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The Rise and Changing Nature of Taiwanese Nationalism

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Introduction

The emergence of a Taiwanese ethnic-political identity — what we might call Taiwanese nationalism — is based on the ideological sway of three major claims. First, Taiwanese nationalists assert that the name Taiwanese denotes a distinct ethnicity; that although most of the people in Taiwan are anthropologically Chinese, the Taiwanese have emerged as a closely bound and interdependent community with a distinct political identity, history and culture. Second, they claim that as a result of the separation of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan from the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland since 1949, the residents of Taiwan have enjoyed a *de facto* sovereignty independent of the PRC which has allowed them to develop their own distinct political system. Third, they argue that the ROC's historical commitment to Chinese reunification should be put aside, if not abandoned, in favour of Taiwan's *de jure* independence so as to uphold Taiwanese sovereignty in the international community (Wong and Sun, 1998).

In calling this new Taiwanese identity "nationalist," we assume that it meets the five conditions of nationalism laid out by Anthony Smith. In the case of modern Taiwan, we find that it has: (1) The existence of social ties — shared names, beliefs or myths of ancestry, a sense of common history and destiny, shared culture, language and religion, identification with a specific geographical territory, and a strong sense of political solidarity — that allow given populations to form an *ethnie*. (2) The vicissitudes of struggle with an array of enemies which serve to inspire populations' belief in a common fate. (3) Access to the workings of a modern

state apparatus able to impart a strong sense of civic solidarity amongst its constituents. (4) An intellectual tradition capable of proposing new *ethnies* and disseminating its political ideals. (5) A clearly articulated nationalist ideology that constructs an "imagined" people motivated by the goal of forming their own nation-state (Smith, 1993:28-34).

Smith's (1986:32) definition of ethnicity or *ethnie* as "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity" suggests that while the basic characteristics of an ethnic nationalism are more or less objective (e.g., association with a specific territory), many others (e.g., a common ancestral mythology or shared cultural/political beliefs) are largely subjective or imaginative. In both cases, the objective and subjective characteristics of a given nationality are formed historically and are therefore subject to transformations, mutations and various forms of convergence or divergence. As a number of prominent students of nation and nationalism have pointed out, the term "nation" should not necessarily be taken to refer to a primordial ethnic group (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Smith, 1991). Instead, ethnic groups do change in different historical contexts to form new nations. On the one hand, they split into new, internally cohesive ethnic groups; on the other hand, they sometimes join other ethnic groups to form larger, unified political entities with a formal sovereign status (Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Smith, 1991; Greenfeld, 1992). In essence, nationalism might best be understood not as the natural development of some primordial ethnic identity but as the outgrowth of complex historical relationships and political possibilities. As Smith (1986) points out, nationalism needs to be understood as both ideology and political movement in which the people of a specific locality are given to believe that they form an ethnicity and aspire to establish their own nation-state. The key difference between the terms *ethnie* and nation is that the former specifies socio-cultural groups without a conscious orientation towards political independence while the latter names a political movement involving a political struggle for sovereignty and the formation of a nation-state. In fact, the (ethnic) identity nationalism seeks must be realised politically and should not be assumed to pre-exist. As Gellner (1964:169) states, "[n]ationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist." Furthermore, Hobsbawm (1972:386) suggests "[t]he 'nation' as conceived by nationalism, can be recognised prospectively; the real 'nation' can only be recognised *a posteriori*." Thus Taiwanese nationalism, like many other modern nationalisms, might best be understood in terms of this desire to form coherence between a cultural identity and a specific political boundary.

In each of the following sections of this paper, we will look at how this two-fold process of cultural identification and political mobilisation has developed out of a century of struggles in Taiwan. The ethno-geographic boundaries upon which modern Taiwan is based were largely determined by Japanese colonisation of the island from 1895 to 1945.[1] However, it was not until 1949, when the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) retreated from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan following its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the civil war, that the Taiwanese became a politicised cultural entity with a clear international mandate. During the 1980s and 1990s, continued separation across the Taiwan Strait, as well as the complex historical-political circumstances it brought about, eventually gave birth to a powerful nationalist movement on Taiwan which has laid the foundations for a new nation-state built upon the principles of liberal democracy. The function of liberal democracy has been to transform Taiwan's ethnic particularism into an emergent inclusive civic nationalism.

Japanese Colonial Rule: 1895-1945

Before looking at the effects of Japanese colonialism on the creation of a specifically Taiwanese national identity, it is useful to

recall the larger historical context in which Chinese nationalism was developing at the beginning of the twentieth century. In a strict sense, traditional China was not a modern nation-state with clearly defined ethno-geographic boundaries. Nor did it have the essential elements that have come to constitute modern nation-states, such as an enfranchised citizenship, a standard language[2] and a system of education, integrative political institutions, etc. It is more precise to say "China" — rather than either of the more specific names PRC or ROC — refers to a sense of cultural unity and historical continuity rather than to a modern nation-state based upon citizenship defined according to any particular system of civil, political and social rights. Because the cultural unity or historical continuity derived from China's imperial past was smashed under the invasion of Western powers during the 18th and 19th centuries, Chinese political leaders realised that if their culture and history were to survive in the international system of modern states like Japan, China would have to adapt a political structure similar to those found in the modern Western nation-states. Thus, the reform movements in the late Qing dynasty as well as the subsequent 1911 and 1949 revolutions can all be regarded as nationalist movements motivated towards the building of a modern nation-state which might unite a dispersed and fragmented Chinese people, or in revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen's own words "a plate of loose sand."[3] However, changing the Chinese people from "a plate of loose sand" to a highly unified nation-state was a tremendous cultural and political project which had little effect on the people of Taiwan. Before the "Chinese" people in Taiwan could become properly involved in modern Chinese nation building, Taiwan had been ceded to Japan as a result of the defeat of the Qing government in the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895. This meant that the islanders, as subjects of Japanese colonialism, were to undergo a completely different process of modernisation and nationalisation from their mainland brothers and sisters.

Before the arrival of the Japanese, the Fukien provincial government had governed the residents of Taiwan until the island

was made an independent province in 1885. Even though the Chinese migrants who inhabited the island had begun to stabilise and indigenise with a view to settling in Taiwan permanently, the Fukien provincial government had only just begun to achieve a modicum of effective rule over island society by the early 1880s (Wong, 1992:92-97). In actuality, by the mid-nineteenth century Taiwanese society was still seriously divided by persistent inter-ethnic and sub-ethnic conflicts and economic competition. Persistent clashes of varying scales among different ethnic and sub-ethnic groups led the Qing government to view Taiwan as a place where "a small rebellion broke out every three years and a big one every five years"; it was detested by the ruling officials as an ungovernable region (Chen, 1987:97-111).

