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HONG KONG TRIED DEMOCRACY : THE 1991 ELECTIONS IN HONG KONG

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HONG KONG TRIED DEMOCRACY

THE 1991 ELECTIONS IN HONG KONG

Edited by
Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun

Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Hong Kong Tried Democracy

The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong

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Lau Siu-kai Louie Kin-sheun

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Preface

The three elections (the District Board elections, the two municipal councils' elections and the Legislative Council elections) held in Hong Kong in 1991 ushered in a new era of political change in the territory. They took place in the final years of British colonial rule. Nevertheless, unlike pre-independence elections in a majority of former British colonies, these elections did not signify the last stage of power transfer from the departing colonial regime to its subjects, nor did they produce the successors to the colonial rulers. Accordingly, the results of these elections can hardly be used to foretell what would transpire after 1997. It is arguable that many of the happenings associated with the 1991 elections are nothing but transient phenomena produced by a fortuitous convergence of circumstances which might not repeat themselves in the future.

Still, the political context in which the 1991 elections took place makes them meaningful and interesting and thus deserving of close analysis. As such the enormous political significance of the elections can easily be belied by the limited constitutional status and power of the political bodies involved. For one thing, it was the first time that direct elections were introduced into the Legislative Council of Hong Kong. Even though the legislature is not a powerful institution in a colonial political system, the declining authority of the colonial regime would however impel it to be more responsive and accommodative to the demands from the legislators, whom it could no longer fully control as in the days when all legislators were appointed by the colonial governor. Secondly, the direct elections for the Legislative Council signify the entry into the political establishment of political elements formerly excluded from it. Thus, the political configurations within the legislature and its relationship with the colonial government would inevitably undergo significant changes. The effects of these changes on the way the political system of Hong Kong functions are bound to be far-reaching.

Thirdly, the elections were held in the aftermath of the June 4 event in China. This momentous event had aroused the political interests and passions of the Hong Kong people, elevated public antipathy toward the Chinese government and raised democratic aspirations in society. It had also politicized and divided the Hong Kong people, thus fundamentally changing the political landscape of the territory. Not surprisingly, the China factor entered into the elections and powerfully shaped the electoral results. Fourthly, the elections and the political organizations and mobilizations they triggered off forged political alignments and realignments in society. To a certain extent the political interests and political participation of the masses also increased as a result of the electoral appeals launched by the candidates and the mass media. Lastly, because the elections had nothing to do with change of government nor with changes in the key rulers in Hong Kong, the established interests in the territory basically shied away from the elections, leaving an open field to political players with varying shades of anti-establishmentarian tendencies. Therefore, the issues raised in the elections and their results provide a unique opportunity to learn of the concerns and demands of the common people of Hong Kong who have all along been excluded from meaningful political participation in their society.

In view of the political importance of the 1991 elections in general, and the direct elections of the Legislative Council in particular, the Political Development of Hong Kong Research Programme (directed by Professor Lau Siu-kai) of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at The Chinese University of Hong Kong assembled a team of researchers in the summer of 1990 and coordinated their studies of the 1991 elections. They came from several tertiary institutions in Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Louie Kin-sheun, Joseph Man Chan, Tsang Wing-kwong, Lui Tai-lok and Chan Hoi-man), University of Hong Kong (Chui Wing-tak), Hong Kong Polytechnic (Lee Ming-kwan and Leung Sai-wing), City Polytechnic of Hong Kong (Agnes K. C. Yeung and K. K. Leung), Hong Kong Baptist College (Ngo Hang-yue) and Lingnan College (Li Pang-kwong). These investigators studied the 1991 elections from different perspectives and concentrated upon different phenomena. To report on the results of the studies, a Workshop on the 1991 Elections was organized by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies on

October 13, 1992. In addition to the investigators in the research team, other scholars were also invited to participate and present their research findings. This book is the collection of the papers presented at the workshop.

We would like to express our gratitude to the following institutions for funding the studies undertaken by the researchers: the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of The Chinese University of Hong Kong, City Polytechnic of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Polytechnic. A special note of thanks is due to Ms Wan Po-san and Mr Shum Kwok-cheung of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies for their assistance to the research and the workshop.

Lau Siu-kai
Louie Kin-sheun
April 1993

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Who Voted in the 1991 Elections?

A Socio-Demographic Profile of the Hong Kong Electorate

Louie Kin-sheun

in collaboration with

Joseph M. Chan, Leung Sai-wing, Ngo Hang-yue and Tsang Wing-kwong

On the 15th of September 1991, direct elections to the Legislative Council (Legco) based on universal suffrage were held for the first time in Hong Kong. Eighteen Legislative Councillors were returned through nine geographical constituencies to the law-making body. The election was in fact the last one in a row of three held in the same year, the first two being the election to the District Boards (DB) in March and the election to the two Municipal Councils (the Urban Council and the Regional Council, or UC/RC) in May. The holding of three elections consecutively offered a rare and valuable opportunity for a comprehensive study of the voting behaviour of the Hong Kong electorate. Such a study also has the merit of being the first to generate information on this subject which can be compared with that of future investigations in a

longitudinal perspective.

According to the official record, the voter turnout in the 1991 Legco election was 39.15%. This participation rate was higher than that of the DB election (32.47%) and of the UC/RC election (23.1%) but was much lower than what had been anticipated beforehand and thus was generally regarded as rather disappointing. However, the turnout was in fact the most impressive since the introduction of popular election in Hong Kong. The fact that more than 750,000 electors turned up at the polls was also something that the territory had never experienced. Notwithstanding one's assessment of the performance of the voters, urgent questions which need to be looked into are: Who, among the enormous body of registered electors, cast their vote? What were the socio-demographic characteristics of these voters? What were the factors that made them turn up at the polls? It is by investigating these problems that reasons causing the absence of so many other electors from the polling-booths can be revealed and efforts to increase the participation rate in future elections can be contemplated. This paper aims exactly to shed light on the background of the electors who voted in the 1991 elections.

In western countries, studies of voter turnout have been prolific since the Second World War.[1] A number of basic facts and relevant mechanisms have already been objectively ascertained, for example, the role of education as a facilitator of voter participation. In Hong Kong, due to the short history of popular elections, such investigations are still at the initial stage. However, studies conducted in Hong Kong have the advantage of being able to refer to the relevant findings in western countries as comparisons. Since Hong Kong is a highly urbanized and industrialized city, it shares a large number of similarities with western societies. However, as a British colony and a Chinese society without a democratic tradition, the behaviour of the Hong Kong electors would certainly consist of aspects different from the western electorates. In this paper, efforts will be made to highlight such similarities and dissimilarities.

The data on which this paper relies were collected through a territory-wide household survey. A systematic random sample of 2,397 registered electors from the 1991 Final Register of Electors was selected.[2] Face-to-face interviews were carried out by two separate research teams from the Chinese University and the Hong Kong Polytechnic during October 1991 and January 1992. A set of identical questions was inserted into their respective questionnaires and the data thus generated provided

the basic information for this paper. The number of successful interviews was 1,654, thus yielding a response rate of 69%.[3]

Before we go into further details, several key terms need to be defined. In the following text, "eligible elector" means a Hong Kong resident who is legally eligible to register himself or herself as an elector. "Registered elector" or "elector" means someone who has already registered and is therefore included in the electoral roll. "Voter" means a registered elector who casts the vote in a concerned election.

Comparing the Electorate with the Hong Kong Population

In Hong Kong, voter registration is not automatic. A resident has to take the initiative to be registered before he can be allowed to vote in an election. A number of studies point out that the decision to register correlates, to a certain extent, to the decision to vote (Kelly *et al.*, 1967; Piven and Cloward, 1989). Therefore, in the study of the Hong Kong electorate's voting behaviour, a problem which should be *a priori* looked into is who, among the eligible electors, registered. In other words, how representative is the electorate in comparison to the overall population? Are some kinds of residents over-registered and thus over-represented among the electors and other sectors under-registered? The exploration of this question is closely linked to that of who voted in the 1991 elections. As an illustration, we may take the case of the types of living quarters as an example. If the registration rate of the residents living in public housing blocks is higher than that of the residents living in private housing blocks, then they can be regarded as over-represented among the electors. If the registered electors living in public housing blocks furthermore have a higher turnout rate in the elections, then they certainly enjoy a state of over-representation among the overall voters and efforts can be made to ascertain the actual ratio of their over-representation. On the contrary, if they have a lower turnout rate in the elections, then their over-representation among the electors will be cancelled out.

Besides the addresses of the registered electors and the constituencies to which they belong, Hong Kong government's Register of Electors contains only information relating to the sex and age of the electors. Data concerning other social characteristics of the electors cannot be found in

the Register and this seriously limits the study of the overall profile of the electorate. In our survey, in addition to the information about the sex and age of the respondents, questions relating to their educational attainment, employment status, income, occupation, marital status, type of living quarters and length of residence in their present living quarters are included in order to study the electors and the voters in a comprehensive manner. Based on these data, a comparison of the electorate and the Hong Kong population can first be attempted. In the following paragraphs, data concerning the various aspects of the Hong Kong population are from the 1991 census, unless otherwise stated (Census and Statistics Department, 1991).

Sex

As Table 1 shows, the registration rate is slightly higher among the males, according to the official record. On the contrary, the data of our survey show that females have a slightly higher registration rate. Such variation seems to be caused by the fact that in household interviews, female respondents are usually more easily contacted. Nevertheless, the two sets of registration figures show that although a state of over-registration might exist, its amplitude is so minimal that the factor of sex can be considered as having very little relationship with registration rate.

Table 1 Registered Electors and Hong Kong Population Aged 21 and above by Sex (%)

	Registered electors		Hong Kong population
	1991 survey	1991 Final Register of Electors	1991 census
Male	49.8	52.9	50.5
Female	50.2	47.1	49.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(1,654)	(1,916,925)	(3,880,542)

Age

The distribution of age among the registered electors, as Table 2 shows, demonstrates a well known fact: A large proportion of the young eligible electors fails to register themselves. The eligible electors of the age group 21 to 30 are in fact the most under-represented among the registered electors. Such a situation is not unique to Hong Kong since in western countries the registration rate of young electors is always lower. Accordingly, the other age groups benefit a situation of over-registration and this is particularly obvious among the age groups 31 to 40 and 41 to 50. The distribution of age in our survey sample matches very closely with that of the official Final Register of Electors. Therefore, what remains to be seen is whether the under-registration of the young electors will be further accompanied by a low turnout in the elections. If that is the case, then the young electors would suffer from serious under-representation.

Table 2 Registered Electors and Hong Kong Population Aged 21 and above by Age (%)

	Registered electors		Hong Kong population
	1991 survey	1991 Final Register of Electors*	1991 census
21-30	16.1	16.9	27.2
31-40	31.6	31.8	27.2
41-50	21.0	19.1	15.4
51-60	15.2	14.7	13.2
61 & above	16.1	17.5	17.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.1
(N)	(1,650)	(1,899,733)	(3,880,542)

* Information supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office (Ref: 91SAPV).

Educational Attainment

The official Register of Electors does not contain information on the educational attainment of the electors. Therefore, comparison can only be made between the data of our survey and those of the census. This will also be the case for the items to be studied in the following paragraphs.

Table 3 Registered Electors and Hong Kong Population Aged 15 and above by Educational Attainment (%)

	Registered electors	Hong Kong population
Primary and below	45.3	38.0
Secondary (including matriculation)	43.4	50.7
Tertiary	11.3	11.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(1,642)	(4,370,365)

In comparing the educational attainment of the registered electors to that of the Hong Kong population, a discrepancy needs to be noted. As Table 3 shows, the 1991 census data contain information on educational attainment of the population *aged 15 and above* whereas the registered electors are aged 21 and above. Fifteen to twenty is the age of secondary education and most of the Hong Kong residents of this age group attend school. Therefore, the figure of the residents with attainment of secondary education is thus inflated in the census data. According to the latter, the total number of residents between 15 and 20 is 489,823, representing 11.2% of the population aged 15 and above. Suppose that they all have attainment of secondary education and therefore are deducted from the relevant cohort, then the distribution of educational attainment in the Hong Kong population *aged 21 and above* would be as follows:

Primary and below	42.8%
Secondary	44.5%
Tertiary	12.7%
Total	100.0%
(N)	(3,880,542)

Of course, it is certain that not all residents between 15 and 20 have secondary educational attainment. Therefore, the actual percentage of the residents having primary educational attainment or below should be higher than 42.8% and that of the secondary educational attainment should be lower than 44.5%, although the difference for one and the other should be rather small. After such a recalculation, it seems that education is not an important factor affecting the registration or non-registration of the eligible electors. There is even a slight over-registration among the electors with the lowest educational attainment and a slight under-registration among the electors with tertiary educational attainment.

Such a situation indeed seems to be rather peculiar. According to the studies in western countries, educational attainment is always a factor having important effect on the registration of the electors as well as on their turnout in the elections. Citizens with higher educational attainment tend to register and to vote in greater proportion. However, this is apparently not the case in Hong Kong with respect to registration. The explanation for this seems to be the high registration rate of the electors living in public housing blocks, as will be presented in Table 9. In Hong Kong, almost half of the population lives in public or aided housing or in home ownership estates of the Housing Authority. The government has detailed and up-to-date information on these residents and therefore the voter registration and re-registration of these residents are easier.[4] The physical conditions of the public housing estates are also conducive to more efficient voter registration drives by household visits, undertaken either by government officials or concerned social and political groups. The result of all these factors is a higher registration rate among the public housing residents. In general, the educational attainment of public housing residents is lower than the territory-wide average. For example, according to the 1986 by-census data, the rates of public housing residents having primary and below, secondary and tertiary educational attainments were respectively 56.4%, 41.1% and 2.5% whereas the territory-wide averages were 52.5%, 41.9% and 4.6% (Census and Statistics Department, 1988:156). Thus, a relatively higher registration rate of the relatively less educated public housing residents cancels out the effect that educational attainment would normally have on voter registration.

Employment Status

With respect to employment status, respondents are classified into two groups: those who are working and those who are not. The latter includes students and unpaid housewives. As Table 4 shows, the difference between the registered electors and the overall population with regard to employment status is minimal. The slightly higher registration rate of the electors with non-working status could be caused by two factors: over-registration of non-working persons due to registration drives by household visits undertaken by government officials, and sample bias of the survey since non-working persons are usually easier to contact and interview in household visits. Therefore, employment status can be regarded as having no impact on voter registration.

Table 4 Registered Electors and Hong Kong Population Aged 15 and above by Employment Status (%)

	Registered electors	Hong Kong population
Working	63.9	64.3
Not working	36.1	35.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(1,653)	(4,370,365)

Occupation

A major difficulty in studying the relationship between voter registration and occupations of the eligible electors is the lack of a clear classification scheme of occupations. Unlike other social characteristics such as marital status or type of housing, one's occupation frequently cannot be classified without ambiguity. Accordingly, respondents in a survey might give inaccurate information and errors in coding are rather common. In our study, the classification scheme used by the Census and Statistics Department has been adopted. A comparison of the occupation distribution of the working registered electors and that of the Hong Kong working population, as shown in Table 5, reveals that only the category of managers and administrators seems to be over-registered whereas the

other occupation categories do not have substantial over-registration or under-registration. To what degree is the over-registration of the managers and administrators caused by the mis-reporting of the respondents cannot be ascertained. Nevertheless, judging from the overall situation, one may conclude that occupation does not have substantial effect on voter registration.

Table 5 Working Registered Electors and Working Hong Kong Population by Occupation (%)

	Working registered electors	Working Hong Kong population
Managers & Administrators	15.0	9.2
Professionals & Associate professionals	11.2	14.0
Clerks	13.9	15.9
Service workers & Shop sales workers	15.5	13.2
Skilled workers, Craft & related workers, Plant & machine operatives & assemblers	27.7	28.8
Elementary occupations	16.3	18.6
Armed forces & Occupations not classifiable	0.3	0.3
Total	99.9	100.0
(N)	(1,038)	(2,715,103)

Monthly Income

As Table 6 shows, the relationship between individual monthly income and voter registration seems to be rather clear. Residents with a lower income tend to register in smaller proportions while residents with a higher income tend to register in greater proportions. Furthermore, it seems that the monthly income of $6,000 is the threshold. Electors with a monthly income of more than $6,000 tend to over-register and those with a monthly income of less than $6,000 tend to under-register. Such a

situation in fact follows the trend in western countries although the threshold between under-registration and over-registration varies from place to place.

Table 6 Working Registered Electors and Working Hong Kong Population by Individual Monthly Income (%)

HK$	Working registered electors (A)	Working Hong Kong population (B)	(A) - (B)
Below 1,000	1.7	3.4	-1.7
1,000-1,999	3.2	3.4	-0.2
2,000-3,999	11.0	20.8	-9.8
4,000-5,999	21.8	29.6	-7.8
6,000-7,999	22.3	17.2	5.1
8,000-9,999	13.0	8.3	4.7
10,000-19,999	20.7	12.2	8.5
20,000 & above	6.2	5.1	1.1
Total	99.9	100.0	
(N)	(1,017)	(2,681,583)	

Marital Status

Table 7 compares the marital status distribution of the registered electors with that of the overall population *aged 20 and above*. However, residents aged 20 are not eligible to register as voters and their total number is 80,181. The marital status of this group of residents cannot be determined but it is believed that most of them are unmarried. If we presume that all these 80,181 are single and are thus deducted from the relevant cohort in the Hong Kong population, then the distribution will become what is presented in Table 8.

As we can observe in Table 8, even after deducting the persons aged 20 from the cohort of single residents, the single registered electors are still in a position of under-registration whereas the married registered electors are substantially over-registered. The reason for this is the

under-registration of the young eligible electors aged 21 to 30, which has been analysed above. Large proportion of these young eligible electors are unmarried and therefore a state of under-registration reappears among the electors of single status.

Table 7 Registered Electors and Hong Kong Population Aged 20 and above by Marital Status (%)

	Registered electors	Hong Kong population
Single	16.2	26.0
Married	80.0	66.1
Others	3.8	7.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(1,652)	(3,960,723)

Table 8 Registered Electors and Hong Kong Population Aged 21 and above by Marital Status (Estimated) (%)

	Registered electors	Hong Kong population
Single	16.2	24.4
Married	80.0	67.5
Others	3.8	8.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(1,652)	(3,880,542)

Type of Housing

In analysing the relationship between educational attainment and voter registration, we have already pointed out the possible impact that type of housing could have on the latter. In our survey, the living quarters of the respondents are classified into three major types: public and aided housing, Housing Authority home ownership estates, and private housing. The distribution is presented in Table 9.

Table 9 Registered Electors and Hong Kong Population by Type of Housing (%)

	Registered electors	Hong Kong population
Public and aided housing	55.5	44.1
Home ownership estates	11.5	7.5
Private housing	30.6	47.4
Others	2.4	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(1,654)	(5,511,179)

One can easily observe from Table 9 that residents of public and aided housing and home ownership estates have a higher registration rate than those of private housing. This trend in fact has already been ascertained by previous studies.[5] This is due to the fact that registration work can be carried out more effectively among these two types of residents, thus causing a higher registration rate among this sector of the community. Another minor reason is that in household interviews, it is usually easier to contact respondents of public housing estates and this affects the sample of our survey and artificially boosts the registration rate of the public housing residents. Nevertheless, even without the survey sample bias, the higher registration rate of the residents of public housing estates proves to be an indisputable fact. This factor cancels out the impact that educational attainment could have on voter registration, as what has been analysed in the above.

In our survey, the factor of respondents' length of residence in their present address is also studied. However, since the census data do not have equivalent and comparable information in this regard, we cannot examine its relationship with voter registration. This factor will be studied when we investigate the question of voter turnout in the next section.

To sum up the examination of the socio-demographic characteristics of the registered electors, we can first of all observe that four groups demonstrate a low registration rate and thus can be considered under-represented:

- young electors aged 21 to 30;
- low income electors, the monthly income of $6,000 being the threshold;
- electors who are single;
- electors living in private housing blocks.

The situation of voter registration in Hong Kong can be considered as basically comparable to that of western countries. The low registration rate of the young and single electors exists in both societies and this is caused by the fact that young and single persons are an unsettled social group for which electoral matters have a relatively lower priority (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980:55-60). The under-registration of the low income electors is also a common phenomenon. Income is one of the measures of social and economic status (SES), the other two being educational attainment and occupation. It has well been proven that citizens of higher SES participate more in politics as well as in electoral matters. However, voter registration in Hong Kong also has its specific characteristics. The most obvious one is the high registration rate of the residents in public housing estates. These residents on the whole have a below average SES. Their over-registration thus artificially enhances the proportion of electors with a lower SES in the overall electorate. Therefore, the other two measures of SES, i.e. educational attainment and occupation, do not demonstrate any appreciable impact on voter registration and this is quite dissimilar from the situation in western countries. With regard to the factor of income, although the general trend that high income residents have a higher registration rate and that low income residents have a lower registration rate still exists in Hong Kong, we surmise that the threshold could be higher than the present one of $6,000 per month if it is not affected by the over-registration of the public housing residents.

As the major traits of the registered electors have been ascertained, we can now proceed to examine the question of voter turnout. The objective is to investigate whether the socio-demographic characteristics of the registered electors *who voted* in the 1991 elections demonstrate any specific pattern. The holding of three elections consecutively in 1991 provides an excellent occasion for such an enquiry.

The Voters in the 1991 Elections

In any election held in Hong Kong, the voter turnout rate has never exceeded 50%. In other words, in any single election, there is always more non-voting than voting electors. If normal behaviour is defined by what is performed by the majority, then the voters in Hong Kong can be regarded as an abnormal group. It is therefore of particular interest to study who these voters are and what their socio-demographic profile is.

In the DB, UC/RC and Legco elections held in 1991, the number of registered electors who turned up at the polls was respectively 423,923, 393,764 and 750,467. A detailed breakdown of these voters by the major socio-demographic characteristics, calculated on the basis of the data of our survey, is given in Table 10.

The figures in Table 10 show that certain variations exist among the different elections in respect of the situation of voter turnout. A detailed examination is thus needed in order to probe the propensity of voting of the various voter groups classified according to the major socio-demographic characteristics.

Sex

As Table 11 shows, male electors seem to have a higher turnout rate in the elections, although the relationship between sex and turnout is statistically not significant.[6] Moreover, if we take the turnout rate as an indicator of the importance of the election concerned in the perception of the electors, then it seems that the more an election is perceived as important, the greater the turnout of male electors compared to female electors. This is shown by the difference between the turnout rate of the male electors and that of the female electors in three different elections, with the Legco election perceived as the most important and the UC/RC election the least. However, the higher turnout rate of the male electors should not be exaggerated because the difference does not prove to be substantial.

Table 10 Socio-demographic Profile of the Voters in the 1991 Elections (%)

	DB	UC/RC	Legco
Sex			
Male	52.1	52.4	51.9
Female	47.9	47.6	48.1
(N)	(547)	(382)	(911)
Age			
21-30	14.8	13.1	16.5
31-40	31.1	31.9	32.5
41-50	23.9	25.1	21.7
51-60	15.7	13.9	14.3
61 & above	14.4	16.0	15.0
(N)	(547)	(382)	(911)
Educational attainment			
Primary & below	43.2	42.8	40.4
Secondary	43.3	41.7	44.1
Tertiary	13.5	15.5	15.5
(N)	(541)	(381)	(905)
Employment status			
Working	65.3	62.8	65.7
Not working	34.7	37.2	34.3
(N)	(547)	(382)	(910)
Occupation			
Managers/Administrators	16.9	17.5	18.1
Professionals/Associate professionals	11.7	13.2	14.3
Clerks	12.6	11.1	14.0
Service/Shop sales workers	14.9	14.5	12.9
Skilled workers	29.2	27.8	27.8
Elementary occupations	14.6	15.8	12.9
(N)	(349)	(234)	(587)

Table 10 (Continued)

	DB	UC/RC	Legco
Individual monthly income (HK$)			
Below 2,000	6.3	6.8	5.4
2,000 – 3,999	10.3	10.3	9.0
4,000 – 5,999	19.8	18.4	18.5
6,000 – 7,999	24.4	26.5	19.4
8,000 – 9,999	11.5	10.3	14.0
10,000 – 11,999	9.5	6.8	10.0
12,000 – 13,999	4.3	3.4	5.5
14,000 – 16,999	4.0	5.1	5.5
17,000 – 19,999	4.6	5.6	4.5
20,000 & above	5.4	6.8	8.1
(N)	(349)	(234)	(578)
Marital status			
Single	15.7	14.4	17.8
Married	81.4	82.7	79.5
Others	2.9	2.9	2.7
(N)	(547)	(382)	(911)
Housing type			
Public and aided	59.9	58.2	55.2
Home ownership estate	12.1	12.5	11.8
Private	28.0	29.3	33.0
(N)	(538)	(376)	(892)
Length of residence at present address			
Below 2 years	10.2	7.6	12.1
2 – less than 5 years	20.7	17.8	19.5
5 – less than 10 years	32.0	36.9	28.9
10 years & above	37.1	23.1	39.5
(N)	(547)	(382)	(909)

Table 11 Voter Turnout Rates by Sex (%)

	Male (N)	Female (N)	Male - Female
Legco election[1]	57.6 (821)	52.8 (829)	4.8
DB election[2]	40.3 (707)	37.5 (698)	2.8
UC/RC election[3]	26.2 (763)	23.7 (769)	2.5

[1] Chi-square = 3.6172, df = 1, p = 0.0572.
[2] Chi-square = 1.0241, df = 1, p = 0.3115.
[3] Chi-square = 1.1930, df = 1, p = 0.2747.

Age

In the previous section, it has been pointed out that eligible electors aged 21 to 30 have a particularly low rate of registration. It is thus of interest to note first of all that a similar situation does not seem to have been reproduced in voter turnout, as Table 12 shows.[7] Electors aged 21 to 30 have a rather high turnout rate in the Legco election, although their participation in the DB election and the UC/RC election is still the lowest among all age groups. By comparison, electors aged 41 to 50 have the highest turnout rate in all three elections and those aged 61 or above tend to have a participation rate on the low end. Statistically the relationship between age and voter turnout is insignificant but the active role of residents aged 41 to 50 as well as the passive role of elderly residents in public affairs, as what have already been highlighted by past studies, seem to be reconfirmed.[8]

However, an explanation of the high turnout rate of the electors aged 21 to 30 in the Legco election should be attempted because, on the one hand, it contradicts the low registration rate of the same group and, on the other hand, it is contrary to the general trend in western countries. In the search for a valid explanation, we surmise that the major intervening factor is educational attainment. Due to the development of education in Hong Kong in the last several decades, the younger generation has attained a higher level of education which is confirmed by the data

shown in Table 13. The factor of educational attainment in return boosts the turnout rate of the age group 21 to 30. As we can see in Table 14, the relationship between voter turnout and educational attainment of the electors aged 21 to 30 is statistically very significant in the 1991 Legco election. The same situation in fact also exists in the DB election and in the UC/RC election. Therefore, we can conclude that the high turnout rate of the electors aged 21 to 30 which is apparently abnormal is basically due to the relatively higher educational attainment of this group.

However, another discrepancy in this regard should also be explained. If the turnout rate of the young electors in the Legco election is boosted by their educational attainment, why then did the same situation not materialize in the DB election and in the UC/RC election? Why did the electors of the age group 21 to 30 have the lowest participation rate in these two elections? It seems that another intervening factor should be taken into consideration. In analyzing the relationship between sex and turnout, we have already mentioned that the perceived importance of an election concerned could have an impact on the decision of the electors with regard to turnout. If an election is generally perceived as more important, then the male electors vote in greater number than the female electors. This mechanism also seems to exist among the electors with higher educational attainment. Residents with better education usually have better access to information concerning public affairs, including elections. Thus, it is not surprising that electors with higher educational attainment are more sensitive to the elections which are perceived as of greater importance and their turnout in such elections is thus higher. In the political context of Hong Kong, Legco elections, in particular the 1991 Legco election, are in general perceived as much more important than any other elections whereas the UC/RC election is generally regarded as the least important. Therefore, the higher turnout rate of the electors aged 21 to 30 is the likely consequence of the combination of these two factors, i.e. educational attainment of the electors concerned and the perceived importance of the Legco election. In the DB election and the UC/RC election, the effect of the second factor does not exist or is much diminished. Electors with higher educational attainment are thus not as motivated as in the Legco election. The turnout rate of young electors then drops to a low level, thus creating a situation similar to that in western countries.

Table 12 Voter Turnout Rates by Age (%)

	21-30 (N)	31-40 (N)	41-50 (N)	51-60 (N)	61 & above (N)
Legco election[1]	56.6 (265)	56.7 (522)	57.2 (346)	51.8 (251)	51.5 (266)
DB election[2]	35.2 (230)	37.9 (448)	44.9 (292)	39.8 (216)	36.1 (219)
UC/RC election[3]	21.3 (235)	24.8 (492)	30.1 (319)	22.4 (237)	25.5 (249)

[1] Chi-square = 3.911, df = 4, p = 0.4182.
[2] Chi-square = 6.6619, df = 4, p = 0.1549.
[3] Chi-square = 7.0846, df = 4, p = 0.1315.

Table 13 Registered Electors by Educational Attainment and Age (%)

	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 & above
Primary & below	11.0	35.8	45.8	67.1	77.5
Secondary	58.0	53.4	50.4	24.5	17.4
Tertiary	31.0	10.7	3.8	8.4	5.1
Total	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(264)	(522)	(345)	(249)	(258)

Table 14 Voter Turnout Rates by Educational Attainment and Age in 1991 Legco Election (%)

	21-30[1] (N)	31-40[2] (N)	41-50[3] (N)	51-60[4] (N)	61 & above[5] (N)
Primary & below	27.6 (29)	50.3 (187)	53.8 (158)	48.5 (167)	49.0 (200)
Secondary	51.0 (153)	57.3 (279)	58.0 (174)	55.7 (61)	57.8 (45)
Tertiary	78.0 (82)	75.0 (56)	84.6 (13)	66.7 (21)	69.2 (13)

[1] Chi-square = 27.2896, df = 2, p = 0.0000.
[2] Chi-square = 10.8383, df = 2, p = 0.0044.
[3] Chi-square = 4.7850, df = 2, p = 0.0914.
[4] Chi-square = 2.9648, df = 2, p = 0.2271.
[5] Chi-square = 2.8466, df = 2, p = 0.2409.

Educational Attainment

In the previous section, it has been pointed out that educational attainment does not seem to have an impact on voter registration and we believe that this is because the effect educational attainment could have is cancelled out by the above average registration rate of the public housing residents. However, in voter turnout, the universal trend that electors with higher educational attainment also have a higher turnout rate is well confirmed, as Table 15 shows. The relationship between educational attainment and voter turnout is statistically significant in the Legco election and in the UC/RC election. In the DB election, although the figures seem to indicate the same association, the relationship between these two factors is statistically not significant. This could be caused by the specific nature of the DB election which is a very localized contest and therefore the local social network of the candidates and their campaign teams could exert more influence on the electors. The mobilizing effect of educational attainment is thus cancelled out or much diminished. Nevertheless, the data in Table 15 as well as the relevant data analysed under other headings all prove in an undisputable way the substantial impact of educational attainment on voter turnout.

Table 15 Voter Turnout Rates by Educational Attainment (%)

	Primary & below (N)	Secondary (N)	Tertiary (N)
Legco election[1]	49.4 (741)	56.0 (712)	75.7 (185)
DB election[2]	37.4 (626)	38.5 (608)	45.9 (159)
UC/RC election[3]	23.7 (687)	24.2 (658)	33.7 (175)

[1] Chi-square = 41.6792, df = 2, p = 0.0000.
[2] Chi-square = 3.9412, df = 2, p = 0.1394.
[3] Chi-square = 7.9098, df = 2, p = 0.0192.

Employment Status

It has been pointed out in the previous section that employment status does not seem to have an impact on voter registration. The same relationship can be found with regard to voter turnout, as Table 16 shows. Perhaps one interesting point to be enquired into is why the turnout rate of the non-working electors matches that of the working electors, since economically inactive persons usually play a relatively passive role in social and political activities. The reason for this may be twofold. On the one hand, elections with a very localized nature such as DB elections are still capable of reaching and mobilizing the non-working electors and thus could boost their participation rate. On the other hand, in our survey, non-working electors include not only economically inactive electors such as housewives and retired persons but also socially active electors such as tertiary students. Therefore, their electoral participation is maintained at a level comparable to that of the working electors, although non-working citizens are generally more passive in social and political affairs.

Table 16 Voter Turnout Rates by Employment Status (%)

	Working (N)	Not Working (N)
Legco election[1]	56.8 (1,053)	52.3 (596)
DB election[2]	39.8 (898)	37.5 (507)
UC/RC election[3]	24.8 (968)	25.2 (563)

[1] Chi-square = 2.8583, df = 1, p = 0.0909.
[2] Chi-square = 0.6156, df = 1, p = 0.4327.
[3] Chi-square = 0.0157, df = 1, p = 0.9000.

Occupation

In the previous section, it has been found that occupation does not seem to have appreciable effect on voter registration, except the manager and administrator group. However, in voter turnout, the effect of occupation appears to be quite evident. Electors whose occupation is of a higher status, such as managers and administrators, professionals and associate professionals and skilled workers, have a higher turnout rate whereas electors whose occupation is of a lower status, such as service and shop sales workers and unskilled workers, have a lower turnout rate. Such a situation is in fact compatible to the trend in western countries. However, as Table 17 indicates, the relationship between occupation and turnout is very significant *only* in the Legco election whereas in the DB election and in the UC/RC election, the relationship between the two is statistically not significant. We surmise that such a difference is caused by the perceived importance of the different elections, a factor which has been expounded in the above. As the Legco election is generally perceived as more significant, the electors, in particular the electors with higher SES, become more motivated. On the contrary, the DB election and the UC/RC election are perceived as less important and therefore an effect of general demobilization occurs. Under the circumstances of the latter, the local social network of the candidates and their supporting organizations play a greater role in mobilizing the electors. Therefore, the normal effect

that SES can exert on voter turnout is thus cancelled out or much diminished.

Table 17 Voter Turnout Rates by Occupation (%)

	1 (N)	2 (N)	3 (N)	4 (N)	5 (N)	6 (N)
Legco election[1]	67.9 (156)	72.4 (116)	56.6 (145)	47.2 (161)	56.4 (289)	45.2 (168)
DB election[2]	41.5 (142)	43.2 (95)	36.7 (120)	38.2 (136)	40.2 (254)	37.5 (136)
UC/RC election[3]	28.7 (143)	27.9 (111)	19.8 (131)	23.3 (146)	24.3 (267)	24.3 (152)

Notes: 1 = Managers/Administrators; 2 = Professionals/Asso. professionals; 3 = Clerks; 4 = Service/Shop sales workers; 5 = Skilled workers; 6 = Elementary occupations.
[1] Chi-square = 34.6239, df = 5, p = 0.0000.
[2] Chi-square = 1.5486, df = 5, p = 0.9074.
[3] Chi-square = 3.6826, df = 5, p = 0.5959.

Monthly Income

Income is another measure of SES. Its effect on voter turnout, as Table 18 shows, is almost identical to that of occupation. Electors with higher income have a higher turnout rate and electors with lower income have a lower turnout rate. The relationship between the two is very significant in the Legco election whereas in the DB election and in the UC/RC election, the relationship is statistically insignificant.

In the studies of voting behaviour in western countries, it has been shown that the increase of income can affect one's probability of voting *only up to a certain level.* In other words, there is a "saturation point" in the relationship between income and turnout. Beyond this saturation point, the turnout rate will be more or less fixed and would not rise with income (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980:24-26). In the case of Hong Kong, the figures in Table 18 seem to indicate that in the Legco election, the saturation point is approximately the monthly income of HK$10,000. Below this level, the turnout rate increases regularly, with the category of

HK$2,000 and below as the only exception.[9] Above this level, the turnout rate fluctuates rather than further increases. However, in the DB election and the UC/RC election, no such pattern can be found with certainty. The turnout rate fluctuates in quite an irregular manner all along the various income categories. Therefore, the saturation point in these two elections cannot be ascertained. We surmise that such a situation of disparity is also caused by the perceived importance of these elections by the electors. The electors of certain low income categories are disproportionately mobilized by non-SES factors, in particular the local network of the candidates and their campaign machines, thus disturbing the normal effect of income on turnout.

Table 18 Voter Turnout Rates by Individual Monthly Income (%)

	1 (N)	2 (N)	3 (N)	4 (N)	5 (N)	6 (N)	7 (N)	8 (N)	9 (N)	10 (N)
Legco election[1]	63.3 (49)	46.8 (111)	48.2 (222)	49.3 (227)	61.8 (131)	68.2 (85)	66.7 (48)	74.7 (43)	74.3 (35)	74.6 (63)
DB election[2]	52.4 (42)	41.4 (87)	37.3 (185)	40.9 (208)	36.7 (109)	45.8 (72)	38.5 (39)	40.0 (35)	57.1 (28)	31.1 (61)
UC/RC election[3]	34.0 (47)	24.5 (98)	21.2 (203)	29.2 (212)	21.2 (113)	19.5 (82)	17.8 (45)	29.3 (41)	41.9 (31)	26.2 (61)

Notes: 1 = Below HK$2,000; 2 = $2,000–$3,999; 3 = $4,000–$5,999; 4 = $6,000–$7,999; 5 = $8,000–$9,999; 6 = $10,000–$11,999; 7 = $12,000–$13,999; 8 = $14,000–$16,999; 9 = $17,000–$19,999; 10 = $20,000 & above.

[1] Chi-square = 42.9164, df = 9, p = 0.0000.
[2] Chi-square = 10.2966, df = 9, p = 0.3270.
[3] Chi-square = 14.2561, df = 9, p = 0.1135.

Marital Status

In analysing the relationship between marital status and voter registration, we have already pointed out that the under-registration of unmarried electors is closely related to that of young electors aged 21 to 30. Then, in analysing the relationship between age and voter turnout, we have further pointed out that the higher turnout rate of young electors aged 21 to 30, at least in the Legco election, is caused by their higher educational attainment. An identical situation reappears with regard to the relationship between marital status and turnout. As Table 19 shows, the turnout rate of the unmarried electors is the highest in the Legco election and is not particularly low in the DB election and the UC/RC election. The reason for this can be found in Table 20 and Table 21. The unmarried electors have a relatively higher educational attainment, thus boosting their participation. The fact that an equivalent level of turnout is not reproduced in the DB election and the UC/RC election would also be caused by the perception of the electors with regard to the importance of these two elections.

Table 19 Voter Turnout Rates by Marital Status (%)

	Single (N)	Married (N)	Others (N)
Legco election[1]	60.9 (266)	54.8 (1,320)	40.3 (62)
DB election[2]	39.3 (219)	39.4 (1,129)	29.1 (55)
UC/RC election[3]	22.3 (247)	25.7 (1,229)	20.4 (54)

[1] Chi-square = 9.1115, df = 2, p = 0.0105.
[2] Chi-square = 2.3588, df = 2, p = 0.3075.
[3] Chi-square = 1.9341, df = 2, p = 0.3802.

Table 20 Electors by Educational Attainment and Marital Status in 1991 Legco Election (%)

	Single	Married	Others
Primary & below	8.7	50.5	90.0
Secondary	56.5	42.5	8.3
Tertiary	34.8	7.0	1.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(246)	(1,312)	(60)

Table 21 Voter Turnout Rates by Educational Attainment and Marital Status (%)

		Primary & below (N)	Secondary (N)	Tertiary (N)
Legco election	Single[1]	47.8 (21)	53.7 (149)	76.1 (92)
	Married[2]	50.5 (662)	56.8 (558)	75.0 (92)
DB election	Single[3]	29.4 (17)	34.4 (128)	48.6 (72)
	Married[4]	38.2 (560)	40.0 (475)	44.2 (86)
UC/RC election	Single[5]	33.3 (21)	16.5 (139)	28.2 (85)
	Married[6]	23.8 (617)	26.2 (515)	38.2 (89)

[1] Chi-square = 13.8238, df = 2, p = 0.0010.
[2] Chi-square = 21.1188, df = 2, p = 0.0000.
[3] Chi-square = 4.6083, df = 2, p = 0.0998.
[4] Chi-square = 1.2256, df = 2, p = 0.5418.
[5] Chi-square = 5.8984, df = 2, p = 0.0524.
[6] Chi-square = 8.4330, df = 2, p = 0.0148.

Type of Housing

In the previous section, it has been pointed out that residents of public housing blocks have a higher registration rate and such a situation indirectly affects the relationship between other socio-demographic factors, including educational attainment, and voter registration. However, with regard to voter turnout, the picture is quite a mixed one, as Table 22 shows. In the Legco election, electors of home ownership estates have the highest turnout rate. In the DB election, electors in public and aided housing blocks have the highest turnout rate. In the UC/RC election, electors in private housing blocks have the highest turnout rate. On the whole, the relationship between type of housing and turnout is statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, if the distribution of educational attainment among the various categories of electors is taken into account, then we can observe that in the Legco election, which is perceived as of foremost importance, educational attainment becomes the most determining factor affecting the turnout of electors, as Table 23 and Table 24 indicate. However, in the elections which are perceived as of lesser importance, the mobilizing effect of educational attainment does not seem to be able to manifest itself, in particular among the electors with higher educational attainment. Under such circumstances, other factors come into play. The case of DB election is of particular interest in this regard. As Table 22 shows, the turnout rate of the public and aided housing electors is the highest in the DB election, in spite of the relatively low educational attainment of this group. We surmise that the reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, the DB election is not perceived as an important election. Therefore, the mobilizing effect of educational attainment cannot be in full play. On the other hand, DB election is based on constituencies of a rather small scale. This provides very favourable conditions for the local social network of the candidates and their supporting organizations to operate and to mobilize the electors. At the same time, the physical setting of the public and aided housing estates suits very well this kind of localized campaign activities. Therefore, the result is an exceptionally high turnout rate among the electors of public housing estates.

Table 22 Voter Turnout Rates by Type of Housing (%)

	Public & aided housing (N)	Home ownership estates (N)	Private housing (N)
Legco election[1]	53.7 (916)	58.5 (504)	55.5 (191)
DB election[2]	41.5 (775)	35.0 (432)	39.6 (164)
UC/RC election[3]	26.2 (836)	22.6 (487)	27.2 (173)

[1] Chi-square = 3.0702, df = 2, p = 0.2154.
[2] Chi-square = 5.0716, df = 2, p = 0.0792.
[3] Chi-square = 2.5601, df = 2, p = 0.2780.

Table 23 Electors by Educational Attainment and Type of Housing in 1991 Legco Election (%)

	Public & aided housing	Home ownership estates	Private housing
Primary & below	57.3	27.7	35.3
Secondary	37.0	50.5	54.2
Tertiary	5.7	21.8	10.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(910)	(499)	(190)

Length of Residence in Present Living Quarters

As Table 25 shows, the length of residence in the electors' present living quarters does not prove to have a significant relationship with their turnout rate in the elections. Such a situation is quite dissimilar to that in western countries, in particular in the United States. The background to this is that Hong Kong is primarily a small city. Moving from one place to another does not necessitate much re-adaptation. The social network can be maintained or re-established easily and quickly after one moves into a new living place. The flow of information within the territory makes whatever differences the various districts may have insignificant. Therefore, an elector's length of residence in his living quarters is not a factor that would seriously affect his participation in the elections. Moreover, for the large number of electors living in public housing blocks or home ownership estates, there is one more additional advantage: the government closely keeps track of their whereabouts. Thus, there is little risk of losing contact with electoral affairs when they move homes. Given all these factors relating to the local context, it is indeed not surprising that the length of residence in living quarters does not affect an elector's participation in the elections.

Table 24 Voter Turnout Rates by Educational Attainment and Type of Housing (%)

		Primary & below (N)	Secondary (N)	Tertiary (N)
Legco election	Public & aided housing[1]	50.1 (521)	55.8 (337)	75.0 (52)
	Home ownership estates[2]	52.2 (67)	53.4 (103)	75.0 (20)
	Private housing[3]	46.4 (138)	57.5 (252)	77.1 (109)
DB election	Public & aided housing[4]	38.1 (438)	44.8 (288)	53.5 (43)
	Home ownership estates[5]	44.6 (56)	37.8 (90)	29.4 (17)
	Private housing[6]	33.3 (120)	30.7 (212)	46.3 (95)
UC/RC election	Public & aided housing[7]	25.2 (476)	26.9 (308)	32.6 (46)
	Home ownership estates[8]	30.0 (60)	25.0 (92)	30.0 (20)
	Private housing[9]	16.2 (136)	21.2 (241)	35.2 (105)

[1] Chi-square = 12.7957, df = 2, p = 0.0017.
[2] Chi-square = 3.5440, df = 2, p = 0.1700.
[3] Chi-square = 23.9502, df = 2, p = 0.0000.
[4] Chi-square = 5.8830, df = 2, p = 0.0528.
[5] Chi-square = 1.4547, df = 2, p = 0.4832.
[6] Chi-square = 7.2565, df = 2, p = 0.0266.
[7] Chi-square = 1.3035, df = 2, p = 0.5211.
[8] Chi-square = 0.5386, df = 2, p = 0.7639.
[9] Chi-square = 12.9772, df = 2, p = 0.0015.

Table 25 Voter Turnout Rates by Length of Residence in Present Living Quarters (%)

	2 yrs & below (N)	2 - 5 yrs (N)	5 - 10 yrs (N)	10 yrs & above (N)
Legco election[1]	62.5 (176)	56.9 (311)	53.3 (493)	54.1 (664)
DB election[2]	37.3 (150)	40.4 (280)	41.8 (419)	36.8 (551)
UC/RC election[3]	18.4 (158)	23.4 (291)	31.0 (455)	23.1 (623)

[1] Chi-square = 5.1878, df = 3, p = 0.1585.

[2] Chi-square = 2.8131, df = 3, p = 0.4213.

[3] Chi-square = 14.0146, df = 3, p = 0.0029.

After an examination of the various socio-demographic characteristics of the voters in the 1991 elections and their respective relationship with the turnout rate, three general remarks can now be advanced.

Firstly, of all the socio-demographic characteristics, the three relating to SES, i.e. educational attainment, income and occupation, prove to be the most important factors affecting the turnout rate of electors. Among the three, educational attainment plays a particularly significant role.[10] This finding in fact should not be of surprise to us since the situation is generally the same in western countries. Furthermore, not only do the SES factors directly affect the turnout rate, but they also have an indirect impact on the relationship between the factors of age, marital status and type of housing on the one hand and the turnout rate on the other. The high turnout rate of the electors aged 21 to 30, of the unmarried electors as well as the electors living in home ownership estates or private housing blocks can all be explained by the SES of the elector groups concerned, in particular their educational attainment.

Secondly, the effect of the SES factors seems to be limited basically to the Legco election. Their impact on voter turnout in the DB election and the UC/RC election is much more diminished. It seems that another factor which comes into play in this regard is the perceived importance of an election concerned. If an election is perceived by the electors as important, then an effect of general mobilization occurs. The electors with higher SES are more susceptible to such an effect since they are better informed and are more alert about social and political affairs. Under such circumstances, the SES factors can fully operate and exert their effect on the voter turnout. On the contrary, if an election is perceived as not important, then a general demobilization of the electors occurs. In this case, the effect that the SES factors could have will be much reduced. Accordingly, other factors will gain in importance. It is our surmise that, in such a situation of general demobilization, the local social network of the candidates concerned will play a greater role in boosting the participation rate of certain groups of electors. The DB election, which is based on small geographical constituencies, is thus particularly susceptible to this kind of voter mobilization by local social network. It is perhaps due to this reason that, although the SES factors have *strong effect* on voter turnout relating to age, marital status and type of housing *in the Legco election,* their impact on the same arenas appears to be *mixed or insignificant in the DB election and the UC/RC election.* However, a point of caution is in order. Our study focuses primarily on the socio-demographic characteristics of the electors. Their attitudes towards different elections have not been investigated in detail. Therefore, the proposition regarding the significance of the various elections as perceived by the electors has to be ascertained by other studies.

Thirdly, the Hong Kong electorate shares a lot of similarities with the electorate of western countries. The crucial role that SES plays in the voting behaviour of both the two electorates is of particular significance. However, there are at least three aspects in which the Hong Kong electorate differs from its western counterpart. The first is the length of residence. In Hong Kong, the factor of length of residence has no effect on the voter turnout and this can be fully explained by the specific local geographical and social context. The second is the high turnout rate of the young electors, at least in the Legco election. The third aspect, which is closely related to the second one, is the high turnout rate of unmarried electors, also in the Legco election. These two phenomena can be explained by the fact that the younger generation in Hong Kong has a higher level of education than the elder generation. Apart from these three variations, the Hong Kong electors' propensity to vote is subject to the same effects that the various socio-demographic characteristics exert on the electors in western countries.

Turnout Rate in the 1991 Legco Election: A Recalculation

An interesting point related to the question of voter participation is the *actual* turnout rate in the 1991 elections. According to the government, the turnout rate in the Legco election was 39.15%. Such a turnout rate was generally regarded as rather disappointing since prior to the holding of the election, all opinion polls anticipated a much higher turnout rate.[11] In our survey, 55.1% of the respondents who were registered electors claimed that they had voted in the Legco election. Therefore, there is a difference of almost 16% between the turnout rate calculated by the government and that of our survey, as Table 26 shows. Although it is quite a common phenomenon that post-election surveys tend to produce a turnout rate higher than the official one due to mis-reporting by the respondents and sample bias in the surveys, a difference of 16% is absolutely too large and an explanation should thus be searched for.

Table 26 Voter Turnout Rates in 1991 Legco Election

	Official Record (A)	Survey (B)	(A) - (B)
Legco election	39.15%	55.07%	-15.92%
Total	1,916,925	1,650	

In Hong Kong, it is almost public knowledge that a certain degree of inaccuracy exists in the official Register of Electors. This is partly due to the high mobility of the local population. The incident that a prospective candidate in the 1991 Legco election found his name removed from the Register of Electors which then led to the discovery of the fact that some thirty thousand electors were also mistakenly deleted from the Register of Electors illustrated the potential error of the registration work conducted by the government.[12] Therefore, we surmise that if the turnout rate of our survey is an over-estimation of the real situation, then the official figure could also be an under-estimated one due to the inaccuracy of the Register of Electors. In fact, Mr Michael Sze, the Secretary for Constitutional Affairs, in answering a question asked by a Legislative

Councillor relating to voter registration, pointed out that during the 1991 elections, 98,935 poll cards sent to the registered electors were returned undelivered.[13] This figure represents an inaccuracy of about 5.3% of the 1991 Final Register of Electors. However, in our survey, it is found that the situation could be more serious. In the course of conducting the interviews, we found that between 17.5% and 24.4% of the electors selected to be interviewed could not be located. A break-down of these "phantom electors" as well as the method to calculate the error rate are given in Table 27.

Table 27 Unlocatable Registered Electors: Types and Geographical Distribution

	HK East	HK West	Kln East	Kln Central	Kln West	NT East	NT South	NT West	NT North	Total
1	3	1	2	2	0	1	2	1	2	14
2	9	2	5	5	5	1	6	3	0	36
3	49	48	30	43	49	22	44	24	16	325
4	4	3	14	9	2	3	14	7	0	56
5	13	14	18	30	9	4	17	11	7	123
6	12	6	9	10	5	10	6	24	9	91
7	26	8	9	21	35	5	10	11	3	128
Total	116	82	87	120	105	46	99	81	37	773

Notes: 1 = Deceased; 2 = Emigrated; 3 = Moved; 4 = Premise not occupied; 5 = Building demolished; 6 = No such address; 7 = No such person.

Total number of registered electors originally selected for the survey: 3,170.

Error rate: (a) if all the seven types are taken into account:

$$\frac{773}{3,170} \times 100 = 24.4\%$$

(b) if only the first five types are taken into account since the last two types could consist of doubtful cases:

$$\frac{554}{3,170} \times 100 = 17.5\%$$

In fact, the above error rate is quite close to what had been estimated by other researchers on the same election.[14] Therefore, if the error of the 1991 Final Register of Electors was between 17.5% and 24.4%, then the actual number of registered electors would have been between 1,449,195 and 1,581,463. The voter turnout rate in the Legco election would thus have been between 47.5% and 51.8% and not 39.15%. Although such calculated turnout rates are still lower than what our survey has revealed, the difference can be considered reasonable because it may have been caused by mis-reporting and sample bias.[15] Of course, how actual turnout rate should be evaluated is another question. What we endeavour to highlight is that the official turnout rate of 39.15% is in fact an under-estimation and the actual turnout rate of the 1991 Legco election could have been as high as between 47.5% and 51.8%.

Concluding Remarks

This paper attempts to study the socio-demographic characteristics of the Hong Kong electors and the Hong Kong voters in a comprehensive manner. It is found that, in terms of voter registration and voter turnout, there is little difference between Hong Kong and western societies, except that the specific local conditions give rise to some variations.

In voter registration, the most salient fact is that the residents of public housing and home ownership estates have an exceptionally high registration rate and this affects the effects other factors could normally have on the eligible electors' propensity to register. The high registration rate is, to a certain extent, the result of special administrative efforts made by the government. Therefore, an implication one can draw from such a situation is whether registration drives to be undertaken in the future should shift the emphasis to the residents of other housing types. In this study, it has also been found that four types of Hong Kong residents are under-registered. They are respectively residents aged 21 to 30, residents with low income, in particular those earning a monthly income of HK$6,000 or less, residents who are unmarried and residents living in private housing blocks. Therefore, attention should also be paid to the question of whether these sorts of residents should become special targets in future registration drives so that their state of under-representation can be remedied.

On voter turnout, our findings further confirm the essential role SES plays in relation to the electors' probability to vote. Among the three major measures of SES, education proves to have the strongest effect on voter participation. In Hong Kong, the development of education has been particularly rapid in the last two to three decades. As a consequence, the educational attainment among the various age groups of the population has become highly uneven. The turnout situation of some elector groups, for example the young and unmarried electors and the electors living in private housing blocks, is thus profoundly affected. Another major finding is that the perception of the electors with regard to the importance of the election concerned also has strong effect on voter turnout. The variation in turnout rate of the same elector group in different elections is very likely linked to such perception. This situation should in fact induce us to investigate the question from a wider perspective, namely, the "meaning" of election to the Hong Kong electors. The most outstanding feature in this regard is that the local electors have the right to select only part of the members to the representative institutions concerned. Therefore, what the electors' assessment of the instrumental value of the elections is as well as what their expectations are with regard to the role the elected members should play would be important factors not only affecting the turnout of the electors but also their choice of candidates. These questions concern the attitudes of electors and are thus beyond the scope of this paper. They should be investigated by other in-depth studies.

To answer the question "who voted in the 1991 elections?" the first and foremost statement we should make is that the voters with higher SES, in particular those with higher educational attainment, voted in greater proportion. Their propensity to turn up at the polls was comparatively higher in the Legco election. In this regard, the Hong Kong electorate is very similar to that in western countries. However, the higher turnout rate of the voters with higher SES did not entail a situation of over-representation of the latter among the overall population. The reason for this is the initial higher registration rate of the residents of public housing and home ownership estates. These residents do not have an above average SES and this cancels out the potential over-representation that the voters with higher SES could enjoy. In fact, if we classify the overall Hong Kong population by the nine major socio-demographic characteristics, namely sex, age, educational attainment, employment status, occupation, income, marital status, housing type and length of

residence in present living quarters, it can be found that no particular group, except one, is over-represented or under-represented among the voters in the 1991 elections. The residents who are aged 21 to 30, who are unmarried and who live in private housing blocks are found to be under-registered. However, due to the impact of the SES factors, these three groups have a higher turnout rate in the elections and their potential under-representation is thus redressed. The only exception is the residents with low income, especially those earning a monthly individual income of HK$6,000 or less. This group of residents has, first of all, a low registration rate and, secondly, a low turnout rate and therefore is the only under-represented group in the overall population. What we have analysed in the above is particularly obvious in the Legco election. Whereas in the DB and the UC/RC elections, the impact of the SES factors become less evident due to the demobilization of the voters and, therefore, the potential under-representation of the various groups concerned could not be redressed in the same manner.

Finally, by using the relevant data generated from our survey, we estimate that the voter turnout rate in the 1991 Legco election could be between 47.5% and 51.8%, and not 39.15% as calculated by the government. Such a turnout rate is calculated on the basis of the registered electors and not the population of voting age. Therefore, by international standard, it can by no means be regarded as on the high end. However, given that direct election based on universal suffrage has only a very short history in the territory and that the electorate can only select part of the members of the representative institutions concerned (in the case of the Legco, only 18 members out of a total membership of 60), such a turnout rate can be considered as normal if not encouraging. Therefore, the turnout rate of the 1991 elections, especially of the Legco election, can be subject to quite different, or even opposite, interpretations.

Nevertheless, what is in fact more urgent is to improve the overall accuracy of the electoral roll. The government should make efforts in this regard so that the official electoral figures could reflect the real situation with greater fidelity.

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Notes

1. Important works include Berelson *et al.* (1954), Campbell *et al.* (1954), Campbell *et al.* (1960), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980).
2. The original sample size of the survey was 3,170. However, 773 addresses were found to be invalid due to various reasons (see Table 26) and were hence deleted. The actual sample size thus became 2,397.
3. The formula for calculating the sample error of any percentage, p, is

   $$s.e.(p) = \sqrt{p\,(100 - p)\,/\,n}$$

   where n is the number of respondents on which the percentage is based. Once the sampling error is obtained, confidence interval for the population percentage can be calculated. For example, a 95% confidence interval is:

   $$p \pm 1.96 \times s.e.(p)$$

4. As an illustration of the efforts made by the government, see for example the speech made by the Secretary for Constitutional Affairs, Mr Michael Sze, at the Legco as answer to a question asked by a Legco member on 8 July 1992. Hong Kong Legislative Council, *Official Record of Proceedings*, sitting of 8 July 1992.
5. For a review of the past studies, see Louie and Wan (1992).
6. The voter turnout rate by sex in the 1991 Legco election calculated from the official voting record is presented in the following as reference.

Male	Female	Male - Female
39.9%	39.1%	0.8%

Source: Information supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office (Ref: 91SAPV).

7. The voter turnout rate by age in the 1991 Legco election calculated from the official voting record is presented in the following as reference.

21 - 30	31 - 40	41 - 50	51 - 60	61 & above
41.1%	37.2%	42.0%	42.3%	37.0%

Source: Information supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office (Ref: 91SAPV).

8. For a review of the relevant studies, see Louie and Wan (1992).
9. This exceptional case is caused by the fact that some of the respondents earning HK$1,999 or less per month are in fact part-time workers with rather high educational attainment.
10. As a reference, the strength of association between voter turnout and socio-demographic variables is given in the table below:

Socio-demographic variables	Gamma	Cramer's V	P*
Sex		0.048	>0.05
Age	-0.056	0.049	>0.05
Educational attainment	0.243	0.176	<0.01
Employment status	0.082	0.039	>0.05
Individual monthly income	0.207	0.198	<0.01
Occupation		0.182	<0.01
Marital status		0.074	<0.05
Housing type		0.044	>0.05
Length of residence	0.063	0.056	>0.05

* Level of significance (Chi-square).

11. For example, an opinion poll conducted some ten days before the Legco election predicted a turnout rate of 71.1%. See *South China Morning Post*, 9 September 1991.
12. See the relevant reports in *South China Morning Post*, 1 and 8 August 1991.

13. Same as note 4.
14. For example, a survey conducted by the Social Sciences Research Centre of the University of Hong Kong in Kowloon Central after the 1991 Legco election revealed that 20% of the electoral roll was wrong. See *South China Morning Post*, 27 September 1991. See also an analysis on the question of accuracy of turnout forecast in *South China Morning Post*, 17 September 1991.
15. In the United States of America, reported turnout in sample surveys usually ranges between 5% and 17% higher than the official estimates. See Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980:115).

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2

Communication, Political Knowledge and Attitudes

A Survey Study of the Hong Kong Electorate

Joseph Man Chan

Election campaigns are one of the most-studied aspects of political communication in western societies. This is a result of the central location of election in western democracy which has been developing for more than a century. With the advent of mass media, political advertising and communication strategies take on an ever growing importance. The major concern of the election campaign studies is to understand how communication affects the voters' choice. Such studies are so numerous that Nimmo and Swanson (1990) have categorized them as belonging to "the voter persuasion paradigm" which continues to dominate the field.

Mass media were found to have little influence in changing the final voting decision in studies in the 1940s and 1950s. Later researches extended the scope of study to all phases of the election campaigns and found that mass media may have powerful effects. For instance, television, in particular, has led to the growth of media politics, resulting in the shrinking role of political parties, the domination of campaign strategies as well as the emergence of mass media as king makers (Graber, 1989). In association with the decline of parties, candidate image gains import-

ance as a primary factor that affects the voters' choice (Boiney and Paletz, 1991).

In contrast, Hong Kong has a very brief history of democratization. It was only in 1991 that Hong Kong had its maiden Legislative Council election based on universal suffrage. Eighteen of the 60-seat Council were so elected in nine geographical constituencies while the rest were either appointed or elected through functional constituencies. This limited and late development of democracy explains why there is a general lack of election campaign studies in Hong Kong.[1]

In addition, the parameters for election communication in Hong Kong are quite different from those of western societies. Firstly, political parties are at an embryonic stage of development. While the shrinking contribution of party in the age of media politics has been observed in the West for more than a decade, we expect to see a growing role of parties in Hong Kong where the first one was formed in 1991. Secondly, unlike the heavy use of political advertising in the United States and elsewhere, political advertising is prohibited on electronic media in Hong Kong. Therefore, the local candidates have to rely on organized mobilization, news reportage and other small media in their campaigns.

One feature that Hong Kong shares with the western societies is the prevalence of mass media. Hong Kong is teeming with mass media, including television, radio, newspapers and magazines. Many journalists assume that in a traditionally apolitical place like Hong Kong, the people would be apathetic towards election affairs. Despite such doubts over the audience's interest in election news, the more serious mass media in Hong Kong did assign special journalists to cover the election. Television held question and answer forums for the candidates. All these were done mainly because of competition pressure and the professional obligation to cover events that were generally perceived to be important. Much of the information about the election was therefore in the form of news and public affairs programmes.

How did the Hong Kong electorate respond to and receive information about the election? How did their information seeking behaviour relate to the electorate's political knowledge and attitudes? These are the two general questions that this paper attempts to explore. The more specific purposes are: (1) To find out the electorate's uses of the mass media and interpersonal communication during election; (2) To examine the voters' evaluation of the informative roles of various communication channels; (3) To study the relationship between the electorate's communication behaviour and their knowledge about the political groups; and (4) To investigate the relationship between the electorate's communication behaviour and their political attitudes.

This paper is based on a territory-wide household survey carried out between October 1991 and January 1992. Face-to-face questionnaire interviews were applied to a systematic sample of 1,392 registered electors from the 1991 Final Register of Electors. The number of successful interviews was 939, yielding a response rate of 67.5%.

To avoid confusion, let us define a few common terms in this paper before we proceed further. "Registered elector" or "elector" refers to someone who has registered and is therefore included in the electoral roll. "Voter" means a registered elector who casts the vote in a election and "non-voter" means a registered elector who has not cast a vote. The "electorate" refers to all the registered electors, including both the "voters" and "non-voters."

Communication Patterns

As indicated in Table 1, about half (48.7%) of the voters said they liked exposing themselves to election news. In contrast, only 10.6% said they disliked such information. The rest (40.8%) did not express strong inclination in either direction. These figures speak against the oversimplified assumption that audience in Hong Kong are not interested in election news. Election news appears to have served the interest of a sizable portion of the electorate.

When asked how often the voters exposed themselves to election news, television is the most cited medium, to be followed by the newspapers and radio. Table 1 shows that 76.1% of the voters sometimes or often watched election news on television. The corresponding proportions for the newspapers and radio are 66.5% and 44.3% respectively.

Table 1 Communication Patterns of Voters and Non-voters during Election (%)

	Voters	Non-voters	Electorate
Watching election news on television			
Often	35.9	21.9	29.6
Sometimes	40.2	40.6	40.4
Rare	14.2	19.7	16.7
Never	9.7	17.8	13.4
Listening to election news on radio			
Often	14.2	6.9	10.9
Sometimes	30.1	20.2	25.7
Rare	28.7	29.0	28.9
Never	27.0	43.8	34.5
Reading election news in newspapers			
Often	35.9	18.5	29.0
Sometimes	30.6	27.6	29.2
Rare	14.7	20.4	17.3
Never	18.8	33.6	25.5
Liking exposure to election news			
Like	48.7	28.6	39.9
So-so	40.8	49.1	44.4
Don't like	10.6	22.3	15.7
Discussing election with others			
Yes	56.2	32.8	45.8
No	43.8	67.2	54.2
Persuading others on voting			
Yes	18.3	7.3	13.4
No	81.7	92.7	86.6

Mediated communication did not act alone. It often interacted with interpersonal communication in constructing social and political reality. More than half of the voters (56.2%) said they discussed the election with their family or friends. Much of such conversation appeared to be carried out in a casual manner as only 18.3% of the voters said they did try to persuade their family members or friends to vote for the candidates they favoured. It will be interesting to note the proportion of voters who try to persuade others as Hong Kong's party formation consolidates.

Comparing the voters and non-voters in the electorate, Table 1 shows that voters were in general more active in election-related communication.[2] For instance, while 48.7% of the voters liked exposure to election news, only 28.6% of the non-voters did so. Likewise, 56.2% of the voters discussed the election with others whereas 32.8% of the non-voters had such behaviour. The same relationship still held when demographic variables like age, sex, education and household income were controlled. This phenomenon accords with the Grunig's situational theory of media consumption which states that the perceived relevancy of a given piece of information for a problematic situation is conducive to information seeking behaviour (Grunig, 1979). To the voters who had to choose among candidates, election news would be more relevant and sought after.

Like media use in general, the consumption of information about election is expected to relate to the socio-economic status of the electors. We have done the crosstabulations separately for the voters and the non-voters. Table 2 only reports the results for the voters because the results for the non-voters are similar. As indicated in Table 2, education is positively associated with the consumption of election news from newspapers (tau-c=.31, p<.001), television (tau-c=.22, p<.001) and radio (tau-c=.13, p<.001), discussion with others (r=.37, p<.001) and persuasion (r=.10, p<.01). The same association is observed to exist between the voters' communication behaviour and household income as education and household income are interrelated. That the more educated consumed more election news is consistent with the findings in western countries. The observed relationships generally hold when age and sex are controlled.

Table 2 Voters' Communication during Election and Demographic Attributes

	Television	Radio	Newspapers	Discuss about election	Persuade others on voting
Education	.22***	.13***	.31***	.37***	.10**
Age	-.07*	(NS)	-.09**	-.28***	(NS)
Sex	-.09*	-.09*	-.26***	(NS)	(NS)
Household income	.09**	.14**	.18***	.23***	.08*

Notes: With sex, the statistic is Pearson's r; for others, tau-*c*.
NS = Not significant.
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001.

Age is observed to be related to communication behaviour too. The younger, usually better educated, tended to discuss more often with others about election (r=-.28, p<.001) and exposed more to election news on television (tau-*c*=-.07, p<.05) and newspapers (tau-*c*=-.09, p<.01). The male is also the more educated. They tended to expose themselves more often to election news in newspapers (r=-.26, p<.001), television (r=-.09, p<.05) and radio (r=-.09, p<.05). However, sex is not related to the voters' discussion and persuasion activities. Among the demographic variables, education appears to be the most important in accounting for the electors' communication behaviour.

Voters may make their candidate choice at various phases of the election campaign. Some make decisions at the beginning of the campaign and some on the voting day. Crosstabulating the voters' communication behaviour and their decision time, we found that the early decision makers (at least one week prior to the voting day) were as a rule more active in communication than the late decision makers (within one week of the voting day).[3] This is reasonable as the better informed can make up their mind earlier.

Evaluation of Communication Channels

The communication channels through which the voters received information about the candidates for the Legislative Council included mass media (television, radio and newspapers), small media (posters, campaign leaflets given out by the candidates and the government) and interpersonal communication (home visits by candidates and interpersonal exchanges about election). To assess the relative impact of these channels, we asked the voters to evaluate each in regard to their helpfulness as informers on candidates.

Table 3 sums up the results of this evaluation. Consistent with the media consumption pattern reported above, television and the newspapers were found to be the most helpful for the voters, with radio and magazines trailing behind. As many as 78.6% rated television helpful or very helpful. The comparable proportions for the newspapers, radio and magazines are 72.9%, 52.4% and 31.2% respectively.

Table 3 Voters' Evaluation of Communication Channels for Information about Candidates (%)

	Very helpful	Helpful	So-so	Not helpful	Not helpful at all	(N)
Television	27.9	50.7	11.4	9.0	1.0	(499)
Radio	7.1	45.3	24.1	19.5	4.0	(477)
Newspapers	18.2	54.7	17.0	8.1	2.1	(483)
Magazines	3.3	27.9	29.5	30.6	8.7	(458)
Leaflets	8.7	47.5	21.9	19.3	2.6	(493)
Home visits	5.3	35.0	18.2	34.5	7.0	(412)
Family members	1.2	28.4	18.7	43.6	8.1	(493)
Friends and relatives	0.8	18.9	21.3	48.8	10.2	(488)
Posters	2.6	35.0	27.8	28.8	5.8	(497)
Government's mailing	4.3	53.2	21.4	18.1	3.1	(491)

The usefulness of the afore-mentioned communication channels was, in some cases, a function of the voters' socio-economic status and the type of housing in which they lived. There was a general tendency for the voters to have a higher evaluation of the media they used. For instance, the educated who exposed themselves more often to election news on television and newspapers valued these media more than others.

While television and the newspapers were by far more valued than the small media and interpersonal channels in general, campaign leaflets sent out by the candidates and the government could measure up to the usefulness of radio and surpassed that of magazines. About 55% of the voters ranked campaign leaflets as helpful. Many of these leaflets were mailed to the registered electors; this ensured that the publicity material reach their target audience. Both the government and the candidates sent out the leaflets only once during the campaign. The relative high ratings they received speaks to the outstanding importance of this little leaflet.

