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Inequalities and Development

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Preface

Is the concept of "class" useful for understanding social inequalities in Chinese society? Can economic growth and social equity be attained at the same time? In terms of policy, what is the optimal balance between these two goals? Which should be pursued first and with what consequences? In the process of modernization, what new types of social strata and attitudes emerge? What similarities and differences exist among the patterns of social inequalities found in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore? Is there a Chinese model of social stratification and mobility?

Until quite recently, it was not possible to have genuine intellectual debates on these issues. As sociologist Robert M. Marsh pointed out in the 1970s, mainland China and Taiwan adopted different approaches to alter the traditional Chinese stratification system. The former sought revolutionary transformation while the latter opted for evolutionary change. During the Cold War era, political confrontation and ideological fervour rendered the issue of class and inequality into a very sensitive and emotionally charged topic. In Maoist China in particular, with the Marxist paradigm ruling supreme and class analysis enshrined as dogma, theoretical exploration and empirical research on the subject were tabooed.

But since Deng Xiaoping launched economic reform in mainland China in the late 1970s, the situation has changed. The slogan

of "Never forget class struggle" has been replaced by that of "Let some people get rich first." Ideological control has been relaxed. Sociology as a discipline has been revived. Rapid economic growth has ensued and new social disparities have appeared which call for investigation. Meanwhile, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore as three of the "Little Dragons" have reached a level of affluence that directs attention to the dramatic rise of the middle class.

Early last year, we felt that the time was ripe to bring together scholars who have been working on the topic of social stratification in different regions to exchange ideas and to compare notes. Subsequently over thirty scholars were invited from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States of America to present papers at a conference on "Social Stratification in Chinese Communities" held on 10-11 December 1993 at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The conference was jointly hosted by the Department of Applied Social Studies of the Hong Kong Polytechnic, the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of The Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Department of Sociology of the University of Hong Kong, and the Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences. The stated objectives were to provide a forum for intellectual exchange on social stratification studies, to consolidate research experiences, to promote this line of research in Chinese communities, and to serve as the basis for further exchange and collaboration. As organizers, we suggested three main areas for exploration, namely theoretical and methodological considerations, regional case studies, and comparative studies.

This book contains the papers presented in English at the conference, most of which are concerned with the situation in Hong Kong and Singapore. The papers presented in Chinese are collected in another volume which deals mainly with the situation in mainland China and Taiwan. As a whole, the papers are strong on empirical case studies in different regions, with several theoretical enquiries. Although there is no paper attempting an explicit comparison among the various communities, we hope that the scene is now set for such comparative studies to be made in the future.

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November 1994

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Class Analysis

The Relevance of Weber

Thomas W. P. Wong
Lui Tai-lok

My wife's studying sociology. She comes home from the lectures and teaches it to me over dinner, and one of the most interesting nuggets of sociological information I've been tossed across the cheese and biscuits so far is that my wife (a doctor's daughter) has married beneath her.
"It hadn't really struck me before," she said. "Journalists are lower-middle class."
"Don't talk tripe," I replied, with my usual scientific detachment.
"I'm not using the term with any emotive connotations," said my wife. "It's just a simple sociological fact. I had it from the lecturer less than an hour ago."
"Class is a matter of supreme indifference to me personally, as you know, so leave me out of it. But are you trying to tell me that people like the editor of the *Spectator* with his £40,000 house are lower-middle class? You take a look at the lads soaking up the hock in El Vino's and you won't go round screaming 'lower-middle class' like that."

(excerpted from Michael Frayn's
"A Question of Downbringing")

Introduction

We do not know if the above scene, in its overall thrust rather than in its details, has been repeated among our friends here today and their spouses. We do, however, feel that the exchange will strike a resonant chord among those of us who teach sociology and who have on more than one occasion harboured the layman's doubts (and be frustrated for that) about the concept of class. For behind Frayn's velvet glove of disarming humour lies the inescapable fact that, however hard one tries to expunge the concept of its "emotive connotations" and turn it into a "simple sociological fact," it is never a simple issue on which consensus could be easily reached. Substitute Frayn's "journalist" with probably any occupation, and one could see how controversial and cumbersome the whole exercise could be. Personal reactions are always, so to say, round the corner, however "sanitized" our formulation is. And perhaps this is because "class" has always carried with it a strong evaluative element; it conjures up both a given natural order and a sense of exploitation and indignation, both hierarchy and mobility, both great fears and great hopes. But that is no reason for us to call it a day and say that class is a useless concept or that it is purely a matter for empirical adjudication or, more sophisticatedly, that there are different "classes" for different enquiries/situations. What needs to be done, in our view, is to aim for a conception of class which would take individual differences seriously — so that, for instance, both the technical job content and the status claims of a "journalist" will be taken into account — and yet will also be theoretically consistent and plausible. The appropriate starting point for approaching the myriad of empirical differences in conditions and opportunities (which any conception of class must necessarily refer to and characterize) is analytical precision.

In the following, we attempt to put forth several claims. First, we will argue that in our interpretation of Weber's writings on class and related concepts, the conventional view of Weber as proposing a multi-dimensional framework (and as an alternative to that from Marx) for social stratification is generally inadequate,

and, in some respects, misleading. Our view is that the relations between "class" and "status" are best treated at different levels, and that a full appreciation of the importance of "class" in Weber is inseparable from a knowledge of the specific modes of relations between it and "status." We would further claim that a Weberian class analysis is in fact part and parcel of a general theory of social action and social order. We shall substantiate our claim by discussing various studies which are explicitly or implicitly influenced by Weber's ideas. Secondly, following our more general claims, we regard some more recent studies of class and social mobility as broadly a Weberian social analysis in the guise of class analysis. Goldthorpe's work on class formation, and on the relation between social inequality and social integration, is, in our view, an excellent exemplar of such kind of analysis. The usefulness of a Weberian approach has to be judged to a great extent by the theoretical rigour and empirical insights one could adduce from these studies. Thirdly, we want to demonstrate, at a more technical and empirical level, the relevance and indeed the superiority of the Weberian approach by comparing and adjudicating the Goldthorpe and the neo-Marxist class schema. Survey data from the Hong Kong Middle Class Project are coded to the respective class schema, and the two resulting class maps are cross-tabulated. We find the Weberian schema to be theoretically more consistent and robust; by comparison, the neo-Marxist schema is theoretically impoverished and practically unviable.

Weber on Class and Status

Analytical precision is something that one expects from Weber. In particular, his formal statements on class and status are part of his attempt to lay down precise distinctions and typologies for understanding economy and society. In a sense, all the analytical components of "class" or "status" are already defined in the sections (in *Economy and Society*; hereafter E&S) on social action, social relationship, organization, community, and so forth (E&S,

vol.1:22-31, 43f.). It is therefore imperative if one were to understand the Weberian meaning of class that one connects "class" to the larger context, with the related component concepts, such as the instrumental-rational type of action, the economic type of social relationship and the market. Before we turn to this issue, let us address the conventional interpretation that Weber has proposed a multi-dimensional approach to social stratification.

In such a view, "class" is seen as one of the three possible dimensions of stratification, the other two being "status" and "party." Elaborations then follow and typically argue that "class" captures the economic dimension, while "status" focusses on the social aspect, and so on. The message is often that Weber basically has supplemented the material or economic approach of the Marxist with factors pertaining to the social (status honour) or the normative-cultural (life-styles and values). Notwithstanding the fact that such an interpretation lends to an overly empiricist tendency to see social position as an aggregate (or rather, some amalgam whose internal integuments remain unelucidated) of socio-economic indicators, it is unfortunate, but perhaps natural, that false dichotomies between the "economic" and the "social," between the material and the cultural/valuational, are being erected. These dichotomies obfuscate two important issues, which, we believe, are central to Weberian scholarship. First, the separation of the economic from the social serves only an analytic or heuristic purpose; such separation could not possibly be found in reality, not to mention specific structures of social stratification. Even in the simplest economic action (other than the "Robinsonade" situation, where the action of the single and isolated individual is directly and purely oriented to considerations of material utilities; more of this later), the social is invoked and implicated. While Durkheim said, "in a contract not everything is contractual," Weber put it in a far more analytical way: "[A]n economic act which took no account of third parties was not social." Most acts are both social and economic. And yet, the limiting case of a non-social economic act is essential, for it, and it alone, brings out the essential characteristics of the "economic" (see Albrow,

1990:ch.13). It thus means that, as an example of Weber's concept formation, "class" and "status" must be seen as both "antithetical" (with the essential difference between them drawn to the full limits) **and** inter-related. The concepts are made "antithetical" so that the truly significant and essential in each is separated from the superfluous, and yet, at the same time, the phenomena they characterize are admixtures or configurations of the two, with one fettering, dominating or subserving the other, depending on historical and social circumstances. In the words of Albrow, "[this] intricate intermeshing of concepts was achieved by an initial separation" (Albrow, 1990:262). From this perspective, knowing the nature of what Schluchter called the Weberian research programme ("Max Weber brought forth his work in the vibrant tensions among historico-empirical research, **concept formation**, and political practice"; our emphasis) is crucial for understanding the analytical meaning and usage of the concept "class" (Schluchter, 1989:xiii-xiv).

If, in reality, class and status are inter-related, then it is essential to ask, at a theoretical level, in what sense (what kinds of meaning or value could we, as observers, attach to the mutually-oriented types of action?) are they connected? Weber's answer is that they are "phenomena of distribution of power within a community" (E&S, vol.2:927). In other words, they represent different bases of control or power. It is here that the conventional false dichotomy between the economic and the social again rears its head and turns Weber's class simply into a positional notion on the economic scale. The latter is in turn conceptualized as determining that aspect of one's life-chances where the distribution of rewards is roughly in proportion to the market value of one's goods and services. This view then counterposes a Weberian "distribution" to the Marxist "production" and often comes away with a feeling of superiority. It is again a false dichotomy. Because for both Marx and Weber, class is about power. The difference between them is that for Marx, what is important, indeed crucial, for his theoretical purpose, is **control** over the means of production, regardless of the basis. For Weber, on the other hand, given

his distaste for collective concepts and historical teleology (see Hekman 1983:57 and *passim*), "the **basis** of control is crucial; [for class] it must be economic, not political" (Burger, 1985:39, fn.13; our emphases). The conventional formulation is thus misleading in the sense that, in purporting to adopt a Weberian position, what is central for Weber to the "meaning" of class (and status), viz. class as that uniquely or purely economic aspect or basis of power, and class relations as relations of power claims and exercise, is divested out. In our view, a Weberian class analysis must always regard the issue of power as central, from general theoretical orientations down to the operationalization of the concept. Let us now examine in detail Weber's concept of class and its relations to status.

For Weber, "[C]lass situation means the typical probability of (1) procuring goods, (2) gaining a position in life, and (3) finding inner satisfactions, a probability which derives from the relative control over goods and skills and from their income-producing uses within a given economic order." And, "[C]lass means all persons in the same class situation" (E&S, vol.1:302). In the relevant sections in Volume Two of *Economy and Society* (which actually represent the earlier formulation of his ideas), Weber put it this way:

> ... classes are not communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent, bases for social action. We may speak of a class when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour markets. This is "class situation." (E&S, vol.2:927)

Here Weber specified the role of the market, and part of the purpose is for him to highlight the uniqueness of the modern form of class struggle, which increasingly takes the form of wage disputes on the labour market, rather than competitive struggle in the commodity market. But the core idea in class remains the

same: it is a matter of relative control, and the interests involved are economic in nature. Let us deal with each one in turn. Weber said "property" and "lack of property" are the basic categories in class situations. He meant this in a special sense. He is not so much, **contra** coventional interpretations, subscribing to the Marxist theory of the nature of capitalist mode of production where the appropriation of means of production plays a pivotal role, as highlighting the purest type of class situation. Property confers direct monopolies over opportunities for profitable deals, for those who, already provided with goods, do not need to exchange them. In other words, he is not simply agreeing to the production (as contradistinct from consumption) side of class; he is, again, bringing out the core element and the purest categories. That is why he immediately distances himself from those who would make more substantive, if not ideological, sense of these basic categories. For him, it is an open question as to whether these categories become effective in the competitive struggles of the consumers or of the producers (ibid.). And, "the mere differentiation of property classes is not "dynamic," that is, it need not result in class struggles and revolutions" (E&S, vol.1:303).

Weber then turned his attention to the further distinctions within both the propertied and non-propertied classes. These distinctions are, as it were, variations on the pure type of control: "property – non-property." Thus, "[I]n principle, the various controls over consumer goods, means of production, assets, resources and skills each constitute a particular class situation" (E&S, vol.1:302). The limiting case is a "uniform class situation," and it "prevails only when completely unskilled and propertyless persons are dependent on irregular employment." In typical cases, where there is a multiplicity of class situations, "[m]obility among, and stability of, class positions differs greatly; hence, the unity of a social class is highly variable" (ibid.). That is why, with reference to the role of the market, class situations are ultimately market situations. This, to Weber, is the generic connotation of the concept of class: "that the kind of chance in the market is the decisive moment which presents a common condition for the

individual's fate" (E&S, vol.2:928). For the propertied class, there are different kinds of assets as its source of control, just as there are different meanings attached to the use of property. For the non-propertied, their claims to control are given by the kinds of services they could provide and in the ways they make use of these services. Serfs or slaves who are non-owning and whose services are not rendered under the conditions of the market are thus in this perspective not a class. "They are, rather, a status group" (ibid.). Again, we can see how Weber stretched the differences between status group and class to the full limits, for the purpose of identifying the core meanings of the pure types of social action and social relationship. Though class situations are premised on different types of action between the classes (action in the market: e.g., social action in the labour market, commodities market, and the capitalist enterprise), class is not a group. In contrast, the "group" concept is integral to "status." Thus a Weberian concept of class will consist of these two central issues: first, if class is a power claim, a control that only makes sense under the conditions of the market, then a Weberian approach necessarily has to take into account the various multifarious conditions and consequences attendant to the "marketability" of different combinations of goods and services, and accordingly delineate the resulting class situations; in this respect, then, property-ownership is important, but so are the other possible combinations of services and the ways the services are made use of. Secondly, if class is not a group, then the question as to whether, how and to what extent it becomes a group or a relatively stable collectivity (with shared beliefs and mutual orientations) becomes a most important matter for historico-empirical enquiry. We will see in a later section that these two issues are indeed central to Goldthorpe's class analysis.

That class is not a group is itself an issue related to the notion of class interest. In a way, "class interest" is a straightforward notion, partly because it is an unambiguous interest generated in relation to an economic situation (ultimately marginal utility), and partly because there are many cases where people do react to their

economic situations with mass actions in the direction of satisfying their economic interests. But Weber again tried to separate the analytical grain from the husk of empirical variations and contingencies:

> ... the concept of class interest is an ambiguous one; even as an empirical concept it is ambiguous as soon as one understands by it something other than the factual direction of interests following with a certain probability from the class situation for a certain average of those people subjected to the class situation. The class situation and other circumstances remaining the same, the direction in which the individual worker, for instance, is likely to pursue his interests may vary widely, according to whether he is constitutionally qualified for the task at hand to a high, to an average, or to a low degree. (E&S, vol.2:929)

The direction of interest will also vary, depending on whether class associations have emerged, from which the individual may expect advantageous results for himself. And yet "[t]he emergence of an association or even of mere social action from a common class situation is by no means a universal phenomenon" (ibid.). The type of action (other than class action or action of class associations) that could occur include "mass behaviour," which is not the same as action arising from the basis of a common and mutual understanding of common life-chance in this particular respect. More typically, the response generated by common class situations is amorphous social action — "grumbling" — as when workers show their moral disapproval of their employers. The modern form of industrial action, slowdown by labourers by virtue of tacit agreement, is, to Weber, one such response. Truly class social action or associations would emerge only under certain conditions, such as the general cultural conditions (including, we believe, the ideological climate), the class contrasts that have evolved, and perhaps (in our view) most important of all, "the transparency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the class situation." And Weber followed with this important conclusion:

> For however different life chances may be, this fact in itself, according to all experience, by no means gives birth to "class action" (social action by the members of a class). For that, the real conditions and the results of the class situation must be distinctly recognizable. (ibid.)

The message is clear: there is no direct or necessary link in the "class situation – class interest – class action" trajectory. For each component in this trajectory, Weber has either distinguished the essential from the contingent or contrasted the pure type with the variants or separated the superfluous from the significant. The aim is to arrive at a "chiselled" conception, where the relations with other related concepts (such as status) are always kept in view and in tension, and where, accordingly, empirical studies and their findings could bear even more fruitfully on it. We return to this issue presently. For the observer — just as for the actor — insofar as he is interested in the possibility and the conditions of class action, the articulation of the causes and the consequences of the class situation is essential for analysing (or bringing about) class action or class struggle.

The "real conditions" and "results" of the class situation would include, in our view, the all-important topic of mobility, or what Goldthorpe called the "intergenerational and career trajectories." They would also pertain to the various responses — the "moral grumblings," the direction of class interests as dependent on the worker's commitment and expectations he brings to the task, etc. — in the class situation. These responses are strictly speaking not pure class action or class interests, but they are an integral part of a Weberian class analysis, precisely because they help us in ascertaining the possibility of a distinctive class action. Weber seems to be saying, *pace* Marx, that whether the proletariat will, from its class situation, develop class action is entirely an empirical question. But meanwhile, one must attend to the normative and cultural concomitants of class processes, with the understanding that class action arises despite, rather than because of, these characteristics. In reality, class action is often inseparable from other types of action and interests. But precisely because of

this, it is all the more necessary to find the conditions for and propensity to class action by means of a "compare and contrast" analysis of the normative orientations and socio-political outlook of a particular class. Class action in the sense of action based on a shared awareness of a common class situation (and that alone) is thus always mediated, at the level of enquiry and in reality, by these other considerations. Thus, findings on the political views or behaviour of a class are, in this view, taken not so much as evidence of a particular class orientation or action but as clues to the "transparency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the class situation." Only when the latter is established can one speak of a class action. Weber's formulation of the "class – group – action" relations is thus more rigorous and complex than the cavalier treatment one finds in some Marxist or non-Marxist theories, where the working class interest is either something putative, or where voting behaviour or consumption patterns are too quickly taken as indicative of class action and interests. We will argue in a later section that Goldthorpe's studies of class formation represent a body of empirical work that takes advantage of, and further extends, Weber's programme for class analysis.

That social mobility is one of the key components in this programme is further vindicated by Weber's typology of class. While the "propertied class" and "commercial class" are respectively characterized by property differences and the marketability of goods and services, the "social class" is made up of "the totality of those class situations within which individual and generational mobility is easy and typical" (E&S, vol.1:302). The typology serves the purpose of bringing out the "key" classes in each type: the rentier, the idle rich in the "propertied class," the entrepreneur and the professional in the "commercial class," and the "occupational classes" (the intelligentsia, the white-collar worker, the technician, and above all, the working class) in the "social class." Obviously, the reality is often a mixture of these "key" classes, and the principle of "marketability of goods and services" underlying "commercial class" is equally immanent in "social

class," if only because the differentiation and distribution of skills in the latter has its effect on the class situation through the market. But at the same time, it is also obvious that Weber regards the "social classes" as in some way best capturing the tendencies of the modern capitalist society. According to him, the working class in this society is more intergenerationally stable (thus attaining the character of a "social class"), especially the more automated the work process becomes (E&S, vol.1:305). And Weber also suggested (though he did not elaborate on this point) that while the mobility from the working class and the petty bourgeoisie into the intellectual and specialist class (the civil servants, the technicians, the white-collar workers) is relatively easy, the rise into those classes privileged through property and education will be less feasible. Here Weber is touching on long-range vs. short-distance mobility, and the barriers and gaps in the mobility regime. Mobility represents the process side of the structure of class situations, and in regard to social classes, this primarily means an occupation *qua* class mobility.

