0.5866**	0.2782	0.1893	0.1412	0.0652	24	F	U	—	T	B
21	**0.5484**	0.1700	-0.0250	0.2887	0.1337	25	M	S	—	T	—
22	**0.4988**	0.0266	0.2423	**0.4337**	0.2364	23	F	U	—	T	—
12	**0.4727**	**0.3414**	**0.3776**	-0.0128	**0.3789**	25	M	G	—	T	—
16	**0.4706**	0.2686	0.1851	0.1012	0.1042	25	M	G	—	T	—
32	**0.4699**	**0.3608**	0.1105	0.1518	0.1835	32	F	U	DPP	T	—
27	**0.4678**	0.2743	0.2141	0.0845	0.1415	31	F	U	DPP	T	B
26	**0.4576**	0.0604	**0.4736**	0.1271	0.0657	40	M	U	—	T	B
17	**0.4238**	**0.4293**	0.2765	-0.1177	0.2744	22	F	U	—	M	—
13	**0.4145**	0.2408	**0.5642**	0.0496	0.2127	25	F	G	—	T	—
30	**0.4089**	0.3121	0.1619	**0.4200**	0.1066	25	M	U	—	T	—
20	**0.4069**	**0.4024**	0.0715	**0.3710**	**0.3459**	39	M	U	NP	M	B
33	**0.3894**	0.2602	**0.5525**	0.0864	0.1936	29	F	U	—	T	—

Table 2 Factor Loadings and Socio-economic Backgrounds (Continued)

Respondent	Factor					Age	Sex	Education level	Party affiliation	Ethnic origin	Religion
	A	B	C	D	E						
3	**0.3479**	**0.4204**	0.3110	-0.0452	**0.3706**	22	F	S	—	T	—
15	**0.3469**	0.0183	0.0590	0.0927	0.1546	54	M	S	—	T	B
8	**0.3454**	**0.4002**	0.1651	**0.3728**	0.0215	32	M	U	—	T	TA
24	**0.3319**	0.2790	0.0511	0.3022	**0.6996**	30	M	U	—	M	—
11	**0.3226**	**0.6531**	0.0479	0.1683	0.2778	24	F	G	—	T	B
23	**0.3212**	**0.3954**	0.1131	-0.0413	0.2075	32	M	S	—	T	P
29	0.1628	**0.6617**	0.0680	0.2188	0.1070	36	F	G	—	T	—
28	0.2039	**0.5836**	0.1733	0.2164	0.0721	33	M	U	—	T	—
18	0.0007	**0.5659**	**0.4961**	0.0909	**0.3315**	53	F	G	—	M	B
25	0.2219	**0.4460**	0.0000	**0.4030**	**0.6360**	24	F	U	—	T	B
31	0.1951	**0.4439**	**0.4020**	0.1896	0.3123	25	M	U	DPP	T	—
19	0.1956	**0.3916**	0.2184	0.2535	0.0524	62	M	S	—	T	B
6	0.0758	**0.3280**	0.2046	0.1379	**0.4593**	29	M	U	—	—	B

Table 2 Factor Loadings and Socio-economic Backgrounds (Continued)

Respondent	Factor					Age	Sex	Education level	Party affiliation	Ethnic origin	Religion
	A	B	C	D	E						
7	0.2367	**0.3229**	**0.4576**	0.1573	-0.0559	32	M	U	—	T	B
14	0.1108	-0.1307	**0.7344**	0.0171	0.0730	52	M	U	KMT	M	B
9	0.2206	0.3007	**0.5442**	0.1384	0.0195	23	F	G	—	T	—
35	0.0689	0.2042	**0.4904**	0.1605	0.1855	55	M	G	KMT	T	C
1	0.2066	0.2559	**0.4116**	**0.4674**	0.0520	44	M	G	KMT	T	—
10	0.3040	0.2215	**-0.3710**	**0.4679**	0.1684	24	M	G	DPP	T	—
34	0.2300	0.1650	0.2339	**0.3419**	0.0091	50	F	S	—	T	TA
2	0.1771	-0.0057	0.1156	0.0126	**0.6014**	39	F	S	KMT	T	P
4	0.0152	0.0322	0.0345	0.2591	0.0591	28	M	U	—	T	—

Notes: Figures in bold face are factor loadings significant at 0.01 level. The significance level (0.32) is obtained by the following formula: $(1/\sqrt{N}) \times 2.56$, where N is the number of statements. For abbreviations, M = male; F = female; NP = New Party; G = post-graduate; U = university; S = secondary; T = Taiwanese; M = mainlander; B = Buddhism; TA = Taoism; C = Catholicism; P = Protestantism.