The newly created Taiwan provincial government under Liu Ming-ch'uan did manage to consolidate the residents of Taiwan somehow through his modernising efforts, but the time was short and the Japanese colonisers came soon. When the Japanese took over Taiwan from the Qing government, the island population, some five million people, was still divided into three broad ethnic groups: Minnans (80 per cent), Hakkas (15 per cent) and the aborigines (5 per cent). The Minnans and Hakkas, speaking different Chinese dialects and having their own cultures, were mainly Han Chinese who had migrated from southern Chinese provinces to the island at various points in time, starting in the sixteenth century. The aboriginal people of the island were Malayo-Polynesian peoples, whose settlement in Taiwan can be traced to 4000 BC (Shepherd, 1995:28). Except for the island itself these three groups had little in common.[4] It took the political and social power of Japanese colonialism to provide the Taiwanese with a shared sense of space, culture and centralised administration, thus giving force to anthropologist Benedict Anderson's (1983:163-85) observation that a key condition for the formation of modern national identity is the colonial boundaries and rule set by the colonial state. The political cohesion, albeit oppressive by nature, instituted by the colonial regime was instrumental in shap-

ing a new cultural experience, history, and ultimately political solidarity for the colonised islanders.

One monumental event in the development of the nascent Taiwanese ethnicity was the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. This treaty stipulated that, for the two years following the signing, the people of Taiwan would be free to sell their property and to leave the island. Those who did not leave Taiwan before the set date automatically became Japanese subjects (Yang, 1992:82-83). This treaty brought about an instant and direct change in the political identity of Taiwan's residents. On the basis of this document, the people of the island had the dubious privilege of gaining a new nationality.

What was more, the formal change in nationality was followed by a Japanese-centred assimilation programme aimed at transforming the population into "Japanese" subjects. Generally called "inland extensionism," the programme literally meant that Taiwan and its people would eventually become an extension of "inland" Japan. Yet, in practice, the colonial regime discriminated between islanders and Japanese settlers. On the basis of their ethnic identity as Chinese or aboriginals, the Taiwanese were subject to a number of political and economic restrictions, even though they were technically Japanese nationals. While the islanders were obliged to learn Japanese in the schools and to adopt Japanese culture and values, the colonisers monopolised high-ranking posts in the government, military, state-run industrial enterprises and schools. Managers, teachers and policymakers were predominantly colonisers from Japan who represented only a small percentage of the island's population (Wachman, 1994:93).

Despite the obvious political and social discrimination brought about by colonisation, Japanese occupation marked the first historical period in which the entire island of Taiwan shared an effective modern government. The colonial regime severed Taiwan's ties with China and established a unified system of education, commerce, agriculture, and law. This new system had two important effects: it raised the standard of living on the island significantly, and it allowed the Taiwanese to develop a collective

identity based on their experience of being not Japanese and no longer Chinese. Caught between cultures, the Taiwanese began to feel a growing sense of identification with the island itself (Wachman, 1994:94). According to one native Taiwanese scholar's observations, while the assimilation movement was hardly successful in fostering Taiwanese people's identification with Japan, the impact of Japanese colonial rule on their collective thinking was extraordinarily deep.[5] In fact, Japanese colonialism gave rise to four separate localist movements in Taiwan: the cultural enlightenment movement, the democratic movement, the Taiwanese self-determination movement and the Taiwanese cultural reconstruction movement (Zhang, 1993). Other scholars also point out that Japanese colonialism introduced new cultural values and world-views to Taiwan which were different from, and even contradictory to, those of mainland China — views which would later fuel the conflicts with the mainland Chinese after Taiwan reverted to China in 1945 (Lai et al., 1991:168-93).

Another effect of Japanese colonialism was that it provided the islanders with an international political identity of their own. Until the signing of the 1943 Cairo Declaration, neither the KMT nor the CCP actively indicated to the international community that it sought the return of Taiwan to China. On the contrary, both parties treated the Taiwanese as nationals independent from the Chinese on the mainland. Fifteen years earlier, in 1928, the Taiwanese Communist Party, supported by the Soviet, Chinese and Japanese communists, openly proclaimed, "down with Japanese imperialism, make Taiwan independent, build the Taiwanese Republic." Again in 1938, at an extended conference of the Chinese Communist Central Politburo, Mao Zedong referred to Taiwan as a nation: he said, "the people of the two great nations of China and Japan and those suppressed nations like Korea and Taiwan should join together to build the united front against aggression... and that the Chinese and Taiwanese should cooperate on the basis of an equal and friendly international relationship." Furthermore, in 1938 at the KMT Provisional National Assembly, Chiang Kai-shek said, "What the President [Sun

Yat-sen] meant is that we must help the compatriots of Korea and Taiwan recover their independence and freedom. Only then can we consolidate the national security of the ROC and set the basis for the peace of East Asia."[6]

There is little doubt, as mainland China historian Jing Lin (1993:46) argues, that the support of the KMT and the CCP for the independence of Taiwan in the former years occurred in a very specific historical context unique to China, and therefore had its own compelling cause independent of either the cultural-political wishes of the islanders or the formation of Taiwanese nationalism. Yet when these proclamations of Taiwanese independence became part of the public discourse of state policy, they had a deep effect on the self-perception of Taiwan's residents. Even though the historical and cultural identity of the vast majority of Taiwanese people was still based on "the fact that they obviously belong to the Chinese nation which is the Han nation," (Fong, 1994:172) nationalist movements began to form around the issues of political autonomy and self-determination. In fact, certain nationalist objectives were clearly embryonic in the inauguration of the Taiwanese Cultural Association in 1921, the most important organisation of Taiwanese intellectuals during the period. At the inauguration one member made the following observations in his speech:

> China has a history of several thousand years. It did not strengthen itself and hence has degenerated into an inferior country, leading to the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. Since the World War, the voices of freedom, equality and national self-determination have been raised loudly. My compatriots and I must not but brace up with each other, and act as the mediator to promote amity between Japan and China and devote ourselves to peace in the Orient (translation mine). (Wang Shi-lang, 1988:253)

At the time, this type of political posturing was not unusual among Taiwanese intellectuals. In fact, the intellectual-led democratic movements, which unfolded in the 1920s and 1930s displayed similar tendencies in both the leftist and rightist camps,

with an agenda of national self-determination rather than reunification with China (Geoffroy, 1997:28-33).

In sum, Japanese colonialism created a coherent Taiwanese people who felt they shared a common fate and viewed the island of Taiwan as their home. It was also instrumental in helping the Taiwanese to develop a modern infrastructure based upon modern ideals of citizenship. Japanese colonialism assisted in the creation of an international identity, which emphasised self-determination rather than reunification with mainland China.