A Weberian class analysis which takes social mobility as a central issue is thus interested in the formation of "social classes," with the latter understood as phenomena of differentials in power (just as the generic concept of class is about power differentials), rather than in vindicating some conception of the class structure itself. From this perspective, classes are always a matter of power claims, with its relative control in reality constantly in tension with other power claims (e.g., status group as accentuating or fettering the economic basis). The study of class formation helps to illuminate the continuity and changes of such power claims. But unlike the Marxist approach, which stipulates the modes of class relations between the major classes with reference to the capitalist division of labour, Weber has little to say on these relations. Partly because such relations are empirically determined but also, more importantly, because the relation between class situation and class interests, as we have seen earlier, is never of a simple or putative kind.

About Weber's position on class relations, we can make two observations: first, formally, the social action which brings forth class situation is "basically not action among members of the same class; it is an action among members of different classes." Further,

> social actions that directly determine the class situation of the worker and the entrepreneur are: the labour market, the commodities market, and the capitalist enterprise.... The existence of a capitalist enterprise presupposes that a very specific kind of social action exists to protect the possession of goods *per se*, and especially the power of the individuals to dispose, in principle free, over the means of production: a certain kind of legal order. (E&S, vol.2:930)

Here, class relations are conceptualized as social action among members of different classes in various institutional contexts. Even though class situation is defined always in (straightforward) relation to the market, what underlies that situation is a matrix of social action connecting different classes. There is no overarching class relation arising from some inexorable logic or tension in the system. Weber seems to be implying, at least at a formal and analytical level, that class situation is a resultant of class relations in various markets and contexts. There is no prejudging of the nature of such class relations (bargaining, conflict, appropriation...), and what is more, in the capitalist system, non-class factors — for instance, the legal order — necessarily enter into these relations (see also E&S, vol.2:926). (In our discussion of Sabel's work in the following sections, we will see that Sabel precisely studied class relations in the context of specific institutional settings and that he emphasized the role of the non-class elements in analysing the nature of such relations.) If it is reasonable to argue that Weber's works are primarily concerned with structures of domination, and with the question as to how the modern rational action (economic but also the non-economic) emerges and prevails, then, given this theoretical interest, the question of class is part and parcel of a larger question: the ideal-typical construction and the historical-structural analyses of different types of structures of domination (see, *inter alia*, E&S, vol.1:36f., 212-231, 952-

954). And true to his action theory, within each structure of domination, "there is a belief in a particular form of legitimacy which determines the other aspects of the social structure: the administrative apparatus, the economic and social order, and the capacity for change" (Hekman, 1983:177). Class situations and class relations in a society where formal rationality (codified in the legal system) is dominant are bound to have different forms and different relationships from those in a society where substantive rationality has a more pervasive role to play. [One can see here something of the way Weber constructs his ideal-typical analysis: beginning from the "chiselled" conception of class as an economic type of action (the basis of control being economic, and that alone, and economic interests arising therefrom), then social relationships (the "group" and "interest" issue discussed above) are, as it were, made to bear on this core concept; and then non-class variables and concepts, derived from other ideal types, enter, as the actual occurrences and forms of the phenomenon are analysed. Presently, we will be elaborating on these points.]

Our second observation concerning Weber's ideas on class relations is that to him class relations or class antagonism in the modern capitalist society are centrally about the determination of the price of labour: "the fight for access to the market and for the determination of the price of products" (E&S, vol.2:931). And unlike the early periods when monopolies and speculative hoarding of goods are the norm and the target of class antagonism, the main antagonists to the most bitter conflicts in the modern society are "those who actually and directly participate as opponents in price wars" (ibid.). Thus, it is the direct labourers, the entrepreneurs and managers, and not the shareholder, the rentier, or the banker. Thus, to Weber, it is this kind of distributive struggle under market conditions that shapes the overall nature of class relations in modern society. To the extent that there are major class actors, they are not born out of the contradiction between capital and labour, as the Marxist would argue, but are the result of unequal class situations in a historically specific market society. And one could say that it is the distributive struggle (in particular,

wage conflicts), rather than the class struggle between the "total classes," that has often occupied the Weberian class analyst's attention.

The discussion of "social class" brings us to "status group." Weber regarded the latter as closest to "social class," which, as we have argued, has "occupational classes," rather than property, as its quintessence. (But we also argued that the three types of class are closely related; the typology serves only to highlight a different aspect of the logical unity of each type.) The reason lies in the fact that status group is about prestige, defined as social estimation of honour, and **occupational** prestige is one of the ways for a status group to stake its effective claim to social esteem. In fact, most of the essential means for such status claims (education, training and occupational prestige) are particularly pertinent in "social class," which, as we have seen, consists of important occupational classes such as the white-collar employees, the specialists, and the intellectuals. Weber defined "status group" as

> ... a plurality of persons who... successfully claim a specific social esteem and possibly also status monopolies. Status groups may come into being... by virtue of their own style of life, particularly the type of vocation: "self-styled" or occupational status groups. (E&S, vol.1:306)

Like class, status group represents a type of power claim. It is a set of power and prerogatives supported by law, ritual and custom. However, as pure types of social action, "class" and "status group" are "antithetical" in many respects. Class, insofar as it is an aggregate of class situations in relation to the market, knows no personal distinctions; status group has these distinctions as its *sine qua non*. Class, in its generic sense, is not a group, but status presupposes this context (thus order, estate, etc.). Class betokens the instrumental-rational type of social action, while status partakes more of the value-rational type. But, true to his method of analysis and concept development, Weber also said the two are related in a "compare and contrast" fashion. Thus,

> Status may rest on class position of a distinct or an ambiguous kind. However, it is not solely determined by it:

> money and an entrepreneurial position are not in themselves status qualifications, although they may lead to them.... Status may influence, if not completely determine, a class position without being identical with it. (E&S, vol.1:306)

And "class distinctions are linked in the most varied ways with status distinctions" (E&S, vol.2:932). Class and status group are thus overlappingly, partially and mutually determining, and yet not reducible to the other. And it is by means of such a mode of analysis that Weber undertook a study of the Confucian literati:

> The relation of the Chinese literati to princely services as the normal source of income differentiated them as a status group from the philosophers of Antiquity.... As a rule, the Chinese literati strove for princely services both as a source of income and as a normal field of activity. (*The Religion of China*, 1951:112)

Here in a particularly elegant way, Weber formulated the relations between status and (the income-generating aspect of) class: as a status group, the Chinese literati were "driven" or predisposed to certain economic activities (and in so doing, place themselves in a specific relation to other power groups: the princes or the emperor), and were thus characterized in terms of specific features of both status and class. The literati were first and foremost a status group and their class situation was only intelligible in the light of their status values or ethics: for them, "the attitude towards things economic, **here as in every status ethic**, is a problem of consumption and not of work" (ibid.:158). The Confucian gentleman was not a tool of God; but neither was he a tool for material acquisitions. It was these status considerations that disposed him to princely services which he saw as proper to the Confucian life orientation, and which was not something "below" him.

In Weber's historical and structural analyses, class and status group are thus invoked, with the finely drawn differences at the pure type level serving extremely important heuristic purposes.

The relations between "class" and "status" could perhaps be represented in the following way:

Figure 1 Class and status in ideal-typical relations



In the construction of class, as a phenomenon or aspect of the distribution of power, the core element is the economic agent whose meaning-endowed action is typified by the instrumental-rational orientation. Apart from the limiting case where his economic action is not social — the Robinsonade situation — the social relationship in which he is embedded tends towards the associative relationship rather than the communal relationship. This is in keeping with the meaning of class as knowing no personal distinctions, where the economic function or interest is purely "functional." When this extends to the economic system (in this case, the market), it completes the construction of the "class situation." Several points are noteworthy here. First, Weber's

characterization of the class situation always takes as central the fact that it is sustained by social actions (i.e. meaningful action of an individual oriented to others, or to his expectations of the meaning of others' action). Whatever vantage point (the concentric cicles in our diagram) one takes, this central fact is embedded in the notion. In this sense, "class" is an integral part of Weber's theory of social action. Secondly, in order to draw the differences between the economic mode and other modes of action to the full limits, Weber has emphasized the pure type characteristics. Thus, for instance, in the discussion of action orientation, he has argued that the instrumental-rational orientation is far more stable and predictable in bringing about the same result. The uniformities, similarities and continuities in a "free" market are far more conducive to stability than the action responses to a system of norms and duties which are considered binding on the members of a group (E&S, vol.1:30). Thirdly, as the action is characterized by the institutional contexts, the overlaps with (and partial determination by) the non-economic or non-class factors become important. Thus, in regard to the market, Weber has argued that there are non-economic considerations that are at work; general expectations or values as in "honesty is the best policy." Similarly, Weber is insistent that the modern economic system could not continue "if its control of resources were not upheld by the legal compulsion of the state... if its formally legal rights were not upheld by threat of force" (E&S, vol.1:65).

This brings us to the status construction in the diagram. As pure type, "status group" is antithetical to "class," as we have argued in the above. Strictly speaking, there is no single individual agent in the case of status. While "class" is a matter of the individuals' relationships to the market, "status group" presupposes a power claim based on specific criteria of mutuality. Social relationship could be associative or communal; it tends to be the latter if the concerned individuals are oriented to each other not just on the grounds of common interest or "expediency," but also because of the feeling that they belong together (see E&S, vol.1:40-43). What is more pertinent to our purpose here is that "status"

represents a unity or order of concepts and meanings that overlaps with and partially determines the characterization and explanation of "class." (This is represented by the shaded area in the diagram.) Such partial determination and overlapping could be interpreted at several levels. First, as in the case of the Chinese literati, status values could predispose economic activities in specific directions (by encouraging some while preempting others as "unbecoming") and, thereby, determine class situations. Secondly, status values are attached to the different economic positions or functions in the society and, accordingly, determine their "equivalent social value." In this way, the marketability of the goods and services of these positions is affected. (We will elaborate on this in our discussion of Schumpeter.) Finally, status, to the extent that it is part of the ultimate values in the society, provides the ethical compulsions or motivations for economic activities. Weber's own study of the Protestant ethic is a classic vindication of this point. All in all, then, "class" and "status" in Weber are related not so much as two discrete, separate principles or dimensions of social stratification as overlapping and partially determining orders of social action and social life. The full distinctiveness and significance of "class" is only intelligible in this larger context. Insofar as this is the case, then, "class" is an integral part of the Weberian theory of action and social order. In the following sections, we try to sketch the nature and implications of such a Weberian class/social analysis, by turning to a few studies which are obviously influenced by Weber's ideas on methodology, class, or historical development. We shall see that the Weberian relevance is important and beneficial.

Sabel, Lockwood and Schumpeter: The Weberian Influence

Sabel's *Work and Politics* (1982) is an attempt to understand class relations and class conflict in the specific context of work and workplace conditions, in particular, the conditions and conse-

quences for class of different labour markets and their segments. For Sabel, the relations between the workers' world views and the labour market condition are crucial for understanding workers' acquiescence or struggle. World views are something similar to Weber's normative or ideal interests. They are a combination of (inextricably intertwined) facts and values. Facts because the worker has captured something of the workplace and the kind of work offered him; facts also because there are certain areas of agreement between the employer and the worker, e.g., a certain equilibrium between the demands of the employer for work of a certain kind, and the expectations of workers for jobs with certain characteristics. Thus, managers with only short-term work to offer recruit workers willing to take such jobs for reasons of their own (Sabel, 1982:13).

But the world views are also values in the sense that, through socialization, certain social imageries and conceptions of his rightful niche in the division of labour or in the society are instilled in the worker. World views are thus about both truths and illusions, inextricably mixed (ibid.:15). Further, Sabel argues that a world view is not reducible to any series of experience, that of the individual, or his parents; the ideational and the evaluative always contain something more. In the concrete workplace, an individual brings to this situation his world views. It will be world views and not a single world view because by nature world view could not be so comprehensive as to be able to organize all the convictions and beliefs of a person into a coherent whole. Moreover, the diversity of economic activity and, in particular, the separation of the worker role from the citizen role in industrial society, mean that there will be a plurality of such world views, with each pertaining to (and gaining primacy in) different spheres of life, and coexisting with one another in often unarticulated ways. Workers may bring quite different world views to the same, single set of labour market conditions or jobs. This is the case, for example, of the craftsmen, who "can be employed on assembly lines or as feeders of automatic machines, provided that at least occasionally they can test their craft knowledge against unforeseen problems" (ibid.:14). Conversely, workers may be operating with the same kind of world view when they are working in different segments of the labour market, as in the case of the peasants "who expect to return to the land working side by side at unskilled jobs with industrial workers who expect to become craftsmen. Both can abide their work because they assume it will be temporary" (ibid.). There is no single workers' interest or expectation, and their relations to different labour market conditions are complex and not automatic. Further, world views affect the kinds of crucial expectations workers bring to the workplace, and it is the (limited, specific) agreement or correspondence between these expectations and the requirements from the employers that give a certain degree of order to the relation between capital and labour.

The above argument, at least in its overall tenor and method of execution, could have been written by Weber. There is the same view of action as meaningful orientation to others, the irreducible nature of ideas and values, and also, more pertinently, the intricate ways in which these subjective elements bear on the objective (the workplace situation). Social order is a result of a "selected" agreement or correspondence between the expectations and the requirements. Weber has this to say about the nature of conflict in associative relationships:

> Associative relationships... very often consist only in compromises between rival interests, where only a part of the occasion or means of conflict has been eliminated.... Hence, outside the areas of compromise, the conflict of interests, with its attendant competition for supremacy, remains unchanged. (E&S, vol.1:42)

Different labour market conditions make for a plurality of class situations, in the Weberian sense. In a way, Sabel's study is to demonstrate what this class situation means at the empirical level of the workplace. And a study of the class situations must necessarily take into account the world views and the non-class elements. Sabel elaborates on the world views in this way. The crucial expectations of the worker define the kinds of normative standards of justice and honour, of propriety. Even though these

expectations (associated as they are with the incomprehensive and incoherent world views or idea of his career of work) are partial and loosely connected, at certain junctures, the management may violate these standards. Workplace struggles then ensue. Thus, in Sabel's view, workers acquiesce not without reservation about management (Weber's "only a part of the occasion or means of conflict has been eliminated"), about its misconduct and potential violation of the terms of the relations. Workers become radical not because they have taken on a new identity but because they want to defend their everyday conception (their expectations and sense of propriety), which both explicates and accommodates normatively their everyday worklife. And when struggle begins, workers' model of society **and** model for society will change, especially when the formerly unarticulated conceptions and formerly tenuous ties are being forged together (for instance, between the political and the economic). Thus, revolutionary potential is still possible despite the everyday legitimating function of the world views, the modicum agreement between management and workers, the diversity of the world views among workers, the diversity of economic activity, and so forth. We can say that Sabel's Marxist concern is strengthened through an extensive borrowing from Weber.

Given the way he argued his case, one can also see why he has grave reservation about both the Marxist and Weberian theories of worker radicalism. The Marxist theory, according to him, simply regards what the worker says and does in his everyday worklife as irrelevant. The underlying notion in such an approach is that of "homo faber": the worker sees himself as a maker and, accordingly, he has a real interest in realizing that goal. An alienated work situation does not treat him as he sees himself. So what explains the acquiescence? The Marxist resorts to "false consciousness" or outright repression. Alienation thus acquires a shadowy, twilight existence: "the alienated worker is comprehensible only in the rare instances where he struggles against alienation" (Sabel, 1982:9). On the other hand, the Weberian approach takes the "self-definitions" of the worker seriously. But Sabel sees this approach as upholding a "worker as consumer" (in opposition to the Marxist "worker as producer") model: workers define themselves by what they have and not what they do. If the most important issue in understanding the rationality of the struggles and the coherence of the worker's identity is the choice of means given arbitrary ends, then the Weberian approach has to explain why new goals and wants arise, and why they in turn "dictate" that class struggle is the "right" means. Sabel argues that the Weberian theorist treats the worker as a consumer and is at a loss as to why this consumer will generate new goals and new desires. For the consumer, there is just a succession of unrelated wants that supercede each other capriciously (ibid.:7). (In contrast, in the Marxist "homo faber" model, the worker is imputed a clear goal, without regard for the means involved.) There is no foundation in the Weberian position for explaining why there is a change in the worker's identity as he engages in class struggle. We do not think that Sabel's criticism of the Weberian theory of class action is entirely justified. But we do not intend to go into this issue here. The point that is relevant to our discussion is simply that Sabel's approach to class and politics is in our view heavily influenced by Weber's framework and that his extremely fruitful approach vindicates our earlier point that a full appreciation of Weber's class or class analysis requires placing "class" in the larger context of what we earlier referred to as the "overlapping and partial determination" of different aspects of power.

Through a different detour, and focussing on theory (Durkheim's theory of social order and social instability) rather than empirical reality, Lockwood (1992) more or less arrives at the same vindication. In his discussion of power and prerogatives, Lockwood follows Weber's definitions and delineations (ibid.:174). Thus, class is the economic side of power claims and exercise of prerogatives, taking place via market societies. It is a matter of the degree of relative control over the life-chance resources taken or rendered by one's goods and services in the market, rather than simply the amount of acquisition or types of goods and services. It is market situation rather than possession

that matters (see also Burger, 1985). Status group, on the other hand, refers to a set of determinants of power claims and prerogatives which are not market-mediated. Status is rooted in the status system of the society where a set of ultimate values and beliefs sanction and emphasize certain activities, roles and positions, endowing them with social honour and prestige, but also, at the same time, implicating them in legal institutions of property and contract, i.e. the larger power structure of the society. (Also see Weber's discussion in "Social Psychology of the World Religions" in Weber, 1948.) This is, according to Lockwood, precisely what Durkheim understands by "social classification": "the fact that class or production relations are always encompassed and partially determined by status relations" (ibid.). By linking Weber's status order with Durkheim's social classification, Lockwood provides, in our view, a broader framework for understanding the world views and "crucial expectations" that Sabel emphasized. At one level, the status order attaches different value to different services and functions:

> ... at every moment of history, there is a dim perception, in the moral consciousness of societies, of the respective value of different social services, the relative award due to each, and the consequent degree of comfort appropriate on the average to workers in each occupation. The different functions are graded in public opinion and a certain coefficient of well-being assigned to each, according to its place in the social hierarchy... a genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally formulated, which fixes with relative precision the maximum degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimately aspire. (Lockwood, 1992:70)

As we said earlier, as part of the world views Sabel's worker brings to the workplace, the conception of his "rightful" niche in the division of labour and in the social hierarchy is an important element — as some status rights — in the workplace relation or class situation. ("Status rights and duties are always an expression of the distribution of political, military and economic power"

Lockwood, 1992:175.) The status order, or Durkheim's "social classification," impinges on, and partially determines, the class situation. Furthermore, class and status order are also inextricably involved in any adequate consideration of the relation between structure and action. Thus, Lockwood argues that, to the extent that the purpose of understanding social structure is to elucidate the variability of class struggle, then some idea of the constituents of social action is indispensable. Once one accepts this, then it means that one has to take into account not only the means and conditions of action, but also the determination of the ends of actors and of the standards by which they relate means to ends (ibid.:355-356). (This is also, as we have just seen, precisely what Sabel is after.) To the extent that class captures the means and conditions of action, and status order the determination of ends and the standards by which means are related to ends, then, again, class and status order are implicated in each other. And there is no escaping from the fact that the two are mutually tied in tension, with each being irreducible to the other. Thus, to Lockwood, the fact that ends are internalized and legitimized does not mean that they will be binding on the individual. The extent to which the individual sees the ends as binding is variable and is affected by, among other things, changes in the class situation. On the other hand, the status situation cannot be reduced to the category of external means and conditions which actors relate to in a purely instrumental manner.