Table 3 Statement Scores on Each Factor

	Statement	Factor				
		A	B	C	D	E
1	I don't think freedom has anything to do with democracy.	-4	-6	-4	-6	-3
2	Democracy is never easy to define. The meaning of the word changes with the vagaries of time, place and circumstance.	5	1	-1	2	3
3	Democracy is a governmental form, not necessarily having anything to do with society as a whole or the way society works.	-5	-5	-4	-4	-5
4	Democracy is an empty vessel into which one can comfortably fit socialism as well as freedom, a corrupt society as well as a healthy people.	0	-1	-5	1	0
5	Community means people who interact at a personal level; have shared identity, values, and traditions; and possess the power to make decisions about their common values.	1	3	2	-1	-2
6	Citizenship is a man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights.	3	5	3	3	6
7	Any citizen who can read and wants to take the time can make a good decision among candidates for an office.	0	0	2	-4	1
8	Mass democracy depends on an informed and active citizenry.	2	4	4	5	5

Table 3 Statement Scores on Each Factor (Continued)

	Statement	Factor				
		A	B	C	D	E
9	To try to find the public good, I would try to ask questions about how this or that would affect the community twenty-five years from now. Not whether such and such a regulation will affect somebody else's pocketbook.	-2	0	-1	0	-1
10	If I wanna say my mind that's fine. But I also have the right not to listen, and that's what the Constitution gives me.	1	3	2	1	4
11	When the president does it, that means it's not illegal.	-6	-6	-6	-6	-6
12	Democracy means my right to choose what's best for me and the public at large.	2	5	1	2	6
13	Work and family are the centre of our lives, the foundation of our dignity as a free people.	3	3	4	3	4
14	Democracy demands diversity.	6	6	6	5	5
15	Men are not created equal. They have different intelligence; they're born into different situations. What "all men are created equal" basically means, of course, is whether you're white or black or poor, you should have your equal say, your equal education, be treated equally.	6	6	3	6	4
16	I think the rights of the individuals add up to majority rule.	-1	-2	1	-1	2

Table 3 Statement Scores on Each Factor (Continued)

	Statement	Factor				
		A	B	C	D	E
17	You can have a socialist society and have the government elected in a democratic election.	1	1	-2	-1	-1
18	A market economy, a democratic legislature, an independent judiciary, and constitutionally guaranteed rights are the only proven foundations for sharing power.	0	1	0	0	2
19	Democracy sure does not exist in its pure form today.	0	5	0	4	1
20	I have a big problem identifying with hundreds of millions of anything — people, flowers, cars, miles. I can see the community around me.	-2	-2	-1	-2	-3
21	We the people have not chosen the freedoms that we have.	1	2	-3	3	-1
22	I don't feel that I'm that knowledgeable about things.... If I knew a lot more about actual facts and everything, then I might be able to strike up a conversation about politics.	2	-3	0	4	3
23	Not everyone is going to be represented, there are always those people who fall through the cracks.	4	4	3	5	2
24	If things don't get done, it's because the people don't go out and do it. The power is with the people.	-3	-3	-1	-2	-3

Table 3 Statement Scores on Each Factor (Continued)

	Statement	Factor				
		A	B	C	D	E
25	I'm interested in the national economy and our defense ability, not all these crappy issues like human rights.	-2	-5	-2	1	-3
26	I don't think it's possible to have a democracy of three people without greed being the main factor.	-2	-1	-1	-3	0
27	In essence, the government doesn't really care about what I say.	1	-1	-3	3	3
28	All governments, and the élites that live off them, want to control public opinion.	0	0	0	6	3
29	Elected officials are better able to make decisions for voters than voters themselves.	-6	-4	-3	-5	-5
30	Now we are pretty much all equal. I don't think the people stand for NOT being treated equal any more.	-1	0	1	0	4
31	The daily lives of all citizens are deeply affected and changed by the decisions of government.	4	4	2	4	1
32	I can get pretty confused when I listen to political speeches. A guy gets up and sounds like he's the best there is. The next guy gets out and makes a bum out of him. You don't know who to believe.	0	-2	-3	-4	-4

Table 3 Statement Scores on Each Factor (Continued)

	Statement	Factor				
		A	B	C	D	E
33	A free press protects our basic liberties by serving as the watchdogs of our nation.	-3	2	0	0	2
34	If I can find something that's good for the average person, that's good for democracy.	-1	-3	0	-2	0
35	Democracies can make mistakes, but they have the unique advantage of a way to make corrections before it is too late.	-3	-3	1	-1	-2
36	Government can't be too powerful because the government is the people.	-4	-4	-2	-3	-4
37	A lot of government's problem is too many chiefs.	-2	0	-2	-1	-2
38	Anybody can stand on the street corner and under the Constitution voice pretty much anything, and that's problem.	-4	-2	-4	-3	-1
39	We should be critically concerned about the drop-off in democratic participation in Taiwan, and about who is voting (the educated and economically well-off) and who is not voting (the poor, the young, minorities and the least educated).	4	1	4	1	2
40	Taiwan has deteriorated in the direction of a democracy as we have become a government of men instead of a government of law.	2	3	-3	1	5

Table 3 Statement Scores on Each Factor (Continued)