From Decolonisation to the Return to Quasi-colonisation: 1945-1949

If Japanese colonial rule was an originating period in the development of a collective Taiwanese consciousness, the next seminal period came about with the 1945 return of Taiwan to Chinese rule under the KMT. Before 1945, Taiwanese political nationalism was essentially latent; the voices of self-determination had not yet begun to imagine Taiwan as a truly independent nation-state (Fong, 1994:197). The five-year period following the end of Japanese rule gave birth to a manifest nationalist identity that was focused on the ideas of cultural autonomy and political independence from China. During the period of Japanese rule, Taiwanese consciousness, albeit with a local character, was largely centred around identification with Han China and was not, therefore, in conflict with a larger Chinese identity (Yang, 1992:88). These conflicts only started to appear after Taiwan was returned to China in 1945 and were inextricably linked with the KMT's political mismanagement of Taiwan.

Except for a few pro-Japan intellectuals and social leaders, the vast majority of Taiwanese welcomed return to the motherland owing to their traditional identification with China, and they were initially enthusiastic about the KMT's take-over.[7] This enthusiasm, however, dissipated soon after the KMT arrived, with the islanders' quick realisation that the KMT regime not only

treated their colonial experiences with contempt but also punished them for the values, ideas and customs they had internalised under Japanese rule. The regime failed to respect the fact that no matter how different the culture of Taiwan was with respect to Chinese culture, it had been formed historically and was therefore rather natural and an integral part of Taiwanese everyday life. The KMT persecuted the Taiwanese as malefactors poisoned by Japanese colonialism by imposing a new system of what can only be called quasi-colonial practices to eliminate or eradicate the non-Chinese differences. Like their Japanese predecessors, the new leaders treated the Taiwanese as a conquered people instead of fellow countrymen. In so doing, the KMT re-created the ethnic inequalities and discrimination characteristic of colonialism, at least in the eyes of the Taiwanese.

The KMT's quasi-colonial practices in Taiwan along ethnic lines manifested themselves in three main aspects: politics, culture and the economy. Politically, the KMT distrusted the native Taiwanese; as the Japanese had done, the KMT imported their own people to fill leadership positions on Taiwan.[8] Culturally, these new leaders carried out a radical de-Japanisation programme, which enforced the use of Mandarin as the official language of government and business and banned the use of Japanese. Thus the local Taiwanese found that the cultural legacies that they had been compelled to adapt were now under attack, for example, the KMT demolished Japanese temples and forced the local Taiwanese elite to abandon their Japanese names (Yang, 1992:18-24). Economically, the inception of KMT rule was accompanied by the end of a period of relative prosperity, which stemmed not only from the massive bombing the Americans directed against all parts of the Japanese Empire, but also from the KMT's rapacity, incompetence and priority on fighting the CCP in the civil war — including the massive transfer of resources and capital from Taiwan to the mainland (Gold, 1986:50). The KMT's new cultural policies and political measures continued the disenfranchisement of the local populace. The islanders found that although Taiwan had been returned to the Chinese motherland, they had not been liberated from colonial suppression. The fact that KMT officials also brought corrupt government practices — the likes of which were unmatched by their Japanese predecessors — made matters worse (Lai et al., 1991:73-75).

The islanders' initial disappointment with the KMT eventually evolved into political anger. On 28 February 1947 after an investigator of the Taipei City Monopoly Bureau accidentally killed a native bystander during an anti-smuggling assignment, large demonstrations and riots broke out in the main cities of Taiwan to protest against the mainlander-run KMT government.[9] The incident, generally regarded as the boiling point of Taiwanese discontent over KMT rule, resulted in military suppression in which it is believed that thousands of native Taiwanese were killed.[10] If the KMT had responded to the street demonstrations and riots with self-reflection, and moved to implement more effective home rule, instead of resorting to military suppression, the bloody incident might have been avoided and subsequent Taiwanese historical development rewritten (Dai and Yip, 1992). However, the KMT was then fighting for its survival against the CCP on the mainland while facing social and economic devastation in the aftermath of the eight-year Sino-Japanese War. It basically lacked the necessary preparation and resources to deal properly with Taiwan's return. In other words, to a certain extent the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait were caught up in historical situations that were difficult if not impossible to transcend (Lai et al., 1991:169-88).

In hindsight, the agony the Taiwanese people went through as a result of the February 28 Incident was in part the realisation that their mainland compatriots were capable of the same type of political and cultural repression as the Japanese colonisers. The Taiwanese found that they were still treated like captives in their own country. They could be arbitrarily insulted, exploited, imprisoned and even slaughtered. Even though the number of casualties incurred by the mainlanders in the form of inter-ethnic clashes during the incident was quite large, the Taiwanese saw themselves as the clear victims of political suppression (Lai et al.,

1991:99-140), enacting what Walker (1993:159-83) refers to as the "politics of forgetting," a characteristic of nation building. After the incident, the ethnic dichotomy of mainlanders versus native Taiwanese coincided with the political demarcation of the ruler versus the ruled. The difference between the islanders and mainlanders was no longer implicit but could now be linked with a real, tragic experience, which like an ethnic myth, in turn precipitated into the collective memory of the Taiwanese. It is important to note that many of the islanders who fled to Japan as a result of this incident were to become key leaders in the first wave of the Taiwanese independence movement (Lai et al., 1991:155). Due to a repressive experience under the KMT, Taiwanese nationalism began to bear a strong ethnic flavour that was anti-mainlander in character and emphasised the liberation of the Taiwanese from the mainlanders' domination.

Divided Nation and KMT Nation Building: 1949-1970s

Perhaps if China had not been divided and Taiwan had been simply another Chinese province subject to the gradual process of political indigenisation and democratisation, the ethnic cleavage spawned by the February 28 Incident might have been smoothed over by the implementation of local home rule. However, the civil war between the CCP and KMT and the ideological difference between the two governments vis-à-vis a Chinese nation meant that, after 1949, the political situation in Taiwan had become exceedingly complicated. In the process of building a modern nation-state, the political rule of China was split between two competing sovereign states separated by the Taiwan Strait (Weng, 1995). For the people of Taiwan, this political battle taxed the economy of the small island province, as the KMT became reliant on Taiwanese resources to keep the giant state structure of the ROC alive.

The cross-strait political and ideological division between these two Chinese governments further bewildered and alienated a local population already disenchanted with mainlander-rule. Due to the fact that until 1945, the Taiwanese experience of nationalism was grounded in their experience of Japanese colonisation, the nation-building process of the ROC was essentially outside the historical consciousness of the Taiwanese. While Taiwan shares a tremendous cultural base with mainland China, especially China's southeastern coast, the islanders' cultural identity had been complicated by Japanese colonial rule. After all, the ideals of the ROC in a political-cultural sense were either too painful for the islanders who were still suffering from the aftershocks of the February 28 Incident or too difficult for them to grasp in a divided nation where the KMT was apparently a loser. As we have seen in the last section, the KMT resettlement in Taiwan and their attempt at the forced development of a Chinese culture had had a disastrous effect on the relations between the Taiwanese and their new rulers. Not only did the obvious and overt political nature of the KMT's cultural programme make it difficult for the islanders to accept the propaganda, but they were also being asked to share in an ROC state which had been for all intents and purposes defeated by the CCP.