Home visit by candidates is often regarded as a strategic means of voter mobilization in Hong Kong. But only 40.3% of the voters said such home visits were helpful.[4] Home visit was found to be more highly evaluated by voters living in public housing (r=.15, p.<001). This is a reflection of the fact that home visit is more possible in public housing which is more accessible to both residents and non-residents. Indeed, candidates usually confined home visits to public housing.

By the same token, the evaluation of small media such as campaign posters and leaflets given out by the government and the candidates was closely related to housing type as well. Voters living in public housing tended to have a higher evaluation of the posters (r=.13, p.<05) and leaflets (r=.09, p.<05) given out by the candidates. The leaflets sent out by the government, however, did not significantly correlate with housing type. This is probably a result of the fact that candidates sometimes distributed leaflets to public housing residents on the streets whereas the government only mailed the leaflets to the electorate.

Again, interpersonal communication channels such as discussion with family members, relatives and friends were found to be much less useful than mass media and the small media. Only 29.6% of the voters found discussion with family members helpful and 19.7% regarded discussion with relatives and friends helpful. Crosstabulations show that there was a slight tendency for the less educated (tau-*c*=-.08, p<.05), the older (tau-*c*=.11, p<.01) and the female (r=.13, p<.001) to derive their knowledge about candidates from conversation with family members.

Communication and Political Knowledge

Given people's dependence on the mass media for information about political affairs, the consumption of election news is expected to lead to an increase of knowledge about the election affairs. Before we go on to test this, we want first to see how such knowledge was distributed among the voters and the non-voters.

The indicator of election knowledge used in this survey is very simple: it measures whether the respondents had heard of a political group or not. Consequently the dependent variables in this case are dichotomies and are treated as dummy variables in statistical analysis. Table 4 shows the proportions of the voters and non-voters who had heard of a given political group. First of all, it is found that the voters were in general politically more knowledgeable than the non-voters. This is consistent with the earlier finding that the voters were heavier consumers of information about election.

Table 4 Proportions of Electors Who Have Heard Of a Political Group (%)

Political groups	Voters	Non-voters	χ^2	df	p
UDHK	90.5	77.1	30.94	1	.000
LDF	77.5	59.1	36.15	1	.000
MP	56.2	38.1	29.92	1	.000
HKADPL	71.7	58.9	16.49	1	.000
HKDF	57.9	46.1	12.61	1	.000
FTU	78.9	67.1	15.86	1	.000

Notes: UDHK = United Democrats of Hong Kong.
LDF = Liberal Democratic Federation.
MP = Meeting Point.
HKADPL = Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood.
HKDF = Hong Kong Democratic Foundation.
FTU = Federation of Trade Unions.

Among the political groups in Hong Kong, the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) was virtually known by all the voters (90.5%), followed by the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) (78.9%), the Liberal Democratic Federation (LDF)(77.5%), the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (HKADPL) (71.7%), the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (HKDF) (57.9%) and the Meeting Point (MP) (56.2%). The same order is observed with the non-voters. Whether the voters had heard of the political group or not was the least that one can demand of a voter. Yet, for some groups, as many as about 40% of them had not heard of a particular group. It appears that as a whole, the electorate in the maiden Legislative Council did not have extensive knowledge about the political groups. The UDHK was merely an outstanding exception.

The positive association between media consumption and political knowledge is borne out in Table 5. Without any exception, it is observed that the voters' knowledge of the names of political groups correlated positively with their consumption of news about election in newspapers, television and radio. The same table shows that those more interested in election news were more knowledgeable as well, presumably because they consumed more information about election. It is also found that those more knowledgeable about the election tended to discuss more often with others and to try persuading others to vote in certain directions. The non-voters were also found to exhibit the same pattern of relationships between political knowledge and communication behaviour.

With the exception of those who had received tertiary education, the observed correlations between communication and political knowledge hold when education is controlled. It appears that for the highly educated, having heard the names of political groups or not is too insensitive a measurement of their political knowledge.

Table 5 Voters' Communication during Election and Knowledge about Political Groups

	UDHK	LDF	MP	HKADPL	HKDF	FTU
Television	.37***	.29***	.31***	.29***	.19***	.32***
Radio	.26***	.20***	.23***	.23***	.14**	.25***
Newspapers	.35***	.30***	.41***	.31***	.24***	.36***
Discuss about election	.24***	.27***	.24***	.22***	.16***	.21***
Persuade others on voting	.10**	.15***	.10**	(NS)	.09*	(NS)

Notes: With discussion and persuasion, the statistics are Pearson's r; for others, tau-*c*.
NS = Not significant.
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001.

Communication and Political Attitudes

In this section, we would like to relate the electorate's communication behaviour to their political attitudes with respect to political groups and general ideological tendencies. The ideological tendencies are those labelled by the mass media, the press in particular. They include "the democratic," "the conservative," "the pro-business," "the pro-China," "the pro-Taiwan" and "the pro-HK Government." A detailed analysis of the relationship among the electors' communication pattern and their political attitudes is important in that it will shed light on the effects of such media labelling.

As the distribution of attitudes towards the political groups are similar for both voters and non-voters, we choose to report the findings for the registered electors as a whole. This will also give us larger subsample sizes so that meaningful elaboration analysis can be done. Table 6 lists the electors' attitudes on the views of political groups that they had heard of. It can be seen that the UDHK had the largest following among those who had heard of its name (43.9%). Trailing behind in order were the FTU (31.6%), MP (30.8%), HKADPL (24.5%), LDF (23.7%) and HKDF (22.1%). These figures should not be read as the popularity

ratings of different groups among the electorate as the number of people who had heard of a group varied. Usually, the higher the proportion and the larger the "N" (those who have heard of a given group) are, the more popular the group is among the electorate as a whole.

Table 6 Proportions of the Electors Who Agree to the Views of a Political Group They Have Heard (%)

	Very acceptable	Acceptable	So-so	Unacceptable	Very unacceptable	(N)
UDHK	5.0	38.9	47.9	7.3	0.9	(683)
LDF	0.8	22.9	67.3	8.2	0.8	(489)
MP	0.9	29.9	61.4	6.9	0.9	(321)
HKADPL	0.2	24.3	69.5	5.5	0.5	(416)
HKDF	0.3	21.8	72.7	4.5	0.6	(308)
FTU	1.5	30.1	54.2	12.4	1.8	(542)

The respondents were also asked how acceptable they found the views of various ideological tendencies as often referred to in the media. As indicated in Table 7, the "democratic" was acceptable by the largest group of electors (50.1%). Following quite far behind were "the pro-HK Government" (34.8%), "the pro-business" (28.0%), "the conservative" (10.1%), "the pro-China" (7.8%) and "the pro-Taiwan" (6.9%). These proportions indicate that the electorate in Hong Kong were on the main viewed themselves as "democratic," "pro-HK Government" and "pro-business." The political rift between the Chinese Communist Party and Nationalist Party is losing its importance as an ideological demarcator in Hong Kong it once had in the 1950s and 1960s. But the electorate exhibited relatively strong responses to the views of "the pro-China" and "the pro-Taiwan" tendencies at the same time. About 50% and 40% of the electorate found the views of each of these tendencies unacceptable or very unacceptable respectively. This is a reflection of the electorate's distrust for political tendencies that identify with external interests and their overwhelming concern for local issues.

Table 7 Electorate's Attitudes towards Ideological Tendencies (%)

	Very acceptable	Acceptable	So-so	Unacceptable	Very unacceptable	(N)
Democratic	6.0	44.1	42.2	6.8	0.9	(768)
Pro-business	0.4	27.6	58.4	12.8	0.7	(688)
Conservative	0.0	10.1	57.4	31.5	1.0	(680)
Pro-China	0.3	7.5	44.2	39.7	8.4	(706)
Pro-Taiwan	0.0	6.9	51.7	39.1	2.3	(642)
Pro-HK Government	1.1	33.7	51.4	12.7	1.1	(701)

We crosstabulated the electorate's attitudes on the views of political groups and those on general ideological tendencies to examine whether they were systematically related. Table 8 shows that those electors who sympathized with "the democratic" tended to accept the views of all groups other than the FTU. It appears that democracy has become a common thread among the majority of political groups in Hong Kong. The positive association between those sympathetic to the UDHK and "the democratic" tendency was particularly strong (tau-b=.53, p<.001), indicating the flagship status of the UDHK among the "democratic" groups. Besides, those sympathetic to the UDHK were found to be less "pro-China" (tau-b=-.21, p<.001) and less "conservative" (tau-b=-.07, p<.05). The MP and the HKADPL, organizationally and ideologically close to the UDHK, exhibited similar association patterns. However, it should be pointed out that, while those identifying with the MP were found to be less "pro-China," it was not so with the HKADPL. Identification with either of them was not significantly associated with conservatism.

Table 8 Electorate's Attitudes towards Political Groups and Ideological Tendencies (Tau-*b*)

	Democratic	Pro-business	Conservative	Pro-China	Pro-Taiwan	Pro-HK Government
UDHK	.53***	(NS)	.07*	-.21***	(NS)	(NS)
LDF	.17***	.20***	.15***	(NS)	(NS)	.15***
MP	.28***	(NS)	(NS)	-.12*	(NS)	(NS)
HKADPL	.24***	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)
HKDF	.25***	.10*	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	.17***
FTU	(NS)	.15***	.13***	.19***	.12***	.09**

Note: NS= Not significant.
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001.

As if reflecting the business and conservative elements in its membership, the LDF, was found to associate positively with "the pro-business" (tau-*b*=.20, p<.001), "the conservative" (tau-*b*=.15, p<.001) and "the pro-HK Government" (tau-*b*=.15, p<.001). The HKDF resembled the LDF in its association patterns.

Expectedly, the electorate's attitude towards the FTU which is organizationally and ideologically linked with China, shows a positive association with the "pro-China" label (tau-*b*=.19, p<.001). What is unexpected is that this attitude associates positively with all but the "democratic" tendencies.[5] It appears that acceptance of FTU does not prevent one from being "pro-business," "conservative," "pro-HK Government" and even "pro-Taiwan." What we can conclude from this somewhat contradictory picture is that the ideologies of the FTU sympathizers are not simple and monolithic. They harboured some ideological traits that were traditionally regarded as unorthodox or incompatible with leftist ideology.

Table 9 Electorate's Communication during Election and Attitudes towards Political Groups

	UDHK	LDF	MP	HKADPL	HKDF	FTU
Television	.18**	.06*	.08*	.13***	.11**	(NS)
Radio	.07*	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)
Newspapers	.08**	-.08*	(NS)	.06*	(NS)	-.09**
Interest in election news	.20***	.10**	.16***	.17***	.20***	(NS)
Discuss about election	.12***	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)
Persuade others on voting	.09**	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	.14**	-.07*

Notes: With discussion and persuasion, the statistics are Pearson's r; for others, tau-*c*.
NS = Not significant.
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001.

Table 9 reports the results of crosstabulations between electors' attitudes towards political groups and their communication behaviour during election. With the exception of FTU, it appears that the sympathizers of all the political groups tended to have higher interest in election news, particularly television news. However, the most notable pattern is all the positive and significant associations for the column under the UDHK. It appears that the sympathizers of the UDHK tended to be the most active in communication. They consumed more election news on television (tau-*c*=.18, p<.01), radio (tau-*c*=.07, p<.05), and newspapers (tau-*c*=.08, p<.01). On the whole they had a higher interest in election news (tau-*c*=.20, p<.001). Besides, they more often engaged in discussion about the election (r=.12, p<.001) and in persuading others to vote in certain directions (r=.09, p<.01). Elaboration analysis by introducing education, sex and age, shows mixed results, depending on the type of communication and the level of the control variables. This indicates that the electorate's political stance may interact with their education, age and sex in shaping their communication behaviour.

Table 10 Electorate's Communication during Election and Attitude towards Ideological Tendencies

	Democratic	Pro-business	Conserva-tive	Pro-China	Pro-Taiwan	Pro-HK Govern-ment
Television	.13***	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)
Radio	.11***	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)
Newspapers	.07**	(NS)	-.08**	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)
Interest in election news	.16***	(NS)	-.08**	(NS)	(NS)	.06*
Discuss about election	.16***	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)	(NS)
Persuade others on voting	.13***	(NS)	(NS)	-.08*	(NS)	(NS)

Notes: With discussion and persuasion, the statistics are Pearson's r; for others, tau-*c*.
NS = Not significant.
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001.

As shown in Table 10, those who were supportive of the "democratic" tendency were prone to a higher level of communication activities during election. This is consistent with the higher communication activities associated with the sympathizers of the UDHK noted earlier. The active communication behaviour of the sympathizers of "the democratic" and the UDHK lends support to observation that there exists a popular aspiration for more democracy in Hong Kong, especially among the electorate. Given a social cause like democracy, however vague it may be, those who identify with it appear to feel a greater need to exchange views and even to persuade others on election matters.

Conclusion

Television and the newspapers were found to be the most important sources of information about candidates. This finding is consistent with

the results of a study of the communication behaviour of the Hong Kong population. In it Chan and Lee (1992) discovered that 95.4% of the people cited television as a news source, being closely followed by newspapers (85.5%), with radio (64.2%) and magazines (21.7%) trailing far behind. Interpersonal communication with family members, friends and relatives, was cited by just 41.2% of the population. Like the public at large, the electorate did not depend on interpersonal communication for information about candidates. This heavy reliance on mass media for information speak to the media-richness of Hong Kong. Given the increasing attention to political affairs by the mass media, we expect them to be playing even more important roles in the elections to come.

What specific functions does interpersonal channels play in election communication then? This survey does not have clear answers to this question. What is known is that slightly more than half (56.2%) of the voters said they had discussed election affairs with others. This signified the use of interpersonal communication in mediating the influence of the information they got from the mass media and other channels. Much of such exchanges appeared to take place in a rather casual manner as only about 20% of the voters cared to persuade others to vote in certain directions. Western studies have found that people do not easily change their voting tendencies. But, when they do, interpersonal communication is involved in the process of conversion. How can the candidates enter the electorate's daily discourse under favourable light becomes a key campaign question. The extent to which people engage in conversation and persuasion over election matters should be longitudinally monitored as it is a good indicator of change in political culture.

An unexpected finding is the relatively high evaluation the voters had for the leaflets given out by the candidates and the government. The brevity of the exposure was out of proportion to its usefulness to the voters. Many of the pamphlets looked crude and commonplace. There is much room for candidates to make better use of this slighted but strategic medium. However, as the party structure and the pool of candidates stabilize after a few more elections, the informative role of such leaflets will likely taper off.

It has been almost universally accepted among political communication researchers that mass media play an instrumental role in the social construction of political reality. Labelling is one of the key processes shaping the images of political groups and candidates. The mass media in Hong Kong, particularly the press, used to label them by their political

tendencies. Consequently we have labels like "democratic," "pro-China," "pro-business," "pro-Taiwan," and "pro-HK Government." The electorate's orientation to these tendencies are found to correlate systematically with their attitudes towards various political groups. This attests to the function of such labels in providing the electors with a schema for analyzing and categorizing political candidates and parties. This schema is not neutral to the electorate. It carries with it connotations that may evoke sympathy and rejection, as the case may be. Once a group is labelled in a certain way, relabelling or changing the connotation of a label will take a great effort. A case in point is the FTU which is labelled as being "pro-China." Given the importance the Hong Kong electorate attach to democracy, the FTU has yet to prove that it stands for democracy in spite of its pro-China stance.

Among the various political tendencies and parties, the "democratic" and the UDHK are the only ones that succeeded in attracting those electors who were particularly active in consuming election news and interpersonal exchanges. Their active communication behaviour can be partly attributed to the relatively higher education and lower age of its sympathizers. That is not all. The ideal of democracy, however vague it may be, appears to have taken root among some electors. These electors generally had a higher sense of political involvement and cared to discuss and even persuade over election matters. How the democratic groups can keep up the fire within the hearts of their supporters and how other groups can spark the missionary zeal of their followers become an important question if they want to expand their influence among the electorate.

Given the nascent nature of election communication in Hong Kong, no one should be expecting the communication patterns and their relationships to political attitudes to remain the same when the parameters of political communication change. Some of the parametric changes that may take place by the next election in 1995 include:

1. Pay-television and Other Media: The introduction of pay-television will likely provide a lot more room for election affairs and debates among candidates. This means that television will become an even more important medium in future elections. Coupled with the increased attention from the traditional media, the electorate will likely derive more knowledge about the candidates who themselves will place greater emphasis on campaign strategies.

2. Political Advertising: If the government introduces political advertising on the electronic media, the information environment during election will be further politicized, sparking more debates. The political advertisement will likely interact with the news in setting the election agenda and in redefining the connotations attached to various political labels.
3. Interparty Competition: The formation of new parties and the consolidation of existing parties will enhance the role of parties and intensify the competition among them. Parties will rely more than ever on communication strategies in their effort to define and redefine their images and to position and reposition their political stances. These strategies, together with the track record of individual candidates, will largely determine the appeals of candidates and parties among the electorate. At the same time, organized social mobilization will play an even greater role.
4. Election Rules: Christopher Patten, the Hong Kong Governor, has proposed to expand the electorate of the functional constituencies to about half of the population and do away with all appointed members at the district and regional levels in 1995. Should his proposals be put into practice, they will require greater participation from the mass media, without which the expanded electorate will hardly be able to know enough to make an informed choice.
5. Editorial Endorsement: So far the major mass media in Hong Kong have tended to avoid explicit endorsement of candidates and parties. Should the mass media shift their practice, how political endorsement affects the electorate's choice will become an interesting question.

All of these possible changes are conducive to greater use of mediated information and interpersonal communication during election. Unlike the trend that is developing in western societies, the role of the parties will continue to grow in tandem with the emergence of media politics in Hong Kong. We expect all the major actors in political communication — the parties, the electorate, the mass media and the government — to show a higher level of involvement in the next election. Only longitudinal comparisons will show whether these expectations will hold up or not.

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Notes

1. However, there are some works (e.g. Kuan and Lau, 1988; Chan and Lee, 1991; Chan, 1992) about political communication in Hong Kong, often from the perspective of institutional and systemic analysis.
2. In fact, voters are found to be in general more devout consumers of general news and public affairs. Space forbids us to report the statistical results here.
3. The correlations between the voters' behaviour and their decision time yield the following results:

   Election news on TV: r=-.16, p<.001;
   Election news on radio: r=-.17, p<.001;
   Election news in newspapers: r=-.15, p<.001;
   Interest in election news: r=-.14, p<.01;
   Discussion about election: r=-.09, p<.05;
   Persuade others on voting: r=-.11, p<.01.
4. This relatively low rating, however, cannot rule out the importance of home visits in getting people out to vote. A change in turnout rate may affect the outcome in a close election race. Whether the home visits can play more important roles depend on how and to what extent they are done. The campaign effects of home visits need further evaluation.
5. The associations are:

   "pro-business": tau-*b*=.15, p<.001;
   "conservative": tau-*b*=.13, p<.001;
   "pro-Taiwan": tau-*b*=.12, p<.001;
   "pro-HK Government": tau-*b*=.09, p<.05.

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3

Youth's Political Attitude in the 1991 Legislative Council Election

A Cognitive-Affective-Conative Analysis

Agnes K.C. Yeung and K.K. Leung

Introduction

This paper focuses on the study of the political attitude of young people in the 1991 Legislative Council (Legco) election process. Despite there having been studies to reflect young people's political views, little effort has been made to investigate the factors behind such views.[1] Moreover, the 1991 election was a new experience for the territory and its young residents. How their perception and participation in the process affected the outcome of the election and what the likely implications of such outcome would be on the future political development of Hong Kong have yet to be seen.

The 1991 Legco election marked an unprecedented event in the history of Hong Kong. It was the first time the people of Hong Kong ever exerted their influence on the composition of the highest law-making body through a ballot. The Hong Kong government, various political organizations and all the candidates involved showed remarkable enthu-

siasm in encouraging citizens' participation in the election. "Voting Is Power" was used by the government as the slogan for the election. It was hoped that citizens would grasp this novel chance to exercise their "power."

Were the Hong Kong youth receptive to the message delivered by the government in regard to the election and functions of Legco? What did the young citizens perceive and feel about the elected members and the political institutions in general? How much were they aware of the current political development and issues involved? These questions are related to the examination of the political subculture of youths in Hong Kong. Political culture is a very embracing and loosely defined concept. It refers to the sense of national identity, attitudes towards oneself as participant, attitudes towards one's fellow citizens, attitudes and expectations regarding governmental output and performance, and attitudes towards the political processes of decision-making (Pye and Verba, 1965).[2] The interpretation of democracy also varies. So far, there is no one single definition of democracy, but there are a lot of propositions to describe and analyze the level of politicization and political orientation of individuals or groups, for example, the liberal/conservative ideology framework of H.E. Brady and P.M. Sniderman (1985); the analysis of political efficacy, radical and the non-activist by M.M. Braungart and R.G. Braungart (1990); the two-value framework, freedom and equality, to measure political orientation by M. Rokeach (1979), and G.L. Rous and D.E. Lee (1978). It is the intention of this research to adopt a more comprehensive and integrated approach to assess the overall political attitudes of Hong Kong youths. As suggested by R.S. Jones (1980), the minimum ideal democratic citizen will (1) be politically knowledgeable, (2) engage in informed political activity, and (3) respect and be tolerant of other people and diverse ideas. Within this framework and among all the possible and interesting directions of investigation, this paper attempts:

1. to identify the cognitive dimension[3] of the Legco in general;
2. to assess various levels of the affective dimension,[4] including an individual's affect towards government and politics, and
3. to analyze the conative patterns[5] of young people's political behaviour in the election process.

Youth is a notable stage of growth and preparation for adulthood. The definition of youth in terms of age delineation however varies from society to society. Their roles in the social, economic and political arena also differ according to their unique national experience in relation to the stage of development of each society, be it developed or underdeveloped, rural or urban (Hunt, 1985).

In Hong Kong, according to the profile of Hong Kong youth compiled by the Census and Statistics Department in 1988, the age range of youth is from 10 to 24. The current legal age to assume adult responsibility is 18; by then an individual can undertake contractional responsibility and obtain a driving licence. Yet, he has to reach 21 years of age to be able to vote. There has been strong advocacy in the community in recent years to lower the voting age to 18 as a positive measure to speed up the political development of Hong Kong. In anticipation of the lowering of voting age from 21 to 18 in the near future, as well as to make the project manageable, this research has chosen to focus on the 18-24 age group which, in psychological terms, is the developmental stage of late adolescence and early adulthood, and also the stage an individual has or is prepared to shoulder political responsibility.

A random sampling procedure was adopted to ensure the scientific representation. So, 8,167 cases were drawn from the households of the whole territory with the assistance of the Census and Statistics Department. The subjects were interviewed in person by interviewers using a structured questionnaire between 19 August and 14 September 1991. A total of 3,004 households were contacted, of which, 2,123 had either no target subject or rejected the interview. Altogether, 881 were interviewed and 833 cases were considered to be valid and completed (see Table 1). The successful contact rate is 27.7%. A follow-up interview took place during the period 21-27 January 1992. All 833 cases were contacted and 383 were successfully interviewed. The successful contact rate is 46.0%.

Table 1 Distribution of Sample Units

Districts	Contacted	Contacted but rejected or no target subject	Uncontacted	Invalid
Central and Western	34	69	298	
Wanchai	5	22	281	
Eastern	76	386	360	2
Southern	54	123	147	
Yau Tsim	13	92	87	1
Mong Kok	5	30	221	2
Sham Shui Po	64	71	433	1
Kowloon City	60	89	441	
Wong Tai Sin	114	168	302	2
Kwun Tong	103	136	706	1
Kwai Tsing	83	73	488	35
Tsuen Wan	56	105	210	
Tuen Mun	58	409	103	
Yuen Long	10	33	172	
North	30	69	77	4
Tai Po	26	62	186	
Sha Tin	84	171	432	
Junk Bay and Sai Kung	6	15	133	
Total	881	2,123	5,077	48

Note: Successful cases = Contacted - Invalid
833 = 881 - 48

Cognition

Knowledge about the Function of Legco

With respect to the terms of reference of Legco, most of the young respondents could identify the three main activities of the assembly (see Table 2), that is, law-making (68.4%), financial monitoring (45.0%) and administrative monitoring (54.0%). However, there were areas other than the prescribed ones that were perceived by the young people to be included in Legco's scope of work. They were: "public sanitary services" (17.1%), "improve community environment" (32.2%), "improve community facilities" (33.4%), "cultural activities" (13.1%), "recreational activities" (12.0%), and "licensing" (9.7%). However, 8.5% of the respondents did not know any function of the Legco.

Table 2 Legco's Terms of Reference

Which of the following do you perceive as the terms of reference of Legco?	%	(N)
* Law-making	68.4	(570)
Public sanitary services	17.1	(143)
Improve community environment	32.2	(268)
Improve community facilities	33.4	(278)
Cultural activities	13.1	(109)
Recreational activities	12.0	(100)
* Control and regulate government finance	45.0	(375)
Licensing	9.7	(81)
* Control government administration	54.0	(450)
Others	1.2	(9)
Don't know	8.5	(71)

* Legislative Council jurisdiction.

Note: Respondents could choose more than one option, therefore the total percentage exceeds 100.

Significant to note, some duties which are essentially functions of the District Board (DB) and Municipal Council (MC) were mistakenly perceived to be within the Legco jurisdiction. Reasons for this could be due to the confusion created by having three levels of election taking place in one year. Respondents might have been confused by duties of DB, MC and Legco. In some instances, the policies debated and laws passed in Legco are indirectly related to the issues and problems of district and municipal nature. Thus, the Legco might be perceived to be involved in areas like public sanitary services and community facilities matters.

Knowledge about the Legco Constituency Areas

In the Legco election, the boundaries of each constituency were different from the ones adopted for DB and MC elections. The territory of Hong Kong was divided into nine constituencies: two in Hong Kong Island, three in Kowloon and four in the New Territories. In spite of the new demarcation of constituency, it was found that 67.4% of respondents were able to identify the constituency they belonged to, in which, the youth of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon districts (44.3%) were much more aware of their belonging to their constituency than their counterparts (23.1%). However, more than one-third said "Don't know" (see Table 3). These figures indicate that the government's promotion for the recognition of constituency areas seems not to have been very successful. It was especially so in the New Territories.

Table 3 Legco Constituency Areas

Which constituency area do you belong to?	%
Hong Kong Island East	9.1
Hong Kong Island West	9.7
Kowloon East	11.4
Kowloon Central	8.4
Kowloon West	5.7
New Territories East	6.4
New Territories South	5.6
New Territories West	5.6
New Territories North	5.5
Don't know	32.6
Total	100.0

Affect

Young people's feelings towards political institutions, that is, Hong Kong and China as their resident territory and nation state, were explored. According to Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations,* one's emotional feelings towards the government and politics are composed of system affect, output affect and input affect. System affect refers to the generalized attitudes towards the system, the nation, its virtues as well as its accomplishments. Output affect refers to attitudes towards the executive and administrative agencies. And input affect refers to feelings about agencies and processes that are involved in the election of public officials and the enactment of public policies.

System Affect

In measuring system affect, respondents were asked to pick not more than five items about Hong Kong and China that they were most proud of. A total of sixteen items under eight major areas were put forward. The

eight areas are: (1) government and political institutions, (2) social legislation, (3) economic system, (4) position in international affairs, (5) characteristics of people, (6) spiritual virtues and religion, (7) contribution to art, and (8) contribution to science.

Hong Kong

Even though respondents could pick a maximum of five items, not every respondent did so. Nearly half of the respondents (47.6%) identified five things that they were proud of about Hong Kong. Another 23.0% chose four items; 15.8% picked three items; 6.8% picked two items; 5.9% one only and 0.8% none.

Among the sixteen items, the most sought item was "freedom" (72.0% of the respondents chose this item). Next came "economic prosperity" (58.3%). Then came "good communication system" (54.5%). While 51.4% of the respondents chose the "strengths of Hong Kong people, e.g., hard-working, efficiency and high adaptability," and 27.4% chose "rule of law." Details of the findings are shown in Table 4. Upon close scrutiny of the research findings, the notion of "freedom" represents the highly regarded element on which the system affect of Hong Kong young people is built.

China

Again, respondents were requested to pick not more than five items of which they felt proud about China. It was found that only 8.2% of the respondents selected the maximum of five items. Some 13.1% chose four items; 20.2% chose three items, and 19.7% chose two items. Finally, 36.6% chose one item whereas 2.2% of the respondents refused to pick even one item about China that they would be proud of.

It is interesting to note the distribution of affective feelings that the people have on the listed items. Nearly half of the respondents (48.6%) reported that they were proud of China's art and cultural achievement. While 38.7% of the respondents were proud of the Chinese ethos of tolerance and forbearance, 35.2% considered the traditional ethics of the Chinese as the values they were proud of. Some 23.5% of them were proud of the strong national dignity of the Chinese. And, 22.6% were proud of the economic modernization programme of China. Further details are displayed in Table 5.

Table 4 Things about Hong Kong that Youth are Proud of

	%	(N)
A. Government and Political Institutions		
Development of democratic political system	19.3	(161)
The return of sovereignty to China after 1997	2.3	(19)
Rule of law	27.4	(228)
Freedom	72.0	(600)
Positive non-interventionism	11.8	(98)
Good public order	10.7	(89)
B. Social Legislation		
Social welfare, e.g., provision of public housing estates	20.8	(173)
C. Economic System		
Economic prosperity	58.3	(486)
Large scale development of infrastructure, e.g., building of new airport	17.6	(147)
D. Position in International Affairs		
The position and involvement in international affairs, e.g., financial support to the Allied countries against Iraq in Gulf War	5.3	(44)
E. Characteristics of People		
Strengths of Hong Kong people, e.g., hard-working, efficient, adaptable	51.4	(428)
F. Spiritual Virtues and Religion		
Open ethical values	2.5	(21)
Incorruptible, charitable	19.7	(164)
G. Contribution to Arts		
Contribution to culture, recreation and sports	8.4	(70)
H. Contribution to Science		
Achievement in science and technology	15.4	(128)
Advanced communication system	54.5	(454)

Note: Respondents could choose more than one option, therefore the total percentage exceeds 100.

Table 5 Things about China that Youth are Proud of

	%	(N)
A. Government and Political Institutions		
Strong feelings of nationalism	23.5	(196)
Develop socialism with Chinese characteristics	3.0	(25)
When compared with Late Qing, people get well-fed under Communist rule	7.2	(60)
Based on the principle of "one country two systems," the first Basic Law in the world was completed	8.4	(70)
B. Social Legislation		
Severe punishment	4.2	(35)
Social policy, e.g., one-child policy	3.5	(29)
C. Economic System		
Economic reform and open door policy	22.6	(188)
D. Position in International Affairs		
An independent diplomacy	3.1	(26)
Member of the United Nations Security Council	8.2	(68)
Being the big brother of the world communist bloc	1.9	(16)
E. Characteristics of People		
Chinese people's ethos of tolerance and forbearance	38.7	(322)
F. Spiritual Virtues and Religion		
Traditional ethical values, e.g., "Li", "Yi", "Lim" and "Chi," the concept of family and respect for the elderly	35.2	(293)
G. Contribution to Art		
Long history of art and culture	48.6	(405)
H. Contribution to Science		
Scientific achievement	4.9	(41)
I. None/Don't know	18.2	(152)

Note: Respondents could choose more than one option, therefore the total percentage exceeds 100.

A strong contrast can be found when the above findings are put in juxtaposition with those about Hong Kong. In the case of Hong Kong, a majority of the respondents (47.6%) chose five items about Hong Kong that they were proud of. However, in the case of China, a majority of the respondents chose one item only (36.6%). It shows that the affective feeling that the young people have towards China is weak, if not negative. Having been colonized by Britain for over a hundred years, they seem to have developed a sense of detachment from China. And the effect of the June Fourth Incident should not be underestimated. The anti-China feelings have not faded after two year's time and continue to bear an impact on the orientation of the youth.

Output Affect

It is assumed that if respondents expect fair and considerate treatment by the government, they will be favourably disposed towards government authority. Thus, questions were set to examine respondents' responsiveness to government officials, whether they thought they were being treated on a "give-and-take" basis. In measuring so, respondents were asked to indicate their possible reactions to an unfavourable bill passed by the government. They were then asked to indicate the expected response from the government. Finally, they were asked to rank the extent of influence that different sectors of population might have on government's decision.

Expected Reaction of Respondents

Respondents were asked to consider the following hypothetical situation:

> If the Legislative Council passes a bill which is in serious conflict with your interest, e.g., reduction of tertiary education places, a large increase in tuition fee, or tax increase, what will you do?

Of the respondents, 44.9% chose to express their opinion to DB members. This indicates the popularity and accessibility of the DB. Another 39.2% would air their grievances to the OMELCO; 28.8% would join some unconventional activities like demonstration and march; 24.1% chose to express their complaints by writing to newspapers' editors. And, 18.6% would join some youth groups and express their opinion. Only 10.3% would join political organization to express opinion, implying that the youth so far were not familiar with the functioning of political groups

in Hong Kong. Clearly enough, most respondents chose to react in a very mild manner. And perhaps because of the hypothetical nature of the question, only 19.2% would remain quiet. Details of the findings are given in Table 6.

Table 6 Respondents' Reaction to Unfavourable Legislation

	%	(N)
Express opinion to DB members	44.9	(371)
Make complaints to the OMELCO	39.2	(325)
Join unconventional activities, e.g., demonstration and march	28.8	(238)
Express opinion personally, e.g., letters to newspapers' editors	24.1	(199)
Do nothing, remain silent	19.2	(159)
Join youth organization to express opinion	18.6	(154)
Join political organization to express opinion	10.3	(85)
Organize unconventional activities, e.g., demonstration and march	5.8	(48)
Others	2.7	(22)

Note: Respondents could choose more than one option, therefore the total percentage exceeds 100.

Expected Reaction of Government Officials

As to their estimated response of government towards people's grievances (see Table 7), only 6.7% of the respondents expected that government would accept their opinion; 33.0% thought that the government might not accept their opinions but reasons would be provided; 25.6% considered that government would take into consideration different opinions and arrive at an appropriate decision. Then, 21.1% expected the government would shirk its responsibility and delay its decision; 13.6% thought that government would not consider any public opinion and would just go its own way. It shows that the first two and the last categories of respondents which comprise the majority (65.3%) held a rather positive image of the government officials.

Table 7 Respondents' Expected Reaction of Government Officials

	%
Does not accept but give explanation	33.0
Considers different opinions and arrives at the most suitable decision	25.6
Government departments do not take up the responsibility and delay the decision	21.1
Does not consider the opinion and goes its own way	13.6
Accepts your opinion	6.7

Different Sector's Influence on Government Decision

The top five sectors which respondents considered as the most influential were (see Table 8): British political consultants stationed in Hong Kong (63.0%), big corporatists (49.1%), Executive Council and Legco members (46.5%), officials of the New China News Agency (42.4%) and government officials (40.8%). The lowest five sectors which the youth identified as the least regarded by government were: students (41.2%), grassroots (16.0%), social workers (11.8%), political activists (10.1%) and political commentators (9.0%). Interestingly, not many respondents regarded MC members (19.5%) or DB members (12.9%) as the most influential groups. In general, the youth could identify the political powerful and the rich having the greatest influence on the decision-making process of the government, whereas the others with less power were having little influence on the government.

Table 8 Perceived Importance of Different Kinds of People's Opinion on Government (%)

To what extent does Hong Kong government consider seriously the opinion of the following types of people?	Most important 1	2	3	4	Least important 5
Big corporatists	49.1	32.9	14.1	2.6	1.3
Grassroots	4.6	16.8	30.6	32.0	16.0
Businessmen and industrialists	19.8	48.0	26.3	5.3	0.7
Social workers	3.2	13.0	37.1	34.9	11.8
Academics	5.5	24.8	46.3	19.6	3.8
Lawyers	16.2	48.0	28.5	5.7	1.5
Students	2.1	6.7	19.6	30.5	41.2
Political commentators	14.4	29.1	33.7	13.9	9.0
Political activists	12.6	27.6	32.1	17.6	10.1
Executive Council and Legco members	46.5	38.7	11.1	2.0	1.8
MC members	19.5	44.6	26.3	7.9	1.7
DB members	12.9	34.2	35.3	13.9	3.7
Government officials	40.8	35.2	17.2	5.1	1.8
New China News Agency officials	42.4	32.5	17.1	5.2	2.8
British political consultants	63.0	23.5	9.6	2.2	1.7

It was found that even when government's policies and decisions were at odd with their own interests, young people seemed to be reluctant to take radical action to alter the decisions. Besides, they expected the government to be a responsive one which would take into consideration their interests and concerns. Findings such as these suggest that respondents were having a kind of positive expectation irrespective of government's actual performance. In a sense, they perceived the government as having a rather paternalistic role.

Input Affect

Here, respondents' motives behind voting and their feelings about the elected councillors are considered.

Perception of Legco

Basically, a majority of the respondents (68.4%) perceived Legco as important to themselves. But, 6.8% of them considered Legco to be unimportant and 24.8% gave no opinion. Besides, 85.2% of the respondents considered that elected Legco members would have a better understanding of people's needs than appointed ones. Respondents basically held a positive perception of the elected members and the Council in general. An overwhelming majority of them reckoned that the elected members were in a better position to take care of citizen's needs. Such findings reflect youngsters' support for the introduction of direct election and their high regard for Legco as an important political institution.

Preferences on Policy Issues

Respondents were asked to indicate the position that they preferred Legco to hold over a number of political, economic and social issues. Questions allowed the respondents to identify themselves with those Legco members who held similar stands as their own.

Political Issues

Among the range of political issues, two subject matters, Hong Kong-China relations and human rights, were selected for examination. They were chosen because of their controversial nature and their being frequently discussed in the context of the 1997 transition.

The respondents' attitude towards the relationship between the governments of China and Hong Kong was ambivalent (see Table 9). On the one hand, 74.3% agreed that Hong Kong should maintain a good relationship with China. On the other hand, the number of respondents who agreed that the Chinese government should have jurisdiction over those policies extending beyond 1997 was more or less the same as with those who disagreed (40.9% and 40.3% respectively). This may imply that respondents perceived the need to uphold a good relationship with China but at the same time preferred that Chinese influence be kept at arm's length from Hong Kong.

Concerning the aspect of human rights, about half of the respondents

(49.9%) disagreed that they should give up their privacy for police power in order to maintain order in society (see Table 9). This shows that respondents were quite concerned about the protection of individual rights.

Table 9 Views on Policy Issues (%)

	Strongly agreed	Agreed	No opinion	Disagreed	Strongly disagreed
Political Issues					
The Chinese government should have the right of jurisdiction over policies of Hong Kong which extend beyond 1997.	2.5	38.4	18.8	36.7	3.6
Being a capitalist society, Hong Kong government should maintain a good relationship with the Chinese government which is a socialist country.	8.0	66.3	22.6	2.3	0.8
For the sake of public order in Hong Kong, citizen should give up their privacy in order to increase police power.	2.3	28.6	19.1	44.0	5.9
Economic and Social Issues					
Smoking should be forbidden in public areas.	27.8	48.6	14.7	7.2	1.8
Government should increase the profit tax in order to improve the provision of social welfare.	8.3	56.7	24.6	10.0	0.4
Government should check the price rise of private housing with a view to curbing inflation.	21.2	60.8	10.2	7.2	0.6

Table 9 (Continued)

	Strongly agreed	Agreed	No opinion	Disagreed	Strongly disagreed
Government should restrict importation of labour.	11.5	61.6	13.6	11.2	2.2
Education expenses should be cut so as to curb inflation.	0.7	4.8	5.8	60.6	28.0
The selling price of public housing should be pegged to the price of private housing.	1.4	12.6	13.6	54.6	17.7
Government should provide medical services based on "ability to pay" principle.	7.6	54.2	19.0	16.7	2.5
The open-camped Vietnamese boat people should be free to seek jobs in Hong Kong.	0.5	17.9	16.5	54.4	10.7
Government should forbid the entry of Vietnamese boat people to Hong Kong.	28.4	55.2	10.3	4.8	1.3
Death penalty should be resumed in Hong Kong.	4.7	39.1	20.1	32.5	3.7

In general, the young people in Hong Kong were cautious of and divided on the political issues. Or they might not have been familiar with political affairs as about 20% showed no opinion on the three questions.

Economic and Social Issues

The gist of the economic and social issues lies with the extent of government intervention. It was found that respondents generally welcomed to a great extent government's interference in economic and social affairs (see Table 9). For instance, 76.4% agreed that the government should forbid smoking in public areas. And, 65.0% agreed that government should increase the profit tax in order to improve social welfare provi-

sion, while 82.0% supported that government should check the price rise of private housing in order to curb inflation. On the aspect of imported labour, 73.1% agreed that the government should restrict further importation, showing their sympathy towards the lower class people.

The research findings also suggested an unclear conception of welfare among the respondents. On the one hand, they demanded that the government should have greater commitment to the provision of welfare. This was reflected by the 88.6% of respondents who disagreed that the government should cut the expense of education in order to curb inflation, and 72.3% also disagreed that the selling price of public housing should be pegged to the price of private housing. On the other hand, respondents also gave support to the "ability-to-pay" principle, as 61.8% agreed that people with ability-to-pay should bear higher medical costs than the poorer ones. The youth expressed their ideal allocation of resources in society. Yet what would be their preference in terms of priority would require further exploration.

The Vietnamese boat people issue, though to be resolved very soon, was controversial at the time of data collection. Respondents seemed to have strong resentment towards the Vietnamese boat people. As shown in Table 9, 65.1% disagreed that the boat people staying in open camps should have the freedom to find jobs in Hong Kong. Furthermore, 83.6% agreed that Hong Kong government should forbid the entry of Vietnamese boat people to Hong Kong. With respect to the death penalty, the number of respondents who supported its introduction was higher than those who opposed it (43.8% and 36.2% respectively), reflecting the strong will of young people to protect the law and order of Hong Kong by means of tight controls. On the whole, these showed that quite a large number of young people were being attracted to policies that could enhance a more even distribution of wealth in society.

Conation

Orientation in the Electoral Process

Though the outcome of voting may bear much influence on the political development of the society, young people, including those who actually participated, seemed to have little expectation in mind. In this study (see

Table 10), a majority of the respondents (67.6%) regarded voting and involvement in the campaign activity merely as a civic obligation to be fulfilled. And only 21.7% reckoned the motive was to support the government. On the whole, the young respondents' desire to vote was rather passive.

Table 10 Motives behind Voting

If you have the right to vote, what is your motive behind voting?	%
Fulfil civic obligation	67.6
Support the government: "voting is power"	21.7
Influence of campaign activities	2.9
There's spare time	2.3
Out of curiosity	1.7
Do what friends do	0.8
Others	2.9
Total	99.9

A majority of the respondents (59.3%) considered that the motive behind those who were involved in campaign activities was to support their desired candidates (see Table 11). But, 23.9% deemed their campaign activities as a mere civic obligation.

Table 11 Motives behind Election Campaigners

What do you think is the motive behind people involvement in election campaign?	%
Support desired candidate	59.3
Fulfil civic obligation	23.9
Do what friends do	5.3
Out of curiosity	4.9
Make the candidate disliked to lose	2.9
There's spare time	2.0
Others	1.7
Total	100.0

Intention of Involvement in Campaigning

Of the respondents, 74.8% indicated that they would not participate in campaign activities while 25.2% would. The desire for participation was low even in response to this hypothetical question. For those who would not participate (see Table 12), "there's no time available" (31.9%), "no desirable candidate" (26.5%), and "campaign activities are of limited use to candidates' victory" (16.9%) were the three most commonly quoted reasons. The proportion of the last reason given was quite astonishing, revealing the skepticism of the respondents towards the electoral process. The outcome of about one-fourth who did not have favourable candidate for them to select was discouraging. It might also suggest the possible failure of campaign strategies in promoting the candidates or the lack of desirable candidates. For those who would participate (see Table 13), their reasons were mainly "civic obligation" (34.0%), "to enrich social experience" (27.3%), "meaningful" (19.6%) and "to enable the desired candidate to win" (13.4%).

Table 12 Reasons for Not Participating in Election Campaign

	%
No time available	31.9
No desirable candidate	26.5
Campaign activities are of limited use to candidates' victory	16.9
Waste of time	9.4
Meaningless	4.8
Others	10.5
Total	100.0

Table 13 Reasons for Participating in Election Campaign

	%
Civic obligation	34.0
Enrich social experience	27.3
Meaningful	19.6
Enable the desired candidate to win	13.4
Interesting	0.5
Others	5.3
Total	100.1

Intention to Vote

Of the respondents, 88.2% indicated that they would vote in the Legco election. For youngsters aged 18-20 who were not given the right to vote under the present legislature, 84.2% reported that they would vote if given the right. This reported tendency, however, was contradictory to their attitudes towards the lowering of voting age to 18.

Half of the respondents (49.9%) disagreed that the voting age should be lowered to 18. Those who agreed covered 33.7% and 16.3% gave no opinion. When compared with findings of two other surveys in 1987 and 1988 conducted by the Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, the 1991 survey showed only a slight increase in the number of those who agreed to the proposal. For the survey conducted in 1987, 67.8% of the respondents disagreed that the voting age should be lowered to 18 and 30.5% agreed. For the 1988 survey, 73.5% considered that the voting age for the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should be set at 21 and 23.4% chose 18.

The reasons of agreement and disagreement over the issue of lowering the age of voting vary. For those who agreed that the voting age should be set at 18 (see Table 14), 61.2% of them reported that this would provide opportunity for the youth to participate in Hong Kong's democratization. And, 49.1% of the respondents considered this a basic political right. As young people are the major force of social change, 44.8% agreed that voting right would allow them to exert influence on society. Of them, 29.9% thought that young people had enough autonomy to vote. Also, 25.6% regarded the lowering of voting age as the inevitable development of democracy. Finally, there were 20.3% of the respondents

who agreed that the setting of voting age at 18 could reduce the inconsistency of legal age in social, economic and political fields.

Table 14 Reasons for Lowering the Voting Age to 18

	%	(N)
This allows young people to participate in the democratic process of Hong Kong.	61.2	(172)
This is a basic political right.	49.1	(138)
Young people are important agents of social change. Voting would enable them to exert the necessary influence on society.	44.8	(126)
Young people have sufficient autonomy to vote.	29.9	(84)
This is an inevitable result of democratization.	25.6	(72)
This can standardize the legal age of social, economic and political activities to 18. Confusion is thus reduced.	20.3	(57)
Others.	1.1	(3)

Note: Respondents could choose more than one option, therefore the total percentage exceeds 100.

For those who disagreed with the lowering of voting age (see Table 15), the most commonly chosen reason was that young people were not mature enough to exercise this right sensibly (67.8% chose this reason). Besides, 59.6% of them considered that young people did not have a full understanding of the representative government of Hong Kong. And, 54.1% thought that young people lacked independent thinking and, therefore, were proned to external influence. Some considered that the civic consciousness of youngsters had not reached the level suitable for casting a vote (46.9%). Whereas, 34.1% of them thought that young people did not even understand the meaning of election.

Table 15 Reasons for Not Lowering the Voting Age to 18

	%	(N)
Young people are immature and lack life experience.	67.8	(282)
In general, young people do not understand the system of representative government in Hong Kong.	59.6	(248)
Young people lack independent thinking and can be easily influenced.	54.1	(225)
Young people's civic consciousness is too low for voting.	46.9	(195)
Young people are still too young to understand the meaning of election.	34.1	(142)
It is not the duty of young people to vote.	1.9	(8)
Others.	0.2	(1)

Note: Respondents could choose more than one option, therefore the total percentage exceeds 100.

It was interesting to discover that there were proportionately more of the elder respondents (aged 21-24) who agreed that the voting age should be lowered than of the younger cohort (aged 18-20), 40.7% and 28.2% respectively. It can be argued that the more mature youngsters and those who had the right and experience to vote had the ability to judge whether the voting age should be lowered or not. Younger respondents who were against the idea did not have the confidence and were not prepared to vote. It seems that the participatory subculture is not deeply rooted in the youth community.

The Cognition-Affect-Conation Analysis

Fiske and Kinder (1981:181) asserted that "Greater attention to politics encourages sharper affective reactions and greater behavioral involvement." There is a triadic relationship in which cognitive involvement

enhances affective engagement and which in turn encourages political participation. Campbell *et al.* (1960) found a high correlation between cognition and conation in political attitudes. And Vidulich and Krevanick (1966) proved there was a close correspondence between cognition and affect (McGuire, 1969:157). In recognition of the interrelationship between the cognitive, affective and conative domains of political orientation and their possible influence on the patterns of political participation, enquiries were made specifically to probe into young people's political attitudes both directly and indirectly relating to voting. By analyzing the relationship of results generated from such analysis, there are a number of phenomena worth noting.

The Education Factor

From the social learning theorists' point of view it is reasonable to assume that education is central to cognitive development. The findings of this research show that education, in comparison with other socio-economic factors like income, occupation and religion, does seem to be an important factor leading to differences at the cognitive level. In identifying the three main functions of the Legco, the higher the education respondents possessed, the more correct answers they could provide compared to the lower educated. In locating the constituency area the respondents belonged to, the lower educated had more "don't-know" than the higher educated (see Table 16).

Table 16 Cognition-Affect-Conation Relationship (%)

		Education		
		High	Middle	Low
Knowledge of Legco's functions	Answer all three	50.6	28.4	17.1
Knowledge of constituency area	Don't know	28.6	32.3	58.8
Reaction to unfavourable legislation	Do nothing	16.7	19.1	32.4
Join unconventional activities	Yes	43.8	25.3	20.6
Importance of Legco to youth	Yes	82.1	65.5	57.1
Exercise of voting right (18-20)	Yes	88.1	84.6	57.1

On the system affect level, however, the education factor is not as significant. Most of the young people, regardless of their education level, had more to be proud of about Hong Kong than about China.

For the output affect (see Table 16), lower educated young respondents were more inclined than the higher educated to do nothing and keep silent when their interests were in conflict with a bill passed by the Legco. Proportionally, the higher educated youth were more likely to apply radical measures to protect their own interest than their counterparts.

For the input affect (see Table 16), better educated respondents better recognized the importance of the Legco to oneself than the lower educated. A number of studies support that there is a positive relationship between education and voting.[6] When the 18-20 age group was asked whether they would vote if given the right, over 80% of the higher educated people said yes, while about 40% of the lower educated said no.

The Attitude-Behaviour Gap

Researchers are often wary of the fact that a person's verbal report of his attitude has a rather low correlation with his actual behaviour towards the object of the attitude. It is no easy task to find out the real relationship between what one **reports** to have done and what one has **actually** done.

In this study, only six respondents (0.8%) joined political organizations. They are: Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (1), Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (1), Meeting Point (1), and United Democrats of Hong Kong (2). While a majority of them did not join any of the political organizations, the reasons they gave are listed in Table 17.

Table 17 Reasons for Not Joining Political Organizations

	%	(N)
No time and not interested.	34.7	(275)
No reason.	18.1	(143)
Lack of information and understanding about political organization and its operation.	13.3	(105)
Do not have the chance to get in touch with political organizations. Or, there is no one inviting to join.	12.5	(99)
Not necessary.	5.7	(45)
Do not trust a political organization. Political organizations are trouble-makers and indulge in demonstrations and march.	5.4	(43)
Do not understand and have no confidence in politics. Politics is dirty.	2.7	(21)
Too young, not educated and lack of experience.	1.9	(15)
Others.	3.2	(25)

It is also noted that 75.7% of the respondents aged 21 and above were unregistered voters. But, 24.3% had registered, and among those 52.3% and 37.3% respectively had casted a vote in the elections for the DB and MC. In the follow-up interview, out of 383 successfully contacted cases, 93 were registered voters. Of them, 64.5% reported that they had cast a vote on the polling day and 31.2% reported that they had not.

In this Legco research and the DB/MC election surveys conducted by the same authors from February to May 1991, it was found that there were great discrepancies among the actual, intended and reported voter turnout rates in the three elections. The intended voting rates were recorded before the elections. The reported voting rates were given at the follow-up interviews after the elections and the actual rates were announced by the government (see Table 18). A sizable gap (38.7%–55.9%) exists between the intended and actual rates. It is probably due to sampling errors, and the so-called social desirability effect. The difference was greatly reduced (15.0%–39.8%) when comparing between the

reported and actual turnout rates. The reason for the difference might be that most of the successfully interviewed respondents were likely to be politically active youth. However, the difference between the intended and reported rates (11.6%–23.7%) is most difficult to explain. It also reflects the complexity of the intercorrelation among the trilogy of cognition-affect-conation which gives vague hints as to the prediction of the actual behaviour.

Table 18 Actual, Intended and Reported Voter Turnout in the 1991 Elections (%)

	Actual (A)*	Intended (I)†	Reported (R)†	Difference (I)-(A)	(R)-(A)	(I)-(R)
DB	20.9	72.3	60.7	51.4	39.8	11.6
MC	13.8	69.7	50.0	55.9	36.2	19.7
Legco	49.5	88.2	64.5	38.7	15.0	23.7

Notes: * 21-25 age group.
† 21-24 age group.

Summary

According to the findings as summarized above, it was evident that, on the cognitive level, young people in Hong Kong exhibited high level of awareness of the political institutions and actors. They were quite able to acknowledge the importance and function of the Legco, to differentiate the difference between the elected and appointed members of the Council, and the needs for the government to consult people and to act in accordance with people's interest.

In terms of their affective orientation, their attitudes were rather inconsistent. It was shown in their different attitudes towards minority groups acquiring equal rights and their preference for governmental policies. On the one hand, they highly acclaimed "freedom" as the attribute they felt most proud of about Hong Kong. Yet they saw the need for more governmental interventions into economic and social affairs. While they highly favoured directly elected councillors, they were nei-

ther prepared to actively support the direct election system, nor did they feel it necessary to take a strong stand against undesirable government policies, or the intervention of the Chinese government.

Young people's strong identity with Hong Kong was shown by their positive expectations towards the government and their readiness to relate themselves with the strengths of Hong Kong. Their feelings towards China, on the other hand, was detached and less positive in that they were more cautious about the relationship with Chinese government and they also lacked strong affective tie with China as their nation-state. It was evident that young people had a strong regional identity with Hong Kong.

On the conative level, it was found that young people were rather reluctant to engage in various political activities. They saw themselves as a group in the community having the least power. As individuals, they were preoccupied by their life tasks, like studying, work and family life. Many of them believed young people were incompetent to shoulder political responsibility like becoming a registered voter. They also inclined to adopt modest means rather than radical actions to express their views. Very few were ready to take part in political organizations.

In a way, the pattern of political participation of young people in Hong Kong was consistent with the observations made in the western countries which have recorded the strongest support from people of the social and political mainstreams like the older, more highly educated, affluent male and unalienated persons (Hunt, 1985).

On the theoretical aspect, findings derived from this project have led to more questions than answers. As discussed in the above, substantial gaps among the intended, actual and reported actions of respondents have been identified. The difference between intended and actual behaviour which amounts to 40–50% is especially glaring. We can easily jump to the conclusion that it may have resulted from a biased sample or from the desirability effect — that people being interviewed are likely to have higher political consciousness, and that the respondent may only provide the answer that one perceives is more socially desirable. Discounting these two factors, we cannot ignore the fact that there is a gap among cognitive, affective and conative levels of political orientation. They do not necessary formulate a linear or cause-and-effect relationship. In other words, the attitudes of youth on a wide range of political issues as elicited by the findings seem to suggest the possibility that an individual's behaviour, thinking and sentiment are not necessary tallying with one

another. One's reasoning, whether it is from a rational or emotive perspective, may or may not be a prerequisite for or determinant of a particular action. That is, one's intention is not necessarily translated into a coherent behaviour. Behaviour may take an opposite or deviated direction from intention. Though this research cannot provide a satisfactory answer to such queries, it points to a potential pitfall that political scientists need to be aware of when assumptions have to be made on the political behaviour of specific groups in the society.

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Notes

1. See Lau and Ho (1980), Hong Kong Young Women's Christian Association (1985), Hong Kong Council of Social Service (1986), Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups (1987, 1988, 1989), Ng and Cheung (1989), and Tam and Wong (1990).
2. See discussion in Almond and Verba (1980) Chapter 1 and also Pye and Verba (1965) Chapter 1.
3. The cognitive component of attitude refers to "how the attitude object is perceived." See McGuire (1969:155).
4. The affective component of attitude deals with "the person's feelings of liking or disliking about the object of the attitude." See McGuire (1969:155).
5. The conative component of attitude refers to "the person's gross behavioural tendencies regarding the object." See McGuire (1969:156).
6. See Campbell *et al.* (1960), Verba and Nie (1972), and Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980).

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4

Exit Polls

Controversies and Methodologies

Robert Ting-yiu Chung

Preamble

While the development of opinion polls in general, and exit polls[1] in particular, in the course of history warrants a detailed academic treatise beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that the first exit poll, in the true sense of the term,[2] in Hong Kong occurred only as early as our maiden Legislative Council direct election on 15 September 1991. We therefore have only a ludicrously short history of exit polls, and we must judge our own history from the perspective of our unique societal development.

Of course, this is not to say that we should not capitalize on others' experience. Exit polls probably began in the United States in 1967 (Mitofsky, 1991:83) and then spread around the world. In 1976, according to Frankovic (1990), within the United States alone, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) News conducted ten primary exit polls and one nation-wide general election poll. In 1988, there was at least one network exit poll in every state of the United States. The pervasiveness of exit polls in most democratic countries has stemmed mainly from their

early prediction of election results, but this in itself has stirred up a raging "exit poll controversy" in 1980 across the United States and the whole world. The controversy was brought to life in Hong Kong shortly before the September 1991 direct election.[3]

"The Controversy"

In 1980, in the American presidential election between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, National Broadcasting Company (NBC) News, CBS News and American Broadcasting Company (ABC) News all made early projections of Ronald Reagan's victory after some polling stations closed on the East Coast, while those on the West Coast were still open. Although such projections were not based entirely on exit poll results, exit poll became the scapegoat. Some claimed that, because of their early predictions, large numbers of voters on the West Coast were dissuaded from voting, resulting in a 6 to 12% reduction in the turnout rate (Jackson, 1983). However, the evidence was not conclusive, and Epstein and Strom found that the effect could have only been about 0.2% (1984:50). Sudman, after comparing voter turnouts for American congressional elections across a number of years, concluded:

> As with so many other interesting real-world events, measuring the exact effect of one thing, the exit polls, and controlling for everything else becomes very tricky. Based on a consensus of the data, there is a *possibility* (author's italics) of a small decrease ranging from 1 to 5 percent in total vote in congressional districts where polls close significantly later... in those elections where the exit polls suggest a clear winner when previously the race had been considered close.... Whether this is a "significant" effect requiring legislation is not a statistical but a political issue. (1986:338)

It must be noted, however, that there was no dispute over the final *winner* of the election, but only over the turnout rate. On the other hand, exit polls may have the converse effect of causing more people to vote if they indicate the race is closer than expected (Jackson, 1983). Nevertheless, the debate, and its outcome,[4] should provide an important reference point for deliberation — on the role of the media, and on the delicate balance between responsible journalism and freedom of information.

Why Exit Polls?

"Exit polls" are important instruments to measure voting behaviour. Politicians and scholars alike would like to know why voters choose a particular candidate. Is it because of his/her party background, past performance, personality, or simply due to somebody else's recommendation? These questions might well be answered through telephone or door-to-door surveys, but they are best answered by *actual voters* immediately after they have cast their ballot, for very simple reasons: Firstly, tremendous resources are saved from having to search for the actual voters;[5] secondly, the sampling technique used is relatively simple,[6] and thirdly, assuming that the respondents speak the truth, maximum recollection of events and feelings is made possible. There is practically no limit to the number and type of questions asked, but the tradeoff is increased refusals if the questions become too complicated, or the questionnaire too long. In the author's experience, the optimum length of an interview should be around three minutes, and it is not advisable to ask questions unrelated to the election at stake.

The main disadvantage of exit polls lies in the absence of non-voters. We, therefore, cannot generalize the findings of the poll to the entire population, which, in a way, limits the scope of investigation. Another disadvantage of exit polls arises from their physical setting. For some polling stations, at certain elections, the place may be too crowded, and passers-by too inquisitive, to provide for a quiet environment for interviews. Otherwise, such polls are ideal for studying voting behaviour.

Exit Polls and "Horse-Racing"

One of the questions raised in the August 1991 debate in Hong Kong was whether exit polls would encourage the horse-racing mentality of our voters. The author's answer to this question is a definite "yes" — if poll findings were broadcast in the early part of the election day. The author is himself against the "degrading" of electoral races to become horse-races, but we must nevertheless be very careful in defining what we mean by "horse-racing mentality."

If horse-racing is equated to gambling or using unlawful means to alter the results, or to capitalise on other people's ignorance or misinfor-

mation, it should not be encouraged. If horse-racing means making calculative moves based on other people's bets, rather than on rational judgement based on a candidate's suitability for service or deserved support,[7] we should also not encourage it (but no society has been able to wipe out such attitudes entirely). However, if horse-racing means providing entertainment to the public via focusing on a set of competitions, there is no reason why we should not add some flavour to the electoral process — perhaps to attract more people to vote in the next round. In the British general election held earlier in 1992, many Hong Kong television watchers had the opportunity of watching an entertaining programme *as results came in.* Through constant updates of local results during the counting process, a holistic picture of party strength and the interlocking relationship of each polling district was revealed to the public. Even in places as near as Macau, the counting procedures allowed the watchful public to follow the results station by station, precinct by precinct, *as results came in.* In Hong Kong, ballot counting is often boring, restricted, uninformative, and even incomprehensible to the general public. The most liberal move by the government so far has been the release of pairwise voteshares in the nine Legislative Council constituencies for the 1991 direct election. In order to make the counting process more interesting and informative, the author advocates that the counting system in Hong Kong be revised to allow for separate counting, and reporting, of voteshares according to polling districts. This, on one hand, would not infringe on the principle of confidentiality, and on the other hand, would make ballot counting more interesting and informative.

It is perhaps one thing to *announce* the results in a more entertaining fashion, but quite another to encourage people's horse-racing mentality during the electoral process. Should we not opt for a quiet environment, freed from the annoyance of campaign activities or opinion polls, for rational voters to perform their sacred duty?

Apparently, in all democratic societies, the occurrence of opinion polls is a regular feature. Scientifically conducted trustworthy polls provide information, to policy-makers and members of the public alike, on how people feel towards particular issues. Whether such feelings are well based or not, they are still important information of which all responsible governments should carefully take note. Along this line of argument, pre-election polls, being one particular type of opinion polls, could also provide important information about voters' feelings towards particular candidates, parties, or issues. Properly conducted polls make the society

more open, let people know how others think, and motivate, if not impel, political parties to clarify, or modify, their stands on particular issues.

The other side of the coin is that voters, especially the less educated, may be lured to cast their votes according to somebody else's opinion. There were those well-talked about "bandwagon" and "underdog" effects, whereby voters either came out to support the stronger or weaker side after knowing which side was more likely to win,[8] but these "effects" were more hypothetical postulations than empirical facts. Since only a very small proportion of actual voters would have heard, if not acted on, the preliminary results of an exit poll even if they were announced before the stations closed (but inevitably late in the day), the effect of such early predictions, if any, could have only been nominal. Pre-election polls which indicate a close fight would probably have more effects on the voters.[9]

The American experience of the 1980 election, discussed in the previous section, has resolved the question of freedom of information versus "undisturbed" rationality by leaning towards the liberty end, but there are other countries which prefer otherwise. Some have banned exit polls altogether. Which way should Hong Kong go?

If we assume that voters are fully rational, and that there is a complete free flow of information before the election day, then opinion polls may well become a nuisance, and whichever way poll results are announced, they would not affect the voters' choice. In that situation, neither exit poll results nor last minute campaign activities would be of interest to the voters. There would simply be no market for such activities. On the other hand, if exit poll results announced during the day become a directive force influencing voter decision, should we not question the voters' maturity, rather than prohibit such activities? Under such circumstances, voters, or campaign workers, can always resort to other means (like private polls) to obtain information and persuade voters. In Macau, for example, it has been against the law to ask, or answer, any question on how one has voted within 100 meters of the polling station, but this has not deterred campaign workers from requiring their supporters to declare how they have voted when they assemble again after returning from the polling stations.[10]

In the author's opinion, Hong Kong has still a long way to go before mastering the democratic process. Because the history of direct election is still a very short one, the first priority should be to attract people's attention to and participation at such elections. If opinion polls and

election day campaign activities can help to attract people's participation, they should not be discouraged. Yet, when Hong Kong people begin to understand the spirit of democracy, and master the skills of it, a more restrained environment should be encouraged. In any case, control should rest with opinion pollsters' professional code of conduct, rather than through government restrictions. It is very dangerous to accept government's intervention on the conducting or announcing of exit poll results, and it will also be grossly inappropriate for any government official to publicly denounce exit polls and suggest voters take an uncooperative stand, before the issue is settled in the court or the legislature. Nevertheless, it would also be wrong for academics and media workers to capitalize on the public's immature attitude towards political elections. Jack Holley was probably right when he concluded:

> The press will also continue to use exit polls; the "why" of the victory or loss fits the definition of news. But, again, the media could be more sensitive to the feelings of the public... and back off on those early predictions of winners.... The media also are unlikely to abandon the horse race stories.... We always have been interested in who is winning... [but] that does not mean the media could not down play those aspects of the story... or be aware that polls taken very early in the season may only register name recognition.... (1991:231-2)

When to Announce?

If properly conducted, there are at least two sets of information available from exit polls: prediction of the winner, and statistics pertaining to voting behaviour. To an academic or a political analyst, the value of exit polls in studying voting behaviour has never been in doubt. In fact, one reason for the appearance of opinion polls in the United States was because opinion polls gave newspapers more trustworthy information than interviews with party leaders, especially in an age when parties were considered suspect (Frankovic, 1990). It certainly makes a difference whether people support you because you are good, or because you are the least evil. Exit polls provide the best evidence ever to support, or refute, politicians' claims for their success.

In Hong Kong, so far, people's attention to exit polls has revolved around their early prediction function. In places like Hong Kong, where

the official counting process is lengthy and uninteresting, exit poll results, if properly analyzed and presented, can attract public attention and add flavour to the day's event. Moreover, early results from exit polls can also prepare candidates, political parties, journalists and analysts for the final outcome. Needless to say, punters and investors around the world also like to capitalize on such early information.

The undesirable effect of such early predictions, if announced before the stations close, is that they might sway voters into strategic voting — casting one's vote in such a way that one would not otherwise do — or perhaps discourage intending voters from turning out to vote. As described in the last section, the so-called "bandwagon" and "underdog" effects are still contentions pending supportive evidence, and the effect of early predictions on turnout rates is still unclear. Nevertheless, it is advisable that we take a conservative stand on this issue in Hong Kong for the moment, if simply because it takes time to refine our research methodology. In all the exit polls that the author conducted, he made it clear to the sponsoring media that no information pertaining to voteshares should be released to either the public or any campaign groups before the polling stations closed at 10:30 p.m. However, it must be pointed out that such exit polls were not the only source of information assessing the situation. Campaign workers from various parties also conducted their own polls throughout the day to monitor the situation; and these surveys have posed a more important ethical question than the ones visible to the public.[11]

Although we should be very careful about "bringing in" new opinion mechanisms to Hong Kong, we should nevertheless maintain an open mind on unresolved debates. Although the author has advocated a more conservative practice of announcing exit poll results after the polling stations close, the effect of opinion polls on voter behaviour should continue to be studied in-depth to prepare for our next wave of elections. Hong Kong's success in the past lies in its adaptability and flexibility in absorbing changes; we must maintain our excellence in the field of political development as well.

Quality or Accuracy?

Theoretically, a good survey is an accurate survey. But there is a tradeoff.

If we want to predict the result accurately, we must theoretically obtain as large a sample as possible, but this at once poses a number of problems. Firstly, we may need to shorten our questionnaire so much that there are few questions remaining,[12] or to deploy large numbers of interviewers *at almost every station* to capture the actual voters. This can be expensive and time consuming (both in terms of conducting the survey and data processing), not to speak of the unnecessary interference created by research teams from other exit pollsters. Secondly, if exit polls are purely aimed at making predictions a couple of hours ahead of the final outcome, then all the data collected is rendered useless immediately after the announcement of the official result. If consumers have a choice, few will be willing to pay for such surveys. Finally, it is against the principle of scientific survey that we study populations instead of samples — not just because of time and money constraints, but because we believe scientific knowledge progresses through induction and deduction. Afterall, this is what statistics is all about.

Table 1 summarizes the sample size and the resulting accuracy of two exit polls conducted by different organizations during the September 1991 Legislative Council direct election.[13]

Table 1 Sample Size and Accuracy of the TVB and ATV/SSRC Exit Polls of September 1991

	TVB Exit Poll	ATV/SSRC Exit Poll
Sample size	246,921	12,054
Percentage of actual turnout	32.9	1.6
Number of stations sampled	100	80
Average error in predicting voteshares (%)	1.01	1.56

Incidentally, both polls had seventeen out of the eighteen seats correctly predicted, and both erred in reversing the second and third place for the New Territories West constituency.

This comparison is not meant to bring out the superiority of one exit poll over the other, it only illustrates the different philosophies of the different pollsters in the usage of such polls. The Television Broadcasting Limited (TVB) poll of September 1991 (and later, December 1991 again) was more concerned with accurate predictions, probably in line with the audience's expectations. The Asia Television Limited (ATV)/SSRC poll conducted by the Social Sciences Research Centre (SSRC) of the University of Hong Kong, on the other hand, was more concerned with studying voter behaviour and had used a much smaller sample. As it turned out, SSRC's sample was only one-twentieth of that of TVB, but the average error of voteshare prediction was only 1.5 times larger.