	Statement	Factor				
		A	B	C	D	E
41	In a systematic way, the rights of individuals have been curtailed in this country, not for the benefit of the whole nation, but in conformity with a narrow interpretation of a vocal conservative minority.	2	1	0	1	1
42	A major problem with democracy is that many people do not know what they want.	1	2	-1	2	0
43	Violence is a just and legitimate response to the economic, political and military violence employed by the state.	-5	-5	-5	-4	-6
44	I'd like to hear all points of view. Sometimes it's confusing, but I'd rather like that.	1	-1	0	2	2
45	The way that democracy is manifested in our culture, some people are more equal than others. It becomes a double standard very quickly.	1	-1	-1	0	0
46	I don't think social class is important.	-1	-1	1	-5	-2
47	The government is like a domineering mother. It takes away all the people's incentives and tries to do everything for them. You know what it's like for children who have been dominated all their lives by a strong, powerful mother. They become near-vegetable cases. It's the same with government.	-3	-1	-5	-2	-2

Table 3 Statement Scores on Each Factor (Continued)

	Statement	Factor				
		A	B	C	D	E
48	The impersonal hand of government can never replace the helping hand of a neighbour.	-1	-1	-1	0	0
49	Politicians should not be allowed to get away with lying as a form of free speech.	5	4	5	2	1
50	Religion should be banished from politics because a democratic politics is based not on truth but on justice.	0	-2	-2	1	-1
51	All voters should be allowed as much information as possible to make their choices. Any attempt to regulate political literature and speeches is a move against our Constitution freedoms and toward totalitarianism.	2	2	5	0	1
52	Our system of social justice must be, and is, based upon natural human rights.	-1	2	3	-1	0
53	The future of democracy? Bleak. It's just gonna get worse, unless things get really bad and people start protesting again.	-3	-3	-4	-2	-3
54	If everyone put what money and/or time they could into political campaigns and causes, we would all be better off.	4	0	3	-2	-1
55	If you want the state off your back, put your feet to the pavement.	-2	-2	-2	0	-1

Table 3 Statement Scores on Each Factor (Continued)

	Statement	Factor				
		A	B	C	D	E
56	We should relocate power away from élites and the central government and return it to the community level.	1	2	1	-3	-1
57	You're part of society. Everybody has to do something to help society.	5	3	5	4	3
58	I think we should take a good look at future candidates and ask questions about him that are for the good of the people and not just big business.	3	1	2	3	1
59	All that is needed is for governments to be honest, for those governments need the people.	-1	0	1	-1	-2
60	Democracy is best, it's something we should strive for.	3	1	4	2	0
61	We can build a world where it is self-evident that all people are created equal.	-4	-4	1	-4	-4
62	Under communism the state would supply all the money for you. Everyone would be working for the state, there wouldn't really be no rich people in it. That would be good, if everyone is on kind of an equal level.	-5	-4	-6	-5	-5
63	The family — like most traditional institutions — simply needs to be made more democratic.	0	0	2	-1	1
64	The perfect society is everybody living in accord, going about their own business and having separate interests, but that hopefully these interests all mesh nicely, they aren't bumping into each other and conflicting.	3	1	6	1	-4

believe that the media, which are supposed to look over the state, have fallen short of protecting the fundamental freedom of the people (33).

Basically, Discourse A is relatively conservative as regards democracy (26). It believes that merely sticking to the abstract principles of popular sovereignty (24) and direct election of government (36) is dangerous. This is because the motivation behind democracy is self-interest (26). Decisions made by the government have a deep impact on the lives of the people (31). Not only can democracy go wrong, but elected government officials (29) and leaders (11) can also make wrong decisions. Without any preventive measures, it may be too late to change course (35). Discourse A maintains that in the development of democracy the notion of civil society (8) and the rights of the people (6, 12) should be given prominent places and the issue of human rights should also be emphasized (25). It is equally important to emphasize the participation of people. As members of society, individuals should care about (39) and participate in democratic activity (57). Such participation is a worthy endeavour (60) because only by so doing can the future of the development of democracy be optimistic (53).

Discourse B: Democratic Communitarianism

Discourse B can be referred to as democratic communitarianism because it tends to put more emphasis on the notion of community (5, 9), arguing that individuals, as members of society, should serve their community and power should be embedded at the level of community (56, 57). The difficulty is that we are often unaware of the existence of the community in which we live (20). The discourse maintains that state leaders and government officials are not free from committing errors (11, 29) and that the livelihood of the people is deeply influenced by government policies and decisions (31). Hence, state power must be kept in check, and one should not equate the state with the people (36). More importantly, democracy does not correct its errors automatically (35), for power does not necessarily rest with the people (24). Nor

can the satisfaction of the preferences of the ordinary people be simply taken as democracy (34). There is also a discrepancy between the majority rule and the rights of individuals (16). The problem of Taiwan's democratic development is that the government is ruled by individuals rather than by law (40). Besides, people may not know exactly what they want (42). Hence, the effective functioning of democracy depends very much on the existence of a civil society filled with information (8). If people are supplied with adequate information, they not only can discuss politics meaningfully (22), but also can make better choices (51).