The huge gap between the KMT's ideals and the realities of Chinese cultural politics in Taiwan distorted the development of Taiwanese society by confusing the issues of nationalism amongst the people (Chun, 1994:65-69). First of all, to preserve their bid to represent a unified China under the name of the ROC, the KMT depended on the political domination of Taiwan. To inculcate their political ideals in the minds of the islanders and to shore up control of this important power base, the KMT regime employed the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion shortly after its retreat to Taiwan. This act terminated all the national-level elections (i.e., the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly), giving the two "provisional" congresses a nickname "wannian guohui" (literally, national congresses lasting for ten thousand years). As a result of this political

manoeuvre, a mainlander elite was able to monopolise the central offices of power for more than 40 years. This "provisional system" meant that the KMT ruled along ethnic lines and so displayed a quasi-colonial character, thereby deepening the local people's sense of alienation from the ROC nationalistic design and exacerbating conflicts with mainlanders on Taiwan.

Furthermore, in order to strengthen ROC legitimacy and political orthodoxy on Taiwan, the KMT actively attempted to indoctrinate the Taiwanese in a "traditional" Chinese culture through a programme called the "Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement." The fact that this Movement unfolded in 1966 — the year the CCP launched the Cultural Revolution on the mainland — forcefully demonstrated the politics of culture underlying the Movement. For the ruling KMT, the Movement was necessary to preserve a Chinese culture which they felt was being attacked and discarded by the Cultural Revolution of the CCP. Obviously this attempt at the preservation of Chinese culture was ideological and was meant to assert the political orthodoxy of the ROC. To borrow Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's (1983) words, the KMT state was planning to "invent tradition" to serve the purpose of integrating the nation. As a matter of course, the Movement granted both the KMT's founder Sun Yat-sen, and its then supreme leader Chiang Kai-shek, traditional distinction. These two political leaders were given the status of classical sages. By putting them on a cultural par with "Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, Confucius and Mencius," (Yang, 1992:27) the KMT was attempting to foster belief in the ROC as protector of a glorious Chinese culture.

While the KMT's cultural programme was designed to strengthen the ideology and political legitimacy of KMT rule over Taiwan, it actually had the opposite effect of furthering the development of a distinct Taiwanese political identity. The insistence on historical orthodoxy and the denial and condemnation of the CCP regime on the mainland as "a group of bandits" worked to further alienate the islanders from the mainland (Chun, 1994:65-69). Not only did the selectively constructed Chinese culture fail to inspire the local populace to identify with its cause, the game of cultural politics also, ironically, pushed the Taiwanese to rethink their own cultural roots. Indeed, the so-called Chinese tradition emphasised by the KMT was essentially rhetorical, based on dry moral doctrines which were largely collectivist, and it was therefore at odds with the individualistic values central to modern society that had already begun to develop on Taiwan (Yang, 1992:49). On the other hand, the construction of a Chinese cultural orthodoxy relegated the indigenous cultures of the Taiwanese to an inferior status. During the 1950s and 1960s, indigenous dialects, literature and arts were either discouraged or suppressed, further humiliating and angering the Taiwanese intelligentsia, who later rose to challenge the KMT rule by fighting for cultural indegenisation and political democratisation (Yang, 1992:86-88; Dai, 1994:24-25). For the people of Taiwan, the knowledge and experience of "China" produced in the KMT's propaganda were either too abstract by themselves or too negative by way of their association with the CCP.

Another consequence of the political separation between the PRC and ROC was the assimilation of the Chinese mainlanders into native Taiwanese society. In the early 1960s when international circumstances began to favour the consolidated PRC regime on the mainland, it appeared that the cross-strait separation might continue indefinitely. As a result, many ethnic mainlanders gradually realised that their dream of Chinese reunification under a ROC framework was increasingly more illusive. Hence, many started to adjust their original sojourner attitude to the practicalities of permanent settlement in Taiwan, and in so doing many began to identify Taiwan as their home. In fact over time, the second and even the third generations of this group of mainlanders were born and raised in Taiwan and have become indigenised into local Taiwanese culture (Lu, 1999:93-94).

As was stated in the introduction, the vicissitudes of struggle with an array of enemies always play an important role in the formation of nationalism. In historian Michael Howard's (1979:102) words: "No nation, in the true sense of the word, could

be born without war, [and] no self-conscious community could establish itself as a new and independent actor on the world scene without an armed conflict or the threat of one." The half-century of cross-strait confrontation has indeed witnessed the waning of Chinese nationalism and the corresponding rise of Taiwanese nationalism in Taiwan. As a result of the KMT's continuing war against communist China and the historical impact this has had on the political, cultural and economic life of the island, the Taiwanese, regardless of their original ethnic origins, have come to identify with the experience of a common destiny. Even though the ruling elite and local Taiwanese remained in conflict, both groups identified with each other in their continuing struggle against communist China, especially the latter's threat to "liberate" Taiwan (Wang, 1993).

Frustration with their cultural and political subordination, growing public opposition to the authoritarian KMT, and the political and cultural alienation of islanders from the mainland pushed the local Taiwanese people towards ethnic nationalism. In the 1970s, new nationalist movements gained clear political purpose. Indeed, when Taiwan was forced to withdraw from the United Nations in 1971, the international status of the ROC was demolished. The *de facto,* yet unrecognised existence of the ROC on Taiwan became increasingly problematic for the ruling KMT and the Taiwanese population as a whole. In order to overcome a crisis of legitimacy arising from the ROC's continued claim to represent the whole of China, the KMT, albeit reluctantly, began to be more tolerant of the embryonic developments of Taiwanese nationalism. In fact, the KMT acquiesced to the growing national consciousness and eventually adopted an experimental form of controlled indigenisation (Wang, 1989).

The developing Taiwanese nationalism was multifarious in content. Culturally, it was an indigenous movement, centred on the Taiwanese intellectuals' promotion of a long-suppressed indigenous culture, in the form of support for traditional island dialects, local literature about Taiwan and traditional Taiwanese folk arts (Lu, 1999:27-39). Politically, it included two related yet

divergent streams. One aimed at transforming the authoritarian state of the KMT. The other sought Taiwan's political independence from the rest of China through the elimination of the contradiction between the KMT's ideal of a unified China and the ROC state's actual political jurisdiction. These two streams had different ethnic bases. While the opposition movement won support across ethnic lines, the independence movement was largely confined to the local Taiwanese (Wu, 1995:112-14). Because the independence movement was grounded in their experience with the neo-colonial rule of the KMT, it carried strong anti-mainlander sentiments.