The situation for the New Territories West Legislative Council by-election on 8 December 1991 was almost a repetition of the September polls. TVB again went out for large samples, but this time they chose less polling stations than SSRC, which did not receive any commercial sponsorship this time. The overall results are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2 Sample Size and Accuracy of the TVB and SSRC Exit Polls of December 1991

	TVB Exit Poll	SSRC Exit Poll
Sample size (approx.)	28,000	2,096
Percentage of actual turnout	51.3	3.8
Number of stations sampled	11	35
Average error in predicting voteshares (%)	5.37	2.86

Although both pollsters predicted the winner, it can be seen that error in predicted voteshares was greater than that of the September polls. But interestingly, predictions from SSRC's smaller sample size (about 7% of TVB's) was about twice as accurate. This points to the importance of sampling method rather than the sample size alone. SSRC's exit poll research design will be discussed in a later part of this paper.

To complete the picture, there was again another Legislative Council by-election in New Territories West on 30 August 1992. This time, TVB and SSRC collaborated to run the only exit poll for the election — the TVB/SSRC Exit Poll, and the results were miraculously accurate (see

Table 3).

Table 3 Sample Size and Accuracy of the TVB/SSRC Exit Poll of August 1992

	TVB/SSRC Exit Poll
Sample size	3,415
Percentage of actual turnout	5.4
Number of stations sampled	25
Average error in predicting voteshares (%)	0.11

There appears to be no clear-cut answer to the dilemma of accuracy versus quality, even with refined research methodology. Much depends on the expectation of the readers of the poll. At this stage, the supreme criterion used by the general public to judge an opinion poll seems to be its accuracy in predicting the outcome, rather than its sophistication in explaining the result. There is, of course, merit in this orientation, because prediction is, after all, the ultimate criterion to verify/falsify any scientific theory, but there is no reason why academics cannot turn the tide by underscoring the importance of quality information, especially when elections become more and more an ordinary event.

What to Ask?

The questions to be asked in an exit poll depend, of course, very much on the issues the pollsters wish to explore. Apparently, how and why voters cast their votes seem to be the crux of all questions. But in places where the law forbids the revelation of candidate choice outside polling stations, such questions cannot be asked.

Given that exit polls are occasions when actual voters are readily available for interview, there can be two opposite tendencies in the preparation of the questionnaire. On one hand, there are researchers who like to ask only one question — "Whom have you voted for?" and on the other hand, there are very long questionnaires attempting to find out

almost everything. Needless to say, the design of the questionnaire depends very much on how a researcher strikes his balance between quality and accuracy. But whatever questions are asked, researchers must try to keep down the refusal rate of exit polls. There is a number of reasons why voters refuse to answer exit polls: they may feel that the information is too personal; they may fear that their choice will frustrate certain campaign workers (in which case they are tempted not to speak the truth); they may be too busy for interview; or they may not trust the interviewers altogether. Researchers, therefore, have to plan their polls very carefully. Serious training should be arranged for interviewers, and fieldwork should be carefully controlled and supervised. In the author's experience, interview time should be kept down to three minutes as far as possible, and emphasis must be made on confidentiality and the poll's academic nature. It is not advisable to ask only one question on candidate choice, because it is the author's contention that exit polls should be used not primarily for early predictions, especially if the media or the Electoral Office are able to make the counting process more interesting and entertaining.

Methodologies of Exit Polls

Mitofsky (1991:93-96) has described in detail how exit polls in the United States are normally conducted. Essentially, they follow a two-tier sampling method, whereby polling stations are selected according to a probability proportionate to their number of voters. During the survey, voters leaving the polling station are systematically sampled and interviewed by a self-administered questionnaire.

In Hong Kong, the SSRC has hitherto conducted eight exit polls since the first Legislative Council direct election in September 1991 (Appendix 1). In these polls, the number of actual voters successfully interviewed was roughly between 2% to 5% of the overall voter turnout. All interviews were carried out face-to-face, instead of using self-administered questionnaires.

In designing such surveys, it might be useful to calculate the number of interviewers available, and to deploy interviewers in teams of two, wherever possible. When polling stations are too many to be covered, they can be selected randomly, or, in some situations, according to

candidates' strength, if known. One important methodology in exit polls lies in the selection of respondents, and the training of interviewers. Interviewers must work strictly under prescribed guidelines and should never be allowed to choose respondents arbitrarily. To avoid overloading interviewers, we recommend a well spaced time schedule for each interviewer, which in effect means sampling according to time segments. We have not yet analyzed the effect of time bias in our exit polls, but there is definitely great differences in candidate choice across stations, districts, and other demographic variables in quite a number of elections. As a rule of thumb, the more we know about how various factors interplay before the actual election, the better we can plan our exit polls. Our experience in the New Territories West exemplifies this.

In the September 1991 Legislative Council election, eight out of the forty stations in the constituency were chosen, but the second place was incorrectly predicted.[14] After studying the discrepancy, a number of hypotheses was put forward and put to test in the December 1992 by-election in the same constituency. The winner of that election was correctly predicted, but the average error in voteshare was still about 3%. The choice of thirty-five stations out of forty made possible the study of variations across polling stations, and in the next by-election held in August 1992, based on a 5.4% sample size, we were able to predict voteshares with an average error of about 1%.

We may not be able to obtain the same accuracy in other elections, due to insufficient manpower and knowledge of other constituencies, but our experience certainly points to the importance of pre-election polls and observations, and along which line we can refine our exit poll methodology.

On the other hand, pre-election and exit polls may never be accurate, because of so many unknown factors. Moreover, the reality is never static, the exercise of unfolding reality can itself become part of the reality. From the interactionist perspective, opinion polls, themselves under the danger of generating self-fulfilling prophesies, are but another set of social symbols upon which people interact to generate a new state of social reality. We, therefore, need not over-stress the accuracy of the polls but, rather, appreciate poll findings from the perspective of how much reality has been actually unwrapped by the scientific method.

Concluding Remarks

The author started by exposing a number of issues pertaining to the conducting of exit polls in Hong Kong, but has ended by saying that we may never be able to judge opinion polls as some objective artifacts. This, however, is not to say that we cannot pass judgement on the quality and excellence of an exit poll, it only shows that exit polls are not static in nature, and must be viewed in light of our unique historical development. To add substance to the discussion, the author would like to finish this paper by offering the following advice to prospective exit pollsters, in order to sharpen the methodology for our next wave of elections:

1. The academic and research community must build up its reputation and credibility in conducting the polls and use the data properly. Should it like to use the data for political purposes, it should explain itself to the respondents. This is simply intellectual integrity.

2. To uphold the quality of opinion polls, researchers should develop among themselves a code of practice similar to that of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) or those standards adopted by the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) before the next wave of elections.[15]

3. Pollsters should conduct their polls scientifically, and in case there are more than one exit polls, the researchers should, as much as possible, liaise among themselves to avoid interfering with each other.

4. Interviewers must be properly trained to respect respondents' privacy and right of silence, and they must not be trained to grab every voter, because on one hand, this is not scientific, and on the other hand, it interferes with other exit poll interviewers.

All said, social survey is probably an art which requires much creativity and originality. There may never be any rigid rules.

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took place between September 1991 and October 1992: Asia Television Limited (ATV), Ming Pao Limited, South China Morning Post, and Television Broadcasting Corporation Limited (TVB). The author would also like to thank Hutchison Telephone Company Limited for providing mobile telephones for a number of our exit polls, and Dr Stanley Ho for sponsoring the exit polls in Macau on 20 September 1992. Documentation of these polls has been made possible by a generous grant from the Centre of Urban Planning and Environmental Management (CUPEM) of the University of Hong Kong, and the author would like to acknowledge CUPEM's contribution. Last but not least, the author would like to express his gratitude to the research assistants and interviewers, amounting to hundreds, who have helped to conduct the surveys. These interviewers very often had to work according to very demanding guidelines, and at very odd hours. The contribution of our sponsors and workers to introducing, refining, and safeguarding this particular mode of opinion expression in our very unique society will always be remembered.

Notes

1. These polls have sometimes been referred to as "same-day polls" in Britain, and "election day polls," "street polls," or "exit polls" in the United States.
2. As "opinion polls" normally refer to some large-scale survey of public opinion, "exit polls" as used here exclude small-scale opinion gathering exercises conducted outside polling stations, which did occurred in the past, on some very small scale, and normally for private reference.
3. The author must say that most of the discussions in Hong Kong have misquoted the American debate, especially over the outcome of the controversy. Serious readers should refer to Mitofsky's (1991) detailed account of the controversy and its final settlement.
4. A number of states set-up legislations banning exit polls after the debate, but was subsequently forced to repeal the legislations after the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional. The present state of affairs is that the United States Government will draft a uniform poll-closing law so as to avoid the time zone problem. The media, in the meantime, exercise self-restraint by not announcing the winner before *a state* closes its polling stations.

5. According to the author's experience there is only about a 30% chance that we can get hold of a *claimed* actual voter by a household telephone contact.
6. The usual practice worldwide for sampling voters with exit polls is to interview the nth person departing from a polling station. The value of n depends on the target sample size and the interviewer strength.
7. This is sometimes called "tactical voting."
8. Such opposing possible "effects" have been discussed in most of the references cited in this paper.
9. Sudman (1986) discussed the importance of the "perceived closeness" of the election before the election occurred and the perceived closeness of the election based on exit poll results.
10. From the author's study of the Macau Legislative Assembly direct election which took place on 20 September 1992.
11. The author is aware of some pre-election and on-the-day opinion polls which were used for political parties' reference but was conducted under the name of some academic institutions. Such surveys, besides posting important ethical questions, also interfere with opinion polls properly conducted for academic studies. The author advocates that all social researchers are required to explain the purpose of their survey, and abide by their explicit purpose. Campaign workers and commercial consultants should, therefore, explain themselves clearly before questioning the respondents.
12. The TVB exit polls of September and December 1991 contained only one question — "Whom have you voted for?" although the answer sheet recorded the sex of the respondent and identified the polling station as well.
13. Full details are given in Appendix 2 of this paper.
14. Recall that both exit polls of the day got the same prediction wrong, in spite of the large difference between the size of the two samples.
15. WAPOR's code of practice is described in Worcester (1991:207-15) while the AAPOR standards are described in Miller and Hurd (1982:244) and Holley (1991:236), which are: (a) reporting the number of persons interviewed (sample size), (b) the sponsor of the survey, (c) the complete wording of the questions asked, (d) sampling error, (e) who was sampled — the population — such as adults over 18, (f) how the interviews were obtained, such as by telephone, by mail or in person, (g) when the interviews were conducted, and (h) the basis for results that use less than the total sample.

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Appendix 1. Listing of SSRC Exit Polls

Code	Date	Topic
POP/916	15/9/91	Legislative Council direct election
POP/919	8/12/91	New Territories West Legislative Council by-election
POP/923	19/1/92	Sha Tin Yuen Wo District Board by-election
POP/927	24/5/92	Shamshuipo Pak Tin District Board by-election
POP/9212	30/8/92	New Territories West Legislative Council by-election
POP/9214	20/9/92	Macau Legislative Assembly direct election
POP/9215	5/10/92	Tuen Mun West Regional Council by-election
POP/9219	11/10/92	Tuen Mun Tai Hing District Board by-election

Appendix 2. Comparing Exit Poll Results: Legislative Council Direct Election, 15/9/1991 (%)

	Candidates	TVB Results	ATV/SSRC Results	Actual Results
Island East	Martin Lee Chu-ming	40.4	38.8	40.2
	Man Sai-cheong	23.9	23.0	22.8
	Cheng Kai-nam	14.9	18.7	15.6
	Chan Ying-lun	9.9	9.1	10.4
	Leung Wai-tung	7.9	7.2	8.0
	Jennifer Chow Kit-bing	3.0	3.3	3.0
Island West	Yeung Sum	35.8	37.0	34.8
	Huang Chen-ya	25.1	24.6	23.9
	David Chan Yuk-cheung	22.3	23.2	22.7
	Alexander Chang Yau-hung	8.4	8.4	9.4
	Ronnie Wong Man-chiu	4.4	3.6	4.7
	Winnie Cheung Wai-sun	3.9	3.3	4.5
Kowloon East	Szeto Wah	38.7	39.9	37.8
	Fred Li Wah-ming	31.5	35.1	32.4
	Hau Shui-pui	14.2	10.4	13.9
	Poon Chi-fai	11.0	9.5	10.9
	Chan Cheong	2.4	2.9	2.2
	Li Ting-kit	1.8	1.8	2.2
	Philip Li Koi-hop	0.5	0.4	0.6
Kowloon Central	Lau Chin-shek	36.0	36.3	34.2
	Conrad Lam Kui-shing	29.7	30.6	28.0
	Chan Yuen-han	21.2	19.1	22.4
	Peter Chan Chi-kwan	6.1	5.9	7.1
	Cecilia Yeung Lai-yin	3.6	3.4	4.1
	John Young	2.6	3.2	3.1
	Justin Cheung Chung-ming	0.9	1.5	1.1
Kowloon West	Federick Fung Kin-kee	28.8	28.7	28.9
	James To Kun-sun	20.6	20.7	20.9
	Desmond Lee Yu-tai	17.1	16.3	17.0
	Kingsley Sit Ho-yin	15.1	16.1	14.8
	Law Cheung-kwok	13.9	12.9	13.6
	Ng Kin-sun	4.6	5.3	4.8

Appendix 2. (Continued)

	Candidates	TVB Results	ATV/SSRC Results	Actual Results
N.T. East	Emily Lau Wai-hing	26.0	28.8	26.3
	Andrew Wong Wang-fat	22.8	22.7	22.5
	Tony Kan Chung-nin	19.4	19.3	21.0
	Lau Kong-wah	16.8	15.3	15.1
	Johnston Wong Hong-chung	14.4	13.5	14.8
	Leung Ka-ching	0.3	0.2	0.2
	Sunny Choi Man-hing	0.3	0.2	0.2
N.T. South	Lee Wing-tat	31.4	32.2	32.0
	Albert Chan Wai-yip	25.3	26.8	25.9
	Leung Yiu-chung	24.6	23.8	23.7
	Yeung Fuk-kwong	18.8	17.2	18.5
N.T. West	Stephen Ng Ming-yum	32.5	33.2	29.4
	Tai Chin-wah	20.1	18.1	21.5
	Zachary Wong Wai-yin	22.2	23.0	18.9
	Tang Siu-tong	13.2	13.2	16.3
	Tso Shiu-wai	12.0	12.5	13.9
N.T. North	Fung Chi-wood	27.9	30.9	27.3
	Tik Chi-yuen	27.7	26.5	25.5
	Johnny Wong Chi-keung	18.5	16.8	19.1
	Cheung Hon-chung	15.6	15.1	18.0
	Ronald Chow Mei-tak	8.7	9.1	8.4
	Tong Wai-man	1.6	1.7	1.7

Actual Turnout	750,467 (39.15%)		
Number of Stations	100	80	
Sample Size	246,921 (32.90%)	12,054 (1.61%)	=TVB/20.48
Success Rate	79.32%	75.12%	
Average Error (All candidates)	0.85%	1.26%	=TVB x 1.48
Average Error (First candidate)	0.95%	2.01%	=TVB x 2.11
Average Error (First two candidates)	1.01%	1.56%	=TVB x 1.54
Winners Prediction	17/18	17/18	=TVB x 1

5

Who Voted for the Democrats?

An Analysis of the Electoral Choice of the 1991 Legislative Council Election

Tsang Wing-kwong

Hong Kong witnessed her maiden general election of legislators in September 1991. It is by all means a significant development in the political history of the colony. This election also provides local social scientists a seminal and invaluable opportunity to study the voting behaviour of Hong Kong citizens. This paper records one of this research endeavours. In the following pages, I am going to report my study of the Hong Kong voters' political attitudes and electoral choice as revealed in the 1991 Legislative Council (Legco) direct election. I will try to substantiate the relationship between electoral choice and a set of variables indicating the various aspects of political attitudes.

I will, first of all, outline the theoretical framework inducted from the researches of voting behaviour in western democratic countries[1] in general and in the United Kingdom[2] and the United States of America[3] in particular. Secondly, the general features of the study will be explicated. Thirdly, patterns of electoral choice found in the election will be depicted. Fourthly, I will report the analysis of how each identified determinant affect the electoral choice. Discussion and interpretation of

the finding of this research will be explicated in the last section of this chapter.

A Theoretical Framework for Voting Behaviour Study

It has been well recognized in the field of voting behaviour that it is the work of Angus Campbell and his colleagues in the Survey Research Center (SRC) of the University of Michigan that lays the theoretical foundation of the field.[4] In their model, which is commonly called the Michigan model, voting behaviour is explained by three layers of variables. The first layer consists of variables indicating the demographic and socioeconomic attributes of the voters, such as sex, age, social class, religious belief, race, education and occupation. In some studies, father's socioeconomic status and partisanship are also included. Taken together, these variables constitute the political-socialization backgrounds of the voters. The second layer of variables characterizes the general political attitudes of the voters. They include, for example, political trust, sense of political efficacy, identification of political ideology and party identification. The third layer of variables measures the specific political opinions of the electorate. The variables consist of measures of voters' perceptions of candidates and preferences of public policy issues. They reveal the voters' opinions on candidates and platforms advocated in a specific election campaign. Lastly, the concept voting behaviour takes on two meanings in the Michigan model. One is the voting turnout, which indicates whether a registered voter really cast a vote or abstained in an election. The other is the electoral choice, which records the candidate or more generally the party that a voter supported in an election.

The Michigan model has widely been adopted by social scientists in other democratic countries. In fact, these internationally joint efforts on research of voting behaviour have produce an impressive data basis for comparison.[5] They have also become essential references for developing countries which are undergoing political democratization.

Taking these international research efforts in general and the Michigan model in particular as the frame of reference, this study is based on the theoretical framework outlined in Table 1.

Table 1 A Theoretical Framework for Voting Behaviour Study

Demographic and socioeconomic attributes	General political attitudes	Specific political opinions	Voting behaviour
Sex	Identification of political organization	Assessment of candidates	Voting turnout
Age	Identification of political ideology	Opinions on public policy issues	Voter choice
Educational level	Political trust		
Occupational status	Internal political efficacy		
Personal monthly income	External political efficacy		
Household monthly income	Sense of citizen duty		
Types of accommodation			
Modes of political participation			

Demographic and Socioeconomic Attributes

In the model, demographic-socioeconomic background of voters are measured by seven variables. The first one is sex which is coded into 1 for male and 2 for female. The second variable is age which is on a continuous scale indicating the biological age of the respondent. Thirdly, educational level is measured by a six-category scale ranging from no education to post-secondary or above. The fourth variable is voters' occupational status, which is measured with a five-category scale. The five categories are (1) professionals, administrators and managers, (2) routine non-manual labourers, (3) skilled manual labourers, (4) semi-skilled manual labourers, and (5) unskilled labourers.[6] The measures of both individual and household monthly incomes of voters are 15-category scales in terms of Hong Kong dollars. Finally, types of accommodation of voters is a dichotomous measure made up of private and public housing.

General Political Attitudes

The measures of the general political attitudes of the Hong Kong electorate are made up of six concepts. First, political organization identification is conceptualized in this study as the degree of support indicated by respondents to each of the seven political organizations listed on the questionnaire. Such a conceptualization deviates from the conventional measure of party identification found in voting behaviour studies in western democratic countries. For example, in Michigan SRC studies, party identification is defined as individual attachment to one single political party (Miller and Traugott, 1989:81). However, our deviation is discernible because in Hong Kong the formation of political organizations, let alone political parties, is still in its primitive stage. Definite political cleavages and alignments are yet to be formed. In fact, in the 1991 election, there is only one alliance of political organizations, namely the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) and Meeting Point (MP), which is able to assemble enough candidates to launch a territory-wide campaign. That is why a more open-ended conceptualization is employed in measuring political organization identification in this study.

In Michigan SRC studies, the concept of political ideology identification is measured by a dichotomy between liberals and conservatives (Miller and Traugott, 1989:94). However, we are of the opinion that such a dichotomy cannot reflect truly the heterogeneity of the Hong Kong political context. Instead, we list out six commonly used ideological stands found in Hong Kong public forum and ask the respondents to indicate the degree of support to each of them. These ideology stands are the democrat, the industrialist and businessman, the conservative, the pro-China or leftist, the pro-Taiwan and the pro-Britain.

Thirdly, political trust is a concept indicating voters' degree of confidence in the efficiency and integrity of the government. Adopting the items in the Michigan SRC studies (Miller and Traugott, 1989:261-3), five questions are used in this study to measure voters' degrees of trust in the Hong Kong government and each of these degrees of trust is indicated by a five-point scale.

Political efficacy was first defined by Campbell and his colleagues as "the feeling that individual political action does have, and can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" (Campbell *et al.*, 1954:187). In subsequent studies,

the concept was refined and divided into two dimensions, namely internal and external political efficacy. Balch defines these two concepts as "Internal efficacy is the individual's belief that means of influence are available to him. External efficacy is the belief that the authority or regime is responsive to influence attempts" (Balch, 1974:24). With reference to Michigan SRC studies, three and four questions are used in this study to register voters' internal and external political efficacy respectively. These degrees of efficacy are measured by five-point scales.

Finally, the concept of sense of citizen duty is defined as "the feeling that oneself and other ought to participate in the political process, regardless of whether such political activity is seen as worthwhile or efficacious" (Campbell *et al.*, 1954:194). Accordingly, five questions are allocated in our questionnaire to survey the sense of citizen duty of Hong Kong voters. Again, they are measured by five-point scales.

Specific Political Opinions

Apart from concepts characterizing long-term political attitudes, we also incorporate in our model concepts indicating voters' specific opinions on features of the 1991 election campaign. They include voters' opinions on criteria for evaluation of candidates and stands on policy issues emerging from the public forum during the 1991 election campaign.

For the concept of candidate evaluation, seven criteria are listed in our questionnaire. Respondents are asked to indicate the degree of importance these criteria have in their decision about which candidates to vote for. These criteria include (1) daring to dissent with the Hong Kong government, (2) daring to dissent with the Chinese government, (3) accepted by the Chinese government, (4) outstanding appearance, (5) holding tertiary education qualification, (6) being a member of political organizations, and (6) not holding a foreign passport.

The construct of opinions on public policy issues itself has been a controversy within the tradition of voting behaviour study. In the original design of the Michigan SRC studies, issue preferences are measured simply for the purpose of monitoring public opinions on a number of "enduring issues" over time so as to provide information that is crucial for understanding attitude change (Miller and Traugott, 1989:155). In fact, Campbell and his collaborators have played down the significance of issue preferences in accounting for electoral choice in their analysis (Campbell *et al.*, 1960:168-85). However, a number of recent studies in

different western democratic countries reveal that stands on public policy issues have emerged to be salient factors in determining electoral choice, and this phenomenon is accompanied by another significant change in voting behaviour, namely the decline of the effect of social class and partisanship on electoral choice.[7] Taking these two points together, quite a number of scholars contend that some "crosscutting" and "postmaterialistic" issues have replaced the traditional political alignment, such as social classes and political parties, to be the major factors determining electorate choice.[8] "Postmaterialistic" issues are meant those issues concerning "nonmaterial quality of life," such as environmentalism, women's movement, unilateral disarmament, opposition to nuclear power. These issues have also cut across traditional political alignments and become critical factors determining electoral choice (Carmines and Stimson, 1984; Inglehart, 1977, 1981 and 1984). In this study, we have designed to take issue preferences as measures of "crosscutting" factors affecting electoral choice in the 1991 election rather than as a measure of long-term opinion on enduring issues. The reason for such a choice is that we have hypothesized that there is a crosscutting issue underlying the 1991 election, that is, a sense of dissenting with the Chinese government or, more specifically, the regime responsible for the June Fourth massacre. We have incorporated twelve public policy issues which emerged from the public forum during the 1991 election campaign. Each issue is measured by a four-category scale, which is (1) support, (2) neutrality, (3) rejection, and (4) do not know.

Modes of Political Participation

Apart from variables pertaining to political attitudes and opinions, we have incorporated the concept of political participation into the model. Political participation is a well researched concept in political science.[9] It refers to "those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978:46). According to Verba and his colleagues, political participation is construed as a multidimensional phenomenon and it takes on four different modes. They are voting, campaign activity, communal activity, and contacting officials on personal matters (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978:52-6). We have incorporated two of the modes which are directly related to voting

behaviour, that is, voting and campaign activity, in this study. Furthermore, we have also included items indicating political participation relating to petitions and protests and, more specifically, to rallies and marches which commemorate the June Fourth incident.

Voting Behaviour: The Dependent Variables

As indicated above, within the tradition of voting behaviour study, voting behaviour takes on two meanings. One is the voting turnout, which indicates whether a qualified or registered voter actually casts his/her vote or abstains from voting in a particular election. The other is the electoral choice, which registers the candidates or political parties that a voter chooses to support in an election. In this chapter, only electoral choice will be accounted for.

The Data

The data under analysis are generated from a territory-wide survey on a sample of registered voters conducted by a research team of The Chinese University of Hong Kong. With the assistance of the Registration and Electoral Office, a random sample of registered voters from all nine constituencies was selected from the 1991 Final Register of Electors. Data collection was carried out in October 1991 to January 1992 by face-to-face interviews. Subsequently, 939 registered voters were successfully interviewed from a sample of 1,392 registered voters. It yielded a respondent rate of 67.5%. The representativeness of the sample has been explicated in details in Chapter 1 of this book; I, therefore, will not dwell into the matter any further.

Patterns of Electoral Choice

The overall configuration of the 1991 election has imposed a number of constraints on the analysis of electoral choice. First, in western democratic countries, where political parties and party politics have been well developed, it is a common or even natural practice in voting behaviour studies to induct electoral choice of candidates into choice of political

parties. This is especially necessary in legislature election, in which electoral choices of candidates are so diversified that they must be grouped into a manageable and meaningful number of categories for analysis. However, in Hong Kong, one of the most salient features of the 1991 election is the disaggregation of candidates and electoral choices. This can be evidenced that most of the candidates in that election have claimed to be independents and to have no affiliation with any political organization (Table 2). It can further be evidenced by the fact that among all the political organizations participating in the 1991 election, only the alliance of the United Democrats of Hong Kong and Meeting Point (UDHKMP alliance) is able to field a sufficient number of candidates to launch a territory-wide campaign. Taken together, it indicates that large-scale and definite political alignment and cleavage along the line of political party divisions have not yet been formed during the 1991 election. As a result, such a disaggregation of candidates and political organizations has asserted considerable limitation on our analysis of territory-wide electoral choice. To accommodate this constraint, we are forced to confine our analysis on electoral choice between those voting for the UDHKMP alliance and those not voting for the alliance.

Table 2 Patterns of Electoral Choice: Votes for the UDHKMP Alliance by other Political Groups and/or Independent Candidates

The UDHKMP alliance[1]	Count	.00	1.00	2.00	Row Total
Liberal Democratic Federation[2]	.00	160	167	156	483
	1.00	18	12		30
	2.00	3			3
Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood[3]	.00	167	166	156	489
	1.00	7	13		20
	2.00	7			7
Candidates of pro-China orientation[4]	.00	139	161	156	456
	1.00	42	18		60
Democratic Foundation[5]	.00	176	171	156	503
	1.00	5	8		13
Independent candidates[6]	.00	68	81	156	305
	1.00	65	98		163
	2.00	48			48
	Column	181	179	156	516
	Total	35.1	34.7	30.2	100.0

Notes:
1. Candidates of the UDHKMP alliance are Martin Lee, Man Sai Cheong, Yeung Sum, Huang Chen Ya, Szeto Wah, Li Wah Ming, Lau Chin Shek, Lam Kui Shing, To Kun Sun, Wong Hong Chung, Lau Kong Wah, Lee Wing Tat, Chan Wai Yip, Ng Ming Yum, Wong Wai Yin, Fung Chi Wood and Tik Chi Yuen.
2. Candidates of the Liberal Democratic Federation are Chang Yau Hung, Ng Kin Sun, Tso Shiu Wai, Wong Chi Kueng and Cheung Hon Chung.
3. Candidates of the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood are Law Cheung Kwok, Fung Kin Kee and Chow Mei Tak.
4. Candidates of pro-China orientation are Cheng Kai Nam, Hau Shui Pui and Chan Yuen Han.
5. Candidate of Democratic Foundation is Chan Ying Lun.
6. Candidates not listed above.

The second constraint on the analysis of electoral choice in the 1991 election comes from the structure of the ballot. The ballot of the 1991 election is structured in a way that voters are entitled to cast two votes. They can choose any two candidates in their constituency. This has diversified the already disaggregated electoral choice. As shown in Table 2, among the 516 registered voters who have reported to have voted in the Legco election in our sample, 30.2% of them have cast both of their votes in support of the UDHKMP alliance, while 35.1% of them have both of their votes cast on candidates who are not members of the alliance. In between, we find 34.7% of the voters have split their votes between the UDHKMP alliance and other political organizations and/or candidates. Among these split votes, we find quite a diversified combination. Of these split votes, 98 are cast between a candidate of the alliance and an independent candidate whose political stand and platform are heterogeneous and diverse. To our surprise, the second largest combination of these split votes is between the candidates of the alliance and those of pro-China orientation. Taken together, even though we have confined our analysis to the electoral choice between those supporting the UDHKMP alliance and those not supporting it, we are still confronted by the situation that one-third of the electoral choice, that is, those 34.7% of split votes, are indefinite and blurred.

To avoid these indefinite electoral choices, we will confine the subsequent analysis mainly to the kinds of electoral choices lying at the two extremes, namely those casting both votes on candidates of the UDHKMP alliance and those not casting both votes on candidates of the alliance. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, the operational definition of electoral choice is indicated by a dichotomy between definite supporters of the UDHKMP alliance and definite non-supporters of the alliance.

The Analysis

Among studies of voting behaviour in western democratic countries, one of the most commonly used statistical models in analyzing electoral choice is causal modelling.[10] Thus, it is very tempting to the author to employ this conventional and powerful technique in analyzing the relationship between electoral choice and the independent variables outlined in Section 1. However, in order to apply causal modelling technique on a

data set, the data must be able to meet three basic requirements, namely, strong association between independent and dependent variables, control over confounding variables and, most of all, confirmation of the temporal ordering that independent variables are in precedence to the dependent variable. In western democratic countries, it is much easier to argue that, because of the long tradition of democratic elections, voters in these countries have developed and consolidated general political attitudes and opinions prior to a particular election. However, in a colony, which has just undertaken her decolonization and democratization process for less than a decade, it may be hard to expect her electorate to have definite political attitudes and opinions prior to their participation in the maiden general election of legislators in September 1991. Therefore, we will only assume that Hong Kong voters' general political attitudes, specific opinions on political issues, as well as electoral choice have all developed and taken shape simultaneously in recent years. In other words, no temporal ordering among concepts in the theoretical framework outlined in Section 1 will be postulated in the following analysis. Thus, in the subsequent analysis, only discriminant analysis will be used to distinguish between those voters who cast both votes on candidates of the UDHKMP alliance and those who do not. And those independent variables listed in the framework will be served as attributes which help to discriminate these two groups of voters. In the analysis that follows, I will report the results of discriminant analysis between electoral choice and each independent concept separately. Then variables selected from each concept will be used in a synthesizing analysis.

Electoral Choice and Demographic-socioeconomic Attributes

Six independent variables indicating voters' demographic and socioeconomic attributes are used to estimate the membership of the two groups of voters, namely the definite supporters of the UDHKMP alliance and the definite non-supporters of the alliance. Reading from Table 3, we can see that the overall performance of the discriminant analysis is quite satisfactory. That is because it has correctly classified nearly two-thirds of the cases (65.36%). This can also be indicated by the canonical correlation, the square of which indicates the ratio of the between-groups sum of squares to the total sum of squares, i.e. the proportion of the total

variance attributable to the differences among the groups. It takes on the value of .3291.

Table 3 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by Demographic-Socioeconomic Attributes

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

Predicators*	Function 1
Sex	-.05357
Age	-.31541
Educational level	.56774
Employment status	.20207
Occupational status	.50259
Personal monthly income	.34656
Monthly household income	.45775
Types of accommodation	.68347

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 cases were processed.
158 of these were excluded from the analysis.
0 case had missing or out-of-range group codes.
158 cases had at least one missing discriminating variable.
179 cases were used in the analysis.

C. Number of Cases by Group

Group membership	Number of cases	
	Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	93	93.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	86	86.0
Total	179	179.0

Table 3 (Continued)

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	93	59 63.4%	34 36.6%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	86	28 32.6%	58 67.4%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 65.36%

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions

(i) Eigenvalue	.1215
(ii) Canonical correlation	.3291

F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)

Group	Function 1
1	-.33326
2	.36039

* Values of the independent variables are:

Sex : 1=Male, 2=Female.
Educational level : 1=No schooling,... 6=Tertiary or above.
Employment status : 1=Employer, 2=Employee.
Occupational status : 1=Unskilled manual labourer, 2=Semi-skilled labourer, 3=Skilled labourer, 4=Routine non-manual labourer, 5=Professional, administrator and manager.
Monthly personal income : 1=HK$1,000 or below,... 14=HK$20,000 or above.
Monthly household income : 1=HK$2,000 or below,... 14=HK$50,000 or above.
Types of accommodation : 1=Private housing, 2=Public housing.

Looking at the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients, we find that sex difference is not a significant discriminator to differentiate electoral choice because the coefficient of sex is insignifi-

cantly small (-.05357). On the other hand, the coefficient of types of accommodation takes on the largest value (.68347) among the discriminators. Since canonical discriminant function is positively related to the means of Group 2, i.e. supporters of the alliance, this indicates that residents in public housing are most likely to be definite supporters of the UDHKMP alliance. Taken together, we may say that in regards to demographic and socioeconomic attributes, the profile of the definite supporters of the UDHKMP alliance is that they are public housing residents, relatively well educated, non-manual labourers or above, higher income groups and young employees.

Electoral Choice and Political Identifications

In our model, there are six constructs indicating the general political attitudes of Hong Kong voters. These constructs can further be classified into two groups. One characterizes voters' political identification. The other indicates voters' attitudes towards the government. In this section, only constructs pertaining to political identification will be used in discriminating electoral choice, while the other constructs will be dealt with in the next section. Two discriminant analyses of electoral choice by identification of political organizations and ideologies are run. The results of these two analyses are presented in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 4 records the result of the discriminant analysis of electoral choice by political organization identification. In the analysis, two variables indicating the degrees of acceptance of the UDHK and that of MP are used as discriminators. The overall performance of the analysis is good because it has correctly classified three-fourths (78.29%) of the cases under analysis and the canonical correlation is .5449. This result implies that Hong Kong electorate votes according to its political organization identifications, or more exactly those who identify with the UDHKMP alliance actually vote in support of it. However, we must underline that political organization identifications are not yet a common characteristic of Hong Kong voters. That is because a considerable portion of voters have not developed their attitudes towards the UDHK and MP. In fact, the data show that nearly one-fifth (103/516) of the voters who have taken part in the Legco election hold no opinion on the UDHK, while more than half (302/516) of these voters have not formed any opinion on MP. This can also be evidenced by the discriminant analysis reported on Table 4; it only processes 129 cases out of 337.

Therefore, a more prudent conclusion on the subject under discussion is that a considerable number of Hong Kong voters hold no opinion on political organizations, as to those who do they vote in accordance with their opinion.

Table 4 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by Political Organization Identification

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

Predicators*	Function 1
Acceptance of UDHK	.93661
Acceptance of MP	.13895

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 (unweighted) cases were processed.
208 of these were excluded from the analysis.
0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.
208 had at least one missing discriminating variable.
129 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.

C. Number of Cases by Group

Group membership	Number of cases Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	62	62.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	67	67.0
Total	129	129.0

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	62	42 67.7%	20 32.3%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	67	8 11.9%	59 88.1%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 78.29%

Table 4 (Continued)

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions	
(i) Eigenvalue	.4222
(ii) Canonical correlation	.5449
F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)	
Group	Function 1
1	.67024
2	-.62022

* All values of the independent variables are on a 5-point scale, where 1=Very acceptant, while 5=Very unacceptant.

In Table 5, the result of the discriminant analysis of electoral choice by political ideology identification is reported. All six items indicating different ideological stands are included in the analysis. The overall performance of the analysis is good. It has correctly classified 72.81% of the cases under analysis, and the canonical correlation takes on the value of .4276. Looking at the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients, we can see that the political ideology stands are grouped into two camps. Three of which take on positive values which imply that voters of these ideological stands are more likely to be definite supporters to the UDHKMP alliance. Among these three positive values, "pro-democrat" has the largest value (.69116). It is evidenced that those who accept the so-call pro-democrat ideological stand are more likely to be supporters of the alliance. On the other hand, the three negative values, which include pro-industrialist and businessman and pro-China and leftist, indicate that voters holding these ideological stands are more likely to be non-supporters of the alliance. This result more or less confirms that general imagery presented and platforms advocated by the UDHKMP alliance. Thus we may say that political ideology identification has certain effect on electoral choice. Again, we must qualify this conclusion by underlining that a considerable portion of Hong Kong voters have not yet had their political ideology identification. That is evidenced by the fact that the analysis can only process less than two-thirds (217/337) of the cases under analysis.

Table 5 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by Political Ideology Identification

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients		
Predictors*		Function 1
Pro-democrat		.69116
Pro-industrialist and businessman		-.45777
Pro-conservative		-.02511
Pro-China and leftist		-.35966
Pro-Taiwan		.01151
Pro-Hong Kong government		.31900
B. Classification Processing Summary		
337 (unweighted) cases were processed.		
120 of these were excluded from the analysis.		
0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.		
120 had at least one missing discriminating variable.		
217 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.		
C. Number of Cases by Group		
	Number of cases	
Group membership	Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	112	112.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	105	105.0
Total	217	217.0
D. Classification Results		
		Predicted group membership
Actual group	No. of cases	1 2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	112	82 30 73.2% 26.8%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	105	29 76 27.6% 72.4%
Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 72.81%		

Table 5 (Continued)

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions	
(i) Eigenvalue	.2238
(ii) Canonical correlation	.4276

F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)

Group	Function 1
1	.45595
2	-.48634

* All values of the independent variables are on a 5-point scale, where 1=Very acceptant, while 5=Very unacceptant.

Electoral Choice and Attitudes towards the Government

Attitudes towards the government are measured by four constructs. They are political trust, internal and external efficacies, and sense of citizen duty. For each of these constructs, a discriminant analysis is run. The results are presented in Tables 6, 8, 9 and 10.

The discriminating power of political trust on electoral choice is not that satisfactory. That is because the result of the discriminant analysis of the electoral choice by trust in government is not that satisfactory. As shown in Table 6, the analysis can only correctly classify 55.65% of the cases. It is just 5.65% better than a random classification. However, though the concept of trust in government is not a good discriminator of electoral choice, the data do reveal a general pattern of perceptions of Hong Kong voters about their government. As shown in Table 7, Hong Kong voters have not had a definite opinion on the efficiency of the Hong Kong government. This can be evidenced by the fact that the responses to the first three items in Table 7, which indicate the efficiency of the government, are largely concentrated on the mid-point of the 5-point scale. On the other hand, looking at the responses to the last two items, which indicate the integrity of the government, we can see that most of the Hong Kong voters (65.9% and 58.1%) are in doubt about the integrity of the government.

Table 6 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by Political Trust

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

Predictors*	Function 1
Most of the government policies are right.	-.11188
Hong Kong government is a lame duck government.	-.72237
Most of the senior government officials are capable.	-.16650
Most of the government policies are for the benefits of the rich.	.42704
Hong Kong government has misused public fund.	.76075

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 (unweighted) cases were processed.
107 of these were excluded from the analysis.
0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.
107 had at least one missing discriminating variable.
230 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.

C. Number of Cases by Group

Group membership	Number of cases Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	113	113.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	117	117.0
Total	230	230.0

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	113	62 54.9%	51 45.1%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	117	51 43.6%	66 56.4%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 55.65%

Table 6 (Continued)

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions	
(i) Eigenvalue	.0277
(ii) Canonical correlation	.1641
F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)	
Group	Function 1
1	-.16852
2	.16276

* All values of the independent variables are on a 5-point scale, where 1= Absolutely agree, while 5=Absolutely disagree.

Table 7 Frequency Distribution of Hong Kong Voters' Attitudes on Political Trust (%)

	Responses*					
Indicators	1	2	3	4	5	9
Most of the government policies are right	2.2 (2.5)	17.5 (18.0)	59.7 (63.0)	6.3 (6.0)	1.1 (1.6)	13.2 (8.9)
Hong Kong government is a lame duck government	2.7 (2.9)	24.5 (28.1)	28.2 (27.7)	26.0 (27.7)	0.3 (0.0)	18.3 (13.6)
Most of the senior government officials are capable	3.0 (3.1)	18.3 (18.4)	44.2 (47.5)	9.6 (9.9)	1.7 (1.9)	23.2 (19.3)
Most of the government policies are for the benefits of the rich	13.2 (12.8)	52.7 (53.7)	16.0 (15.9)	11.4 (13.4)	0.1 (0.2)	6.6 (4.1)
Hong Kong government has misused public fund	13.3 (14.0)	44.8 (45.7)	22.0 (22.9)	6.7 (7.2)	0.9 (1.0)	12.2 (9.3)

* 1=Absolutely agree,... 5=Absolutely disagree, and 9=No answer or not applicable.

Percentages on the upper row of each indicator are calculated from the total sample, i.e. both voters and non-voters (total=939). Percentages on the lower row are calculated from voters only (total=516).

Hong Kong voters' perceptions of their internal political efficacy is also not an effective discriminator to differentiate electoral choice. As shown in Table 8, the discriminant analysis of electoral choice by internal political efficacy can only correctly classify 56.63% of the cases under analysis. Though the concept of internal political efficacy does not serve well in differentiating electoral choice, the data, however, suggest a very essential feature of the political attitudes of Hong Kong voters. Only 7.8% of the total respondents of this study, i.e. both the voters and non-voters, consent that they can influence government policies. As for those who have actually cast their votes in the Legco election, only 7.9% of them agree that they have the respective influence. Furthermore, only 10.7% of our respondents think that they are able to understand politics, while only 12.9% of the actual voters claim that they have the respective ability. However, the responses of the Hong Kong electorate to the third indicator, that is, "voting is an effective means to express one's view to the government," register that most of the Hong Kong citizens have great expectation about election. Of the respondents, 52.4% agree to the respective statement, while 61.2% of the actual voters think so. Taken together, we may conclude that Hong Kong citizens hold a mixed perception of their internal political efficacy. On the one hand, they have a strong sense of inefficacy in comprehending politics and influencing government policies. On the other hand, they hold high hope about the democratic election system which they hope can remedy their political inefficacy.

Table 8 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by Internal Political Efficacy

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

Predictors*	Function 1
I can influence government policies.	.43886
I can understand politics.	.54882
Voting is an effective means to express my view to the government.	.59070

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 (unweighted) cases were processed.
58 of these were excluded from the analysis.
0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.
58 had at least one missing discriminating variable.
279 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.

C. Number of Cases by Group

Group membership	Number of cases Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	145	145.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	134	134.0
Total	279	279.0

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	145	84 57.9%	61 42.1%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	134	60 44.8%	74 55.2%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 56.63%

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions

(i) Eigenvalue	.0469
(ii) Canonical correlation	.2117

F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)

Group	Function 1
1	.20749
2	-.22452

* All values of the independent variables are on a 5-point scale, where 1=Absolutely agree, while 5=Absolutely disagree.

As for external political efficacy, its discriminating power is at least better than that of the internal efficacy. The discriminant analysis of the electoral choice by external political efficacy can correctly classify 63.59% of the cases under analysis. It is a fairly satisfactory result. However, if we look into the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients, we can reveal some essential features of the relationship between external political efficacy and electoral choice of the Hong Kong voters. Two of the four indicators of the external efficacy take on significantly large values on the respective coefficients (.69672 and .57907). They indicate that definite supporters of the UDHKMP alliance tend to believe that elected councillors and political organizations can enhance the responsiveness of the Hong Kong government.

Table 9 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by External Political Efficacy

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

Predictors*	Function 1
Elected councillors are responsive to people's opinions.	.69672
Political organizations strive for power rather than work for public interests.	-.19920
Appointed councillors vote on government proposals in line with government's will rather than with public interest.	.05587
Political organizations can enhance the responsiveness of the government to the public.	.57907

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 (unweighted) cases were processed.
120 of these were excluded from the analysis.
0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.
120 had at least one missing discriminating variable.
217 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.

Table 9 (Continued)

C. Number of Cases by Group

Group membership	Number of cases Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	113	113.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	104	104.0
Total	217	217.0

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	113	72 63.7%	41 36.3%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	104	38 36.5%	66 63.5%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 63.59%

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions

(i) Eigenvalue	.1519
(ii) Canonical correlation	.3631

F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)

Group	Function 1
1	.37213
2	-.40433

* All values of the independent variables are on a 5-point scale, where 1=Absolutely agree, while 5=Absolutely disagree.

Finally, sense of citizen duty is, once again, not an effective discriminator for electoral choice. As shown in Table 10, the respective discriminant analysis can only correctly classify 56.16% of the cases under analysis. However, it is worth underlining that Hong Kong citizens do have a strong sense of citizen duty. This can be evidenced by the data presented in Table 11. On all four indicators of the sense of citizen duty,

the respondents of this study, that is both voters and non-voters, demonstrate a strong sense of citizen duty. Looking at the respective responses of the actual voters alone, they show an even stronger sense of citizenship. This implies that, though sense of citizen duty may not be a good predictor of electoral choice, it may be an effective discriminator to differentiate voters from non-voters.

Table 10 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by Sense of Citizen Duty

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

Predictors*	Function 1
So many other people vote that it does not matter much whether I vote or not.	.12271
I will vote even though the candidate I support has the least chance of winning.	.67179
I will vote in the Legco election even though I recognize that its influence on Hong Kong affairs is limited.	-.19899
Unless it concerns my vested interest I will not vote.	.54497

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 (unweighted) cases were processed.
45 of these were excluded from the analysis.
0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.
45 had at least one missing discriminating variable.
292 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.

C. Number of Cases by Group

Group membership	Number of cases Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	151	151.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	141	141.0
Total	292	292.0

Table 10 (Continued)

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	151	83 55.0%	68 45.0%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	141	60 42.6%	81 57.4%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 56.16%

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions

(i) Eigenvalue	.0119
(ii) Canonical correlation	.1086

F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)

Group	Function 1
1	.10519
2	-.11265

* All values of the independent variables are on a 5-point scale, where 1=Absolutely agree, while 5=Absolutely disagree.

Table 11 Frequency Distribution of Hong Kong Voters' Sense of Citizen Duty (%)

Indicators	Responses* 1	2	3	4	5	9
So many other people vote that it does not matter much whether I vote or not.	2.9 (1.0)	14.5 (8.1)	12.4 (8.0)	53.8 (64.5)	10.6 (15.7)	5.9 (2.7)
I will vote even though the candidate I support has the least chance of winning.	34.9 (47.3)	26.1 (27.1)	11.8 (8.0)	9.4 (6.2)	7.6 (5.2)	10.2 (6.2)
I will vote in the Legco election even though I recognize that its influence on Hong Kong affairs is limited.	14.0 (19.8)	50.3 (54.8)	11.4 (6.2)	12.7 (11.4)	0.4 (5.8)	11.3 (7.2)
Unless it concerns my vested interest I will not vote.	1.4 (1.0)	10.3 (8.0)	8.0 (5.8)	62.6 (66.7)	9.9 (14.0)	7.8 (4.7)

* 1=Absolutely agree,... 5=Absolutely disagree, and 9=No answer or not applicable.
Percentages on the upper row of each indicator are calculated from the total sample, i.e. both voters and non-voters (total=939). Percentages on the lower row are calculated from voters only (total=516).

Taken together, the Hong Kong voters are holding a mixed, if not contradicting, attitude towards the government. First of all, they are doubtful about the integrity of the Hong Kong government. Furthermore, they demonstrate a strong sense of inefficacy in respect of comprehending politics and influencing government policies. On the other hand, the Hong Kong voters show a strong sense of citizen duty and have high expectation the elected councillors and political organizations can help to enhance government responsiveness. These seemingly contradictory political attitudes can be construed as follows: confronted by those senses of internal inefficacy and mistrust in the integrity of the government, Hong Kong citizens are inevitably, if not helplessly, looking for demo-

cratic participation and election in general and the UDHKMP alliance in particular for salvation. This may be a plausible explanation for the landslide victory of the UDHKMP alliance in the 1991 election.

Electoral Choice and Specific Political Opinions and Mode of Political Participation

In our framework, we have incorporated two constructs indicating voters' specific political opinions to account for electoral choice of Hong Kong citizens. They are opinions about candidates and on public policy issues. In this section, I will report the result of discriminant analysis of electoral choice by these two constructs.

First, as explicated in the previous section on conceptualization, the construct of candidate evaluation is measured by six indicators, however, after a series of analyses, the final analysis reported here includes only four of these indicators (Table 12). The performance of this analysis is quite satisfactory because it has correctly classified 63.73% of the cases under analysis. However, looking more closely at the classification results (Table 12, Section D), we can see that these predictors are more effective in discriminating non-supporters of the UDHKMP alliance than the supporters. That is evidenced by the fact that the analysis has correctly classified 70.1% of the non-suppoters but can only do so for 56.5% of the supporters. The result of this analysis has revealed some salient features of the relationships between these indicators and electoral choice, which are indicated by the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients. The indicators take on the largest value on the respective coefficient (.81569), which is "not holding a foreign passport." It suggests that voters, who consider "not holding a foreign passport" is important, tend to be non-supporters of the UDHKMP alliance. Furthermore, the indicator takes the second largest value on "daring to dissent with the Chinese government" (-.41896). This implies that non-supporters of the alliance think that such a quality is unimportant in evaluating candidates. The same relation also applies to the indicator "daring to dissent with the Hong Kong government" but to a lesser extent (-.23124). Finally, non-suppoters of the UDHKMP alliance do take higher education qualification as an important criterion in evaluating candidates (.32193). To summarize, non-supporters of the alliance are not expecting their candidates to stand up and dissent with both the

Chinese and Hong Kong governments, while they take candidates' nationality or tertiary education qualifications as important evaluating criteria.

Table 12 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by Candidate Evaluation

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

Predictors*	Function 1
Holding tertiary education qualification	.32193
Not holding a foreign passport	.81569
Daring to dissent with the Hong Kong government.	-.23124
Daring to dissent with the Chinese government.	-.41896

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 (unweighted) cases were processed.
42 of these were excluded from the analysis.
0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.
42 had at least one missing discriminating variable.
295 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.

C. Number of Cases by Group

Group membership	Number of cases Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	157	157.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	138	138.0
Total	295	295.0

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	157	110 70.1%	47 29.9%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	138	60 43.5%	78 56.5%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 63.73%

Table 12 (Continued)

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions	
(i) Eigenvalue	.0948
(ii) Canonical correlation	.2943
F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)	
Group	Function 1
1	-.28768
2	.32728

* All values of the independent variables are on a 5-point scale, where 1=Very important, while 5=Very unimportant.

There are twelve public policy issues listed on the questionnaire to ask the respondents to indicate their preferences. Having conducted a number of exploratory analyses, only six of these issues have been used in the final analysis and the result of which is recorded in Table 13. This discriminant analysis performs quite well in differentiating electoral choice. It has correctly classified two-thirds (66.01%) of the cases under analysis. The readings of the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients suggest that the issue which has the largest effect on the discriminant function is "Hong Kong governemnt should dissolve the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDM)." Its coefficient (.46601) suggests that those who oppose this policy tend to be supporters of the UDHKMP alliance. The issue taking on the second largest value of the respective coefficient (.42296) is "the death penalty should be implemented." It implies that those who oppose the policy are more likely to vote for the alliance. "China has the right to examine policies which are to be carried over beyond 1997" is the issue scoring the third largest coefficient (.41668). It means that voters who oppose the issue tend to vote for the alliance. As for the issue on the establishment of a central provident fund, voters opposing such a plan are more likely to be supporters of the alliance. Finally, voters who support policies such as "Special Administration Region (SAR) chief executive should be directly elected" and "the Bill of Rights should be carried over beyond 1997," are also more likely to vote for the UDHKMP alliance. In light of these issue preferences, we

may conclude that supporters of the UDHKMP alliance take on a liberal and democratic stand on the public policy issues. They basically endorse a democratic state which respects and protects individual liberty, freedom of association and human rights.

Table 13 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by Opinions on Public Policy Issues

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients	
Predictors*	Function 1
Hong Kong government should dissolve HKASPDM.	.46601
Death penalty should be implemented.	.42296
SAR chief executive should be directly elected.	-.25294
China has the right to examine policies which are to be carried over beyond 1997.	.41668
Bill of Rights should be carried over beyond 1997.	-.23175
Central provident fund should be established.	.38695

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 (unweighted) cases were processed.

84 of these were excluded from the analysis.

0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.

84 had at least one missing discriminating variable.

253 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.

C. Number of Cases by Group

	Number of cases	
Group membership	Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	129	129.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	124	124.0
Total	253	253.0

Table 13 (Continued)

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	129	85 64.9%	44 34.1%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	124	42 33.9%	82 66.1%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 66.01%

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions

(i) Eigenvalue	.1283
(ii) Canonical correlation	.3372

F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)

Group	Function 1
1	-.34976
2	.36386

* All values of the independent variables are on a 3-point scale, where 1=Support, while 3=Oppose.

The last independent variable in our framework is modes of political participation. In our questionnaire, ten items are allocated to measure three dimensions of voters' political participation, namely voting, campaign activities, and petition and protest. In the discriminant analysis of electoral choice by political participation, only two dimensions are used. They are campaign activities and petition and protest. The reason for not taking voting as a predictor is simply because voting itself is the dependent variable under analysis. After a series of exploratory analyses, only two modes of political participation are used in the final analysis. They are "discussed Legco election with friends and relatives" and "participated in June Fourth marches or rallies in 1989." The overall performance of the analysis is not that satisfactory for it can only classify

57.91% of the cases under analysis. However, these two modes of political participation are quite effective in predicting supporters of the UDHKMP alliance. They have correctly classified 70.3% of the alliance supporters. The values of the two standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients suggest that voters who have discussed Legco election with friends and relatives (.79312) and who have participated in June Fourth marches or rallies in 1989 (.51814) are more likely to vote for the UDHKMP alliance.

Table 14 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices by Political Participation

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

Predictors*	Function 1
Discussed Legco election with friends or relatives.	.79312
Participated in June Fourth marches or rallies in 1989.	.51814

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 (unweighted) cases were processed.
2 of these were excluded from the analysis.
0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.
2 had at least one missing discriminating variable.
335 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.

C. Number of Cases by Group

Group membership	Number of cases Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	180	180.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	155	155.0
Total	335	335.0

Table 14 (Continued)

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	180	85 47.2%	95 52.8%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	155	46 29.7%	109 70.3%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 57.91%

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions

(i) Eigenvalue	.0379
(ii) Canonical correlation	.1911

F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)

Group	Function 1
1	.18011
2	-.20916

* All values of the independent variables are on a 2-point scale, where 1=Yes and 2=No.

To summarize the results of the above three discriminant analyses, a salient feature emerges from the relationship between electoral choice and specific political opinions and participation activities. A political disposition, which can be called "the China complex," has run through the voters' political opinions and participation activities. That is evidenced by the findings that definite supporters of the UDHKMP are voters who

1. expect their candidate to dissent with the Chinese government,
2. oppose the policy that Hong Kong government should dissolve HKASPDM,
3. oppose the policy that China has the right to examine policies that are to be carried over beyond 1997,

4. support the policy that the chief executive of the SAR should be directly elected,
5. support the policy that the Bill of Rights should be carried over beyond 1997, and
6. have participated in June Fourth marches and rallies in 1989.

Conclusion

To recapitulate, in the preceding analysis, each of the independent variables in the framework has been used separately as discriminator to differentiate the electoral choice of Hong Kong voters. The salient findings which emerge from these analyses can be summarized into four points:

1. Demographic-socioeconomic attributes of voters are fairly effective predictors in differentiating definite supporters of the UDHKMP alliance from non-supporters. From these socioeconomic-demographic attributes, we may depict the profile of the definite supporters of the UDHKMP alliance as public housing residents, relatively well educated, occupying a relatively higher occupational status, earning a higher income and young employees.
2. Both identifications of political organization and ideology are effective discriminators in differentiating electoral choice. Both discriminant analyses can correctly classify more than 70% of the cases under analysis. However, there is still a considerable portion of voters who have not developed or consolidated their political identification yet. Hence, the findings suggest that those voters who have held opinions on political organizations and/or ideological stands tend to vote in accordance with their opinions.
3. Though Hong Kong voters' political attitudes towards their government do not serve well in discriminating electoral choice, the study has, however, revealed some essential features of the political attitudes of Hong Kong citizens. A large portion of Hong Kong citizens mistrusts the integrity of the government and holds a strong sense of internal inefficacy in comprehending politics and influencing government policies. On the other hand, they have demonstrated a strong sense of citizen duty towards and high expectation of

elected councillors and political organizations to enhance the responsiveness of the government. Taken together, we may conclude that, in order to envisage, if not resolve, their mistrust of government and sense of internal political inefficacy, Hong Kong voters, especially those supporting the UDHKMP alliance, put their faith in the democratic election system, or more specifically, in the newly emerging political organizations and/or figures.

4. Hong Kong voters' opinions of candidates, evaluation of public policy issues and their modes of political participation have served quite well as predictors in differentiating electoral choice. Emerging from these predictors is a political disposition which can be called "the China complex." Supporters of the UDHKMP have unambiguously demonstrated their dissent and fears of the interventions of the Chinese government in Hong Kong affairs.

To further summarize the findings of these series of analyses, we have run another discriminant analysis to synthesize the discriminating power of these independent variables. We have chosen ten significant predictors from these variables. The performance of these predictor turns out to be very satisfactory (cf. Table 15). They have correctly classified nearly three-fourths of the cases under analysis (74.32%). These predictors are especially effective at predicting supporters of the UDHKMP alliance because they have correctly classified 77.5% of them. The canonical correlation takes on the value of .5379, which indicates that the difference between groups has accounted for 28.93% of the total variance.

Table 15 Discriminant Analysis of Electoral Choices (A Synthesis)

A. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

Predictors	Function 1
Educational level.	.03168
Acceptance of UDHK.	.54144
Pro-democrat.	.16039
Elected councillors are responsive to public opinion.	.34960
Political organization can enhance government's responsiveness to the public.	.20061
Not holding a foreign passport.	-.22048
Daring to dissent with the Chinese government.	.03742
Hong Kong government should dissolve HKASPDM.	.05653
Death penalty should be implemented.	-.19742
China has the right to examine policies that are to be carried over beyond 1997.	-.11104

B. Classification Processing Summary

337 (unweighted) cases were processed.
154 of these were excluded from the analysis.
0 had missing or out-of-range group codes.
154 had at least one missing discriminating variable.
183 (unweighted) cases were used in the analysis.

C. Number of Cases by Group

Group membership	Number of cases Unweighted	Weighted
1. Non-supporter of UDHKMP	94	94.0
2. Supporter of UDHKMP	89	89.0
Total	183	183.0

Table 15 (Continued)

D. Classification Results

Actual group	No. of cases	Predicted group membership 1	2
Group 1 (Non-supporter of UDHKMP)	94	67 71.3%	27 28.7%
Group 2 (Supporter of UDHKMP)	89	20 22.5%	69 77.5%

Percentage of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 74.32%

E. Canonical Discriminant Functions

(i) Eigenvalue	.4071
(ii) Canonical correlation	.5379

F. Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)

Group	Function 1
1	.61741
2	-.65209

The preceding analyses have yielded some significant findings which have illuminated our understanding of the relationship between electoral choice and demographic-socioeconomic attributes, general political attitudes and specific political opinions. However, due to the lack of large-scale and definite political alignment and cleavage in the 1991 election, the electoral choices demonstrated in the election are still in a state of flux and disaggregation. The analyses are unable to account for one-third of the electoral choices, which are from voters who have split the two votes on their ballots to two candidates of different political orientations. Furthermore, as the UDHKMP alliance has been the only political organization which has launched a territory-wide campaign in the 1991 election, a territory-wide survey, such as ours, is inevitably forced to concentrate the analysis on accounting for the differences between the supporters and non-supporters of the alliance.

In light of the political development taking place since the 1991 election, it is most likely that we will envisage a different political

configuration in the 1995 election. By then, we expect that political parties will have well developed, political alignments and cleavages will have formed or consolidated, and electoral choice will have been structured by the unilateral ballot. Subsequently, the abovementioned limitations of this study will be mostly resolved. Therefore, we take the findings of this study as the foundation upon which studies on voting behaviour in 1995 election and thereafter will be based.

Notes

1. See for example Rose and Urwin, 1970; Butler *et al.*, 1981; Daalder and Mair, 1983; Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1984; and Franklin *et al.*, 1992.
2. See for example Butler and Stokes, 1974; Budge, Crewe and Farlie, 1976; Himmelweit, Humphrey and Jaeger, 1981; Franklin, 1985; Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985; Heath *et al.*, 1991; Denver and Hands, 1992.
3. See for example Campbell, Gurin and Miller, 1954; Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976; Abramson, 1983; Neuman, 1986; Long, 1987a and 1987b; and Ferejohn and Kuklinski, 1990.
4. See for example Denver and Hands, 1992:6-8; and Franklin *et al.*, 1992:15-6.
5. See for example Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1984; and Franklin *et al.*, 1992.
6. These categories are derived from an analysis of 1981 census data and are based on Weberian conceptions of economic class and social class. See Tsang (1992) for details.
7. Please refer to Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1984; and Franklin *et al.*, 1992 for international examples. Cf. Franklin, 1985; Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985; Heath *et al.*, 1991; Denver and Hands, 1992 for discussions of the case of Britain.
8. Please refer to the work of Inglehart, 1977; 1981 and 1984.
9. See for example Milbrath and Goel, 1977; and Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978.
10. See for example Himmelweit, Humphrey and Jaeger, 1981; Sniderman, Glaser and Griffin, 1990; Rahn *et al.*, 1990; and Pomper, 1992.

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6

The "Party-Identification" Factor in the 1991 Legislative Council Election

Louie Kin-sheun

This paper is an enquiry into the question of party-identification in the context of Hong Kong. It seeks to ascertain whether party-identification existed among the voters taking part in Hong Kong's maiden direct election to the Legislative Council (Legco) held in September 1991 and, if so, how many voters could be considered "party-identifiers." It also aims to ascertain the extent to which the voting choice of the electors was conditioned by an underlying feeling of attachment to the political groups contesting the seats in the election.

The above questions appear to be out-dated in any research on the electorate in the western democracies. However, in the context of Hong Kong, the problem of party-identification is not only a new one but also reveals to be particularly interesting and significant.

The 1991 Legco election distinguished itself from all previous elections held in the territory by one very fundamental fact: the intensive participation of political parties.[1] Among the 54 candidates contesting the 18 seats on offer in nine double-seat constituencies, 34 were fielded by political groups or publicly announced that they were supported by

certain political organizations.[2] The United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), generally regarded as the first genuine political party in the territory, fielded the largest contingent of candidates: 14 in total, with two candidates in each of five constituencies and one candidate in each of four constituencies.[3] Furthermore, the results of the 1991 Legco election also seemed to confirm the weight that political parties carried. Among the 18 candidates eventually elected, 15 were affiliated to parties: 12 being members of the UDHK, two being members of Meeting Point (MP) and one being member of the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (HKADPL). Such a seemingly "landslide" victory of the party-affiliated candidates over the independent candidates induced some political analysts to claim that the "party factor" played a determining role in the 1991 Legco election (Lo, 1992).

However, in spite of the intensive participation of the parties as well as the overwhelming victory of the party-affiliated candidates, a common sense judgement impels us to throw doubt upon the "magic power" that the political parties had in the election. First of all, most of the local parties are of recent creation. For example, UDHK was established in April 1990 and Liberal Democratic Federation (LDF), the rival group formed by the conservative forces and some businessmen to counterbalance the liberals, was formed in November 1990. The electorate in general is still not familiar with these infant organizations. It is a well known fact that party-identification is a product of a socialization process. In particular, an individual's affective orientation to a political party is usually formed in the childhood or youth period (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Easton and Dennis, 1969; Greenstein, 1965; Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Langton, 1968). However, in Hong Kong, such a socialization process in relation to parties is still to take place and, therefore, in the 1991 Legco election, it was unlikely that party-identification constituted an important factor affecting the voting choice of the electors. Secondly, almost all the local parties are very small organizations in terms of their membership and the resources at their disposal. The kind of "mass party" as we know in western countries is non-existent in Hong Kong.[4] Therefore, the logistic support that these parties could provide to the candidates was in fact minimal. Under such circumstances, one finds it hard to believe that the political parties had any noticeable impact on the electors who turned out to vote.

Confronted by such a puzzling picture, we have to rely on empirical data to ascertain the real effect of party-identification in the 1991 Legco

election. In a territory-wide survey of the registered electors conducted after the election, a set of questions was thus incorporated into the questionnaire in order to probe the attitudes as well as the actual behaviour of the voters in this regard.[5] It is hoped that such a study would not only be able to shed light retrospectively on what happened in 1991, but also to generate the first batch of information on the question of party-identification so that future research can have references in a longitudinal perspective. In fact, in western countries, studies on voting behaviour have in general been conducted after political parties had been well established and elections had also become more or less a routine exercise in the political life. Therefore, sometimes one is at a loss to comprehend what exactly were the geneses of the electors' various attitudes and behaviour, including their feeling of attachment to political parties. Hong Kong seems to be able to provide some insight in this regard because both election and political parties are new phenomena in the territory. Relevant research may reveal how the electors' identification with political parties is developed *from the very beginning*. This paper may not be able to provide a definite and satisfactory answer to this question but it, nevertheless, is a first attempt in this direction so that future studies can have sources for comparison.

The Concept of Party-identification and the Hong Kong Context

Before we embark on a study of whether party-identification was a factor in the voting behaviour of the electors in the 1991 Legco election, some preliminary questions with theoretical implications need to be tackled.

The concept of party-identification is extensively used in the study of voting behaviour as well as that of political socialization. A number of assumptions are in fact involved in this concept and they can be briefly summed up as follows (Budge, Crewe and Farlie, 1976:12):

(1) Most electors feel an underlying attachment to a party, thus termed "party-identification," which can be distinguished from current voting intention.
(2) This underlying attachment is produced by socialization, in particular within the family.

(3) Most electors remain attached to their party throughout life, whatever the leadership does.
(4) The minority who change attachments do so from a combination of the following circumstances: absence or weakness of parental attachments; family and own initial attachments different from those of adult reference groups such as class; large-scale economic, social and political change.
(5) Underlying attachments to parties are reflected in electors' direct responses to questions about their self-perceived closeness to parties, and their strength of feeling about this.
(6) The more strongly attached an elector is to a party, the more likely he is to vote independently for the party to which he is attached in a particular election as well as over a series of elections.
(7) The more strongly attached an elector is to a party, the more likely he is to turn out to vote.
(8) The more strongly attached an elector is to a party, the more likely are all his other evaluations and perceptions of politics to be consistent with his party attachment.
(9) Temporary inconsistencies between voting choice and party attachment can be produced by the appeals of issues and candidates, but only over one or two elections, following which the individual generally votes again according to his party attachment.

Based on the above assumptions, partially or in totality, the concept of party-identification is then deployed to explore or explain other political phenomena, such as "normal vote" (Converse, 1969), different kinds of elections ("maintaining election," "deviating election," "realigning election") (Campbell *et al.*, 1960), democratic stability and legitimacy (Converse and Dupeux, 1962; Converse, 1969). A consequence of this is that party-identification rapidly has become a key concept as well as a pervasive one in the study of politics in western countries. The existence and stability of party-identification among the electorate of these societies is now well recognized.

However, although the question of party-identification has been extensively studied in western countries and thus a lot of hindsight is available for a similar exploration to be undertaken in Hong Kong, it is necessary to note that controversies in relation to the methodology as well as the actual meaning of the concept still exist (Budge, Crewe and Farlie, 1976). For the purpose of facilitating our study, two problems need to be examined here.

Firstly, there is a debate over the measurement of a voter's party-identification, or partisanship. The original party-identification questions, first used in the surveys of the electors of the United States of America, ran as follows (Campbell *et al.*, 1960):

> Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
> (If Republican or Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong (Republican, Democrat) or a not very strong (Republican, Democrat)?
> (If Independent) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?

Answers to these questions gave rise to a seven-point classification: strong Democrat, weak Democrat, independent Democrat, independent, independent Republican, weak Republican, strong Republican. A slightly modified scheme was used to study the partisanship of the British electorate, due to the presence of a minor but not insignificant third party (Bulter and Stokes, 1974). An underlying assumption of such a measurement scheme is that the partisanship of the electors can be somewhat interpreted as a continuum. However, the above approach suits primarily a system in which only two major parties exist and compete one against the other. When applied to a multi-party system, the measurement scheme reveals to be inadequate and no continuum can be easily established. For example, in the Netherlands, since the number of political parties is too large, it is not possible to name them all in a survey on partisanship. Therefore, respondents are requested to name the party with which they identify. Under such circumstances, it is of course very difficult to make cross-national comparison (Thomassen, 1976). In fact, when the study of partisanship is conducted in a multi-party system, how the questions are formulated becomes very important, for different approaches may yield very different results. A case in point in this regard is an estimate of the party-identifiers in the Federal Republic of Germany. According to two surveys conducted by the same investigator, in 1967 and 1969 respectively, the proportion of party-identifiers fluctuated from 54% to 29% and this was basically due to the fact that the names of the parties were mentioned in the former survey whereas in the latter their names were omitted and the respondents had to indicate the parties with

which they identified (Kaase, 1976). To date, there is still disagreement among researchers concerned on how to measure the partisanship of the voters in a multi-party system. Accordingly, cross-national comparison in this regard is not easy to carry out.