Apart from its communitarian orientation, Discourse B shares many common views with Discourse A. It insists that democracy should include pluralism (3, 14) freedom and equality of the people (1, 15) and civil rights protected by law (6, 10, 12, 25, 55). It also thinks that the equality of the people means not absolute equality but equal opportunities and social treatment. But, for Discourse B, the ideal form of equality is a process of continuous pursuit rather than an achieved reality (19, 61). Even in a pluralistic society, not all people have their representatives, and there always are some people whose interests are overlooked (23). It is therefore wrong to over-emphasize absolute equality, like communism (62). Nevertheless, Discourse B is optimistic about the future democratic development because there is a free press to protect people's liberties (33) and because people are able to differentiate good and bad politically (32).

Discourse C: Democratic Liberalism

Discourse C is a discourse that contains bipolar factors with Subject 10 constituting the negative pole (-C). A discourse with bipolar factors means that whatever one discourse embraces is opposed by its negative counterpart. Discourse C essentially bases its core values on liberalism, believing that freedom lies in the choices one makes (21) and democracy is closely related to freedom (1) and it has a universal form and content (2), which are freedom (51). Grounded on the faith in liberalism, Discourse C

holds that democracy is manifested in the interaction between society and the state, in which society and its people play an extremely important role in checking the state and its representatives (11, 29, 36, 55, 62). As a form of government, democracy must be in harmony with the needs and operations of the society (3, 4, 8, 17) and builds itself on the principles of pluralism (14), freedom (1, 51) and peaceful co-existence (64). People should uphold the importance of human rights (52) and civil rights (6, 10, 12). It is true that human beings are not born equal (15) and not everyone is represented (23), but social classes are not important (46), for a free and fair society can be created by the efforts of people (21, 61). Discourse C is very confident about the choices people make (7, 32), believing that, as a member of society, everyone should take an interest and participate in the development of democracy (39, 54, 57). If everyone plays an active role, all will live a better life (60). Out of its faith in freedom, Discourse C does not worry about the present political situation in Taiwan (40) and is very optimistic about the future democratic development there (35, 53).

In contrast to Discourse C's stress on individual freedom, Discourse -C emphasizes the independence of the state, regarding the representatives elected through democratic procedures as the guardians of people, while expressing doubts about the ability of the general masses to make sound decisions and choices for themselves. If democracy reflects the interaction between the state and individuals, Discourses -C attaches more weight to the state than to individuals, whereas the opposite is true with Discourse C.

Discourse D: Democratic Élitism

Discourse D basically agrees that democracy should emphasize civil rights (6, 12), the protection of the rule of law, individual freedom (10, 13, 38) and that the governmental form must be in harmony with society as a whole and the way it operates (3, 17). As members of society, individuals should contribute to help society (57) and to fight for democracy (60). However, it should be noted that the ideal form of democracy is nowhere to be found in

today's world (19). This has nothing to do with the fact that democracy is based on self-interest (26). It is rather a result of today's so-called democratic rule being really élitist rule. Since democracy is an abstract notion (4) and its content is hard to define (2), in the actual operation of democracy, people are not taken as equal (15). Even in a pluralistic society, not everyone is represented (23). As a matter of fact, in modern democracies social classes are very important (46), and élites are closely related to the ruling class (58). Élites always attempt to control public opinion (28) on the basis of self-interest regardless of their ability (29) or the lawfulness of such control (11). Through various means, élites exercise their influence on and even control the government, whose policies in turn greatly affect the life of the people (31). Essentially, the government does not care very much about the opinions of the ordinary people (27) since the élites are concerned mainly with the interests of the ruling class, including those of the big corporations (58). It is in this regard that Discourse D can be identified as democratic élitism.

Being élitist, Discourse D also believes that the ordinary people have very little influence on politics (24, 54, 61), or that they cannot control the government (36). What is good for the people may not necessarily be good for democracy (34). Even if something is good for most people, it may still fail under the principle of majority rule (16), for power is held in the hands of a few people (24). Another cause of the failure is the lack of adequate information for the people to make the right decisions (8). In a pluralistic society (14), different voices should be heard (44), and people should have the ability to make choices for themselves and not be fooled (32). If there is not enough information, they hardly know what is happening around them (22), nor do they know what is really good for them (42). In sum, Discourse D is not pessimistic about the development of democracy (53), but it also finds that it is no easy task to make democracy a reality, for the élites will continue to control politics. Limited by insufficient access to information, people have very little power to alter the course or to go back to the level of the community to push for democracy (5, 56).

Discourse E: Democratic Populism

Similar to Discourse A, Discourse E believes democracy is difficult to define (2), including its processes (54, 60), contents (4, 19, 26, 34) and issue domains (21, 42, 45). At the same time, however, the discourse sees the protection and realization of civil rights as the prerequisite for the development of democracy embodied in the notions of pluralism, freedom and equality. Civil rights are the fundamental rights of the people (6). Democracy means the people can enjoy the right to choose (12, 16), the right of freedom guaranteed by the constitution (1) and the right of equal treatment (15). These rights are not endowed in individuals at birth (52); they are fought for historically and must be protected through legislation (10, 18, 51). People should pay more attention to issues of human rights in order to prevent encroachments of their rights (25). Nonetheless, the view on civil rights in Discourse E is built upon the principle of majority rule (16), oriented by public opinion (33) and, thus, shows little sensitivity to the various forms of inequality existing in Taiwan (30). It is for this reason that the discourse can be roughly characterized as democratic populism.