But there is one particular aspect of the relation between class and status which is noteworthy. We have argued in an earlier section that for Weber, class action emerges when there is a transparency in the connection between the causes and consequences of class situation. Lockwood further elucidates this idea by saying that class conflicts vary inversely with the degree "production relations are embodied within a stable system of hierachial status" (ibid.:176). And he continues in this way:

> [C]lasses, born out of production relations, only become active social forces, or "classes for themselves", when economic power is momentarily disengaged from the status

> order in which it was previously incorporated and legitimated. (ibid.)

It follows, then, that the principle of citizenship (as a status order stressing equality rather than hierarchy) in modern societies will mean that status differentiation will be heavily circumscribed by laws (in Marshall's succession of stages: laws for civil, political and social rights; see Marshall, 1964). This egalitarian status order, conferring equal (citizen) status rights to acquire property and enter into contract, "has profound consequences for the constitution of production relations as well as for the nature and extent of any consciousness of class division these relations are likely to give rise to" (Lockwood, 1992:175-176). Although Lockwood is here referring to "production relations" and not "market situations," the impact of status order, and in particular, the modern one characterized by citizenship, on class situations and the probability of class action at various empirical-institutional levels is unmistakable. Probably, for Lockwood, one of the major defects of the Marxist theory of action is precisely its lack of attention to this question of "institutionalization of status." Because of this, the Marxist theory loses an important foothold in understanding the status order, which is the primary focus of the integration of the ends of the class actors:

> The tendency to dismiss both hierachical and egalitarian aspects of status as ideological reflections of the class structure is far too crude to grasp the complicated ways in which the legitimation of status relationships is both contingent upon, and constitutive of, class interests. (ibid.:370)

In this light, the Weberian approach to class and status represents a far more sophisticated and adequate framework, not least because, at a general level, Weber has a far more insightful grasp of the relations between ideas and interests: "ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest" (Weber, 1948:280).

The point that, at a general level, a society's status order encompasses and partially determines class situation by way of ascribing certain social values to its functions and roles is also

made by Schumpeter in his attempt to integrate elements from the Weberian and the Durkheimian traditions. To start off, Schumpeter distinguishes class into two senses: first, class as a living, social phenomenon and, secondly, class as a classification scheme (Schumpeter, 1951:105). To him, the most important thing is that the link between the two is to be established and not postulated. One could say that Weber's ideal-typical analysis is precisely a methodology for that link. More substantively, Schumpeter tends to see class as a social fact, as it is defined by Durkheim, and (strangely, given the Weberian aversion to reified concepts) as something also close to Weber's notion of "social class." Let us quote Schumpeter himself:

> Class is something more than an aggregate of class members. It is something else, and this something else cannot be recognized in the behaviour of the individual class member. A class is aware of its identity as a whole, sublimates itself as such, has its own peculiar life and characteristic "spirit". (ibid.:107)

But Schumpeter is also attentive to the nature of the associative relationships in a class:

> [O]ne essential peculiarity... of the class phenomenon lies in the fact that class members behave towards one another in a fashion characteristically different from their conduct towards members of other classes... they look out into the same segment of the world, with the same eyes... [they] shared social *a priori*... social intercourse within class barriers is promoted by the similarity of manners and habits of life... [and] intermarriage prevails among its members. (ibid:107-108)

There is thus also an element of closure in classes, and, for Schumpeter, this boundary-defining element is, as in the case of Weber's, closely tied to mobility. Schumpeter's writings on class are thus primarily concerned with class formation, underlaid and influenced by mobility. In his historical survey of class formation, he has emphasized two points. First, he operates with a Durkheimian notion of social differentiation in his understanding

of the emergence of classes and the changes in the topology of the class map. In social differentiation, socially necessary functions become more diverse and become different from earlier times. As the society develops, the new tasks require a different organization of the society and a different type of leadership. Moreover, the tasks or functions are ascribed values. (Recall the earlier quotation from Lockwood about the dim perception in the moral consciousness of respective value of different social services; an idea obviously influenced by Durkheim.) Societies evaluate the different functions of the classes differently, and individuals do subscribe to these values at the interpersonal level (thus making for, in our view, the kind of order that Sabel pointed to in the workplace). Thus for Schumpeter, a conception of the genetic reasons for class emergence is inseparable from an understanding of the predominant goals or purpose of the functions in the society in a specific period of time (ibid.:137f). And class "dominance" is the result of the gaining in importance of a class's special function (as, for instance, that of military leadership in the Germanic aristocracy), and the acceptance (though not always consciously) by the rest of the people of such importance (ibid.:138).

Schumpeter further makes the point that the way in which a class's special functions are carried out is also important. The occasional exercise of a function (no matter how frequent the occasion, how vital that function is) is not sufficient to intrench "a special discipline and orientation in such a way that they become the very life of a class" (ibid.:148). That is why the modern professional soldier differs from the warrior in the old aristocracy, although both have the same functions. For the latter, combat is a mode of life, and it inculcates a persistent readiness and engagement. Its modern counterpart, however, is "a soldier in the sense that a lawyer is a lawyer." Similarly, the family enterprise entrepreneur may share the same function, the same class situation, with his corporate counterpart. Yet, the competitive economy of the nineteenth century is such that the former is always kept, as it were, up on his toes. Again, it is the "external" environment that matters: the modern society tends to circumscribe the occasion

and opportunity for defending individual and class position by force of arms (the warrior) or by economic innovation (the family entrepreneur). One could thus say (to revert to the Weberian relevance) that, in the determination of class situations, such societal factors are crucial. And it goes without saying, we believe, that the Weberian approach is far more able to allow for, and at the same time to be precise about, the diversity of market and work situations.

Secondly, Schumpeter also emphasizes the role of individual efforts in the mobility process and, thus, in class formation. For him, class distinctions and social differentiations arise and have meaning only where the environmental factors change with sufficient speed, where there is scope for action, decision and service. It is precisely such action and decision that enables mobility to happen. It is Schumpeter's view that class barriers are more often than not transgressed and, in the long run, only the individual is class-born, not the family. Class position is in this sense an exercise of particular activities "chosen by or imposed on [an individual] within his class limitations." Class barriers are transgressed by luck, enterprise, and efficiency; and, in industrial capitalism, perhaps the most important means is by striking out, to move with assurance outside the rut. The more differentiated structure in its division of labour makes the entrepreneurial activity more likely. Thus the change from the competitive mode of capitalism to corporate capitalism means that the "rising specialization and mechanization, reaching up to the leading positions, has thrown open positions at the top to men with purely technical qualifications that would, of themselves, be inadequate to the needs of family enterprise" (ibid.:124). So, on the whole, we could say that while Weber has elucidated the generic characteristics of class and its relations with status at a general, ideal-typical level, Schumpeter has further extended this line of enquiry by saying now that class is, as it were, "overdetermined" by the (economic) needs of the economic system (corporate capitalism or the competitive mode) and by the functions and values in the society. But from the vantage point of individual efforts, mobility counts, and individ-

ual behaviour and aptitude matter, with the movements within a class made possible by them no different qualitatively from movements between classes.

Goldthorpe: Class Formation and Social Mobility

The issue of mobility is of course central to Goldthorpe's studies of class formation. In fact, one could see in his works both a gradual development from a concern with social inequalities *per se* to a problematic of class structure and class formation, and a persistent concern with the openness and fairness of the society. In an article published in 1974, Goldthorpe tackled the relation between inequalities and social integration. In contrast to many other theorists (both Marxist and Weberian), who postulated different explanations for the lack of political instability despite increasing economic and industrial conflicts by, in effect, insulating the potentially destabilizing consequences of inequality by socio-psychological or cultural factors, Goldthorpe argued, borrowing from the concept of anomie or declassification from Durkheim, that the disruptive potential of serious and largely unlegitimated inequality lies primarily in the economic realm. The disruptive potential is manifested in wage conflicts, in a "catch as catch can" mentality and institutional arrangements. By and large, it results in a lack of moral regulation of people's wants and goals (Goldthorpe, 1974:224, 228f).

In its essence, the "wage jungle" (and Goldthorpe was largely concerned with the British society at the time) is no longer regulated by what Lockwood/Durkheim and Sabel respectively call the legitimation by the status order, and the legitimating world views the worker brings to his everyday worklife. Inequality and, to the extent that it is institutionalized and maintained over time, class are thus in this fashion in tension with the status order and the moral regulation of the society. In his later works, Goldthorpe further built upon his views on inequality. Inequality is differences in power and advantage, and since different forms of them

are often convertible, and with these differences ranging across wide areas of life-chances, the differences tend to be perpetuated over time. In other words, structures of social inequality — in both condition and opportunity — are inherently highly resistant to change. (In saying that these structures are inherently resistant to change, Goldthorpe reveals his Marxist inclinations, for he continues on to say that "change is therefore only likely to be brought about through collective action on the part of those in inferior positions, relying on their numbers and above all on solidarity and organization... if class society is to be ended — or even radically modified — this can only be through conflict between classes in one form or another" Goldthorpe, 1980:28-29.) The study of class formation is precisely to delineate the parameters of these structures, to highlight the areas of "concentrated" power as well as those where mobility or permeability are more likely. The general concern is to examine the degree to and the way in which class has become a relatively stable collectivity. The problem is not so much inequalities as such ("who owns what") but as "proportion and relation," power and prestige differentials. Thus, insofar as Goldthorpe's approach to class focusses on both the social structure (the structures of inequality) and the processes (mobility, or intergenerational and career trajectories), it fits neither into the "attribute" school (for which social hierarchy is in terms of discrete attributes, with the latter defined by criteria of antagonism or contribution), nor the "variable" school (for which the social structure consists of continua of selected variables). (See Runciman, 1989, vol.2:24 for a discussion of the two approaches.)

As inequality is a multiform and pervasive phenomenon, it is natural that Goldthorpe finds the Weberian notion of class more amenable. That the notions "market situation" and "work situation" of occupation have become (through the work of Lockwood; see Lockwood, 1958:13-16) the operational definition of Goldthorpe and of other Weberian researches on class and mobility is well-known and has been documented elsewhere. We just need to add that, in approaching the nature of occupation, these two components combine to form an indicator robust enough to be of

relevance to various conditions of external competitiveness and of internal advantages such as training and promotion prospects. The aim is to incorporate both employment relations (employee, employer, self-employed) and the relations at the production/work unit into the occupation *qua* class measure. The differentiation in work situation also takes into account the factor of "management – supervision – sheer employee" directly and is, in our view, both technically more viable and theoretically less problematic than what the neo-Marxist is wont of doing (Wong and Lui, 1992:27-28). It is interesting to note that in Lockwood"s formulation of "work situation," he specifically discusses "status systems" and their bearing on the deferential-subordinate relationships at work and their legitimacy (see Lockwood, 1992:83-92 for further developments).

There are two components in class formation. For a class to become a relatively stable collectivity, it must at least attain a degree of demographic unity. In this respect, the homogeneity (self-recruiting) and heterogeneity (newcomers coexisting with the old guard) of classes become crucial indicators of this unity. The second component is socio-political formation. This concerns the "preparedness and capacity for action." What matters here is not just socio-political orientations and propensities but also the normative and relational continuities (or discontinuities) wrought by the experience of social mobility. A classic example is provided in Goldthorpe's earlier work, *The Affluent Worker*. It is a text critical of the embourgeoisement thesis. It is found that, in terms of class voting patterns, a sizable segment of the affluent workers has a more instrumental approach to voting for the Labour Party, and that it is also this group which has the least degree of subscription to the belief in the Labour Party as a "class party" (thus entailing the implication that the relation between the trade union and the Labour Party is not too desirable). An examination of this segment reveals that the patterns are especially found among workers who have extensive "white-collar affiliations," defined in terms of family ties (spouses or parents having white-collar jobs) and/or previous occupational experience (i.e. the job history of the worker

himself). It is these "family and occupational bridges" to the "middle class" that explain the less solidaristic, and more instrumental outlook of this significant minority within the affluent workers (Goldthorpe et al., 1968:81-82).

Here, leaving aside Goldthorpe's position on the embourgeoisement thesis, one can note several issues. First, the interests of the working class are empirically determined. They are not imputed, assumed or necessarily homogeneous. Indeed, its heterogeneity is something expected. Secondly, the important diversity in these interests is traceable to the factor of "white-collar affiliations." Thirdly, these "affiliations" are not something determined or overdetermined by the political or ideological apparatus of the society, and then inculcated and disseminated at the workplace. Rather they are part and parcel of the worker's occupational/class experience and his more general experience of (or exposure to) middle class values his "significant others" embody through their incumbency of a different set of class positions. Finally, the pervasiveness of these "white-collar affiliations," and their specific effect on "class voting," depends on the changes in the larger occupational/class structure itself. The more middle class occupations there are, or the more extensive it is for women to join the labour force, and occupy the nonmanual, white-collar jobs, the more likely one will find such affiliations among the workers. What is happening at the aggregate level of class voting is then to be understood in terms of the changes of the occupational/class structure, although the linkage between the two is via the individual or interpersonal level of the experience of work, sociation and values. Such kind of analysis, combining, as it were, class position and life experience, and a contrapuntal interplay between the objective and the subjective, is an underlying thread in Goldthorpe's work, just as much as it is in Weber's.

The features of Goldthorpe's framework are presented in the following figure. We have also provided the Marxist framework, as schematized by Scase (1992), for comparison.



Figure 2 The Goldthorpe framework

Figure 3 The Marxist framework*

Social relations of production	⟶	**Class structure**	⟶	**Occupational categories**
Functions of capital relating to:				
(a) ownership				(a) shareholders and proprietors
(b) control and coordination		Middle class		(b) directors, managers, higher-grade professional employees
(c) research and technological development				(c) scientists, engineers and technologists
Functions of labour relating to:				
(d) production of economic surplus		Working class		(d) productive manual workers
(e) execution of necessary but non-productive tasks				(e) clerical, secretarial, routine "nonmanual," support and maintenance workers

* Adapted from Scase, 1992:25, figure 3.

Three points are in order. First, Scase emphasizes that, for the Marxist approach, occupational categories are not constitutive of class positions; rather, it is the class structure which determines the occupational order. Thus, "it is class relations, embedded as these are within the control relationships of organizations, that determine the delineation of occupations, and therefore, occupa-

tional orders" (Scase, 1992:26). Secondly, it is also clear from this presentation that the Marxist approach lay much stock on the production side of the matter. Class structure is conceptualized in relation to production and the needs of production (the coordination and control, research and development). We can see that, at least in the way Scase presents it, other bases of control (Weber's power claims) which have a bearing on the functions of capital and labour and, thereby, modify their power and legitimacy, are simply not entertained. Coordination and control are always serving capital, but obviously, such tasks also have their associated power and prerogatives derived from a larger context. An example is Goldthorpe's notion of "service class." The notion of "service" connotes trust, delegation of authority and related code of professional ethics. Its primacy lies in the economic context, and yet this context is a prism refracting forces from the general status notions and values in the larger society. The third point is about interests. Since the various classes are derived from the social division of labour (which is in turn determined by the capital – labour axis), they are simply different means, so to say, for meeting the needs of capital (and become accordingly advantaged or disadvantaged). There is no attempt to theorize the possible diverse interests generated by coordination and control **as such**, by research and development **as such**. Again, in the Marxist scheme, interests are either putative or assumed (e.g., the workers as **homo faber**).

Let us conclude with an exercise adjudicating the Goldthorpe and the neo-Marxist class schema. The purpose is to throw some light on the practical and theoretical difficulties when the two approaches are being applied in empirical research. We code the occupational information we gathered for our Hong Kong Middle Class project (1990-) into the two schemes by following their respective operational criteria. In the case of Wright (1978, the unrevised Wright scheme), the determination of the bourgeoisie, small employers and petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat is relatively simple. The determining criteria are the ownership or dispossession of means of production, and whether this happens in

the capitalist mode of production (thus making for the bourgeoisie and workers), or in the simple commodity production (e.g., the petty bourgeoisie). In determining the managers and supervisors, and the semi-autonomous employees, the relevant criteria concern decision-making power, supervisory functions and autonomy in work. In the case of the Goldthorpe scheme, the relevant criteria are employment status, managerial-supervisory role, plus secondary indicators such as size of establishment. The underlying assumption is that each class thus delineated will share more or less common market situation and work situation, including things such as career stability/development, work rank or status, authority in work, and so forth.

The cross-tabulation of the two class distributions is shown in Table 1. If we confine our attention first to the row and column totals, then several points can be noted.

First, in both the Goldthorpe and the Wright scheme, the working class is still very sizable: in the former case, 35.7 per cent, and in the latter, 48.6 per cent. Secondly, we note that those who could be broadly characterized as "middle class" in Wright consist of "managers and supervisors," and it comes to 31.7 per cent. Together with "small employers" and "semi-autonomous employees," they (constituting 40 per cent of the sampled population) come to occupy what Wright calls "contradictory class locations." In the case of Goldthorpe's, the "middle classes" broadly include "service class I and II," which comes to 20 per cent of the population, although if we extend the definition and include the routine nonmanual class (III), then nearly 45 per cent of the population could be characterized as "middle class." It should be noted that the Wright scheme does not treat the nonmanual workers separately; they are lumped with the manual workers.

Next, it is noted that 7 per cent (4 individuals) of Goldthorpe's "service class I" are workers if they are coded according to the Wright scheme. A substantial 32 per cent (20 individuals) of "service class II" are labelled as Wright's "workers." And then 7 per cent (10 individuals) of Goldthorpe's "semi-skilled and unskilled

Table 1 Cross-classification of respondents into Wright and Goldthorpe class categories

Goldthorpe Scheme	Wright Scheme							
	Bourgeoisie	Small employers	Petty bourgeoisie	Managers	Supervisors	Semi-autonomous employees	Workers	Total
I	18	1	1	33	1	1	4	59
	[3.1]	[0.2]	[0.2]	[5.6]	[0.2]	[0.2]	[0.7]	[10.0]
	(30.5)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(55.9)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(6.8)	(100.0)
	(64.3)	**(3.8)**	**(2.9)**	**(19.9)**	**(4.8)**	**(3.6)**	**(1.4)**	
II	0	0	0	40	0	2	20	62
	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[6.8]	[0.0]	[0.3]	[3.4]	[10.5]
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(64.5)	(0.0)	(3.2)	(32.3)	(100.0)
	(0.0)	**(0.0)**	**(0.0)**	**(24.1)**	**(0.0)**	**(7.1)**	**(7.0)**	
III	0	0	0	40	11	10	86	147
	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[6.8]	[1.9]	[1.7]	[14.6]	[24.9]
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(27.2)	(7.5)	(6.8)	(58.5)	(100.0)
	(0.0)	**(0.0)**	**(0.0)**	**(24.1)**	**(52.4)**	**(35.7)**	**(30.0)**	
IV	10	25	33	0	0	0	0	68
	[1.7]	[4.2]	[5.6]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[11.5]
	(14.7)	(36.8)	(48.5)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(100.0)
	(35.7)	**(96.2)**	**(97.1)**	**(0.0)**	**(0.0)**	**(0.0)**	**(0.0)**	

Table 1 (Continued)

V	0	0	0	27	4	1	11	43
	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[4.6]	[0.7]	[0.2]	[1.9]	[7.3]
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(62.8)	(9.3)	(2.3)	(25.6)	(100.0)
	(0.0)	**(0.0)**	**(0.0)**	**(16.3)**	**(19.0)**	**(3.6)**	**(3.8)**	
VI	0	0	0	18	3	6	38	65
	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[3.1]	[0.5]	[1.0]	[6.4]	[11.0]
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(27.7)	(4.6)	(9.2)	(58.5)	(100.0)
	(0.0)	**(0.0)**	**(0.0)**	**(10.8)**	**(14.3)**	**(21.4)**	**(13.2)**	
VII	0	0	0	8	2	8	128	146
	[0.0]	[0.0]	[0.0]	[1.4]	[0.3]	[1.4]	[21.7]	[24.8]
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(5.5)	(1.4)	(5.5)	(87.7)	(100.1)
	(0.0)	**(0.0)**	**(0.0)**	**(4.8)**	**(9.5)**	**(28.6)**	**(44.6)**	
Total	28	26	34	166	21	28	287	590
	[4.8]	[4.4]	[5.8]	[28.1]	[3.6]	[4.8]	[48.6]	[100.1]
	(100.0)	**(100.0)**	**(100.0)**	**(100.0)**	**(100.0)**	**(100.0)**	**(100.0)**	

Notes: [ ] total percentage.
( ) row percentage.
( ) (in bold) column percentage.

workers" (class VII) belong to Wright's "managers and supervisors." In order to understand these anomalies, we "unpack" the occupational composition and other related characteristics of these cases, with the belief that the results could be instructive, at least in this exercise of adjudicating the pros and cons of the two schemas.