The second problem concerns the distinction between party-identification and vote preference. Generally speaking, party-identification is regarded as a predisposition with a stable and long-term character whereas vote preference or voting intention is considered as short-term action taken under specific circumstances. Unless distracted by some current factors, in particular the appeals of issues and candidates, an elector's party-identification and vote preference should be the same. However, this distinction is contestable. Why is the vote preference of an elector not a better reflection of his attachment to a party? Why is the vote preference, compared to an elector's self-declared attachment and self-perceived closeness to a party, not a more reliable indicator of one's party-identification? Why is the vote preference, given the fact that it has direct impact on electoral results, not a more meaningful measure of one's predisposition? Furthermore, it seems that the larger the number of parties is, the less clear-cut the distinction between the two concepts will be. In a system of multiple and unstable parties, party-identification is primarily no more than an alternative way of measuring current voting intention (Thomassen, 1976). The concept of party-identification was developed basically first in the United States and then in the United Kingdom where both have a stable two-party system. Therefore, in these two countries, the separation of party attachment and vote preference appears to be possible and somewhat natural. This may not be the case in other countries or systems.

The above discussion is particularly pertinent to our study of party-identification in Hong Kong. The political setting of the territory is radically different from that in western democracies. Therefore, any endeavour to probe the partisanship of the electors must take into account the specific local conditions which can be summed up as follows.

Firstly, Hong Kong is certainly not a two-party system. It cannot be regarded as a multi-party system either. Although a number of parties were present in the 1991 Legco election, most of them were in fact very small groups fielding a very small number of candidates. In fact, Hong Kong as a whole is undergoing the stage of party formation. Therefore, the methodology that is conventionally used to probe the party attachment of the electors must be extensively modified to suit the local

conditions.

Secondly, among the various parties involved in the 1991 Legco election, none fielded candidates to contest every seat on offer. Thus, one may claim that there is no territory-wide party in Hong Kong. The largest contingent of candidates was fielded by UDHK which jointly with MP contested 17 seats out of the total 18 seats on offer. Besides this "preponderant" presence, the other groups usually fielded only one to six candidates. Therefore, with the exception of UDHK, the other groups were present only in certain constituencies but absent from most of the others. With such an unbalanced presence of the political parties, to employ the conventional techniques to detect the voters' party attachment becomes problematic.

Thirdly, given the fact that the total number of parties involved in the election was not small but the electors in general were still unfamiliar with these parties, it would be impossible and meaningless to name all the parties in the questions probing the electors' attachment to them. In fact, whether any predisposition in relation to political parties has been nourished is still doubtful and therefore to separate party-identification from vote preference reveals not to be feasible. In the actual context of Hong Kong, the vote preference may be a better or the only possible indicator of the electors' attachment to parties, at least for the time being.

Fourthly, the double-seat arrangement of the constituencies renders the study of party-identification more difficult. In a single-seat system or a list system in which each elector can vote for only one list fielded by a political party, the preference as well as the identification of the voter concerned are clear-cut. However, when an elector can vote for two candidates, then his loyalty to a certain party, if any, can easily be split. The existence of the possibility to vote for two candidates fielded by different parties would naturally reduce the proportion of strong or even weak party-identifiers in the overall electorate. It is a well known fact that different electoral arrangements have different effects on the voting intention of the electors (Grofman and Lijphart, 1986). No matter whether we regard voting intention as an indicator of party-identification or as an act separable from party-identification, a double-seat arrangement certainly creates extra difficulties in the investigation of voters' partisanship.

Given the above-mentioned conditions specific to Hong Kong, the measurement of party-identification must be based on different grounds. Methods generally used in western countries cannot be directly adopted.

Voters' Cognition and Acceptance of the Parties

Before we venture on to an examination of partisanship in Hong Kong, it is necessary to find out how knowledgeable the electors are with regard to the existing political parties as well as how acceptable the latter are to them. It is only when cognition and acceptance both attain a reasonable level that party attachment can become meaningful.

In our survey, a total of 939 registered electors were interviewed. Each respondent was asked if he or she had heard of the following political organizations: UDHK, LDF, MP, HKADPL, Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (HKDF), Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) and Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDM).[6] In western countries with established political parties, it may be a mockery to ask an elector whether he or she had heard of the name of a major political party. However, in Hong Kong, to ask such a question can help to screen out those who have no knowledge of the parties. In fact, as Table 1 shows, each party in Hong Kong is still unknown to a non-negligible proportion of the registered electors although all parties except MP had been heard of by more than half of the respondents.

Table 1 Registered Electors Who Had Heard Of and Who Had Not Heard Of the Political Parties (%)

Political Party	Who had heard of	Who had not heard of
HKASPDM	85.4	14.6
UDHK	84.5	15.5
FTU	73.6	26.4
HKADPL	65.9	34.1
LDF	69.2	30.8
HKDF	52.6	47.4
MP	48.0	52.0
(N = 939)		

The figures in Table 1 can be interpreted in two symmetrically opposite ways. On the one hand, one may claim that the Hong Kong electorate is rather ignorant of the local political parties because every party is not even heard of by quite a substantial proportion of the electorate. In the case of MP which is a political organization formed nine years ago and which had fielded three candidates in the 1991 Legco election and eventually won two seats, more than half of the electors had not even heard of its name. Thus the picture could be quite a disappointing one. On the other hand, one may also interpret it from an opposite angle. Most of these parties had only recently been established or become active on the political scene. That they could make their names known to the majority of electors in such a short time was itself an impressive achievement. It could also mean that the electors in general had been sufficiently sensitized to, firstly, the existence of these parties and, secondly, their participation in the electoral activities. Here, a caveat is in order. Our survey was conducted *after* the holding of the Legco election. The names of the parties had certainly been intensively and extensively propagated during the election period, either by the parties or the candidates themselves or by the various media. Thus, the electors' level of cognition shown in Table 1 is in fact a *post-election* one, and it is unlikely that the parties had been heard of by the same number of electors prior to the election. Nevertheless, such a level of cognition could be considered as capable of constituting a solid working basis for us to attempt further enquiries.

To a respondent who stated that he had heard of a particular party, we then asked whether he accepted the opinions of this party or not. The data thus collected are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Acceptance of the Opinions of the Political Parties*

Party	Degree of acceptance (%)						Standard
(N)	1	2	3	4	5	Mean	Deviation
UDHK (683)	5.0	38.9	47.9	7.3	0.9	2.6018	0.7342
LDF (489)	0.8	22.9	67.3	8.2	0.8	2.8528	0.5961
MP (321)	0.9	29.9	61.4	6.9	0.9	2.7695	0.6249
HKADPL (416)	0.2	24.3	69.5	5.5	0.5	2.8173	0.5425
HKDF (308)	0.3	21.8	72.7	4.5	0.6	2.8344	0.5248
FTU (542)	1.5	30.1	54.2	12.4	1.8	2.8303	0.7276
HKASPDM (692)	3.8	34.5	48.3	10.8	2.6	2.7399	0.8008

* Electors who did not express their views are not included in this Table.
Notes: 1 = Very much accept; 2 = Accept; 3 = Average;
4 = Do not accept; 5 = Very much do not accept.

Several remarks can be made with regard to the data in Table 2.

In the first place, it is easy to observe that a generalized apathetic feeling existed among the electors *vis-à-vis* the parties. Those who had a substantive view in either accepting or not accepting the opinions of the parties were always the minority except in the cases of UDHK and HKASPDM. In other words, with regard to the other five organizations, the majority of the electors did not have any positive or negative views on their positions. Therefore, even among the electors who had heard of the parties, their attitude towards what these parties stood for was basically evasive or indifferent. If the degree of acceptance as shown in Table 1 can be considered as comparable to the electors' self-perceived closeness to political party, then we must admit that the overall partisanship of the Hong Kong electorate is at a rather low level. In a nutshell, the Hong Kong electorate's attitude towards political parties is on the whole a lukewarm one.

Secondly, for each party, the mean score of acceptance is always on the positive side, as Table 2 indicates. It implies that for each single party, the number of electors who accepted its opinion was always larger than those who rejected it. No party appeared to be the target of massive rejection by the electorate. Among the six organizations studied, UDHK and HKASPDM had relatively more support among the electors but the difference between one party and the other was rather small. No party seemed to enjoy a built-in advantage of support among the electors. With regard to the range between acceptance and unacceptance, it can be observed that only three organizations, i.e. HKASPDM, UDHK and FTU, found the views of the electors on them relatively polarized. For the other organizations, the dispersion was rather small. Such a situation should not be an astonishment to us because HKASPDM, UDHK and FTU had better defined position on some issues generally considered as essential in Hong Kong, including in particular their attitudes towards or relationship with the Chinese government, whereas the programme or position of the other parties were comparatively less well known to the public and therefore the electors would have difficulty in differentiating them. However, the data in Table 2 show that even among the electors who had substantive views on the parties, their attitudes towards the latter was on the whole a mild one.

Thirdly, although the overall attitude of the electors towards the parties could be considered as lukewarm and their opinion basically a mild one, it did not mean that they were not capable of distinguishing parties of different orientations. The seven organizations that we have studied in fact can be classified into three categories. UDHK, MP, HKADPL, HKDF and HKASPDM belong to the "liberal camp." LDF belongs to the "conservative or pro-business camp." Whereas FTU is publicly known as a long-time pro-Chinese organization. As Table 3 shows, electors who accept a party of the liberal camp most likely also accept others of the same camp. Electors who accept the parties of the liberal camp also accept LDF which belongs to the conservative camp, although the correlation is statistically less significant. However, electors who accept the parties of the liberal camp, in particular UDHK and HKASPDM, in general tend *not* to accept FTU, or vice versa. Therefore, the line of demarcation seemed to be the parties' attitudes towards the Chinese government and this constituted a major criterion for the voters to decide whether they accepted a party or not.

Table 3 Correlation between Acceptance of Political Parties (Pearson's R)

	UDHK	LDF	MP	HKADPL	HKDF	FTU
LDF	.2919***					
MP	.4507***	.2349***				
HKADPL	.3778***	.2482***	.5447***			
HKDF	.3658***	.5156***	.3961***	.5580***		
FTU	.0260	.3173***	.1718**	.2921***	.3033***	
HKASPDM	.6043***	.1955***	.3596***	.3554***	.4081***	.0628

** p<.01, *** p<.001 (two-tailed).

To sum up our findings on the electors' cognition and acceptance of the political parties, we may say that the overall situation reveals to be normal. The parties, most of which are of recent origin, are not yet known to all the electors. Quite an important proportion of the electorate has still not yet heard of the names of some parties. However, such ignorance could disappear soon. The holding of elections at regular intervals as well as the attention that all sectors of the society pay to them would propagate the names of the parties rapidly. For example, after the 1991 Legco election, UDHK was known to 84.5% of the registered electors. Therefore, some parties may be able to become household names in Hong Kong in the near future. On the whole, the electors' cognition of the parties has attained quite an impressive level and this constitutes the ground for us to attempt further studies on their attitudes. Furthermore, the electors on the whole do not have strong opinion on the parties. They express a mild acceptance of all the parties. Such a situation is in fact perfectly normal given the short existence of most of the parties and the embryonic familiarity of the electors with them. However, the electors are capable of distinguishing the parties of different orientations. Their attitude towards the parties thus is not disorderly and unrecognizable but rather an attitude based on a reasonable level of knowledge of the parties as well as on a sensible level of appreciation. It is based on such a general observation of the electorate that we now turn to examine the question of party-identification among the voters.

Identifying the Party-identifiers

Given Hong Kong's specific conditions, it is not possible to directly apply the method that similar research uses in western countries in the study of party-identification. It is in particular not advisable to ask directly an elector how he perceives his closeness to a certain party. An appropriate scheme needs to be devised to probe the party-identification of the Hong Kong electors.

In our study, we try to reconstruct the party-identification of the Hong Kong electors by taking the vote preference as the point of departure. After an elector's vote preference is ascertained, we then look into whether he is aware or not of the party to which his chosen candidate is affiliated. Finally, the vote choice and awareness of the candidate's party affiliation is cross-checked with whether the elector accepts the party concerned. If an elector votes for a party-affiliated candidate and is well aware of which party his chosen candidate is affiliated to and also accepts the opinions of the party concerned, then he is recognized as a party-identifier. Therefore, in our scheme, the probing of party-identification is based on the vote preference, rather than the self-perceived closeness to the parties, plus knowledge of and attitude towards the party concerned.

However, the double-seat constituency arrangement brings extra difficulty to the above scheme. An elector may have split attachment to two parties at the same time since he can vote for two candidates. In this case, whether such an elector can be considered a party-identifier becomes problematic. Accordingly, we further elaborate our scheme and classify the party-identifiers into two categories: the core-identifiers and the peripheral-identifiers. A core-identifier is an elector whose attachment to a party is clear and consistent whereas a peripheral-identifier's attachment to a party is still not a fully fledged one but has the potential of developing into a clear and consistent one. The operational definitions of these two categories of identifiers are as follows.

Core-identifier A core-identifier is an elector who, in the 1991 Legco direct election, voted for two candidates who were affiliated to the same party. The elector was aware of such party affiliation and further-

more claimed that he accepted or very much accepted the opinions of the party concerned. Or he voted for only one candidate in the 1991 Legco direct election, this candidate being affiliated to a party and he was aware of such affiliation and furthermore claimed that he accepted or very much accepted the opinions of the party concerned. One more element needs to be taken into consideration. In the 1991 Legco direct election, UDHK and MP ran a joint campaign. Therefore, an elector who voted for two candidates affiliated respectively to these two parties, who was well aware of such affiliations and who claimed that he accepted or very much accepted the opinions of these two parties will also be considered a core-identifier although his attachment was a split one.

Peripheral-identifier Compared with a core-identifier, a peripheral-identifier is characterized by an attachment to a political party which is less firm or less consistent, but nonetheless he is capable of becoming a core-identifier at a later stage. Peripheral-identifiers can be further divided into three groups. Group one is composed of the electors who voted for only one candidate affiliated to a party or for two candidates affiliated to the same party in the 1991 Legco direct election and claimed that they accepted or very much accepted the opinions of the party concerned. In other words, the difference between this group of peripheral-identifiers and the core-identifiers is that the former might not be aware of the party affiliation of the candidate or candidates for whom they voted. However, such a knowledge gap can be filled and these peripheral-identifiers might thus become core-identifiers. The second group is composed of the electors who voted for only one candidate affiliated to a party or for two candidates affiliated to the same party and were well aware of such affiliation but they did not express particular acceptance or unacceptance of the opinions of the party concerned. In other words, what distinguishes this group of peripheral-identifiers from the core-identifiers is the degree of acceptance in relation to the parties. The third group of peripheral-identifiers are the electors who, in the 1991 Legco direct election, voted for two candidates affiliated to different parties or voted for one party-affiliated candidate plus an independent candidate, who were well aware of the position of the candidates and claimed that they accepted or very much accepted the opinions of the party or the parties concerned. In other words, the difference between this group of peripheral-identifiers and the core-identifiers is that the former does not have a consistent attachment towards one single party. However, two points should be noted with regard to the justification of

considering voters of such seemingly split loyalty as party-identifiers. On the one hand, an attachment to more than one party at this initial stage is likely to boost the political interest and awareness of the elector concerned and the latter stands a good chance of eventually becoming a core-identifier. On the other hand, the parties involved in the 1991 Legco election were not antagonistic to one another. In a two-party system, it is rather impossible to have shared attachment to both parties. In a multi-party system, identification with more than one party is not only possible but probable. In the political context of Hong Kong, having attachment to two different parties does not necessarily mean having a self-contradictory attitude. On the contrary, it might help the elector concerned to develop stronger identification with one party or the other at a later stage.

Therefore, our approach in identifying the party-identifiers is radically different from that used in western countries. Instead of asking an elector directly how he perceives his closeness to the existing parties, we start by ascertaining the voting choice of an elector and then confirm it with first his awareness of the party-affiliation of the candidate or candidates chosen and then his acceptance of the party or parties concerned. Such an approach is devised in view of Hong Kong's specific political context. Since our approach and the one commonly used by researchers in the West have very different points of departure as well as very different logic, it is hard to compare the two. However, the criteria that we use are certainly not looser or more lenient. In fact, it can be considered as even more stringent than those in western countries because it is not easy for an elector to satisfy the requirements through the different steps and thus becomes a core- or peripheral-identifier whereas in similar studies in the West, a self-declared perception will suffice to make an elector a party-identifier.

With the above expounded method, we then screen the electors who voted in the 1991 Legco direct election. It is found that among the 516 electors who voted, 73 were core-identifiers, thus representing 14.1% of the voters. Among these 73 core-identifiers, 69 identified with UDHK or UDHK jointly with MP. Three identified with HKADPL and one identified with FTU. It is also found that there were altogether 106 peripheral-identifiers, thus representing 20.5% of the electors who voted in the 1991 Legco election. The breakdown of these peripheral-identifiers is as follows:

Group 1:
total: 46
of which: 43 identified with UDHK or UDHK/MP;
1 identified with LDF;
2 identified with FTU.

Group 2:
total: 18
of which: 11 identified with UDHK or UDHK/MP;
2 identified with LDF;
5 identified with FTU.

Group 3:
total: 42
of which: 31 identified with UDHK plus independent candidates;
3 identified with UDHK plus FTU;
3 identified with UDHK plus HKADPL;
2 identified with UDHK plus HKDF;
1 identified with MP plus independent candidate;
1 identified with FTU plus independent candidate;
1 identified with HKADPL plus independent candidate.

If we pool the core-identifiers and the peripheral-identifiers together, they then represent in total 34.6% of the electors who voted in the 1991 Legco election. In our survey, an effort was also made in order to ascertain whether an "anti-party" sentiment existed among the electorate and, if so, how strong it was. This question was enquired by way of asking the electors who had chosen two independent candidates without party-affiliation, who were aware of the non-affiliation of the candidates and who at the same time claimed that they deliberately made such voting choices. It is found that among the 516 electors who voted in the 1991 Legco election, only 13 voters could be considered as such "anti-party voters," representing only 2.5% of the voters. Therefore, the anti-party sentiment could be regarded as having not much significance in the election.

How the above figures should be interpreted is of course an important question. Nevertheless, it is, first of all, necessary to ascertain who these party-identifiers are in terms of their socio-demographic characteristics before we attempt to enquire into the impact they made on the

electoral results.

Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Party-identifiers

In recent decades, a general trend in western countries with respect to political change has been the decline in the number of party-identifiers. For example, in the United Kingdom, the proportion of the electorate who has identified with the two major parties (Conservative and Labour) has dropped from 81% in 1964 to 67% in 1987. The share of the votes that the two major parties have obtained has also dropped from 87.7% to 74.8% for the same period (Heath *et al.*, 1991, chapters 1 and 2). Such a trend reflects a greater degree of electoral volatility. Nevertheless, the party-identifiers are still by far the majority in the electorate in spite of the decline in their absolute number. Therefore, it would not be very meaningful to study the socio-demographic profiles of the party-identifiers in western countries since they are reflecting the particular population. Researches instead seek to find out the base of support of each party by investigating the socio-demographic characteristics of its identifiers. In the case of Hong Kong, the picture is a radically different one. The party-identifiers constitute, at present as well as in the foreseeable future, the minority. Therefore, an endeavour to ascertain who these identifiers are becomes not only necessary but meaningful. It is by ascertaining the socio-demographic characteristics of the identifiers that we will be able to make further analysis about them.

Table 4 to Table 11 present the eight major socio-demographic characteristics of the identifiers, namely sex, age, educational attainment, employment status, occupation, income, marital status and type of housing. In each characteristic, a comparison is made among the registered electors, the voters in the 1991 Legco election, and the three categories of identifiers, namely the core-identifiers, the peripheral-identifiers and the non-party-identifiers. In order to ascertain the relationship between each of the characteristics and party-identification, the relevant statistical figures are also given in each table.

Table 4 Party-identification and Sex (%)

	Registered electors	Voters	Party-identification*		
			Core-identifier	Peripheral-identifier	Non-party-identifier
Male	48.8	51.4	64.4	52.8	48.1
Female	51.2	48.6	35.6	47.2	51.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(939)	(516)	(73)	(106)	(337)

* $\chi^2 = 6.5071$, df = 2, p = 0.0386.

Table 5 Party-identification and Age (%)

	Registered electors	Voters	Party-identification*		
			Core-identifier	Peripheral-identifier	Non-party-identifier
21-30	16.4	16.9	28.8	27.4	11.0
31-40	32.2	33.5	34.2	37.7	32.0
41-50	20.1	20.9	17.8	15.1	23.4
51-60	14.8	13.4	13.7	9.4	14.5
61 & above	16.5	15.3	5.5	10.4	19.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
(N)	(939)	(516)	(73)	(106)	(337)

* $\chi^2 = 34.7064$, df = 8, p = 0.0000.

Table 6 Party-identification and Educational Attainment (%)

	Registered electors	Voters	Party-identification*		
			Core-identifier	Peripheral-identifier	Non-party-identifier
Primary & below	47.2	42.4	15.1	29.2	52.5
Secondary	42.0	42.1	50.7	42.5	40.1
Tertiary	10.9	15.5	34.2	28.3	7.4
Total	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(939)	(516)	(73)	(106)	(337)

* $\chi^2 = 68.8707$, df = 4, p = 0.0000.

Table 7 Party-identification and Employment Status (%)

	Registered electors	Voters	Party-identification*		
			Core-identifier	Peripheral-identifier	Non-party-identifier
Working	62.3	64.3	81.9	71.7	58.2
Not working	37.7	35.7	18.1	28.3	41.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(938)	(515)	(72)	(106)	(337)

* $\chi^2 = 17.8200$, df = 2, p = 0.0001.

Table 8 Party-identification and Occupation (%)

	Registered electors	Voters	Party-identification*		
			Core-identifier	Peripheral-identifier	Non-party-identifier
Managers/ Administrators	13.6	16.3	20.3	20.0	13.6
Professionals/ Asso. professionals	10.3	13.5	28.8	18.7	6.8
Clerks	13.8	13.5	10.2	12.0	15.2
Service/Shop sales workers	16.7	13.2	8.5	9.3	16.2
Skilled workers	27.7	29.5	27.1	32.0	29.3
Elementary occupations	17.9	13.8	5.1	8.0	18.8
Total	100.0	99.8	100.0	100.0	99.9
(N)	(574)	(325)	(59)	(75)	(191)

* $\chi^2 = 33.1085$, df = 10, p = 0.0003.

Table 9 Party-identification and Individual Monthly Income (%)

(HK$)	Registered electors	Voters	Party-identification*		
			Core-identifier	Peripheral-identifier	Non-party-identifier
Below 2,000	3.4	2.9	0.0	2.7	3.8
2,000-3,999	12.0	8.6	6.9	2.7	11.5
4,000-5,999	23.5	19.0	8.6	5.3	28.0
6,000-7,999	21.5	18.7	20.7	22.7	16.5
8,000-9,999	12.7	15.9	19.0	20.0	13.2
10,000-11,999	8.6	10.5	5.2	17.3	9.3
12,000-13,999	3.6	4.4	8.6	5.3	2.7
14,000-16,999	4.8	7.0	5.2	13.3	4.9
17,000-19,999	4.5	5.7	15.5	1.3	4.4
20,000 & above	5.2	7.3	10.3	9.3	5.5
Total	99.8	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.8
(N)	(557)	(315)	(58)	(75)	(182)

* $\chi^2 = 58.2449$, df = 18, p = 0.0000.

Table 10 Party-identification and Marital Status (%)

	Registered electors	Voters	Party-identification*		
			Core-identifier	Peripheral-identifier	Non-party-identifier
Single	16.6	19.0	35.6	22.6	14.2
Married	79.7	78.3	63.0	76.4	82.2
Others	3.6	2.7	1.4	0.9	3.6
Total	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0
(N)	(938)	(516)	(73)	(106)	(337)

* $\chi^2 = 20.8492$, df = 4, p = 0.0003.

Table 11 Party-identification and Housing Type (%)

	Registered electors	Voters	Party-identification*		
			Core-identifier	Peripheral-identifier	Non-party-identifier
Public & aided	58.6	56.6	56.2	51.9	58.2
Ownership scheme	11.7	11.2	15.1	9.4	10.9
Private	29.7	32.2	28.8	38.7	30.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0
(N)	(939)	(509)	(73)	(106)	(330)

* $\chi^2 = 3.6789$, df = 4, p = 0.4512.

The figures in Table 4 to Table 11 almost speak for themselves and there is not much need for further explanation. On the whole, the party-identifiers in Hong Kong are composed of a larger proportion of male, unmarried and working persons who are younger in age and have higher educational attainment, higher income as well as occupations of higher

social status. Among the eight socio-demographic characteristics studied, only type of housing is not found to be related to party-identification whereas the relationships between the other seven characteristics and party-identification are statistically very significant. Among these seven characteristics, the three which are commonly regarded as indicators of socio-economic status, namely educational attainment, occupation and income, prove to have particularly strong relationship with party-identification, as Table 12 shows.

Table 12 Strength of Association between Degree of Party-identification and Voters' Socio-demographic Characteristics

	Gamma	Cramer's V	p*
Sex		0.112	<0.05
Age	-0.319	0.183	<0.001
Educational attainment	0.528	0.258	<0.001
Employment status	-0.376	0.186	<0.001
Occupation		0.225	<0.001
Income	0.325	0.304	<0.001
Marital status		0.142	<0.001
Housing type		0.060	>0.05

* Level of significance (Chi-square).

The above findings should not surprise us. On the whole, the party-identifiers, in particular the core-identifiers, reveal to be a middle-class oriented group. In Hong Kong, this group has always been more alert about public affairs and has played a more active role in social and political matters. If we view the question from another angle, the existing parties in Hong Kong are primarily also middle-class oriented organizations. Therefore, it is quite natural that they draw stronger support from the middle class groups (Lau, 1992).

In our survey, we also tried to examine when the electors made their decision on the voting choice during the electoral period. It is found that

the party-identifiers arrived at a decision on whom to vote for generally at an earlier time, as Table 13 shows. This again is not surprising, because stronger and more consistent party-identification would certainly facilitate the decision of voting choice or would considerably reduce the burden of reaching a decision. In western countries, party-identification, besides being conceived of as a non-calculative product of early socialization processes, is also interpreted as an information-economizing device. The relatively early decisions made by the party-identifiers in Hong Kong in respect of their voting choice confirms the same mechanism. At the same time, it may also be a reflection of the fact that party-identifiers are politically and socially more active citizens and thus are capable of reaching the decision on voting choice at a time earlier than the average elector.

Table 13 Timing of the Vote Decision (%)

	First candidate chosen				Second candidate chosen			
	All	CI	PI	NPI	All	CI	PI	NPI
In poll station	7.0	1.4	0.9	10.1	6.2	0.0	1.9	8.9
On poll day	9.5	1.4	9.4	11.3	9.3	5.5	8.5	10.4
One week before	29.3	27.4	33.0	28.5	27.7	26.0	27.4	28.2
One month before	19.4	26.0	20.8	17.5	13.8	17.8	17.9	11.6
Two months or before	31.4	43.8	34.9	27.6	20.9	38.4	23.6	16.3
Others	3.5	0.0	0.9	5.0	3.5	1.4	0.0	5.0
Inapplicable*	—	—	—	—	18.6	11.0	20.8	19.6
Total	100.1	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.0
(N)	(516)	(73)	(106)	(337)	(516)	(73)	(106)	(337)

* Voted for one candidate only.

Notes: All = All voters; CI = Core-identifier;
PI = Peripheral-identifier; NPI = Non-party-identifier.

To recapitulate our findings on party-identification in the 1991 Legco election, it should, first of all, be noted that according to our approach, 34.6% of the voters could be considered party-identifiers with varied degrees of attachment to the various parties. Among them, 14.1% were core-identifiers with clear and consistent attachment to parties and the remaining 20.5% were peripheral-identifiers with only an embryonic and under-developed attachment to the parties. On the contrary, anti-party sentiment appeared to be very weak in the election. Only 2.5% of the voters harboured an explicitly anti-party attitude. With regard to the socio-demographic characteristics of the party-identifiers, it could easily be observed that on the whole they had a predominantly middle-class profile. The party-identifiers in Hong Kong were also the most socially and politically alert and active element of the society.

Conclusion

It is necessary to admit that the approach we adopt to identify the party-identifiers is a peculiar one and is primarily tailor-made for the Hong Kong context. It allows us to assess approximately how many voters in the 1991 Legco election could be considered party-identifiers but does not permit us to undertake cross-national comparisons on the question of party-identification. Nevertheless, as we have already pointed out, the major difficulty for any cross-national comparison of voting behaviour comes from the diversity of the electoral systems and the party systems among the various nations. The different and non-standardized approaches devised to probe voting behaviour are only the consequence of such a situation of diversity. In Hong Kong, any attempt to study the question of party-identification must take into consideration the very specific local conditions. At present or in the foreseeable future, it is not feasible nor desirable to apply the method that researchers in the United States or Britain use to probe the party-identification of the electorate. Accordingly, our approach reveals to be a pragmatic substitute allowing us to initiate relevant studies in this field.

How, then based on our approach, should we interpret the situation that 14.1% of the voters who turned out to vote in the 1991 Legco election were core-identifiers and another 20.5% were peripheral-identifiers? In social science, to interpret a given figure or a given fact always

involves a certain degree of subjective judgement. An interpretation is also subject to what background or perspective one puts the figure or the fact against. With regard to the factor of party-identification in the 1991 Legco election, the following four points seem to be of particular salience.

Firstly, given the proportion of core-identifiers and peripheral-identifiers among the general electorate, party-identification could not be regarded as a major factor affecting the overall results of the election. The number of party-identifiers, especially the core-identifiers, was still too small to have a substantial impact on the outcome of the election. Therefore, viewed as a whole, the 1991 Legco election could not be considered as determined by the effect of party-identification. Nevertheless, the above remark does not exclude the possibility that, in certain constituencies, a candidate supported by a certain amount of voters who identified with his own party might have a better chance to win when other factors were equal between him and his opponents.

Secondly, although party-identifiers were still the absolute minority in the general electorate, the fact that they already constituted a non-negligible proportion at such an initial stage of party formation and electoral politics was itself impressive. This may be a reflection of the general politicization of the Hong Kong society in this unique historical period caused by the transfer of sovereignty.

Thirdly, the proportion of party-identifiers among the electorate seems to be capable of becoming much greater in future elections. On the one hand, the participation of the political parties in the 1991 election was, to a certain extent, a "crippled" one in that most of the parties could only field candidates in one or two constituencies. Therefore, some voters who might have been potential identifiers of these parties could not find a target to realize their attachment and were thus excluded from our calculation. The FTU which is itself a territory-wide mass organization but fielded only one candidate in the 1991 election, is a case in point. It is anticipated that such "crippled" participation will be sensibly modified in the future. On the other hand, the various political parties would certainly seek to strengthen their organization and their interaction with the local community after the election. The parties as a whole would most likely become more salient and visible in the society. Accordingly, it will be easier for the parties to inculcate a feeling of attachment among the population in general and the electors in particular.

Fourthly, the socio-demographic profiles of the party-identifiers

show that the latter are basically a middle-class oriented group. Their attachment to parties is primarily a rational one which is related to their overall alertness to public affairs and their active role in social and political matters. A kind of mass party which draws the support from the ordinary and mostly passive citizens inculcated with a habitual loyalty to the party is still to appear in Hong Kong. In fact, the basis of support of the parties will remain rather limited until the latter can successfully establish a habitual attachment to them among the population.

This paper puts forward some figures which could help us comprehend the attitudes and behaviour of the electors in the 1991 Legco election. However, a more important purpose is to advance an appropriate approach to study the question of party-identification in the Hong Kong context thus allowing similar researches to be conducted in the future. The figures that this paper produced could then serve as points of comparison in a longitudinal perspective. It is thus with the objective of providing the initial set of information on this question that this paper was conceived.

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Notes

1. In Hong Kong, no political organization uses the term "party" in its official denomination. In this paper, we adopt a loose definition of "political party" in that any organization fielding candidates in the Legco election is regarded as a political party. For a discussion of the definition of political party in the Hong Kong context, see Louie, 1991.
2. These 34 candidates were fielded or supported by 11 organizations, namely United Democrats of Hong Kong (14 candidates), Liberal Democratic Federation (6 candidates), Meeting Point (3 candidates), Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (3 candidates), New Hong Kong Alliance (2 candidates), Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (1 candidate), Hong Kong Citizen Forum (1 candidate), Hong Kong Civic Association (1 candidate), Reform Club (1 candidate), Federation of Trade Unions (1 candidate) and Association for the Stabilization of Hong Kong (1 candidate). The electoral laws of Hong Kong do not require a candidate to declare whether he is supported by a political organization or not. Therefore, there is no legal and objective criterion to determine whether a candidate is an independent candidate or a candidate supported by political organization. In the 1991 Legco election, there was in fact confusion in this regard in relation to some candidates. The figures mentioned above are based on what had been reported by the local press. However, political groups which fielded only one or two candidates eventually received very few votes and none of their candidates was elected. These small parties were so insignificant that in our survey as well as in this paper they were not the principal target of study. The only exception is the Federation of Trade Unions. Although it fielded only one candidate, the Federation is a mass organization and its participation in the 1991 Legco election was of particular political significance and thus attracted a lot of attention from the media and from various sectors of the society. Therefore, it is included in the detailed study below. On the contrary, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDM) is included in our study as a reference although it is certainly not a political party and was officially not involved in the election. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, most of the prominent candidates in the liberal camp were at the same time leaders of the HKASPDM. To a certain extent, the role they played in the HKASPDM was even more well known to the public than their candidacy in the election. Respondents sometimes might mention their membership of the HKASPDM rather than that of the political party supporting their candidacy. On the other hand, the HKASPDM plays a peculiar and unique role in the political context of Hong Kong in that it symbolizes the search for democratization but also an antagonistic relationship with mainland China. To include it in the study could help to clarify the positions of the respondents as well as to provide a contrast with the existing political parties on various aspects.
3. Among the four constituencies of single candidacy, UDHK jointly campaigned with another candidate of Meeting Point in three constituencies. Therefore, it was only in one constituency (Kowloon West) that

UDHK did not seek to grasp all the seats single-handedly or with an allied party.

4. The Federation of Trade Unions is an exception. However, although the Federation is itself a mass organization, it is not a political party *per se*. Its participation in electoral matters can only be regarded as an exception rather than a norm.
5. The survey was conducted between October 1991 and January 1992. A systematic random sample of 1,392 registered electors from the 1991 Final Register of Electors was selected. Face-to-face interviews were carried out by using a standardized questionnaire. The number of successful interviews was 939, thus yielding a response rate of 67.5%.
6. HKASPDM is included in the study for reference purpose, as expounded in note 2.

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7

The "China Factor" in the 1991 Legislative Council Election

The June 4th Incident and Anti-Communist China Syndrome

Leung Sai-wing

The 1991 direct election culminated in the landslide victory of the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) and the fiasco of all pro-China candidates. In fact, before the election the competition between the pro-China candidates and the democratic camp, with UDHK as the protagonists, was the focal point of report of local newspapers. During the campaign, we could see how one of Mr Cheng Kai-nam's campaign boards had been defaced to describe him as "the running dog of the Chinese communists," how Mr Lau Chin-shek plagued his opponent, Miss Chan Yuen-han, by asking her opinion about helping participants in the 1989 democratic movement to flee China, and how Mr Hau Shui-pui was described by one newspaper as "strictly adhering to the Chinese communists' line" (*South China Morning Post* (*SCMP*), 30 August 1991; *Oriental Daily News*, 7 September 1991; *Ming Pao Daily News*, 20 August 1991). After the election, scholars, journalists and commentators all came to the conclusion that it was the very pro-China

stance of these pro-China candidates that provoked their failure. Some emphasized Hong Kong people's complex of the June 4th Incident and the issue of Hong Kong's future; some underlined the blocking of further democratization in Hong Kong by China; some highlighted Hong Kong people's vehement support of the UDHK for their outright criticisms of China's interference into Hong Kong affairs (*Hong Kong Economic Journal*, 18 September 1991; *Wah Kiu Yat Pao*, 17 September 1991; *Hong Kong Standard*, 16 September 1991; *Ming Pao Daily News*, 17 September 1991). Thus, the battle loss of the pro-China candidates seemed to be fully explained and the focus of the media reports then shifted, as expected, to another battle ground, the new Legislative Council (Legco). We, however, still have a query here.

To us, the so-called "China Factor" is an umbrella concept. There are different variables of different nature hiding under the same general concept, China factor. Some of them may be directly relevant to the understanding of voting behaviour in the last Legco election, but some may not be. One may conceptualize China factor, like Louie, as "how a candidate declares his stance towards mainland China to his constituents" (Louie, 1990:15). This was proved to be a critical point to the pro-China candidates for they were time and again criticized by their opponents on their stance towards Chinese politics, especially towards the June 4th Incident. Behind Louie's conceptualization, however, there are many assumptions and their interrelationships and their implications beckoning our inquiry. The question, "What is the China factor?", may sound worthless and trivial to someone's ear. If we ask, "Which China factor affected Hong Kong voters' choice in the 1991 election?", we do not think we have straightforward and empirically well grounded answers, the more so if we ask the following theoretically related questions: "What exactly were our voters attitudes towards the pro-China candidates?", "To what degree were their attitudes related to the June 4th Incident?", and "What is the implication of our voters' attitudes towards the pro-China candidates and the June 4th Incident for the 1995 election?". This paper is an attempt to answer these questions.

China Factor as a Historical, Structural, and Socialization Factor

We conceptualize China factor as a historical, a structural as well as a socialization factor. It is a historical factor in the sense that the past, the present, and the future development of Hong Kong are closely intertwined with the development of China. Just a brief review of the whole colonial history, from the early Nanking Treaty to the later Joint Declaration, from the 1967's riot to the 1988's debate on direct election, and from the food and water supply from the mainland to Hong Kong and the capital investment from Hong Kong to the mainland, can easily demonstrate our point. What is more important, or more ironic, is that right after the Second World War, Hong Kong was a paradise for refugees and immigrants from the mainland. No matter why they came to the colony, it was certain that they had found the situation in China unacceptable, or even unbearable, at that time (Hoadley, 1970). That is to say, many of them came with a life scarred by the history of Chinese communist rule. Thus, whereas the intertwining of the history of Hong Kong with that of China resulted in, for better or worse, the reunion of the city with the mainland in 1997, the immigrant generation and their progeny living in Hong Kong did not seem to welcome any reunification. Once the issue of the future of Hong Kong took priority on the agenda of the society, an anti-Communist China sentiment sparked off.[1] This anti-Communist China sentiment, which smacks of historical necessity and irony, began to colour the Hong Kong Chinese's feeling, judgement, and evaluation of China's penetration, be it justified or not, of Hong Kong's politics.[2]

China factor is a structural factor in the sense that China had injected a dual authority structure into the political system of Hong Kong. Before the 1980s, when the issue of the future of Hong Kong had not been ignited, the colony status of Hong Kong served as a buffer between China and Hong Kong. As a colonial regime, the Hong Kong government was an unchallenged authority in the society (Lau, 1982:26-9; 1988:3-5). This was coupled with the long time low profile of the Chinese government's attitude towards Hong Kong affairs. After the Joint Declaration, however, China could not help but start penetrating Hong Kong politics (King, 1986; Lau, 1987:7; Cheng, 1987). Whereas the Hong Kong government became a "lame duck," the dominance of the

Chinese government began to loom large. Given the divergence of the two regions in economic, social, and political development, China's penetration could only provoke a series of confrontation of basic interests, manifested in the construction of Daya Bay nuclear power plant, the drafting of the Basic Law, the debate on the political reform of Hong Kong, and the tragic June 4th Incident, between the Hong Kong government, the Chinese government, and local populace. A dual authority structure was doomed to be highly politicized as a spate of political events aggravated the anti-Communist China sentiment of the adult generation and sparked off a socialization of alienation among the younger generation.

The study of political socialization was a promising subfield of political sociology in the 1960s (Greenstein, 1968; Sears, 1975; Sigel, 1989a). The early studies of political socialization were characterized by their focus on the study of children's perception of the President (Hess and Easton, 1960; Easton and Hess, 1962; Greenstein, 1966; Hess and Torney, 1967; Jaros, 1967; Sigel, 1968; Greenstein, Herman, Stradling, and Zureik, 1974; Greenstein, 1975). This was perhaps under the influence of Easton's work on political system. For Easton, the theoretical relevance of political socialization to the persistence of a political system laid in its ability to "inculcate and reinforce supportive attitudes and behavior to maintain minimal level of input" (Easton, 1979:172). His work with Dennis was an exemplar of this theoretical concern (Easton and Dennis, 1969). From the 1970s onwards, however, this approach has been severely criticized by scholars (Marsh, 1971; Connell and Goot, 1972-73; Searing, Schwartz, and Lind, 1973; Schwartz and Schwartz, 1975; Sears, 1975; Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz, 1976; Renshon, 1977; Cook, 1985; Somit and Peterson, 1987; Connell, 1987; Sigel, 1989b; Sears, 1990). One of the criticisms has been its neglect of the impact of social and political events on political socialization. In other words, it was a-historical. One major argument of the early scholars that the transfer of children's benevolent image of the President to the political institution resulting in a reservoir of diffuse support for a political system was refuted by the history of the United States in the 1960s and the 1970s. During these two decades, the Americans were bombarded by a string of political events, such as the assassination of President Kennedy, urban riots, the Vietnam War, the assassination of Martin Luther King, the Watergate scandal and so forth. All these events helped to unfold the underlying conflicts over concrete issues so that the American

public had the chance, willy nilly, to feel and to grasp political reality. The events were so dramatic that they could easily draw mass attention. The issues were so concrete that they could leave their imprint on mass political mind. The political reality was so horrifying that many people thought their rights were at stake. The result was a continuous rise of political alienation (Sigel, 1966; Sears and Tomlinson, 1968; Meyer, 1969; Clarke and Soule, 1972; Tolley, 1973; Arterton, 1974; Chaffee and Becker, 1975; Hawkins, Pingree, and Roberts, 1975; Hershey and Hill, 1975; Rodgers and Lewis, 1975; Sniderman, Neuman, Citrin, McClosky, and Shanks, 1975).

Of course, political events do not necessarily lead to political alienation. It all depends on, as argued by Verba, whichever of the two tendencies, integration or disintegration, is stronger in the society (Verba, 1965:357). In other words, if a series of political events has already triggered off social disintegration, another similar event will normally escalate the trend. In the case of the US, the Watergate scandal was to continue and intensify the erosion of presidential support among adolescents caused by the political crises in the 1960s (Dennis and Webster, 1975; Carmines, 1981). In contrast, in Mexico "there exists the myth of the benign Revolution and *presidencialismo*, the institutional charisma that the Mexican presidency has acquired in recent decades" (Almond and Verba, 1963). All these come to the simple conclusion that political socialization is not working in a social vacuum, neither does it have a built-in mechanism of producing diffuse support for a political system. Rather, we can conceptualize a process of socialization of alienation, that is, people become alienated because they receive cue from the socializing agents. For this process to work, several social conditions are prerequisites: firstly, a society must be politicized, usually by some significant political events; secondly, this politicization has the effect of increasing the exposure of people to politics; thirdly, through this exposure negative images of a political authority or a political system flow from socializing agents to people; finally, for the socialized alienation to be persistent, there must be a period of continuous reinforcement, that is, the third condition must sustain for a period of time.[3] Hong Kong in the 1980s matched such a society.

From the emergence of the issue of Hong Kong's future onwards, the society could not help getting more and more politicized. On the one hand, the political issues more often than not involved the interests of the Hong Kong government, the Chinese government, and the Hong Kong

people, it was no longer a simple confrontation between an overpowering colonial bureaucracy and some feeble Chinese dissidents. On the other hand, these issues were so important and urgent that it could easily draw full coverage by the media. Needless to say, it became "talk of the town." Whereas in the old colonial days, Hong Kong citizens could enjoy their money-making life and leave political matters to the colonial government and the elites she absorbed, today people in the city can no longer escape from the ubiquitous, noisy, and haunting messages of the issue of Hong Kong's future, the construction of Daya Bay nuclear power plant, the drafting of Basic Law, the exodus of migrants, the debate on political reform, and the outcry for democracy in the June 4th Incident. Consistently, each event involved the conflict of interests between Hong Kong people and the Beijing regime and each event saw local interest succumb to the interest of the Chinese government. As a result, all these political events served as reinforcements to the underlying anti-Communist China sentiment.[4] For some of the Hong Kong Chinese, these cues might have helped to fuel their persistently negative attitude towards the Chinese government; for others, these cues might have helped to erode their national identity; for the younger generation, a majority of them born in Hong Kong "who have no special allegiance to some geographical point in China" (Cameron, 1978:259), these cues might have only ignited their alienation from the Chinese government. With a prolonged period of reinforcement, an anti-Communist China sentiment might have gelled into an anti-Communist China syndrome. It is in this way China factor is a socialization factor.

In short, before the 1991 direct election, Hong Kong voters had already experienced a decade of political crises brought on by the history of the city. Under the dual authority structure, they experienced enough the coming threat of China to their stake in Hong Kong, be that freedom or democracy or stability or prosperity. Most important of all, they received abundant reinforcements from various socializing agents, parents, teachers, peers, friends, neighbours, colleagues, and mass media or even from their own participation in the protests against the Beijing regime, so to kindle, intensify, or solidify their negative attitude towards the Chinese government. To put it succinctly, it was the socialization of alienation through political events, with the June 4th Incident as the climax, during the transitional period of Hong Kong that resulted in the besieging of pro-China candidates by an anti-Communist China sentiment and in the landslide victory of the democratic camp in the 1991

direct election. To what extent are we telling the truth? This is what we now turn to.

The data on which the analyses of this paper are based come from a territory-wide survey conducted from late September 1991 to January 1992. A systematic random sampling of 1,349 registered electors from the 1991 Final Register of Electors was selected. Face-to-face interviews with structured questionnaires were carried out by trained Hong Kong Polytechnic students. All cases were used. The successful cases are 715. The return rate is 53.04%. If we delete all the 341 error addresses, including the categories of "deceased," "emigrated," "moved," "premise not occupied," "building demolished," "no such address," and "no such person," from our original 1,349 sampled addresses, the return rate reaches 71%.[5]

Perception, Stereotyping, and Voting Support of the Pro-China Candidates

Given an overriding anti-Communist China sentiment, it is not unexpected to find that only 14% of our respondents would trust or would certainly trust a pro-China candidate and 12% would vote or would certainly vote for him, contrasting with 32.1% who would not trust or would certainly not trust him and 42.8% who would not vote or would certainly not vote for him.[6] These simple findings do not tell us what made the pro-China candidates so untrustworthy, so we asked our respondents about their perception of the pro-China candidates. Their perception of the pro-China candidates is reported in Table 1. At first glance, our respondents did not seem to have a generally negative image of the pro-China candidates. They were regarded by more than one-third of our voters as patriots, committed to socialism, helping China's modernization, acting as a bridge for Hong Kong's and China's communication, and going to stay in Hong Kong after 1997. Of course, an item like "committed to socialism" is too ambiguous to indicate whether it carries a positive or a negative image, especially in the context of Hong Kong. Though no generally negative perception was found, nearly half of our voters did think the pro-China candidates were seeking China's support to win election and safeguarding China's interest in Hong Kong, and more than one-third regarded them as politically conservative. The ab-

sence of a generally negative image of the pro-China candidates side by side with the general distrust of the pro-China candidates and the decline of voting support for them seem baffling. It becomes apparent through multiple regression analysis that it is the negative image that matters, but the positive image that does not count.

Table 1 Frequency Distribution of the Perception of Pro-China Candidates (%)

If a candidate is pro-China, you would think he is:	Strongly agree/ Agree	May be	Strongly disagree/ Disagree	Don't know	(N)
(item 1) seeking China's support to win election	43.2	29.0	12.8	15.0	(704)
(item 2) safeguarding China's interest in Hong Kong	46.8	29.9	9.4	13.9	(703)
(item 3) blocking further democratization in Hong Kong	25.5	26.7	31.0	16.8	(705)
(item 4) acting as a bridge between Hong Kong and China	44.5	36.7	8.4	10.4	(706)
(item 5) committed to capitalism	22.2	35.2	22.5	20.1	(710)
(item 6) helping Hong Kong's development	27.7	42.8	14.2	15.3	(708)
(item 7) a patriot	34.9	38.5	13.2	13.4	(704)
(item 8) committed to socialism	33.7	30.3	17.2	18.8	(704)
(item 9) helping China's modernization	38.2	35.6	10.5	15.7	(709)
(item 10) going to stay in Hong Kong after 1997	41.3	31.5	9.2	18.0	(709)
(item 11) politically conservative	37.2	31.8	14.3	16.7	(705)

Note: The scores of all these items are 1 for "strongly agree" to 5 for "strongly disagree," with a total of 5 ranks.

Before the running of the multiple regression analysis, we first collapse our eleven items by conducting a principle component analysis with varimax rotation. The result, reported in Table 2, is a four factor extraction from the eleven items explaining 61.2% of the variance of the original data set. The result of this principle component analysis is quite good with the exception of Factor 4. On the one hand, the two correlation coefficients are quite divergent and that of item 11 is even below 0.5. On the other hand, the integration of the politically conservative nature of the pro-China candidates and their stay in Hong Kong after 1997 into one factor simply defies meaningful interpretation. We therefore decide to delete Factor 4 from later analyses. Three factor variables, which can explain 52.6% variance of the original data set, are then created from this principle component analysis: Running Dog of China (item 1, item 2, and item 3), Committed to Hong Kong (item 4, item 5, and item 6), and Committed to China (item 7, item 8, and item 9).[7]

Table 2 Varimax Rotation of Factors of the Perception of Pro-China Candidates

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
item 1	.81789	.02213	.00169	-.01771
item 2	.74919	-.18882	-.11067	.04260
item 3	.67923	.06775	.39018	.10734
item 4	.14884	.78192	-.20686	-.17327
item 5	-.21218	.64740	.09186	.37152
item 6	-.14096	.61735	.29391	.15369
item 7	.23155	.00336	.76086	-.16149
item 8	-.09647	.01611	.69709	.21558
item 9	-.03274	.48919	.53914	.19089
item 10	.10443	.06016	.03126	.88725
item 11	.04827	.32892	.37184	.41319

The multiple regression analysis using the three factor variables (the Perception Factors) as independent variables and the voting support to the pro-China candidates (Voting Support) as dependent variable is reported in Table 3, which displays the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the standardized regression coefficients (β), the squared semi-

partial correlations (sr^2) and the R^2.[8] The multiple R, 0.45, for regression is significantly different from zero: F (3,412)=35.50, p<.001. Only two of the three Perception Factors contribute significantly to prediction of Voting Support. They are Committed to Hong Kong (sr^2=0.10) and Running Dog (sr^2=0.07). The three factors in combination contribute another 0.04 in shared variability. Altogether, 21% (20% adjusted) of the variability in Voting Support can be predicted by knowing scores on these three factors. It is unmistakably clear from Table 3 that in our voters' mind it was Committed to Hong Kong and Running Dog of China that counted as more significant than Committed to China in determining their voting support for the pro-China candidates. Between Committed to Hong Kong and Running Dog, it was the latter that exerted greater impact. So although more than one-third of our voters thought the pro-China candidates were patriots, committed to socialism, and helping China's modernization, this positive image simply did not count much when they considered whether they should give their votes to the pro-China candidates. What our voters took into consideration, either Committed to Hong Kong or Running Dog, is a reflection of their political values and judgements being shaped by their historical experience of the past decade.

Table 3 Unstandardized Regression Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients, and Squared Semipartial Correlations for Voting Support on the Perception Factors (N=416)

Independent variables	B	β	sr^2 (unique)
Committed to Hong Kong	.20***	.27	.07
Running Dog	.17***	-.32	.10
Committed to China	.05	.08	–
R^2=.21§			

*** p<.001.
§ Unique variability=.17, shared variability=.04.

As argued before, there was an unremitting confrontation between the basic interests of the Chinese government and the local populace

resulting in a string of political events. The interference of the Chinese government in Hong Kong, as manifested clearly in the debate on political reform, created a quest for political leaders who could defend the interests of Hong Kong. The pro-China candidates' affiliation with China, whose track record of interference was too blatant, could simply convince the public that they were not the type of leaders that the public wanted. This could be seen from the polls, conducted before the election, which showed that the three most conspicuous pro-China candidates, Mr Cheng Kai-nam, Miss Chan Yuen-han, and Mr Hau Shui-pui, were all outdone by their democratic opponents (*SCMP*, 15 August 1991; 27 August 1991; 9 September 1991). On the other hand, Hong Kong people's perception of the pro-China political leaders or political organization as not defending local interest could be more vividly shown in a poll conducted ten months after the election that, among all well known political parties, it was the UDHK that ranked top on defending Hong Kong people's interest and the newly formed pro-China political party, the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, ranked bottom (*Ming Pao Daily News*, 27 July 1992). Our voters' demand was clear. That the pro-China candidates could not satisfy this demand was also clear. Given such an election atmosphere, the pro-China candidates, no matter their individual talent, achievement, and sense of commitment, were just joining an election battle in the wrong place at the wrong time.

We have argued in previous paragraphs that the more politicized the society, the higher the exposure of Hong Kong people to politics, the higher the alienation from the Chinese government and the pro-China candidates. For this argument to be valid, we should see a difference of mean scores on Voting Support and the Perception Factors between those who were politically better informed and those who were not. To check this argument, we divide our sample into three groups: those who named correctly the pro-China candidates or pro-China political leaders (group A), those who replied "don't know" or "no answer" or "no pro-China candidate" (group B), and those who named incorrectly (group C), by using our voters' responses to an item asking "Among the candidates that you know, whom do you think is pro-China?" We then run one way ANOVA tests to see if there are any difference of mean scores among these three groups on Voting Support and the three Perception Factors. We do find a consistent pattern of difference of mean scores, but all these differences are not significant by one way ANOVA tests. Anyway, respondents of group A did show less voting support to

the pro-China candidates and were more inclined to regard the pro-China candidates as running dogs and as not committed to China.

To carry on the exploration, we divide our sample into three other groups: those who named correctly the pro-China political organizations (group 1), those who replied "don't know" or "no answer" or "no pro-China political organization" (group 2), and those who named incorrectly (group 3), by using our voters' responses to an item asking "Among the political organizations that you know, which do you think is pro-China?" This time, by one-way ANOVA tests, reported in Table 4, we find significant difference of mean scores among these three groups on Voting Support and Running Dog. According to Table 4, respondents of group 1 did show less voting support to the pro-China candidates and were more inclined to regard the pro-China candidates as running dogs than respondents of group 2. If the ability of correctly naming pro-China candidates and pro-China political organizations indicates respondents' grasp of political information, these data can help us demonstrate how a politicized environment sensitised Hong Kong voters to political reality and in turn intensified their alienation from the pro-China candidates.

Table 4 One-way ANOVA Tests of the Mean Score Differences of Voting Support, Running Dog, Committed to Hong Kong, and Committed to China, by the Ability to Name Pro-China Political Organizations

	F	p	Groups with significant mean score difference
Voting Support	4.9315	.01	group 1 (3.60)>group 2 (3.39)
Running Dog	5.0162	.01	group 1 (5.54)<group 2 (6.04)
Committed to Hong Kong	2.2390	NS	
Committed to China	2.3377	NS	

Notes: The group mean score differences are tested by multiple comparison using Tukey's procedure. Figures inside the brackets are the group mean scores. The N is 198 for group 1, 509 for group 2, and 6 for group 3.

To further substantiate our argument, we conduct a t-test to see if there is a significant difference of mean scores between group 1 and group 2 respondents on the item measuring knowledge of current affairs.[9] The result is consistent with what we thought. The mean score of correct answers is 4.66 for group 1 and 2.85 for group 2, with t-value=12.28 and $p<.001$. Similar result was found by comparing the mean scores on knowledge of current affairs between those who could name pro-China candidates correctly and those who replied "don't know" or "no answer" or "no pro-China candidate." The mean score of correct answers is 4.73 for the former and 2.71 for the latter, with t-value=14.55 and $p<.001$. On the basis of these findings, we are confident that those who could name pro-China candidates and pro-China political organizations correctly were also those who were politically better informed.

It is even more interesting if we further elaborate the correlations between the Perception Factors and Voting Support by controlling the ability of naming pro-China political organizations correctly. As reported in Table 5, being politically better informed acts clearly as an antecedent factor for the correlations for Committed to Hong Kong, Committed to China and Voting Support: the correlation coefficients of group 1 are stronger than the original ones, but that of group 2 are weaker. This pattern is what we expected. Thus, for the better informed, the perception of pro-China candidates as not committed to Hong Kong and as not committed to China had greater effect on their voting support to these candidates than the poorly informed. This finding helps further substantiate our thesis of socialization of alienation. However, in the correlation for Running Dog and Voting Support, not much change can be detected. Anyhow, the picture depicted by the elaboration analysis seems to confirm what we have argued. To be better informed means to have a better grasp of political reality. If this goes together with stronger impact of the Perception Factors and higher alienation from the pro-China candidates, then a process of socialization of alienation is really at work in Hong Kong. This is exactly what our tests tell so far.

Table 5 Correlation Matrix between the Perception Factors and Voting Support, Controlled by Correct Naming of Pro-China Political Organizations

	Original (N=426)	Group 1 Voting Support (N=140)	Group 2 Voting Support (N=271)
Committed to Hong Kong	.33***	.44***	.25**
Running Dog	-.34***	-.33***	-.35**
Committed to China	.10*	.19*	.04

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Notes: Group 1 are those who named correctly the pro-China political organizations, Group 2 are those who replied "don't know" or "no answer" or "no pro-China political organization."

The responses of some of our poorly informed voters, however, do produce a variant of our major argument. There were 64.47% of our voters answering "don't know or no answer" to the question asking "Among the candidates you know, whom do you think is pro-China?" Among them, 49.6% thought the pro-China candidates were seeking China's support to win election, 53.6% thought the candidates were safeguarding China's interest in Hong Kong, and 29.5% thought the candidates were blocking further democratization in Hong Kong. Moreover, 31.8% did not trust these candidates and 42.8% would not vote for them. Given that they claimed they could not identify the pro-China candidates, how could they have such a perception and how could they come to the decision not to vote for them? Their responses seem to be *prima facie* evidence in contradiction of our major argument that the higher the exposure of Hong Kong people to politics, the higher their alienation from the Chinese government and the pro-China candidates. Rather, stereotyping of the pro-China candidates by some of our respondents seemed to be working during the 1991 direct election.

"Political judgements are obviously complex in that they potentially require a consideration of several different types of information... stereotypes will often come into play in making these judgements" (Ottati and Wyer, Jr., 1990:202). It is, therefore, not surprising to find that there was

stereotyping of the pro-China candidates. It is surprising, however, to find that both groups of voters were feeling alienated from these candidates, no matter whether they were politically informed or not. This idiosyncrasy helps to unfold the inner dynamics of the process of socialization of alienation. Everyone needs some political information to build up one's images of government, to judge policies, and to make comments on the performance of politicians, etc. How much information one needs and which channel of information is more important seem to vary from person to person. If we conceptualize the amount of information one needs to build up one's distrust of a government as "the threshold of producing alienation," then some of our voters just need a minimum amount of political information to pass this threshold. Once they have passed this threshold, they extend their judgement to whatever the government has done, on the basis of the stereotype of this government, without any motivation or action to gather more relevant information. As a consequence, whereas one group of our voters was well informed and alienated, another group that was ill informed was also alienated. Between them, the process of socialization, in terms of information gathering, was somewhat different, but the result was the same: alienation from the pro-China candidates. What happened in 1989 was so tragic that it almost pushed every Hong Kong Chinese to pass this threshold: the June 4th Incident.

June 4th Incident, Democratic Aspiration, and Voting Support for the Pro-China Candidates

In June 4th 1989, the whole Hong Kong society was shattered. The June 4th Incident was much more significant than other political events: it was so dramatic that it drew round the clock coverage by Hong Kong mass media, so emotional that it ignited the national feeling of many Hong Kong Chinese, so appealing that it rekindled the democratic aspiration of local populace, and so tragic that it made most of the Hong Kong people moan, weep, and thunder. "(A) great war, or a depression, an experience like Italian Fascism or German Nazism, is an enormous learning experience which is not mediated through any particular social institution"(Almond, 1960:3-64). The June 4th Incident was certainly an momentous learning experience for Hong Kong people. As summarized by Sweeting,

> ...what happened in schools, colleges, and universities during these weeks was a form of civic, political and moral education in the most practical and active ways.... Seminars, workshops, and other types of symposia were quickly and efficiently arranged. All sorts of voluntary societies and associations connected with formal or non-formal education rushed to announce publicly their support for the Pro-Democracy Movement in China and their condemnation of martial law and the carnage committed under its authority by the military. (Sweeting, 1990:19)

In a word, never before did Hong Kong Chinese have such an intensive political learning with a consistent and continuous inculcation of a negative image of the Chinese government within so short a period of time. Moreover, the effect did not seem short lived.

Our voters' opinion of the June 4th Incident is clear and unambiguous. As reported in Table 6, about half of our voters thought the Chinese government mishandled the June 4th Incident and more than one-fourth thought it was a bloody repression. Only a total of 9.6% took an opposite view. Similar pattern of responses was found in our respondents' assessment of the Chinese government's handling of the Incident in Table 7. More than three-fourths strongly opposed or opposed the Chinese government's treatment of the Incident, while only a tiny 3.4% strongly supported or supported it. In comparison with our voters' perception of pro-China candidates, we can see that there was a much smaller number of people taking the middle-of-the-road position, only 3.2%, or answering "don't know" or "no opinion," only 9%, or choosing "no answer," only 1%. That is to say, most of our respondents wanted to assert their defiance of the Chinese government with respect to the June 4th Incident. However, when our respondents took more into consideration, some softened their defiant stance.

Table 6 Frequency Distribution of Attitudes towards the Nature of the June 4th Incident

(item 1) The June 4th Incident is:	Percentage
a riot by Beijing students and citizens	2.3
an upheaval by a mob	7.3
an accident	3.2
an incident improperly handled by the Chinese government	51.0
a bloody repression	26.2

Notes: The N is 695 with 20 cases giving other opinions. The scores of the item are 1 for "a riot by the Beijing students and citizens" to 5 for "a bloody repression."

Table 7 Frequency Distribution of Attitudes towards the Chinese Government's Handling of the June 4th Incident

(item 2) To the Chinese government's handling of the Incident, you:	Percentage
strongly support/support	3.4
take no special position	11.6
strongly oppose/oppose	77.4
don't know/no opinion	7.1
no answer	0.6

Notes: The N is 715 with no missing case. The scores of the item are 1 for "strongly support" to 5 for "strongly oppose."

As reported in Table 8, the proportion of those who strongly disagreed and disagreed to the item that we should forget the Incident for Hong Kong's stability and prosperity is 47.8%; to the item that we should forget the Incident for the good relationship between Hong Kong and China the response is 47.9%, but the proportion of those who strongly agreed and agreed to these two items are 27.5% and 27.9% respectively. It seems to indicate a presence of pragmatic element in some of our

voters' political mind. Nevertheless, given there are still about half of our respondents taking a strong defiant position, to emphasize too much the pragmatic inclination of our voters in this respect is simply unwarranted. Nevertheless, the closer we came to the concrete issues, especially those directly related to taking actions, the more our respondents either stepped back or became ambivalent. In the last two items of Table 8 we can see 41.9% who strongly agreed or agreed to continue the rally for the Incident and 40.4% who strongly disagreed or disagreed to the dismissal of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (HKASPDM), with 24.5% and 16.9% taking the opposite position. And it is in these two items that more respondents took a middle position, 22.4% for continuing to rally and 22.9% for the dismissal of HKASPDM, and more respondents answered "don't know," 10.1% and 18% respectively. All in all, the basic attitude of our respondents towards the Incident is dominantly one of defiance and rejection of the Chinese government. Some of them, and just some, softened their uncompromising position when more practical matters were taken into consideration. Be that as it may, to conclude that there is a sleeping volcano of defiance towards the Chinese government is clearly no exaggeration.

Table 8 Frequency Distribution of Attitudes towards June 4th Incident (%)

	Strongly agree/ Agree	Average	Strongly disagree/ Disagree	Don't know	No answer
(item 3) to forget the Incident for Hong Kong's stability and prosperity	27.5	16.1	47.8	7.0	1.5
(item 4) to forget the Incident for the good relationship between Hong Kong and China	27.9	15.4	47.9	8.0	0.8
(item 5) to continue the rally for the Incident until the Chinese government has released all democratic movement participants	41.9	22.4	24.5	10.1	1.3
(item 6) the HKASPDM should be dismissed	16.9	22.9	40.4	18.0	1.7

Notes: The N is 715 with no missing case for all four items. The scores of all the items are 1 for "strongly agree" to 5 for "strongly disagree."

If the June 4th Incident really has the socializing effect of implanting negative image of the Chinese government into the mind of Hong Kong Chinese, then we should see the similar effect of eroding the voting support for the pro-China candidates. For one thing, the Incident can be regarded as a touchstone of the morality of the Chinese government. To deploy troops to repress a peaceful rally can in no way convince Hong Kong Chinese, no matter whether one is invoking western standard of democratic government or traditional Chinese standard of benevolent emperor. Thus, the Chinese government cannot help being viewed by a majority of Hong Kong Chinese as morally contemptible. Being a morally contemptible political entity, any affiliation with it will beyond all doubt result in a transfer of contempt, mistrust, and hatred of the Chinese government to the affiliated body. It is this moral context which explains why Running Dog is a more decisive factor than other Perception Factors

in the erosion of voting support to the pro-China candidates.

To check our argument, we conduct another multiple regression analysis. Before this, we at first collapse our six items of the Incident by conducting a principle component analysis with varimax rotation. The result, reported in Table 9, is a three factor extraction from the six items explaining 80.4% of the variance of the original data set. The result of this principle component analysis is quite good, with the caveat that we have treated a categorical variable (item 1) as an interval one. Nevertheless, since the categories of this variable have implicit ranking order, we think the present practice is acceptable. Three new variables (the June 4th Factors) are then created from this principle component analysis: Basic Attitude (item 1 and item 2), Not to Forget (item 3 and item 4), and Continue to Support (item 5 and item 6).[10]

Table 9 Varimax Rotation of Factors of the June 4th Incident items

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
item 1	.90261	.21990	.22160
item 2	.89681	.22835	.23544
item 3	.16031	-.87747	.11515
item 4	.25223	.78881	.22145
item 5	.18216	.14320	.83330
item 6	.21423	.17132	.79530

The multiple regression analysis using the June 4th Factors as independent variables and Voting Support as dependent variable is reported in Table 10. The multiple R, 0.38, for regression is significantly different from zero: F (3,473)=27.15, p<.001. Only one of the three June 4th Factors contributes significantly to prediction of Voting Support. It is Basic Attitude (sr^2=0.08). The three factors in combination contribute another 0.07 in shared variability. Altogether, 15% (14% adjusted) of the variability in Voting Support can be predicted by knowing scores on these three factors. It is unmistakably clear from Table 10 that in our voters' mind it was Basic Attitude that counted to be more significant than Not to Forget and Continue to Support in determining their voting support to the pro-China candidates. So although our voters did seem to

soften their defiant attitude when more practical matters were taken into consideration, it was their basic alienated attitude towards the Chinese government's handling of the Incident that proved to be most decisive.[11]

Table 10 Unstandardized Regression Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients, and Squared Semipartial Correlations for Voting Support on the June 4th Factors (N=477)

Independent variables	B	β	sr^2 (unique)
Basic Attitude	.28***	.33	.08
Not to Forget	.02	.05	–
Continue to Support	.04	.06	–
R^2=.15§			

*** p<.001.
§ Unique variability=.08, shared variability=.07.

If there is really a socialization of alienation at work in Hong Kong, then we should see a stronger impact of the June 4th Factors on Voting Support among those who are politically better informed. This is exactly the result of our elaboration of the correlation matrix for the June 4th Factors and Voting Support by our voters' ability to name pro-China political organizations. As reported in Table 11, all correlation coefficients of group 1 become stronger and all that of group 2 become weaker. This indicates the intervening effect of the ability to name pro-China political organizations. In other words, some of our voters, spurred by the Incident, paid heed to Hong Kong politics. The more they knew political reality, the more they felt alienated from the pro-China candidates. For other voters, however, the Incident might have been successful in increasing their exposure to politics for only a limited period of time. From then on, the voters remained politically ignorant. With a poor grasp of political reality, they also felt less alienated from the pro-China candidates. If so, the process of socialization of alienation would again be confirmed.

Table 11 Correlation Matrix between the June 4th Factors and Voting Support, Controlled by Correct Naming of Pro-China Political Organizations

	Original (N=477)	Group 1 Voting Support (N=160)	Group 2 Voting Support (N=310)
Basic Attitude	.38***	.57***	.27***
Not to Forget	.24***	.37***	.17**
Continue to Support	.21***	.38***	.13**

** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Notes: Group 1 are those who named correctly the pro-China political organizations, Group 2 are those who replied "don't know" or "no answer" or "no pro-China political organization."