It was not until the late 1980s that this period of ethnic nationalism began to give way to a civic nationalism. The eventual dissipation of ethnic inequalities, which was in a large part due to cultural indigenisation in the 1970s and political democratisation in the 1980s and early 1990s, eroded anti-mainlander sentiments amongst the local Taiwanese. On the other hand, Taiwan's international isolation during this era created an important condition for the ethnic mainlanders to rethink Taiwan's relationship with the Chinese mainland. In consequence, the political goals and opinions of the ethnic mainlanders began to converge with those of the local Taiwanese to form a more autonomous vision of Taiwan. Borrowing Anderson's (1983) well-known phrase, we might say that it was during this period the people of Taiwan as a whole began to see themselves as an "imagined community," distinct both politically and culturally.

Democratisation and the Rise of the Democratic State: Late 1980s to Early 1990s

With the development and democratisation of Taiwan's political situation, what the people of Taiwan in fact "imagined" was the preservation and perfection of an emerging civil society with a new nation-state whose rule was consistent with Taiwan's actual jurisdiction (Wong, 1997). The principal characteristics of this new

state were to be based on modern political ideals. The people of Taiwan began to subscribe to the liberal democratic belief that political sovereignty should originate from below and represent the desires of free citizens in accordance with democratic norms, rather than from above with authoritarian rulers (Greenfeld, 1992:11; Wong and Sun, 1998:266-67). Interacting with such a democratic civic state meant that the Taiwanese citizenship began to develop a new identity that coincided with the state's actual jurisdiction (Habermas, 1994:23-28). To locate this transition in terms of the discourses of nationalism, we might say that the democratic breakthrough of Taiwan in the mid-1980s has led from an ethnic nationalism based on the formation of a politically aware cultural identity to a civic nationalism oriented towards the creation or perfection of a political system based on the values of inclusive citizenship rights.[11] While this political transformation is generally referred to in terms of the democratisation of the ROC state, these changes have had a radical effect on the political-cultural situation in Taiwan. Before the introduction of recent democratic reforms, the state in Taiwan was built around the ideals of reunification with the Chinese mainland, meaning that its mandate went beyond the actual parameters of its geographic control. The shift in political focus towards local issues has signalled the emergence of a *bona fide* nation-state.

Another aspect of democratisation has been that the government of Taiwan is now able to actively attempt to create an independent international identity fundamental to its status as a true nation-state. As political scientists Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim (1993:240) have pointed out, in the existing world system of political economy constituted by the basic units of nation-states, international participation is the prerequisite for any state to prove its existence and to fulfil its people's need for collective security. Because international isolation poses serious challenges to the creation and administration of a modern state, Taiwan's political leaders have begun to rethink the country's position in relation to the global sphere. As Taiwanese political scientist Yu-shan Wu has observed:

> Beijing's monopolisation of the "China" identity on international occasions has forced Taiwan to cast off its pretensions to represent the only legitimate government of China. Westerners also generally fail to appreciate the Republic of China's effort to keep its Chinese identity, and refer to it simply as Taiwan.... Under these circumstances, Taiwan is psychologically forced to seek an alternative identity. (Wu Yu-shan, 1996:4)

The attempt to establish an international identity independent of China has, in fact, been an important political pursuit for the hitherto isolated Taiwanese — particularly those activists who advocated the priority of Taiwan's interests. Prior to the period of democratisation, a number of Taiwan's political activists attended to the question of international isolation and the forced withdrawal from the United Nations. However, given the fact that at that time the people of Taiwan were divided by ethnic conflicts and the fact that nationalism tended to represent Chinese unification, the quest for a unitary Taiwanese identity that might participate in the international system of nation-states was quite weak (Wong, 2000). The coming of democratic reforms in the mid-1980s changed the situation in a number of important ways. Firstly, as has already been argued, the political indigenisation and democratisation of the populace helped to bring about an end to ethnic conflicts. Secondly, because Taiwan is now ruled by a democratic state, it has been easier to seek political acceptance abroad.[12] While the KMT still insisted on keeping the ROC as Taiwan's country name for ideological and political reasons, international recognition of the fact that Taiwan appeared to have developed a cohesive cultural and political national identity independent of China was leading many Taiwanese to question the legitimacy of this name (Kuo, 1998:297-303). Politically, democratisation has forced the reconstruction of a people who are the elementary subjects of society and has meant the institutionalisation of the principles of political participation (Greenfeld, 1992:10).

Under democratisation, Taiwan's local interests gradually replaced the more abstract interests based upon reunification. Since its formation in 1986, the largest opposition party, the rapidly growing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),[13] has been consistently fighting for Taiwanese sovereignty independent of the PRC. In October 1991, it formally included in it's manifesto the use of referendum to decide the national status of Taiwan (Kuo, 1998:67-70). It has also pushed the notion that Taiwan is an independent nation with its own national myth and history.[14] Under pressure from the DPP's as well as the people's quest for popular sovereignty, the democratising KMT regime had to play up its existence as an independent political entity, forcing it to seek Beijing's official recognition of the ROC on Taiwan and to strive for formal representation in the international community, especially in the United Nations. As the populace's democratic awareness grows, the people of Taiwan have become increasingly uncomfortable with the notion that Taiwan is merely a transitional state that must be absorbed into a unified China in the future. On the contrary, the new citizens of Taiwan are beginning to identify their political future with the concerns of Taiwan's own civic state. This has forced the KMT to present itself through slogans that point to a separate political reality for the people of Taiwan, such as "the ROC on Taiwan," and "one of the two Chinas at the present stage with the goal of moving towards one China."[15]

These political expressions deployed by the KMT regime are aimed at clarifying the position of the new Taiwanese state in the face of the existing political realities, and are motivated by the dual desires of rejoining the international community and redefining the relationship with the PRC. The clarification of this new political identity, however, has inevitably begun to transform the ROC from a state whose sovereignty covers the whole of China to one that represents Taiwan only. In this way, Taiwan has increasingly looked like a genuine nation-state in its own right, and the possibility of reunification with the mainland is fast becoming a contingency. To a large extent, this shift in political focus is central

to Beijing's accusation that, through its attempt to join the United Nations, Taiwan is attempting to split the Chinese nation. Beijing worries that the return of Taiwan to the United Nations will merely provide Taipei with an excuse to keep China divided forever (Wong, 1997:195). From Taipei's point of view, this political re-adjustment is necessary to the continued sovereignty of the ROC, which is otherwise threatened by popular sovereignty brought about by democratisation.