Table 2 Selected characteristics of cases in Goldthorpe class I/ Wright "workers"*

Occupation	Sex	Age	Monthly income (HK$)	Education	Self-assigned class
Accountant (trainee)**	F	22	5,000-5,999	university	upper-middle
Medical practitioner	M	25	30,000 or more	university	middle
Civil, structural, municipal, mining and quarrying engineer	M	30	15,000-19,999	university	upper-middle
Electrical engineer	F	51	12,000-14,999	university	lower

* The Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) occupational titles, and not the specific job titles of the respondents, are used here and Tables 3 and 4.

** The original OPCS occupational title is "chartered and certified accountant." "Accountant trainee" is used here to highlight the fact that the respondent is in the early stage of her professional career.

Table 2 shows the occupations of those respondents who are coded as Goldthorpe's "service class I" and yet become "workers" if they are coded according to the Wright scheme. We can see that all of them are in what is commonly accepted as professional occupations. All have university education and enjoy high income (with the exception of the accountant trainee). In Table 3, we find

that nearly half of those who are in "service class II" and are "workers" for Wright are teachers. The reason that they are "workers" in the Wright scheme is simply because they lack any decision-making power, supervisory function and autonomy in work. Perhaps an extreme case of this example is that of the airline pilot; he will also be regarded as belonging to the "worker" class, precisely (perhaps too precisely) because he scores negative on all these three counts. All the respondents (20 in total) in this category have high income (more than HK$10,000 a month), with all of them having completed at least secondary school, and with the majority of them claiming middle class membership.

Table 3 Selected characteristics of respondents in Goldthorpe class II/Wright "workers"

Occupation	Sex	Age	Monthly income (HK$)	Education	Self-assigned class
Teacher n.e.c.	F	53	15,000-19,999	upper secondary	middle
Teacher n.e.c.	M	31	12,000-14,999	college (non-degree)	middle
Teacher n.e.c.	F	32	12,000-14,999	university	middle
Teacher n.e.c.	F	24	12,000-14,999	university	middle
Teacher n.e.c.	F	22	5,000-5,999	upper-secondary	not belong to any
Teacher n.e.c.	F	42	15,000-19,999	college (non-degree)	middle
Teacher n.e.c.	F	43	15,000-19,999	upper-secondary	middle
Teacher n.e.c.	F	34	12,000-14,999	upper-secondary	middle
Teacher n.e.c.	F	29	15,000-19,999	matriculation	working

Table 3 (Continued)

Teacher n.e.c.	F	43	15,000-19,999	upper-secondary	middle
Welfare occupation	F	27	12,000-14,999	university	middle
Physiotherapist	M	24	10,000-11,999	college (non-degree)	middle
Medical technician, dental auxiliaries	M	24	10,000-11,999	college (non-degree)	middle
Author, writer, journalist	M	39	15,000-19,999	university	lower
Building and civil engineering technician	F	32	10,000-11,999	college (non-degree)	middle
Office manager n.e.c.	F	44	12,000-14,999	lower-secondary	upper-middle
Supervisor of other clerks and cashiers (not retail)	M	37	10,000-11,999	upper-secondary	lower
Policeman (below Sergeant)	M	26	12,000-14,999	upper-secondary	middle
Policeman (below Sergeant)	M	35	12,000-14,999	upper-secondary	working
Policeman (below Sergeant)	M	29	10,000-11,999	upper-secondary	middle

Lastly, we turn to those who are workers (class VII) in the Goldthorpe scheme and who happen to be "managers and supervisors" to Wright. One can see from Table 4 that all have relatively low income, much poorer education and more often than not claiming lower class status.

Table 4 Selected characteristics of respondents in Goldthorpe class VII/Wright "managers and supervisors"

Occupation	Sex	Age	Monthly income (HK$)	Education	Self-assigned class
Driver of road goods vehicle	M	38	6,000-7,999	lower-secondary	not belong to any
Driver of road goods vehicle	M	46	8,000-9,999	primary	middle
Builders (so described)	M	43	6,000-7,999	primary	working
Waitress	F	33	4,000-4,999	lower-secondary	middle
Storekeeper, warehouseman	M	23	6,000-7,999	lower-primary	middle
Kitchen porter, hand	M	41	no answer	lower-primary	not belong to any
Other metal, jewellery, electrical production worker	M	26	6,000-7,999	upper-secondary	middle
Sewer, embroiderer	M	58	6,000-7,999	lower-secondary	middle

Their occupational titles also suggest that the decision-making and/or supervisory aspect of their job (thus qualifying them, for Wright, as belonging to the "managers and supervisors") are either esoteric (e.g., drivers of various kinds of vehicles as "supervising" his co-driver mate), or that the "authority" is one by default rather than *de jure* (e.g., warehouse keeper, embroiderer).

If we turn back to Table 1, we also find that Wright's "managers and supervisors" have a wide spread in Goldthorpe's class map: ranging from 20 per cent in the two service classes, peaking at 27 per cent in the routine nonmanual (class III), to a notable 5 per cent in the unskilled working class (class VII). In terms of income, this means a range from more than HK$30,000 a month

(more than one-third of service class I falling into this category) to less than HK$4,000 a month (more than one-fifth of class VII are in this category). In terms of self-assigned class membership, it ranges from upper-middle class to lower class. That Wright's "managers and supervisors" have such a wide occupational and, more importantly, educational, income spread, makes one wonder if the criteria of class determination in the Wright scheme are really up to the task, at least in this case, of capturing the importance of "coordination and control," which, as Scase argued, meets the needs of capital in the overall social division of labour (see also Marshall et al., 1985:93f). One could not get away from this exercise without feeling that perhaps the defining criteria in the neo-Marxist approach are too slender a stem to support the foliage of the capitalist division of labour. Moreover, given its wooly character, it makes one wonder if this class could ever develop a modicum of interest heterogeneity which has a bearing on the contradiction between the interests of capital and those of labour. Indeed, it makes one wonder (and it is no secret that neo-Marxist have barely studied mobility rigorously) whether Wright is interested in the issue of class interests at all (see Lockwood, 1992:347-351). The impression one gets from the neo-Marxist studies is that there is a piecemeal approach to the question of translating the theoretical insights about the capitalist division of labour into a theoretically coherent and consistent framework for empirical investigation. The emphasis on autonomy and authority-related elements, and on organization and skill assets in the revised Wright scheme, may bear some semblance to the Weberian focus on authority and other forms of inequality derived from the ways in which economic rewards are actually gained: thus contents of job, status in the administrative hierarchy, and so forth. But, whereas the Weberian approach takes these inequalities as a multiform and pervasive phenomenon and produces a framework in which the guiding principles of class and status (at different levels of generality) are visible and are, indeed, indispensable, the neo-Marxist attempt is fraught with *ad hoc* inclusions and generally inconsistent, theoretically impoverished, decisions.

Concluding Remarks

In this theoretical paper, we have attempted to place Weber's ideas on class in larger contexts: in the context of his ideal-typical construction and mode of analysis; in the context of (historical and theoretical) studies which, though influenced by these ideas, also extend and develop Weber's insights; and lastly, in the context of translating the theoretical principles into a workable framework for empirical investigation. We have not compared directly Weber and Marx on the issue of class, nor have we confronted the important issue of "why Weber in Hong Kong/Chinese society?" We rest our case on the belief that the relevance of Weber pertains to social analysis as a whole, and that "class" is as good a point of departure as any other.

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2

"Class" and "Class Formation" in Hong Kong Studies

Benjamin K. P. Leung

Introduction

Class analysis was conspicuously absent in Hong Kong studies before the mid-1980s. This may be a reflection of the relatively short history, and hence the immaturity, of the social sciences and in particular of sociology in the territory. It may alternatively be attributed to the non-salience of class in Hong Kong's social structure. The latter position was taken by two local sociologists who in the early 1980s proclaimed the irrelevance of class in the study of Hong Kong society. In his article "Emergent Patterns of Social Conflict in Hong Kong Society," Lee Ming-kwan maintained:

> It will no longer be realistic to describe Hong Kong as a "class society".... The last decade saw the beginning of a new pattern of social conflicts, which assume the form of "interest group politics".... (Lee, 1982:31)

Lee explained the alleged fading of the class society mainly as a consequence of Hong Kong's growing affluence which generated abundant mobility opportunities and which also led to the birth and expansion of a new middle class. Abundant mobility oppor-

tunities obliterated class consciousness and class solidarity. The new middle class, which was emerging as the society's numerically dominant class, was heterogeneous and internally divided and had no distinct class identity. On these grounds, Lee asserted that orthodox Marxian class analysis would no longer be applicable to Hong Kong society.

If Lee's observation was of an impressionistic nature, the other sociologist Lau Siu-kai's dismissal of the relevance of class was empirically grounded. On the basis of his survey data, he concluded:

> [W]hen opportunities for upward mobility are seen as available, and when the wealthy are admired as people who have earned their success through cunning or individual striving, then class consciousness and class antagonism would be low.... In short, social classes as structural forces in shaping interpersonal relationships and political actions are relatively insignificant in Hong Kong. (Lau, 1982:98)

Yet, a few years after the publication of the above two works, a number of local scholars embarked on what could be called the re-discovery of class in Hong Kong society. The edited volume *Class Analysis and Hong Kong* (Cheung et al., 1988) was one of the major pioneering works in this endeavour, followed by the large-scale social mobility project and subsequent publications (Wong and Lui, 1992a, 1992b) by two of the authors, Thomas W. P. Wong and Lui Tai-lok, in the afore-mentioned edited volume. Building on their criticism that in omitting class analysis from their studies, previous scholars had overlooked class-related differences and failed to provide an adequate portrait of Hong Kong's social structure, Wong and Lui sought to fill in this hiatus in Hong Kong studies by bringing class back in. Their survey findings indicated that important differences existed in the mobility chances of different classes and that Hong Kong's social structure was far less fluid than commonly assumed — findings which were echoed in Tsang Wing-kwong's parallel but independent study of social mobility in Hong Kong in the past two decades (Tsang, 1992). The rigidity of social structure, Wong and Lui further observed, could

well be the main contributing factor to the behavioural and attitudinal differences between classes which they also discovered in their survey study.[1] This suggested that Hong Kong society was by no means as homogeneous as previous studies, especially that of Lau (1982), would have us believe. It further implied that given appropriate conditions, class formation — as referring to the emergence of class consciousness, class solidarity and collective class action — would take place on the basis of class differences in values and attitudes. In short, the social mobility studies laid the groundwork for the investigation of class as a social and political force in Hong Kong society. In approach, this line of studies had taken to task Lau's assertion that social class as a structural force in shaping political action was relatively insignificant in Hong Kong.

The relevance of class in the analysis of Hong Kong society was given a boost, perhaps unintentionally, in Ian Scott's study of political change and the crisis of legitimacy in Hong Kong (Scott, 1989). That the class factor played an important role in all the four crises in Hong Kong's history seemed to be an underlying theme in Scott's study. The first two crises in the 1850s and 1890s, in Scott's view, had been generated by the power contest between the government and the then very powerful **merchant class**. The gross social and political inequality that had resulted, with the government bureaucracy and the wealthy capitalists forming a closed circle of interlocking ruling elites, precipitated the third crisis of legitimacy in the mid-1960s. The 1966 and 1967 disturbances were perceived by Scott as expressions of **working class** discontent with Hong Kong's social and political system. The rise and expansion since the mid-1970s of the new middle class, who in Scott's view was liberal-democratic in orientation, in a context in which the government with a loss of autonomy could not cater to because of the growing political demands, resulted in the fourth crisis of legitimacy. In this regard, Scott described the **middle class** as "a primary source of instability" (1989:267) in Hong Kong since the mid-1980s. It was obvious that Scott was taking class as a

significant social-political force in the course of Hong Kong's development.

A brief reference to two other studies embodying class analysis would suffice for the purpose of demonstrating the pertinence of class to our understanding of Hong Kong society. Leung's study of power and politics in Hong Kong (1990) attempted to demonstrate that in 1982 and 1987 a core group of the capitalists with multiple directorships in Hong Kong's largest business corporations had been members of Hong Kong's highest policy-making bodies, the Executive and the Legislative Councils. The fact that those capitalists with the greatest economic clout had been traditionally co-opted by the government into the highest levels of the administrative structure suggested, in Leung's view, that the interests of the capitalist class were major considerations in government policy-making. Finally, W. K. Chan's *The Making of Hong Kong Society* (1991) was perhaps the finest example among local studies of how through a Weberian class analysis we could gain important insights into the structure and dynamics of the society. Suitably subtitled *Three Studies of Class Formation in Early Hong Kong*, Chan demonstrated the social and political conditions which circumscribed and facilitated the formation first of the European merchant class, and then of the Chinese merchant class and finally of the labouring class. His treatment of class formations as coterminous to the making of Hong Kong society and his analysis of the labourers' industrial actions as class confrontation against the merchant class were a further testimony to the need to bring class back in, at least in our study of early Hong Kong society.

This brief survey of the recent corpus of class studies of Hong Kong society is not meant to proclaim their superiority over those — especially the afore-mentioned works of Lee and Lau — which had not employed class analysis. After all one could justifiably expect Lee and Lau to concur with and appreciate the findings in the social mobility studies. What they questioned is rather the fruitfulness of seeing class as a significant contributing factor to social-political action. In other words, the bone of contention here

is the issue of class formation. In this respect, despite Scott's reference to class in his discussion of the crises of legitimacy, he had by no means offered a thorough and convincing account of class formation. His discussion lacked empirical backing and was basically impressionistic. On the other hand, W. K. Chan's admirably and carefully documented analysis of class formation pertained to early colonial Hong Kong, while Lee's and Lau's arguments about the irrelevance of class as a social-political force referred principally to Hong Kong in the 1960s and 1970s. The question confronting us is therefore that of class formation in post-Second World War Hong Kong. Those who disagree with Lee and Lau and castigate them for omitting class in their studies have the burden of demonstrating how class formation occurred and in what way class constituted a significant social-political force in the past few decades. The issue of class formation is the main subject of the remaining discussion.

Class Formation and Class Structure in Hong Kong before the Second World War

We can take as the background of our discussion W. K. Chan's analysis of class formation and class structure in Hong Kong in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Chan, 1991). Our objective is to tease out those conditions which in Chan's view were conducive to class formation in early Hong Kong society and then to investigate to what extent these conditions existed in post-war Hong Kong. It should be noted at the outset that Chan's approach is Weberian, and as such the study is a sophisticated application of the Weber's concepts of class, status group and party (in the sense of political groupings) in the analysis of the process of class formation in early Hong Kong. The exclusive social clubs and associations of the Europeans, particularly the Hong Kong Club, contributed to the formation of the European merchant class in demarcating on the one hand status distinctions among the Europeans, hence helping to erect a social hierarchy

and order within the European community, and on the other in segregating the Chinese merchants from their European counterparts. The economic clout and high status of the European merchants were the basis on which they gained entry into Hong Kong's upper echelons of political power. In this sense, the European merchants were the first to emerge as Hong Kong's economically, socially and politically privileged and powerful class. As a consequence, the Chinese merchants were left on their own to build up their leadership among the Chinese community, and this they did through their sponsorship of charitable organizations (such as the Tung Wah Hospital and the Po Leung Kuk) and charitable deeds. The activities of these charitable organizations conferred on the Chinese merchants not only status among the Chinese community, but also juridical power (as the directors of the Tung Wah Hospital were also entrusted with the responsibility of settling disputes among the Chinese). In acting at the same time as a chamber of commerce for the Chinese merchants, the Tung Wah Hospital further contributed to their solidarity as a class. Around the turn of the century, the Chinese merchant class had become such a significant economic and social force that the colonial government began to co-opt them into the territory's policy-making bodies. Gradually, the coincidence of economic interests and the sharing of political power between the European and the Chinese merchant classes eclipsed the previous racial and status barriers between them and they merged as one merchant class. It was in this context that the Chinese labourers started to perceive the major cleavage in society as a class rather a racial cleavage. Class consciousness and solidarity among the Chinese labourers were inculcated in particular during industrial actions in which the Chinese merchants sided with their European counterparts rather than with their compatriots. Furthermore, the small size of the Chinese labour force and its concentration in a number of relatively large-scale industrial enterprises facilitated its organization and mobilization for collective action. The eruption of the Seamen's Strike in 1922, in which many workers other than seamen also joined in support, and during which the strikers

attacked the European and Chinese merchants as "unvirtuous capitalists" carrying out "wicked plans against the labouring class" (Chan, 1991:182), was an indication that the Chinese labourers had formed into a class. In the words of W. K. Chan:

> Like the European merchants, the Chinese elite were seen as "capitalists", as adversaries of "workers". Class cleavage became as important as, if not more important than, existing racial divisions in Hong Kong society. In other words, the labourers had matured into a class of their own. (Chan, 1991:191)

Chan's work is a cogent demonstration that class formation does not proceed spontaneously from economic class positions. It is a process contingent on unique social structural configurations (for example racial divisions, and social organizations such as the Hong Kong Club and the Tung Wah Hospital) and historical circumstances (in particular struggle in the form of industrial action). Chan captures this well when he says:

> Class formation is as much the binding together of a group through the development of the same cultural and behavioural patterns as it is an aggregation of people sharing similar class situations. (Chan, 1991:205)

In this light, I shall address the issue of class formation in Hong Kong since the end of the Second World War. My objective is not to offer a comprehensive or exhaustive discussion of the factors conducive to or obstructing class formation in Hong Kong, but merely to single out some variables which in my view bear significantly on the debate about class formation and about class as a potent social-political force in the territory.

The Re-structuring of Hong Kong Society and its Implications for Class Formation

The re-structuring of Hong Kong Society was a consequence, firstly, of the Civil War in China and the subsequent establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and, secondly, of Hong

Kong's economic transformation in the early 1950s. The two impacts were related. The Civil War and the coming to power of the communists in China led to a large influx of refugees to Hong Kong. The territory's population stood at around 840,000 in 1931; it grew to over two million in 1951 and roughly three million in 1961 (Mok, 1993:110). The trade embargo imposed by the United Nations on China following the Korean War of 1950 severely crippled Hong Kong's entrepot trade on which the Colony's economy had heavily depended. Hong Kong was forced to overcome this crisis by producing its own industrial products for export to overseas markets, and the territory entered into a phase of industrialization. In this, the society benefited from the inflow of capital, entrepreneurial personnel and labour from China.[2] But, the relevance of all these for our present discussion is that the rapid population increase and economic re-structuring led to a truncation of whatever class structure existed before. The refugees, as many writers have noted, came to settle in the Colony with the "don't rock the boat" mentality, and in any case could not be expected to develop for some period of time any class consciousness and identity, let alone act collectively in class struggle. The establishment in the late 1940s of the pro-communist Federation of Trade Unions and the pro-Guomindang Trade Unions Council also weakened the solidarity of the working class by splitting them into rival political factions.[3] The predominance of small-sized industrial firms in Hong Kong, many of which operated on a family basis,[4] further obstructed the organization of the workers as a class and their capacity to act as a collective force. In this respect, Lau Siu-kai's portrait of the Hong Kong Chinese at the time as atomistic, familistic, depoliticized and lacking in class consciousness appears to be an apt description of the social reality. The conditions which W. K. Chan has shown to be conducive to the formation of the working class in the early nineteenth century did not seem to be present in Hong Kong society of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, it is also within this period more than any other time in Hong Kong's post-war history that social turmoil in the form of large-scale hostile outbursts of the working class and

the underprivileged occurred. The overwhelming majority of the participants in the 1956, 1966 and 1967 riots were working class. The question, therefore, arises as to what extent these disturbances could be considered as class struggles. In other words, were these collective episodes a reflection of the formation of the workers as a class? And further, how could we account for the anomaly that despite Lau Siu-kai's empirically substantiated portrait of Hong Kong society at that time as atomistic and politically apathetic, large-scale mobilization and confrontational actions of the workers occurred in, and only in, this period of Hong Kong's post-war history? To find the answers, we need to have a brief analysis of the nature of these disturbances.