One of the major theme of the June 4th Incident was its outcry for democracy, no matter what kind of democracy. This theme was distinct and clear. So if the Incident really had so tremendous an impact on the political socialization of Hong Kong Chinese, then we should have detected some imprint of this message. From the responses to an item asking what our voters thought was the most important goal of democracy, we did detect this imprint. More than half of our voters, 53.6%, chose the two basic tenets of democracy, "to safeguard individual freedom" and "to let people have more say in government's decision making," as the most important goal of democracy. By contrast, less than one-third of them, 30.9%, chose the most appealing slogan, "stability and prosperity." Only 2.7% chose "national unity" and 7.1% chose "to shorten the economic gap between the wealthy and the poor." Moreover, there was far less people replying "don't know" or "no opinion," only 4.5%, or "no answer," only 0.4%. These responses were simply what our voters thought was the most important goal of democracy, that is, their perception of democracy, they did not necessarily indicate their democratic aspiration. But the responses to another item did. About 64% of our respondents agreed that there should be more elected seats than the originally planned twenty in the 1995 Legco's election. This agreement was unmistakably an aspiration for further democratization in Hong

Kong. The proportion of disagreement was as small as 6.9% , with 14.5% taking the middle position, 13.6% choosing "don't know" or "no opinion," and 0.4% choosing "no answer."[12]

Simply to report these figures can hardly substantiate our argument that it was the June 4th Incident that transformed our voters' perception of democracy and ignited their democratic aspiration. So firstly we conduct several t-tests to see if there are any significant difference of mean scores on the June 4th Factors between those who chose "to safeguard individual freedom" or "to let people have more say in government's decision making" (group 1) and those who chose the remaining categories (group 2). Any significant difference may indicate the effect of the Incident on our voters' perception of democracy. The findings reported in Table 12 are encouraging. For all three factors, the mean scores of group 1 are significantly higher than that of group 2. In other words, respondents who chose either one of the two basic tenets of democracy as the most important goal of democracy were also those who took more defiant stance towards the June 4th Incident than those who chose others. Our next step is to correlate Should Have More Elected Seats with the June 4th Factors. Any consistent negative correlation may indicate the effect of the Incident on our voters' democratic aspiration. The finding reported in Table 13 is again encouraging. All three June 4th Factors have significant negative correlations, ranging from the weakest -0.13 to the strongest -0.32, with Should Have More Elected Seats. In general, the more our voters agreed that there should have more elected seats in the 1995 Legco election than the originally planned number of twenty, the more likely they thought that the Chinese government was wrong in the handling of the Incident, that we should not forget the Incident, and that we should continue to support the Incident.

Table 12 T-tests of the Mean Score Differences of the June 4th Factors by the Most Important Goal of Democracy

	t-value	p	Group 1 (N=384)	Group 2 (N=296)
Basic Attitude	6.88	.001	7.03	6.88
Not to Forget	5.44	.001	6.27	5.43
Continue to Support	5.09	.001	0.51	-0.14

Note: Figures under group 1 and group 2 are mean scores of the group.

Table 13 Correlation between the June 4th Factors and Should Have More Elected Seats (N=486)

	Should Have More Elected Seats
Basic Attitude	-.27***
Not to Forget	-.13**
Continue to Support	-.32***

** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Would it be that the June 4th Incident had kindled and fuelled the democratic aspiration of our voters such that they declined to give their votes to the pro-China candidates because of this aspiration? In other words, democratic aspiration served as an intervening factor between the June 4th Factors and Voting Support. To elaborate on the correlation between the June 4th Factors and Voting Support, we divide our sample into two groups, one are those who agreed or strongly agreed that we should have more elected seats (group 1), the other are those who disagreed or strongly disagreed (group 2), then we compare the correlation matrix of each group with the original one. If there is an intervening effect, then we should see stronger correlation coefficients in group 1 but weaker coefficients in group 2. However, as reported in Table 14, all the correlation coefficients in group 1 and group 2 are slightly weaker than

the original, except for the coefficient between Continue to Support and Voting Support in group 2 which shows change of direction. Is our hypothesis totally refuted?

Table 14 Correlation Matrix between June 4th Factors and Voting Support, Controlled by Should Have More Elected Seats

	Original (N=477)	Group 1 Voting Support (N=345)	Group 2 Voting Support (N=36)
Basic Attitude	.38***	.36***	.31*
Not to Forget	.24***	.21***	.17
Continue to Support	.22***	.18***	-.04

* p<.05, *** p<.001.

Note: Voters of group 1 are those who agreed or strongly agreed that we should have more elected seats in the 1995 election and those of group 2 disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Perhaps the process of political socialization is much more complicated than we have theorized. Given our voters have grown up in a colonial society without much genuine democratic government structure and in a social environment without many formal or informal channels of learning democratic norms and practices, it is reasonable to believe that the democratic aspiration induced by the June 4th Incident may be at most an inculcation of democracy as an ideal. For most of our voters, to translate this ideal into political action has still a long way to go. In other words, there is a discrepancy between democracy as an ideal and democracy as a way of life among our voters. Nevertheless, if our voters have really internalized democracy as an ideal, then it would be just normal for them to support those political leaders embodying, symbolically or actually, this democratic ideal in Hong Kong. This argument is confirmed by several one-way ANOVA tests, reported in Table 15, showing that those voters who identified with the UDHK had the highest alienated scores on the June 4th Factors, followed by those who identified with no political organization, and those who identified with the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) had the lowest alienated scores. It

does seem that identification with the UDHK is in some way a better indication of democratic aspiration. If so, to elaborate on the correlation between June 4th Factors and Voting Support by controlling three groups of respondents, we should have a more powerful test of the intervening effect of democratic aspiration.

Table 15 One-way ANOVA Tests of the Mean Score Differences of June 4th Factors by Party Identification

	F	p	Groups with significant mean score difference
Basic Attitude	31.2667	.001	group 1 (7.16)>group 2 (6.69)>group 3 (5.51)
Not to Forget	14.1592	.001	group 1 (6.44)>group 2 (5.74)>group 3 (4.75)
Continue to Support	32.3964	.001	group 1 (0.81)>group 2 (-.01)>group 3 (-1.19)

Notes: Voters of group 1 are those identified with the UDHK, those of group 2 with no political organization, and those of group 3 with the FTU.
The N is 136 for group 1, 437 for group 2, and 45 for group 3.
The group mean score differences are tested by multiple comparison using Tukey's procedure. Figures inside the brackets are the group mean scores.

The elaboration result is reported in Table 16. The finding is quite puzzling. If we just look at the first correlation coefficient between Basic Attitude and Voting Support for those who identified with the UDHK (group 1) and those who identified with no political organization (group 2), there is indeed the intervening effect of democratic aspiration: coefficient in group 1 is stronger than the original but that in group 2 is weaker. However, if we look at other correlation coefficients, both groups display a pattern of weaker coefficients than the original. Even more puzzling is the findings from group 3. Here, all correlation coefficients are much stronger than the original. What do all these mean?

Table 16 Correlation Matrix between June 4th Factors and Voting Support, Controlled by Party Identification

	Original (N=477)	Group 1 Voting Support (N=116)	Group 2 Voting Support (N=252)	Group 3 Voting Support (N=28)
Basic Attitude	.38***	.43***	.23***	.49**
Not to Forget	.24***	.19*	.06	.55***
Continue to Support	.22***	.18*	.01	.51**

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Note: Voters of group 1 are those who identified with the UDHK, those of group 2 with no political organization, and those of group 3 with the FTU.

Certainly, among the voters of group 3, the June 4th Incident had stronger effect on their voting support for the pro-China candidates. But it was the group of voters who had the lowest mean scores on Voting Support (2.79), Basic Attitude (5.51), Not to Forget (4.75), and Continue to Support (-1.19). In other words, they took a more supportive attitude towards the pro-China candidates and less defiant stance towards the June 4th Incident. However, it was also the group of people that was hurt deeply by the Incident. Once they took a defiant stance towards the Chinese government, they were more likely than the other two groups to decline their voting support to the pro-China candidates. That is to say, the erosion of the voting support for the pro-China candidates by the June 4th Incident is more salient among those who identified with the FTU. More importantly, we do not see any weakening of the effect even when these voters took more practical issues into consideration. Does this indicate there is an alienated group of voters among FTU camp? Since group 3 is so small that no further subgroup analysis is meaningful, we do not have any conclusive answer here. Nevertheless, from the thrashing of Miss Chan Yuen-han by the candidates of the UDHK by more than ten thousand votes in Kowloon Central, a constituency supposed to be the stronghold of pro-China voters, it seems clear that either there were alienated FTU voters who did not turn out in the 1991 election to vote for

Miss Chan or they did turn out but shifted their support to the UDHK. This alienation no doubt germinated in the June 4th Incident.

Regarding the voters of group 1, those who took the most defiant stance towards the Chinese government with respect to the June 4th Incident and were most disinclined to vote for the pro-China candidates, there is indeed a stronger correlation between Basic Attitude and Voting Support than in group 2. That is to say, the Incident did motivate voters to identify with the UDHK, which in turn helped reduce the support for the pro-China candidates. This intervening effect is, however, not consistent for all three factors. Nevertheless, the effect of the June 4th Incident to spur our voters on to identify with the UDHK did produce a bizarre consequence that in the present context of Hong Kong democracy is defined as anti-Communist China. We have got this impression from the finding that among those who had participated in the rally protesting against the Chinese government about the June 4th Incident, the correlation between agreement with the political stance of the democratic camp and that with the pro-China camp is -0.30 (N=192, p<.001); and among those who had not participated, the correlation is 0.42 (N=412, p<.001). That is to say, for those participants, the more they agreed with the democratic camp, the more they opposed the pro-China camp.[13] But for those non-participants, the more they agreed with the former, the more they agreed with the latter. This is not an isolated finding. Consistent pattern can also be seen from the following data that, among those who identified with the UDHK, the correlation between agreement with the political stance of the democratic camp and that with the pro-China camp is -0.20 (N=130, p<.05); among those who identified with the FTU, it is -0.14 (N=40, p=.381); and among those who identified with no political organization, it is 0.49 (N=347, p<.001). Thus, in some of our voters' mind, to be democratic is to be anti-Communist China.

The identification with the UDHK also had effect on our sampled voters' actual voting behaviour. Among those who claimed to have voted for a candidate belonging to a political organization, most of them voted for the UDHK. For those who identified with the UDHK, 41 out of 62 voters voted for the candidates of the UDHK on their first vote; on their second vote, the figure is 33 out of 62. For those who identified with the FTU, 5 out of 9 voters voted for the candidates of the UDHK on their first vote, but only 2 out of 9 voted for the FTU candidates; on their second vote, the corresponding figures are 3 out of 9 and 2 out of 9. For those who identified with no political organization, 33 out of 73 voted for the

candidates of the UDHK on their first vote; the figure is 26 out of 73 on their second vote. Due to the small sample size, it is not meaningful to conduct further subgroup analysis to examine the actual voting behaviour constituency by constituency, let alone to delve into the actual voting behaviour of these three groups of voters in each constituency. Suffice here to say that, in terms of the voting outcome of the 1991 direct election, it is the UDHK which benefitted the most from the June 4th Incident. We can conclude with respect only to our sample that the defeat of the pro-China candidates can be partially explained by the UDHK candidates' grasping of an absolute majority of the UDHK devout supporters' votes, many of the alienated FTU votes, and more than one-third of the wavering voters' votes.

So far we have demonstrated the effect of the Perception Factors and the June 4th Factors on the voting support for the pro-China candidates. Theoretically and methodologically, it is interesting to see how much explanatory power these factors have. It is also interesting to consider the explanatory power of all these factors in conjunction with several fundamental social variables, age, income, and education. To examine this joint effect, we conducted a multiple regression analysis again by using the Perception Factors, the June 4th Factors, age, education, and income as independent variables and Voting Support as dependent variable. As reported in Table 17, multiple R, 0.55, for regression was significantly different from zero: $F(9, 341)=16.72$, $p<.001$. Only three of the independent variables contributed significantly to the prediction of the voting support for pro-China candidates. They were Basic Attitude, Committed to Hong Kong, and Running Dog. The unique contribution of each of these variables to the prediction of Voting Support is as follows: 0.066 for Running Dog, 0.045 for Committed to Hong Kong, and 0.051 for Basic Attitude. All the independent variables in combination contribute another 0.144 in shared variability. Altogether, about 31% (29% adjusted) of the variability in the voting support for the pro-China candidates can be predicted by knowing the scores on these independent variables.

Table 17 Unstandardized Regression Coefficients, Standardized Regression Coefficients, and Squared Semipartial Correlations for Voting Support on the Perception Factors, the June 4th Factors, Age, Education, and Income (N=351)

Independent variables	B	β	sr^2 (unique)
Committed to Hong Kong	.16***	.23	.045
Running Dog	-.14***	-.27	.066
Committed to China	.02	.02	–
Basic Attitude	.22***	.27	.051
Not to Forget	-.01	-.01	–
Continue to Support	.05	.08	–
Age	.01	.03	–
Education	.03	.05	–
Income	.02	.09	–
R^2=.31§			

*** p<.001.
§ Unique variability=.16, shared variability=.15.

The significance of this multiple regression analysis is twofold. Firstly, it helps us confirm again our previous finding that Basic Attitude, Committed to Hong Kong, and Running Dog are the three most important variables in accounting for the erosion of voting support for the pro-China candidates. In other words, it was because our voters had denounced the Chinese government's handling of the June 4th Incident and consequently perceived the pro-China candidates as the running dogs of the Chinese government and as not committed to Hong Kong that they disinclined to vote for these candidates. Secondly, we know that age, education, and income do not have independent effect on Voting Support. They only have shared explanatory power with the Perception Factors and the June 4th Factors. Thus, the effects of Basic Attitude, Committed to Hong Kong, and Running Dog on Voting Support seem to be widespread among voters, no matter what age, what income categories, and to what education groups they belong.

All in all, through these statistical analyses, we can depict the following process of socialization of alienation, which sowed the seeds of defeat for the pro-China candidates in the 1991 direct election. From the very beginning, we saw Hong Kong society politicized by the issue of its future, an issue destined by its history being intertwined with the history of China. Then a dual authority structure sparked off China's intervention and a spate of political crises which involved the confrontation of basic interests between the Chinese government and Hong Kong people. All these helped to ignite, to intensify, and to solidify the anti-Communist China sentiment among local populace. The tragic June 4th Incident pushed almost all Hong Kong Chinese to pass through the "threshold of producing alienation." During this process, some built their negative stereotype of the Chinese government and became persistently alienated, some had their democratic aspiration kindled and became supporters of the UDHK, some had their national identity shattered and became wavering and ambivalent, some had their political interest burned and became steady consumers of anti-Communist China sentiment. If we treat political events like the June 4th Incident as input, then there are several mechanisms at work inside the "black box" of political socialization. However, the output is often the alienation from the Chinese government and its affiliated political entities. Given a whole decade full of such kind of input and reinforcements, it is reasonable to believe that the mere anti-Communist China sentiment has already gelled into an anti-Communist China syndrome.

Conclusion: Anti-Communist China Syndrome Looming Large

By anti-Communist China syndrome, we refer to an integrated set of political attitudes, with the distrust of the Chinese government as the centrifugal force, from which other related political attitudes, or even political actions, are derived. Given Hong Kong people's notoriety for their ignorance of political matters and their loose structure of political thinking,[14] the development of political attitudes into a syndrome is an exception rather than a rule. During the past decade, with so many significant events, all centred on China vis-à-vis the future of Hong Kong, pouring into Hong Kong people's minds, the socialization process

had already be accentuated.

> Crises are often the major constitutive events of a political system.... It is during crises that most people learn about the nature of their political system. People not ordinarily involved in politics are suddenly deeply involved. They see the operation of the system in an intense light, and what they learn at the moment of crisis will determine what they believe about politics after the crisis. (Verba, 1965:348-60)

Thus, for some Hong Kong people, the constant inflow of a negative image of the Chinese government from socializing agents not only reinforced their rejection of the Beijing regime, but also drove them to crystallise what they had absorbed so that an integrated set of political attitudes began to build up. The experience of Hong Kong in the past decade is similar to the experience of the US in the 1970s. As pinpointed by Nie and Andersen, "not only specific political attitudes but the structure of mass attitudes may be affected by politics in the real world" (Nie and Andersen, 1981). Consequently, Hong Kong people may still be disinterested in other areas of the political world, but they have already evolved an anti-Communist China syndrome.

This anti-Communist China syndrome should be more pronounced among the younger generation. On the one hand, most of our youngsters were born in the city and grew up in an age of affluence, the 1980s of Hong Kong. Without the experience of living in an age of scarcity and in China, political freedom and economic development for them have become something taken for granted. They can neither understand nor accept the planned reunion of Hong Kong with China, which poses a threat to their future. As a result, whether they migrate or not, they may have already experienced too much uncertainty. Politics seems to be alien to them. On the other hand, in comparison with the older generation, they have the weakest national feeling or national pride. This is perhaps a joint effect of a deprivation of Chinese history and Chinese culture education and a prolonged experience of confrontation between China's interests and Hong Kong's interests during their years of attitude formation.[15] The near absence of national identity plus an urge for democracy and prosperity may highly likely drive our youngsters to stereotype the Chinese government. On the basis of this stereotype, an anti-Communist China syndrome has evolved. Consequently, the problem for future Hong Kong is in no way dissimilar to other new states that both would find difficulties "in trying to socialize young people to national consciousness and loyalty in a nation which to many people is nothing but a name"(Sigel, 1970). In fact, in our study Age is correlated negatively with the Perception Factors, the June 4th Factors, and Voting Support. That is to say, the younger the age, the higher the alienated responses to these items.

To substantiate our argument, we resort to another data set. This data set is a society-wide survey of 1,849 Form 5 and Form 7 secondary school students of Hong Kong conducted in 1988, a year before the June 4th Incident.[16] To measure students' alienation from the Chinese government, we borrowed the standard political alienation items widely used in the US (Mason, House, and Martin, 1985). The finding was quite astonishing. As reported in Table 18, there was a pattern of extreme alienation among our students. Not only was there a widespread alienation from the Chinese government in every aspect our items covered, but the extreme alienated responses were also stunning. Without exception, every item drew more than half of our students' alienated responses, ranging from the lowest 60.3% to the highest 95%. The figures of extreme alienation were from the lowest 13.6% to the soaring 50.6%. The message carried by these data was simple: an alienated generation was in the making. If we take into consideration that the data were collected before the June 4th Incident, then we should expect an intensification of this widespread alienation.

Table 18 Frequency Distribution of Alienated Responses to the Items of Political Alienation for the Chinese Government*

	Total percentage†	Percentage of extreme alienation§
Political Efficacy		
People like me don't have any say about what the Chinese government does.	67.2	26.0
I don't think public officials of China responsible for Hong Kong affairs care much about what people like me think.	74.1	28.9
Political Trust		
How much of the time do you think you can trust the Chinese government to do what is right?	93.9	27.1
Would you say that the Chinese government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or for the benefit of all people?	72.1	16.4
Government's Responsiveness		
Over the years, how much attention do you feel the Chinese government pays to what people think when it decides what to do?	87.9	27.4
How much attention do you think most congressmen of the Chinese government pay to the people when they decide what to do in Congress?	60.3	13.6
How much do you feel that having election makes the Chinese government pay attention to what people think?	78.5	22.2
System Evaluation		
Would you say you are proud of many things about the present form of the Chinese government or you can't find much in the present Chinese government to be proud of?	95.0	49.9

Table 18 (Continued)

Some people believe a change in the whole form of the Chinese government is needed to solve the problems facing our society, while others feel no real change is necessary. What do you think?	85.5	50.6

* Since missing cases range from 1 to 4 of 1,849 cases, we do not specify each N. Higher scores on these items indicate alienated responses. There are totally four ranks of answer for each item.

† The total percentage is the sum of the percentages of students choosing third or fourth choice, which indicates a feeling of alienation, of the items.

§ The percentage of extreme alienation is the percentage of students answering fourth choice, which indicates a feeling of extreme alienation, of the items.

To corroborate that there is an anti-Communist China syndrome, we had to examine the correlations of our students' alienation from the Chinese government with their other related responses. In the survey, we asked our students about their identity, their plan of migration, their thought on the most important social goal, their future political participation, their vision of the future, and their acceptance of the Chinese officials' taking up positions in the public sector and in the private sector of Hong Kong. If there was an anti-Communist China syndrome, then we should see at least some correlations between these variables and our students' alienated responses. Firstly, a t-test showed that for those who identified with Hong Kong, their mean alienated score of Political Trust (3.05) was significantly higher than those identifying with China (2.98), with t-value=2.78 and $p<.01$. Another t-test showed that for those who chose to migrate, their mean alienated score of Political Trust (3.13) was significantly higher than those who chose to stay in Hong Kong (2.93), with t- value=-8.91 and $p<.001$. Still another set of t-test showed that for those who chose not to participate in the following activities: damaging public properties as a protest, writing or contacting the Governor, writing or contacting the members of OMELCO/District Boards/Urban Council/ Regional Council, and writing or contacting a newspaper, television or radio station; their mean alienated score of Political Efficacy was significantly higher than those who chose to.

Secondly, a one-way ANOVA test showed that for those who chose

"giving people more say in the decisions of the government" and "protecting individual freedom," their mean alienated score of Political Trust (3.12) was significantly higher than those who chose "maintaining order in the society" (2.97) and those who chose "fighting rising prices" and "providing a decent standard of living for everyone" (3.02), with $F=14.69$ and $p<.001$. Thirdly, the correlation in Table A of the Appendix showed that the higher the alienated score of Political Trust, the more pessimistic our students' vision of freedom of speech, standard of living, democracy, and economic development of future Hong Kong. Fourthly, the correlation in Table B and Table C of the Appendix showed that the higher the alienated score of Political Trust, the more likely our students rejected the Chinese officials to take up positions either in the private sector or in the public sector of Hong Kong.

So far our findings show a consistent pattern of correlation between our students' identity, plan of migration, thought of the most important social goal, future participation, vision of Hong Kong's future, and acceptance of the Chinese officials' taking up positions in the private and public sector of Hong Kong and their alienation from the Chinese government. We think these are enough traces to suggest that an anti-Communist China syndrome has already loomed large. Our sample is a sample of adolescents. We have clear limitation in the generalizability of our findings. However, we do come cross similar finding in other scholar's work. In Lau's survey, "[i]t appears that if the public is mistrustful of the Chinese government, or those political bodies and politicians who are considered to toe the line of either the Hong Kong or the Chinese government, they would be more supportive of the formation of political parties" (Lau, 1992a:15). Be that as it may, the important question remains: if there is really an anti-Communist China syndrome, what is its implication for the 1995 direct election?

With an anti-Communist China syndrome looming large, we expect the 1995 election battle to be a difficult, if not insurmountable, one for the pro-China candidates. As we have demonstrated in previous sections, the voting support for the pro-China candidates was eroded by their being perceived as the running dogs of the Chinese government and as not committed to Hong Kong. These two negative images are clearly the result of the anti-China feeling of Hong Kong people, intensified by the June 4th Incident. To overcome the image of running dogs of China, the pro-China candidates can best hope China to soften her authoritarian posture towards Hong Kong. The sooner China changes her attitude

towards the June 4th Incident, the better the chance these candidates to cultivate mass support. However, what China would do or would not do is simply out of their control. As long as they are pro-China, all their popularity and their moral status depend on China, which already led to their defeat in the 1991 election. One way out is not to be pro-China candidates, which amounts to commit political suicide. The other way is to water down their pro-China stance to become independent candidates. With a track record of being pro-China, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, for them to convince the public that they are really independent. Thus, it is not exaggerated to say that the pro-China candidates are being entangled in a Catch-22 situation.

Certainly, the pro-China candidates can prove their allegiance to Hong Kong's interests by really doing something for Hong Kong people. In fact, the success of some UDHK candidates is partly due to their long-term effort in community construction, district betterment, and social movements. All these take a long time and a lot of effort to have something accomplished. Needless to say, given the present complex economic and political structure of Hong Kong, some issues like housing and inflation have already become Sisyphean tasks that make our elites and politicians seem powerless and impotent. The easier way to prove one's standing on Hong Kong's interest is to fight for freedom and democracy for Hong Kong. Here, it is not the outcome but the gesture that counts. In other words, through this symbolic struggle, the leaders, like the candidates of the UDHK, can deliver one of the cherished value of the society. As we have argued before, to fight for democratization in Hong Kong is tantamount to confront the Chinese government. Given the present China's stance towards democracy and the June 4th Incident, the pro-China candidates simply do not have the will, let alone the ability, to press for further democratization. As a result, they can never become "more democratic" than the UDHK and will once again lose the appealing banner of "fighting for democracy for Hong Kong people" in the next election. On the other hand, being pro-China candidates, these potential Hong Kong leaders dare not to express their sympathy nor sorrow nor grief for those who died in the June 4th Incident. Consequently, the anniversary of the Incident always becomes the monopolized ritual of the UDHK so as to let them reinforce their public support. The UDHK may have achieved nothing for the democratic development in Hong Kong, but they are the embodiment of democracy in the right place at the right time. For the pro-China candidates, social construction needs time to

demonstrate accomplishment, and since fighting for democracy is not their road to the Legco, they are really being enmeshed in a Catch-22 situation.

The threat of China disallowing those elected councillors, whom she regards as not patriotic or not showing respect to the Basic Law, in the coming 1995 election to retain their seats after 1997 can only aggravate mass anti-Communist China feeling. This can also destroy the legitimacy of the election mechanism of Hong Kong. Given the present anti-Communist China syndrome, we expect four types of responses. One response of our voters is not to turn out in the election due to their loss of the faith in the election mechanism. Another response is to cast a protest vote, to vote for those candidates who are criticised by the Chinese government. In a secret ballot system, to cast a protest vote hardly costs one anything; but to cast a protest vote is the most effective formal channel to express one's discontent and mistrust of the Chinese government. Still another response is to vote for independent candidates and candidates of the democratic camp taking more compromising stance towards China on the consideration that these candidates are regarded as acceptable to China. Of course, some of our voters may take China's advice and elect those "patriots" who "vehemently support the Basic Law." Thus, the threat of China will create an election atmosphere advantageous to those compromising democratic leaders and the independent candidates. To the pro-China candidates, given the election is the only formal and effective way that Hong Kong people can express publicly their defiance of the Chinese government, they have to bear the brunt of the anti-Communist China syndrome.

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Notes

1. For a summary of opinion polls on the future of Hong Kong, see Cheng, 1984, Chapter 3. For Hong Kong people's responses to the Joint Declaration, see Cheng, 1986.
2. As described by Cha (1992), "In the eyes of many Hong Kong people, any action of the Chinese Communist Party is sinister, ominous, and menacing. Anyone who praises China, even if the praise is objective and based on fact, Hong Kong people will regard him as kowtowing to the Beijing regime and betraying Hong Kong's interest."
3. For the effect of a politicized environment on political socialization, see Sigel and Hoskin, 1981. For the learning of alienated attitude from socializing agents, see Jaros, Hirsch, and Fleron, Jr., 1968. For the persistent trend of alienation, see House and Mason, 1975; Gilmour and Lamb, 1975; Macke, 1979; Lipset and Schneider, 1983.
4. The anti-Communist China sentiment can be vividly shown by the following survey findings: the proportions of respondents feeling distrust of the Chinese government in three surveys are 42.9% in 1985, 43.8% in 1988, and 75.5% in 1990. These figures come respectively from Lau and Kuan 1988, p. 84; Lau, Kuan, and Wan, 1991, p. 200; and Lau, 1992c. We are grateful to Professor S. K. Lau for providing the latest finding.
5. On the other hand, unsuccessful rate due to refusal is 5.34% (72 cases). Unsuccessful rate due to other reasons, including the categories of "successful cases but using telephone interview," "respondents temporarily not in Hong Kong," "no people at home during the past three visits," "respondents not at home for a long time," "sampled electors are foreigners," and "addresses are c/o or letter box," is 16.39% (221 cases).
6. The answer categories of the two items, "trust of the pro-China candidates" and "voting support to the pro-China candidates," are: 1 for "would certainly trust/vote for him" to 5 for "would certainly not trust/vote for him." As expected, the two variables are strongly correlated, with R=.76, N=587, p<.001. For the sake of parsimony, we will only use "voting support to the pro-China candidates" in later analyses.
7. The three factor variables are created by the following equations:

   Running Dog for China (Factor 1) =
   0.81789 x item 1 + 0.74919 x item 2 + 0.67923 x item 3

Committed to Hong Kong (Factor 2) =
0.78192 x item 4 + 0.64740 x item 5 + 0.61735 x item 6
Committed to China (Factor 3) =
0.76086 x item 7 + 0.69709 x item 8 + 0.53914 x item 9

The higher the scores in Committed to Hong Kong and Committed to China, the more inclined the voters thought the candidates did not stand for interests of Hong Kong and China. On the contrary, the lower the score in Running Dog, the more inclined the voters thought the candidates were running dogs of China.

8. The squared semipartial correlation is calculated by $sr_i^2=(T_i^2/df_{res})(1-R^2)$. T is the t-value of the *i*th item and df_{res} is the residual degree of freedom (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1983:108-38).
9. There were in total nine items measuring respondents' knowledge of current affairs. A variable was created by counting the correct answers. With nine items, the possible highest score is 9 and the possible lowest score is 0.
10. The three factor variables are created by the following equations:

Basic Attitude (Factor 1) = 0.90261 x item 1 + 0.89681 x item 2
Not to Forget (Factor 2) = 0.87747 x item 3 + 0.78881 x item 4
Contnue to Support (Factor 3) =-0.83330 x item 5 + 0.79530 x item 6

Higher scores of the three factors indicate alienated response towards the June 4th Incident.

11. Consistent finding can also be seen in a t-test of the difference of mean scores of Voting Support by voters' participation in the rally protesting against the Chinese government in the June 4th Incident. For those participants, the mean score is 3.73, which is significantly higher than 3.33 for the non-participants (t-value=4.87, $p<.001$). This means that the participants were more disinclined to vote for the pro-China candidates than the non-participants.
12. We do not think that when our voters showed democratic aspirations, they were simply paying lip service or giving socially desirable answers. In fact, we have found that they had a consistent attitude towards democracy. As indicated by several t-tests, the differences of mean scores on the items, "Appointed councillors are better than elected councillors," "Political change brought by 1991 direct election

is good to Hong Kong," and "We should have more elected seats in the 1995 Legco election than the originally planned twenty" are significant between those who thought the most important goal of democracy was "to safeguard individual freedom" or "to let people have more say in government's decision making" and those who chose other categories.

13. As expected, among those who identified with the UDHK, 74.3% agreed to the political stance of the democratic camp and only 5.9% agreed with the pro-China camp. For those who identified with the FTU, the corresponding figures are 13.3% and 31.1%. This contrasting support for the democratic camp and for the pro-China camp can also be seen in Lau's study (1992b) that 40.6% of his sample would support democratic political organizations while 25.9% would support the Chinese government. On the contrary, only 12.2% would not support the former while 25.4% would not support the latter.
14. For the past and recent discussions of Hong Kong people's political attitudes and political participation, see Wong, 1970-1971; Hoadley, 1973; Lau and Kuan, 1986; Lau and Kuan, 1988; Lau, Kuan, and Wan, 1991. For a discussion of mass belief systems, see Converse, 1964. For a summary discussion of citizen apathy, low levels of public knowledge, unstructured political thinking, and so forth, see Neuman, 1986.
15. There are already some reforms in the formal curriculum to prepare students for the transition of Hong Kong from a colony to a Special Administrative Region, see Morris, 1992.
16. We stratified our sample according to three identifiers, namely, Forms (Form 7 and Form 5), subject groups (arts class and science class), and status of schools ("outstanding school" and "mediocre school"). The result is a sample composed of eight strata:

1st stratum : Form 7 arts class, outstanding school.
2nd stratum : Form 7 science class, outstanding school.
3rd stratum : Form 7 arts class, mediocre school.
4th stratum : Form 7 science class, mediocre school.
5th stratum : Form 5 arts class, outstanding school.
6th stratum : Form 5 science class, outstanding school.
7th stratum : Form 5 arts class, mediocre school.
8th stratum : Form 5 science class, mediocre school.

Since the sampling frame was compiled with government schools

listed first, followed by aided schools and private schools, by means of systematic sampling we could have enough cases of each type of schools.

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Appendix

Table A Correlation between Political Trust and Vision of Hong Kong's Future (N=1,836)

	Political Trust
Freedom of speech	.33***
Standard of living	.28***
Democracy	.39***
Economic development	.26***

*** p<.001.

Table B Correlation between Political Trust and the Acceptance of Chinese Officials Taking Positions in the Private Sector of Hong Kong (N=1,835)

As to Chinese officials, would you be willing to let them:	Political Trust
be middle-level executives in private companies of Hong Kong?	.29***
be high-level executives in private companies of Hong Kong?	.29***
be chief executives in private companies of Hong Kong?	.26***
take over private companies of Hong Kong?	.22***

*** p<.001.

Table C Correlation between Political Trust and the Acceptance of Chinese Officials Taking Positions in the Public Sector of Hong Kong (N=1,835)

As to Chinese officials, would you be willing to let them:	Political Trust
be middle-level civil servants in the future government of Special Administrative Region?	.33***
be high-level civil servants in the future government of Special Administrative Region?	.33***
be ministers in the future government of Special Administrative Region?	.29***
be the governor in the future government of Special Administrative Region?	.23***

*** p<.001.

8

Issue-Positions in the 1991 Legislative Council Election

Lee Ming-kwan

I

I began this project with two inter-related objectives: to find out what issues were espoused by the 54 politicians who entered their candidacy for the territory's historic direct elections to the Legislative Council, and to determine, if only in very general terms, whether the outcomes of the elections had anything to do with the issue positions assumed by the candidates.

The issues identified by the competing politicians and their positions over these issues together defined a universe of political discourse which engaged not just theirs but also the public's attention. In setting forth their views of what mattered and what did not matter for Hong Kong, these politicians were defining and constructing Hong Kong's political reality, with real consequences. In the course of debates, clarification, sifting and sorting, focusing and re-focusing, some issues became non-issues, some revived from collective oblivion, and some elevated to positions of great importance and brought to the central stage of public

attention. Issues were prioritised; agenda set; and public opinion formed. But there was more to the process than just the construction of political reality. Issues, particularly contentious issues, separated friends from foes. The process made friends as well as enemies, consolidating old divisions and building new alignments. Knowing what the key issues were and who took what positions over them enabled one to gain an additional vista of the complex process of group and party formation as Hong Kong was democratizing.

Did issues and issue positions matter in the 1991 elections? Many studies (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Converse, 1964; Butler and Stokes, 1969; Stokes, 1966) of voting behaviour and elections in western democracies, particularly studies in the 1960s, support the view (cf. contradicting views held by Key, 1966; Repass, 1971; Page and Brody, 1972; Rabinowitz, 1978; Hinich and Pollard, 1981; Powell, 1982; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) that of the three sets of factors considered to be important in shaping voters' choice, i.e. candidates, party loyalty and identification, and issues, the last has the least salience.

That issues are relatively unimportant can perhaps be explained in terms of two arguments: one, that most voters have in fact made up their minds regarding who gets their vote at a fairly early stage, even before issues surface; two, that mass voters are not in possession of the rational capacity for comprehending complex arguments underlying issues, hence it does not really matter whatever the positions are taken by the candidates. Some researchers have noticed, nevertheless, that issue-voting becomes more likely when "easy" rather than "hard" issues are involved, i.e. "when a particular issue becomes so ingrained over a long period that it structures voters' 'gut responses'" (Carmines and Stimson, 1980:78), issues such as racial desegregation and America's involvement in the Vietnam War.

In Hong Kong's first-ever direct elections to the Legislative Council, when all competitors were, in a sense, new to the game, and when parties were without exceptions newly created, one has good reasons to wonder whether issue-voting might be more important than it would have been were parties more well established and politicians more experienced. If issues are relevant, one would like to know whether this has anything to do with the nature of the issues.

More specifically, the study aims at the following three objectives:

1. to describe the issues which captured the attention of the candidates;
2. to find out whether in fact there were significant differences in the issues addressed and the positions taken by various major camps of politicians, particularly those between the so-called "liberals" and "non-liberals;"
3. to find out whether there was a correlation between issue-positions and electoral outcomes.

II

In terms of research method, I have principally relied on the content analysis of campaign materials to capture and classify relevant data. I have gathered a near-complete set of leaflets setting out the platforms of the candidates. These vary in formats and length but share one feature in common: they were widely distributed to the electorate. Platforms were usually stated in succinct terms comprehensible to most people. Candidates who also belonged to political parties usually adopted abridged versions of their party platforms suitably tuned and modified to reflect individual styles and district characteristics. Because it was basically through these instead of the bulky and wordy documents that their platforms were made known to the electorate, I have chosen to include leaflets instead of party documents in my sample.

The issues tackled by the candidates have been grouped under fourteen categories:

1. "Distribution issues," which have to do with incomes, taxation, and the distribution of resources;
2. "Growth and stability issues," which concern ways to promote economic growth and stability;
3. "Social services and public utilities," which address issues concerning social welfare, health, public housing, education and public utilities;
4. "Urban issues," which cover urban re-development and the maintenance and monitoring of private housing;
5. "Class issues," which reflect labour's concerns, such as the right to collective bargaining, labour legislations and imported labour;
6. "Environmental issues," which cover issues like environmental protection and education;

7. "Sino-Hong Kong relations," which concern ways to enhance or otherwise maintain a "healthy" relation between Hong Kong and the Mainland;
8. "Political system and political changes," which deal with the pace and directions of the democratization of the colonial polity;
9. "Human rights," which cover issues like human rights legislation and international covenants on human rights;
10. "Gender issues," which address the rights and policies promoting the interests of women;
11. "Law and order," covering issues such as combating crimes and restoring the death penalty;
12. "Vietnamese boat people," which addresses the need to repatriate the Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong;
13. "Civil service," which concerns the morale of the civil servants and the impact of privatization and localization on the quality of their service;
14. "Others," covering such issues as "youth policy" and all others not classifiable in terms of the other thirteen categories.

All candidates articulated some positions on some if not most of these issues. Some were very articulate over most issues; some were only articulate over some issues. Some issues received many while others very few articulated views. These various positions were also identified and culled from the leaflets.

The election battle was widely regarded as one fought between the so-called "liberals" and the "pro-China candidates." What I intend to address in this paper are: In terms of their positions regarding (a) social policies and the welfare role of the government; (b) working class interests and (c) the pace and direction of further change to be introduced to the colonial political system, are differences between them real? Secondly, are there in fact differences between them in terms of their stances on approaches to Sino-Hong Kong relations?

To ascertain the degree of liberalism in the positions taken by a candidate, I have relied on a "liberalism index," constructed from six indicators, namely: (1) whether the candidate endorses a progressive income tax system and an increase in the rate of profit tax; (2) whether the candidate asks for a bigger welfare budget; (3) whether the candidate asks for the introduction of central provident fund; (4) whether a candidate is opposed to the importation of labour; (5) whether the candidate is

for strengthening the labour right of unionization and collective bargaining and (6) whether the candidate is for a quicker pace of adding directly elected seats to the various councils. A candidate can, depending on whether he/she has articulated some of these positions, score up to 10 points. A high liberalism score represents a strong liberal position and vice versa.

I have also tried a "pro-China index" to measure the extent to which a candidate is willing to stay on good terms with the Mainland government. The index is derived from a candidate's response to three questions: (1) whether he/she is for enhancing two-way communication and co-operation; (2) whether he/she is for a conciliatory approach to resolving differences; and (3) whether he/she is concerned that Hong Kong should not become involved in confrontational politics with the Mainland and in China's internal political conflicts. A "pro-China score" of 5 signifies a very strong pro-China stance.

There are admittedly serious drawbacks to the methodology used. Leaflets were not the only medium through which the candidates expressed their views. Also, the person and what he did in other roles were often equally if not more important than what was conveyed by words written in leaflets. Veteran "liberal" leader Mr Szeto Wah, for example, said not a single word in his leafletized platforms (29-7-1991) about Sino-Hong Kong relations and Hong Kong's democratic change although it was public knowledge that he had played leading roles in actions related to both. The person is, in a sense, the living platforms, and no studious coding of the still document can adequately capture what the person symbolizes. Platforms written on campaign materials can be regarded, therefore, as but partial records of candidates' views. A second serious shortcoming of this approach is that leafletized platforms do vary in the details they contain. Unless all candidates follow the same format, adopt similar styles, and use roughly the same number of words to describe their platforms, there are bound to be some who espouse more views than others not because they are more articulative but because they are not short of words.

Granting these limitations and possible biases, what is reported here can be regarded as a first approximation of the issues which engaged the attention of the candidates and the positions over these issues taken by them.

III

Which were the most and the least popular issues? Table 1 shows different measures of issue popularity. The most popular issue was "social services and public utilities." Nearly every candidate took some positions on this issue and, on the average, each had expressed 7.03 issue-positions. Other popular issues included "distribution" (90.7%, 110 positions and 2.24 positions per candidate with views), "political system and political change" (72.4%, 128 positions and 3.28 positions per candidate with views), and "environmental issues" (72.2%, 83 positions and 2.13 positions per candidate with views). Issues which were much less popular, apart from "civil service," included "human rights" (42.6%), "Vietnamese boat people" (48.1%), "growth and stability" (53.7%), and "Sino-Hong Kong relations" (57.4%). Only about half of the candidates had views on these issues and articulated fewer positions on these than on the more popular issues like "social services and public utilities," "political system and political change," and "distribution." In other words, they were less concerned with and had fewer views to state on these less popular issues.

The same pattern was essentially maintained when we observe subgroup issue-popularity (Table 2). All three groups — the "liberals," "pro-China candidates," and the "others" — had many views on "social services and public utilities." "Pro-China candidates" had relatively more to say on "gender issues," "law and order," and "Sino-Hong Kong relations." But compared to the other two groups, they had relatively fewer views expressed per person on "political system and political change." "Distribution issues" were popular among all three groups.

Table 1 Issue Popularity

	No. of candidates with position(s) on the issue	% of all candidates	No. of positions articulated on the issue	Average no. of positions articulated by candidates with views
Distribution	49	90.7	110	2.24
Growth and stability	29	53.7	54	1.86
Social services and public utilities	51	94.4	359	7.03
Urban issues	36	66.7	66	1.83
Class issues	38	70.4	77	2.03
Environmental issues	39	72.2	83	2.13
Sino-Hong Kong relations	31	57.4	54	1.74
Political system and political change	39	72.4	128	3.28
Human rights	23	42.6	37	1.61
Gender issues	37	68.5	95	2.57
Law and order	38	70.4	81	2.13
Vietnamese boat people	26	48.1	50	1.92
Civil service	4	7.4	9	2.25
Others	6	11.1	6	1.00

Table 2 Issue Popularity* by Camps

	Liberals§ (N = 22)	Pro-China† candidates (N = 5)	Others (N = 27)
Distribution	2.2	2.4	1.8
Growth and stability	1.2	0.6	0.9
Social services and public utilities	7.8	8.0	5.5
Urban issues	1.6	1.0	0.9
Class issues	1.9	1.6	1.0
Environmental issues	2.3	2.0	0.9
Sino-Hong Kong relations	1.0	2.0	0.8
Political system and political change	3.0	1.6	2.0
Human rights	1.1	0.4	0.4
Gender issues	2.1	3.0	1.3
Law and order	1.3	2.4	1.5
Vietnamese boat people	0.6	1.6	1.0
Civil service	0	0	0.3
Others	0	0	0.2

* Average number of issue-positions articulated among candidates.

§ By "liberals," I refer to the candidates supported by the United Democrats of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, Meeting Point, Ms Emily Lau and Mr Andrew Wong.

† By "Pro-China candidates," I refer to Mr Cheng Kai-nam, Ms Chan Yuen-han, Mr Hau Sui-pui, Mr Wong Mun-chiu and Ms Cheung Wai-sang.

On whether there were in fact differences among the various political camps on "liberalism" and "pro-China" attitudes, the findings are very revealing (Table 3). The "liberals" have the highest liberalism score. Pro-China candidates come second, and, in terms of liberalism score, they are more liberal than the rest of the candidates. But if "pro-China candidates" are re-defined to include just Mr Cheng Kai-nam, Mr Hau Sui-pui and Ms Chan Yuen-han, their average liberalism score comes very close to that of the "liberals." In other words, if liberalism is defined

along the line taken by this paper, then the "pro-China candidates" are nearly as liberal as the "liberals." One-way ANOVA test using Scheffe procedure shows, indeed, that "liberal" candidates are not, at 0.05 level of significance, significantly more liberal than the "pro-China" candidates.

What actually discriminates between the "liberals" and the "pro-China candidates" is apparently not so much liberalism as their stances on how to approach Sino-Hong Kong relations. "Pro-China candidates" are found, in terms of the pro-China index, to be most pro-China, and the "liberals," least pro-China. One-way ANOVA test using Scheffe procedure also shows that pro-China candidates, over pro-China scores, are significantly more pro-China than the other two groups at 0.05 level of significance.

Table 3 Liberalism and Pro-China Scores by Political Camps

	Liberalism score	Pro-China score
Liberals (N = 22)	5.45	0.45
Pro-China candidates (N = 5)	3.20 (4.67*)	2.80
Others (N = 27)	2.67	0.67

The bracketed score has to do with just three candidates: Mr Cheng Kai-nam, Mr Hau Sui-pui and Ms Chan Yuen-han.

The "others" turn out to be an uninteresting and fuzzy batch. They are less liberal than the other two groups and less pro-China than the pro-China candidates. They seem to be lacking a distinct identity which can win either the electorate's love or their hate.

IV

Let me perhaps draw some tentative conclusions on this brief study:

1. Candidates for the territory's first direct elections to the Legislative Council were overwhelmingly preoccupied with issues which had to do with social services, public utilities, and distribution. They were near-unanimously asking the government to spend more on almost everything, but were much less concerned with ways to "make a bigger pie," and were, what is more, either reluctant or oblivious to the need to pay more for social services. These political expectations were almost certain to translate into political pressures on the government via, on one hand, public opinion, and, on the other hand, the political agenda of the directly elected Councillors, if they remained committed to what they said during campaigns. Given the government's commitment to the new airport project, hence the need to watch the public purse with stringent care, rising welfare expectations on one hand and government's inability or reluctance to meet them could precipitate some kind of "crisis of collective consumption" (Castells, 1977), when citizens, becoming frustrated with government's failure to deliver, seek political actions to express their demands.
2. Also putting pressures on the government would be a very popular agenda on further democratizing the colonial polity. With hindsight, the electoral victory of the "liberals" and the political pressures on the British as well as Hong Kong governments to hasten the pace of democratisation helped set the stage for the new governor, Christopher Patten, to introduce his controversial political reform package which, at the time when this article is being written, has seriously upset Peking, polarized the community, strained Sino-British relations, and undermined the basis of co-operation and trust between the two governments so essential to preparing the colony's smooth transition to Chinese rule in less than five years' time.
3. There were significant differences between "liberals" and "pro-China candidates" over their approach towards China. Their stances on social and economic policies and, to a somewhat lesser extent, democratic change, were however basically in agreement.
4. The triumph of the "liberals" spelled the definite end of consensus politics. Their pro-welfare pro-labour stance coupled with their irreconciliatory position towards China made them foes of both business interests and "pro-China" legislators. The legislature became inevitably divided. One would have thought that the most likely scenario to follow from this would have been one in which the administration aligned itself with the twenty-strong "conservative" Co-operative Resources Centre (CRC) and pro-China legislators to gain a majority over the "liberals." It was, therefore, to everyone's surprise when events took a most unexpected turn after Christopher Patten took over as Lord Wilson's successor. The "liberals" threw their support behind Patten and his political reform package. CRC members rebelled against the administration to become the legislature's most unlikely opposition.
5. The outcomes of the elections, with the "liberals" in landslide victories defeating all "pro-China candidates," appeared to support the view that in Hong Kong's first direct elections of legislative councillors, issues were relevant. The "liberals" apparently thrived on two positions over two sets of important issues: liberalism and their uncompromising stance towards China. Whether they can be as successful in 1995 as in 1991 could depend very much on whether the electorate continues to welcome these positions. A not unlikely scenario unfavourable to the "liberals" would be one in which the electorate continues to endorse liberalism but warm instead to a more pragmatic approach to China. Should this scenario occur and assuming voters continue to vote on issues, pro-China politicians should have the most to gain. For, no less liberal than the "liberals," they are much more acceptable to China.
6. The study lends support to the claim that issues could matter in elections. However, limited by its methodological approach and the nature of its data, it stops short of either confirming or denying the importance of party loyalties or the personal attractions of the candidates.

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9

Political Markets, Competition and the Return to Monopoly

Evolution amidst a Historical Tragedy

Stephen Lung-wai Tang

The long-delayed first direct election to the Legislative Council (Legco) was finally held on September 15, 1991, and concluded with mixed results and a lot of unknown that need to be addressed. The 39.15% turnout rate was even significantly lower than the most conservative estimate of a 50% range with a 5% plus or minus. The electoral results evidenced the unexpected landslide victory of the pro-democracy liberals who captured 16 out of 18 seats, the total but decent defeats of the pro-China forces, and the miserably low voter support for the conservatives. Consequently, the political landscape in Hong Kong was transformed overnight. The long-suppressed, populist pro-democracy liberals finally concluded their long march to power, and emerged as one of the dominant players in the colonial power centre.

The pro-democracy liberals' landslide victory has been sketchily interpreted by some as a populist rejection of both China and the British administration in Hong Kong, but by others as the charismatic spillover of the dominant liberal superstars. Both may be partially correct, but they

fail to provide sufficient, structural grounds for explaining the complexity of this historically embedded phenomenon. Instead, we propose to tackle the problem from a structural-historical analysis modelled after our understanding of market and competitive strategies. Within this framework, electoral competition is perceived as taking place within the context of political markets. Like economic markets, as institutions, they are made up of a multiplicity of competing actors, norms, and capital. Their structures and internal dynamics are shaped incessantly by the key competing forces operating within them. But at times, their internal balance can be abruptly distorted by the eruption of unexpected historical events that have some lasting, irrevocable impacts on the relative competitiveness and positioning among groups.

In light of this framework, the paper will focus on elaborating those forces and the historical undercurrents that have shaped the evolution of the emerging political market system in Hong Kong since the early 1980s. This would provide us insights into how different political groups or cohorts are acting, reacting, defining or redefining themselves, taking or changing their positions in light of these changes to capture and sustain their competitive advantages in a largely fluid, evolving political market system. Hong Kong's experience shows that her political market system went through a healthy sequential transition from an unstructured, evolving, structuring, to an institutionalizing stage within a relatively short span of time, but failed to sustain a long-term institutional stability due to an untimely eruption of a sorrowful historical accident — the June 4th massacre in Beijing. The event shook the political landscape nearly upside down. It totally disrupted the evolving equilibrium among groups and pushed the system once again into an unhealthy, quasi monopoly of the pro-democracy liberals.

Market and Competitive Strategies

To begin with, the political market shares with the economic market that its operation depends on the presence of the following factors: actors, products, and capital. Simply put, actors include buyers and sellers. Buyers are individual citizens or civil groups (corporator actors) who may have never been, were or are active participants in the market, whereas sellers are individual politicians, parties, or political groups that

are either novice, experienced, retiring, or being forced to retire actors in the market. Products (commodities) in the market refer either to individual candidates, ideologies, or certain policy options. Finally, capital points to those reputations, networks, organizational resources, achievements, or images that politicians, parties, or political groups are holding.

Political market — principally as a form of periodic market — differs from economic market in such a way that ordinary voters, unless they have unusual demands, are usually relatively inactive between elections when politicians and parties are working hard to build up their capital base through lobbying, legislative work, image building, public debate, networking, and resource generating. At times, the politicians and parties may approach the voters in a limited way which is generally conducted through other agents. Voters as buyers are given an active opportunity of product choice only in the period just immediately preceding the elections.

Politicians and parties compete in the context of a particular market. Hence, the peculiarity of the market under study shapes the way how the competition takes place. Few markets are similar. They differ in terms of history, maturity, size, centrality, internal cohesiveness, vertical integration, etc. A different mixture of these parameters provides opportunities to some, poses barriers for entry to other, and shapes the very ways of how competition works. For example, a highly cohesive, localized, small traditional political market with practically no outside link tends to be extremely stable in terms of leadership composition and continuity, hence poses enormously high entry cost that deters outside political entrepreneurs' intrusion. On the contrary, a loosely coordinated, and internally fragmented, localized, small traditional political market with lots of external elite patronage is more likely to be subjected to outside intervention and leadership instability, thus providing ample opportunities for internal and external political entrepreneurs. Hence, it is clear that the nature of the market has a significant impact on the analysis of electoral competition therein. It is a matter of urgency that a typology of political markets should be devised. However, it would be difficult to justify doing so in this short article.

Electoral competition can take place at different stages of market evolution. Strategies and forms of competition vary significantly as the market evolves. It can range from a totally amorphous to a highly structural one with clear differentiation, and from an spontaneous to a highly calculative one. It can be structured through bundles of informal

networks to ones that are simulated eminently as a high-tech game. It is really a matter of the synchronization of evolutionary maturity of both the market and the competitive game. In the subsequent section, we will illustrate this evolutionary synchronization process by means of Hong Kong's electoral experiences since the early 1980s. We argue that the extensive and conscientious adoption of competitive strategy in the September 1991 Legco elections is the result of this synchronization.

Evolution of a Political Market

Chaotic Competition in an Unstructured Market

Universal suffrage has a relatively short history in Hong Kong, but limited elections have existed in the New Territories (NT) and the urban areas for quite sometime. In the NT, indigenous male adults have enjoyed the rights to elect their village representatives for a long time. However, beyond village level, politics has always been the game of the gentry class. This has clearly been reflected in the exclusive power politics of the rural committees and the *Heung Yee Kuk* (Rural Council). Prior to the formation of the district advisory committees in the mid 1970s, political markets had existed in the NT, but they were mainly part markets. These markets were usually very elitist, regionalized, fragmented and factional. The urban scene was quite different. Dating back to the 1950s, the Urban Council had already allocated a portion of its seats for competition. Voting rights were categorically restricted. As a limited franchise, the eligible voters seldom went beyond 1% to 2% of the total population. Hence, the idea of an urban political market was not high in people's mind. So, when universal franchise was first introduced at the district level in 1982, the urban political markets rarely existed.

So far, Hong Kong has only experienced four election cycles since early 1982 when universal suffrage was first introduced. They have been mainly confined to the district or municipal level. The only exception is the 1991 election cycle that has also included the first direct elections to the legislature. With such a relatively short span of electoral history, it would be unrealistic to assume the political markets, if they ever existed at all, are sufficiently matured. They can only be regarded as evolving markets at the most. Nonetheless, it is still analytically interesting to

differentiate the evolutionary processes by phases. Tentatively, we differentiate sequentially the last ten years as an evolution that has incorporated an unstructured, evolving, consolidating, and institutionalizing stage. They coincide with the four district-board election cycles that have been held so far, and they will be dealt with in the subsequent part.

As part of Britain's decolonization package, universal suffrage was first introduced at the district level in March 1982. Then, the government was very cautious and limited the first universal suffrage experiment to the eight administrative districts in the NT where they had a better political infrastructure. The successful experiences strengthened the government's further implementation of the universal suffrage to the other ten administrative districts in the urban area. Both took place in a quasi unstructured political landscape. However, the urban and rural scenarios differed markedly. Unlike the urban areas, there had already been quite a number of small, regionalized, and fragmented indigenous political markets existing in the NT. The indigenous political markets were organized at two different levels — first at the level of the rural committees, then at the *Heung Yee Kuk* designed three regional constituencies. As part markets, they had existed for a long time. With the exception of *Heung Yee Kuk* election year, most of their political activities had been usually concentrated in the market towns where the rural committees were based. These elite structures were typically highly pyramidal, factional, and exclusively reserved for the indigenous men. Besides, upward mobility tended to be very slow. Political mobility was very structured. It usually took a political novice at least 15 to 20 years of involvement and also a hefty amount of financial contribution to build up a sustainable network before becoming a significant player in rural politics. The barriers of entry to these indigenous political markets were exceedingly formidable, hence reinforcing their exclusiveness. But once being admitted to the inner circle, individuals enjoyed close association and easy access to the top government officials in the district. That in turn facilitated one's social mobility and economic opportunities, in particular with issues concerning land acquisition and development. Virtually, these were closed, entrenched political markets.

Fundamental changes were taking place in early 1981 when the British administration began to clearly demarcate Hong Kong into 18 administrative districts. To prepare for the first district board elections, they subdivided each of the districts into smaller electoral constituencies. At first, with the exception of a few, the number of constituencies in most

districts were confined to four or five. Each of the constituencies would generally return one to two members. Instantly, opportunities were opened up to all. It looked very similar to a monopoly suddenly under pressure to deregulate.

The sudden expansion of political opportunities created a totally new scenario in the traditionally conservative market towns in the NT. To ensure the ruling rural elites' acceptance of government's effort to institute district boards in the NT and partly direct elections to them, the administration skillfully ensured the *status quo* of the rural gentry with one formal and one informal arrangements. Formally, the chairmen of all the 27 rural committees in the NT would be returned automatically as *ex officio* members of their respective district boards where the rural committees were situated. The official recognition was crucial to secure the support of both the rural committees and the *Heung Yee Kuk*. Informally, the administration also included most of the first echelon rural leaders, including those who had held chairmanship of the respective district rural committee(s), and in some cases, the incumbent vice-chairman of individual rural committees, into the newly formed district boards. This arrangement helped to accommodate the dissatisfaction of and factional groups among the core of the gentry class.

The sudden expansion of political opportunities was perceived by the second echelon rural leaders as it would not only create more mobility channels for them but, most importantly, also shorten the time span needed for their upward mobility. In response to these opportunities, they adopted two centrifugal strategies. The first involved a substantial number of them rushing back to their own indigenous-based constituencies to stand for the first district board elections. As the overwhelming majority of these indigenous-based constituencies were united within their ranks, outsider politicians could hardly have any edge over them in any electoral competition. No doubt, internal competition was very keen, but was acceptable to most of them. Meanwhile, another batch of the second echelon rural leaders either stepped up their power base in the market town constituency where they still retained an overwhelming advantage, or strengthened their reach into the new town public housing estate constituencies in the vicinity of the market town where the new migrants were still struggling hard to settle down. The power vacuum in these new housing estates presented the indigenous leaders ample opportunity to patronize. Consequently, these aspiring, middle-aged rural leaders were able to be returned *en masse* as their representatives in the 1982 district

board elections. The most obvious examples were those in Tai Po, North, and Tuen Mun districts.

The rural gentry had always been central to market town politics and the focus of government's consultation on major issues affected not only the indigenous population but also those in the administrative districts where the rural committees were located. As compared with these political insiders, the early migrants from Guangdong province who had settled in these market towns either before the formation of the People's Republic of China or after had always been relatively marginal to the power politics in the NT. The non-indigenous market-town settlers were mainly inter-regional traders before the Communist takeover but settled down permanently after that. They usually settled in the dialect enclaves in the market towns and engaged either in fishing or market town small businesses and industries. The Chiu-chow traders and industrialists in Tai Po and Tuen Mun, and the Weizhou merchants in Shek Wu Hui and Luen Wo Hui were clear examples of these marginal settlers. Despite their economic clout and predominant population size in the market towns, the British administration adopted an avoidance strategy towards them. With the exception of Cheung Yan Lung in North district, their leaders were seldom taken as prominent local leaders with whom government officials would regularly consult. Instead, they were generally clustered into the functional groups, mostly in the form of business associations and clubs, where government cultivated contacts and collated views. They were considered as politically marginal in the market towns. For a long time, there were clear discrepancies between their economic clout and political influence. Conflicts between the indigenous and the marginal groups were not uncommon in the market towns. Moreover, complaints by the marginal groups about the administration's favouritism were not infrequent and at times spilt over publicly. Yet, to maintain its stable working relations with the indigenous population, the administration resisted conferring a proper political status to these marginals.

However, the formation of the district advisory committees and, subsequently, the district boards eased the situation a bit. The formalization of public consultation through these institutional arrangements expanded both the scope and audience of consultation. The administration was able to appoint some of these marginal individuals, especially those prominent in the local business associations and clubs, to the committees (and subsequently the boards) without having the fear to alienate the

indigenous leaders. Opportunities for the marginals were further extended when direct elections were introduced. Other than being ensured of the chances to be appointed to the district boards, and their committees, the marginals were watching closely the power vacuum in the new town public housing estate constituencies and the market town constituencies where they mostly lived. The expanded political opportunities, instead of easing the conflicts between the marginals and the indigenous, further reinforced their head-on competition for power. The market town and the new town public housing estate constituencies turned into their battle grounds. Moreover, internal competitions among marginals for the market town constituencies unnecessarily weakened their chances of winning. Typical of this were the experiences of internal competition in Tai Po South, Luen Wo Hui, Shek Wu Hui, Yuen Long Central. Consequently, the marginals failed to grasp the opportunities due to their internal split.

Marginality was not confined only to the early migrant settlers. It also extended to a cluster of individuals and organizations (including those both territorially and functionally based) who were closely identified with the People's Republic of China. They were usually being classified as the pro-China forces or organizations. The pro-China forces were more heterogeneous in background. They involved both the indigenous and the marginal settlers. Functionally, they incorporated groups ranging from business associations to women's clubs. Unlike the migrant settlers, their marginality was self-imposed due to their difference with the British administration. Other than refraining from participating in activities organized by the British administration, they generally adopted an anti-British attitude. Their own networks were relatively tight. Following Beijing's official line, they were quite indifferent to the formation of the district advisory committees (and later, the boards). Hence, there was hardly any sign that they had tried to mobilize their members either to stand for elections or to vote. Only some members relatively junior and marginal to them participated in the district board elections. Even those who participated tended to be more closely identified with the rural committees and the rural forces. Chan Koon Yau of Tai Po, Tang Kwok Yung of North, and Wan Yuet Kau of Sai Kung were good examples of that. This self-imposed marginality made the elections in 1982 less structured and competitive, but this changed dramatically in 1985 when China finally recognized that it would be strategically unwise to remain inactive.

Unlike the coerced marginality of early migrant settlers, and the self-imposed marginality of the pro-China forces, the new town settlers of the late 1970s and early 1980s had been too unsettled when the first district board elections were introduced. They were totally peripheral politically. Advocacy groups were rarely on the scene. To sum up, the first district board elections in the NT succeeded in drawing a massive entry of political entrepreneurs to compete in the newly created but unstructured market places. With no market precedents to follow, the battles were chaotically competitive. In fact, most survivors won without knowing the reasons why. Candidates seldom needed to bother about their relative positioning either in terms of ideology, political affiliation, political platforms, past performances, or images that have been so crucial in modern political marketing. It resembled those head-on competitions in the totally unstructured, petty trade markets in the rural hinterlands where everyone was over-zealous in getting his produce sold to whoever wanted them. This reminds us of the steady mass influx of small entrepreneurs to Shenzhen in the early 1980s when it first opened up economically.

The urban scene had been less vivid as there had been an absence of political markets in operation on the eve of the first district-based elections held in September 1982. Unlike the NT, many of the administrative districts in the urban areas were created arbitrarily. For example, there was hardly any explanation why Mong Kok should be singled out rather than combined with Yau Ma Tei to form a single district board, and similarly why could Central and Western not be merged with Wanchai to form a single board. As there were hardly any significant territorially entrenched power or social groups in them, there were practically very few objections to the initial boundary delineations. This in turn reinforced the argument that there was an absence of political markets in the urban area.

Strictly speaking, the only territorially-based groups in the urban areas had been the *kaifong* (neighbourhood) associations, and some redevelopment advocacy groups. However, they were regarded largely as socially or politically peripheral. The *kaifong* associations had proved themselves to be lacking a solid mass base in the 1966-67 social disturbances when the government had betted on their efforts to mobilize mass support against the rioting local leftists. The *kaifong*'s failure and miserable performance had prompted the government in the early 1970s to start rigorously building up a new type of administrative-political

infrastructure in the form of the urban district offices. The scheme was modelled after the district office in the NT. Consequently, the *kaifong* associations were downgraded to locality-based benevolent societies rather than local power groups. Their decline was further complicated by both the aging of their key power players — who were mostly in their late fifties to early seventies, and the limited base of their membership. So, throughout the 1970s, other than paying lip-service to the *kaifong* associations' contribution to communal services, the administration had worked very concertedly to groom a cluster of networks of individuals and organizations in the urban areas as its new partners of community work and services. The *kaifong* associations have since been out of the government's list of the key urban power players. This has contrasted very sharply with *Heung Yee Kuk* which have always been treated by the administration as partners in defining the new decolonization package. The ailing *kaifong* associations, as a political category, were unable to capitalize on the expanded political opportunities when direct elections were introduced in 1982. Only a handful of incumbent appointed district board members or former district advisory committee members who simultaneously had *kaifong* association membership or affiliation joined in the electoral processes. Nonetheless, most joined the game in an individual capacity either reluctantly at the invitation of government officials to support the new show, or half-heartedly to wait for their fortune stars.

On the other hand, public housing redevelopment advocacy groups in the urban areas were well organized but lacked a clearly articulated district identity. Driven by project concerns, they tended to focus either on general redevelopment policies or to concentrate on individual redevelopment projects. Lacking an identifiable geographical focus, both contributed to their failure to cultivate solidly district-rooted power bases. The situation only warranted some attention in 1983 when Fung King Hey, a key player of the Nam Shan Estate Redevelopment Project, capitalized on it and stood for the first universally-franchised, constituency-based Urban Council election in Sham Shui Po East where the project was located.

Similar to the NT, there were substantive pro-China forces in the urban area. At the territory level, the pro-China Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) had a strong following in many trades, and at the district level, there were quite a number of pro-China neighbourhood organizations, trade associations, and cohort-specific groups, such as women's

associations and youth groups. Because of Beijing's indifference to the district boards as a viable political infrastructure, the pro-China forces were not at all keen on entering into the game organizationally. The situation did not differ significantly from those of the pro-China forces in the NT. The passivity on the part of the pro-China forces surprised many as the pro-Kuomintang (KMT) organizations had shown quite an interest when the direct elections to the boards were first introduced. However, in retrospect, this was quite understandable. Despite their high-profiled publicity, the pro-KMT candidates in the 1982 district board elections were largely the aged community leaders. They either had overlapping memberships with the rural committees and trade associations in the NT, or with the *kaifong* associations in the urban areas. As a cohort, they could hardly pose any threat to Beijing's political interest in Hong Kong.

In recognition of the lack of organized territorially-based social and political groups in the urban areas, and the risks of having a poor show, the administration instead worked hard to convince the incumbent appointed members to fill the non-competitive slots in the urban constituencies. The first urban district board elections could hardly be considered a competition in the strict sense. The political markets were never on the scene, hence the battles were a no-starter game with the aged community volunteers reluctantly staging the first government-sponsored bazaars. These diffident players were seen hardly interested in wasting their resources to package themselves for these pre-maturely constructed local political theatres.

In sum, when the market ingredients (universal suffrage) and the mixing powders (elections) were first provided by the British administration, the NT and the urban Hong Kong reacted utterly differently. A political entrepreneur cohort which pushed actively the formation of political markets emerged in the NT, whereas in sharp contrast the politically apathetic urbanites left the aged volunteers to stage a motionless and faceless episode in the empty-seated political bazaars untimely created by the colonial government.

Securing Competitive Advantages in an Evolving Structure

The transition to the second district board elections which were held in early 1985 was more dramatic. It was marked by a few pivotal, local and

territory-wide events that had decisive impacts on the subsequent evolution of political markets in Hong Kong. In parts of the NT, there was a major political undercurrent fermenting in preparation for a drastic transformation of the local political markets while the rural elites and the marginals were celebrating over their victories in the newly formed exclusive political clubs (the district boards). Meanwhile, local advocacy groups (the crusaders) had suddenly sprung up *en masse* in the new towns. That was particularly obvious in Tuen Mun which is located quite remotely from the urban-industrial centres in NT South and Kowloon. Most of these groups were based in the new public housing estates and took the names of territorially identifiable concerns groups or associations. They focused on, articulated and addressed the discrepancies between the planned provisions and the needs of the new town residents. They contrasted sharply with the local conservatives in political style, organization and visibility. The local conservatives were in general more prepared to accommodate government requests, less well-connected with the grassroots, and less willing to confront the government publicly, whereas the crusaders, being peripheral to the local power centres, were more sceptical of government promises, worked closely with the grassroots involving them in mass campaigns and more prepared to antagonize the administration in the open. Over time, that gave rise to a highly contrasting image with those in power being perceived as merely the clients of the colonial bureaucrats, whereas the advocacy groups as the grassroots' crusaders. This was manifested very visibly in Tuen Mun. Years of incessant cultivation earned the crusaders a handsome amount of political capital. It was clearly reflected in the forms of local networks, images, achievements, mass organizing and mobilizing logistics, and territoriality. Hence, that helped them to knock down the barriers of entry to these evolving political markets and consolidated their chances in the forthcoming, briskly political battles.

An analogous trend also took place in the non-new-town public housing constituencies in both the NT and the urban areas. A batch of upwardly mobile social activists — mostly unmarried, in their mid and late twenties and still staying with their parents in the public housing estates — suddenly surged on the scene. They focused on massive public housing redevelopment issues as their niche and got active in organizing residents affected by them. They were best exemplified by Lee Wing Tat and his associates in Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi, and Fung Kin Kee and Lee Chik Yuet in Sham Shui Po. Avoiding identification with the community crusaders, they positioned themselves as the upwardly mobile, second-generation housing activists committed to help themselves and their neighbours. Such a position helped to differentiate them as young, upwardly mobile and socially conscious actors from the *kaifong* and mutual aid committee leaders who were categorically depicted as old, conservative and status-conscious. In addition to articulating these images, the cohort also shared a commonality. They were extremely skillful in handling their relationship with the press, in particular the electronic media, and in socializing with the politically significant in society. Their aggressive public cultivation also contrasted sharply with the passivity of the aged incumbents in their intended constituencies. The contrast further strengthened their position in the forthcoming elections. Unlike the new town crusaders whose political capital were cultivated through hard work, sustained campaigns and close connections with the grassroots, the activists' competitive edge was largely derived from good image-building and the absence of comparable competitors. Their fortune in securing this competitive advantage had a lot to do with the lack of alternative, electable contenders in the underdeveloped urban political markets.