Recent Trends in the Self-definition of the Taiwanese People

The formation of a democratic state that covers only the territory of Taiwan is logically connected to the development of a compatible national identity. In the past, the ROC's systematic construction of culture was centred on the identification with and reconfiguration of a Chinese identity, which tended to subordinate and marginalise Taiwanese culture. This is evidenced by the KMT's system of education in Taiwan before democratisation, which tended to emphasise materials about the mainland; in the school curriculum there were next to no materials that focused on Taiwan (Dai, 1993; Yang, 1994). However, this has changed since the recent shift in the political structure of the ROC. By realigning the state's interest with a new Taiwanese culture, the democratisation of the ROC state has challenged the primacy of the Chinese national cultural discourse. Recently there has been growing political interest in such emerging discursive constructions as "the Taiwanese life community" (*Taiwanren shengming gong tongti*) and "the priority of Taiwan" (*Taiwan youxian*). In an interview with a Japanese journalist in 1994, President Lee Teng-hui openly criticised the limited Taiwanese curriculum in the local education system:

> Now education on local affairs has increased. I want our country's primary education to add more courses on the history of Taiwan, the geography of Taiwan, our

> roots, and so on. In the past, matters about Taiwan were not taught; what was taught was usually about the mainland. So absurd the education was! (translation mine). (Lee, 1995:476)

Whether or not he has thought through the implications of his position, Lee is nurturing a kind of nationalistic awareness that is based upon knowledge of Taiwan instead of China. Within the political discourse of the modern nation-states, this shift in focus towards a Taiwanese awareness in the cultural development of the country is strongly related to the tendency for a nation-state to actively support a coherent identity based on the supposed homogeneity of the new "nation" or "imagined community." Indeed as we discussed at the outset of this paper, the term "nationalism" is often defined in terms of the political and cultural goals of a community whose members share a strong sense of common history and political purpose. If we look at Lee's speech at his presidential inauguration on 20 May 1996, we can see the effects of new Taiwan-centred discourses and the increasingly nationalistic ideology of the Taiwanese government:

> This is our common homeland, and this is the fundamental support we draw upon in our struggle for survival. Fifty years of a common destiny forged in fortune and misfortune have united us all into a closely bound and interdependent community. The first direct presidential election ever has reconfirmed our collective consciousness that we in Taiwan have to work together as one man.[16]

In describing the Taiwanese people as possessing a "common homeland" with "a common destiny" and forming "a closely bound and interdependent community" with a "collective consciousness" and suggesting that they "have to work together as one man," it is clear that Lee was adopting the rhetoric of nationalism and was projecting an image of the Taiwanese nation independent of China and the nationalism of the PRC.

According to various opinion polls conducted in Taiwan over the years, the government's change in focus and attitude reflects

recent developments in the political and cultural attitudes of the people of Taiwan. The supporters of an independent Taiwan (including those who believe that Taipei should "make Taiwan independent as soon as possible" and those who think that they should "maintain the *status quo* and then move towards an independent Taiwan") have been on the rise, from 14 per cent in January 1993 to 18.3 per cent in March 2000, while the supporters of unification (including those who agree that Taiwan should "unify with mainland China as soon as possible" and those who would like to "maintain the *status quo* and then move towards unification") have been declining relatively rapidly, from 34.7 per cent to 21.4 per cent. Meanwhile, the supporters of the "maintain the *status quo* indefinitely" and "maintain the *status quo* and decide Taiwan's future later" options have also risen from 10.1 per cent and 19.7 per cent to 19.3 per cent and 35.2 per cent, respectively. If we group the supporters of "maintain the *status quo* indefinitely," "maintain the *status quo* and decide Taiwan's future later," "maintain the *status quo* and then move towards an independent Taiwan," and "make Taiwan independent as soon as possible" options together as supporters of an autonomous Taiwan (albeit in different forms), the percentage actually becomes much higher: 72.8 per cent in March 2000, compared with 43.8 per cent in January 1993.[17] These figures appear to demonstrate that the majority of the Taiwanese have now taken a rather open attitude towards their national future based upon political autonomy/independence instead of reunification with China.

Another set of polls demonstrates that this shifting emphasis on political autonomy/independence has been accompanied by a growing public identification with Taiwan. In January 1993, only 16.7 per cent of Taiwan people identified themselves as Taiwanese, but by March 2000 the percentage had increased to 45. On the contrary, those who identified themselves as Chinese had dropped significantly over the same period, from 48.5 per cent to 13.9 per cent. It should also be noted that during the same period, those who identified themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese had increased from 32.7 per cent to 39.4 per cent.[18] This more or

less reflects that with the fading Chinese identification and growing Taiwanese identification, an increasingly significant portion of Taiwan residents are trying to harmonise two identities, a trend that should have an important bearing on Taiwan's future national development.

It is thus clear that within Taiwan there is a movement towards social and political cohesion. Socially, the evolving Taiwanese nationalism is increasingly focused on civic issues rather than ethnic differences. A case in point is the 1998 mayoral election in Taipei. During the election campaign, candidate Ma Ying-jeou, a KMT politician who was born in Hong Kong of mainland parents, declared four days before the vote that he was a "New Taiwanese," a slogan first coined by another mainlander candidate, James C.Y. Soong, during his 1994 Governor of Taiwan election campaign, in order to win the support of local Taiwanese. Soong's call attracted little public attention at the time because ethnic tension was still high and democratisation had not been completed. However, in 1998, especially after the first popular presidential election was successfully held in 1996, Ma's situation was much more favourable. Taiwan's ethnic equality was basically guaranteed with the completion of democratisation and Taiwan had been under increased threat of force from Beijing since the 1995/96 cross-strait crisis. In supporting Ma, President Lee Teng-hui openly explained that "New Taiwanese" was an identity that transcended the traditional divide between local Taiwanese and ethnic mainlanders. It identified Taiwan as its homeland and the ROC on Taiwan as an independent sovereign state and it should be the identity for all Taiwanese people (*United Daily*, 2 December 1998, p.1). Although it is not clear what role the invention of this new political identity played in Ma's eventual narrow victory over popular incumbent Chen Shui-bian, a DPP member and native son whose election campaign was mainly based upon an appeal to ethnic divisions (*Asiaweek*, 17 March 2000, pp. 18-28), it appears that the general public has increasingly approved of the idea of an inclusive "New Taiwanese" identity after a decade of democratic consolidation through which inter-ethnic equality is

basically secured. It thus gives support, as DPP theorist Julian Kuo had observed, to the notion that Taiwan is capable of enacting a peaceful transition from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism (*China Times*, 9 December 1998, p. 24). In fact, before the election the DPP had already sensed the coming of the era of civic nationalism and begun to emphasise, albeit slowly, inter-ethnic harmony (Kuo, 1998:229). The wide public acceptance of the "New Taiwanese" identity should accelerate the process of national integration on the island.