Due to its populist orientation, Discourse E believes that democracy should be brought into step with the way society works (3). In the modern world, there is no such thing called perfect society in which people with different views live peacefully and harmoniously (64), nor is there any society where everyone is born equal (61, 62). Nevertheless, Discourse E believes strongly that the democratic development in Taiwan is heading in the wrong direction (40) because the government is not controlled by people but by élites (36). Therefore, it does not care what people say (27). What the government and élites want is to control public opinion (28). Because of this fact, they are all prone to make mistakes (11, 29, 35). Yet, Discourse E opposes the use of violence as a means to combat breaches of civil rights (43), advocating that the protection and realization of civil rights should be guided by the rule of law (40).

Discourse E also maintains that the development of democracy depends on a vigorous civil society (8) and all members of the society should help promote democracy (57). The problem is that very often people do not have sufficient access to information on issues of their concern (22). In spite of this fact, people still should listen to different voices (44), so that they can tell what is good for them (32). If this principle can be upheld, the future development of democracy should be bright (53).

Analysis and Discussion

Comparing the five discourses with each other, certain commonalities emerge. As Table 3 shows, there exists quite a number of consensus statements,[26] despite some variation in intensity. All agree that democracy should be based on pluralism (14) and that its development should be in accord with the need of society as a whole and the way society works (3). All disagree with the position that the state leaders are infallible (11). All agree with work and family as the centre of our life, the foundation of our dignity as a free people (13). All agree that people do not feel the community around them (20). All disagree with people having power to get things done (24). All agree that the power of the government should be kept in check and the government is not equal to the people (36). All agree that violence should be ruled out as a form of legitimate response to the economic, political and military violence employed by the state (43). All agree that the future democratic development should be optimistic (53). All agree that, as members of society, people should contribute to help society (57). All agree that political leaders should care more about the good of the people than just about big business (58). All agree that people should oppose communism or the idea of absolute equality (62).

These consensus statements among the five discourses should be regarded as both products of and responses to the complex setting of Taiwan's democratic history. Some possible explanations are given as follows. First, their shared anti-communist sentiments should to a large extent have been nurtured by the ruling KMT's continuous strong anti-communist ideological education forcefully imposed on Taiwan after it lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party on the Chinese mainland in 1949 and subsequently retreated to the island. As a researcher has noted, the anti-communist ideological education not only has fostered strong anti-communist sentiments in Taiwan, but also has seriously alienated the Taiwan people from communist China, forming one of the major foundations for the rise of separatism on the island later.[27] Secondly, their shared views on the fallibility of the state leaders and the necessity to check the power of the government reflect Taiwan people's fresh memory of and general aversion to the KMT authoritarianism, which was just remorselessly pushed by them into past history about a decade ago.[28] Thirdly, their common emphasis on pluralism and opposition to violence should be, in part, related to Taiwan people's former unhappy experience with the political monism and repressive rule under the KMT authoritarianism and, in part, congruent with the rise of divergent social forces in Taiwan in recent years.[29] Mutual respect and opposition to violence in the form of pluralism are definitely needed if these divergent social forces want to co-exist peacefully. Fourthly, their similar respect for work and family may be imparted by the Chinese culture, which is well known for its high value accorded to individual hard work and familism.[30] As a Chinese society, Taiwan's inheritance of such value should not be unimaginable, though whether the value can continue to survive in Taiwan's emerging democratic politics is still too early to determine. Fifthly, their relative optimism about the future of democratic development may be affected by Taiwan's experience in recent years of rapid but basically smooth democratic transition and subsequent progressive democratic consolidation.[31] Sixthly, their common feeling about the absence of the sense of community may be caused by the competing national visions between reunification with mainland China and pursuing an independent Taiwan. The competition has divided the Taiwan people socially, politically and culturally.[32] Seventhly, their shared urge that polit-

ical leaders should care more about the good of the people instead of big corporations more or less echoes the general criticism that Taiwan's democratic development, albeit impressive, has been faulted by money-politics.[33] It is perhaps for this reason that all the five discourses see the need for people to contribute to help the society.

The above explanations, of course, are very tentative and must be substantiated by further research. Whatever the future research suggests, the consensus statements identified above can be seen as providing a common ground for dialogue between the five discourses. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that these statements are quite broad and loose, and their substantive meaning must be located and ascertained in the context of each discourse.

In general, while sharing quite a wide range of common attitudes, the five discourses constructed represent five different theories of democracy. They are subjective opinion structures formed and self-constructed by the subjects in the special circumstances of Taiwan's democratic development. Each of the five discourses has its internal logic and forms its own system.