Meanwhile, crucial changes in the territory had further contributed to the consolidation of their competitive position. While the crusaders and activists were working hard to establish their niches in the evolving markets at the district level, sequences of constitutional reform activities were simultaneously taking place which included controversial lobbying on the future of Hong Kong, head-on debates on her constitutional reform, and a tight-scheduled preparation for the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

All these clearly pointed to the inevitability and imminence of political change and an urgency to prepare for "Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong." Hence, the intense political climate at the time that lasted for more than two years provided an extremely favourable ground for the rise and the public acceptance of a young and politically-motivated professional cohort who could assure the public of their commitment to carry through "Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong." Although the crusaders and activists did participate in the territory-wide debates, but, compared with the intelligentsia class, their role was relatively marginal. Nonetheless, they gained substantially from the spillovers of this enchanting, yet critical societal self-reassessing exercise. On the whole, the ongoing constitutional reform debates were working to their advantage.

The discussion so far shows that the crusaders and the activists,

though adopting different strategies, succeeded quite well in carving a niche in their respective local political markets. Moreover, they were fortunate enough to enjoy the spillovers of the political climate in the larger society. The combination of all these factors enhanced their position in the still-formative local political markets. Furthermore, the government's proposed constitutional reform package for the 1985 district board elections which in part included the expansion of elected seats from a third to two-thirds strengthened their opportunities in the formative local political markets. Their landslide victories in the 1985 district board elections provided them not only a good share in but also helped firming-up these evolving local political markets. Their entries made the local political markets more diverse, structured, and competitive. But at the same time, the government's decision to hold changes at the local level political institution to a minimum in 1988, the barriers of entry to these local political markets became more fortified. New entrants to the 1988 electoral competitions had very limited chances unless they were closely associated with the key incumbent power players.

In Search of Structured Competitions

The phenomenal victory of a politically motivated young cohort in the March 1985 district board elections marked the beginning of a new era. The fatal defeats of the conservatives posed a number of consequences for the formative local political markets. They included: a sharp shrinkage in the conservatives' share of the local political market, the collapse of the indigenous leaders' control over a significant number of the new town public-housing constituencies, the rise of the marginals in the new towns, and the gradual disappearance of a volunteering, aged political cohort in the urban area. On the positive side, the defeats facilitated the formation of political markets in both the NT and the urban areas. The market participants not only grew in number, they also got more organized and committed to keep on. Hence, conflicts and competitions among groups became increasingly more structured. This was reinforced by the government's announcement that there would not be any significant increase in the number of electoral seats in the near future. The politicians were further guaranteed that only minor changes in electoral boundaries would be proposed for the 1988 district board elections. These policies undoubtedly contributed substantially to the stabilization of the local political structures. Hence, it enabled groups to operate in a more stable environment and to be more calculative in devising strategies that were suitable to secure and sustain their hard-won competitive advantages.

This competitive consciousness was more prevalent among the new victorious entrants. In parts of the NT, the crusaders missed no opportunities in further strengthening their power base right after the elections. They adopted a proactive populist strategy which sequentially included seeking out issues, articulating them, organizing the residents, and petitioning the government. Repeated uses of these measures gave them a wide edge at the beginning, but their utilities were seen gradually to decline over time. A number of social and economic changes that had taken place in the new town communities also contributed to the declining efficiency of these populist methods. First, after years of stay in the communities, many new town families gradually moved away from the resource-dependent child-bearing and early child-rearing stages of their domestic life cycle. This consequentially led a shift in their focus. They felt the concerns over the adequacies of public provisions — such as medicare, school, transport, and recreational facilities — had become less significant. Instead, the quality of family life and the schooling performance of their kids predominated their priorities. Unfortunately, the crusaders failed to deal with these as effectively as they used to do in the areas of public provisions. Secondly, as the communities gradually settled down, residents became more tolerant of some degree of inadequate public provisions. They were a bit tired of continuing their fights with the administration over minor improvements, instead, they preferred a more harmonious communal image. This was greatly different from "the community-in-crisis" images articulated by the crusaders during their early long march to power. Thirdly, similar to others in Hong Kong, most new town families also enjoyed the growing affluence of her strong economic growth. This made their reliance on public provision less significant, hence reduced the attractiveness of the crusaders' appeals. These changes demanded a new set of agenda for politicians if they still intended to remain on the scene. The case was particularly obvious in Tuen Mun.

After their fatal attack by the liberals, the conservatives were left on the sideline for a while, and eventually came to recognize the need for change. They actively considered three options: (1) to take no action and wait for the miracles to come, (2) to withdraw from the political scene totally, or (3) to reposition themselves and stage a comeback. The incum-

bent elites in Tsuen Wan, Kwai Tsing and Tuen Mun had shared the same bitter experience, but they reacted differently. Leaders in Tsuen Wan chose the first option, whereas those in Kwai Tsing and Tuen Mun adopted the second and third respectively. Their differences had a lot to do with the very nature of their respective elite structure. Tsuen Wan and Kwai Tsing had long been known for their lacking a cohesive local elite structure. There had always been a number of competing elites on the scene, but none of them was able to serve as a prominent power broker. So, after the liberal assaults, they simply disappeared from the scene. The case of Kwai Tsing was particularly miserable. There was no sign that the local elite was trying to stage a comeback. Tsuen Wan was a bit better. The ambitious Yeung family had kept a close watch on the scene and was always prepared to capture whatever opportunities that were available. Among the three, Tuen Mun offered a totally different scenario. In addition to being resource-rich, there had always been the presence of at least one or two dominant power brokers readily available on the scene. After the fatal assaults by the liberals in 1985, they regrouped and staged a comeback as early as 1986.

The Tuen Mun experience deserves further discussion here as it poses not only an interesting empirical case of positioning, but it also has critical structural implications. The crusaders' landslide victory was a total shake-up of the power base of Lau Wong Fat — the incumbent chairman of *Heung Yee Kuk* who had been considered the richest landlord in the NT and most powerful gentry in the district. Furthermore, the assault had also inflicted a symbolic fatal wound to the indigenous as a political group. Inaction or withdrawal would have to be taken not only as an irresistible downfall for Lau but also an irreversible decline of *Heung Yee Kuk* as New Territories' only powerhouse. Hence, it would be fatal politically to both Lau and *Heung Yee Kuk* to remain sedentary. Lau responded promptly by regrouping his frontmen, reviewing the casualty causes, and adopting a series of strategies to rebuild their political stock. The strategic package included the withdrawal of the aged, wounded soldiers, grooming a young cohort that had closer local connections, copying the mass mobilization tactics from the crusaders, reducing their dependence on government, forming an alliance with the manpower-rich local leftist groups, adopting electoral campaign strategies from the crusaders, and finally, working on a closer relationship with the media. The package was designed to serve several strategic purposes: (1) to dilute the crusaders' influence, (2) to build a new moderate image, and

(3) to signal their commitment to remain as the powerhouse not only in the district but also in the *Heung Yee Kuk* region.

Instead of recuperating the short-term loss, Lau was aiming at strengthening their long-term combat disposition and effectiveness. His unprecedented and decisive strategic move, while avoiding immediate direct confrontation with the crusaders, served effectively to dilute the group's conservative image, build a cohort of young frontmen, and minimize the political difference between him and the crusaders. The gentry's determination and ability to launch a new image-building strategy and an action-oriented programme contrasted distinctly with the severe factional struggle for dominance among the crusaders at the time. Their infighting further enhanced the gentry's manipulation in portraying them as "radical, factional and opportunistic." The crusaders' image was eventually bleached. Hence, the competition between the two dominant factions in Tuen Mun was redefined as one between "the radical-factional-opportunist" and "the moderately conservative local core." In total divergence, the activists in Kwai Tsing and Tsuen Wan have fared excellently since, solidly expanded their power bases through another two waves of election cycles, and finally led to their ascendancy as the most powerful political group in the NT South Legco constituency.

Meanwhile, the general picture of the urban political markets was more blurred. The retreat of the aged, volunteering political cohort provided the activists and young, politically-motivated professionals ample grounds to build, consolidate and expand; it pushed the residual conservative groups to rethink their very existence, and it precipitated the pro-China forces to assess their proper positioning in the new political era. The survival of the fittest as most calculated was more a pressing reality than an intellectual concept. This political exigency was further fuelled by the 1987 Review on the Further Constitutional Development in Hong Kong, and the ongoing consultative process in the drafting of the Basic Law. Both processes attracted the participation of many local crusaders and activists into this prolonged political debate. Their involvement finally led to the emergence of a highly identifiable liberal cohort in Hong Kong.

The liberals' consolidated advances had threatened the survival of the local conservative cohort. Though the conservatives were not exactly in a stage of total impasse, they were limited by the fragmentation of their financial strength, poor organizational resources and coordination, miserable contacts beyond the mutual aid committees, poor and less than

desirable media image, lack of clearly articulated political platforms, and the deficiency of a consensual ideological stand. To fight back, the conservatives were left with four options: (1) to bet on the emergence of one or a few conservative charismatic leaders, (2) to forge a coalition with the resource-rich pro-China forces, (3) to merge with locally-based pro-China neighbourhood organizations, or (4) to disappear from the market either voluntarily or under force through the next round of elections. The attractiveness of each of these options differed markedly. The first was the least desirable, one that few would accept untroubled. The other three would demand some degree of reduction in individual autonomy, but the resulting closer cooperation would at least help strengthening their short-term survival as a political cohort.

The liberals' advance had inevitably drawn Beijing's concerns. Other than threatening the very survival of the local conservatives, the gradual formation of a territorial liberal cohort and its consolidated penetration into the local political markets throughout Hong Kong also made many powerful players in the colonial power centre and officials at the New China News Agency (NCNA) — China's local official representative — feel uneasy. They were pushed to actively reassess their own strategic positions in the late phase of the transition. The concerns were particularly pressing as it was highly probable that direct elections to the Legco might be introduced either in 1988 or, to the latest, in 1991. Undoubtedly, their respective concerns were different. For those close to the colonial centre, they were extremely worried about their own residual existence in the new age, whereas China felt enormously nervous about the rising populism that might eventually curtail their control over Hong Kong when sovereignty was returned. The threat from a common enemy facilitated the two to form a variety of odd partnerships. Though not all in the colonial power centre were equally motivated. However, those who were keen to remain as significant players were forced to be on the move. In response to the new situation, a number of strategies emerged. They included: (1) building inroads to China's local and national inner circles through business networking and profit-sharing; (2) adopting stands on major issues that would be endorsed by China; (3) serving as advisor or honourary chairman in pro-China organizations and community groups, and/or (4) forming organizational alliances with pro-China groups. As their strategies differed, their working styles also diverged. Allen Lee and Stephen Cheong best exemplified those adopting the first strategy, whereas Maria Tam, another prominent colleague of theirs,

handled her job through networking in the local political markets and engaged in the head-on confrontations with the liberals in the electoral battlefields. Metaphorically, one strategy facilitated the future masters' networking with the local capitalist class, whereas the other helped by serving as a political penny broker in the formative political market.

The emergence of political penny stock brokerage was relatively new to Hong Kong and warranted further elaboration. It had a lot to do with the unique political reality of the pre-transitional Hong Kong. As key power players, both Britain and China lacked the much-need popular mandate to exert their authority. As a colonial government, the British administration had very limited options but depended on her performance as ground for legitimation. China, on the other hand, was not in favour either. She failed to gain the confidence of the refugee-majority here who had run away from her control. However, both Britain and China fully recognized the significance of popular support, and were equally keen on building up and maintaining a network of individuals and organizations loyal to them. Both were very successful in their own respective domains. On the whole, the British administration commanded a strong controlling influence over most of the territorial and community organizations, whereas China also maintained an unquestioned loyalty from the powerful FTU, and a cluster of pro-China business functional groups and district-based neighbourhood organizations. The implied loyalty limited the cross contacts of individuals and organizations of different political persuasions. The barriers fitted the political reality of the pre-transitional period well, and had long been taken by insiders as a political asset rather than a liability.

Meanwhile, significant changes were taking place on both sides. The British administration was first under pressure to maintain a degree of political neutrality in its handling of individual politicians and organizations after electoral politics was introduced. This put under strain the traditional working relationship and close ties between the British administration and those elites whom it had groomed for years. The public, especially those emerging political personalities and organizations which had traditionally been undermined, were extremely critical of any signs of favouritism by the administration. Hence, the government was under pressure to distance itself from the conservative elites. This was particularly so in the election years. The government-groomed elites were left for the first time to test the political water in the 1985 district board elections. Unfortunately, they ended up with a lot of fatal casualties.

Some attributed this to their premature independence from the government, while others accused the government of betrayal.

The crisis led some to think more thoroughly how they should position themselves in future. Should they still rely on the administration to direct them in time of crisis? Or should they actively search for new alliances elsewhere? Their quest for political survival undoubtedly put the administration into an extremely difficult position on the one hand, and provided grounds for the intervention of those who would be able to offer them confidence and organizational support. This exigency also offered golden opportunities for those in colonial alliance who were planning to build up an independent political base of their own. Local elites were no doubt only political penny stocks. However, if properly piled up and used, they could be turned into a valuable political capital base for any aspiring individual or organization. The prospect attracted the attention of both Maria Tam and Allen Lee, the two contenders for the top slot in the colonial power centre. Tam adopted a more aggressive step in announcing the outstanding performances of her Progressive Hong Kong Society without clearly naming those victors. Her boldness clearly revealed her uncovered intention to become a key power player in the years to come. Allen Lee, her leading rival in the colonial power centre, had not been as decisive. He shifted positions a number of times on whether to organize a party or not. Furthermore, his views on the suitability of party politics in Hong Kong also changed periodically. Unlike Tam, he failed to show a keen interest in tapping the political penny stocks.

Throughout the Sino-British negotiation, China had failed to gain the hearts and minds of the public in Hong Kong, although few would object to the propriety of the return of sovereignty. The signing of the Joint Declaration over the future of Hong Kong was undoubtedly a major diplomatic victory for China, but she was confronted with an extremely difficult task of how to gain their acceptance of her. A political glass wall had undoubtedly been installed between her and the majority of the public in Hong Kong. On one side of the glass wall, China had the unfailing support of the FTU and a cluster of networks of individuals, functional associations, and neighbourhood organizations under her umbrella. However, on the other side, there were huge numbers of individuals and organizations across different social, political and functional domains who had different degrees of dislikes of China. The signing of the Joint Declaration marked the beginning of the transition to the future

Special Administrative Region (SAR). A smooth transition inevitably requires a degree of support from the other side of the glass wall or its gradual crumbling. This exigency precipitated Beijing's interest in tapping on the resources of the traditional pro-British camps. Co-optation of those who could help bridging and serving as brokers between the two sides was high on China's agenda. China's exigency in the new era immediately turned those in the colonial power centre who had access to colonial elite hierarchy into valuable resources.

In sum, the administration's self-imposed political neutrality in electoral politics, and China's exigency to break political isolation and build support gave political brokerage and its skills a vitality in Hong Kong's evolving polity. Thus, this provided the historical background of the rise of Maria Tam as a political penny stock broker. Furthermore, the administration's tolerance of her new role also further sustained its persistence for quite sometime. In retrospect, the administration seemed to have mixed feelings about her rise as a conservative power broker. On the positive side, some government officials, especially those at the district level, privately expressed their approval of Tam's new role. She would help to take up part of the coordination work they used to do. Besides, a minority felt that Tam and her associates might be able to balance the liberals' growing influence and power. That might help to reduce part of the political pressure they were experiencing. On the less affirmative side, her ambition and rapid ascendancy as a powerful political broker might induce a sense of uneasiness among those in the colonial inner circle. They were troubled that Tam would eventually overshadow them completely. Moreover, there were also fears among some officials that Tam's loyalty might be problematic. But on balance, Tam's ascendancy as a political broker was temporarily to the advantage of the defeated conservatives, Beijing, and the administration.

The Rise of the Pro-China Forces

Electoral successes depend less on luck than on sustained efforts in elite-mass interactions. Few would object to this proposition. But the methods political groups adopted differed significantly. There were a few factors which accounted for it. They included differences in historical tradition, economic resources, and methods of organization. Let us start with the liberals first. As activists and community advocates, the liberals' ascendancy as a visible political force both locally and territori-

ally had a lot to do with their successes in issue mobilization. Media exposures through these issues had contributed to their cultivation of a mass following, and enhanced their subsequent contacts with the masses through reinforced mobilizations. On the whole, the liberals scored highly on media exposure, but low on communal networking. Some argue that network building is both a labour and capital intensive work. The liberals, especially those at the grassroots, could hardly afford it. So, their heavy reliance on issue mobilization and media exposure was strategically necessary. Besides, they turned out to be the most cost-efficient methods available to them. In contrast, the pro-China forces, also for those at the local level, normally preferred to adopt a labour intensive strategy in cultivating elite-mass relations. They were less well-versed in dealing with the media, but strong in cultivating membership, grooming and consolidating communal organizations and their networks. Other than their common commitment to socialism and nationalism, Beijing's strong backing in both financing and human resources was considered to be crucial. More specifically, their advantages in having a stable membership base and a cluster of well-established networks also enabled them to reach their constituents either directly through a variety of service provision activities or indirectly through group cells.

Unlike the liberals and the pro-China forces, most local conservatives were closely associated with the locality-based networks, mutual aid committees, and/or area committees. They were intimately linked with the administration as most of them were active participants in the British established social and political institutions. A number of favourable factors, including a relatively low voter turnout, the absence of any power advocacy groups and the inaction of the pro-China forces, had contributed to their success in the first direct elections to the district boards in 1982. However, the situation turned sharply in the mid-1980s when part of these parameters got changed. The challenge from the newly emerging advocacy groups had led to their decline. That caused the resource-rich pro-China neighbourhood groups to become cautious about the potential threats from the rising liberals. Subsequently, China also gave them a proactive signal to get involved in the early 1987. With China's blessing, the pro-China forces started taking an active role in the 1987 constitutional reform review as well as the then ongoing Basic Law consultative exercise. Both took places just months before the 1988 district board elections. To fence off the liberals, they adopted a united front strategy either by co-opting individual conservatives or groups into

their own camp, such as in Kwun Tong and to a limited extent in Tuen Mun, or by forming an alliance with them such as in Wong Tai Sin, Tai Po, and North. Moreover, China's blessings also enabled them to build a temporal alliance with some traditionally pro-British political heavyweight, such as Maria Tam, to strike a head-on battle with the liberals in the 1988 elections.

Despite their alliance, the work style of the pro-China forces differed significantly from Maria Tam's and her Progressive Hong Kong Society's. Stressing long-term gains, pro-China forces took a proactive strategic package that included: (1) to concentrate on just a few districts that they had already built a sustainable power base, (2) to pool together resources to train a few highly identifiable young members as potential candidates, (3) to avoid any head-on competition with existing conservative individuals and groups, and (4) to cultivate a pro-China, yet moderate image. Strategically, they aimed at consolidating power bases in a number of districts, such as Wong Tai Sin, Kwun Tong, Tai Po, and Tuen Mun. The pattern was very similar to what the activists and communal advocates had done in the early 1980s. Nonetheless, Tam's political style was quite different. Instead of working hard to build and consolidate powerhouses in selected districts, she worked as though she was running a one-off political penny-stocks brokerage firm that functioned only months before any elections. Her temporal empire building strategy included a number of distinct features. First, she usually visited as many administrative districts as possible just months before the nomination to identify potential candidates and work out arrangements so that they could use her name for campaign purposes (which some called "name-renting"). Secondly, she actively served as a middlewoman, if needed, to lobby other politically significant individuals to rent out their names. Thirdly, instead of building up power bases more permanently, she provided once or twice some campaigning advices to a selected few. Fourthly, she toured those voting stations where her name was being used by individual candidates on election day. Fifthly, she publicized her electoral achievements immediately after the elections, but nonetheless without divulging the specifics. And finally, she disappeared from the districts till the next round of electoral battles.

Indeed, her strategy was very calculative and cost-efficient. By merely putting in tiny efforts, she impressed the press as a powerful broker with clout extending from Hong Kong Island to the border. In the short term, it helped to inflate her political clout in the eyes of those in the

colonial power centre, yet failed to earn her any solid power base. Despite such short-lived glamours, her mode of work posed a number of difficulties for those associated with her. First, Tam's strategy had over-inflated her political capital stock but coincidentally had deprived her associates of the opportunity to build a self-sustained image and consolidate their power base. Secondly, it also exposed her clients to too much risks by over-relying on her. Given this, the pro-China forces tended to be more cautious with their dealing with her. Instead, they tried to make their reliance on her relatively peripheral. This was clearly reflected in Tam's inability to exert her influence in Tai Po, North, Wong Tai Sin, and Kwun Tong. This enabled the pro-China forces to build up their own power bases in a selected number of districts. Furthermore, it also helped to insulate the pro-China forces from any major shocks from the rise and fall of any single political charisma. Their insight proved to have been a prudent one when Tam's scandal erupted in the mid-1990s, thus shielding them from devastating effects just months before the 1991 elections.

The case built-up so far has clearly shown that, on the eve of the 1988 elections, there were signs of a turnaround in the once shattered territorial and local political markets. The activists and the liberals had succeeded in building up and consolidating their power bases in a selected number of districts. Consequently, that had created some significant barriers to entry for other groups. Nonetheless, the rise of Tam and Beijing's determination to play a more proactive role in the run-up to 1991 had steered a bit the markets away from a liberal monopoly. With this, most local political markets turned to be more structured and competitive. The scenario differed quite remarkedly from the highly unstable and evolving mode of the markets that had prevailed in 1985. The pro-China forces' entry had put the activists-advocates on the defensive. The situation was further facilitated by the changing socio-political environment. The improving public provisions in the districts had diminished the attractiveness of their localized appeals. They were forced to take a closer look at their relative competitiveness. Of course, the polarization among groups about the pace of democratization provided the liberals some competitive edges. This was further augmented by the clear-cut territorial clustering of dominant elites along ideological and political lines. The polarization made political affiliations more clear-cut, and subsequently, name-renting became more common to all competing groups. Hence, the clear differentiation of political endorsement marked fierce competitions.

To sum up, the period leading up to the 1988 district board elections was marked by the consolidation of activists/community advocates and the further decline of the conservatives in the local political markets, an intense involvement of key territorial power players in the debates over the pace and direction of Hong Kong's constitutional reform leading up to 1997 and beyond, the emergence and consolidation of a highly visible liberal political cohort, the growing anxieties of those closely associated with the colonial power over their political survival as a cohort, and also China's increasing concerns about the ascendancy and dominance of the liberals. Fear of a quasi-monopoly by the activists-advocates of the local political markets and the ascendancy of a territorial liberal cohort prompted both China and the conservatives to form a variety of unholy alliances at all levels. Their cooperation helped to ease the situation. In 1985, cohort difference and people livelihood concerns were two major parameters that marked the differences between groups. In contrast, difference over the pace and direction of constitutional change became the major dividing line. Furthermore, name-renting became a very pervasive practice. This implied the growing importance of brand identification in political marketing. Despite their efforts at repositioning, the conservatives' performances in the 1988 elections were quite mixed. In contrast, the pro-China forces succeeded both in establishing some contact points in a number of districts and steadily expanding in a few others.

Despite being more structured, the competition in the 1988 district board elections failed to curtail the liberals' further expansion. Nevertheless, the competition was instrumental in preventing the total collapse of the local conservatives, in assessing the limits of populist supports for the liberals, in institutionalizing the pro-China forces' entries into a number of district boards, and finally in diluting the once fortified barriers to entry. The low voter turnout in 1988 frustrated most key players, but the electoral results unquestionably helped to revitalize the dynamism of the political markets. This was clearly reflected in the weakening of a quasi-monopoly by the liberals, and the emergence and gradual consolidation of a multiplicity of substantive power players (or groups). Undoubtedly, the markets' turnaround made the transition to the 1991 election cycle far more exciting. Nonetheless, there existed a number of disappointing factors which made the transition to the 1991 election cycle quite uncertain. They included China's insistence on further limiting the scope and pace of constitutional change in the Basic Law, Britain's gradual retreat of her commitment to make Hong Kong relatively more autonomous

before the hand-over, the administration's decline in its governance capabilities, the escalation in the out-migration of businessmen and professionals, the growing presence and influence of the pro-China forces, and finally a deepening sense of impotence and fatigue among the public after years of over-politicization. Generally, there was a fear that potential voters might be so depressed that they might simply give up. All these contributed to the making of strategic planning for election year 1991 extremely intricate.

Emergence of a Territorial Political Market System

Election year 1991 was extremely important, politically, for the following reasons. First, it was the first election to be held in Hong Kong after the Tiananmen event. The crisis had deeply divided Hong Kong. The popularity of those candidates who were either closely associated with Beijing organizationally and politically was subjected to popular test. Secondly, Beijing had formally promulgated the controversial and unpopular Basic Law in early 1991. The liberals were dominant among those who opposed it. The 1991 election cycle would provide the liberals a ground to verify the public acceptance of their political stand. Thirdly, having succeeded in her opposition to the introduction of direct elections to the Legco in 1988, China finally compromised with Britain for its introduction in the 1991 election cycle. And finally, it was the first time a three-sequence election cycle was to be held within one single year. It would provide opportunities for individuals and groups to test their popular acceptance at all three levels of the political structure. As all the proposed directly elected seats were coming up for bids for the first time, they were of critical importance to all individual and corporate actors who wanted to carve a niche in the scene leading to and beyond 1997. As electoral competitions up to 1988 had largely been an elitist, factional, one-off, and void of platforms game, it remained totally uncertain whether such a mode of operation would work in 1991.

Quite unsure of the electoral outcomes, political groups and key power players were extremely keen on assessing the relative importance of the following strategic factors for the 1991 election cycle. First, had there been any changes in the public's perception and acceptance of the Territories' three super-powers — China, Britain, and the administration? If so, what was the relative weight one should put on siding with or struggling against either one of these parties? Secondly, after years of intense politicization, would the voters prefer the candidates who could provide them a clear-cut political platform or the ones with just a general political orientation? Thirdly, was the voting public prepared to accept party-politics or only individual elites? Fourthly, would the voters prefer candidates to take one or all three levels of the political hierarchy? And finally, how did the voters perceive the Legco election? Were they considering it as a territory-wide election or merely an extension of local elections? Each of these parameters or their assorted combinations made the preparation for the elections in 1991 completely different. Hence, competitors were forced to devise strategic packages that would best handle them.

The unending debates and waves of scandals that took place during the drafting of the Basic Law throughout the second part of the 1980s had alienated the already fatigued voting public. It was clearly reflected in the disastrously low voter turnout of 17.6% for the March 1989 municipal council elections. This further confirmed the common belief of voters' alienation from politics. Meanwhile, there were also wild rumours that groups of different political persuasions and class orientations were working hard behind the scene for the possible amalgamation into a few consolidated political parties. Yet, the general public was very much left in the dark as passive audience. Undoubtedly, politics in Hong Kong had turned increasingly towards an insider game among the elites. The trend was actually running against the tide of democratization. Public apathy could persist unless some very unexpected and shocking events suddenly took place. Such historical incidence might transform some of the political fundamentals in a society and, subsequently, lead to a major restructuring of competitive advantages among groups.

Tragedy on the Pike

The Advent of an Historical Tragedy

The turning point suddenly came in April, 1989. Upon the news of the untimely death of China's former General Secretary, Hu Yaobang, students in Beijing flooded the streets to address their grievance and de-

mand freedom and democracy. At first, people in Hong Kong were attracted by its festivity, and gradually they got involved in supporting them through participating in sequences of small and large scale demonstrations. Finally, they watched its real-time tragic ending with the Beijing authority ordering the massacre on the eve of June 4th. Shocked completely, they came to realize political passivity was not at their own advantage anymore. This traumatic experience led them to rethink their own long-term position. It prompted many to recognize the quest for freedom and democracy was not a pure intellectual issue but was a necessity if they would like their way of life to remain unchanged. Fear of authoritarianism penetrated into the hearts and minds of the apathetic majority. Meanwhile, months of common struggle drastically changed their perception of the Chinese communist authority, severely weakened their faith in China's promises as stipulated in the Joint Declaration, further deepened their sense of crisis, and unanticipatedly reinforced the liberals' popular mandate. Moreover, the Wilson administration's miscalculation of the popular reactions to China together with the conservative, pro-China businessmen's premature submission further alienated the public.

A decade long of intense politicization that had begun with the Sino-British negotiation in the early 1980s made most in Hong Kong feel tired of politics and frustrated of the unending debates over constitutional reform. The low voter turnout for the 1989 municipal council elections which had taken place just over a month before the death of Hu Yaobang was a clear indication. Most observers believed that the same might happen in the first direct elections to the Legco scheduled for September 1991. Nonetheless, the unanticipated eruption of the student movement in Beijing had changed the whole political scenario. It transformed a relatively lifeless political climate into a somewhat turbulent one. The tragedy had not only deepened a strong anti-Communist sentiment but also further polarized the community. The polarization was further sustained by a number of undercurrents. First, the anti-Communist movement became more broad-based this time. It attracted not only those who used to oppose Beijing on ideological ground but also a significant number of those who were sympathetic for patriotic reasons. Moreover, a large majority of those who were politically apathetic were also drawn into it. Secondly, the administration was under increasing pressure to maintain order and stability in Hong Kong as there were more and more widespread street demonstrations in support of students in Beijing. Any

suppression might lead to further chaos. On the other hand, further tolerance might jeopardize its future working relations with Beijing. Torn between these, the administration was seen as indecisive. The indecision drew the criticism of those who were sceptical of Britain's commitment to Hong Kong's interest when dealing with Beijing. Thirdly, a similar dilemma also existed among the pro-China forces. They were at first very moved by the students' patriotism and their struggle against bureaucratic corruption. Support for the cause started collapsing when signs emerged of severe power struggles among dominant factions in Beijing. The pro-China forces also suffered internal split. Hence, they failed to provide either moral or political leadership at this critical historical juncture. Fourthly, in contrast, liberal and labour activists captured the golden opportunity very timely by moving in to provide a leadership. They formed the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDM). Their capabilities and experiences in organizing mass demonstration proved to be an asset. Confident of their abilities, the administration tried its best to cooperate and accommodate their demands. That fitted well with the government's need to maintain social order and stability. The partnership worked extremely smoothly and also enhanced the prominence of the liberals as a viable territorial political force.

The Tiananmen incident unanticipatedly led to the emergence and gradual consolidation of a political market in Hong Kong. It had a number of features. First, the focus of group politics shifted from the local to the territory-wide level. The political clout of local groups were considered as relatively peripheral. Secondly, a few highly visible, pro-democracy figures who were closely associated with the HKASPDM were widely accepted as dominant power players. They included prominent figures like Martin Lee, Szeto Wah, Lau Chin-shek. And there were signs of some district-based activists and advocates working closely with them to assess the viability of forming one or more democratic alliances that might eventually turn into political parties. Thirdly, the pro-China forces were also actively consolidating their power bases in individual districts. They also started assessing ways of cooperating with the conservative leaders. Fourthly, a few dominant conservative figures, like Maria Tam, Allen Lee, Vincent Lo, etc., were working hard behind the scene to iron out their differences. Furthermore, they were lobbying for the financial support of the business community which was extremely nervous about the ascendancy of the liberal-democrats. They aimed at

pooling together resources to form a powerful conservative party. Fifthly, there were widespread rumours that a large amount of money from undisclosed business sources had poured in. The money would be used to sponsor not only the formation of pro-business think-tanks, but also parties that were willing to work closely with them. And finally, political groups of different persuasions were stepping up their alliances with local groups and individual politicians in preparation for the 1991 election cycle.

The shift in both the political locus and focus from the districts to the territorial stage had been quite obvious since the Tiananmen incident. In response, local elites and community groups were driven to adopt a number of corresponding strategies. First, other than fully concentrating on consolidating local networks, they became increasingly aware of the advantages of closely associating with territorial groups and key power players. There were formal and informal arrangements. Some worked out arrangements to invite prominent power brokers to serve as honourary presidents or chairmen of their closely associated groups and clubs in the districts. Moreover, there were also cases of local groups forming election alliances or negotiating possible alliances with emerging territorial organizations. Secondly, as the new election cycle was edging closer, they became increasingly conscious of the needs to be close to the public's aspiration. Hence, most of them were keen on forging a clearly identifiable and populist image. Thirdly, as future elections were less likely to be purely local events, most were aware of the necessity to map out those competitive strategies that could sustain their positions both locally and territorially. Fourthly, some key power players in the districts recognized the inalienability of the links between each of the three-tiers structure in the 1991 election cycle. Hence, that forced those local power figures in the districts to start negotiating with their potential rivals. And finally, instead of focusing just on local issues, some of them were watching out very carefully for some unexpected territory-wide events that might provide them grounds for emerging as territorial leaders.

Unquestionably, the case discussed so far showed that the Tiananmen incident was a highly divisive issue. When the event first occurred, people in Hong Kong were very unanimous about their support of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing. Unfortunately, this only lasted relatively briefly. When the *status quo* in Beijing was seen as being gradually recaptured and consolidated, the conservatives and pro-China forces in Hong Kong came under great pressure to pledge their full

support to the regime again. They had very limited options, but changed their mind overnight and pledged their support to the *status quo* in Beijing. Their shift was seen by most in Hong Kong as unprincipled. The resulting division profoundly transformed the evolving political landscape. This was clearly reflected in the unexpected rise of a highly polarized political market system, its subsequent consolidation, a closer local-territorial link, and a deeply entrenched anti-Communist sentiment among the general public.

Shifting Advantages, Involuntary Submission and Avoidance

The spillover of the Tiananmen incident had meant some long-term structural implications for Hong Kong's political development. Most obviously, there was a drastic shift in the relative positions of the key power players. The liberals had scored a substantial tally out of the event, whereas the pro-China forces were unfortunately being victimized. Through hard work, careful calculation and good strategy, the pro-China forces had gained quite a lot of momentum in their community work just months before the outburst of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing. Their favourable performance in the 1988 district board elections had modified the liberals' absolute advantage, prevented the total collapse of the conservatives and strengthened their own niches. More importantly, it had helped to institutionalize a multi-player system. The advancement of the pro-China forces had not been something accidental. It had truly reflected the results of their hard work in community building since the mid-1980s. Though closely related to Beijing, their credibility as a significant power player in Hong Kong would depend very much on whether they were able to maintain a degree of relative autonomy on those key social and economic issues that were internal to Hong Kong. Failing to do so would seriously undermine their public acceptability. Periodically, they had held views on some major public issues that were different from Beijing. That had won them some benefit of the doubt from the public. Unfortunately, they failed in the test of the Tiananmen incident completely. Under pressure from Beijing, they changed their position on the Tiananmen incident, hence infuriated the emotional public. This confirmed people's belief that, in time of crisis, they would pledge loyalty to Beijing rather than to Hong Kong. This episode pushed

the conservatives and the pro-China forces into an extremely unfavourable position. This was particularly so when compared with the liberals. In other words, the Tiananmen incident weakened the pro-China forces' hard-won assets that they had accumulated for years. Hence, they were put on the defensive. That also faced them with some formidable uncertainties when preparing for the electoral battles in 1991.

Unlike the pro-China forces or the liberals, the conservatives had always been less cohesive. They were more heterogeneous as a cohort in terms of class and status. Moreover, horizontal and vertical linkages among themselves were also weak. Some attributed that to the lack of leadership. However, the situation failed to improve despite Maria Tam, a powerful broker who was holding offices in both Executive Council (Exco) and Legco, worked extremely hard to unite them and attempted to form a conservative political caucus. Furthermore, the conservatives were unable to come up with a clearly identifiable political platform. The call for a slower pace of democratic reform seemed to be their only common concerns. So, the conservatives could more appropriately be regarded as a political category rather than a group. Analytically, they could be differentiated into two distinctly identifiable, stratified cohorts, namely, the local conservatives and the territorial conservatives.

Other than class and status, they also differed significantly in terms of societal influences, orientation and interest. The territorial conservatives comprised primarily the big businessmen and their political agents. It was extremely rare for big businessmen to lobby in public. Generally, they preferred to work behind the scene. In the pre-electoral days, they used to have excellent chances of being appointed either to the legislature or to the key policy committees. But the situations had changed quite strikingly when elected elements were introduced. Their chances had been limited. Fear of the growing influence of the liberals had pushed some of them to enlist political brokers to help cultivate and maintain links with a broad range of district-based conservative elites and organizations. Operating like an invisible hand, their interest was served through a patron-client system which was managed by a few skillful political brokers. Maria Tam was surely one of the most obvious and successful political brokers throughout the 1980s when Hong Kong started pushing for partial democratization. Despite their common concerns over the pace of constitutional development, the territorial and the local conservatives always maintained a degree of distance and insulation. Direct communications among them were rare. Their relationships

were largely managed through political brokers.

As petty politicians, local conservatives were generally less immune from populist pressure. This was particularly true for those who had planned to stand for elections in 1991. To avoid direct confrontation with the passionate public, they took special precaution in their handling of the Tiananmen incident. Their reservation in pledging open support of the *status quo* in Beijing contrasted sharply with the territorial conservatives. The local conservatives preferred the controversy to fade out gradually. This avoidance strategy was a prudent one. It kept them staying away from the boiling water. Unfortunately, they were victimized by the open confrontation approach adopted by the territorial conservatives. With nothing to lose, some dominant figures among the territorial conservatives, such as Vincent Lo, took issues openly with the pro-democracy liberals. Lo publicly pressured the government to dissolve the broadly-based pro-democracy HKASPDM. Their moves, which contrasted blatantly from the low-key, involuntary submission of the pro-China forces, infuriated the public. Unavoidably, the local conservatives were implicated by their excessive and unwelcome political moves at a highly sensitive time. Hence, local conservatives were reluctantly being pushed to share an extremely unpopular image with them.

For fear of the extra complications for their work in canvassing votes for the 1991 elections, most local conservatives decided a number of avoidance strategies. First, they refrained from any active, public involvements with key territorial conservative figures. Secondly, they maintained a low-key participation in those ceremonies that commemorated the deaths of June 4th. Thirdly, they distanced themselves from participating in China's National Day celebration activities. Fourthly, they abstained from any unnecessary confrontations with the ascending pro-democracy liberals. And finally, they focused on local networking activities which they had been particularly skilled at. Taking as a whole, the package aimed largely at not being overtaken by the June 4th-induced political turbulence that they could have very little control of. "No action is better than any action" was the underlying assumption of this low-key, avoidance strategy. "To be ignored is better than being buried untimely" was considered a preferable survival strategy. When the stormy weather had finally passed, they could reposition themselves without being stigmatized. Hence, the local conservatives were better off than the pro-China forces who could only submit involuntarily.

Undoubtedly, the Tiananmen incident had created an excessively

unfavourable political climate for both the pro-China forces and the local conservatives. The electoral results in 1988 showed that despite their gains in the number of seats, the popularity of the urban activists and the new town advocates had dropped dramatically. This provided grounds for local conservatives an excellent chance to recuperate. However, the outburst of the controversial Tiananmen incident forced the scenario to change. They were left in extreme uncertainty. Adopting a low-key avoidance strategy could hardly be a lasting one. Likewise, it would be equally difficult for them to cultivate a new niche. The fate of the pro-China forces was even more deplorable. The incident had written off much of their hard-won electoral achievements of 1988. Their ascendancy as a significant political force in the years leading to and beyond 1997 was being put into doubt. In addition, the incident had also led to their internal split. The composition of the pro-China forces had always been quite complicated. Some of them were attracted by Beijing's commitment to socialist construction, whereas others were drawn by national pride. This was particularly so among the working class in Hong Kong. The pro-democracy movement in Beijing was widely regarded by them as a nationalistic movement. Their commitment on the issue seemed very firm. This was clearly reflected in the streams of mass protests and donation campaigns organized by the pro-China organizations and leaders at the time. Any negation of the movement could easily prompt passionate responses from them. Thus, core leaders of the pro-China forces had been extremely cautious in their unqualified pledge of support of the *status quo* in Beijing. They feared that doing so would alienate their grassroots supporters.

Furthermore, the sorrowful incident put the unity of the pro-China forces to test. It robbed them of a hard-won niche and deprived them of an opportunity to further consolidate their gains in the formative political structure. They were aware that populist support would further diminish if they took a stand too close to those in power. To avoid the repercussion, they chose to adopt a low-key, involuntary submission strategy. It included a number of significant features. First, they refrained from sending any official delegations to Beijing to pledge their supports. Secondly, they tried hard to distance themselves from the local NCNA. Thirdly, they scaled down the scope and publicity of the year's National Day celebration. Fourthly, they insisted on regarding the pro-democracy movement as a nationalistic one. Fifthly, they avoided making any direct confrontation with the pro-democracy HKASPDM. And finally, instead

of stepping up political work, they tried their best to focus on those issues that affected the welfare and livelihood of the working class. The strategy enabled them to avoid being further stigmatized by the Tiananmen incident and to search for a new position.

The incident had undoubtedly crippled their ascendancy on Hong Kong's political front stage, forcing them to shy away from the limelight, scaling down their coalition-building efforts, halting their image-building momentum, and driving them to retreat into the districts. Years of hard work in institution-building were washed away. This left them with very restricted capabilities to prepare for an aggressive lead in the 1991 election cycle. People seemed very committed on the eve of the first anniversary of Tiananmen. This was reflected in having a quarter of a million people still showing up at the mass rally organized by the HKASPDM commemorating the first anniversary of the incident. The timing was very unfavourable to the pro-China forces as the new election cycle for 1991 would commence in six months' time. There were a number of setbacks for them. First, unlike that in 1988, conservative candidates were reluctant to seek endorsement from those territorial level pro-China leaders. Secondly, they avoided alliances with pro-China neighbourhood organizations or trade associations in the districts. Thirdly, the pro-China neighbourhood organizations and their sponsored candidates were unable to clearly articulate a patriotic, grassroots image which used to be in their favour in mass mobilization. Given these constraints, they became totally passive and failed to map out a reasonably offensive strategic package for the 1991 election cycle.

Their setbacks were further complicated by the Maria Tam scandal in the mid-1990. Tam was considered a skillful and influential political broker. Other than maintaining extensive links with most local conservatives in the administrative districts, she had also enjoyed close associations with both the *status quo* in the local NCNA and Beijing, as well as with the colonial administration in Hong Kong. Furthermore, she seemed to be well connected with some of the emerging super-rich whose businesses were closely tied with China. Given these, she was expected to play a strategically significant role for both the local conservatives and the pro-China forces in the 1991 election cycle. The situation changed dramatically after the eruption of her scandal. She was accused by the press of having a serious conflict of interest as the incumbent Chairman of the Transport Advisory Committee that was responsible for formulating policies regarding public transport. She was found operating a fleet

of taxis and holding an interest in a parent-company of CityBus — a non-franchised bus company that had lobbied extremely hard for a franchise to operate the bus service. The explosive controversy lasted for more than a month. It was the first time that a major policy advisory committee and its chairman was subject to such criticism. In response to the accusation, she acted very unprofessionally by censoring a news reporter of TVB through its managing director and accusing her political rivals of setting her up. Immediately, she was severely attacked by her enemies both within and outside the colonial power centre. The administration was extremely embarrassed and was forced to take the initiative and review the adequacies of rules and regulations monitoring conflict of interests in public bodies.

Subsequently, her reputation suffered a drastic plunge. Despite widespread call for her resignation as the chairman of the Transport Advisory Committee, the administration resisted to take any immediate action. Not surprisingly, she was removed when her tenure expired in April 1991. She was also denied re-appointments to both the Legco and the Exco when the new session of the Legco was convened in September 1992. The scandal and the subsequent events had not only frustrated her ambition to become "the most well-connected and powerful broker" but also her role in the formation of the Liberal Democratic Federation (LDF), a territorial conservative party. With the new election cycle scheduled to be open at the beginning of 1991, as a keen contender, the LDF was supposed to be officially declared established in mid-1990s. As she was well connected with a lot of local organizations and district board members, Tam was taking charge of the membership recruitment drive. Weeks before the outburst of the scandal, she had stepped up the drive and had been quite confident in meeting the LDF's timetable. The recruitment exercise came to a total halt at this most critical moment when Tam got trapped into the controversy. She was in the press nearly everyday trying to calm down the public fury. Failing to do so, she simply took a leave of absence from her work and went to Canada to visit her family.

With her absence, the controversy gradually cooled down over the summer. Nonetheless, it left a number of significant implications for the evolving polity. First, her status as a resourceful political broker was called into doubt. Many within the conservative camps were worried of being contaminated by her stain and kept a distance from her. The drastic drop in the number of candidates using her sponsorship in the 1991

district board elections was a clear sign of it. Secondly, LDF's ambition of becoming "the conservative party" in Hong Kong was voided. Even at its formative stage, core organizers of the LDF had worked extremely hard in various districts, such as Eastern, Southern, Wong Tai Sin, Kowloon City, Yau Tsim, Tai Po, North, Tuen Mun, Kwai Tsing, to recruit incumbent district board members and potential candidates for the 1991 elections as their founding members. Other than members of the conservative Progressive Hong Kong Society, those being contacted also included a large number of pro-China local leaders. They were promised that the party would back them up financially if they were standing on behalf of the party. Tam's scandal and LDF's refusal to disclose their sources of finance made the recruitment extremely difficult. Many refused to join. As a compromise, candidates for the March 1991 district board elections would be allowed to stand as independent and at the same time receive the financial backing of the LDF. LDF's accommodation attracted criticism both from the media and the academic community. Those receiving the financial support were criticized as "invisible LDF members." Hence, the LDF failed to position itself as a decent contending party for the 1991 elections.

Thirdly, Tam's scandal also alienated the pro-China leaders and neighbourhood organizations. Their candidates were advised to refrain from standing under the umbrella of the LDF. Instead, they were encouraged to stand as independent. In those areas where they had already developed a mass following, the pro-China candidates were strongly recommended to stand under the banner of the pro-China organizations. The pro-China forces' stand differed significantly from their initial plan for closer cooperation with the conservatives. Fourthly, Tam's major conservative rivals in the colonial centre, such as Allen Lee, Stephen Cheong, etc., profited substantially from her temporal incapacity to stage a big show. Her political handicap greatly reduced the pressure on her rivals to step up organizing. Instead of capitalizing on the new opportunities to build a popular base, they expected the Wilson administration to re-appoint them when the new legislative session was to convene. In retrospect, this was a miscalculation. Their complacency eased the barriers of entry for the liberal-democrats. In sum, Tam's scandal had thrown the conservatives into complete uncertainty, deprived the pro-China forces of a potentially resourceful broker, and comforted her rivals in the colonial centre to remain unchanged. They all contributed to the liberals' struggle for entry to the colonial power centre when the door

was open in September 1991 through the introduction of direct elections to the legislature.

Securing and Sustaining Competitive Advantage

Public interest in politics had dropped rather consistently since 1988. This was reflected in the disastrously low voter turnout rates for the 1988 and 1989 elections. Public interest in electoral politics had begun to gain momentum after the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Many considered active involvement in electoral politics as a way to ensure Hong Kong's relatively autonomy. At first, mass enthusiasm had given the liberal-democrats a relative edge over both the pro-China forces and the local conservatives. However, with the decline of their interest in electoral politics, the liberal-democrats' competitive edge had also dropped correspondingly. The situation became more obvious when there were signs that the pro-China forces had gradually succeeded in expanding and consolidating their alliances with the local conservatives. The liberals' ability to hold firm to their edge was put into doubt. A pro-democracy platform was surely insufficient as their rivals had also prepared to take a more populist approach. The liberals' performances in both the 1988 district board elections and the 1989 municipal council elections had clearly proved their declining edge. Nonetheless, the liberals seemed quite unmoved by their poor show. Instead, they blamed the government's refusal to introduce direct elections in 1988 as a major frustrating factor. Fortunately, the outburst of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing offered the liberals an opportunity to redeem their uncertain future.

For most in Hong Kong, the upheaval in Beijing had come as a total surprise. The liberals were at first caught unprepared. The incident had drawn enormous public interests. People in Hong Kong were eventually overtaken by the episodes in Beijing as they were screened minute by minute by the local television stations. With Beijing in total chaos, Hong Kong was completely overwhelmed too. As people got more excited they spontaneously went out to the street to stage demonstrations. Likewise, the administration was also overwhelmed by events but failed to provide direction. Hong Kong was momentarily in great flux. The local NCNA was caught in absolute confusion as there were signs of severe power struggles taking place in Beijing. They failed to clarify the conflicting signals from Beijing. Hence, the local pro-China forces were left to

handle the business in accordance with their own interpretations of the reality. Meanwhile, fearing possible repercussions, the administration also took a cautious and tolerant attitude towards the amorphous masses. A somewhat orderly but anarchical mass movement gradually surfaced in Hong Kong. From late April, streams of spontaneous demonstrations and donation campaigns in support of the students and citizens in Beijing flooded the streets nearly day and night. Participants also included many from both the pro-China and the Hong Kong-based China organizations and enterprises. The situation was so fluid that anything disastrous could have happened. It warranted the rise of charisma or charismatic organization. The vacuum finally led to the formation of a pro-democracy HKASPDM under the leadership of two heavy-weight liberals, Szeto Wah and Martin Lee. Both used to be Basic Law drafters but had been sacked due to their disagreement with China over the direction and pace of democratization.

Once formed, the HKASPDM was amazingly broad-based. It included not only political activist groups, offices of district board members, religious organizations, spontaneously emerging groups of different political persuasions and class orientations in responses to the pro-democracy movement in Beijing, but also some significant pro-China local and territorial groups. The HKASPDM served practically as a united front organization in support of the pro-democracy students in Beijing. It was actually the first time ever that people and groups from rival camps worked together for a common concern. Meanwhile, the formation of the HKASPDM did not draw any explicit objections either from the local NCNA, the administration, dominant factions in the colonial power centre, or the pro-China big businessmen. Indeed, there was evidence that the administration at one point even considered the formation of the HKASPDM as a necessary evil as it would provide the much-needed leadership for the masses. Unlike the amorphous masses and the spontaneously emerging groups, the core at the HKASPDM consisted mostly of those prominent liberal activists who had been extremely experienced at organizing mass campaigns. The administration, in particular the police, felt more at ease in dealing with them. Other than experience and leadership, the administration was also fully aware that the core leaders of the HKASPDM commanded sufficient respect from the masses. Their capabilities and leadership in handling sequences of massive rallies — which involved participants ranging from several hundred thousand to over a million and a half — and maintaining law and order in May and June

1989 earned them the respect from both the administration and the global media community. That helped to convince the police that the HKASPDM could function more effectively in restraining the emotional crowd than their direct involvement.

A subtle division of labour gradually evolved. The HKASPDM was held responsible for disciplining the participants, whereas the police helped to facilitate the general law-and-order in the gathering places and during the processions. This arrangement served the purposes of both the HKASPDM and the police well. Despite China's growing impatience with the HKASPDM and its activities, the administration continued its cautious tolerance. The close working relation between the police and the HKASPDM, the subtle tolerance of the administration, the good will and behaviour of the masses, and the HKASPDM's capability and excellent tract record won the warm support and praise of the media. That in turned enhanced the political clout of both the HKASPDM and its core leaders.

Pro-democracy movement had a long history in Hong Kong. It could be dated back to the early 1980s when China and Britain first initiated their negotiation over the future of Hong Kong. It gained further momentum after the Sino-British negotiation. However, the core of the movement was confined mainly to the young, educated, upper-middle class. Media mobilization was their main strategy. They filed their views to the columns of those upper-middle class newspapers such as *Ming Pao*, the *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, and at times to the pro-China *Wen Wei Po*. The public had always been left in the cold watching quietly their debates with China, the administration, or among themselves. Basically, it worked more like an intellectual forum than a mass movement. Their views on liberty and democracy had been too abstract for the general public to digest. As a movement, it had experienced many ups and downs. The expansion of the electoral infrastructure in Hong Kong since the early 1980s had provided these middle class intellectuals ample chances to practice their hard-learnt ideal of liberty and democracy. Some among the core had considered getting involved in local politics to be too time-consuming and inefficient. They had periodically complained of the administration's reluctance to provide sufficient powers of the local-level advisory committees as reasons for their passivity. Beyond that, they had seldom showed any keen interest in the labour intensive and time consuming work of political network building.

In sharp contrast, the Tiananmen incident made many from different political persuasions and class structure in Hong Kong to recognize the

importance of liberty and democracy and got themselves involved. The bloody massacre in the late hours of June 3rd till June 4th was vividly and instantaneously witnessed by the once-politically apathetic folks on their big screens at home. It prompted many to query the nature of authoritarianism. The symbolic wound also ran very deep. It led many to change into a fervent pro-democracy horde. They flooded the streets in small groups and big crowds to demonstrate their support for the Beijing's pro-democracy movement and donated generously to the movement. In a way, some Durkheimians might consider people in Hong Kong were fanatically celebrating their own projected crucification. But for others, they were acting out of simple commotion. Nevertheless, the interpretations did not matter much. Clearly, the event struck deeply into the hearts and minds of the people. A critical mass was born out of this historical accident. This symbolic wound was embedded into people's political consciousness and could easily be invoked if situations warranted. Its existence was to the advantage of the liberal democrats and to the disadvantage of the pro-China forces.

Party Born Out of Common Struggles

The Tiananmen incident and the mass support of the patriotic students in Beijing contributed enormously to the revitalization of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. The emotional outburst of the masses gradually subsided, but the protracted progression of the movement exerted a number of decisive, irrevocable, structural impacts on Hong Kong's unfolding territorial political market system. They included a number of features. First, a highly critical, and broad-based pro-democracy mass emerged out of the protracted struggles with Beijing. Secondly, the incident fermented a participant culture. People became more conscious of their rights as citizens and required the government to be more open. Thirdly, the movement gave additional credentials to a small number of liberal democrats who subsequently emerged as the core of a new political party — the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK). The core comprised not only those prominent liberal figures, more importantly, also a significant number of elected district board members and municipal councillors with liberal outlook. Unlike the territorial liberals, the local core was very experienced in community organizing, and electoral campaigns. Tuen Mun's Ng Ming Yum, Sha Tin's Lau

Kong Wah and Wong Hong Chung, and Eastern's Man Sai Cheong were the most typical examples. When the UDHK was formed, its members brought with them their own local networks and power bases. That provided the UDHK a competitive edge over other groups.

Fourthly, sequences of mass demonstrations involved a large amount of labour intensive work and through that an intense interaction between the key organizers and their followers. It further strengthened their bondage and facilitated the evolution of their organizational infrastructure. Not surprisingly, many of these active pro-democracy participants got involved in the September 1991 Legco electoral campaigns for the UDHK candidates. Fifthly, Hong Kong's passionate and sustained involvement in support of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing attracted the attention of the international community. They came to recognize the political dilemmas Hong Kong was confronting in her transition to the future SAR. This succeeded in elevating Hong Kong's quest for further democratization to a global concern. And finally, the Tiananmen incident severely shook Hong Kong's confidence in China's promise to allow a high degree of autonomy under Chinese rule. Britain was pushed to renegotiate with China to quicken the pace of democratization. The crisis ultimately forced both China and Britain to agree on increasing the number of directly elected seats from 10 to 18 for the 1991 Legco elections. The move notably expanded the political opportunities for the liberal democrats.

In Hong Kong, the pro-democracy liberals had been working extremely hard for nearly a decade trying to bring forth the fundamentals outlined above, but had failed to do so. They had made lots of attempts to lead a broad-based pro-democracy movement, but they never succeeded to go beyond their own small, intellectual, upper-middle class circles. Being frustrated by poor results, they blamed mass apathy for their failure. Interestingly enough, events leading to and beyond June 4th in Hong Kong told otherwise. From the very start, it was a spontaneous mass movement. People from different walks of life and persuasions suddenly came out, and united around a non-tautological issue. They expressed their feelings in very simple languages and through patriotic songs, at times acted on impulse, and looked for whoever could lead them. Instead of listening to the elites' usual, verbose speeches and elaborations, they demanded immediate action — to get them organized, to let them express their deep-seated frustration in an orderly and decent manner, and to coordinate efforts in getting the needed supports for

students and citizens in Beijing. The exigency left the pro-democracy liberal elites with no time to conceptualize, but to react shiftily to their needs. Indeed, they also were being overwhelmed by events.

Steadily, an intimate elite-mass bondage unfolded out of their common struggles. In the process, the pro-democracy elites needed to tackle an extremely fluid, at times compulsive but deeply-committed crowd. Their reactions to the historical episodes and the organized activities tended to be very passionate, immediate and straightforward. These were reflected not only in the midst of activities but through the phone-in radio programmes and newspaper columns. The applause, frustration, and shifts of the critical masses prompted the organizers to define and redefine their strategies abruptly. The task was far more demanding than handling debates on television or elaborating views in the lecture halls which they were extremely good at. As the movement evolved further, the mass-elite relations became more interactive. It helped to consolidate the leadership of a highly visible territory-wide pro-democracy elite and brought forth a commonality to their struggles. Hence, the evolving events and the common struggles laid a solid ground for the subsequent formation of a territorial pro-democracy party in early 1990. Instead of being a conspiratorial, politically calculated move by the frustrated pro-democracy liberals, the movement was born out of an historical accident. It provided them ample opportunities for a turnaround. They were forced to react, to lead and to provide the unsettled masses a vision. Their success gave rise to a new political panorama that eventually became extremely favourable to them just months before the kick-off of the 1991 new election cycle.

On the eve of the outburst of the June 4th event, the political markets both at the territorial and local levels were moving towards a new equilibrium. The pro-China forces and the local conservatives seemed to come very close to a deal in forming a strategic alliance whereas the pro-democracy liberals' influence and political clout dropped slightly. It was very favourable to the emergence of a relatively competitive political market system where entries were not too difficult to break. Nonetheless, the sorrowful event turned this hard-won equilibrium upside down. The new scenario was in strong favour of the pro-democracy liberals. In sharp contrast, the pro-China alliances were left with very limited choices in positioning as the 1991 new election cycle was approaching. The first anniversary of the June 4th event was a critical test point for the pro-democracy liberals. The HKASPDM organized a series of commem-

orating activities on both June 3rd and June 4th, projecting only a moderate turnout of no more than tens of thousands of people. They got a total surprise by having close to a quarter of a million participants turning out for the June 3rd demonstration, and slightly over 100,000 people attending the candle-light rally on June 4th. Both commemorative activities clearly indicated that the pro-democracy movement still enjoyed widespread, sustainable mass supports. Thus, this implied their acceptance by the public. Nevertheless, they were facing a dilemma of whether to capitalize or not on the public mood when preparing for the 1991 elections. A miscalculation could easily transform them instantly into a bundle of political opportunists — an image they had worked hard to avoid.

At that time, they were facing three options, and each would impose different political implications for them. These included (1) positive avoidance, (2) minimum exploitation, and (3) total manipulation. Under the positive avoidance option, candidates would refrain from articulating the public sentiments on the Tiananmen incident, hinting their active role in the movement, and asserting a link between the incident and the supports of the pro-democracy liberals. In the case of minimum exploitation, they would only casually highlight their role in the pro-democracy movement. But in sharp contrast, under the total exploitation scenario, candidates would fully capitalize on the public sentiments on the Tiananmen incident, inflate their role in the movement, and forge a belief that electing the liberals would be the only way to protect democracy.

There were different implications for each of these options. Total exploitation was the worst among the three as it would provoke the pro-China forces' immediate rebuttal that the pro-democracy movement was the liberals' politically calculated move. It would create an image that they were merely political opportunists who tried to exploit a nationalist cause. Were the pro-China forces to take a concerted strategy, the liberals would commit a politically suicidal mistake. Neither was positive avoidance a recommendable one. It would be suspected by the public as a politically calculated move. Further, it would reinforce the pro-China alliances' newly-created agenda — concerns for the people's welfare and livelihood. Since the Tiananmen incident, the pro-China alliances had worked exceedingly hard to keep a low profile in confronting the liberal democrats, yet had pushed with full strength to rebuild their communal networks. Impasse would not be a good option either. The core of the liberals finally decided that a minimal exploitation of the

Tiananmen incident might be a better choice. The strategy would enable the liberals to revitalize their bonds with the pro-democracy masses, yet renew their commitment to fight for liberty and democracy in Hong Kong.

The choice of a proper strategy was extremely difficult since there were tens of relatively independent, district-based, and competing local liberal groups and individuals. This had happened in 1985 and 1988. The situation changed dramatically in the early 1990 when the UDHK was formed and its leadership accepted. From the very beginning, the UDHK insisted on being a political party, and openly admitted aiming at a seizable niche in the reconstituted legislature in 1991 through direct elections as its primary objective in the short run. This contrasted sharply with the indecisiveness of both the conservatives and the pro-China forces whether party politics was a proper mode of political operation in Hong Kong. LDF's insistence of itself being a political organization rather than a party was an excellent example. Nonetheless, as a party, the UDHK was in a better position to set a more standardized electoral package. Furthermore, the political atmosphere in the post-Tiananmen Hong Kong was very favourable to the UDHK as they could enjoy all its spillover without having to articulate it too explicitly. After very careful assessment, UDHK's core leaders decided that it would not be advisable to either fully exploit or totally avoid the Tiananmen incident. Instead, they preferred a territorial platform that focused equally on the party's dominant concerns over people's livelihood and their continued struggle for democracy in Hong Kong. The Tiananmen incident and their involvement in it were only casually highlighted. As a strategy, they included their achievement in the pro-democracy movement as only one among their list of past performances. Instead, party-building and "the coming age of party politics" formed the major theme of their electoral strategy. UDHK's proactive strategy saved them from being put on the defensive. More importantly, the party could position itself more prominently as the *avant-garde* in the age of party politics. In turn, this facilitated the UDHK to adopt a focused strategy to package the party and its candidates. Moreover, the party also enjoyed the benefits of having a few highly visible, widely accepted, charismatic, pro-democracy movement leaders, such as Szeto Wah, Martin Lee, Yeung Sum, etc. as its founding core members. Their leadership strengthened the party's efforts in image-building and also later in its electoral mobilizations for the party's candidates.

The Return to Monopoly: Tragedy of a Historical Accident

The case built so far indicated that the outburst of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing and its tragic end on June 4th not only stunned the world but also changed the evolving political equilibrium in Hong Kong. This sorrowful event nearly wiped out all the pro-China forces' hard-won political ascendancy over the years, fatally shocked the recuperating local conservatives, prematurely deformed the foetus of a territorial conservative party, unexpectedly created a pro-democracy, committed, critical mass, forcefully fermented the rise of pro-democracy charisma, rigorously revitalized the declining pro-democracy liberal caucus, and finally led to the timely formation of the UDHK — a territorial pro-democracy liberal party. The newly evolving territorial political market system was then turned upside down. It subsequently led to a new round of repositioning struggles among groups. Those groups that had close relationship with the Beijing authority and the local NCNA were deeply implicated, whereas those retaining some distance from or having animosity with them turned out to be the real beneficiaries. Struggling for survival led groups to work hard and map out different coping strategies for themselves under the new political landscape. Trapped by this historical tragedy, the pro-China forces and local conservatives were both victimized, but instead of being totally buried by the event, the former resorted to submitting involuntarily to Beijing while keeping its grassroots political works ongoing, whereas the latter preferred a temporary, total withdrawal. Both strategies were aimed at keeping a distance from being further implicated by the Beijing massacre. However, the two were not exactly the same. In comparison, the involuntary submission strategy was a proactive one. The pro-China forces deliberately used that to signal their disagreement with Beijing, to distance themselves from the NCNA official line, and to refocus on the pressing concerns of people's livelihood. No doubt, they had got burnt but they struggled hard to recuperate. Instead, the conservatives got shocked, ran and hoped that things would eventually return to normal. The difference reflected their respective commitment to remaining in the political battlefield. The pro-China forces were keen on remaining as a significant power player despite their short-term setbacks, whereas the conservatives were more opportunistic.

In a highly distorted, unbalanced market system, the pro-democracy

liberals showed their political maturity by avoiding to exploit the June 4th event to their absolute advantage. Instead, capturing on their favourable competitive edge in the post-June 4th era, they worked on and succeeded in setting a focused agenda for the Election Year 1991 as the coming age of party politics. Subsequently, they presented themselves as the *avant-garde* of the new age. This positioned them better than exploiting their combatting comradeship with both the public and the people in Beijing against an authoritarian government. Of course, as an historical accident, the impacts of June 4th went far beyond the ability of the pro-China forces of winning the hearts and minds of the resentful public. Their victimization was clearly reflected in their heavy casualties, the near total wipe-out of the conservatives and the landslide victories of the pro-democracy liberals in both the March 1991 district board elections and the first direct elections to the Legco in September 1991. In sum, we evidenced the persuasive power of a single historical accident in transforming the equilibrium of an evolving market system and the inabilities of those being victimized to get a short-term rebound. The market system has once again been turned into a quasi-monopoly of the liberals.

The development of electoral politics of Hong Kong over the last ten years provided us an excellent case for the study of the evolution of local political markets and territorial market system. It went through stages of growth — from unstructured, evolving, structuring, and hopefully institutionalizing. At each stage, we observed political entrepreneurs rushing to the scene. Some got burnt, and others survived happily and productively. But no one was sure to be always in the driver's seat. Competition was keen. There were pressing needs on the part of key power players to adjust, readjust, position, and reposition themselves in light of the new situations. This made the competitive situations extremely fluid. The market was always shifting. Those commanding competitive advantages at one point needed to secure and sustain them rather than sitting there idling. Ten years of electoral experience are relatively short, but they provided some hints on how the competitive markets work.

Over the years, the competitive political forces in Hong Kong and the overall political environment forced and accelerated the local political markets to mature and the territorial market to evolve. We observed a healthy path of development up to June 4th, 1989. The local political markets ran through the unstructured, evolving, and structuring stages in a relatively short span of time. They reflected the very entrepreneurship people in Hong Kong have been good at: transferring from the economic

market to the political market. Throughout much of the 1980s, as the markets evolved, it succeeded in avoiding a move towards a monopoly. The emergence and consolidated expansion of the pro-China forces further enabled the evolving territorial political market to move towards a more healthy equilibrium. It came to a tragic halt as a result of a historical accident — the June 4th event. The miserable incident was beyond Hong Kong's control and unfortunately wiped out the hard-won ascendancy of the pro-China forces, halted the local conservatives' recuperation, killed the foetus of a conservative territorial party, and shifted uni-dimensionally in favour of the pro-democracy liberals. Instead of institutionalizing the territorial market system and its rules of the game, this historical accident totally transformed the evolving political landscape, and moved the system once again into a quasi-monopoly of the pro-democracy liberals. It clearly showed the vulnerability of an evolving political market system. The path of market evolution is not as certain as expected.

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Note

In consultation with the editors, the author has decided to exclude hundreds of footnotes that extend for more than some 20 pages. However, they will be included in a book on the topic the author is preparing.

10

Campaigning Themes of the Candidates in the 1991 Legislative Council Election

Jane C. Y. Lee

Introduction

The 1991 direct elections in Hong Kong have often been regarded as being a milestone towards a more open and accountable government in the transition to 1997, and as having important implications for the territory's future local autonomy under China's sovereignty. The landslide victory of the "democrats" seems to indicate that the electorate is overwhelmingly in favour of a more responsive government and more autonomy from mainland China. This paper primarily intends to discuss what choices have been made available to the voters, and what alternatives have been offered by the candidates during the electoral campaigns.

During a period of four to six weeks of campaigning (1 August–15 September), voters were bombarded by numerous messages about the candidates from newspapers, television, radio and many other sources. In order to distinguish himself/herself from other competitors, most candidates highlighted a few important messages which they believed to be the

most persuasive to the voters. Whether or not the candidate emphasized his/her personal character (like leadership, articulateness, intelligence), or particular issue(s) which he/she stood for, or a combination of both, these messages consistently reflected a dominant theme (Beaudry and Schaeffer, 1986). A good and effective theme was therefore most likely to stand out from among the competitive information and enabled the voters to differentiate the characteristics of one candidate from another. For example, the campaigning theme of the British Labour Party in the two recent general elections in 1987 and 1992 was to emphasize the "caring issues" and the need for "a change," which contrasted with the emphasis of the Conservative Party on "effective management of the economy" and "continuity" (Crewe and Harrop, 1989). By competing with each other with different themes, the candidates were actually providing alternative choices to the voters.

In Hong Kong, direct elections to the Legislative Council are carried out in a political context very different from the general elections in other democratic societies. The Basic Law has provided for the maintenance of an executive-dominated political system after 1997 in which the Legislative Council remains as a law-passing organization with more effective monitoring and representative functions than that of the pre-1985 period. In other words, Hong Kong's legislative representatives are not elected to take over political power and to govern the society, they mainly serve to monitor the non-elected executive government under the leadership of an appointed Governor, at least before 1997. Consequently, Hong Kong's electoral contests are not providing alternatives for Hong Kong's future government. Instead, they merely become forums for candidates to articulate the major concerns of the voters.

Based upon these assumptions, the research aimed at understanding how candidates presented themselves to the voters and how they distinguished themselves from each other during the electoral campaigns of the 1991 direct elections. The research was mainly conducted during the period between July–October 1991. Indepth interviews both before and after the elections were arranged with the fifty-four candidates and/or campaign managers[1] to discuss their campaign themes, which were then complemented by contents analysis of the campaign materials such as platforms, pamphlets, posters, banners and field observation of the candidates' activity, whenever possible.

Findings

The themes of most candidates exhibited a lot of common characteristics, partly because of the similarity in political background among some of them, but basically because of the adoption of similar techniques and approaches to the electoral campaigns.

A major theme — democracy — predominated the electoral campaign. Among the fifty-four candidates, forty-seven of them either described themselves as "democrats" or claimed to be committed to "democracy." (For a summary of the campaign themes of individual candidates, see Appendix 1.) Yet candidates did not differentiate each other in ideological terms. Although most candidates claimed to be committed to maintaining a free economic society in Hong Kong, there was no major campaign for "capitalism," "socialism" or "communism." A few candidates identified themselves with Trotskyist People's Revolution or Sun Yat Sen's Three People's Principles but received minimal public attention. Although three candidates of the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood in the Kowloon West and the New Territories North constituencies advocated a more equitable distribution of resources in society, their message was mainly expressed in terms of the candidates' personal appeal to concern for the welfare of the lower income people. Without the possibility of forming an alternative government, candidates in fact could not differentiate each other according to certain programmes or platforms being offered to the voters. Candidates understood that, even if he/she got elected, the platforms merely reflected his/her broad orientations towards certain values rather than any concrete programmes for future government.