If "New Taiwanese" symbolises that the ethnically divided people of Taiwan are beginning to imagine themselves as a cohesive social group by shifting their focus of national construction from ethnic difference to equal citizenship in the democratic era, then president Lee Teng-hui's open redefinition of cross-strait relations as "special state-to-state" relations on 9 July 2000 should be seen as a conclusive move to formalise Taiwan's distinct political identity vis-à-vis the PRC in the international system of nation-states. According to Lee's explanation, the 1991 and 1992 constitutional amendments limit the area covered by the ROC Constitution to that of the Taiwan area, recognise the legitimacy of the rule of the PRC on the Chinese mainland, and stipulate that members of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly and the president and vice president shall be elected by the people from the Taiwan area only. Hence, the amendments "have placed cross-strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government."[19] Objectively speaking, Lee's explanation should not be simply taken as rhetorical but points to the enormous impact of democratisation on Taiwan's state development and its political identity. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the March 2000 presidential election, the three front running candidates, the KMT's Lien Chan, Independent James C.Y. Soong, and the DPP's Chen Shui-bian, all emphasised the subjectivity of the Taiwan people and the autonomy of the ROC state on Taiwan, even though they did not

exclude, on this basis, the possibility to develop closer relations with the PRC on the mainland (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 December 1998, pp. 18-19). The convergence has, again, confirmed the coming of age of Taiwanese civic nationalism, which upholds equal citizenship among Taiwan residents as a people and the political autonomy/independence of the ROC on Taiwan from the PRC on the mainland. That the pro-independence candidate Chen Shui-bian defeated all other candidates and won the presidential election further testifies to the strengthening of this trend. To avoid a possible military attack by Beijing due to the pro-independence DPP's rise to power, Chen promised in his presidential inauguration speech on 20 May 2000 that "as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called 'state-to-state' description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the *status quo* in regards to the question of independence or unification." He also indicated his flexibility to discuss with Beijing on the "question of a future 'one China.'"[20] Yet, in spite of this flexibility, Chen has continually refused to accept the one China principle, which, as Beijing defines it, sees Taiwan as an integral part of China. Instead, like his predecessor Lee Teng-hui, Chen continues to uphold the independent sovereignty of the ROC on Taiwan from the PRC on the mainland, leading many cross-strait affairs analysts to believe that while Chen no longer uses the term "state-to-state," he remains committed to its implications.

Looking at the development of Taiwanese nationalism within the international context we might argue that its growth has been strengthened by three additional factors: (1) a natural convergence between the nationalist movement in Taiwan and the Western liberal nationalism of some of Taiwan's key trading partners; (2) the increasing asymmetry between Taiwan and the mainland; (3) international attitudes towards the existing cross-strait relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. If in general terms, liberal nationalism refers to a movement in which

people seek a nation-state with the spirit of free association (Greenfeld, 1992; Tamir, 1993), then the DPP Constitution's insistence on the use of a referendum to decide the political future of Taiwan appears to be consistent with this type of nationalist development. This insistence indeed seeks to employ liberal ideals to rationalise Taiwanese nationalism. No wonder that Independent presidential candidate James C.Y. Soong also included the use of a referendum to decide Taiwan's national future in his policy platform during his election campaign. Other things being equal, with the continuing practice of democracy in which liberalism is a key dimension, it is likely that more and more Taiwan people will be consolidated into an independent Taiwanese political identity under the banner of increased political participation in the affairs of the new state (Wu Nai-teh, 1996:19).

Taiwan's asymmetrical relationship with the mainland and the continuing denial of sovereign status by the international community have had a positive impact on the development of the liberal approach to Taiwanese nationalism. As mentioned earlier, the population, geographical area and international influence of Taiwan are extremely small in relation to the mainland. Because of this Beijing has been able to monopolise the notion of a singular Chinese identity and to force the international community to recognise the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China. The apparent dead-end that the ROC faces in its competition with the "giant" PRC has inevitably pushed more and more Taiwanese people to rethink their relationship with the mainland — especially since many now see the mainland as being too "big" for Taiwan to swallow and that the international community is not on Taiwan's side. As a result, many now appear to believe that a separate political (state) identity based on an independent Taiwan, rather than reunification, may be a more realistic option for Taiwan.

In fact, as the idea of reunification in Taiwan subsides, the name ROC has begun taking on a hollow ring. Former President Lee Teng-hui (1995:246) once admitted that "one China" was

merely an ideal. For present President Chen Shui-bian, "one China" is at best a future question to be discussed with Beijing. Given that the formation of a new "Taiwanese community" is fundamental to the political pursuits of Taiwanese people and that there is strong support for the use of a referendum to determine Taiwan's future relationship with "China," it is fair to say that the essentialism Chinese nationalists accord to the concept "China" will inevitably vanish. While many may wonder why Taiwan in general and Taipei in particular are still holding to the possibility of reunification in their official exchanges with Beijing, and how much of this tenacity is due to natural sentiment towards the Chinese nation and how much is a response to Beijing's threat of force,[21] the fact of Taiwan's political and cultural independence seems to be firmly established.

Conclusion

This paper has charted the birth and development of Taiwanese nationalism through five key historical periods: the Japanese colonisation of the island of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945; the reunion of Taiwan and mainland China between 1945 and 1949; the prolonged confrontation between the PRC on the mainland and ROC on Taiwan and the increasing international isolation of the Taiwanese from 1949 to 1970s; democratisation and the emergence of a democratic state in the late 1980s and early 1990s; and the trend towards a civic nationalism since the mid-1990s. In moving through these historical periods this paper has shown that Taiwanese nationalism is a product of history and its content has continuously been shaped by various historical forces, both internal and external. In particular, it has moved from an ethnic nationalism emphasising the distinct historical-cultural experience of local Taiwanese, to a civic one with liberal values and equal citizenship as the basis of Taiwan's national construction.

As demonstrated in this paper, Taiwanese civic nationalism in the form of upholding the subjectivity of the Taiwan residents as a

people and the political autonomy/independence of the ROC on Taiwan has won wide acceptance in Taiwanese society. Yet, the Beijing government continues to be openly hostile towards it, accusing it of splitting China and threatening it with the use of force. As both sides across the Taiwan Strait seem unwilling to compromise, their conflict is likely to intensify. The purpose of this paper has been to aid in the development of mutual sympathetic understanding of the political situation in Taiwan by providing a clearer depiction of the historical forces underlying the recent political and cultural developments of the new Taiwanese identity.