The 1956 riots were confrontations not between the working class and the capitalists and government, but rather between the two rival labour union factions. The disturbances originated from the flying of the Guomindang national flag on 10 October in the Li Cheng Uk Resettlement Estate, against the regulation of the Resettlement Department. When the officers of the Resettlement Estate attempted to remove the flags, the opposition of the residents, many of whom were "predominantly in sympathy with the Guomindang cause and opposed to the present government in China... and loosely organized in right wing labour unions and other bodies" (Hong Kong Government, 1956:2), soon escalated into rioting. Within a couple of days, the riots spread to Tsuen Wan and other parts of Kowloon, ending on 16 October. As reported by the government's commission of inquiry into the riots, the rioters attacked and looted almost exclusively the property and personnel of the left wing labour unions and organizations. The Report stated:

> It would appear that people of Nationalist (i.e. Guomindang) persuasion joined in collaboration with Triad gangs to redress old scores and to attempt to win a dominant position in the labour world. (Hong Kong Government, 1956:ii)
>
> [N]o attacks were made on the main administrative or business centres, whether on the mainland (i.e. Kowloon)

> or on Hong Kong Island. (Hong Kong Government, 1956:52)

The 1966 riot started as a protest against a fare increase by the Star Ferry Company. When the police arrested some of the protesters, what began as a peaceful demonstration erupted into a violent confrontation between the protest participants and the police. But the riot was short-lived, lasting from 6 April to the early morning of 9 April. The riot participants were mainly the underprivileged workers. Ironically, the Star Ferry Company suffered no damage during the riot. The government's commission of inquiry observed:

> [T]here was no indication of any political or triad control or exploitation of the situation... the actions were spontaneous and unco-ordinated and... there appeared to be no central organization or control. (Hong Kong Government, 1967:112)

The 1967 disturbances[5] occurred in conjunction with the Cultural Revolution in China. They originated from minor labour disputes in two factories in Kowloon, but the left-wing labour unions and communist sympathizers were quick to make use of the opportunity to turn the disputes into a territory-wide confrontation against the capitalists and their alleged supporter, the Hong Kong government. That these disturbances were to a large extent an extension of the Cultural Revolution was evidenced by the communist slogans and quotations from Chairman Mao which the protest participants used against their opposition. The Federation of Trade Unions played an active part in organizing and directing the struggle, and two struggle committees, the All Trades Struggle Committee and the All Circles Struggle Committee, were formed in May to plan and co-ordinate the strategy of confrontation. The turmoil lasted from May to December and was the most traumatic episode of disorder in Hong Kong's post-war history.

The above brief account of episodes of hostile outbursts suggests that only the 1967 riots bear a resemblance to class struggle. The 1966 riot seem to qualify as "issueless" riot in that, as the

report of the Commission of Inquiry indicates, the riot participants acted out of curiosity and excitement and were hardly aware of the issue of ferry fare increase. The 1956 riots on the other hand were obviously internal political struggles within the labouring class. But leaving aside the so-called Star Ferry Riot of 1966, we can say that large-scale mobilization in Hong Kong, in this case of the working class, seems to hinge on a political factor. In the 1956 riots, it was partisan politics which characterized the confrontation within the working class. In the 1967 riots, it was the nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments of the working class which spurred them to collective actions against the Hong Kong colonial government and capitalist management. This suggests that Chinese politics, be it partisan politics or the politics of nationalism and anti-imperialism, was a strong motivating factor for working class collective action. From this we can derive the argument that major political events or developments in China served as the cognitive cues or the ideological impetus for working class mobilization. The relevance of this for our discussion is that these cognitive cues could well be one significant factor for understanding the dynamics of working class formation in Hong Kong. In the same way as the racial dimension had initially divided the European merchant class and the Chinese merchant class in early Hong Kong, the political factor split the working class in post-war Hong Kong into the left-wing and right-wing factions. The point is: the study of working class formation in Hong Kong has to take note of this political dimension. This political dimension, or the China factor, weakens the solidarity of the workers as a class. But at the same time, given appropriate circumstances, it unites a faction of the working class and motivates them into collective action. This is the nature of working class formation and collective action in Hong Kong. The relevance of the China factor to the class consciousness and collective action of the working class can further be deduced through a brief review of the rise and fall of industrial conflict in Hong Kong.

Industrial Conflict and Working Class Formation

If we denote the level of industrial conflict by the number of working days lost per 1,000 workers through industrial strikes, then two periods stand out as times of high industrial conflict in post-war Hong Kong.[6] These are 1946-1950 and 1967. As industrial strikes are the collective actions of the workers, we can take the level of strikes or the level of industrial conflict as a reflection of the propensity for working class formation. The circumstances generating a high level of industrial conflict are then by extension circumstances conducive to working class formation. Our previous discussion suggests that the Cultural Revolution in China gave the impetus to the industrial strikes and related disturbances of 1967. What were the instigating factors for the high level of industrial action in the period 1946-1950? Joe England locates a background factor:

> [A] by-product of the Japanese occupation [of Hong Kong] was the emergence of a strong Communist influence in immediate post-war Hong Kong.... The chief anti-Japanese guerilla force in Guangdong province during the occupation was a Communist-dominated band.... Many people from Hong Kong slipped out of the colony to join these guerillas and a number in time became convinced Communists.... [By the end of the war], many returned to Hong Kong and it was these men, dedicated and battle-hardened, who formed the solid core of Hong Kong's Communists in the post-war years. They began to organize the workers.... (England, 1989:109-110)

Indeed a substantial number of the industrial strikes between 1946 and 1950 were instigated by the pro-communist labour unions, who apparently intended to match the success of the Communists on the mainland with a similar success in the colony. The Commissioner of Labour at the time described these strikes as "labour disputes where politics dominates economics (Annual Report, 1950:50), and he added that many of the behind-the-scenes advisers in these strikes "were suspected to have been in close touch as

to policy with labour bodies in Canton and on the Chinese mainland generally" (Annual Report, 1950:49). What then explains the low level of industrial conflict from 1951 to 1966 and since 1968? For the earlier period, Britain's recognition of the People's Republic of China most probably had the effect of containing the militancy of the left-wing unions. Adding to this was the left-wing unions' "desire to maintain the economic stability of Hong Kong from which China derived a substantial proportion of her foreign exchange" (England, 1979:30). The prolonged period of industrial peace after 1968 can be attributed, first, to China's advancement in international status and its improved relationships with the West in the late 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., the United States relaxed travel and trading restrictions with China in 1969; full ambassadorial meetings were resumed between the United States and China in 1970; China re-entered the United Nations in 1971; and President Nixon visited China in 1972). Improved relations between China and the West led to the non-militancy of the left-wing labour unions in Hong Kong. Then, China's economic reforms and open-door policy since the late 1970s has established increasingly close economic ties between Hong Kong's capitalists and the Chinese government. This new alliance has been another major factor that has dampened working class industrial action in Hong Kong.[7] Therefore, if we take working class industrial action as an indicator of the extent of their class consciousness and solidarity, and hence of class formation, we can say that the China factor, in particular China's relations with the western capitalist countries and especially with Britain, has had a major impact on working class formation in Hong Kong.

Economic Transformations since the mid-1970s and their Implications for Class Structure and Class Formation

There has been a number of important economic changes in Hong Kong since the mid-1970s. First, as Table 1 indicates, there has

been a relative contraction of the manufacturing sector and an expansion of the service and financial sectors. Secondly, with the launching of China's modernization and its attendant open-door policy since 1978, there has been on the one hand a revival and rapid expansion of the entrepot trade in Hong Kong and, on the other, an increasing volume of capital investment from Hong Kong in China. Tables 2 and 3 bear evidence on these trends. Thirdly, as Gilbert Wong (1991) and S. L. Wong (1992) have pointed out, in the past fifteen or so years, the local Chinese capitalists have gradually come to match and even supercede the British capitalists in terms of ownership and control of Hong Kong's economic resources. Fourthly, the relocation from Hong Kong to China of manufacturing production dependent on unskilled and semi-skilled labour and the overseas market demand for higher quality products have led to a greater emphasis in Hong Kong's manufacturing industries on more capital intensive production, with the consequence that there has been a substantial increase in wages. The implications of all these are (1) the rise and rapid expansion of a new middle class in Hong Kong, a product of the expansion of the tertiary sector and (2) the increasingly important role of the local Chinese capitalists both in Hong Kong and in China's economic reforms. This section dwells on the issue of the class formation of the new middle class and the capitalist class.

Table 1 Working population by industry, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991 (%)

Industry	1976	1981	1986	1991
Manufacturing	44.6	41.3	35.8	28.2
Construction	5.8	7.7	6.2	6.9
Wholesale, retail and import/export trades, restaurants and hotels	19.3	19.2	22.3	22.5
Transport, storage and communication	7.4	7.5	8.0	9.8
Financing, insurance, real estate and business services	3.3	4.8	6.4	10.6
Community, social and personal services	15.2	15.6	18.4	19.9
Others	4.4	3.9	2.9	2.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number in thousands	(1,915)	(2,404)	(2,643)	(2,715)

Sources: 1976: *1986 By-Census: Summary Results.*
1981-91: *1991 Census Main Report,* p. 95.

Table 2 Growth in China trade (US$ million)

	HK's imports* from China and % share of HK's total imports		HK's imports from China for re-exports and % share of HK's re-exports	
1970	470	(16.1%)	97	(20.2%)
1981	5,276	(24.0%)	1,951	(26.2%)
1985	7,568	(25.5%)	3,778	(28.0%)
1989	25,215	(34.9%)	20,517	(54.3%)
	HK's exports§ to China and % share of HK's total exports		HK's re-exports to China and % share of HK's total re-exports	
1970	11	(0.4%)	6	(1.2%)
1981	1,961	(9.0%)	1,438	(19.3%)
1985	7,857	(18.6%)	5,907	(43.7%)
1989	18,816	(25.7%)	13,268	(29.9%)

Notes: * Including retained imports and imports for re-exports.
§ Including domestic exports and re-exports.
Source: Sung (1991:19-20, Tables 2.3 and 2.4).

Table 3 Foreign investment in China from Hong Kong

	US$ million	% share of total foreign investment in China
1983	642	34
1987	2,331	54
1989	3,645	58

Source: Sung (1991:18, Table 2.2).

There are conflicting views among local academics about the potential of Hong Kong's new middle class as a social-political force. Cheung Bing-leung (1988) pointed to the alleged similarity in education background and life experiences of the new middle class and to the predominance of middle class personnel in Hong Kong's current politics; he considered the middle class as playing a pioneering and leading role in Hong Kong's political development. He envisaged a scenario in which the middle class with their liberal-democratic and egalitarian orientations would form an alliance with the grassroots whose numerical strength would constitute substantial support to their middle class allies. His argument implies an optimism about the capacity of the middle class to develop a unity and solidarity and to play a historical role in Hong Kong's development — a suggestion about the possibility of middle class formation in Hong Kong. Yet other writers, for example, Lui (1988) and Lau (1990), described the new middle class as heterogeneous, individualistic and privatist, implying that the middle class lacked class identity and solidarity. These opposing views were based on impressionistic observations and educated speculations. In a recent paper entitled "The New Middle Class in Hong Kong: Class in Formation?" Thomas Wong[8] has attempted a more rigorous and empirically informed analysis of the pertinent issue. He draws attention to a number of structural and process variables that bear on middle class formation. The tradition of bureaucratic polity in Hong Kong, in his view, has obstructed the formation of powerful political organizations in the civil society, and because of this, the middle class lacks an organizational basis to articulate their class interests and solidarity. The institution of functional constituencies in Hong Kong's reformed political system further fragments middle class leadership through tying their electoral support and hence accountability to occupational and functional categories. In addition, the middle class leaders are split in their orientations and positions with regard to China, a split which has been aggravated by the 4 June Incident of 1989. Wong also points to the immaturity of the new middle class — an immaturity reflected by the very fact that it is a "new" class having only advanced to the present class position from the working class in the past two decades. His survey data

testify to this, in that a large proportion of the administrators/managers and professionals in his sample perceived themselves as belonging to the working class. The pertinent class residues — the utilitarian familial ethos of "security and survival" characteristic of the working class — are additional obstacles to middle class formation. On the whole, Wong is not optimistic about middle class formation in Hong Kong's near future.

With regard to the capitalist or business class, the decline of the British **hongs** and the concomitant ascendance of the local Chinese capitalists was perceived by S. L. Wong (1992) as a development that would weaken the organization and solidarity of the capitalist class. In the past, the British **hongs**, in particular the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Jardine and the Swire groups, had acted as the spokesmen of capitalist interests and contributed to the integration of the capitalist class. Their decline since the mid-1970s has meant a gradual eclipse of the power and influence of the business class, and, in this respect, Wong observed, quoting Gilbert Wong (1991:149), "there was no longer a large tightly knit group that encompassed a large number of companies and that linked up the Chinese and non-Chinese business groups." The situation, in S. L. Wong's view, was aggravated by the predominance of small and medium-sized Chinese business firms in Hong Kong, whose fragmentation and aversion to politics seriously detracted from their capacity to act as a cohesive social-political force. Adding to these structural obstacles to capitalist class formation was the low level of trust which the Hong Kong Chinese had in the business class, as a number of recent survey studies had indicated.[9] This was a stumbling block to whatever attempts the business class made to attain political leadership in Hong Kong. Wong concluded:

> [T]he concentration of business power is unlikely to occur in Hong Kong.... Economic power [in Hong Kong] is... diffused and cannot readily foster an organized political force. (1992:21-22)

Yet, one can construct a very different scenario for the prospective development of Hong Kong's capitalist class if we bring

into consideration the growing economic ties and interests between China and the local Chinese capitalists. It is very probable that, in the same way the colonial government of Hong Kong had recognized and fostered the economic and political clout of British business in Hong Kong in the past, the Chinese government will cultivate and buttress the organization and power of the Chinese capitalists in Hong Kong. The process indeed seems to be already underway, in the form of the Chinese government's co-option of local Chinese business elites into various political bodies and advisory committees, both locally and on the mainland. A sociological study of the pattern of such co-option and the linkage between economic clout and status conferment and political power that seems to be being fostered by the Chinese government is yet to be undertaken. The study may well reflect, in my view, a local Chinese capitalist class in formation, which would play the integrating and leading role for Hong Kong's capitalists in the foreseeable future.

One can further envisage a concomitant change in the Hong Kong Chinese's attitude of distrust towards local capitalists. A couple of ongoing developments warrant such a conjecture. China's united-front approach has, on the one hand, strengthened the tie between the left-wing labour unions in Hong Kong and the authorities in China and, on the other, brought together labour union leaders and business elites in organizations and committees loyal to China. A waning of past antagonism between the working class and the capitalist class is a likely outcome of this development. The entry into the local political arena of political organizations and parties whose leaders are predominantly business people may narrow the communication gap between the capitalist class and the masses, especially in view of the grassroots approach now adopted by the newly formed Liberal Party. The overall effect could be the reduction of the public's distrust of capitalists.

What then about the working class? We observed in a previous section that the major cognitive cue for the mobilization of the working class in collective action in post-war Hong Kong had been the anti-colonial and anti-capitalist ideology that had spilled

over from mainland China. But now, with China's cooperative and friendly relationship with Hong Kong's capitalist class and with China's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, the powerful ideology for working class formation and collective action is fading. In view of this, the prospect of working class formation in Hong Kong in the near future is grim.

Conclusion

We started this paper with Lee Ming-kwan's and Lau Siu-kai's dismissal of the significance of class as a social-political force in Hong Kong since the early 1970s. The subsequent attempts to resurrect class analysis among local scholars re-established the relevance of class as an important variable in structuring mobility opportunities in Hong Kong. The social mobility studies paved the way for the investigation of class formation in Hong Kong in that the proven rigidity of the class structure was conducive to the growth of class consciousness, class solidarity and collective class action. We then discussed as an example of the study of class formation W. K. Chan's work on the making of Hong Kong society and took note of his skilled use of Weber's concepts of status and party to bear on the process of class formation in early Hong Kong. But, the social and economic situations in Hong Kong in the two or so decades after the end of the Second World War were such that whatever class consciousness and solidarity that had been existent before the war had been obviated. Despite this, we argued that the 1967 disturbances which involved a substantial number of the working class could be viewed as an example of working class formation and collective action. This case denoted one important feature of working class formation in Hong Kong which was substantiated by the post-war history of industrial conflict in the territory. The politics of China, especially its relationship with western capitalist countries, had an important impact on working class formation in Hong Kong. We then proceeded with a discussion of Hong Kong's economic transformation since the mid-1970s and of the concomitant expansion of the new middle class. Our conclusion in this respect has been that the new middle class at present lacks the organizational strength and the ideological unity to realize its potential as a powerful social-political force in the territory. The capitalist class, however, seems to fare better in the prospect of class formation, as the solidarity and power of this class have been given a boost under China's patronage. In light of the growing economic and political links that have been forged between the Chinese government and Hong Kong's capitalists in recent years, the local Chinese capitalists are likely to emerge as Hong Kong's hegemonic class in the future Special Administrative Region. The message for Hong Kong's working class, on whom China has exerted a considerable influence through the Federation of Trade Unions, is to maintain a relationship of peaceful co-existence with the capitalists. This will significantly dampen the class consciousness and militancy of the working class and grossly reduce the prospect of working class formation in Hong Kong.

Notes

1. These include class differences in coping mechanisms in respect of paying the downpayment for a flat, finding a job, finding childcare, and in solving environmental problems (see Wong and Lui, 1992a:32-35, Tables 5a to 5d). Wong and Lui's findings also reveal class differences in perception — the lower classes in comparison with the higher classes are much more likely to see employers as having to exploit workers in order to make profits, and to regard the ordinary wage-worker as receiving less than he contributes; they are also far more inclined to see their job as no more than just a means of earning a living, and to view politics as beyond their understanding (see Wong and Lui, 1992b:58, Tables 19 and 20).
2. For details, see Wong Siu-lun (1988, chapter 2).