When being asked how they managed to distinguish themselves from the other candidates, many of them admitted that they had in fact very limited options in presenting themselves to the voters. Democracy became expressed in terms of the candidates' proof of their commitment to articulate the interests of the people in Hong Kong. Two fundamental messages were commonly emphasized by the candidates, namely (1) to safeguard the wishes of Hong Kong people concerning the territory's return to China's sovereignty, and (2) to improve people's livelihood. Nevertheless, Sino-Hong Kong relations was not introduced as an issue by individual candidates themselves as shown in the major campaign materials like pamphlets, banners or leaflets, except when it was raised

by opponents in the forums. Most of the candidates rather chose to focus themselves on attacking policy issues directly affecting people's livelihood and immediate welfare. For example, thirty-four candidates highlighted their concerns for "people's livelihood" and twenty-three candidates claimed to be representing the interests of the grassroots or to come from a lower-class background. By demonstrating their commitment to improve general welfare, these candidates used a set of common expressions, such as "to fight for" (爭取), "to guarantee"(保障), "to protect" (保護) and "to take care of" (照顧) the interests of the grassroots; or "to urge" (促使), "to monitor" (監管), "to supervise" (監察), or "to oppose" (反對) government on some specific social legislations and policies, such as the importation of labour and price increase.

The common method of attacking the policy issues of the government ended up neutralizing the differences among the candidates. Consequently, voters were merely receiving similar messages which suggested to them the choice of an articulate and eloquent opposition into the Legislative Council. The competition turned out to be focusing on differentiating the "genuine democrats" from the "non-genuine democrats." The question became: who would consistently and genuinely speak up for the wishes of people in Hong Kong. During this process, candidates began to focus on differentiating the leadership styles of each other, based on (1) political affiliation, and (2) personal background and track record in articulating the interests of the Hong Kong people against the government. The approach to handling the Chinese authorities also inevitably became the focal point on which the styles of individual candidates were differentiated.

During the indepth interviews, candidates were being asked to describe and explain their own leadership style either as radical, moderate, conservative, confrontational/non-confrontational, or pragmatic, etc., which could or could not be found in the campaign materials. (For detailed description of the style differentiation by individual candidates, see Appendix 2.) Except for a few cases where the candidates were not accessible and whose styles were not being identifiable, none of the candidates chose to describe themselves as "radical" or "conservative." Instead, twelve candidates described their own styles as "moderate," and these included members of the Liberal Democratic Federation and a few other independents. All of the other thirty-four candidates preferred to describe themselves as articulate or outspoken. Among the thirty-four

who described themselves as articulate, thirteen candidates explained that they tried to offer a "rational" and "pragmatic" approach in order to contrast themselves with what they identified as the "radical" and "confrontational" styles of those candidates generally known as belonging to the "democratic camp." These thirteen "pragmatists," therefore, mainly comprised the independents, including the three pro-China individuals from the Federation of Trade Unions. The three members of the liberal-oriented Meeting Point were also classified as "pragmatists" primarily because these candidates did not highlight their previous participation in socio-political campaigns, although they did not deny such involvement. On the contrary, the remaining twenty-one candidates who also described themselves as articulate were classified as "campaigners," because they commonly claimed to be deeply involved in various socio-political campaigns in the 1980s and thus demonstrated their consistent commitments to fight for the interests of the general public in Hong Kong. The campaigners included members of the United Democrats of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, Trotskyist group and pro-Taiwan union. For a classification of the styles of individual candidates, see Table 1 below.

Table 1 Classification of the Styles of Individual Candidates

Constituency	Articulate		Moderate	Unclassified
	Campaigner	Pragmatist		
Island East	M. Lee S.C. Man	K.N. Cheng	K.B. Chow	W.T. Leung Y.L. Chan
Island West	S. Yeung C.Y. Huang	Y.C. Chan	Y.H. Chang W.S. Cheung M.C. Wong	–
Kowloon East	W. Szeto T.K. Li C. Chan	W.M. Li	S.P. Hau	K.H. Li C.F. Poon
Kowloon West	J. To K.K. Fung C.K. Law	Y.T. Lee H.Y. Sit	K.S. Ng	–
Kowloon Central	C.S. Lau C. Lam J. Young	Y.H. Chan	C.K. Chan C. Yeung	C.M. Cheung
New Territories East	K.W. Lau H.C. Wong	E. Lau A. Wong	C.N. Kan	M.H. Choi K.C. Leung
New Territories South	W.T. Lee W.Y. Chan Y.C. Leung	–	F.K. Yeung	–
New Territories North	C.W. Fung M.T. Chow	C.Y. Tik	C.K. Wong	H.C. Cheung W.M. Tong
New Territories West	M.Y. Ng	W.Y. Wong C.W. Tai S.T. Tang S.W. Tso	–	–

Notes:

1. The twenty-one "Campaigners" were those who emphasized themselves being articulate as well as involved in various socio-political campaigns and/or pro-democracy movements in 1989. These candidates included all candidates of the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), members of the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, Trotskyites and pro-Taiwan union leaders. Thirteen (62%) of them got elected, accounting for 72% of the directly elected seats.
2. The thirteen "Pragmatists" were those who claimed themselves as articulate and willing to speak up for the interests of Hong Kong people. Yet they offered an approach emphasizing rational dialogue, non-confrontation, and objectivity. These candidates consisted of some independents, including the three supported individuals of the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), and members of Meeting Point who generally claimed themselves as being more "moderate" than the UDHK. Five (38%) of them finally got elected accounting for 28% of the directly elected seats. (A few of those like K. N. Cheng, Y. C. Chan, Y. H. Chan, W. Y. Wong lost as second runners-up, while W. Y. Wong and S. T. Tang got elected in the next two by-elections in December 1991 and August 1992 in New Territories West constituency.)
3. The eleven "Moderates" comprised mainly all candidates of Hong Kong Democratic Foundation, Liberal Democratic Federation, Progressive Hong Kong Society and some independents. All of them did not get elected during the 1991 electoral campaign.

Implications

The above discussions suggest that the campaign themes of individual candidates in the 1991 elections were a reflection of the characteristics of Hong Kong's political system — the limited functions of the elected Legislative Council in particular. Such limitations were however reflected in the dominant theme of the electoral campaign, namely the need for a more democratic and accountable system in which the elected legislature could more genuinely exercise its power and influence in the political process. The electoral contest therefore did not serve to provide alternative policy programmes for the future government of Hong Kong, but merely to offer a choice of leadership style. The question became what style of elected representatives would be more capable of articulating the concerns of Hong Kong people and monitoring the performance of the executive authorities.

The electoral results demonstrated that voters generally preferred those who presented themselves as being "articulate." While none of the "moderates" got elected in the 1991 elections, thirteen out of the twenty-one "campaigners" got elected, accounting for a majority of 72% of the elected seats. The result proved that Hong Kong's voters were generally convinced by these candidates' campaign-style, viz. political mobilization on major socio-political issues. Nevertheless, the "pragmatists" who criticized the campaigners as "radical" and "dominating" remained to be

a strong alternative political force. Although only five of the thirteen pragmatists got elected in 1991, a few of the others, like K. N. Cheng, Y. C. Chan, Y. H. Chan, and W. Y. Wong, lost marginally as second runners-up, with W. Y. Wong and S. T. Tang respectively getting elected in the next two by-elections in December 1991 and August 1992 in New Territories West constituency. These pragmatists commonly shared the view that Hong Kong's future elected legislative members should be acceptable to China and should be capable of establishing serious dialogue with the senior authorities in Beijing.

Even though the voters accepted the campaigners' style of political leadership, there remained an unsettled question by the end of the 1991 electoral campaign. That is, what should be the style and attitude of different candidates in handling the thorny China relations issue. During the 1991 electoral campaign, most of the "campaigners" as well as "pragmatists" claimed that better communication and dialogue with China was necessary. The major bone of contention, therefore, remained whether the candidates would (and should) speak up against the pressures of the Chinese authorities. While almost all of the campaigners had repeatedly condemned China's intervention in Hong Kong's internal policies, they were capable of proving that they were not afraid of the Chinese political authority and potential suppression. Nevertheless, they had to keep on persuading the voters whether or not their uncompromising approach would still be feasible in the run-up to 1997 and beyond. Contrary to the uncompromising approach of the "campaigners," the "pragmatists" claimed that maintaining good relations and serious dialogue with China would be most beneficial to Hong Kong's future, but they failed to convince the voters during the 1991 elections that their rational and pragmatic approach would not result in a sell-out of Hong Kong's interests. Yet a substantial percentage of voters was beginning to accept the pragmatists' message as necessary to the long-term interests of the people in Hong Kong. The whole question of what leadership style is best for Hong Kong's interests will inevitably remain a focal competitive point in the future electoral campaigns.

Note

1. Among the fifty-four candidates, thirty-two were interviewed before the election, and forty-three after the election. Four candidates were not interviewed; twenty-five candidates were interviewed once and twenty-six candidates were interviewed twice.

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Appendix 1. A Summary of the Campaign Themes of Individual Candidates

Candidates	Themes
Island East	
Martin Lee and S.C. Man	"Genuinely stand for Hong Kong's interest": i.e. democracy; human rights, people's livelihood; better dialogue and relations with China and high degree of local autonomy for Hong Kong.
K.N. Cheng	"Hong Kong Spirit": i.e. to build a democratic and free economic society specifically suitable for Hong Kong's future local autonomy.
Y.L. Chan	"Democracy and people's livelihood."
W.T. Leung	"Democracy, human rights, and rule of law."
K.B. Chow	"Harmonious Hong Kong": i.e. democracy and better Sino-Hong Kong relations.
Island West	
S. Yeung and C.Y. Huang	"Democracy, more direct elections, human rights."
Y.C. Chan	"To avoid party monopoly based on objective and balanced discussions of views and better Sino-Hong Kong relations."
Y.H. Chang	"Democracy, rule of law, and better mutual understanding and communication between Hong Kong and China."
W.S. Cheung and M.C. Wong	"A harmonious and prosperous Hong Kong": i.e. better relations with China.
Kowloon East	
W. Szeto	"Thirty years of dedication to democracy, human rights, rule of law."
W.M. Li	"Stay in Hong Kong to promote democracy and people's livelihood."
S.P. Hau	"Stable and prosperous Hong Kong with better livelihood."

Appendix 1. (Continued)

T.K. Li	"Nationalism, citizens' rights and people's livelihood."
C. Chan	"To call for direct elections to National People's Congress and Hong Kong Legislative Council."
K.H. Li	"Better future together."
C.F. Poon	"Stable development of democracy."
Kowloon West	
James To	"A solicitor originating from the grassroots."
K.K. Fung and C.K. Law	"Grassroots' democrats": i.e. to protect the interests of the grassroots by improving Hong Kong's economy.
Y.T. Lee	"More direct elections, public consultation."
H.Y. Sit	"An incumbent proven to be capable of speaking up for public interest."
K.S. Ng	"Monitor the government, reflect public opinion."
Kowloon Central	
C.S. Lau and Conard Lam	"Open government, democracy, freedom, human rights and representation of the interests of the labourers."
Y.H. Chan	"Democracy, people's livelihood, grassroots representative."
John Young	"Democracy, human rights, rule of law."
C.M. Cheung	"A peaceful and just society."
Cecilia Yeung	"To reflect public opinion, to safeguard public interest."
C.K. Chan	"To monitor government and to establish a stable and prosperous society."
New Territories East	
Andrew Wong	"Accountable and responsible government."
Emily Lau	"Democracy, human rights, rule of law, freedom of the press and justice."
C.N. Kan	"Democracy, rule of law, liberty and representation of grassroots interests."
K.W. Lau	"Democracy, people's livelihood and representation of grassroots interests."

Appendix 1. (Continued)

H.C. Wong	"Democracy and representation of grassroots interests."
M.H. Choi	Unidentifiable.
K.C. Leung	Emigration specialist.
New Territories South	
W.T. Lee and W.Y. Chan	"Democracy, people's livelihood and representation of grassroots interests."
Y.C. Leung	"Aggregation of the interests of the labouring classes."
F.K. Yeung	"Democracy, equality, rule of law and improvement in Sino-Hong Kong relations."
New Territories North	
C.W. Fung	"Democracy and people's livelihood."
C.Y. Tik	"Stay in Hong Kong to promote democracy and people's livelihood."
H.C. Cheung	"Democracy and public opinion."
C.K. Wong	"Democracy, people's livelihood, rule of law."
M.T. Chow	"Grassroots democrat."
W.M. Tong	Unidentifiable.
New Territories West	
C.W. Tai	"Democracy, people's livelihood, community building."
M.Y. Ng	"Democracy and people's livelihood."
W.Y. Wong	"Democracy in China and Hong Kong."
S.W. Tso	"Democracy, human rights, rule of law and better coordination of Sino-Hong Kong relations."
S.T. Tang	"Democracy, people's livelihood."

Appendix 2. Style Differentiation of Individual Candidates*

Candidate	Political affiliation	Personal background /Track record	Style
Island East			
Martin Lee and S.C. Man	United Democrats	Proven leadership in socio-political campaigns for direct elections, and 1989 pro-democracy movement, etc.	Articulate, eloquence, and argumentative.
K.N. Cheng	Independent (support of pro-China FTU)	Criticised China over suppression of student movement in 1989.	Rational, calm, moderate, pragmatic, sincere, and easily approachable.
Y.L. Chan	Hong Kong Democratic Foundation	Previous Legco member.	Moderate and non-confrontational, pragmatic, and hard-working.
W.T. Leung	Independent	Previous Legco member.	Did not emphasize.
K.B. Chow	Independent	Did not emphasize.	Pragmatic and moderate.
Island West			
S. Yeung and C.Y. Huang	United Democrats	Proven leadership in socio-political campaigns for direct elections and 1989 pro-democracy movement, etc.	Consistent, uncompromising, argumentative, and unafraid of suppression and authority.
Y.C. Chan	Independent (Generally regarded as pro-China)	Journalist background famous for balanced and objective comments on socio-political issues.	Articulate, moderate, pragmatic, and objective.

Appendix 2. (Continued)

Y.H. Chang	Liberal Democratic Federation	A solicitor capable of upholding the rule of law and democracy.	Professionalism, moderate, and compromise.
W.S. Cheung and M.C. Wong	Independent	Did not emphasize.	Moderate and harmonious.
Kowloon East			
W. Szeto	United Democrats	Proven leadership in socio-political campaigns for 30 years and also in direct election campaigns and 1989 pro-democracy movement, etc.	Critical, committed, sincere.
W.M. Li	Meeting Point	Elected DB/Urbco member; experienced in community services.	Articulate, committed, moderate and sincere; genuine love for Hong Kong and China.
S.P. Hau	Local pro-China Kwun Tong Man Chung Association	20 years of participation in community affairs.	Moderate, non-confrontational.
T.K. Li	Independent (Pro-Taiwan Unions)	Unclear.	Did not emphasize.
C. Chan	Trotskyite	DB member.	Did not emphasize.
K.H. Li	Independent	Unclear.	Did not emphasize.
C.F. Poon	Independent	Incumbent Legco member and claimed to fight for the community over a number of issues.	Did not emphasize.

Appendix 2. (Continued)

Kowloon West			
James To	United Democrats	Leader of student and socio-political movements.	Articulate, young and enthusiastic, straightforward, sincere, and approachable.
K.K. Fung and C.K. Law	Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood	Fung: involvement in various socio-political movements for more than 10 years. Law: expertise in economic analysis.	Activist style. Committed to the interests of the grassroots.
Y.T. Lee	Independent	Previous Legco member.	Outspoken, articulate, accessible, and approachable.
H.Y. Sit	Independent	Incumbent Legco member.	Outspoken and critical.
K.S. Ng	Liberal Democratic Federation	Community worker.	Committed to the community's welfare; hard-working, approachable and accessible; claimed to be "moderate democrat."
Kowloon Central			
C.S. Lau and Conard Lam	United Democrats	Lau: involvement in labour movements and demands for monitoring various government policy. Lam: reputation of being outspoken in Legco.	Outspoken, articulate, consistent, uncompromising, and unafraid of authority.
Y.H. Chan	Independent (support of pro-China FTU)	Involvement in various labour movements and anti-government social legislations to protect the welfare of the labourers.	Articulate, sincere, approachable, and rational.

Appendix 2. (Continued)

John Young	Independent	Criticisms of the government as evident in his writings; previous involvement in pro-democracy movements.	Claimed to be "genuine democrat."
C.M. Cheung	Independent	Originated from the grassroots.	Anti-confrontation.
Cecilia Yeung	Independent	20 years of political experience.	Moderate.
C.K. Chan	Independent	Experienced in politics.	Articulate, intelligent, and moderate.
New Territories East			
Andrew Wong	Independent	Incumbent Legco member; specialist in constitutional and political affairs.	Honest, reliable, experienced, pragmatic, and rational.
Emily Lau	Independent	Leadership in journalist association; record of writing critical comments on Hong Kong and Chinese governments.	Outspoken, articulate, presentable, and critical.
C.N. Kan	Independent	Solicitor, experienced in community affairs based on his capacity as Regco and DB member.	Professionalism, hard-working, genuine and committed to community welfare but moderate in style.
K.W. Lau	United Democrats	Experienced DB and Regco member in Shatin; committed to socio-political movements.	Familiar with and committed to community welfare.

Appendix 2. (Continued)

H.C. Wong	United Democrats	Experienced in DB and Regco; committed to socio-political movements for 15 years.	Familiar with and dedicated to community welfare and political movements.
M.H. Choi	Independent	Unclear.	Unclear.
K.C. Leung	Independent	Unclear.	Unclear.
New Territories South			
W.T. Lee and W.Y. Chan	United Democrats	Proven leadership in socio-political movements and experienced in DB and Regco in NT South.	Articulate, outspoken, and full commitment.
Y.C. Leung	Trotskyite	Experienced DB member and dedicated to the welfare of the labourers in Kwai Tsing area.	Honest, approachable, and dedicated.
F.K. Yeung	Progressive Hong Kong Society	A lawyer from the grassroots.	Claimed to be "moderate democrat," and pragmatic.
New Territories North			
C.W. Fung	United Democrats	Experienced and proven leadership in anti-nuclear and other socio-political campaigns.	Articulate, outspoken, and critical.
C.Y. Tik	Meeting Point	Experienced community worker for 13 years.	Committed to stay in Hong Kong; reformist.
H.C. Cheung	Independent (nominal support of Liberal Democratic Federation)	Unclear.	Dedicated to reflect public opinion.

Appendix 2. (Continued)

C.K. Wong	Liberal Democratic Federation	Legal profession.	Professionalism; claimed to be genuine and pragmatic democrat; non-confrontational; not anti-China.
M.T. Chow	Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood	Incumbent Legco member; grassroots oriented.	Outspoken.
W.M. Tong	Independent	Unclear.	Unclear.
New Territories West			
C.W. Tai	Independent (Rural support)	Incumbent Legco member; proven being critical of government's Vietnamese and other policies.	Dedicated, outspoken but mild, moderate with balanced opinion.
M.Y. Ng	United Democrats	Experienced and dedicated commitment to socio-political movements in Hong Kong.	Articulate, unafraid of authority and pressures; dedicated and committed to Hong Kong people.
W.Y. Wong	Meeting Point	Yuen Long DB member; experienced in community services.	Dedicated to stay in Hong Kong, reformist.
S.W. Tso	Independent	Proven involvement in the crisis of Bank of Credit and Commerce; neither pro-China nor anti-China.	Outspoken, articulate, but non-confrontational; critical of the United Democrats.

Appendix 2. (Continued)

S.T. Tang	Independent (Rural support)	Medical professional; experienced and committed to Yuen Long's community welfare.	Outspoken, but pragmatic, non-confrontational, and hardworking.

* Information about the personal background/track record is based on the candidates' own emphasis during the interviews as relevant to their self-proclaimed leadership style.

11

An Exploratory Study of the Rural-Urban Cleavage in the 1991 Elections

Li Pang-kwong

Politics arise out of conflict. That means no political community can be free from conflict. An issue can divide the community into several segments. The advocates from different segments may try to mobilize support from people having similar values, attitudes, or social background. As a result, political groups or parties can be developed as an institution of mobilization or interest articulation and aggregation. Eventually, social divisions that can manage to find political expression will become the political cleavage of that political system. Needless to say, the kind and nature of political cleavages will be varied according to time and space.

Cleavage is described as "the criteria which divide the members of a community or subcommunity into groups." These criteria may be class, ethnicity, religion, ideology, region and so on. While political cleavages are "those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places" (Rae and Taylor, 1970:1).

As Zuckerman (1982:137-40) argued, "[t]he interplay between the actions of the party leaders and the variable strength of the social bonds determines the kind and extent of political cleavage present." His notion of social bonds is different from the Marxist concept of class and is a

"tightly knit networks of interaction" in which "most individuals interact with others on many dimensions and exist within variably bound groups." Only politicized networks of interaction would give rise to the persistent political divisions.

The ways to observe the presence of political cleavages in a particular political community are several, but elections may be the most common and available one. This is especially the case in a free and competitive political system where people are encouraged to express their views and differences. Lipset (1960) had once described elections as "the expression of the democratic class struggle."

The political reforms in the 1980s stirred up a political muddle and threatened the traditional political order. The "frozen" political *status quo* was gradually melted down by the successive challenge of the rising political forces of the middle class. Though the political reforms have been described as "unfinished," a new band of politicians and activists have already come to the political stage. Group cleavages, as Huntington (1974:177-81) indicated, between declining and rising social forces, between declining forces, or between rising social forces, should be expected.

In this short paper, the researcher will try to explore the electoral cleavage between the new emerging liberal force and the still influential rural force in the New Territories of Hong Kong. It is believed that rural residents tend to vote more for candidates with conservative political stance. The claim of this cleavage seems to be accepted by both the mass media and campaigners. Election battles are often considered to be a struggle between conservative and liberal forces. While rural residents and local figures seem to be the pillar of the conservative force, the liberal force is mainly comprised of young school teachers, social workers, and members of pressure groups. Since little effort has attempted to give empirical evidence to the above claim, the researcher will try to test the proposition that the more rural residents there are living in a constituency, the more votes the conservative force receive by analyzing aggregate data of 1991 District Board (DB) elections and the 1991 population census. For the exploratory study, Tuen Mun and Yuen Long districts have been chosen as a start, for these two districts are traditional rural dominated constituencies with significant rival liberal forces there. The ecological analysis of aggregate data provides the advantage of taking the contextual factors into account whereas the survey (individual) data method is handicapped in this respect.

Data and Methods

Two sets of data are being employed. One is the electoral data for the 1991 DB elections. The other is the data from the 1991 population census. The former will be used to estimate the electoral support of various political forces at the DB constituency level. The latter will be employed to estimate the socio-economic characteristics of the constituency concerned.

The decision of choosing the DB data set is based on the following considerations:

1. the DB constituency seems to be the appropriate unit to reflect the context and process of local politics;
2. only the DB return data can provide the number of votes given to various political groups at the lowest possible level; and
3. the coincidence of the DB constituency boundaries with the tabulation of the 1991 population census data allows comparison of the two data sets.

There were altogether 58 candidates joining the DB election battles in Tuen Mun and Yuen Long districts in March 1991. The job of classifying these candidates is smoother for those candidates with manifest political affiliation than those without. Hence, media coverage and information acquired through consultation with the people who have a deep understanding of the areas may help to clarify the political background of those without group or party label. Subjective judgement is, thus, hard to prevent.

Nevertheless, three groups of candidates are being classified. These are the "Conservative," the "Liberal" and the "Independent." Candidates who are considered to have strong local ties or connections with the *Heung Yee Kuk* (Rural Consultative Council), or the Rural Committees are being classified as the "Conservatives." Candidates with party label of either the United Democrats of Hong Kong, or Meeting Point, or with pressure group's affiliation are being classified as the "Liberals." Candidates with neither of the above political backgrounds are being classified as the "Independents."

The variable of the conservative vote share (V-CON) in a particular constituency is computed by dividing the sum of the vote given to its

candidates by the total sum of the registered electors in that constituency. Thus, the vote share and relative strength of the conservative in each constituency is computed.

The type of living quarter in the 1991 census data set, in terms of number of enumerated residents, is used to estimate the proportion of rural residents living in a particular constituency. This is calculated by dividing the total number of residents living in those categories of villa/bungalow/modern village house, simple stone structure and other permanent housing, by the total number of residents living in the concerned constituency as a whole. The variable of the proportion of rural residents (P-RURAL) is, thus, created.

Besides, three more independent variables are being introduced for testing their relative effects on the vote share of the conservatives. The first one is the proportion of age 45 or above in each constituency (P-AGE). The cutting point of 45 is adopted under the assumption that people born before or after the Second World War may make different voting decisions and have different political inclinations. The second one is the proportion of non-student population, aged over 20 and having tertiary education in each constituency (P-EDC). The third one is the proportion of working population who are managers, administrators, professionals and associated professionals in each constituency (P-OCCUP). For those age 45 or above, or having higher education, or with prestigious occupation are hypothesized to vote conservative, and vice versa.

Correlation and regression analyses are being employed to find out whether there are associations between/among these variables and which factor(s) is(are) the most significant one(s) in accounting for the variance of the conservative vote share. Given the aggregative nature of the data, the unit of analysis will be the DB constituency. Bearing in mind the ecological fallacy, no cross level analysis will be attempted at this stage of research.

Profile and Findings

There are altogether 28 DB constituencies in New Territories west districts, of which 16 are in Tuen Mun and 12 in Yuen Long. The constituencies under study are quite homogeneous in terms of the proportion of

residents living in rural or urban type of living quarters. Nearly one-third (nine) of the constituencies have over 50% rural residents. Seventeen have less than 10% rural residents. The remaining two have 23% and 49.6% rural residents, respectively.

The number of candidates in these 28 constituencies amounts to 58. Among them, 19 candidates are being classified as "Liberal," 36 candidates as "Conservative," and 3 candidates as "Independent" (see Table 1).

Table 1 Distribution of Candidates by Affiliation and District

	Tuen Mun N (%)	Yuen Long N (%)	Total N (%)
Conservative	17	19	36
	(47.2)	(52.8)	(100.0)
	(50.0)	(79.2)	(62.1)
Liberal	15	4	19
	(79.0)	(21.1)	(100.1)
	(44.1)	(16.7)	(32.8)
Independent	2	1	3
	(66.6)	(33.3)	(99.9)
	(5.9)	(4.2)	(5.2)
Total	34	24	58
	(58.6)	(41.4)	(100.0)
	(100.0)	(100.1)	(100.1)

Note: Due to rounding, row or column totals may not be 100%.

For all the contested constituencies under study, the Conservatives and the Liberals have received about 48% and 50% of the vote cast, respectively, and the Independents have acquired less than 2% of the voters' support (see Table 2).

Table 2 Number of Votes Given by Affiliation and District

	Tuen Mun N (%)	Yuen Long N (%)	Total N (%)
Conservative	17,014	17,106	34,120
	(49.9)	(50.1)	(100.0)
	(34.7)	(76.4)	(47.8)
Liberal	30,754	5,283	36,037
	(85.3)	(14.7)	(100.0)
	(62.8)	(23.6)	(50.5)
Independent	1,213	6	1,219
	(99.5)	(0.5)	(100.0)
	(2.5)	(0.0)*	(1.7)
Total	48,981	22,395	71,376
	(68.6)	(31.4)	(100.0)
	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

* Due to rounding.

Source: Raw data supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong Government.

By dividing the constituencies into contested and uncontested, we can examine the rural-urban cleavage more closely. Regarding the uncontested constituencies, seven candidates were returned unopposed, and they all belonged to the conservative group. Of which, five constituencies (71.4%) had 51% or above rural residents. The mean P-RURAL of the five and all uncontested constituencies (N=7) are 67.2% and 52% respectively. We have the ground to speculate that a constituency with a high proportion of rural residents will tend to return uncontested conservative candidates.

On the other hand, the mean P-RURAL of the contested constituencies with competition between conservative and liberal candidates is 1.2% (N=14). When comparing this figure with those of the uncontested

constituencies, one can find that the mean difference is wide enough to illustrate that the electoral competition of the conservative and liberal groups are more likely to take place in constituencies with low proportion of rural residents.

Furthermore, by excluding uncontested constituencies and Fairview Park constituency of Yuen Long,[1] the association of V-CON with P-RURAL and P-AGE is very significant. The correlation coefficients are 0.8578 and 0.7509, respectively, at the significance level of 0.001. But the P-EDC and P-OCCUP have a weak and inverse association. The coefficients are -0.2677 and -0.2736, respectively. Conversely, the vote share of the liberals is correlated inversely with P-RURAL and P-AGE. The respective coefficients are -0.571 and -0.6251, at the significance level of 0.01.

In order to estimate the relative significance of P-RURAL and P-AGE, regression analysis with stepwise methods is employed. The P-RURAL is found to be the best predictor of V-CON. Over 73% variance of V-CON are accounted by the P-RURAL. Residual analysis indicates the normality assumption of the regression model is not violated.

Discussion

The above findings have empirically confirmed the proposition that the larger the proportion of rural residents living in a constituency, the more votes the conservative forces have received. People living in a similar condition may feel, think, or even act alike. Their common interests, life experience or political exposure have supported the emergence of the "tightly knit networks of interaction," in which "neighbourhood effects" are very likely to define the voter's menu. This is believed to be the case of the New Territories' rural residents.

The successive penetration of the state since 1898 and the subsequent urbanization and industrialization of the New Territories since the 1950s have significantly transformed the traditional power structure there (Baker, 1966; Freedman, 1966; Berkowitz and Poon, 1969). Starting from the very beginning and up till the 1960s, the colonial government had governed the leased territories through the co-optation of the village elders into its local committee system. Stewart Lockhart, the then Colonial Secretary and Registrar General, wrote in 1900 that:

> The committee-men (village elders) as a rule are those who possess influence in their immediate neighbourhood, whose advice is listened to, and whose lead is generally followed. The wisdom of affecting with responsibility those to whom the people have been accustomed to look for leadership and of using them to elucidate the objects of government, is evident. (Endacott, 1964:131)

The *Heung Yee Kuk*, founded by the rural elders and elites in 1926, was also recognized by the colonial government as the sole representative organ for the New Territories. Acting as the sole channel of communication between the government and the villagers, these elders had been viewed as the *de facto* rulers in the villages.

The indirect-rule of the New Territories had its stabilizing effect when the colonial government had to administer a settled population with its own culture and way of life. So, the adopted policy was to interfere as little as possible. But the political *status quo* had been forced to change since the 1950s. Several factors accounted for this happening:

1. the influx of refugees from the mainland;
2. the deterioration of living conditions in the urban area; and
3. the problem of space in further drives of industrialization.

Thus, the colonial government had to carry out "planned" developments in the New Territories (Kuan and Lau, 1980). The active involvement of the government in developing rural area led to the transformation of power configuration there. House-building programmes were inevitably followed by community-building schemes which aimed at making the urban immigrants settle both physically and psychologically. As a result, the then District Advisory Boards, which consisted of appointed members only in the first instance, were established in 1977 for the sake of allowing gradually the participation of urban citizens in the local administration process. Though the rural leaders vigorously criticized the move, their dependency on the government for political power and economic benefits (i.e. prior information of land resumption scheme) prevented them from protesting uncompromisingly (Kuan and Lau, 1980).

The local administration reforms since the early 1980s have further weakened the power or influence of the rural residents in managing local affairs. Though the *Heung Yee Kuk* is the sole organ of interest articulation for the rural residents, its role has been challenged by the newly established DB and the Regional Council (RC). The establishment of a parallel system of representation seems to work unfavourably for the former for it only represents the rural residents but not the entire population in the New Territories.

The traditional representative and administrative roles of the *Heung Yee Kuk* and Rural Committees have been eroded in the past decade or two.[2] Several factors have contributed to the declining of the rural forces. First, the urbanization of the New Territories since the 1960s has made the rural residents lose their numerical edge over the urban immigrants. The population in the New Territories has grown significantly, from about 0.41 million in 1961 to 2.37 million in 1991 (see Table 3).

Table 3 Resident Population by Area, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1986 and 1991 (in thousand)

	1961	1971	1981	1986	1991
Hong Kong Island	1,004.9	996.2	1,215.7	1,201.5	1,251.0
	(32.1%)	(25.3%)	(23.8%)	(21.9%)	(22.0%)
Kowloon and New Kowloon	1,578.0	2,194.9	2,515.4	2,349.5	2,030.7
	(50.4%)	(55.8%)	(49.2%)	(42.7%)	(35.8%)
New Territories	410.0	665.7	1,329.0	1,907.0	2,374.8
	(13.1%)	(16.9%)	(26.0%)	(34.7%)	(41.9%)
Marine	136.8	79.9	49.8	37.6	17.6
	(4.4%)	(2.0%)	(1.0%)	(0.7%)	(0.3%)
Total	3,129.7	3,936.6	5,109.8	5,495.5	5,674.1
	(100.0%)	(100.0%)	(100.0%)	(100.0%)	(100.0%)

Sources: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 1988, 1991c.

Secondly, through a brief transition period of neo-indirect-rule in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Kuan and Lau, 1979), the colonial government transformed its indirect rule into a direct one. The method of political recruitment has made a corresponding change, from purely co-optative to partly elected. Given the rural leaders have no longer been

the only target pool of recruitment, their importance has, therefore, declined relatively. By reserving legally a certain number of seats in the DB and the RC,[3] the rural conservative forces have been incorporated into the new but disadvantageous system.

Thirdly, the rural leaders have not adjusted well to the new rules of the power game, which are by and large based on universal franchise and electoral competition to allocate political power. To date about two-thirds of the DB and one-third of the RC members are returned by the universal franchise. The ever expanding electorate (see Tables 4 and 5) has affected the rural leaders' ability to mobilize electoral support. Added to the disadvantage of the rural forces is the championing of the rising liberal force amongst the urban immigrants. The further opening-up of the power structure, both at local or territory-wide levels, and the electoral mode of allocating political power seem to have taken place at the expense of the might of the rural leaders.

Table 4 Resident Population Age 20 or Above in Tuen Mun and Yuen Long

DB District	1981	1986	1991	% Change 1981-86	% Change 1981-91
Tuen Mun	69,833	164,598	229,539	+135.7% (94,765)	+228.7% (159,706)
Yuen Long	107,035	135,415	151,071	+26.5% (28,380)	+41.1% (44,036)

Sources: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 1981, 1986, 1991a.

Table 5 Number of Registered Electors in Tuen Mun and Yuen Long

DB District	1982	1985	1988	1991	% Change 1982-91
Tuen Mun	25,551	72,196	85,092	115,953	+353.8% (90,402)
Yuen Long	28,337	55,466	64,757	70,138	+147.5% (41,801)

Source: Raw figures supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong Government.

Given the above developments, the already closely knitted community of rural residents has easily transformed itself into a "quasi" political group to protect their common interests. Common interests and threat have driven the rural leaders to organize themselves in the face of the liberal challenge and competition. Strategically, it is very natural and logical for the conservative leaders to mobilize electoral support along the line of rural and non-rural (urban) differences. Thus, at least in the local elections, the rural-urban cleavage has been politicized and has served as the basis of the electoral division of the day.

However, with the rapid growth of new towns in these two districts in the near future, especially in Yuen Long, the numerical strength of the rural forces may decline relatively. This is already the case of Sha Tin, Tai Po, and Tsuen Wan. Probably, the rural-urban cleavage may become less significant than it used to be. For the rural leaders, one possible way to maintain and broaden their electoral support is to carry on broadening their concerns for the non-rural community's interests.

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Notes

1. Fairview Park is eliminated from further analysis because most of the residents migrated from urban areas not so long ago, and the socio-economic characteristics are quite in contrast to other rural constituencies.
2. Recently, the *Heung Yee Kuk* was deprived of its long-held power to issue a certificate to confirm a person's appointment and status as a New Territories Justice of the Peace. *Hong Kong Government Gazette* No. 48/1992 (27 November 1992), G.N. 4190; *Oriental Daily News*, 29 November 1992, p.3.
3. In the New Territories, Rural Committee Chairmen are ex-officio members of DB. Besides, the Chairman and the two Vice-Chairmen of the *Heung Yee Kuk* are also ex-officio members of the RC.

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12

Two Logics of Community Politics

Residents' Organizations and the 1991 Elections

Lui Tai-lok

I

It was the end of the beginning. The 1991 elections signified the end of the chapter on the experience of political participation by local grassroots organizations in the 1980s. Beginning with active participation in the 1982 District Board Election, and once described as "the most powerful social force behind local electoral politics" (see, for instance, the special feature in *The Hong Kong Economic Journal*, 1985), local grassroots organizations (especially residents' organizations) came to play a limited role in the 1991 elections, and particularly in the direct election to the Legislative Council. In a sense, residents' organizations came full circle in the 1980s. After a short spell of activism in electoral politics, they returned to their original position, i.e. community-based pressure groups for the protection of the interests of local residents.

This short paper reports the preliminary findings of an on-going project on the development of residents' organizations in contemporary Hong Kong.[1] As a follow-up to an earlier study of housing protests and urban politics in the 1970s (Lui and Kung, 1985), the project investigates

the impacts of electoral politics on residents' organizations. So, the focus of our study is not so much the dynamics of local politics in the 1991 elections as the response of residents' organizations to the changing local political environment brought about by political reforms at the district and regional levels and in the Legislative Council. It is suggested that the logic of interest group politics is different from that of electoral politics (cf. Offe, 1990). The gradual withdrawal of residents' organizations from electoral competition represents not so much the general decline of this form of grassroots organization, but rather the outcome of the political restructuring in local communities.

II

Unlike previous years, residents' organizations assumed a lowly manner in the 1991 elections. With the exception of Y.C. Leung in the "New Territories South" constituency, who was supported by The Neighbourhood and Workers Service Centre together with some residents' organizations in Tsing Yi and Kwai Chung, received 38,568 votes and ranked third in the competition for two seats in the constituency, residents' organizations were literally edged out of the direct election to the Legislative Council. In the elections of 1991, political groups came to the forefront, leaving limited space for residents' organizations to manoeuvre in the increasingly politicized environment of community participation.

Before we come to discuss the changing approach to electoral politics adopted by residents' organizations, a brief note is in order for explaining why the performance of residents' organizations in the 1991 elections is a topic worthy of attention. Indeed, one can argue that, given the limited organizational resources of local residents' organizations — thus they are not equipped to participate in electoral politics — the whole question is simply a non-issue. However, while it is fair to note the limitations of residents' organizations as political agents in elections, it is still early to write them off and assume that they are irrelevant to the political development at local level. First, as shown by election campaigns in the "New Territories South" constituency wherein Y.C. Leung only marginally lost the seat to Albert W.Y. Chan (by 3,596 votes), in the current state of development of electoral politics in Hong Kong, and

especially in the absence of organized mobilization by hegemonic political groups in the electoral process, residents' organizations are capable of making an impact. Secondly, despite their failure to put up candidates for election, residents' organizations are still active and important in organizing and providing campaign support in the process of election. They can act as "broker" for contacting established groups in the district and rallying local support. Thirdly, residents' organizations have a noteworthy record in community politics (Leung, 1977; Lui and Kung, 1985). They constitute an important form of grassroots organization and have been active in protesting against government policies and protecting the interests of local residents.

Indeed, our question follows this concern of residents' organizations as a form of spontaneous grassroots organization in the civil society. So, to probe the changing role of residents' organizations in community politics, we are implicitly addressing the question concerning the possibility of grassroots participation in institutional politics — what grassroots organization can do in the changing political environment? What are the potentials (and limitations) and prospects of grassroots politics?

III

As regards the participation of residents' organizations in the 1991 elections, they were mainly active in endorsing and supporting individual candidates and organizing campaign activities. Whether their participation made an impact on the outcomes of the election campaign is difficult to say. But it was quite clear that their involvement served to facilitate local networking and the mobilization of support from local residents. More importantly, it also carried the symbolic function of helping campaign candidates to build up their "popular" and "grassroots" images. A good example in the 1991 direct election to the legislature was the support given by the Tai Hang Tung and Nam Shan Resident Association to candidates K.K. Fung and C.K. Law. Such support confirmed the popular perception of K.K. Fung as "an old friend" of the residents of Sham Shui Po, as a social worker of the Society for Community Organization in the 1970s and later as a widely supported councillor in the District Board and Urban Council. And the extension of its support to C.K. Law, the campaign partner of K.K. Fung, a late-starter in local

political participation, was a gesture symbolizing its trust in the latter.

It should be noted that, as an indicator of the involvement of residents' organization in the elections, there is a significant difference between the endorsement of friendly candidates and the initiation of members to stand for election. Indeed, what really concerns us here is the retreat of residents' organizations from supporting their members in electoral campaigns. For instance, the Hong Kong People's Council on Public Housing Policy (HKPCPHP) had once been active in supporting its members to run for local election. In the 1986 elections to Urban and Regional Councils, the HKPCPHP had six candidates, including its secretary, three members of its executive committee, and two individual members, to stand for election, and all won their seats. Its grassroots support could be, at least partially, transferred to those candidates it had endorsed. But then in the 1991 elections, the HKPCPHP made a U-turn, ended its "honeymoon" with electoral politics and moved back to its original position of a pressure group on public housing issues.

The HKPCPHP deliberately assumed a low profile in the 1991 elections. Instead of supporting as many candidates as they could, the HKPCPHP reconsidered its relationships with election candidates and elected councillors and adopted a more reserved approach to the elections. Its main worry concerned the difficulties in monitoring the performance of elected candidates in matters related to public housing. While, theoretically speaking, the elected candidates were obliged to support demands put forth by the HKPCPHP and/or other supporting residents' organizations and the latter was entitled to ask the candidates to vote for their suggested policy options when matters were put to the councils, in practice there were no more than vaguely spelled out oral agreements with no binding power on final voting decision. Since there was no way whereby the HKPCPHP could prevent the elected candidate from voting contrary to its interests, the point then was why should residents' organizations continue to support those so-called friendly candidates.

Actually, as early as 1989, the HKPCPHP had already expressed its intention to monitor the performance of elected councillors (*Hong Kong Standard*, 1989:4):

> We have heard kai fong complain that they are disappointed by certain district board members. They feel they have been used as a stepping stone.... There were occasions that the kai fong came and asked us why so-and-so did not comment on an issue when they expected them to.

Beginning with the 1991 District Board Election, the HKPCPHP required the non-member candidates seeking its endorsement and support to sign an agreement letter showing their pledge to its programme and platforms. The main items of the agreement letter included (HKPCPHP, February Issue, 1991:5):

> The signatory agrees that during his/her terms as a Councillor... s/he will work with the HKPCPHP to fight for the realization of the "ten major objectives of public housing" and to sign the public statement concerning this matter... to attend meetings organized by the HKPCPHP on reporting the progress of activities concerning public housing... and in discussions concerning housing policy wherein the signatory has opinion different from the HKPCPHP, s/he will not criticize or attack the latter in public....

Whether this agreement letter can really function as a "pact" defining the mutual obligations between the candidates and the HKPCPHP is a question worthy of further investigation. However, the significance of this arrangement lies not in its effectiveness in binding the candidates to the HKPCPHP programme as the symbolic meaning of grassroots organizations showing their scepticism of previously informal relationships between residents' organizations and political groups and/or campaign candidates. Thus, in the 1991 Legislative Council Elections, the HKPCPHP made it very clear that (HKPCPHP, September Issue, 1991:3):

> The main objective of the HKPCPHP is to work for the interests of public housing residents and has decided not to support any non-member candidate to participate in the Legislative Council Election. Even in the case of members indicating their interest in running for election, we shall examine their request for support case by case. On the other hand, we shall... encourage residents to vote rationally and monitor the performance of the legislature. In previous elections, the HKPCPHP, on the assumption of showing a positive attitude towards democratic election, had been rather casual in deciding its support of individual candidates. Many candidates received the endorsement and support of the HKPCPHP without seriously understanding its programme on housing policy. And there were voters voting for these candidates simply on the ground that they had the HKPCPHP's endorsement.

Apparently, the HKPCPHP had decided to formalize its procedures and mechanisms for endorsing those candidates asking for its support.

This is a change from previous practice of relying on personal connections and established relationships to a formal and contractual approach to the relationship between the HKPCPHP and elected councillors. And the decision of the HKPCPHP to formalize its relations with election candidates is by no means an isolated case. In fact, as a consequence of the political restructuring brought about by the reforms in local councils, many residents' organizations had started to reconsider their relationships with local councillors (see, for example, Wong, 1990:68-77). In some cases, residents' organizations became increasingly sceptical and unhappy with the councillors they had once supported. There were requests for monitoring the performances of their supported councillors. However, there were also cases where, despite the continuation of a friendly relationship between residents' organizations and the local councillors, some arguments for formalization had been put forth on the ground of responsiveness and responsibility to the constituency. For instance, there is now agreement between the Tai Hang Tung and Nam Shan Estates Resident Association and its supported councillors that the latter are expected to participate in the "meet the public" scheme once a week and to give monthly and bi-monthly reports to the executive committee and the monitoring committee respectively. Also, after becoming a local councillor, an executive member will be requested to withdraw from the executive committee (see Ko, 1990:Appendix 2). All these arrangements are designed to facilitate the monitoring of local councillors.

Such arrangements in the formalization of organizational linkage between political activists (and/or politically active members) on the one hand, and grassroots organizations on the other are long overdue. There are, generally speaking, four major ways for a residents' organization to participate in election:

(a) to nominate its candidate as a representative of the organization to stand for election (for example, Tsing Yi Concern Group);
(b) to endorse and support its members to participate in election (for example, the HKPCPHP);
(c) to endorse and support friendly candidates to run for election; and
(d) to mobilize its members to support certain candidates and to participate in campaign activities.

Few residents' organizations had seriously considered the implications

of the different ways of participating in election. Very often, personal trust of individual candidates (whether members or otherwise is not important) and the belief that securing seats in local councils would assist in promoting organizational activities would be adequate to provide the drive for active involvement in election campaigns. It was only gradually when problems emerged — such as the subordination of residents' organizations to councillor's offices and conflicts of opinions on community issues — that residents' organizations had to revise their established but casual practices of handling electoral matters. The deepening of the involvement of political groups in local elections and grassroots mobilization further complicated the situation.

IV

The sheer pace of the development of Hong Kong's electoral politics in the 1980s made it difficult for residents' organizations to catch up with the changes in the local political environment. First, given their limited organizational resources, it was difficult for residents' organizations to compete in political mobilization with councillor's offices and political groups, which were eager to build up their electoral basis in local communities. Secondly, the politicization of electoral politics had reshaped the agenda of local politics. The focus of current debates and controversial issues fell mainly into the areas of democratization, Sino-British relationship, and territory-wide policies (see Cheung and Louie, 1991 on the changing agenda of social conflicts in the period 1975-1986). Residents' organizations found it rather difficult to relate their local and sectional interests to such wider concerns, and in turn, to articulate current political debates to the practical concerns of local residents. In a sense, residents' organizations had been marginalized in the process of the restructuring of local politics.

In terms of their intervention in electoral politics, residents' organizations had reached an impasse. In the first place, political reforms had restructured the opportunities of political participation. And electoral politics had its own rules of the game. To the political activists, political groups, compared with residents' organizations, presented a more appropriate organizational form for their participation in electoral competition. Whereas political groups were essentially geared for election and *realpo-*

litik, residents' organizations still placed their emphasis on local interests and worked in an issue-and-district-based framework. So as political groups developed, many activists, who were previously supported by residents' organizations, became their members and made use of their resources for election campaigning. The consequence was that these activists were expected to be "loyal" to both political groups and residents' organizations. When there were differences between the "party lines" of political groups and the demands of residents' organizations, there was no guarantee that the activists would follow the wishes of residents' organizations.

Secondly, the friendly relationship between residents' organizations and (more specifically, the leaders of) the liberal political groups grew out of long-term collaboration during the 1970s (cf. Lui, 1989). In the early 1980s when political groups had not yet assumed a leading position in electoral competition, residents' organizations could work out their relations with political groups on the bases of personal connections and loosely defined organizational linkages. But then the further politicization of local elections and the formation of different political groups under the umbrella of the "liberal" camp made it difficult for residents' organizations to decide how they were to collaborate with a political group or candidate instead of the others. The indecision of residents' organizations over either becoming local chapters (or affiliated organizations) of political groups or retaining organizational autonomy and continuing to be community-based interest groups, did not help prevent political groups from encroaching upon their turf. Indeed, the inaction of residents' organizations only invited political groups to start building their own local organizations for the purpose of future electoral mobilization.

Thirdly, the growth and development of political groups, councillor's offices, and livelihood concern groups posed a new challenge to residents' organizations.[2] These new organizations for community mobilizing (for a review of such organizations, see Community Development Division, The Hong Kong Council of Social Service, 1988), unlike residents' organizations which needed more time for opinion articulation and mobilization, were comparatively quick to take action and voice complaints. Indeed, for the purposes of ensuring media coverage of the issue concerned and meeting responsible officials, councillors and their local offices were the most effective agents for handling complaints and problems at the community level. In short, there were

then quite a number of local organizations which could perform functions similar to those of residents' organizations. The development of electoral politics had created competitions among the emergent local organizations and residents' organizations in the articulation of community interests and the mobilization of community action. And as a consequence of such development, many residents' organizations were found subordinated to councillor's offices and thus to the dynamics of electoral politics.

It was in the context of such changes in the local political environment that we could understand the retreat of residents' organizations from electoral politics. The growing tensions between residents' organizations on the one side and political groups and elected councillors on the other revealed the incompatibilities of the roles of community-level interest groups and political agents of local election assumed by the former in the 1980s. In a sense, the dual role taken up by residents' organizations was more the result of the wishful thinking of community organizers, hoping that grassroots organizations could constitute a political force for protesting against the colonial government and fighting for democratization, than the necessary outcome of a decade of protests in the 1970s. Indeed, if housing protests ever possessed the significance of anti-colonialism and popular power in the 1970s, it was because these actions were taking place in the context of a colonial administration with limited channels for political participation (also see Lui, 1989 and 1990). The character of these protest actions was shaped by the form of the state rather than the concrete demands expressed in the course of actions (cf. Anderson, 1979; Berger, 1981; Offe, 1985). When they first participated in local elections, residents' organizations only intended to take the opportunity to obtain more organizational resources for their own development. Their interest was more in using the status of the district board councillor for local networking and action mobilization than the functioning of the local council *per se*. The intervention in electoral politics was a strategic move.[3] Indeed, it was fair to say that residents' organizations were never prepared for institutional and electoral politics. Now, with hindsight, it was evident that such strategy was not a success. And in the face of the process of political restructuring, residents' organizations had to re-define their role of grassroots organization in the community.

The experience of residents' organizations in participating in local elections reveals the two different logics of community politics (cf. Offe,

1990). On the one side, there is the logic of community-based interest group politics. Residents' organizations are essentially issue-specific, fighting for sectional interests, and are action-oriented. The emphasis is on demands, spontaneity, and confrontation. Protest actions are organized for publicizing the issue concerned, attracting the attention of the third party, and putting pressures on the government. They bargain with the government department concerned and demand the immediate settlement of disputes. Whereas residents' organizations are good at action mobilization and dramatization of event, they are ill-equipped to deal with the problem of time. Even in the course of action, once they get into prolonged bargaining with the government, residents' organizations have great difficulties in sustaining mobilization and the organization of action. And this problem of organizational maintenance is more acute when residents' organizations undergo formalization.

On the other side, political groups operate in the framework of electoral politics. Political groups are election-oriented, with an eye on the development of their influence over various constituencies. Their emphasis is on the form of organization and political negotiations. Though they must be responsive to the interests of their constituencies, they have to accommodate wider concerns and be ready to make compromise. So when political groups and residents' organizations come to specific issues, they may adopt diverse approaches and take entirely different actions. What concerns us here is that the gap between the two is widening.

The problem is particularly pertinent to liberal political groups. First of all, liberal political groups have been working with residents' organizations for a long period of time. The support given by residents' organizations is crucial to the success of liberal political groups in local elections. And there is every reason for the latter to maintain friendly relations with community groups. Secondly, liberal political groups are keen to maintain their popular and grassroots images. The discontents expressed by residents' organizations would undermine the claim made by liberal political groups that they represent grassroots interests.

Once residents' organizations and liberal political groups can no longer collaborate on the basis of personal trust, they are likely to be locked into a web of mutual antagonism. Because residents' organizations are becoming critical of the presence of political groups in their districts, the latter must start to establish their basis for electoral mobilization. The more unreliable, as a source of campaign support, are

residents' organizations, the more eager political groups are to reduce such uncertainties and to integrate local groups into their own organizational structure. Given their experience in organizing pressure groups and protest actions, local chapters of liberal political groups can, and very often do, organize actions similar to those of residents' organizations. In fact, many residents' organizations have already expressed the complaint that political groups attempt to undermine and replace local groups by making their actions redundant. The further political groups go on to develop their own organizational bases at the community level, the more likely that they will get into conflict with residents' organizations. When residents' organizations try to fight back and to support their own candidates for election (as an attempt to keep political groups out of their turf), they become the competitors of political groups. Such electoral competition further dampens the relationship between political groups and residents' organizations.

The clashes between the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) and residents' organizations in Tuen Mun and Tsing Yi are examples showing the problem of growing distrust and antagonism mentioned above. However, it should be noted that the problem is by no means specific to the UDHK. In fact, it is my contention that the above analysis is applicable to all liberal political groups; Meeting Point and the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood will not be exemptions. Given their different orientations towards community politics, it is likely that political groups will continue to build up their own organizational bases at the community level for the purpose of electoral mobilization, and residents' organizations will remain active in defending local interests and mobilizing for community action.

V

If the 1991 elections signified the ending of the "honeymoon" between residents' organizations and political groups, they also marked the beginning of a "new" approach to community politics by residents' organizations. This "new" approach is to go back to the basics, i.e. the assumption of the role of community-based interest groups. After almost a decade of activism in local elections, many residents' organizations have come to recognize their limitations in electoral competition. But then their failure

at becoming significant political agents in local elections does not necessarily mean that residents' organizations are in decline (cf. Leung, 1986). True, residents' organizations are weak at developing membership and organizational building. And they are ill-equipped for electoral politics. But, as community-based interest groups, they are still effective and important. By nature, they are short-lived and issue-based. Indeed, those residents' organizations which can continue to function effectively over a long period are exceptional. Many simply go through the cycle of growth and disbandment in the course of protest actions. However short-lived and issue-specific these interest groups are, they constitute an important component of community politics. In fact, it is exactly this role of defending local interests that makes political groups not fare well. In the present state of political development, political groups are still trying hard to make a balance between specific concerns of certain constituencies and the general interest of the public. When they come to specific issues and demands of certain localities, they show hesitation. To residents' organizations, these will be the issues fueling their actions and organizational survival.

It is now apparent that there are two levels of community politics — one that is institutional and overwhelmed by electoral competitions among political groups and the other local and based upon sectional interest. Residents' organizations are collectivities for the defence of local interests. They may not be able to make a significant impact on the political development of Hong Kong. But they are important agents for expressing the voice from the grassroots. Through them, people say "no" to government policies. Whether their preference should be taken as the ideal policy arrangement is an issue for another debate. But there is one thing we can be sure of, that is, in a democratic society people have the rights to express their views and to act in their own interests.

Notes

1. The focus of this exploratory study is placed on the development of residents' organizations in the 1980s. Information on residents' organizations are collected by visiting organizations and interviewing activists. To date, twelve visits/interviews have been conducted. Another source of information on the development of residents' organizations is case studies of actions organized by residents' organizations. The study is supported by a small grant from the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
2. The livelihood concern groups are not necessarily affiliated to political groups. However, compared with residents' organizations, they are more likely to take an interest in election and their formation is closely linked to the intention of electoral participation. Also, in these organizations we often find the active participation of social workers. On these newly formed local groups, see Leung, Li and Mok, 1986; and for a case study, see Ng, 1992.
3. The strategic discussion at that time focused on the question of "war of position." It was argued that as a consequence of political reforms at the district level, there were new political opportunities and resources open to competition. Should residents' organizations fail to make use of these new openings, conservative groups would be strengthened both in terms of their positions in the newly reorganized local political bodies and in terms of resources for organizational mobilization.

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13

Popular Culture and Democratic Culture

Outline of a Perspective on the 1991 Legislative Council Election

Chan Hoi-man

Introduction

No doubt a political election is a multi-faceted event that reverberates along social, political, as well as cultural fronts. What is of especial concern for the present essay is the complex horizon of meaning and signification that the election event plausibly encompasses. At its more pragmatic, mundane reach, one can focus on the protocols, tactics, and power dynamics that inform the variegated aspects of the election process, and how these can be manoeuvred to the optimal advantage of the participants. On this more instrumental, manipulative side of election, one observer notes grimly:

> Interests are articulated through procedures that only pretend to be participatory, through forms of symbolic action such as general elections, where participation remains abstract and partial. The nature of contemporary political elections illustrates the types of demand our ruling political authorities... make on citizens; a role prescribed mobilizability with no right of participation.[1] (Narr, 1985:44)

At its higher, more aspiring reach, however, election signifies the vindication and actualization of specific political ideals and values which furnish the legitimate mandate for the elected officials. This higher aspiring streak is well represented in the classical tradition of liberalism, which maintains that:

> A system of representative democracy makes government accountable to the citizenry and creates wiser citizens capable of pursuing the public interest. It is thus both a means to develop self-identity, individuality and social difference — a pluralistic society — and an end in itself, an essential democratic order.[2] (Held, 1989:27)

In this manner, election is, therefore, by its nature a double-edged affair. The more world-wearied, cynical observers can easily dismiss the entire fanfare as but façades of the privileged sector in a scramble for domination and leadership, whereas the more hopeful, committed members of society can see election as the concrete assertion of political values and rights on the part of the citizens. Both sides are correct in their own fashion, and both can be adopted as contrasting foundations of understanding and action in the election process. How these foundations interact and compete with each other, in an empirical election context such as Hong Kong, will be a crucial vantage point into the deeper mechanism of the election processes.

The more enlightened observers from the social sciences communities may yet reenact this by and large schistic scenario, plausibly at a higher level of sophistication and awareness. And as the case of the Hong Kong 1991 direct election clearly testifies, while both of these diverged terms of reference are readily alluded to in many of the commentaries on the event, the weight of the discussion rested unmistakably on the tactical, the campaigning side of the story. It may be stretching the point somewhat to imply here that journalists, "current affairs commentators," or academicians all subscribe to conspiracy theory of some form. Yet, it is probably true to maintain that, in the heat of the campaigns and the mobilization of voters, instrumental and strategic considerations have largely blocked out the more idealistic side of the picture. And this even in the face of the fact that the 1991 election was to be among the most significant steps of democratization yet undertaken. In these respects, the interests of most intellectual observers and journalists share the same bearing as the public and the candidates themselves. With a quick nod to the value of democratization in general, attention is quickly shifted to the more immediate and exciting prospects of tactics, organization, and mobilization.[3]

The present essay seeks to swing the analytical pendulum towards the opposite and complementary direction. While the value of analyses on political ecology and campaign dynamics are fully admitted, the socio-cultural meaning and implication of the 1991 direct election must also be underscored in their own right. This is important for two connected reasons. In the first place, there is obvious intellectual rationale in relating this political episode to the wider spectrum of development and transition of Hong Kong. Whereas in the second place, as this essay will argue, much of the unfolding of the 1991 election cannot be adequately appreciated apart from its embeddedness in the prevailing socio-cultural milieu of Hong Kong. Here, the question is not solely one of facile political culture, but also the very socio-cultural foundation of political culture as such. This invocation of a more fundamental grounding for political culture is theoretically far-reaching. In this connection, K. Eder notes:

> If political culture is to be more than the sum of political opinions or the sum of individual voting decisions (and the behaviorist program in political science has been reduced to this), then what suggests itself is an understanding of political culture as a socially structured production of opinions and voting decisions. (Eder, 1992:109)

While Eder seeks this foundation mainly in socio-structural variables, the present essay opts for a cultural grounding of political culture. The basis for this shift in research direction is explained to a large extent by the limitations of a structural approach in and of itself. The case is eloquently argued by D. Bell, when he maintains that:

> Moreover, economic (or occupational, or structural) interests are not necessarily the decisive determinant of political, and certainly not of cultural, attitudes, which are more diverse and varied than the specific interests identified with an economic position... the standard demographic variables that sociologists have used for social-class identification in order to predict voting behaviour, child-raising patterns, buying habits, and the like are less reliable as the culture increasingly fosters "discretionary social behaviour," and individuals choose to "make themselves" on the basis of varied images drawn from the mass media. In effect, culture has become increasingly uncoupled from the social structure. (Bell, 1980:160)

This passage is worth quoting at some length, as an insightful warning against the simple-mindedness of structural analysis reduced to social class variables. Instead, an alternative approach might be sought by way of the arena of culture, together with how its formal and substantive dynamics might foster behavioral orientation of one mode or another. The rationale of this alternative approach is well summed up by M. Bloch, as the foremost historian of mentality:

> Social realities is a whole. One could not pretend to explain an institution if one did not link it to the great intellectual, emotional, mystical current of the contemporaneous mentality.... (Burguiere, 1982:430)

For Bloch, this amounts to the "interpretation of the facts of social organization from the inside" (*ibid.*). Such would apply of course to the development of democratic culture and institution as well.

Perceiving the 1991 Direct Election

This broad agenda may be specified via the more salient features of the 1991 elections, which need be made sense of also in terms of the overarching cultural setting. While no doubt other chapters in the volume will present other accounts on features of note, the discursive structure of this chapter would require a more broad-based yet cogent reconstruction, so as to represent in sharper contour the embeddedness of the direct election within the socio-cultural context at large.

In this light, the following discussion will depict the unfolding of the 1991 direct election via four fundamental sets of abrupt, unforeseen reversals, each of which indicating areas where significant disjunction occurred regarding the anticipation, outcomes, and consequences of the election. Such disjunction or reversals can take place under contradistinctive circumstances — when the perceived outcome significantly fell short of what was expected, as well as when outcome far-surpassed expectation. In both instances, as events turned out, participants and observers alike were thrown into states of confusion, striving to make sense of a runaway trajectory they helped to bring into being.

The concomitant political and psychological uncertainties would lead the *dramatis personae* eventually to a rethinking of the socio-cultural meaning and foundation of the direct election itself. In these ways,

the four sets of reversals, taken together, marked the essential morphology of the direct election, the gist of which can only be unravelled with recourse to the Hong Kong cultural milieu as a whole.

The first and most obvious reversal in the 1991 direct election was the far from trivial discrepancy between the projected participation of voters and the actual voting rate. This reversal was all the more striking when viewed in light of the drummed up political festivities of the pre-election campaigns. While poor turn-out rate is nothing new for elections in Hong Kong, in this instance it carried the disturbing signal that, for the majority of qualified voters, perhaps the direct election was nothing new either. It was widely publicized, in both governmental and campaigning media, that a vote cast in the election would be a vote in support of the ideal of democratization, regardless of who one might vote for.[4] The multifarious and comprehensive campaign activities, on the other hand, presumably also injected a significant dose of civil and democratic awareness into everyday life. It was therefore not surprising that most pre-election polls had been consistently optimistic in estimating the turn-out rate of voters. The most hopeful ones set the estimate at around 75 per cent, while even the more conservative estimates, including that of the Government's, set the figure at over 50 per cent. These different estimates and polls varied widely in terms of methodological rigor and samples drawn, yet indicating the same encouraging level of enthusiasm.[5] Were these figures viewed in light of the pre-election excitement, and of the heightening demand for democratization made urgent by the June 4th incident, they were not at all unrealistic. Hence, when the actual turn-out rate came to just less than 40 per cent, it had to be considered one of the least expected reversals of the 1991 direct election — to say nothing of the embarrassment it caused for the community of political analysts, researchers, and pollsters. This reversal left ample room for undermining the mandate of the elected candidates. As well, it reflected badly on the alleged determination of the population for faster pace of democratization. There were *post-factum* rationalizations that sought to place the turn-out rate on a par with regular municipal elections conducted elsewhere. Yet, such simplistic comparisons effectively dismissed the landmark status of the 1991 direct election that was being emphasized all along. The disjunction between expectations and outcomes, in this instance, constituted an ironic and damaging reversal of the 1991 election.

The second reversal was a somewhat happier one, namely the unex-

pected landslide victory of the democrats. This victory offset to some extent the depressing turn-out rate. In fact, even as the many pre-election polls had predicted, candidates from the United Democrats of Hong Kong — and others running for a democratic platform — were as a rule leading the pack. Yet, when such estimates were more than fully actualized, it appeared that both the candidates, their supporters, and members of the public were equally taken by surprise. Though the landslide victory of the democrats was not wholly unexpected, the momentum and extent of its actualization were enough to distract the composure and perspective of those in the front line. This reversal of the democratic victory contrasted sharply with the apathy of the low turn-out rate. While the majority remained silent, those who did speak up clearly supported the quest for democracy. Both of these constitutive facets were part and parcel of the volatile political situation epitomised in the 1991 direct election.[6] Caught in the tension between apathy and support, the elected candidates were given highly mixed signals the precise meaning of which would be difficult to ascertain.

A third moment of reversal took place during the campaigning period, with the progressive displacement of policy platforms by more instrumental tactics of mobilization, to the point where the policy positions of the candidates were all but marginalized. The espoused centrality of a feasible and consistent policy framework was of course never questioned, and candidates dutifully delineated their prospective policy positions on issues of social well-being, as well as of economic and political stability.[7] When the election campaign was in full swing, however, most of the mobilization activities centred around two agenda that increasingly steered focus away from the substantive policy concerns of the candidates. The first of these concerned the alleged political — even partisan — affiliation of the candidates, while the second agenda focused on the actual method and means most effective for mobilizing the voters. These agenda were largely external to the horizon of policy proposals of the candidates, emphasizing instead the primacy of instrumental strategies at both the generalized and specific levels. In the reversal that took place in the 1991 election, the displacement of policy propositions by tactical deployment was both unabashed and widespread. In consequence, by the time of the election day, policy platforms had all but ceased to count as significant factors.[8] At a more general level of campaign strategies, the scramble for votes soon escalated into a battle of political labelling. Going beyond the usual dichotomy of the pro-Chinese

as versus the pro-democratic camps, the labelling game would extend backward into the past (Did anyone subscribe to the doctrine of the Gang of Four?) and downward into real-life conducts (Who failed to join the mass demonstration during June-Fourth? Who were holders of foreign passports?).[9] This political labelling could be so pervasive, and with the left-leaning candidates generally on the defensive, that an alleged pro-Chinese posture became "the kiss of death." Apart from this general practice of name-calling, another side of the escalating primacy of tactical means was the level of grassroots campaign. These included deployments such as the formation of double-bills, mobilizing supports of — or countering opposition from — local interest groups, floor to floor "mopping up" campaign on the election day, estimating the distribution and control of "fool-proof" votes, and so forth.[10] Many of the candidates, both in action and in words, openly admitted the overriding decisiveness of the smart campaign manoeuvres. The attention of the voters, on the other hand, was easily diverted by the more exciting prospects of candidates engaging in a shouting match of political stigmatization. This reversal of priority in policy platforms and campaign tactics no doubt stemmed from complex origins. It may have reflected more on the overall momentum and direction of the election campaign as a whole, rather than on the attitude and ability of the candidates. What may have been more pertinent here was, however, the fact that, once a candidate was elected, the reversal concerned had to be reversed yet again, with the elected candidates putting their policy platforms in actual operation. In a manner of speaking, the voters could only decide after-the-fact if indeed they had approved of the more down to earth policy positions — as well as their manner of execution — of the candidates they voted into office.

This point was closely related to the last instance of reversal that could be observed in the 1991 direct election. This last reversal captured in a moment of exceptional clarity all the zigzagging and the wavering that underlined the unfolding of the direct election. What was involved here was the intricate dynamics between the elected democratic candidates and the voters. In a matter of days, the cheering of the democratic winners degenerated into widespread criticism of their alleged complacency and rashness. This drastic attitudinal turn-around was triggered off by the unlikely episode of the alleged recommendation name-list for appointment to the Legislative Council.[11] The confusion over this episode was perhaps best understandable in terms of the symbolic meaning of the name-list in question. The widespread criticism of the members of

the United Democrats of Hong Kong was essentially a gesture to put them in their place, so to speak, for they plausibly exaggerated their perceived mandate from the people. The complex signal sent across in this episode suggested that, even though the democratic candidates had enjoyed a landslide victory, they were not to regard themselves as winners too unreservedly because it was somehow not entirely their victory as such. As many observers already noted, the massive support that the democrats attained was to no small extent based on the survival of the June-Fourth syndrome, as well as on the outright opposition against the pro-Chinese and the more conservative candidates.[12] The victory of the democrats was clearly instigated in part by a political gesture that the majority of voters sought to assert, which geared to spite both the Chinese and the Hong Kong governments. The subsequent landslide victory, thus, could not be taken at face value, as it was based more on the political gesture than on the political commitment of the voters. The mandate that was endowed hence had a fundamental ambiguity to it. The cross-purposes between the candidates and the voters were clearly revealed once the democrats exercised in a forthright manner their perceived mandate from the people. The public was taken by surprise when symbolic gestures transfigured into political practice. Whereas the democratic candidates were equally taken aback when the mandate they received turn out to be far less clear-cut and unconditional than had been assumed.