Further analysis of the five discourses can be done according to three different aspects: (1) to compare the five discourses with those of the United States as found in Dryzek and Berejikian's study; (2) to compare the five discourses with the existing theories of democracy; (3) to examine how the five discourses are related to the democratic development in Taiwan. The analysis of the first aspect will be given in a separate paper and will not concern us here. In what follows, we will focus on the latter two aspects.

Let us first compare the five discourses of democracy with traditional theories. Table 4 summarizes the main discursive elements of the five discourses. As discussed, since the five discourses share many common attitudes toward democracy, their discursive elements also overlap with each other in various areas, particularly in ontology and agency. For example, all five discourses have the individual as one of their ontologies, reflecting the special status individual freedom has among the Taiwan peo-

Table 4 Analysis of Five Discourses of Democracy

Discourse	Discourse element			
	Ontology	Agency	Motivation	Relationships seen as natural
A. Pragmatism	People, Individuals	Everyone, Government	Public good	Political equality
B. Communitarianism	Society, Community, People, Individuals	People, Everyone	The creation of community, Community interests	Communitarian equality
C. Liberalism	Individuals, Government	Everyone, Government	Public good, Individual interests	Individual freedom and equality
D. Élitism	Élites, Government, Individuals	Élites, Classes, Government	Mysterious	Hierarchy
E. Populism	People, Society, Individuals	Majority of people	Majority interests	Majority rule

ple after they had been made captive of the KMT authoritarian rule for decades. Another example is that three discourses, namely A, B and C, take everyone as one of the agents that act for their ontologies, once again pointing to the importance of the individual self in the Taiwanese mind. These and other overlaps suggest that, though the five discourses are systematic in themselves, their boundaries are not very clear-cut. Such phenomenon contrasts the traditional theories in an interesting way, as the latter tend to have more distinct theoretical boundaries in relation to each other, as in the case of the Marxist conception of democracy, which is almost diametrically opposite to all liberal models of democracy.[34] Even if we contrast the five discourses with the four in the United States constructed by Dryzek and Berejikian,[35] the American discourses are still much more clear-cut with obviously less overlapping areas among each other.[36] The contrast may tell us two things. First, it may reveal the fundamental difference between ordinary people and professional academics in democratic theorizing. As we know, the ordinary people are usually less concerned with theoretical completeness and logical consistency than the professional academics. Secondly, the contrast may also indicate that the democratic development in Taiwan is still in a very young, developmental stage, and people still need time to formulate more theoretically complete and logically consistent discourses.

Whatever the case is, we may conclude that after decades of continuous transplantation and indigenization, democratic theories of Western origins have become increasingly integrated with the unique political, social, economic and cultural settings in Taiwan, giving birth to at least five discourses of democracy. At present, it is still too early to say whether the continuing interactions of the five discourses in connection to Taiwan's changing circumstances will ultimately produce more distinct Taiwanese theories of democracy in the future. The identification of the existence of the five discourses at least proves that the democratic development in Taiwan has borne fruits. For democracy to survive, it must be supported and buttressed by democratic discourses with theoretical inclinations. Only with such theoretical

inclinations are people able to conceptualize their political roles and competences and participate meaningfully in the democratic order. As there have already existed at least five democratic discourses in Taiwan, it is not difficult to imagine that democratic theorization is spreading and evolving there. Besides, these discourses should have their own base of supporters, though the exact proportion of supporters for each discourse cannot be ascertained in our study.

It should also be noted that, as Table 2 indicates, out of the 35 subjects, 21 identify themselves with more than one discourse and one (Subject 4) whose factor loading is not significant for any discourse. Several observations can be made from these results. First of all, the finding of an unloaded subject may suggest that the five discourses do not exhaust all possible discourses held by the Taiwan residents. If more subjects are included, new discourses may be discovered. Equally possible is that some Taiwan people still have not formed any clear and systematic orientation toward democracy due to the fact that democratic politics in Taiwan is still a relatively new phenomenon. It is even possible that both cases are part of the reality. In the meantime, however, we have no evidence to ascertain whichever the case is. Only future research can tell. Secondly, as to the phenomenon that many subjects identify themselves with multiple discourses, this may be because the boundaries between the five discourses are by no means clear-cut and the subjects may therefore easily shuttle between several discourses. Besides, owing to the fact that Taiwan's democratic history is very short, it is thus possible that the democratic views of the people are not fixated yet and still in a process of formation and crystallization. As a result, they may simultaneously cross over several discourses, especially those that are quite close to each other in orientation. In any case, since many Taiwan people are not confined to a certain discourse while excluding the other, their receptivity to different discourses should be high, thereby enhancing both their political tolerance and discursive imagination regarding the emerging democratic order in Taiwan.

However, the future democratic development there is still by no means easy. There are many conflicts yet to be resolved. For instance, the polarization of Discourse C and Discourse -C means that the views of the two discourses on state-society relations are by nature irreconcilable and may come into serious clashes in the future.[37] For another instance, followers of the élitist Discourse D may be opposed by the advocates of the populist Discourse E, as the latter may see élitism as harmful to the will and interests of the majority. After all, all the five discourses have their different emphases. In the course of democratic development, how their differences in emphasis are resolved in accordance with the democratic procedures and principles so that Taiwan's democratic practice can advance steadily is a strenuous task for both the political élites and the general public. This does not necessarily mean that all different democratic ideals must eventually be unified and subsumed under one particular democratic discourse, whether existent or prospective, because the essence of democracy should be that it allows divergent discourses to co-exist, yet compete with one another.