3. For a detailed historical-sociological study of the rivalry between the two labour union factions and its impact on working class solidarity and the labour movement in Hong Kong, see Leung (1991).
4. For a detailed study of small and medium-sized industrial firms in Hong Kong, see Sit and Wong (1989).
5. For further discussion of these disturbances, see Scott (1989, chapter 3). Leung's article "Political process and industrial strikes and the labour movement in Hong Kong 1946-1989" draws attention to the role of Chinese politics in the 1967 disturbances and other industrial strikes in Hong Kong.
6. See Leung (1991) for a detailed analysis on the bearing of politics on industrial conflict in Hong Kong.
7. The point here is that following China's lead, the left-wing labour unions in Hong Kong also refrained from confrontational actions against the capitalists. As the left-wing unions had a substantial membership and hence influence among the workers, working class industrial action subsided consequently.
8. See Thomas W. P. Wong (1993). I would like to express my thanks to Thomas W. P. Wong for permission to use the materials in his article for this paper.
9. In his article, S. L. Wong refers to data from his and Lee Ming-kwan's joint study "Hong Kong Professionals and Attitudes Survey" and survey data from Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi's joint study "Public Attitudes Toward *Laissez Faire* in Hong Kong" as well as data from Thomas W. P. Wong and Lui Tai-lok's article "From one brand of politics to one brand of political culture."

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3

Consolidation of a Class Structure

Changes in the Class Structure of Hong Kong

Tsang Wing-kwong

Studies conducted in the last three decades in Hong Kong have revealed that there is a consensual and firm conviction among Hong Kong residents that Hong Kong is a land of abundant opportunities and these opportunities are allocated equally and fairly (Chaney and Podmore, 1973; Johnson, 1971; Lau and Ho, 1982; Lau and Kuan, 1988). It is also an oft-quoted statement that the socio-economic structure of Hong Kong has undergone a process of liberalization in the last three decades. This can be signified by the substantial increase in opportunities for social mobility, more specifically upward mobility. For example, according to census data, professional and technical related workers increased by 174.2 per cent from 1971 to 1986, while administrative and managerial workers increased by 157 per cent in the same period. These increases have constituted more or less a pulling effects towards upward mobility because they have offered opportunities for young men and women with lower-class backgrounds to fill up those additional vacancies. In fact, the pulling-effect thesis has been confirmed by this study that the absolute upward mobil-

ity rate in Hong Kong rose from 32.5 per cent in 1976 to 45.1 per cent in 1986 (Table 24). Another indication of the fluidification of Hong Kong social structure is the universalization or even equalization of educational opportunities within the schooling system. Hong Kong government began to provide free primary education to all school-aged children in 1972 and extended it into a nine-year compulsory education system in 1978. Tertiary education opportunities also increased during the 1960s and 1970s as The Chinese University of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Polytechnic were established in 1963 and 1972 respectively. Policies enhancing educational opportunities have often been advocated as equalizers of social conditions and even liberators for socially deprived children who are constrained by their family backgrounds from educational and socio-economic achievement. Thus, increases in educational opportunities in Hong Kong during the 1960s and 1970s can be viewed as pushing effects for lower-stratum children who were released from socio-economic containment to attain upward social mobility.

In contradiction to these liberalizing effects, my analysis of the Hong Kong 1981 and 1986 census data (Tsang, 1992, 1993, 1994) reveals that the class structure of Hong Kong has undergone a process of structuration. It means that definite social closures of mobility opportunities have emerged and consolidated within the occupation hierarchy of Hong Kong. In other words, class inheritance by young workers from their fathers has become more prominent phenomena within the class structure of Hong Kong. It signifies that young men and women who entered the labour market in the 1980s had much greater chances to inherit their fathers' social-class positions than those entering the market a decade ago.

In this chapter, I first report the result of my mobility analysis as it extends to the 1976 census data. By juxtaposing the mobility patterns emerging from the 1976, 1981 and 1986 census data, we can see a clear trajectory of class structuration within the social structure of Hong Kong. I then try to explore the plausible reasons working behind this process of class structuration. In my search

for explanations, I adopt Erikson and Goldthorpe's framework (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:1-27) by looking into three aspects of Hong Kong society, which are economic, political and cultural factors. In the process, I am able to reveal more salient features of the process of class structuration operating in Hong Kong society in the last few decades.

The Study

As indicated above, this study is an analysis of the process of class structuration. By class structuration,[1] I mean "the process whereby *economic classes* become *social classes*" (Giddens, 1981:105, my emphasis). The concepts economic class and social class are adopted directly from the Weberian conception of class.[2] According to the Weberian view, economic class is defined as a group of individuals sharing a common market situation or a group of individuals possessing the same amount of market capacity in labour and commodity markets (Weber, 1978:302-307, 927-928; Giddens, 1981:41-52; Collins, 1986:132-138). As for social class, I refer to a cluster of economic classes which takes the form of a social closure within which the opportunities for both inter- and intra-generation mobility are easy and typical (Weber, 1978:302; Giddens, 1981:49; Parkin, 1979:47-60). Thus, class structuration can be construed as a process whereby groups of individuals with similar market situations and capacities are further aligned into clusters by their common opportunities for inter- and intra-generation mobility. A number of scholars have contended that the Weberian conception of economic and social classes can be operationalized by two prevalent statistical techniques of class analysis. They are techniques of socio-economic index construction and mobility-table analysis. The former has been accepted as the measure of economic classes (Duncan, 1961; Featherman and Stevens, 1982; Nam and Powers, 1983), while the latter has been used as instrument to detect clusters of mobility chances, i.e. social classes

(Goldthorpe, 1987; Breiger, 1981; Marshall et al., 1988; Hauser et al., 1975a; Hout, 1983).

Accordingly, my study of the process of class structuration of Hong Kong consists of two parts. One is the analysis of the socio-economic status of occupational groupings found in the Hong Kong economy. This has been obtained by calculating a socio-economic index for all occupational titles found in the Hong Kong 1981 census data (Tsang, 1992). Altogether 153 occupational titles are generated from the census data. Means of educational and income levels of each occupational grouping are used as predictors in the calculation. Socio-economic status score for each occupational title is then calculated in accordance with the method designed by Nam and Powers (1983). The result has been reported elsewhere (Tsang, 1992), therefore I will not explicate it further here.

Based upon this socio-economic index for all occupational titles in Hong Kong, I proceed to the second part of this class-structuration study by constructing, first of all, an inter-generational mobility table consisting of 14 class categories.[3] The 14-category class schema used in the mobility table is designed with reference to the prevalent class schemata in the field of mobility-table analysis (Blau and Duncan, 1967; Hope, 1972; Goldthorpe, 1987; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993; Halsey et al., 1980). According to the means of socio-economic scores of each class category, the 14 categories are arrayed in a hierarchical ordering (Tsang, 1992). Thus, the social mobility revealed in this study will not be indicated only in terms of magnitude but also by directions, that is, either upward or downward. By making use of a log-linear modeling technique, we can then proceed with the 14x14 mobility table to search for definite closures of chances for inter-generational mobility, i.e. social class in Weberian terms, within the Hong Kong social structure. This mobility-table analysis is first applied to the 1981 census data. In that analysis, the 14x14 mobility table is subsequently combined into a 10x10 table and then further collapsed into a 5x5 table. As a result, five definite closures of mobility chances, i.e. social classes, are revealed (Tsang, 1992). I

then extend the analysis to the 1986 census data. The result confirms that five social classes have been well consolidated within Hong Kong society (Tsang, 1994). In this chapter, I will report the latest result of my mobility-table analysis of the 1976 census data. I will also juxtapose these three-set mobility tables and try to delineate the process of class structuration in Hong Kong.

As indicated before, the data sets under analysis are census data which were collected and prepared by the Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong government. They are the 1981 census and the 1976 and 1986 by-censuses. The 1981 and 1976 data sets are 5 per cent random samples from the respective census data, while the 1986 data set is a 10 per cent random sample. All three sets of data are arrayed by family, that is, in each case, the information of the son/daughter, father and mother are included. They are tailored for the purpose of inter-generation mobility analysis. However, it must be underlined that the original census data are household data rather than family data, that is, they only contain family members who live together within a household. Hence, it is not possible to track down, from the data, those sons and daughters who have moved away from the household. In order to avoid a serious bias caused by any possible characteristics demonstrated by those sons and daughters who still live with their parents after being of age, the data set will only include those sons and daughters aged 17 to 27,[4] a considerably large proportion of whom still live with their parents.

I think that a verification of the external validity of the family data sets is necessary. That is because the way the data sets are tailored may raise doubt that the sons and daughters in the family data sets are different from the respective age-cohort in the population. For validation, a comparison is made between the sons and daughters in the 1981 family data set with the same age-cohort in a 20 per cent individual data set which is also sampled from the 1981 census data. The comparison is made under the assumption that the age-cohort selected from the 20 per cent individual data set is a representative sample of the same age-cohort found in the population. If we accept such an assumption, then the result of the

comparison can verify whether the family data set is a representative sample. I have reported in details the result of the comparison elsewhere. The comparison reveals that "with regard to the market and class situations which are the primary concern of the study, the sons and daughters in the family data set do not deviate much from the same age cohort in the population" (Tsang, 1992:30-31).

The Analysis

As explicated above, the procedures of my mobility-table analysis, or more specifically my search for social classes within the Hong Kong social structure, will begin with the mobility table based on the 14-category class schema. It will then proceed to the 10x10 and 5x5 tables. The class categories of these three class schemata are presented in Table 1. For each mobility table, two mobility models will be tested. They are the Perfect Mobility Model and the Quasi-Perfect Mobility Model. The former is the conventional "ideal-type" model for mobility-table analysis. It assumes that there is no interaction between the rows (which conventionally indicate the class positions of fathers or what is commonly called the *origin*) and columns (which signify sons' and daughters' class positions or what is commonly called the *destination*) in a mobility table. It is basically a null hypothesis of the social closure thesis, which assumes that there is no interaction between fathers' and sons' or daughters' class positions. In other words, they are statistically independent of each other. Usually, a log-linear modeling technique is employed to do the testing. The basic logic is to compare the estimated frequency counts with the observed counts and to see whether the likelihood chi-square supports the perfect mobility model (Goodman, 1965, 1969a, 1969b; Hauser et al., 1975a; Hout, 1983). As for the quasi-perfect mobility model, it is postulated that the diagonal cells of a mobility table indicate class inheritance or immobility. The model further assumes that the observed counts in the diagonal cells are larger than the estimated

Table 1 Comparison among the 14-category, 10-category, and 5-category class schemata

14-category class schema	10-category class schema	5-category class schema
1 Professional, technical and related workers—employers	1 Professional, technical and related workers	1 Professionals, administrators, and managers
2 Professional, technical and related workers—except employers		
3 Administrative and managerial workers—employers	2 Administrative and managerial workers	
4 Administrative and managerial workers—except employers		
5 Supervisors and foremen	3 Supervisors and foremen	2 Routine non-manual labourers
6 Clerical and related workers	4 Clerical and related workers	
7 Sales workers—except hawkers	5 Sales workers—except hawkers	
8 Operative workers	6 Operative workers	3 Skilled manual labourers
9 Technicians and craftsmen	7 Technicians and craftsmen	
10 Service workers—except domestic helpers	8 Service workers—except domestic helpers	4 Semi-skilled manual labourers
11 Manufacturing labourers	9 Manufacturing labourers	
12 Sales workers—hawkers	10 Unskilled manual labourers	5 Unskilled manual labourers
13 Agricultural workers and fisherfolks		
14 Service workers—domestic helpers		

counts, thus they cause most of the residuals in the log-linear model. It also assumes that perfect mobility may prevail in the off-diagonal cells. The method to verify these assumptions is to "block out" the diagonals (i.e. assign zero counts to the diagonals) in the log-linear model and to test the model of perfect mobility against the off-diagonal cells (Goodman, 1965; Hout, 1983:18-23; Pullum, 1975:70-93; Hauser et al., 1975a, 1975b).

In the following pages, I will first explicate the results of the 14x14 mobility-table analysis with 1976, 1981 and 1986 data. Then, the results of the 10x10 mobility-table analysis with all three sets of census data will be elucidated. Thirdly, the results of the 5x5 mobility-table analysis will be presented. Finally, a comparison among the results of the 5x5 mobility-table analysis among the three data sets will be presented.

14x14 Mobility-Table Analysis

The results of the perfect-mobility-model analysis with the 14x14 table are presented in Tables 2 to 7. In Tables 2 and 3, the analysis results of the 1976 census data are recorded, while those of the 1981 and 1986 data are reported in Tables 4 to 7 respectively. Reading from the figures, results confirm that all three sets of data indicate that perfect mobility does not exist. First, according to the three sets of goodness-of-fit statistics shown at the bottom of Tables 3, 5 and 7 the likelihood ratio chi-squares are so large that the null hypothesis of perfect mobility is rejected by a huge margin in all three cases.

Looking at the adjusted residuals[5] of the three mobility tables generated from the 1976, 1981 and 1986 data sets reveals that there is immobility or class inheritance prevailing within the Hong Kong social structure. This can be evidenced by the fact that most of residuals in the diagonal cells in the three mobility tables are positive in value and statistically significant. For the 1976 table, residuals in all 14 diagonal cells are positive in value and statistically significant, while for the 1981 and 1986 tables 12 out of 14 of those are so. This indicates that sons and daughters have much

Table 2 Observed frequencies of father's class position (14-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1976

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	14	0	0	0	0	5	1	1	5	4	2	0	0	0
2	0	150	0	12	9	190	40	36	120	53	114	5	0	6
3	103	0	53	2	33	282	177	43	117	66	177	6	0	2
4	0	95	0	42	28	304	170	60	144	95	181	10	4	12
5	8	62	1	5	43	234	48	65	198	66	237	2	1	8
6	2	143	0	21	36	652	79	97	311	122	332	7	1	20
7	5	108	1	9	21	304	147	64	252	88	342	6	1	13
8	0	145	1	10	50	486	121	422	911	274	1220	22	3	44
9	6	131	0	13	29	504	125	260	1572	270	1615	9	8	26
10	1	157	0	16	51	581	151	279	1056	646	1401	19	10	46
11	8	79	0	15	26	337	98	180	575	179	1379	8	2	10
12	1	61	0	6	12	197	90	149	416	151	698	308	19	16
13	3	18	0	4	5	53	20	58	188	72	318	3	157	7
14	0	12	0	2	2	45	13	13	66	35	82	2	0	29

Source: Computed from a 5% sample of the 1976 Hong Kong by-census data.

Table 3 Adjusted residuals under perfect mobility model from father's class position (14-category) to son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1976

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	32.1907	-1.2224	-.2627	-.4407	-.6557	-.0611	-.4683	-.7972	-.9638	.9022	-3.0370	-.7131	-.5053	-.5446
2	-2.0998	21.2609	-1.2764	3.6602	-.2399	7.3696	.6732	-1.9133	-4.2229	-.9355	-9.2533	-1.9559	-2.4552	-.2914
3	39.9922	-7.1824	34.3279	-1.7795	5.1963	9.5723	18.1093	-3.4436	-9.3096	-2.3357	-10.3475	-2.6730	-2.9690	-2.5425
4	-2.6423	6.4414	-1.6062	13.7074	3.3943	9.9339	15.9058	-1.9316	-8.4089	.1972	-11.4214	-1.9223	-1.7245	.4743
5	1.0012	2.9092	-.7757	-.3763	8.5681	6.8700	-.0075	.0223	-1.9155	-1.6233	-4.7176	-3.4901	-2.4778	-.3322
6	-2.7405	7.2692	-2.0548	3.1425	2.5196	23.8314	-1.1871	-2.3275	-6.0240	-2.3456	-12.3122	-4.2065	-3.6783	.8346
7	-1.0594	6.3893	-1.1576	.2872	.7252	6.5244	10.3228	-2.9342	-3.8402	-2.3215	-4.8751	-3.4267	-3.0687	.1503
8	-5.0211	-1.7430	-2.6693	-2.8295	.1372	-5.2314	-5.0224	12.5530	2.8179	-1.8124	2.5720	-5.1389	-5.2703	1.8551
9	-4.3948	-5.7297	-3.4543	-3.0583	-4.4884	-10.1207	-7.4950	-2.8032	20.6748	-6.0703	6.8694	-8.1934	-5.1727	-2.7181
10	-5.3485	-3.1777	-3.3834	-2.2619	-1.0766	-5.6811	-5.0326	-.9025	2.0145	17.3120	1.0350	-6.6532	-4.6434	.9541
11	-2.2810	-4.7813	-2.6492	-.6244	-2.1294	-6.8229	-4.0381	-.9483	-3.9615	-4.0914	20.3919	-5.9192	-4.6508	-3.4250
12	-3.3734	-3.6924	-2.2319	-1.9891	-3.1941	-8.8445	-1.5035	.7466	-3.6463	-1.8145	1.8492	50.1749	.5638	-.8275
13	-1.0028	-3.6667	-1.4219	-.6378	-2.0700	-8.4956	-3.8350	-.2796	-1.4719	-.2174	2.6588	-3.0415	57.2081	-.4651
14	-1.3324	-.3971	-.8099	.1394	-1.0072	-.5095	-.4797	-1.6202	-.3488	2.2250	-1.4479	-1.2633	-1.5579	15.9556

= The highest positive value across a row **and** the column of the same number.

= The highest positive value across a row **or** the column of the same number.

Goodness-of-fit test statistics

Likelihood ratio chi-square = 6827.69375, df = 169, p = 4E-32

Pearson chi-square = 14208.37265, df = 169, p = 4E-32

Table 4 Observed frequencies of father's class position (14-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1981

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	0	9	0	0	1	6	1	0	2	3	2	0	0	0
2	0	51	1	11	6	92	19	8	45	23	34	1	0	0
3	2	65	10	26	49	203	70	15	76	49	89	8	2	0
4	4	67	2	25	25	212	47	18	79	46	52	6	0	0
5	0	52	2	9	45	231	32	24	108	63	86	1	0	0
6	0	100	2	23	33	437	46	30	125	61	107	2	2	0
7	0	48	1	6	16	231	86	25	160	56	146	3	2	0
8	0	118	3	23	48	572	123	206	578	173	535	18	2	3
9	0	142	2	21	65	639	98	128	1073	248	748	10	5	3
10	0	197	4	27	72	734	169	191	868	487	805	7	7	5
11	2	133	1	12	65	580	98	140	616	194	864	9	2	2
12	0	70	5	14	34	256	96	106	325	128	329	106	8	1
13	0	17	0	4	4	62	14	44	180	59	172	2	74	2
14	0	9	1	4	2	18	3	4	3	2	8	1	0	0

Source: Computed from a 5% sample of the 1981 Hong Kong census data.

Table 5 Adjusted residuals under perfect mobility model from father's class position (14-category) to son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1981

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	-.1034	6.5114	-.2132	-.5261	.4896	.1461	-.1895	-1.1499	-1.7570	.6316	-1.6254	-.4843	-.3737	-.1462
2	-.3626	8.3643	.6133	4.2819	-.5646	3.1866	1.1979	-1.9076	-3.2731	-.5683	-4.3134	-1.0948	-1.3109	-.5129
3	3.1992	4.2077	7.9663	6.8729	7.9407	4.2214	6.6591	-3.4912	-7.4841	-1.3526	-5.4969	.6399	-.9577	-.7831
4	7.4739	5.6956	.8719	7.2869	2.6394	7.2877	3.4342	-2.3491	-5.7786	-.8229	-7.7920	.1575	-1.8709	-.7320
5	-.5488	2.1680	.7042	.5881	7.0709	7.1236	-.1304	-1.8028	-4.2944	.7388	-5.5960	-2.1639	-1.9841	-.7763
6	-.6743	5.8554	.1310	3.7306	1.6666	16.0976	-.3778	-3.0441	-8.0103	-2.8619	-8.5077	-2.4840	-1.5659	-.9539
7	-.6020	.2005	-.3988	-.9940	-.9565	3.9485	7.8744	-2.5815	-2.0361	-1.6721	-2.3198	-1.6981	-1.2103	-.8516
8	-1.1100	-2.3847	-.7754	-.8984	-1.9393	.1005	.2679	7.9586	.6520	-3.0406	.2345	-1.1679	-3.4344	.6366
9	-1.3108	-3.9952	-1.8041	-2.8046	-2.1160	-5.3346	-5.5000	-3.3348	14.9227	-2.2952	2.1264	-4.1442	-3.4496	.1130
10	-1.4077	-1.3329	-1.1824	-2.4096	-2.3887	-5.0051	-.8564	.3917	1.1888	11.2599	.7110	-5.2583	-3.3629	1.1444
11	.7827	-2.6088	-1.9815	-3.7174	-.6819	-3.1826	-3.6418	-.1638	-1.1659	-3.3967	13.2294	-3.6741	-3.7632	-.2902
12	-.8460	-2.1160	1.3814	-.7237	-.7139	-6.0473	2.7326	3.5314	-1.4649	-.2567	.1659	25.4531	-.1925	-.2856
13	-.5405	-3.5719	-1.1150	-1.2266	-3.1542	-8.4074	-3.2921	1.9887	2.9326	.4190	3.1151	-1.7057	37.5290	1.9494
14	-.1566	3.2485	2.7876	4.2944	.4934	1.5704	.1515	.6874	-3.1661	-1.3619	-1.3505	.6467	-.5661	-.2215

= The highest positive value across a row **and** the column of the same number.