The four moments of reversals outlined in the above, taken together, indicated the ambiguities and wavering that underlined the 1991 direct election, *qua* the first major step of democratization in Hong Kong. It is of course possible to maintain that such turbulence is unavoidable in the initial stage of democratization. Yet this position precisely underscores the fact that the so-called democratic climate in Hong Kong is far from attaining well-defined shape. And there is no obvious reason to believe that it will in due course. The low voting rate was of course a key symptom of what transpired in the election. The same must hold true for the reversal of centrality in policy platform and campaign tactics. Even when the democrats achieved the victory they did, it turned out to be less than a fully fledged commitment by the public concerned. The detailed mechanisms for all these setbacks and reversals cannot be diagnosed in full here. Yet broadly speaking, the 1991 direct election remained an unreliable touchstone in the forging of democracy. Many problems and gaps must yet be ironed out, before one can begin to tell with any

certainty which direction the next step would take. And what the four sets of reversal amount to is the fact that, as the situation stands, the quest for democratization in Hong Kong remains largely pitched at the level of emotion and yearning. Both the potentials and the limits of this democratic aspiration will have important ramifications on the trajectory of political development in Hong Kong.

Perceiving the Popular Cultural Milieu

How then can one make sense of the manner of unfolding of the 1991 direct election? How can the reversals — the hesitation and wavering of the democratic climate be accounted for? The lack of pertinent political tradition and experience can of course explain part of the picture. It will be, furthermore, suggested that the inherent limits of the democratic impulse in fact goes far beyond the political horizon itself. Both the claims and the lacunae of the prevailing democratic culture are themselves embedded within the cultural milieu of Hong Kong society at large. Political culture is part and parcel of the overarching cultural milieu, and its character and form cannot be fully comprehended independent of the latter. Hence, the centrality of a unified problematic of cultural climate and democratic climate. To unravel political culture in terms of the stated claims, self-espoused attitude, or projected behaviour of the individuals concerned, can be a tenuous project taken in itself. It is only by contextualizing political culture within broader cultural parameters that the credibility and meaningfulness of the political culture surveyed can be ascertained. K. Eder has formulated the situation in somewhat more extreme terms, when he maintains:

> Neither political opinions nor voting decisions can be taken as empirical indicators for political culture. Rather, they are a result of political culture, and in order to be able to interpret election results and survey data, we have to be familiar with the political cultures of those expressing their opinions and voting. Thus, the indicator of political culture itself turns out to be a dependent variable of political culture.... (Eder, 1992:107)

In thus problematizing the concept of political culture, Eder was effectively emphasizing the cultural foundation that underlined political opinions and behaviour. Without understanding the wider cultural foun-

dation involved, it becomes difficult to project plausible political behaviour, as well as to interpret its meaning afterward. While people may uphold certain political attitude in good faith, the picture would change rapidly if in practice such attitude should contradict or compete against other more fundamental cultural beliefs they simultaneously uphold. The crux of the problem, in other words, does not lie in the self-espoused attitude and preferences of the individual. It lies rather in the imperatives of practical vicissitudes, when not everything one believes in can be upheld at the same time or embraced in the same agenda. The priority and choice that one eventually decides upon may have more to do with accustomed framework of cultural practice — which one can fall back upon in case of unresolved value conflict — than with personal volition or reason as such. The following, therefore, seeks to map out this broader setting of cultural practice, before moving on to consider the cultural embeddedness of the democratic aspiration of Hong Kong.[13]

The pursuit of this agenda inevitably brings to the fore the fact that, in the multi-faceted social world of Hong Kong, there is no comprehensive and integrative national culture, high culture, or even a persistent cultural tradition *per se*. In the various facets of cultural life in Hong Kong, fragments of these cultural horizons no doubt can be located. And many observers still look on "Hong Kong culture" as but idiosyncratic versions of western culture, Chinese culture, colonial culture, or what not. The implication is that, if there really is a cultural foundation underlying the society of Hong Kong, this foundation can only be a fragmentary, incoherent one. In so far as the practical conduct of everyday life is concerned, other modes of cultural pragmatics must be resorted to, which will, on the one hand, fashion the direction of everyday livelihood while, on the other hand, sufficiently mesmerizing to camouflage the lacunae of a divisive cultural foundation. Hence the deeper imperatives which exist behind the pervasiveness of popular culture formation in Hong Kong.

In this light, popular culture figures not simply as one constellation of cultural artifacts in the domain of socio-cultural dynamics. What is crucial is to recognize the strategic, privileged position that popular culture occupies in the indigenous cultural formations of Hong Kong. As a society largely banished from the security of a well-consolidated cultural foundation, the socio-cultural prerequisites of society is met largely within the more immediate, mundane, and even arbitrary universe of popular culture. This accounts for both the apparent glamour and the

alleged vulgarity of cultural life in Hong Kong.[14]

Generally speaking, the foremost characteristic that can be underscored in the makeup of the Hong Kong cultural milieu is precisely this schistic complexity. In very broad strokes, and as tentative observations in this regard, the cultural climate as reflected or epitomized in the popular culture formation of Hong Kong can be conceived in terms of three contradistinctive constellations of cultural discourses. These can be preliminarily identified as the cultures of affluence, of survival, and of deliverance. The juxtaposition of these general spheres of cultural discourses together defines the dynamic fabric of cultural mentality in present-day Hong Kong, as will be outlined in the following. The interactive dynamics and directions of this cultural mentality in very important ways delimit the option of socio-political practice available to the individuals involved.

The culture of affluence here postulated builds on the sense of material abundance that has become pervasive in Hong Kong from the mid-1970s onward. This is a trend not confined solely to popular cultural formation. Yet in so far as the popular culture industry is closely associated with entertainment and satisfaction in social life, the widening sense and scale of affluence is readily reflected in the transformation that the popular culture industry itself has gone through. Even mainly at the level of institutional forms and development, the expansion of sense of affluence, of consumerism and materialism, or even of a general climate of hedonism, is clearly revealed in the multiplicity of cultural choices and forms. Such expansion of cultural horizon took place during the same conjuncture that saw Hong Kong's rise as an international metropolis. The rapid accumulation and concentration of resources, whether financial, cultural or technological, cannot be divorced from this trend.

The consequent façade of freedom and potency emerged in concomitance with the easy availability of cultural choices, whether in genres, styles, or price range. The trajectory of this progressive expansion in cultural freedom can be illustrated in particular by the shifting fortunes of the television industry in Hong Kong. It was, afterall, the initial impact of television that first extended significantly the horizon of cultural choices in Hong Kong in the early 1970s. Furthermore, it was this same perpetual widening of the horizon of cultural choices into other genres and media that eventually undermined the hegemony of television broadcasting in the Hong Kong world of popular culture. This path of fluctuating fortunes is hence indicative of the expanding scenario of choices in popular

culture production at large.

If one moves beyond this initial cultural discourse of affluence, as based primarily on generic diversity and growth, a second cultural discourse can be uncovered that counter-balances a perspective representing Hong Kong as simply an arena of affluence and fulfilment. In so far as the substantive makeup of the popular culture universe is concerned, the need for thematic and textual variations necessarily undermines any simplistic, wishful projection of affluence and fulfillment. The latter is admittedly there, but mitigated by more down to earth recognition of both the promises and setbacks of city life. Especially in cultural formations that rely on textual narratives of various forms, e.g. romance fiction, movies, TV drama, and so forth, the appeal of material abundance will have to be given concrete plots and settings, and balanced with contrasting themes and motifs. In so doing, it is often inevitable to evoke the more problematic side of social life that haunts the majority of the populace. It is hence that one may suggest, beyond the culture of affluence and fulfilment, the popular culture world also epitomizes a more realistic cultural discourse of survivalism, reflecting the enigma of life experiences at both the levels of the individuals as well as the collectivity.

At the more personal level, survival and stoicism have to do with the quest of individuals for self-actualization through the course of social life. The city, as empirical incarnation of society, is rightly seen as an arena of resources, of possibilities and hopes. Yet these may not be readily realized even after dire struggles. It is in this respect that city romance, in the form of popular novels or TV melodrama, converges with romance as a literary genre. In both cases, the hero must face up against a quest and its associated struggles, in both allegorical and realistic terms.[15] As for the more collective level, even the survival of society *per se* can be at stake. How to sustain collective survival against overwhelming historical odds is not an easy question to answer. This is of course a theme that has attained urgent primacy for Hong Kong, in the face of the impending 1997 transition.

The juxtaposition of these contradistinctive cultural discourses, as captured in the dynamics of popular culture formations, set the foundation for a third cultural discourse of Hong Kong. This discourse evokes the imagery of enchantment and aura of the city, by means of which realistic enigma may at least be imaginarily suspended. In a less elevating sense, this is the aura of intoxication, of escapism, commonly associated with the popular culture industry, which renders the latter heavily suspect by the more highly aspiring critics. Yet it would seem that this sphere of cultural enchantment can be more diffused and complex than commonly assumed. Ultimately, at this level of cultural formation, the city is not merely the arena of tension between fulfilment and survival, but is possibly also the arena of deliverance and defiance. This use of enchantment as vehicle of deliverance can be best illustrated by the movie industry — as the alleged "factory of dreams." Especially in the raving popularity of comedies in Hong Kong, life experiences can be rendered more tolerable through the use of jokes, dark humour, or outright farce. In its extreme form, essentially all situations can be laughed at, including even the toughest obstacles or the most sacred — therefore most burdensome — ideals. Hence the resulting mood of defiance and deliverance.[16]

One may suggest that it is this cultural discourse of deliverance which, ultimately, provides the foundation whereby the cultures of fulfilment and of survival can attain delicate balance. In this way, the three sets of discourse converge into a unique if volatile configuration of cultural mentality. This catalytic discourse of defiance and deliverance is best exemplified in the general profusion of comical genres in the Hong Kong popular culture scene. Of the ten most popular movies in each year of the 1980s, the percentage of comedies averaged at about 70 per cent. In the three consecutive years of 1984-1986, each year nine out of the ten most popular movies were comedy — or mix-genred movies with a clear comical bent.[17] It should be noted that, even as a literary genre, comedy is closely associated with the urban setting. Comedy relies on the manoeuvring of contexts and situations, to create pleasant disjunction or surprises that delight its audience. In contrast, tragedy appeals to slow changing, deeper human conditions and principles. And in so far as the city provides the greatest variations of contexts and situations, it pertains readily to the cultural formations of the comic, the farcical, or even the absurd.[18]

With the delineation of these three sets of cultural discourses then, a three-fold construct of the Hong Kong cultural milieu might be put forward, as exemplified by its more palpable representation in the popular cultural formations. What this paper has tentatively charted is the complex cultural terrain that sets the stage for attitudes and expression towards other spheres of pragmatic, down to earth pursuits — including of course the pursuit of an acceptable political order. The intertwining of

cultural discourses — of affluence, survival, and deliverance — together delimits the field of plausible socio-political attitudes and action commensurate with this multiplex cultural dynamics. This would be a case of the Weberian elective affinity, where not so much a process of causation, but a process of juggling for goodness of fit will shape the limit of possibilities for more pragmatic, down to earth pursuits and attitudes.[19] Contrary to what other more impatient observers may insist on, the operation of culture cannot be naively reduced into mechanistic chains of causation. The hermeneutically oriented categories such as interpretive understanding and elective affinity, on the other hand, seek to underline the fundamental embeddedness and correspondence of varieties of cultural pragmatics, within a broader, overarching framework of cultural mentality. And with the outlined morphology of this cultural construct in place, its intertwining with the actual contour of socio-political development can be more closely gauged.

Perceiving the Intertwining of Culture and Politics

This way, if one of the major empirical endeavours in Hong Kong society has to do with the re-fashioning of political form and institution, through election or otherwise, this empirical process cannot be understood apart from the underlying horizon of political culture. And yet the political culture of the Hong Kong populace itself must be comprehended also in terms of its entrenchment in the more embracing, pervasive cultural mentality. The present essay seeks to uncover the latter via the discursive dynamics of popular culture formation. Political culture cannot go against the tides of cultural milieu at large. The added complication, in the case of Hong Kong, is, however, that there is no well-defined course or direction to speak of in the prevailing cultural outlook. The discourses of affluence, of survival, and of deliverance, as portrayed in the above, are essentially cultural forces that pull in diverging directions, and none may be viewed as domineering in any fundamental, sustained sense. In addition, these cultural discourses must be embraced in a tenuous balance of some kind, both at the individual and the collective levels. The fragility of this balance dictates that it must be constantly adjusted, reshaped in order to accommodate new changes or development. Without the benefit of a well-defined cultural direction or foundation, it

follows that stable, coherent socio-cultural ideals will be difficult to sustain — and this holds true also in the sphere of political ideals. Hence the symptomatic case of a democratic yearning that is unable to articulate itself into a systematic framework of understanding, reason, and action. This line of formulation will merit closer examination.

The crux of the problem amounts to that, in a very real sense, the ingrained tension and conflict in the cultural universe can have no easy, feasible resolution. It is not a question of choice in one's encountering with the culture of affluence and the culture of survival. Both are part and parcel of the complex conditions of everyday reality in Hong Kong. Whereas the kind of defiance or even redemption that might be attained in a quest of deliverance can only be a partial one, staying largely as but emotional outlet. The real interlocking of glamour and predicament remains in place within the structuration of social development and assumes different acuity of urgency under changing socio-political scenarios. The uncertainties and strain thus resulting cannot be removed through either cultural imperatives or psychological volition. In encountering this overpowering historical vicissitude, the contingency of individuals can be temporarily masqueraded, but not permanently redressed. This would apply not simply to such cataclysmic events as June 4th or 1997, but in general to the fabric of social life conducts in Hong Kong.

The crucial outcome of this surface light-heartedness and ingrained enigma is the *de facto* renunciation of positive commitment of one kind or another. Such commitment, whether of a political or socio-cultural character, would be futile if realistic constraints go far beyond what individual assertion might accomplish. Such commitment will also be seemingly redundant in so far as these constraints are often concealed, even defied, through invoking cultural enchantment of one kind or another. This is, then, the intricate dynamics that flow from the three-way strain that make up the substance of the Hong Kong cultural milieu.

If no feasible socio-political alternative can be construed and accepted, if no such alternative can be put forth as convincing resolution for the complex labyrinth at hand, it follows that the urge for commitment and positive participation can have no unifying direction or goal as such. Enthusiasm and emotion notwithstanding, in the absence of convincing and feasible societal goal, even more positive, progressive posture cannot be concretized into clear vision and agenda. At issue is not any superficial absence of sincerity, aspiration, or enthusiasm on the part of the public, but also a question of the lack of commensurate and convinc-

ing agenda of practice.

It can be noted that, as a subsidiary movie genre of the 1980s, the so-called heroic movies have also taken a pride of place besides comical genres of various shades. In a very real sense, these so-called heroic movies express positive commitment to various subcultural values, and to the self-actualization of the individuals. Such quest for positive values, as part of the constituting facets of the cultural mentality, stands for the more hopeful, elevating side of the latter. Portents of commitment and sincerity are, therefore, not entirely absent from the Hong Kong cultural mentality. This quest for positive assertion, however, cannot translate into more realistic attributes of the cultural mentality but must remain entrenched within the sphere of myth-making in popular culture. This is so because in the violent, gangster infested world of the heroic movies, the kind of values emphasized — usually loyalty to other gang brothers or the unscrupulous strive for a better future — cannot be carried over into spheres of everyday life. Its feasibility and persuasion can only be attained within the insulated parameters of the fictive, popular cultural world. The irony is, therefore, that, in so far as some value and commitment can still inject inspiration for audience of popular culture, they do so only by virtue of their remoteness from the pragmatic, everyday way of life.

Furthermore, the quest for these more positive values, even as portrayed in the popular cultural world, involved cost and sacrifice that could well be fatal or disastrous for the heros concerned. The tragic glamour that these sacrifices conjure up can be immensely touching for the audience, yet it is by no means what the viewing public is willing to — or capable of — replicating in reality. The momentary absorption in the movie world, albeit how moving or inspiring, cannot supersede the imperatives of reality, which prescribe that sacrifice and damage are to be avoided as far as possible. While the elation and goodness of heart can be comforting and touching for the audience, the inherent limit here is that the sense of emotional catharsis thus obtained must remain pragmatically irrelevant.

With these two sets of limiting parameters in place, it is then no accident that the heroic movies stand secondary to the comical genres. The latter blends in much more readily as a general everyday attitude. In the absence of any recognized, master ideal of whatever kind, essentially any ideal upheld can be questioned, dismissed, or laughed at — including of course the rebuilding of the socio-political framework of life. Laughter and mockery would be the most natural response to an enlightened, yet post-utopian milieu. The case of Hong Kong society can be viewed in the same light.

Conclusion

The above excursus has thus arrived at the heart of the problem. While there has been general outcry for political expression and participation in Hong Kong, yet it does appear that the sustained formation of political activism can be incompatible with the shared cultural climate. A persistent and stable cultural ideal cannot be generated which can justify and inspire prolonged struggle and sacrifice in political life. Instead, what takes place is a cluster of often mutually inconsistent, more down to earth interests that have to be tackled in an episodic, utilitarian manner. The unresolved tension among cultural discourses, in the end, dictates that cultural ideals in Hong Kong would be in the main fragmentary and momentary in character. As yet, it remains difficult for the majority of population to both agree on fundamental socio-political ideals worth pursuing, and uphold political action and sacrifices over a meaningful period of time. And these, one may postulate, are the limits that the cultural milieu has imposed on the political development of Hong Kong. It is within the setting of these limits that dynamics of political events such as the direct election are eventually shaped. As for the individuals, *qua* bearers and agents of this milieu, the ambiguity and ambivalence of the situation can always be camouflaged in light-hearted, unconcerned laughter. These will be the laughter of the self-aware cynics, mocking the *a priori* futility of securing durable meaning in a world of ephemeral changes. In the case of Hong Kong, this undercurrent of cynicism already had its root in the ideology and practice of colonialism. With the oncoming of the transitional phase, it inevitably surges to the forefront of cultural consciousness, by way of the interactive strains of cultural discourses. One can almost postulate that, in the case of Hong Kong, pervasive cynicism is the joint product of the colonial original sin and the 1997 apocalypse.

This invocation of cynicism and the cynical reason thus encapsulates in one perspicacious moment the condition of culture and polity in Hong Kong. The three discursive facets of affluence, survival, and deliv-

erance cannot be contained otherwise. Their simultaneous yet contradistinctive hold over the collective mind of the people remains a schistic one. And to avoid the prolonged agony of schism and despair, a cynical posture provides the form of containment that ensures the temporary stability of socio-cultural order, allowing the individual to shift smoothly from one discursive facet of culture to another.[20] Such would be the enigmatic essence of the cultural milieu of Hong Kong. And the democratic impulse that pervades the 1991 direct election summarized in one stroke the simultaneous stronghold of hope, reality, and ambivalence.

The wavering and reversals of the 1991 direct election, as part and parcel of the democratic aspiration in present-day Hong Kong, were then symptomatic of certain deep-seated enigma in the underlying cultural milieu. It is not so much a lack of experience or of political maturity that is at issue. The point appears to be that, in so far as the underlying cultural milieu can be antithetical to the persistent formation of sustainable values and commitment, the fully fledged consolidation and articulation of a democratic culture would be a tenuous project. This being the case, the impulsive reversals and set-backs of democratic spirit, whether at the levels of collective movement or of voting behaviour, may well be integral to the schistic formation of the Hong Kong cultural milieu itself. This would hold true when voters fail to show up during election day, or when they turn the table against the elected candidates hot on the heel of their victory. As well, this would also hold true when excitement of campaign strategies rapidly displace the meaning of policy ideals, or when prejudice for or against the Chinese or Hong Kong government seal the fate of the candidates. This is not to assert that such wild reversals or impulsive response are "caused" by the cultural climate in any immediate, simplistic sense. It would be even more wrong-headed to seek one-to-one correspondence between facets of the direct election and aspects of the cultural milieu. The point is rather to view these reversals and impluse as themselves part and parcel of the politico-cultural formation prevalent in current Hong Kong society. Furthermore, the uncertainties and indirection as exemplified in this political culture, even amidst proclaimed determination and optimism, must be understood with reference to the formation of the overarching cultural milieu as such — a cultural milieu constituted by schistic discursive formations, and the resultant pervasive streak of cynicism. Hence the reversals and fluctuation of the 1991 direct election, which even if indeed unexpected, are by no means accidental or peripheral. There is no need for undue pessimism

even in the face of these wild fluctuations. What does require underscoring is the fact that, events and moments of socio-political development do have their fundamental roots in the perhaps less then tangible sphere of cultural climate and mentality, via individuals as simultaneously agents of culture and politics. The strive for political change, in other words, cannot be undertaken apart from the strive for more penetrating, commensurate cultural changes.

Notes

1. This position is by and large shared even by such prominent political theorists as J. Habermas, whose position is well summed up in the following:

   > The targeted voters are approached not through enlightenment but through appeals to consumerist behaviour, and not by agitators or even "propagandists" of the old type but by advertising experts.... The result is not understanding or agreement with policies but a "symbolic identification" with leaders that is measurable, and further opened to manipulation.... (Cohen and Arato, 1992:246)

2. This more classical position is still maintained by such modern doyen of democratic theory as R. Dahl, who observes that, in his democratic system of polyarchy:

   > Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in relatively frequent, fair, and free elections in which coercion is quite limited.... Citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials, the conduct of the government, the prevailing political, economic, and social system, and the dominant ideology. (Dahl, 1989:233)

3. On this rather blatant facet of the 1991 direct election, see for example the following reports and criticism: Shiu, Lo-sin, "Two Much Fanfare, Too Little Choices," *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, 10 September 1991. "The Direct Election Should Not Be Promoted Like a Carnival," *Ta Kung Pao*, 2 September 1991. "Scholars' view on Media Coverage of the Election," *Ta Kung Pao*, 5 September 1991.
4. It is interesting to note that this emphasis on the more elevating meaning of the direct election extends even to the Chinese government. The

semi-official Chinese magazine *Zijing (Bauhinia)*, for example, published an extensive comment entitled "An Important Step in the Learning and Practice of Democracy" in its September issue, 1991.

5. The *Ming Pao* for example ran a series of polls in August and September, projecting in general a voting rate of 60 to 70 per cent (see 26 August and 9 September issues). Another poll commissioned by the *Hong Kong Standard* also reported a projected turn-out rate of 60.9 per cent (see 26 August issue). These figures were quite representative of the barrage of polls and surveys published in August and September 1991.
6. On the variegated and sharply divergent reactions towards the liberal victory, see for example the following comments: Lee Ming-kwan, "The 91 Election: Another Step towards Political Democratization," *Wen Wei Po*, 25 September 1991. "Listening for the Silent Majority," "The Liberals' New Balancing Act," both in *South China Morning Post*, 17 September 1991. As well, left-leaning newspapers devoted much of their effort to challenging the liberals on the one hand, and analyzing the leftist defeat on the other.
7. The policy position of the candidates were of course laid out in their campaigning materials. As well, newspaper reports of the campaigns also sought to contrast positions of different candidates. One typical approach pitched this contrast along the following questions: Hong Kong-China relation, political system, Vietnamese boat people, public security, labour, housing, and the economy (see *Wen Wei Po*, September 1991, various issues). The concreteness and feasibility of these various policy programmes were of course often open to question.
8. Two factors might be responsible for the progressive marginalization of policy platforms. On the one hand, the vagueness and lack-lustre outlook of many policy programmes did not leave much room for meaningful debates or discussion. And in consequence, conduct of election campaign as well as media coverage resorted to other more controversial attributes of the candidates. For observation in these regard, see for example, "How to Cast a Sacred Ballot?" *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, 15 September 1991; special column "Behind Election Activities," *Ming Pao*, 8 September 1991.
9. While the left-leaning candidates were usually hard put to defend their pro-China posture, the case of the self-proclaimed moderate, Chan Yuk-Cheung, was especially illustrative of this shift towards political stigmatization. Thus, he was repeatedly challenged for his alleged loyalty to the Gang of Four during his student days, a charge that he vehemently denied. This led to a political advertisement by his former acquaintances that openly questioned his integrity. Chan was involved as well in controversies regarding foreign passports. While he himself had attacked other candidates for possibly holding a foreign passport, it was discovered by the press that he had twice unsuccessfully applied for naturalization to become British subject. In the case of Chan, these accusations plagued his candidacy right up to his narrow defeat on the election day.
10. The various strategies of grassroots mobilization provided much of the substance of newspaper coverage. For general descriptions of these strategies, see for example, "Elect Me to Benefit Yourself," *Ta Kung Pao*, 8 September 1991; "Different Manoeuvres of the Six Candidates for Kowloon West," *Ta Kung Pao*, 3 September 1991.
11. For analyses and comments on this baffling incident, see for example the special section, "Open Forum: Summing Up Realistically the 'Appointment Squabble'," *Ming Pao*, 24 September 1991; the section contained articles such as, "The Mistake of the United Democrats is Their All Too Sudden Victory," "What's Wrong with Making Request for Appointment?" and others.
12. The dramatic defeat of the leftist candidates had especially sparked off speculations and debates regarding the cause of the defeat. See for example the following discussion: "Commandism Repels Popular Support," *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, 18 October 1991. "Why the Leftist Candidates failed?" *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, 18 October 1991.
13. As already alluded to in the above, this approach has close affinity with the study of socio-cultural mentality as such, a programme made famous by the Annalist School of social history. The point is to pin down the stablest, the most slow-changing foundation of society. And as Le Goff suggests:

    > The social changes more slowly than the economic, and the mental more slowly than the social. (Le Goff, 1985:167)

    In a different context, Le Goff has characterized this programme as:

    > The study of how people represented themselves alongside the study of the way in which they thought and felt.... (Le Goff, 1988:viii)

14. Note that this more potent image of popular culture does not imply

evaluation of its political bearing one way or the other. In fact, perspectives that adopt a more condemnatory posture of popular culture recognizes its primacy as much as perspectives that look upon it as the arena of political possibilities. For a fair sample of both approaches, cf. the two widely contrasting readers: Lazere (1987), and Bennett *et al.* (1986).

15. Hence the popularity of such popular novelist as Yeh Su, who has published more than 120 volumes of fiction and prose, and who may be described as specializing in mapping with great sensitivity the tribulation of individual survival in the city-jungle of Hong Kong.
16. In more theoretical terms, the relation between the comic genre and outside oppression is succinctly summarized in the following observation:

> The comic spirit under tyranny emerges as a positive force, necessary of survival and, indeed, liberating and heroic. Systematic repression induces laughter as a healthy outburst (Gerould, 1978:3).

17. For a full listing of the ten most popular films in each year of the 1980s, see appendix to Lee (1990).
18. On this point, M. Silk's observation is instructive:

> The normality of comedy... lies in its correspondence with, and proximity to, the diversities of life. (Silk, 1988:23)

19. The Weberian notion of elective affinity is developed in the context of Weber's famous attempt to relate Protestant ethics to the formation of Capitalism. It can be suggested that Weber, in this as in his scholarly pursuit in general, sought to steer a middle course between methodological scientism and nihilism. The lesson of his endeavour can easily become lost on dogmatic ears.
20. The essential character of this cynic posture can thus provide some insight into the "in-depth structure" of the Hong Kong mentality. Thus, the foremost theorist of cynicism, Sloterdijk, observed:

> Psychologically, present-day cynics can be understood as borderline melancholics, who can keep their symptoms of depression under control and can remain more or less able to work. Indeed, this is the essential point in modern cynicism: the ability of its bearers to work — in spite of anything that might happen, and especially, after anything that might happen. (Sloterdijk, 1987:5)

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14

The 1991 Elections

An Exploration into the Elite-Mass Relationship in Hong Kong

Ernest Wing-tak Chui

Introduction

It has been ten years now since the Hong Kong people started to enjoy the "privilege" of universal franchise since the introduction of the 1982 District Board (DB) election. Incidentally, to celebrate the decade's achievement, people of Hong Kong further gained in the year 1991 their first chance of electing legislators into the uppermost echelon of the territory. To make the case more dramatic, the same year recorded the unprecedented, consecutive elections at the district, the municipal, and the central, territory-wide levels. The Legislative Council (Legco) election held last year captured the attention of all concerned parties, ranging from officials of the British, Hong Kong, and Chinese governments; the political groups and figures; the academics; and last but not least the ordinary citizens. The election aptly provided a clue for people in different positions to pass their specific interpretations and judgements tailored to their respective motives. Nonetheless, it was undeniably a process of elite recruitment in the local political arena. It is the attempt of

the present paper to explore the possible implications of such a process of elite recruitment, or selection, by the masses in the local context, for the possible development in the territory's political arena. Reference is also made to the political culture of the local people in the analysis of such an unprecedented event.

A Cursory View of the Elites and Masses in Hong Kong

In the discussion of elites in the local context, it is of prime importance to delineate the boundary of the elite groups. Definitive formulations on the concept of elites can be found in classical literature of the disciplines of political sociology and political science. For instance, C.W. Mills formulated his famous postulation of the political, economic, and military elites in society. For other analysts on the issue of elites, Pareto put forward his often-quoted "circulation of elites," designating the change in types of leadership in society. Prewitt and Stone (1973) in their review of elitist theories, summarized the elitist view that democratic values, social stability and progress could be upheld by elites endowed with superior talents and qualities. All these amount to a basis for formulating the conception on the nature of "elites," being the leaders in the social, economic, and political arenas of society. A more contemporary scholar, Etzioni-Halevy (1989) put forward his distinction between "ruling" and "non-ruling" elites in society, to demarcate the political leaders in government from those other leaders in the economic and social spheres.

In the local context, the government is essentially one not constituted by popular election, and is basically a colonial government in nature. Effective rule is not based upon popular consent through the institutional mechanism of elections, but on the domination of career bureaucrats with their collaborators from the leaders in the economic and social circles. Such a feature was well documented by local scholars such as King (1975) and Harris (1978), who coined the benchmark notions of "administrative absorption of politics" and "administrative state" respectively. Before the 1970s when the local populace was characterized by what was regarded as "refugee mentality" (Hoadley, 1970), and "utilitarianistic familism" (Lau, 1978), the government and the civil society were essentially insulated from each other, with minimal mutual

interaction between the two. The masses of Hong Kong were long portrayed as being apolitical, and having instrumental orientation to politics (Lau, 1978, 1990a). Being not particularly prone to ideological aspirations, and having had negative experience in political maneuvers of political parties in the civil wars in the Mainland, the older generation among the citizenry had refrained from political participation. Moreover, being satisfied with the efficiency of the administration in providing a stable social environment, the ordinary people had been satisfied to remain inactive.

As revealed aptly by Leung's (1990) examination of the composition of the Executive (Exco) and Legislative Councils, the ruling elites have basically comprised senior civil servants and business leaders. Such a collaboration between the business interest and the career bureaucrats has been running the society rather smoothly in pursuit of preserving a stable environment for capital accumulation. Being guaranteed the secure positions in the uppermost echelon of the territory's policymaking bodies, the Exco and the Legco, the business elites have remained dormant in organizing into any visible political platform. Given no obvious challenges from both the economic elites and the masses, the senior civil servants have actually been playing the dual roles of policy formulators and interest articulators, as observed by Cheung (1987). Such an "administrative class" has enjoyed exclusive prerogative in policy formulation (Mushkat, 1984). Mushkat's analysis (1982) of such an administrative class revealed that they were largely achievers on the social ladder, remote from the ordinary people in terms of educational attainment as well as income. Thus, it could safely be asserted that the political elites in the local context have been largely composed of bureaucrats and business leaders who have been distant socially and politically from the citizens. Such a distance seems to have engendered people's distrust against the elites within the establishment. It is best revealed by Lau and Kuan's 1985 survey findings that 53.2% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that achievers in social and economic spheres would make good political leaders (Lau and Kuan, 1988).

The relative efficacy of the administration in preserving economic prosperity, given the historical conjuncture of the Korean War and subsequent economic booms, had tamed the local people from resorting to political activism. There apparently was no ground for the blossom and growth of activist political groups. Furthermore, the administration had been cautious in curbing the development of political groups, given the

territory's peculiar political situation of having subtle linkages with both the "left" and "right" factions of Chinese politics. The non-existence of such political groups thereby provided no solid ground for political leaders from outside the establishment to anchor their foothold.

Thus in the final analysis, administrative dominance, coupled with the absence of visible political groups, had resulted in what Lau called "poverty of political leaders" (Lau, 1990a) both within and without the establishment in Hong Kong. It is therefore no surprise to see from Lau and Kuan's 1985 finding that 47.8% of his respondents had no leader in mind to trust (Lau and Kuan, 1988).

However, the social uprisings in the 1970s gave rise to a new group of non-ruling, social leaders who were actually social activists and opinion leaders striving for parochial interests of specific communities. They resorted to unconventional tactics of mass mobilizations in confrontation with the administration in the pursuit of tangible concessions in the social policy domains. Their success, though intermittent and sporadic at large, aroused people's attention and eventual acceptance. Thus, while the prestigious political-cum-economic ruling elites had been remote from the ordinary masses, social activists from amongst the grassroots seemed to have gradually captured people's aspiration for furthering their interests. In Lau and Kuan's same survey, 45.6% opined that political leaders outside the establishment better reflected public opinion than the Exco and Legco members (Lau and Kuan, 1988).

In response to such possible threat to stability from the grassroots, albeit feeble and sporadic, the administration resorted once again to the strategy of absorption, but this time the target was this group of grassroots leaders. The District Administration Scheme at the beginning of the 1980s marked the very first step whereby the administration attempted to accommodate bottom-up political demands. Incidentally, the 1997-Future-of-Hong-Kong issue and the subsequent political repercussions it stirred up fueled the hastened politicization of the territory at large. Unprecedented pace of development of a representative government spread throughout the decade. In actuality, from the 1980s onwards as some of the activists succeeded in entering the legitimate official channels of the representative institutions of the DB and Municipal Councils (MC) through elections, they ascended to become new figures of the political elite for the people. Their affinity to the masses was grounded upon their having similar social background, having worked with the grassroots throughout the 1970s, and their positive outlook in having

liberal-democratic orientations. Furthermore, those of them who were elected DB and MC members made deliberate effort to secure their positions by maintaining close liaison and connection with their respective constituents. It is such a new group of social and political leaders who resorted to "double-barreled approach of using conventional and unconventional channels of political influence" (Chui, 1992:15), who succeeded in capturing a new hope and aspiration from the masses to advance citizens' interest. The proximity to the people in terms of social background and the political strategies of these political leaders were well suited to the local people's utilitarian orientation towards political leaders in meeting their immediate concerns (Lau, 1982). Thus, the masses began to have a new political elite in whom they can vest their hope and aspirations. All in all, the overall composition of the elite groups in the territory began to reshuffle.

The 1991 Elections: Repositioning Elite-Mass Relationship

The 1991 elections for the three tiers of the representative institutions was the first election held after the 1989 June-Fourth Incident in Beijing. It constituted a "political thermometer" for indicating the people's confidence in politics in general and the territory's possible future. The tense political atmosphere rendered by difficult diplomatic relations among the British, Chinese, and Hong Kong governments had precipitated into a genuine mood of insecurity and uncertainty. This even manifested itself into what Lau coined "defeatism cum pessimism" (Lau, 1990a). However, the unprecedented popular election to the territory's legislature, albeit not constituting an election of government, kindled mass aspiration towards selecting a group of vanguards shielding people's interests against possible tyranny of the existing and the future administration. It provided an opportunity for the local people to spell out their political demands through the act of voting. The masses spoke for themselves in such a phenomenal event. Furthermore, the Legco election essentially brought in the novelty of having directly elected legislators for the territory, which basically constituted new positions in the elite groups. The elections brought about subtle changes amongst the masses and the elites alike.

Although there have been reservations about popular election as the means safeguarding people's interests against the leaders — as Rousseau once critically remarked "people are free during elections but not after it" — an election is nonetheless a mechanism whereby the masses can convey their political aspiration towards a group of elites. Thus, a vote is not merely an act of selecting political representatives. It denotes people's orientation towards politics in general and political leaders in particular. It also amounts to expressing some specific expectations upon the representatives' personal qualities and political background as well as political platforms. Furthermore, elections embody a major aspect of elite-mass linkage — electoral mobilization. As Putnam (1970) put it, elites have to solicit mass support for legitimation purpose. Candidates have to appeal to electors on their respective general political platform and issue positions. For incumbent politicians, their success in elections also hinges upon their efficacy in constituency service and in handling grievances and maintaining viable liaison with the masses. The extent to which political leaders secure people's satisfaction towards their performance is also of crucial significance in affecting electoral success, and more importantly in defining the elite-mass relationship.

Thus, in the following discussion on the possible implications of the 1991 Elections for the elite-mass relationship in Hong Kong, the following areas will be dealt with:

1. people's orientation towards political leaders in general;
2. people's expectation about candidate's qualities;
3. elite-mass linkage in terms of electoral mobilization;
4. elite-mass linkage in terms of constituency service; and
5. people's satisfaction towards leaders' performance.

Orientation towards Political Leaders

As suggested by Lau (1992), the people of Hong Kong seem not to be "guided principally by democratic precepts," though attending to vaguely conceived democratic notions. Moreover, they are attaching utilitarian orientations to politics in general as well as political leaders in particular, as pointed out by Lau (1990a) and Leung (1986). Such a political orientation can also be detected from a 1991 DB survey (Yeung and Chui, 1992b): respondents appeared to be having rather mixed orientations towards political leaders. For instance, 48.6% of respondents disagreed that "Given that a society is ruled by a few able people, it is better to talk about democracy in vacuum," which strikes a contrary tone against the elitist position. Moreover, 56.8% disagreed with the statement that "The government should treat its citizens like parents treat their children, having the element of authority." This apparently reflects people's resentment against the authoritarian political outlook characteristic of older-generation Chinese people. These seem to suggest that people of Hong Kong are increasingly attuned to broadly conceived democratic ideals. However, a comparable proportion of respondents tended to disregard the democratic precept of popular election: 52.8% agreed that "Given that the leaders of a society can take care of the majority's will, it is not crucial how they come to power." This might reflect their having pragmatic orientation or the remnants of traditional Chinese attitude in looking upon capable elites as benefactors of the people. It might also be interpreted as people's realization of the futility of election in the local context. Nonetheless, this apparent discord between attuning to democratic precepts and having utilitarian outlook among the local citizens might be interpreted as an uneasy compromise between the real and the ideal.

Before the introduction of popular election, interest articulation for the citizens had largely been shouldered by opinion leaders outside the establishment. With the ascendancy of elected political leaders at various levels of the advisory-cum-representative government machinery, there emerges a group of political elites playing the roles of vanguard for citizens' interest. Thus, people of Hong Kong appear to be increasingly identified with this group of political figures as having relevance to their immediate interest, especially when these elites are within "the establishment." Such an assertion finds its anchorage in a survey finding of the 1991 MC election: a majority of 57.6% of respondents disagreed that "The Urban/Regional Councillor's issues are not relevant to my own." Furthermore, in a 1991 Legco election survey, it was revealed that people were vesting in the newly elected legislators high expectations of interest articulation: 74.1% of respondents confided that the more directly elected members there were in the Legco, the better would the citizens' interest be protected (Yeung and Chui, 1992b).

Direct election to the legislature is essentially not an election of government in the local context. It merely amounts to the introduction of a "formally recognized pressure group" (as remarked by some local

political analysts) or countervailing force within the establishment vis-à-vis the collaborating power camp of the bureaucrats and the business elites. As local political observer Lo Chi-kin observed, the Legco direct election was essentially one whereby the citizens could elect opposition leaders to counteract administrative dominance (Lo, 1991). Thus, it is obvious that the local people are having high expectations about the new batch of political elites in the newly constituted Legco. As revealed in a survey, 60.7% of respondents agreed that "Those directly elected Legislative Councillors are likely to be leaders of good quality." This is to be contrasted to the distrust against the supposed allies of the administration — the appointed and functional constituency representatives — 62.3% and 64.6% agreed respectively that the former would only speak for the government and the latter would only consider the interest of their representing groups (Yeung and Chui, 1992b). Here, we can detect a grain of resentment among the local people against the administration which has been dominated by bureaucrats and business tycoons.

However, even though the people are placing high hopes upon the directly elected elites, they are somewhat ambivalent about the actual efficacy of these new contesters. While 31.5% of respondents disagreed that the directly elected Legco members would realize their promises made during the campaigns, a further 46.2% even had doubts about it by giving "no opinion" to the question (Yeung and Chui, 1992b). This invites two possible interpretations in terms of the people's perception of the elites. Firstly, it might indicate an element of distrust against the candidates' political rhetoric made during the campaigns. On the other hand, it might possibly imply the citizens' awareness of the structural and political constraints confronting the elected minority in putting forth their policy proposals in the Legco.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a trend of increasing demand for the elites' accountability to the public. A great majority of 93.6% of respondents agreed to the statement that the Legco members should report constantly to the citizens about their work (Yeung and Chui, 1992b). This apparently bespeaks of the demand for increasing direct contact between the elites and the masses in the local political arena.

Table 1 Orientation towards Political Leaders (1991 Survey) (%)

Statement	Agree	Dis-agree	No opinion	Don't know	(N)
District Board					
Given that a society is ruled by a few able people, it is better to talk about democracy in vacuum.	35.3	48.6	9.0	7.1	(764)
Given that the leaders of a society can take care of the majority will, it is not crucial how they come to power.	52.8	37.6	5.6	4.0	(771)
The government should treat its citizens like parents treat their children, having the element of authority.	34.4	56.8	5.4	3.4	(762)
Municipal Councils					
The Urban/Regional Councillors' issues are not relevant to my own.	32.4	57.6	1.2	8.9	(429)
Legislative Council					
Legislative Councillors elected from functional constituencies will only consider the interest of their representing groups, more than that of the entire Hong Kong people.	64.6	24.7	3.7	6.8	(674)
Appointed Legislative Councillors will only speak for the government.	62.3	30.5	4.6	2.7	(676)
The directly elected Legislative Councillors are likely to be leaders of good quality.	60.7	30.9	4.7	3.7	(676)
The directly elected Legislative Councillors will realize the promise they made in their platforms during the election campaigns.	18.3	31.5	46.2	3.8	(675)
The Legislative Councillors should constantly report to the citizens about their work.	93.6	3.0	1.3	2.1	(676)

A Figuration of Elite Characteristics

An election is basically a matter of selection based upon the electors' supposedly rational choices. Such choices can further be apprehended as the conveyance of the elector's aspiration to those who are to be elected as political representatives advancing their rights and interests. The 1991 Elections constituted a process whereby the local people imparted their messages of expectation to the candidates, in terms of quality and performance as political elites at the various levels of the government.

One of the peculiarities of the 1991 Elections was its repetitive nature, giving rise to what has been remarked as "election fatigue" on the part of the electorate. It might be speculated that the government deliberately so arranged the sequence to boost up the voting rate, in view of the citizens' increasing familiarity and habituations with going to vote. Notwithstanding this, the three elections were essentially different in terms of political significance, given the divergence in functions and positions of the three tiers of the representative machinery. For the first two, namely the DB and MC, elections had been held several times, which might suggest the citizens' familiarity and recognition. Moreover, given the relative affinity of the members/councillors at these two levels, in terms of their greater numbers and policy relevance, the electorate's choice of candidate qualities might have been more established. While for the Legco election, given that it was the first time Hong Kong people were so privileged to cast a vote to select their legislators, they might not have figured out a clear configuration of the qualities these candidates should possess. Thus, it is of interest to make a gross comparison among the three, in order to depict any particular picture of the electorate's perception of the different types of elites.

In Yeung and Chui's survey (Yeung and Chui, 1992b), eight different criteria of standing candidates for the three elections and the electorate's general expectations were consistently explored (see Table 2).

Table 2 Respondents' Selection of Candidate Qualities: A Comparison between the Three Levels of Elections in 1991 (%)

Candidate qualities			
Age	**31-40**	**41-50**	**Not important**
DB	38.3	21.9	15.6
MC	33.6	24.8	11.8
Legco	62.0 (minimum)	25.8 (maximum)	
Sex	**Male**	**Female**	**Not important**
DB	28.7	7.2	50.2
MC	32.2	9.0	50.1
Legco	35.9	7.8	56.3
Education	**Tertiary**	**Above-tertiary**	**Not important**
DB	18.8	24.3	25.4
MC	21.6	31.6	21.9
Legco	23.2	36.3	31.2
Occupation	**Professional/Management**		**Not important**
DB	20.7		56.6
MC	20.6		62.9
Legco	29.0		58.4
Local residence/Work	**Yes**	**No**	**Not important**
DB	72.1	15.4	6.4
MC	72.5	17.1	8.8
Legco	53.0	35.6	11.3
Political group affiliation	**Yes**	**No/Independent**	**Not important**
DB	22.8	39.5	23.7
MC	24.7	53.5	13.3
Legco	24.8	34.5	40.1
Acceptable to China	**Yes**	**No**	**Not important**
DB	11.9	57.5	12.6
MC	12.1	67.4	9.3
Legco	28.3	54.9	16.8
Foreign residence	**Yes**	**No**	**Not important**
DB	4.0	60.7	24.8
MC	4.7	75.5	16.6
Legco	5.0	72.5	22.2

Note: "Not important" refers to the respondents who regarded such a criterion as not their major concern.

Source: Adopted from Yeung and Chui (1992b).

As remarked by the two authors, there seemed to be an elitist bias in the respondents' preference for candidates having high educational attainment and respectable professions (Yeung and Chui, 1992a). More specifically, in terms of education, the requirement for high educational attainment increased progressively (in terms of proportion) from the DB to the Legco: DB 24.3%, MC 31.6%, and Legco 36.3% of respondents of the respective surveys voted for candidates with "tertiary or above" level of education. Though a sizable proportion of the respondents alleged to disregard occupation as a crucial criterion of their selection for the three levels of elections, the category of "professionals" was singled out as the most frequently chosen item across the three elections.

With respect to age, it appeared that young politicians seemed to be in the ascendancy. The age group of 31-40 received most preference in all three levels of elections. In the two levels of the DB and the MC, this age group excelled over the older cohort of 41-50 — DB: 38.3% vs 21.9%, MC: 33.6% vs 24.8%. This might reflect the case that those young incumbent politicians at these two levels had proved their efficacy during their terms of office, which compared favourably over their seniors.

The gender issue appeared to capture some attention in the Legco election, especially when several of the prominent female figures entered into keen competition. However, this specific attention given to the female candidates also reflected the picture of relative disadvantage of the females in the local political arena. This is evidenced by the findings that across all three elections, male candidates appeared to be more advantaged in securing votes. For instance, the proportions favouring male candidates were DB 28.7%, MC 32.2% and Legco 35.9%, as contrasted to those voting for females DB 7.2%, MC 9.0%, and Legco 7.8% for the three elections respectively. Nevertheless, a considerable portion of the respondents alleged to disregard candidate's sex as a determinant factor. These observations concur with Louie and Wan's findings based upon their review of past election studies (Louie and Wan 1992:18).

A stark difference between the three levels could be observed in the requirement for the candidate to either reside or work in the constituency. For the two levels of DB and MC, a large proportion of respondents preferred candidates having close connection with the constituency: 72.1% and 72.5%. This might again mirror the citizens' perception of close affinity with local level political leaders. For the Legco election,

though there was still a considerable portion of respondents favouring candidates with district connection (53.0%), the ratio of saying that it was not imperative for the Legco candidates to reside or work in the local community was much higher than the two other levels: 35.6% as compared to 17.1% of MC and 15.4% of DB.

The issue of massive emigration, or "brain-drain" of professionals and the "well-to-do" in the past years seemed to have aroused subtle repercussions in people's mind. People who were destined to stay, or unable to leave so to speak, tended to cast an element of suspicion on the allegiance of those who were able and intended to emigrate. In fact, such an issue of candidate's citizenship aroused heated debates in the candidates' campaign forums during the Legco election. As shown by the survey findings, a great majority of the respondents disfavoured candidates having secured foreign citizenship, across the three elections: 60.7% DB, 75.5% MC and 72.5% Legco of respondents said they voted for candidates not having foreign citizenship (Yeung and Chui, 1992b). Such a finding was also supported by what Louie and Wan observed in their comprehensive review of past election studies (Louie and Wan, 1992:19). This apparently implies the people's preference for political leaders having a commitment to the Hong Kong community.

In terms of political background, the actual results of the Legco election seemed to avouch the citizens' preference for candidates having political group support and not associated with the Chinese government. However, the results of Yeung and Chui seemed to provide another look at the picture. In the survey on the Legco election, it was found that the proportion of respondents who belittled the significance of political group support was the greatest among the three surveys: 40.1% as compared to 23.7% and 13.3% for the DB and MC respectively. In fact, those who preferred to vote for "independent" candidates were much more numerous than those who opted for the group-supported counterparts: DB 39.5%, MC 53.5%, Legco 34.5% voted for "independents;" while DB 22.8%, MC 24.7%, Legco 24.8% voted for candidates with political group background. Such a discrepancy between the survey findings and the actual election results should be read with consideration to the fact that the winning candidates from political groups were essentially "political stars," so to speak, whose image had long been implanted into people's minds. Such personal charisma seemed to have played a significant part in influencing people's choice of candidates, especially when these "stars" were well known as social activists and opinion leaders

identifying themselves with the common people.

With respect to the issue of patronage from the Chinese regime, data from the surveys seemed to support the actual results of the Legco election indicating a dislike for candidates having linkage with the "leftist" camp. Political analysts and commentators have all converged and attributed such sentiment towards the Chinese government to the June-Fourth Incident of 1989. In terms of figures, 57.5% of DB, 67.4% of MC, and 54.9% of Legco survey respondents opined that acceptance by China was not an essential quality for the candidates. However, in the Legco survey, the proportion opting for candidates accepted by China scored highest as compared to the other two levels: 28.3% contrasted to DB 11.9% and MC 12.1%. This might indicate people's awareness of the need for the Legco members to have communication with the Chinese regime, in view of a smooth transition to 1997. As for the DB and MC, their functions have diminutive interface with the political maneuver at the high levels. The issue of whether or not the candidates were having visible or undercover linkage with the Chinese regime did not surface.

In the final analysis, Yeung and Chui's survey findings furnished a rough configuration of a new group of political leaders with whom the local people began to identify. These ascending elites were to be well qualified in terms of education and profession. They should be young, and preferably male. They should have viable contact with the people to acquaint themselves with local issues, and to articulate people's interests. They should have good indication of their commitment to Hong Kong. Alliance with the emerging political groups was not a crucial and necessary merit for these leaders. Lastly, they should keep their distance from the Chinese regime by not having direct or even indirect patronage from it. This image thus silhouetted seems to reflect people's explicit expectations of the political elites. This is to be contrasted to what Lau and other scholars have remarked to the effect that local people had a vague impression of political leadership in the past. It may therefore be suggested that the masses are gradually putting a more concise frame of expectation upon their political elites.

Elite-Mass Linkage (I): Electoral Mobilization

Viable elite-mass relationship is to be grounded upon sustainable linkage between the two groups of actors. There can be a variety of means whereby the two come into contact. There is also a difference between the two groups in terms of the initiative and motivation of making contact with the counterpart. As Nettl (1967) vividly pointed out, there can be "stalagmite" and "stalactite" modes of political mobilization, depicting the respective directions of "bottom-up" and "top-down" initiations.

Election should basically be a rational choice grounded upon viable contact and communication between the candidates and the electorate, providing informed choices. Electoral mobilization is essentially the elite's initiative in rallying support, appealing for votes from the masses. The amount and nature of information conveyed by the candidates to the electors rest upon the amplitude of campaign activities. Such activities are basically unilateral, informative as well as sensational in nature. The modes and intensity of the various kinds of campaign activities employed by the elites can also reflect the pattern of linkage between the elites and the masses.

In Hong Kong, direct elections have a short history of ten years, starting with the local level elections of the DB in 1982. Based upon the author's actual experience of participation in campaigns since then, it has been observed that the use of various kinds of campaign activities has undergone a gradual evolution, somewhat taking the path of innovation diffusion. Some means effectively employed by successful candidates have been gradually taken up by subsequent contesters in later elections. A cursory review of the various campaign strategy and means employed at the various levels of election in the local context may help shed light on the analysis of elite-mass linkage in Hong Kong.

It is asserted here that electoral mobilization in the local context is characterized by indirect contact between the candidates and the electorates. As Louie and Wan (1992) revealed in their detailed review of various studies, in the 1991 Legco election, material supplied by candidates and the media were the two most significant means through which the electors knew of the candidates. Such means are essentially indirect and unilateral, where the receptive audience remains passive and has no chance of critically querying the information thus provided. Actually, campaign leaflets had been widely utilized and well received throughout the past elections. In the 1985 DB election, 79.0% of respondents alleged to have read such leaflets (Law, 1985). For the 1988 DB and 1989 MC elections, 76.8% and 39.1% respondents claimed to have read

candidates' leaflets (Chui, 1988, 1989). This can be attributed to the fact that printed material can best provide detailed and retainable information for easy reference by the receptive electors.

The increasing incidence and significance of the mass media in campaign mobilization deserve greater attention. In the 1991 DB election, 56.3% of respondents in a survey alleged to have known the candidates through the mass media. In the 1991 Legco election, a remarkable 88.3% was recorded (Yeung and Chui, 1992b). This can be explained by the fact that the two television broadcasting companies had paid substantial effort to closely follow the election, and the newspapers also made special features and columns on the territory's unprecedented political event.

Those direct means of contact, such as home visits and campaign forums, were relatively under-utilized. Louie and Wan postulated that the past election studies had portrayed a scene where campaign forums were poorly attended. They further cited the Social Sciences Research Centre's survey finding that only a petty 7.1% of respondents had direct contact with the candidates in the 1991 Legco election (Louie and Wan, 1992:11). It suffices to point out that forum as a means of contact between candidates and the electorate has not received much popularity. In the author's past surveys on the 1988 DB and 1989 MC elections, only 4.6% and 6.8% of respondents alleged respectively to have attended campaign forum (Chui, 1988, 1989).

Attending a forum requires considerable initiative of the part of electors themselves to go to the specific venue which might not necessarily be convenient to them. However, the campaign means of home visit seems to put the onus of initiative on the candidates and their campaign teams to reach out to the electors. However, given the intensity of labour and time input, home visits seem to be adopted more widely in district level elections with smaller constituencies. For instance, the use of home visits by campaign teams has been more popular in DB elections over the years. In 1985, it was found that 18.2% of the respondents claimed to know the candidates through home visits (Meeting Point, 1985). In the 1988 DB election, an even higher rate of 25.3% was recorded (Chui, 1988). The MC elections also recorded higher incidences of home visits by campaign teams: 17.1% of respondents had been visited in the 1989 MC election (Chui, 1989). Moreover, in the 1991 DB election, 21% of the respondents claimed to have been visited by the candidates and/or their campaign teams (Yeung and Chui, 1992b).

The above reveals a picture whereby indirect contact between the electorate and the candidates predominates over direct contact. Admittedly, it conveys the technical constraints in launching campaign activities enabling direct contact between the candidates and the electorate, especially in view of increasing constituency size and the avowed political apathy of ordinary citizens. In actuality, survey findings also seem to confirm such citizens' passivity. In the 1985 DB election, a survey revealed the respondents' preference of campaign activities: 25.9% mass media, 22.7% leaflets and banners, 9.5% home visits (Meeting Point, 1985). The author's studies of the 1988 DB and 1989 MC elections also recorded the following findings of respondents' preference: posters 25.3%, leaflets 17.2%, banners 10.0%, home visits 7.0% and forums 4.6% for DB election (Chui, 1988); and posters 29.0%, leaflets 24.5%, home visits 10.8% for MC election (Chui, 1989). The low priority of home visits, albeit being a direct channel of communication whereby citizens can know more about their potential political representatives, might be attributed to local people's aversion to being intruded upon. Such disinclination on the part of the electorate in having direct communication with the candidates deprives them the legitimate right of critically examining the candidates' proclaimed platforms and making their claims upon the candidates. This even provides the image of public apathy and disinterest in political activities, which might be detrimental to the development of democratization in the territory.

Nevertheless, it is the author's position that only by promoting better direct contact between the electorate and the candidates can the masses make an informed choice in their selection of political representatives. Campaign activities should not be characterized customarily by "top-down" elite mobilization of the masses, but on the contrary by viable means whereby the people can convey their expectations and demands to the candidates as well as channel their grievances against incumbent candidates.

Elite-Mass Linkage (II): Constituency Service

Viable contact between the elite and the masses is an essential ingredient of political representation. Such contact can take various forms, ranging from campaign canvassing, issue mobilization, and constituency service

to handle complaints. As revealed in Yeung and Chui's DB and MC surveys, a moderate level of contact has been sustained between the political leaders and their respective constituencies. In the 1991 DB survey, 30.2% respondents indicated that they had heard about their DB members reporting their work progress in the Boards in the past year. An even higher rate of 38.6% was recorded for the MC counterparts (Yeung and Chui, 1992b). It is interesting to recall the afore-mentioned finding from the 1991 Legco survey that there appeared to be a strong urge for the new batch of Legco members to report to the citizens. Though they have to face a much greater constituency than their DB and MC counterparts, the Legco members might find it desirable to devise more linkage mechanisms with the citizens.

Of related interest, reference is made here to the author's survey of the DB and MC members (1988/89-91 session) about their views on such elite-mass linkage. It was found that among the 197 respondents, about three-quarters could manage to provide various means to sustain contact with their respective constituents (Chui, 1992). Such means included distributing leaflets of work report, erecting display boards, operating telephone hotlines and meet-the-public sessions, paying visits to local organizations, and even home visits and community forums. Furthermore, nearly all the respondents (97.4%) answered in the affirmative to the statement "The representatives should have contact with the citizens to the fullest extent" (Chui, 1992:23). Such a finding is comprehensible as the local level political representatives are having a rather small constituency, and that they are more accessible to the citizens.

Another aspect of constituency service lies in the area of handling citizen's complaints about community problems. The efficacy of political representatives in resolving social problems in general can have considerable effect upon people's trust vested upon them. This certainly has critical impact on the success of incumbent candidates during elections. It is also of crucial significance in the elite-mass relationship in terms of trust in elites' political efficacy. In the author's 1989 MC election survey, it was found that 7.7% of the respondents did approach the DB members in their district for complaints, while there was only 3.1% who approached the MC members (Chui, 1989). In terms of the respondents' inclination for approaching these two levels of the representative institutions, 35.2% of the respondents would approach the DB, while 10.6% would resort to the MC as vehicle for handling complaints (Chui, 1989). Such a pattern of citizens' relative preference for DB over

the MC could be attributed to the relative closeness of DB members because of their greater numbers and more independent offices.

In Yeung and Chui's 1991 DB survey, 11.1% of respondents made complaints to the DB members in the past year (Yeung and Chui, 1992b). In that same survey, in response to a question on their readiness to file complaint to the respective channels, 55.0% took the initiative to approach either the DB or the MC, which is higher than the figure relating to the government departments (52.5%) and the OMELCO (36.8%). The relative popularity of the two non-central level representative institutions, namely the DB and the MC, is grounded upon the respondents' preference of rating the effectiveness of the various channels for redressing grievances: DB/MC 25.3%, mass media 19.7%, OMELCO 17.0%, and government departments 12.5%. This might support the claim that the local level representative institutions have rather successfully created a group of political figures whom the citizens could look upon for articulating their interests, or at least alleviating administrative mistakes.

Thus, it is apparent that the more proximate the institutions and the political figures are to the citizens, the more trust they can secure from the masses and aspiration they can respond to. Hence, the DB excels over the MC which also surpasses the Legco, as the most preferred channel of redressing grievances. It is also to be recalled from a previous section on respondents' orientation towards the legislature, that the Legco is being viewed as remaining remote from the ordinary citizens.

Satisfaction about Political Leaders

In modern representative politics, political elites are supposed to be the guardian of public interest, or at least of the various sectors in society. Their effectiveness in safeguarding and advancing their respective constituent's interest can shape the elite-mass relationship to a large extent. It constitutes the people's satisfaction, and therefore mass expectation about the elites.

In Yeung and Chui's 1991 DB survey, it was found that there were more respondents having a positive evaluation of the DB members of their respective constituencies: 26.0% feeling satisfied with their performance; 26.1% partly satisfied; and only 12.3% being dissatisfied. Further investigation revealed that such satisfaction was very much based upon

the respondents' perception of the efficacy of the DB and/or the DB members in resolving their community problems. For illustration, there was a significant relationship between the respondents' level of satisfaction of DB performance and their view of the DB's effort at tackling the specific community problems mentioned by themselves in the interview (lambda=0.2635; chi-square=158.056, df=4, p=0.0000) (see Table 3). Furthermore, the relationship between satisfaction about the DB performance and the DB members was also significant (lambda=0.6434; chi-square=462.808, df=4, p=0.0000) (see Table 4). Such a finding seems to support Leung's and Lau's observations that the local people are having a utilitarianistic orientation towards politics in general and political leaders in particular.

Table 3 Relationship between Satisfaction with DB and Whether DB Had Tackled Community Problem (%)

Satisfaction with DB	Whether DB had tackled community problem			
	Yes	Partly	No	(N)
Yes	61.9	30.5	11.7	(176)
Partly	32.2	58.1	36.5	(204)
No	6.2	11.4	51.8	(101)
(N)	(177)	(167)	(137)	(481)

Notes: Lambda=0.2635.
χ^2=158.056, df=4, p=0.0000.

Table 4 Relationship between Satisfaction with DB and Satisfaction with DB Members (%)

Satisfaction with DB members	Satisfaction with DB			
	Yes	Partly	No	(N)
Yes	83.6	20.7	4.3	(192)
Partly	14.7	73.6	13.8	(181)
No	1.7	5.7	81.9	(91)
(N)	(177)	(193)	(94)	(464)

Notes: Lambda=0.6434.
χ^2=462.808, df=4, p=0.0000.

In the 1991 MC survey, similar questions were asked to explore the citizens' evaluation of the Municipal Councillors' performance. It was shown that, similar to the picture in the 1991 DB survey, more respondents evaluated positively: 27.5% satisfied; 21.8% partly satisfied; and 16.4% dissatisfied.

Generally speaking, results of these two levels reveal the picture that the DB and MC members seem to be able to capture a considerable level of satisfaction and positive evaluation from amongst the citizens. It can therefore be asserted that, as suggested earlier, the emerging political elites at the local levels of the representative institutions seem to have built up a positive image of efficacy. Their political efficacy is very much based upon their effort in trying to tackle citizens' livelihood concerns in the community.

It would be interesting to explore the people's perception of and satisfaction about the newly constituted Legco and its members. Reference to past studies can shed some light on such a picture as already exists a survey of the satisfaction about these political elites in the previous Legco assembly. Lau's 1988 findings depicted one sketch whereby 64.1% of respondents had trust in the then Legco members (Lau, 1990a). However, recent surveys by local journals and newspapers reveal that the level of satisfaction about the new Legco members has undergone fluctuations (Cheung, 1992). Nevertheless, the present ses-

sion of the newly constituted Legco has only passed its first year. The overall performance of the Legco and its incumbent members has yet to be examined in due course.

Concluding Remarks

The 1991 elections at the three levels proved to be a recruitment process of political elites in the local political arena. With the novel element of direct election to the legislature, there were inevitably ramifications and readjustments in the overall political configuration of the territory at various levels. Though the abolition of the electoral college in the 1991 Legco election abrogated the access of local level political leaders to the legislature, it cannot be assumed that such linkages between political leaders at various levels were thereby curtailed. In fact, the political groups/parties have been serving the role of mediating such linkages, in their attempt to build up and sustain viable community networks. Such manoeuvre can be seen as paving the way for the second Legco direct election in 1995. It has also served the crucial function of articulating citizens' interest at different levels.

Undeniably, the masses have been politicized and activated in participating in politics. Their aspirations are attuned to expect a new group of political elites in managing the territory's social, economic, and political affairs, in view of stable and sustainable growth in transition to 1997. They have formulated a clearer picture of political elites in terms of their personal qualities, political outlook, organizational affiliation, as well as their general performance. Nevertheless, still adhering to the utilitarianistic and pragmatic orientation towards politics, the masses of Hong Kong are basically looking for a cohort of political elites able to bring about tangible benefits to guarantee a stable and prosperous socio-economic environment. However, given the baptism of various political mobilizations, ranging from urban social conflicts[1] in the 1970s, electoral campaigns in the 1980s, then political acculturation through various incidents like the drafting of the Basic Law, the New Airport controversy to the heated dynamics of the newly constituted Legco, the masses of Hong Kong are now more familiarized with democratic precepts. People begin to have the awareness of holding political leaders accountable. They are more ready to express their satisfaction to competent leaders or

dissent towards incompetent ones.

In the final analysis, political representation in Hong Kong is beginning to take shape. The masses have begun to map out their position vis-à-vis the political elites whom they also have begun to configure. Representative democracy as evolved in the West has undergone changes in time. Outcries of "crisis of democracy" explicated by various writers (Barber, 1984; Etzioni-Halevy, 1989; Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 1988; Hirst, 1990) have called attention to reinstating the viable relationship of political representation. It is the author's position that as Hong Kong is going to pursue the path taken by predecessors along the road of representative democracy, it is desirable and necessary for the elites and masses to strive for a viable relationship between themselves.

On the part of the elites, their awareness of being the value-guardian of the masses is of crucial importance. Moreover, it would be desirable for the elite to have a better grasp of the various concepts related to political representation, their perception of being the "trustee" or "delegate" of the people (Pitkin, 1967), the concept of accountability, and the like. Furthermore, efforts from both sides should also be supplemented by their awareness of the need to build up sustainable linkages between them. Reliance upon sporadic or periodic interaction during electoral mobilization is liable to be influenced by non-rational and *ad hoc* factors. As Pitkin (1967) rightly pointed out, representation should be supported by institutional arrangements. The good will on both parts of the elites and the masses should be consolidated by such arrangements as periodic forum between the two. The "liberal democrats," under the bandwagon of the three major political groups of the United Democrats of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood, and Meeting Point, have clearly taken steps in operating district offices for grassroots mobilization. The business elites, in response to the challenge from the liberal democratic forces, have begun to reposition themselves in the search for preserving their vested interests. A recent move by the Cooperative Resources Centre, comprising spokesmen of the so-called "conservative" wing of the local political scene, also indicates their recognition of the need to build up grassroots connection by launching their local offices. This apparently validates the postulate that political elites have to maintain good relationship with the masses, for whatsoever reasons and motives.

As for the masses, it is imperative for them to equip themselves with the various aspects of cognition, evaluation, and behaviour with regard to

political affairs in the territory. They should utilize the available channels to access the elites in expressing their political demands. Their active initiative can spur the elites to act responsively towards the citizens' concerns. Here, the role of such intermediate organizations as Mutual Aid Committees, Owners' Corporations, and other grassroots organizations become crucial in aggregating and articulating the interests of the unorganized masses. These organizations have proven their strategic positions during electoral campaigns. They still have to demonstrate their efficacy in maintaining sustainable connection with the elected political representatives, thereby exerting the people's pressure for better accountability. It calls for more active participation of the people in materializing real political representation. The past phenomenon of "compartmentalization of cognitive and behavioral political involvement" (Lau, 1978) should be swept away, in view of laying a solid foundation for representative democracy to flourish in Hong Kong.

Nonetheless, the existing political reality is still characterized by the predominance of career bureaucrats and the collaborating business elites. This might still render such viable elite-mass relationship difficult to materialize. However, the most recent issue in the institutional arrangement of the territory lies in the possible separation of power between the Exco and Legco. With the advent of more elected seats in the Legco, there emerges a cry for holding the "executive-led" government accountable, in the name of better reflecting citizens' interest. However, the existence of functional constituency representatives in the legislature has invited controversies as a possible violation of the political right of equality in voting. The sensitive issue of elite-mass linkage and accountability within the restricted circles should also be attended to. Furthermore, the preservation of the appointment system to the various representative institutions also waters down the essence of political representation. The group of non-elected elites apparently stands as an enclave, immune from people's scrutiny, and thereby it is frustrating people's attempt at holding political elites accountable. Alterations to such a system amount to fundamental restructuring of the entire political system of the territory, which is confined by multiple historical, socio-economic, as well as political constraints.

Furthermore, given the emergence of political representatives having the people's mandate, the career bureaucrats have to re-orientate themselves by shedding their previous duality of roles as depicted by Cheung (1987). They have also to readjust their orientation to public

administration, say, by taking more initiative in reaching out to citizens and attending to people's grievances, by accommodating such restructuring of the power relationship on the political stage. There might be arguments raised against such move because of the adverse effect on administrative efficiency following the heated debates brought about by political representatives. However, such a price, if any, should be paid in view of a better reflection of people's needs, and of building up a representative democratic system for the Hong Kong society.

It is hoped that by the concerted effort of all parties concerned, albeit their divergent socio-economic backgrounds and thereby their divergent political outlooks, the road to building viable representative democracy in Hong Kong can be straightened.

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Note

1. "Urban social conflict" refers to the social uprisings in the 1970s when grassroots people attempted to redress their grievances against the administration through social action strategies. Recent literature has coined "Urban Social Movement" to characterize such citizen politics. The neo-Marxian school focuses more on the conflicts derived from "collective consumption" aspects, in which citizens show discontent about government provision of various social services like education, housing, and welfare.

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Appendix. Note on Methodology

In the present paper, reference was made to data obtained from the author's joint project with Mrs Agnes K.C. Yeung of City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, on the three elections held in 1991. The research was basically a household sample survey of registered electors using telephone interviews. Samples were drawn randomly from telephone directories published by the Hong Kong Telephone Company. In the three surveys, a total of 807, 432 and 676 successful interviews were obtained on the March DB election, May MC election, and September Legco election respectively. In addition, the author's studies of the 1988 DB and 1989 MC elections also resorted to such a methodology, having 790 and 648 successful interviews respectively.

There are possible limitations to such a methodology. In the first instance, though domestic consumption of telephone service is generally common in Hong Kong, it nevertheless cannot entirely rule out the possibility of incomplete coverage of registered electors in the territory with the use of the telephone directory as the sampling frame. In the second place, since the interviewers had no direct contact with the responding persons, they could not conduct random sampling from the household accessed through the phone. It might give a biased sampling based upon the first respondent's subjective screening. Thirdly, given that there could not be direct interaction between the interviewer and the respondent, the validity of responses could not entirely be ascertained, which compares unfavourably with face-to-face interviews. However, telephone interviews excel other interview methods by its relative cost-economy and time-efficiency, as well as their superiority in interviewer supervision.