Given the fact that Taipei continuously rejects any form of unification under PRC domination while Beijing strongly opposes the idea of Taiwanese independence, it is obvious that some political compromise must be reached if military confrontation is to be avoided. However, for such a compromise to be effective, a great deal of effort still needs to be made by both sides. As this paper has demonstrated, the people of Taiwan appear to be poised to move, through collective experience over the past century, from a parochial ethnic nationalism to a continued fulfilment of the ideals of citizenship. Perhaps in so doing the Taiwanese will be able to rebuild communication and possibly a form of union with the mainland under a more flexibly defined "one China" framework that approximates Habermasian (1994:22-24) ideal of a universal practice of citizenship. In recent years, the various political forces in Taiwan have unanimously emphasised democratisation in China as a basic condition of negotiation over possible cross-strait reunion, reflecting that the Taiwanese are now taking a more open, flexible attitude towards their national future. Apart from the threat of force from Beijing, the new attitude should more or less echo their practice of citizenship in the democratic era. If that is the case, the replacement of ethnic nationalism by free citizenship may provide a much hoped for solution to the current political crisis separating the various peoples of China. This is, of course, a point that Beijing must grasp.

Notes

1. Having said that, we fully realise that both the Kuomintang (KMT) government and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have rejected the argument that Taiwan should group Jinmen and Mazu on the grounds that they are part of Fujian rather than Taiwan. Both parties emphasise the preservation of Taiwan's post-1949 boundaries.
2. While under the dynasties, China did have a standard system of Chinese characters, people in different localities spoke different dialects, most of which are incomprehensive to each other.
3. Indeed, the term "Chinese" did not exist until the emergence of Chinese nationalism in late Qing. See Chun (1994).
4. Even though Minnans and Hakkas did share a larger Chinese identity, but such Chinese identity did not save them from frequent intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic conflicts and clashes resulted from cultural-regional differences and economic competition. See Chen (1987:97-111).
5. The term "native Taiwanese" here refers to those Taiwan residents who had settled in Taiwan before 1945, including Minnans, Hakkas and aborigines, or their descendants, as opposed to another term "ethnic mainlanders," which refers to those people who moved from mainland China to Taiwan after 1945 or their descendants.
6. All quoted from Wang Hsin-tsu (1988:16).
7. See Lai et al. (1991:47-48). This enthusiasm did not deny the fact of an aborted plot in 1945 by some prominent Taiwanese families, including the Goo family, who conspired with mid-level Japanese Imperial Army officers to declare Taiwan independence in order to ward off the KMT takeover.
8. See Lai et at. (1991:63-67). It should be noted that the Taiwanese were not the only ones excluded from governance. Well into the 1970s the large majority of leading positions were occupied by figures who hailed from Chiang Kai-shek's base in Zhejiang/Jiangsu/Shanghai and demonstrated personal loyalty to Chiang. What is emphasised here only the Taiwanese perception.
9. For detailed description of the incident, see Lai et al. (1991).
10. The estimated figure of casualties has to date remained controversial, ranging from a few thousands to over a hundred thousands. After thorough examination, Lai et al. (1991:155-64) estimated that it should be around ten thousands.
11. For details of the causes for the democratic breakthrough in Taiwan, see Tien (1989), Wu (1995), Chao and Myers (1998).
12. Shared democratic institutions and values are considered to be an important ground for international co-operation in international politics. The ROC government particularly emphasises this point in its bid for participation in the United Nations. See Lee (1994:96-97).
13. The DPP's popularity can be reflected in the popular votes it received in several major elections in recent years: in the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections, it captured 36.9 per cent of the popular vote; in the 1993 Mayors and County Magistrates elections, 41 per cent; in the 1994 Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung and Governor of Taiwan elections, 38 per cent; in the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections, 34 per cent. Although the DPP experienced a major setback in the 1996 Presidential Election by capturing only 21 per cent of the popular vote, it performed rather stably in the National Assembly elections held on the same day, capturing 31 per cent of the popular vote. Later, it even won the 2000 Presidential Election and marked the historic peaceful alteration of political parties in power in Taiwan.
14. In 1995, Hsin-liang Hsu, former president of the DPP, published a book entitled *The Rising People* (Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co.), attempting to lay down a historical-theoreti-

cal construction for Taiwan's people as a new nation different from and independent of the Chinese nation.

15. The slogan was first put forward by the ruling KMT in the fall of 1993. Since then it has been continuously used by Taipei to describe its mainland policy.
16. Translated and released by the ROC Government Information Office.
17. See release of the Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China, May 2000.
18. See release of the Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China, May 2000.
19. See *http://web.oop.gov.tw/web/msgspch...592c482567af002cec8c?OpenDocument.*
20. See *http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/MacPolicy/ch9001e.htm.*
21. In early June 1995, for instance, after the ROC President Lee Teng-hui successfully paid a "private visit" to the United States, Beijing immediately condemned the visit as a plot of the Taiwan government to divide China. In consequence, it responded by conducting a series of successive missile tests and military manoeuvres between July 1995 and March 1996 near the Taiwan Island as well as other Taiwan-controlled front-line islands such as Jinmen and Mazu. As Beijing openly admitted, these actions were warnings sent against the "worrying" separatist development of Taiwan. See Li (1998).

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The Rise and Changing Nature of Taiwanese Nationalism

Abstract

In the context of the on-going complex political interaction between Taiwan and mainland China, this paper offers an analysis of the historical-structural evolution of Taiwanese identity over the past one hundred years. It charts the birth and development of Taiwanese nationalism through five key historical periods: the Japanese colonisation of the island of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945; the reunion of Taiwan and mainland China between 1945 and 1949; the prolonged confrontation between the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and the increasing international isolation of the Taiwanese from 1949 to 1970s; democratisation and the emergence of a democratic state in the late 1980s and early 1990s; and the trend towards a civic nationalism since the mid-1990s. In moving through these historical periods this paper endeavours to trace the cultural and political origins, as well as the changing faces of, nationalist discourses in Taiwan in order to further scholarly understanding of both the cultural politics of Taiwan and the development of the nation-state in general.

台灣民族主義的興起及其轉變中的面貌

王家英

（中文摘要）

本文旨在從兩岸持續複雜的政治互動脈絡中分析過去一百年來台灣人認同的歷史結構演變。台灣民族主義的誕生和發展可分爲五個重要歷史階段：1895 年至 1945 年間日本對台灣的殖民統治、1945 年至 1949 年間台灣的短暫回歸中國大陸、1949 年至七十年代大陸的中華人民共和國和台灣的中華民國政權的長期對峙和台灣人民日趨嚴重的國際孤立、八十年代末至九十年代初台灣的民主化和民主國家體制的出現，以及九十年代中期以後出現的公民民族主義趨向。透過這五個歷史階段的分析，本文探討了台灣民族主義論述的文化和政治根源及其轉變中的面貌。這樣的分析應有助我們深入瞭解台灣的文化政治和一般性的民族國家的發展。