= The highest positive value across a row **or** the column of the same number.

Goodness-of-fit test statistics

Likelihood ratio chi-square = 2593.06408, df = 169, p = 4E-32

Pearson chi-square = 4172.97449, df = 169, p = 4E-32

Table 6 Observed frequencies of father's class position (14-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1986

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	0	20	0	4	0	14	0	2	4	4	0	0	0	1
2	2	256	3	21	16	426	77	35	126	96	46	3	1	5
3	1	433	59	111	62	882	418	91	269	243	159	15	2	4
4	0	364	14	109	35	874	413	124	307	256	185	7	3	1
5	0	194	3	23	42	558	139	86	259	169	171	5	0	1
6	3	369	4	45	29	1082	199	78	286	192	159	6	2	3
7	0	207	5	32	34	737	319	91	315	194	194	7	1	1
8	1	549	15	59	90	1961	518	654	1310	759	815	20	14	4
9	1	692	10	42	99	2155	515	447	2050	744	1036	22	10	6
10	0	828	18	91	125	2567	647	603	1773	1387	1138	19	5	12
11	1	346	5	30	64	1204	318	234	873	437	858	7	3	5
12	0	189	7	15	32	588	201	142	367	223	261	252	14	3
13	0	118	4	9	18	250	96	108	331	166	230	11	713	0
14	0	16	2	3	0	44	9	14	16	13	16	2	0	0

Source: Computed from a 10% sample of the 1986 Hong Kong by-census data.

Table 7 Adjusted residuals under perfect mobility model from father's class position (14-category) to son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1986

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	-.0985	7.1600	-.4013	4.2330	-.8403	-.1131	-2.1345	-.5533	-1.8219	-.5800	-2.5335	-.6391	-.9174	4.2762
2	3.8423	14.5273	-.3415	1.7325	.0531	6.6554	-1.9140	-4.0061	-6.0226	-2.2927	-7.8544	-2.0764	-4.1889	3.7018
3	.6390	10.2285	17.2259	13.0273	3.8251	3.3013	13.0095	-6.0365	-11.7967	-3.2970	-9.7862	-1.6749	-6.7797	.7570
4	-.7522	6.1507	1.8054	12.9357	-.5374	3.7138	13.1267	-3.0394	-9.4218	-2.1021	-7.8579	-3.3445	-6.5439	-1.0757
5	-.5818	2.3316	-1.0538	.3252	3.9409	4.1015	-.1101	-1.2914	-2.6848	-.6463	-1.5623	-2.3905	-5.4201	-.5266
6	3.7094	8.3956	-1.4677	2.3636	-1.0284	16.4936	-.7294	-5.9799	-8.6648	-4.7947	-8.1253	-3.2756	-6.3536	.3378
7	-.6659	-.5917	-.7736	.8040	.6888	5.3902	10.9170	-3.3871	-4.2466	-2.5212	-3.6908	-2.6074	-6.0307	-.8085
8	-.3169	-5.7856	-1.6500	-3.4035	-.6739	-.6583	-2.7049	13.9889	2.6631	1.4038	1.3067	-5.2262	-10.2485	-1.1773
9	-.4839	-3.9545	-3.3974	-6.5832	-1.2697	-3.8036	-6.6961	-.9902	20.1205	-3.8419	5.0504	-5.8544	-11.7728	-.7469
10	-1.5112	-3.8408	-2.4821	-3.0024	-.5651	-3.4084	-5.6876	2.7015	2.9078	15.0355	2.6230	-7.3586	-13.6252	.9881
11	.1504	-5.0290	-2.6010	-3.8096	.2388	-2.8299	-3.1136	-1.8082	3.0839	-1.7107	17.4109	-5.1282	-8.7547	.2847
12	-.6911	-2.9793	-.1905	-2.8191	-.0998	-3.9675	.4645	.4978	-2.8054	-1.5959	-.2979	55.1726	-4.1091	.4600
13	-.6522	-6.6563	-1.0763	-3.5418	-2.1279	-17.4597	-6.3611	-1.3575	-2.5070	-3.9628	-.5419	-1.4880	118.9384	-1.4750
14	-.1636	.6922	2.3515	.9408	-1.3961	.8401	-.7644	2.1741	-1.9146	-.4122	.1020	.8429	-1.5243	-.3701

= The highest positive value across a row **and** the column of the same number.

= The highest positive value across a row **or** the column of the same number.

Goodness-of-fit test statistics

Likelihood ratio chi-square = 8752.51635, df = 169, p = 4E-32

Pearson chi-square = 20950.86656, df = 169, p = 4E-32

higher chances to inherit their fathers' class positions than they would have had in a perfectly mobile class structure. Furthermore, most of the residuals in the diagonal cells in all three mobility tables are of the highest positive values across the respective rows and columns. For the 1976 table, 10 out of 14 of these residuals are of that character, while 10 out of 14 of them are in the 1981 table and 9 out of 14 of them are in the 1986 table. In fact, it is a common understanding in mobility-table analysis that the rows of a mobility table represent the "outflow" counts of particular origins, while the columns of the table represent the "inflow" counts of particular destinations (Hout, 1983:11-12). This means that, on the one hand, young men and women in Hong Kong "enjoy" a higher probability to follow their fathers' class positions than to "outflow" into the other destinations. On the other hand, it also indicates that youths who "inflow" into a particular destination are most likely to be from the same origin.

To further the verification of the thesis of class inheritance, the quasi-perfect mobility model was run with all three sets of data. The likelihood ratio chi-squares of these model are shown in Table 8. They all indicate that the quasi-perfect mobility model does not fit the data. However, in comparison with the perfect mobility model, the quasi-perfect mobility model is definitely an improvement. The three likelihood ratio chi-squares of the quasi-perfect mobility model are all much smaller than those of the perfect mobility model. In fact, Goodman (1972) has worked out the parameter of the *coefficient of multiple determination* which is connoted as rG^2. It "shows the percentage reduction in the G^2 (goodness-of-fit statistics) for a model taken as baseline that is achieved by a more complex model" (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:89). In our case, the perfect mobility model will be taken as the baseline model while the quasi-perfect mobility model will be the more complex model. Accordingly, the three rG^2s are calculated and reported in Table 8. They all indicate that on the average the quasi-perfect mobility model has reduced about 60 per cent of the likelihood ratio chi-square.

Taken together, the 14x14 mobility-table analysis confirms that the ideal-type model of perfect mobility is far from the reality prevailing in the Hong Kong social structure through the 1960s to the 1980s. Furthermore, by looking at the distribution of the residuals of the model, we notice that immobility or class inheritance has been a prominent phenomenon in Hong Kong society for the last three decades, that is, most of the offspring of upper classes are well protected from falling too far down along the social hierarchy, while most young men and women from lower classes are constrained from far-ranging upward mobility.

Table 8 Goodness-of-fit statistics and coefficients of multiple determination for various mobility models and samples for 14x14 mobility table

Sample and model	G^2	df	p	rG^2
1976 by-census data				
a. Perfect mobility model	6827.69375	169	4E-32	
b. Quasi-perfect mobility model	2556.24494	157	4E-32	62.55%
1981 census data				
a. Perfect mobility model	2593.06408	169	4E-32	
b. Quasi-perfect mobility model	1082.72562	157	4E-32	58.24%
1986 by-census data				
a. Perfect mobility model	8752.51635	169	4E-32	
b. Quasi-perfect mobility model	1895.16540	157	4E-32	78.35%

10x10 Mobility-Table Analysis

To continue our search for mobility closures, we can collapse the 14-category class schema into a 10-category schema and construct a 10x10 mobility table to see whether the data in the 10x10 table fit better with the models.[6] The way the 14-category class schema is grouped into the 10-category schema is shown in Table 1. The results of the perfect-mobility-model analysis with the three census data sets are in Tables 9 to 14 respectively. The goodness-of-fit statistics in all three mobility tables confirm once again that the perfect mobility is rejected by a huge margin.

Moreover, the adjusted residuals of the three tables confirm once again and in much more definite ways that immobility or class inheritance is a salient and persistent phenomenon within the class structure of Hong Kong throughout the 1960s to the 1980s. This can be evidenced by the fact that all of the adjusted residuals in the diagonal cells in the three mobility tables are positive in value and statistically significant. Moreover, most of the residuals in the diagonal cells in all three models are of the highest positive values across the respective rows and columns. For the 1976 and 1986 models, 8 out of 10 of these residuals are of that character, while 9 out of 10 are for the 1981 model. It signifies that young men and women in Hong Kong are much more likely to "inflow" into their fathers' class positions and the least probable to "outflow" into other destinations. Thirdly, a clear line of social cleavage between manual and non-manual labourers also emerges from all three sets of data. If we take Classes 1 through 5 as non-manual labourers and Classes 6 through 10 as manual labourers, we can then cross-cut the 10x10 table into four sub-tables. Two prominent features emerge:

(1) In the upper right-hand part of the table, most of the residuals are negative in value. For the 1976 and 1981 data, 23 out of 24 residuals are negative in value, while for the 1986 data all residuals are. Furthermore, most of these negative values are larger than 2, which means they are statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level. For the 1976 data, 20 of the residuals are larger than 2, while 18 and 22 of them are in the 1981 and 1986 data respectively.

(2) In the lower left-hand part of the table, most of the residuals are negative in value. Of them, 23 are negative in value in the 1976 and 1986 data, while 22 of them are in the 1981 data. Again, most of these negative values are larger than 2. Of the residuals in the 1976 data, 22 are larger than 2, while 16 and 19 of them are in the 1981 and 1986 data respectively. Taken

together, there prevail two definite social closures of mobility chances separating the manual and non-manual classes within the class structure of Hong Kong.

Table 9 Observed frequencies of father's class position (10-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1976

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	164	12	9	195	41	37	125	57	116	11
2	198	97	61	586	347	103	261	161	358	34
3	70	6	43	234	48	65	198	66	237	11
4	145	21	36	652	79	97	311	122	332	28
5	113	10	21	304	147	64	252	88	342	20
6	145	11	50	486	121	422	911	274	1220	69
7	137	13	29	504	125	260	1572	270	1615	43
8	158	16	51	581	151	279	1056	646	1401	75
9	87	15	26	337	98	180	575	179	1379	20
10	95	12	19	295	123	220	670	258	1098	541

Table 10 Adjusted residuals under perfect mobility model from father's class position (10-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1976

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	21.0128	2.3319	-.3709	7.2061	.5624	-2.0394	-4.3362	-.7294	-9.6932	-2.9021
2	8.8441	19.5148	6.1884	14.1103	24.5683	-3.8671	-12.8010	-1.5130	-15.7559	-4.7724
3	3.0926	-.7224	8.5681	6.8700	-.0075	.0223	-1.9155	-1.6233	-4.7176	-3.8454
4	5.9077	1.6440	2.5196	23.8314	-1.1871	-2.3275	-6.0240	-2.3456	-12.3122	-4.3172
5	5.6609	-.3485	.7252	6.5244	10.3228	-2.9342	-3.8402	-2.3215	-4.8751	-3.8367
6	-3.3875	-3.8048	.1372	-5.2314	-5.0224	12.5530	2.8179	-1.8124	2.5720	-5.2131
7	-6.9318	-4.4051	-4.4884	-10.1207	-7.4950	-2.8032	20.6748	-6.0703	6.8694	-9.7456
8	-4.8549	-3.6841	-1.0766	-5.6811	-5.0326	-.9025	2.0145	17.3120	1.0350	-6.4397
9	-5.3032	-1.8992	-2.1294	-6.8229	-4.0381	-.9483	-3.9615	-4.0914	20.3919	-8.2790
10	-6.1717	-3.1385	-4.0755	-12.0719	-3.4897	-.0600	-3.9072	-.8942	2.5107	45.0712

= The highest positive value across a row **and** the column of the same number.

= The highest positive value across a row **or** the column of the same number.

Goodness-of-fit test statistics

Likelihood ratio chi-square = 4954.99523, df = 81, p = 4E-32

Pearson chi-square = 6446.71095, df = 81, p = 4E-32

Table 11 Observed frequencies of father's class position (10-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1981

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	60	12	7	98	20	8	47	26	36	1
2	138	63	74	415	117	33	155	95	141	16
3	52	11	45	231	32	24	108	63	86	1
4	100	25	33	437	46	30	125	61	107	4
5	48	7	16	231	86	25	160	56	146	5
6	118	26	48	572	123	206	578	173	535	23
7	142	23	65	639	98	128	1073	248	748	18
8	197	31	72	734	169	191	868	487	805	19
9	135	13	65	580	98	140	616	194	864	13
10	96	28	40	336	113	154	508	189	509	194

Table 12 Adjusted residuals under perfect mobility model from father's class position (10-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1981

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	9.7894	3.8834	-.4068	3.1055	1.0995	-2.1547	-3.6371	-.3709	-4.6010	-1.8584
2	7.7411	11.9127	7.7344	8.2143	7.3372	-4.2292	-9.5841	-1.5777	-9.5127	-1.0103
3	2.1120	.8123	7.0709	7.1236	-.1304	-1.8028	-4.2944	.7388	-5.5960	-3.0392
4	5.7755	3.5080	1.6666	16.0976	-.3778	-3.0441	-8.0103	-2.8619	-8.5077	-3.0780
5	.1465	-1.0728	-.9565	3.9485	7.8744	-2.5815	-2.0361	-1.6721	-2.3198	-2.2347
6	-2.4748	-1.1270	-1.9393	.1005	.2679	7.9586	.6520	-3.0406	.2345	-2.8054
7	-4.0974	-3.2843	-2.1160	-5.3346	-5.5000	-3.3348	14.9227	-2.2952	2.1264	-5.2351
8	-1.4529	-2.6823	-2.3887	-5.0051	-.8564	.3917	1.1888	11.2599	.7110	-5.8007
9	-2.5305	-4.1978	-.6819	-3.1826	-3.6418	-.1638	-1.1659	-3.3967	13.2294	-5.1545
10	-3.3390	-.1531	-2.3054	-9.5979	.4661	4.2223	-.1116	-.2102	1.6755	28.6656

= The highest positive value across a row **and** the column of the same number.

= The highest positive value across a row **or** the column of the same number.

Goodness-of-fit test statistics

Likelihood ratio chi-square = 2167.80743, df = 81, p = 4E-32

Pearson chi-square = 2668.23732, df = 81, p = 4E-32

Table 13 Observed frequencies of father's class position (10-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1986

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	278	28	16	440	77	37	130	100	46	10
2	798	293	97	1756	831	215	576	499	344	32
3	194	26	42	558	139	86	259	169	171	6
4	372	49	29	1082	199	78	286	192	159	11
5	207	37	34	737	319	91	315	194	194	9
6	550	74	90	1961	518	654	1310	759	815	38
7	693	52	99	2155	515	447	2050	744	1036	38
8	828	109	125	2567	647	603	1773	1387	1138	36
9	347	35	64	1204	318	234	873	437	858	15
10	323	40	50	882	306	264	714	402	507	995

Table 14 Adjusted residuals under perfect mobility model from father's class position (10-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1986

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	15.8752	2.1193	-.1227	6.4937	-2.3181	-4.0379	-6.2763	-2.3657	-8.2180	-3.7947
2	11.9688	23.2844	2.4179	5.1244	19.0972	-6.6425	-15.5128	-3.9494	-12.8994	-9.9810
3	2.3024	-.1838	3.9409	4.1015	-.1101	-1.2914	-2.6848	-.6463	-1.5623	-5.8358
4	8.5615	1.4571	-1.0284	16.4936	-.7294	-5.9799	-8.6648	-4.7947	-8.1253	-6.9192
5	-.6223	.3713	.6888	5.3902	10.9170	-3.3871	-4.2466	-2.5212	-3.6908	-6.5078
6	-5.7954	-3.7920	-.6739	-.6583	-2.7049	13.9889	2.6631	1.4038	1.3067	-11.4712
7	-3.9737	-7.4275	-1.2697	-3.8036	-6.6961	-.9902	20.1205	-3.8419	5.0504	-12.9722
8	-3.9080	-3.8079	-.5651	-3.4084	-5.6876	2.7015	2.9078	15.0355	2.6230	-14.9752
9	-5.0176	-4.5844	.2388	-2.8299	-3.1136	-1.8082	3.0839	-1.7107	17.4109	-9.9188
10	-6.7384	-4.1172	-1.8104	-14.9225	-4.2298	-.1834	-4.1555	-4.0074	-.5776	86.5443

= The highest positive value across a row **and** the column of the same number.

= The highest positive value across a row **or** the column of the same number.

Goodness-of-fit test statistics

Likelihood ratio chi-square = 6914.76431, df = 81, p = 4E-32

Pearson chi-square = 10919.82477, df = 81, p = 4E-32

Once again, we can verify the thesis of class inheritance with the quasi-perfect mobility model. The goodness-of-fit statistics and coefficient of multiple determination for all three sets of data are shown in Table 15. The quasi-perfect mobility model does not fit any set of data. However, the rG^2s indicate that on the average the quasi-perfect mobility model has reduced about 70 per cent of the likelihood ratio chi-square.

To sum up, the 10x10 mobility-table analysis substantiates once again that the ideal-type model of perfect mobility has never been a social fact within the Hong Kong social structure for the last three decades. Moreover, the closures of mobility chances revealed by the 10x10 table are much more definite than in those in the 14x14 table. In other words, we begin to see that a social class structure emerges from the data. Finally, the analysis has also revealed a definite line of social cleavage between manual and non-manual workers cutting across the social structure of Hong Kong.

Table 15 Goodness-of-fit statistics and coefficients of multiple determination for various mobility models and samples for 10x10 mobility table

Sample and model	G^2	df	p	rG^2
1976 by-census data				
a. Perfect mobility model	4954.99523	81	4E-32	
b. Quasi-perfect mobility model	1817.59508	71	4E-32	63.32%
1981 census data				
a. Perfect mobility model	2167.80743	81	4E-32	
b. Quasi-perfect mobility model	830.74633	71	4E-32	61.68%
1986 by-census data				
a. Perfect mobility model	6914.76431	81	4E-32	
b. Quasi-perfect mobility model	1490.92076	71	4E-32	78.44%

5x5 Mobility-Table Analysis

Though the 10x10 mobility-table analysis has been able to delineate some definite social closures within the Hong Kong social structure, the results are still not conclusive. To follow the conventional practice in the field of mobility-table analysis, I will, therefore, group the 10-class categories into 5, which are shown in Table 1. Thus, the 5x5 mobility table is constructed and applied to the three sets of census data for analysis. The results of the perfect-mobility model are reported in Tables 16 to 21.