Conclusion

This study reconstructs Taiwan people's existing discursive structures on democracy through Q methodology. We find that under the existing specific historical circumstances, Taiwan people's democratic attitudes manifest a complex, pluralistic and interrelated discursivity, in which at least five democratic discourses can be identified, namely democratic pragmatism, democratic communitarianism, democratic liberalism, democratic élitism and democratic populism. Yet, among these five discourses, there exists a number of commonly held views. In particular, they all accept democratic pluralism and reject communism and violence, believe in the fallibility of state leaders and the necessity to limit government power, and are optimistic about the future democratic development in Taiwan. This broad consensus reflects both

Taiwan people's strong aversion to the former KMT authoritarian rule and their concerted confidence to build for them a bright democratic future, which should be gained from their impressive democratic accomplishments in recent years. It also provides a broad common ground for dialogue and interaction among the five discourses.

The five discourses represent five possible value systems embedded in Taiwan people's perceptions of democracy under present circumstances. Each has its own defined ontologies, agents that represent these ontologies, recognized motivations of the agents, and naturalized political relationships, which are more or less logically organized to form the discourse's own meaningful opinion structure. Nonetheless, in the meantime since the five discourses share many common attitudes, while their differences are still not yet made profound, there are many overlaps among their discursive elements and the boundaries among them are still quite ambiguous. This signifies, on the one hand, that democratic discourses are still taking shape in Taiwan's unfolding democratic practice and, on the other, that these democratic discourses are quite accommodative to each other. Given this fact and given time, it should not be difficult to see sooner or later there will emerge peacefully from Taiwan some more fully fledged theories of democracy with Taiwanese characteristics.

Finally, as pointed out at the outset, we must reiterate that our findings cannot be generalized across the entire Taiwan population. Yet, the discovery of the five democratic discourses is still extremely valuable, since it is the first attempt ever for a study systematically to explore how ordinary Taiwanese theorize democracy in their specific historical settings by using a definitely international perspective. Thus, we believe that the discursive complexity of the five discourses we have shown, not only can significantly enrich our understanding of the democratic theorizing in Taiwan, it also can serve as a basis for cross-national comparison, a task that we have already set for ourselves in the future.

Notes

1. The reform process was partly triggered by the necessity to remove the old authoritarian structures so as to pave the way for direct elections of the local and central regimes. It was also partly driven by the rising pressure from the opposition forces to adjust the ROC state design, which was originally built upon China as a whole instead of Taiwan only. See Timothy Ka-ying Wong, *The Political Economy of Taiwan's Foreign Policy* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999), p. 31.
2. The ROC government was withdrawn from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan by the ruling Kuomintang after it was defeated by the Communists in the Chinese civil war in 1949. Since then, there have appeared two Chinese states across the Taiwan Strait, the ROC on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China on the mainland, both claiming themselves as the sole legitimate government of China and both upholding cross-strait reunification as their national ideal. The attitude of the Taiwan side, however, has changed after democratization started on the island in the mid-1980s. The most important change is that the opposition Democratic Progressive Party openly advocates Taiwan independence instead of reunification, thus unleashing an independence movement in Taiwan. The latter has not only become an important political cleavage in Taiwan, but has also created uncertainties over the development of cross-strait relations, for Beijing insists that it will resort to force if Taiwan goes for independence.
3. Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 303.
4. Timothy Ka-ying Wong, "The Impact of State Development in Taiwan on Cross-Straits Relations," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1997), pp. 177-80.
5. The designation Q has two meanings. First, it is different from Pearson's "R," used to represent objective trait correlation. What Q indicates is subjectivity and the correlation of subjects in discourses. Secondly, Q is the prefix of "queue," which means rank-ordering.
6. William Stephenson, *The Study of Behavior: Q Technique and Its Methodology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
7. Steven R. Brown, *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
8. Steven R. Brown, "Q Technique and Method: Principles and Procedures," in William D. Berry and Michael S. Lewis-Beck (eds), *New Tools for Social Scientists* (Beverly Hill: Sage, 1986), pp. 57-76.
9. John S. Dryzek and Jeffrey Berejikian, "Reconstructive Democratic Theory," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (1993), pp. 48-60.
10. The central neutral category can refer to "undecided," "no comment," "no clear preferences," "the preferences are not as strong as others," etc.
11. Brown, *Political Subjectivity*, pp. 12-57; Timothy Ka-ying Wong and Milan Tung-wen Sun, "Dissolution and Reconstruction of National Identity: The Experience of Subjectivity in Taiwan," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1998), pp. 247-72.
12. Dryzek and Berejikian, "Reconstructive Democratic Theory," p. 50.
13. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
14. Ibid., pp. 48-60.
15. The statements and their order are listed in Table 3. Except in a few cases where "the United States" and "America" are changed into "Taiwan" (as in 39 and 40) and "federal government" into "central government" (as in 56), all the 64 statements are literally translated into Chinese to keep the meaning of the original.
16. In fact, Taiwan is only the first step of our larger study design, which includes also Hong Kong and mainland China.

17. The ordering of the statements follows the principle of fixed distribution as shown below:

6	5	4	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6
2	3	4	5	6	8	8	8	6	5	4	3	2

18. Brown, *Political Subjectivity*, pp. 191-92.
19. Dryzek and Berejikian, "Reconstructive Democratic Theory," p. 52.
20. Factor loadings indicate degrees of association between subjects and various factors.
21. To facilitate reading, the subjects holding the same discourse are grouped together.
22. Factor arrays denote how idealized subjects (with a perfect factor loading of 1) in a particular factor will sort (rank-order) the statements. For the technical and statistical aspects of Q methodology, see Brown, *Political Subjectivity*, pp. 181-263.
23. Our interpretation of each discourse involves the following two considerations. First, the inherent structure of each discourse is identified. The meaning associated with a statement must be consistent with the whole discursive structure to which the statement belongs. It is not located at the literal meaning of isolated words, nor is it necessarily constrained by the researcher's selection criteria. The meaning is fundamentally determined by the factor scores a statement gets. Secondly, the interpretation must also consider the differences between discourses.
24. The number in brackets refers to the statement number. Compare also Table 3.
25. Chih Hwang-yu, *The Political Development of the Republic of China* (Taipei: Yang-chih Book Co., Ltd., 1996), pp. 1134-38.
26. "Consensus statements" are statements carrying the same positive/negative values, and the difference of the numbers attached to the statements is not greater than 2.
27. Allen Chun, "From Nationalism to Nationalizing: Cultural Imagination and State Formation in Postwar Taiwan," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 31 (1994), pp. 49-69.

28. Wong, "The Impact of State Development in Taiwan on Cross-Straits Relations," pp. 174-77.
29. For the rise and development of various social forces in Taiwan in recent years, see Jaushieh Joseph Wu, *Taiwan's Democratization: Forces behind the New Momentum* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 46-70.
30. Siu-kai Lau, "Chinese Familism in an Urban-industrial Setting: The Case of Hong Kong," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, No. 43 (1981), pp. 181-96.
31. For such experience, see Fu Wu, *Political Change and Democratization* (Taipei: San-min Book Co., Ltd., 1998) and Ying-long You, *Public Opinion and Political Change in Taiwan* (Taipei: Yu-dan Publishing Co., Ltd., 1996).
32. Wong and Sun, "Dissolution and Reconstruction of National Identity," pp. 248-49.
33. Zheng-wen Wang, "The Formation of New Political-business Relations and Political Transformation in Taiwan," *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, No. 14 (1993), pp. 23-63.
34. David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
35. The four American discourses constructed by Dryzek and Berejikian are contended republicanism, differential conservatism, disaffected populism and private liberalism.
36. A systematic comparison of the five discourses with Dryzek and Berejikian's study will be given in another paper.
37. Although there is only one subject in the present study whose factor loading is significant for Discourse -C, it does not mean that the number of people holding this discourse must be extremely small.

Reconstructing the Democratic Discourses in Taiwan

A Q Methodological Approach

Abstract

This study reconstructs Taiwan people's existing discursive structures on democracy by replicating Dryzek and Berejikian's Q methodological study of American democratic discourses. We find that under the existing specific historical circumstances, Taiwan people's democratic attitudes manifest a complex, pluralistic and interrelated discursivity, in which at least five democratic discourses can be identified, namely democratic pragmatism, democratic communitarianism, democratic liberalism, democratic élitism and democratic populism. Yet, among these five discourses, there exists a number of commonly held views. In particular, they all accept democratic pluralism, reject communism and violence, believe in the fallibility of state leaders and the necessity to limit government power, and are optimistic about the future democratic development in Taiwan. This broad consensus reflects the specific historical experience of Taiwan people's democratic pursuit on the one hand and provides a broad common ground for dialogue and interaction among the five discourses on the other. These findings should significantly enrich our understanding of the democratic theorizing in Taiwan and serve as a basis for future comparison with the American as well other countries' experiences.

台灣民主政治論述的重構

一個 Q 方法論的探討

王家英　孫同文

（中文摘要）

本文運用 Q 方法論，系統地重構了當前存在於台灣的各種民主政治論述。本文發現，當前台灣存在了五種民主政治論述，包括：現實主義民主政治、社區主義民主政治、自由主義民主政治、菁英主義民主政治、民粹主義民主政治。值得注意的是，這五種民主政治論述之間具有相當多的共通之處，彼此之間的界線仍然相當模糊，還未完全構築出完整獨立的體系，這多少反映出台灣的民主政治論述還處於發展的初階，隨著時間的推移，它們還有相當大的可塑造空間。