The readings of the adjusted residuals in all three sets of census data suggest unambiguously that there have been five solid closures of mobility chances persisting in the Hong Kong social structure for the last three decades. This is evidenced by the fact that all the residuals in the diagonals in all three sets of data are positive and significantly large in value. Moreover, they all take on the highest positive values across the respective rows and columns. On the other hand, most of the residuals in the off-diagonal cells are negative and significantly large in values. In the 1976 data, 16 of 20 off-diagonal cells take on negative and statistically significant values, while in the 1981 data 14 of them are of the same character and in the 1986 data 15 of them are. In all three sets of data, there are two residuals in the off-diagonal cells which are positive and statistically significant in value. They are in $Cell_{1\,2}$ and $Cell_{2\,1}$. They indicate that mobility between non-manual classes is relatively easier.

Table 16 Observed frequencies of father's class position (5-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1976

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	471	851	914	692	45
2	242	965	798	757	39
3	429	1394	3874	3809	132
4	276	995	2339	3605	95
5	107	314	1013	1356	541

Table 17 Adjusted residuals under perfect mobility model from father's class position (5-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1976

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	24.6506	17.2563	-4.3486	-18.9219	-5.7216
2	6.6493	25.3100	-6.8646	-13.9957	-5.9150
3	-7.3882	-9.4134	15.3400	.7517	-13.2172
4	-8.9220	-9.9405	-4.9043	20.8357	-11.1689
5	-6.9532	-12.9249	-5.0714	1.8792	45.0712

☐ = The highest positive value across a row **and** the column of the same number.

Goodness-of-fit test statistics

Likelihood ratio chi-square = 3201.87322, df = 16, p = .000

Pearson chi-square = 4204.21448, df = 16, p = .000

Table 18 Observed frequencies of father's class position (5-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1981

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	273	594	380	298	17
2	188	746	365	317	5
3	364	1571	2477	1906	46
4	376	1451	2082	2350	32
5	124	376	775	698	194

Table 19 Adjusted residuals under perfect mobility model from father's class position (5-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1981

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	16.0270	11.0010	-8.2513	-10.6050	-1.7769
2	6.8517	18.8881	-10.0369	-10.3866	-4.4107
3	-6.2293	-3.6707	10.8238	-2.1048	-7.1242
4	-5.2058	-7.2581	-1.3889	13.6684	-8.7227
5	-3.1116	-10.1036	2.1000	1.3747	28.6656

☐ = The highest positive value across a row **and** the column of the same number.

Goodness-of-fit test statistics

Likelihood ratio chi-square = 1503.82272, df = 16, p = .000

Pearson chi-square = 1916.38475, df = 16, p = .000

Table 20 Observed frequencies of father's class position (5-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1986

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	1397	2309	1866	989	42
2	641	1711	1047	691	17
3	1613	5076	6219	3742	85
4	1319	3960	4448	3820	51
5	363	932	1284	909	995

Table 21 Adjusted residuals under perfect mobility model from father's class position (5-category) by son's and daughter's (aged 17-27) class position in Hong Kong, 1986

Father's class position	Son's and daughter's class position				
	1	2	3	4	5
1	25.8047	8.0835	-8.2265	-15.4530	-10.8941
2	8.1341	15.9253	-10.2537	-8.8331	-9.2644
3	-10.4997	-1.3880	15.6527	.2469	-21.4721
4	-8.7215	-4.8393	.1818	19.3869	-19.5394
5	-7.9311	-15.1864	-6.0271	-3.4231	86.5443

= The highest positive value across a row **and** the column of the same number.

Goodness-of-fit test statistics

Likelihood ratio chi-square = 5250.07297, df = 16, p = .000

Pearson chi-square = 9021.38974, df = 16, p = .000

The thesis of closures of mobility chances can further be verified with the quasi-perfect mobility model. The goodness-of-fit

statistics and coefficient of multiple determination for all three sets of census data are shown in Table 22. The quasi-perfect mobility model does not fit any set of census data. However, the rG^2s indicate that the quasi-perfect mobility model has reduced on the average 80 per cent of the likelihood ratio chi-square.

In light of the Weberian conception of social class, which defines social classes as closures within which social mobility is easy and typical, we can conclude that there have been five social classes persisting in Hong Kong society for the last three decades. These social classes are (1) professionals, administrators and managers, (2) routine non-manual labourers, (3) skilled manual labourers, (4) semi-skilled manual labourers, and (5) unskilled manual labourers. The above analyses have verified not only that inter-generational mobility within each social class is easy and typical. They have also confirmed that inter-generational mobility among these social classes, except between the non-manual classes, is most unlikely. Thus, in Hong Kong social mobility chances are not distributed equally and fairly as its residents perceive. In fact, they are firmly structured along the five cleavage lines that this study has revealed.

Table 22 Goodness-of-fit statistics and coefficients of multiple determination for various mobility models and samples for 5x5 mobility table

Sample and model	G^2	df	p	rG^2
1976 by-census data				
a. Perfect mobility model	3201.87322	16	.000	
b. Quasi-perfect mobility model	716.24376	11	.000	77.63%
1981 census data				
a. Perfect mobility model	1503.82272	16	.000	
b. Quasi-perfect mobility model	390.89776	11	.000	74.01%
1986 by-census data				
a. Perfect mobility model	5250.07297	16	.000	
b. Quasi-perfect mobility model	453.90539	11	.000	91.35%

Comparison

The preceding analyses have revealed that for the last decades there have been five social classes persisting within the class structure of Hong Kong. In this section, this class structure will be located along a temporal trajectory and its changes over time will be examined.

Changes in the class structure of Hong Kong can first be examined by comparing the magnitudes of the residuals in the diagonal cells found in the three census data sets. To facilitate the comparison, the adjusted residuals of diagonal cells in the three 5x5 mobility tables are juxtaposed in Table 23. It reveals two salient features. First, the 1986 table takes up three of the largest values, which are Class 1, 3, and 5, while the 1976 table takes up the other two highest values. Secondly, the 1981 table takes up four of the five smallest values, which are Class 1, 3, 4, and 5. They indicate that closures of mobility chances are relatively less prominent in the 1981 census data than those in the 1976 and 1986 data. Furthermore, they signify that closures of mobility chances are relatively more prominent in 1976 because the five diagonal residuals in the 1976 table take the two highest values. Finally, they also indicate that among the three mobility tables, mobility closures are most prominent in the 1986 table because they take up three of the five highest values. The analysis also reveals that mobility closures at the two extremes, that is, Class 1 and 5, are most salient in the 1986 data.

Table 23 Comparison of adjusted residuals of the diagonal cells in the 5x5 mobility tables of the 1976, 1981 and 1986 census data

Mobility tables	Adjusted residuals of diagonal cells				
	$Cell_{1\,1}$	$Cell_{2\,2}$	$Cell_{3\,3}$	$Cell_{4\,4}$	$Cell_{5\,5}$
1976	24.6506	25.3100	15.3400	20.8357	45.0712
1981	16.0270	18.8881	10.8238	13.6684	28.6656
1986	25.8047	15.9253	15.6527	19.3869	86.5443

The overall degree of closure among the three sets of diagonal residuals can also be signified by comparison of the magnitudes of the three rG^2s. As explicated before, rG^2 indicates the percentage of the difference between the G^2s for perfect mobility model and the quasi-perfect mobility model. In other words, it represents the percentage that the diagonal residuals contribute to the G^2 in the perfect mobility model. Thus, it can be construed as the measure of the overall degree of immobility or closure in a mobility table. Reading from Table 22, the three rG^2s imply that the degree of closure of social class structure in Hong Kong was highest in 1986, while that in 1981 was lowest. And the degree of closure of the class structure in 1976 was slightly higher than that in 1981.

Taken together, we can conclude that the social class structure was a relatively closed structure in the first half of the 1970s. Then, these social closures began to loosen up in the late 1970s and the early1980s. However, these social closures underwent a process of consolidation in the mid-1980s. In short, there has been a fluctuation in the degree of closure of the social class structure of Hong Kong. It makes us wonder whether what we have envisaged is a trendless change or a constant flux in class mobility as Erikson and Goldthorpe conclude in their comparative study of class mobility in industrial societies (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993).

The Explanations

In light of the above findings, I think it is time for us to investigate the factors working behind these changes in the social class structure of Hong Kong. To follow the framework put forth by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993:1-27), I will pursue my search in three directions, namely the economic, political and cultural factors.

The economic thesis to be examined is what Erikson and Goldthorpe characterize as the liberal theory of industrialism (1993:3-9).[7] The thesis comprises three propositions. First is the *structural* proposition, which indicates that:

> [W]ithin industrial society the dynamism of a rationally developed technology calls for continuous, and often rapid, changes in the structure of the social division of labour, which also tends to become increasingly differentiated. High rate of mobility thus follows.... Furthermore, the overall tendency is for advancing technology to upgrade levels of employment.... The net effect is a reduction in number of merely labouring and routine occupations and a rising demand for technically and professionally qualified personnel. (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1922:5)

Thus, it suggests that the structural changes elicited by industrialization and technology advancement will enhance social mobility and particularly upward mobility. The second proposition is the *processual* proposition. It suggests that industrialism will also bring about rationalization of the social selection process:

> Rational procedures of social selection require a shift away from *ascription* and toward *achievement* as the leading criterion. What counts is increasingly what individuals can do, and not who they are. Moreover, the growing demand for highly qualified personnel promotes the expansion of education and training, and also the reform of educational institutions so as to increase their accessibility to individuals of all social backgrounds. Human resources cannot be wasted; talent must be fully exploited wherever it is to be found. Thus, as within a society of widening educational provision, "meritocratic" selection comes to predominate, the association between individuals' social **origins** and their eventual **destinations** tends steadily to weaken; or, in other words, **relative mobility chances** become more equal and the society takes on a more "open" character. (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:6; emphasis in italics are original and those in bold are mine)

The third proposition in the liberal theory of industrialism is the *compositional* proposition. It indicates that structural and processual effects of industrialism will work compatibly with each

other to constitute a class structure within which "both rates of mobility and degree of equality of opportunity tend to increase" (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:5).

Erikson and Goldthorpe's distinction between structural and processual effects of industrialism on class structure has provided us an essential conceptual framework to comprehend the findings of this study. The mobility chances revealed by the aforementioned mobility-table analysis can be characterized as "relative mobility chances" which are caused by the disassociation (and association for immobility) between individuals' social origins and destinations. That is because the statistical measures generated from the preceding log-linear analyses are "margin-insensitive" (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:56). That is, they have not been affected by the changes in the marginal distributions of the three mobility tables that are constructed with census data collected at different points in time. It has been suggested by some researchers in the field that changes in marginal distributions of different mobility tables reflect the structural changes in occupational and employment structures of a given society over time (Lipset and Bendix, 1959; Boudon, 1973). This type of mobility has been called the structural mobility, which corresponds quite neatly with the structural proposition of the liberal theory of industrialism. Taken together, we can see that the preceding log-linear analyses have only revealed one type of mobility in Hong Kong, namely relative mobility, and have not taken the structural mobility into consideration. However, there is a debate in the field of mobility study on the validity of the measurement of structural mobility (Duncan 1966:62-63; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:58-59; Goldthorpe, 1987:75) and most of the queries generated from the debate have still "remained unresolved" (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:59). To avoid these technical problems, I will not calculate the structural mobility rates from the three mobility tables. Instead, I will look into the absolute mobility rates and changes in the overall occupational structure of Hong Kong in order to reveal the general feature of structural mobility in Hong Kong.

By absolute mobility rate, I "refer to the proportions of individuals in some base category who are mobile, and these rates are thus most readily expressed by percentaging values in particular cell within the mobility table" (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:55). Thus, the total rates of absolute mobility can be obtained "by the percentage of all individuals represented in the mobility table who are found in cells off the main diagonal — that is, whose categories of origin and destination are not the same" (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:55). For hierarchical mobility table such as those constructed in this study, the absolute mobility rates can be differentiated into two types. They are upward and downward mobility rates. The former can be obtained by adding up of all the percentages found in the off-diagonal cells lying at the lower left corner of the mobility table, while the latter can be obtained by adding up those percentages of off-diagonal cells lying at the upper right corner of the mobility table. I have in fact calculated these mobility rates from the 5x5 mobility tables in Tables 16, 18, and 20, and they are shown in Table 24.

Table 24 Absolute mobility rates for 5x5 mobility tables of 1976, 1981 and 1986 (%)

Absolute mobility rates	1976	1981	1986
1. Total mobility rates	63.70	64.35	68.94
2. Upward mobility rates	32.49	40.98	45.13
3. Downward mobility rates	31.21	23.37	23.81

Reading from the figures, we can see that there is a moderate increase in total rates of absolute mobility in Hong Kong's class structure over time. We also witness a substantial increase in upward mobility rates, which increase by 12.64 per cent from 1976 to 1986, that is at a growth rate of more than one-third (38.17 per cent). Moreover, there is a decrease in downward mobility rates. Taken together, these imply that there might be upward structural

mobility taking place in Hong Kong in the last three decades. However, the hypothesis of increase in structural upward mobility in Hong Kong cannot be substantiated by the absolute mobility rates alone. Therefore, we turn to another set of figures which indicates changes in the overall occupational structure of Hong Kong in the last three decades. By looking at the figures shown in Table 25, particularly the relative growth rate of each occupational category, we can see that the working population increase by 43.12 per cent from 1976 to 1986. At the same time, the upper strata in the occupational hierarchy, that is, occupational groupings 1 to 3 in Table 25, have exceeded the overall growth rate substantially (i.e. the relative growth rates of these occupational groupings are much larger than 1). On the other hand, the manual workers (occupational groupings 6 to 7) have been shrinking relatively. Thus, this lends proof to the thesis that there was an increase in upward structural mobility chances in Hong Kong in the last two decades.

If we accept the thesis that opportunities for upward structural mobility have increased in Hong Kong over the last two decades, then we can integrate it with the thesis which has been substantiated by the preceding log-linear analyses, that is, the relative mobility chances have first increased slightly in the late 1970s but have decreased in the mid-1980s. We can conclude that as Hong Kong carried on with its economic growth and industrialization into the 1970s, both the structural and processual effects of industrialism worked in congruence with each other and asserted their impacts on mobility chances. Thus, this constituted an increase in both the structural and relative mobility chances within the Hong Kong social structure in the late 1970s, which has been evidenced by the 1976 and 1981 data. However, as Hong Kong's social structure entered into its stage of maturation in the 1980s, the structural and processual effects of industrialism began to work on different or even contradictory directions. The structural mobility chances continued to grow in the mid-1980s, while the chances for relative mobility which were supposed to be contributed by the disassociation between individuals' origins and

Table 25 Working population by occupations, 1976-1986

Occupations	1976 N (%)	1981 N (%)	1986 N (%)	Growth rate (76-86) %	Relative growth rate*
Professional, technical and related workers	101930 (5.5)	143700 (6.0)	220528 (8.3)	+116.35	2.70
Administrative and managerial workers	39930 (2.2)	64106 (2.7)	95417 (3.6)	+138.96	3.22
Clerical and related workers	179780 (9.7)	293905 (12.2)	385587 (14.6)	+114.48	2.66
Sales workers	213350 (11.5)	247924 (10.3)	309059 (11.7)	+44.86	1.04
Service workers	274600 (14.9)	374093 (15.6)	429389 (16.2)	+56.37	1.31
Production and operative workers and labourers	963230 (52.1)	1212545 (50.4)	1143280 (43.3)	+18.69	0.44
Agricultural workers and fishermen	49000 (1.4)	50676 (0.7)	50150 (0.4)	+2.35	0.05
Armed forces and unclassified	24990 (1.4)	17118 (0.7)	9863 (0.4)	-60.53	
Total	1846810 (100.0)	2404067 (100.0)	2643273 (100.0)	+43.12	

* Relative growth rate is a ratio between the growth rate of a particular occupational category and the total growth rate.

Sources: Census and Statistics Department, 1981:34, Table 2.11; and 1986:38, Table 34.

destinations began to shrink. What are the factors that contribute to the shrinking of relative mobility chances? What causes the structural and processual effects of industrialism to work in contradictory directions? To answer these question, we must go beyond the economic factor, more specifically the liberal theory of industrialism, and search for other explanations.

The second explanation put forth by social scientists to account for changes in class structure in capitalist societies can broadly be characterized as political factors, which refers to public policies implemented by capitalist states to enhance equality of opportunities and to reduce economic and social inequality (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:18-19; Esping-Anderson et al., 1993; Esping-Anderson, 1985). These kinds of state policies which are predominantly advocated and implemented by social democratic governments, in particular Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Norway, can be classified into three categories, namely welfare policy, labour policy and educational policy. First, the kind of welfare policies in point are public policies such as regulatory policies on wage level, affirmative action policies on employment, income redistribution policies in the forms of progressive income tax or transfer payment, economic policies to maintain full employment, and other welfare policies which are positive discrimination in nature. As for labour policies, they refer to, on the one hand, state policies which enhance or at least guarantee labour unionization and labour movement. On the other hand, they include more comprehensive industrial-relation policies which are well known in Scandinavian countries to bring the strong and unionized labour movement with the large industrial and capitalist federations to form a kind of corporatism to promote welfare state policy. Thirdly, the educational policies in point are those policies which aim to equalize mobility opportunities. They can be classified into two main types. The first type is policies relating to universalizing the provision of educational services, such as compulsory education and expansion of post-compulsory education. The second type can be characterized as positive discrimination policies which aims to assist children who are culturally or socially disadvantaged in receiving and making use of the universal education. These may include various form of compensatory education and affirmative admission policies.

In light of these state policies, we can see that Hong Kong society is quite "under-devloped" in this respect. The welfare policies in Hong Kong are subsistence type in nature, that is, they never go beyond the objective of maintaining a basic level of subsistence for Hong Kong residents. Therefore, the major social expenditure of Hong Kong government is on provision of housing and health services (Deyo, 1992). There has not been any radical policy on wealth redistribution nor any social services that are positive discrimination in nature. As for labour policies, Hong Kong government has been characterized as "an employer-dominated unitary state" (England, 1989:233), and most of the labour policies adopted are passive and regulatory in nature. There is hardly any state policy to enhance wage-labourers' collective or individual opportunities for social advancement. Lastly, although Hong Kong government has been expanding its provision of school places for the last three decades, the educational policy as a whole has never gone beyond the objective of universalization of provision. In fact, there has never been any genuine positive-discrimination policy introduced to the schooling system of Hong Kong. Taken together, we may say that for the last three decades there is hardly any state policy or action in Hong Kong which aims directly at disassociating the origin and destination nexus and equalizing opportunities for social mobility. This may be one of the reasons why in contrast to the increase in structural mobility chances in Hong Kong for the last three decades, the relative mobility chances have never had any substantial increase.

The third and final explanation for the changes in social class structure in Hong Kong can be characterized as a cultural thesis, which can be categorized into two propositions. One is the thesis on culture of familism and the other is the thesis of cultural capital in educational attainment process. First, the thesis of familism has been well researched by sociologists in Hong Kong. On the one hand, Siu-kai Lau's oft-quoted thesis of *utilitarianistic familism* has characterized a normative and behavioural tendency among Hong Kong Chinese who "place[s] his familial interests above the interests of society and of other individuals and groups, and to

structure his relationships with other individuals and groups in such a manner that the furtherance of his familial interests is the overriding concern. Moreover, among the familial interests, material interests take priority over non-material interests" (Lau, 1982:72). Siu-lun Wong, on the other hand, has coined the concept *entrepreneurial familism* which depicts an economic ethos among Hong Kong Chinese. "This ethos involves the *jia* as the basic unit of economic competition. The family provides the impetus for innovation and the support of risk-taking. Entrepreneurial familism is by no means confined to the rich sector of the population in the form of family firms; it permeates the whole society. Where there is little physical capital to be deployed, heads of less well-off families still marshal the limited *jia* resources and try to cultivate human capital for collective advancement" (Wong, 1988:142). In his explication, Wong has cited Janet Salaff's study of 28 middle- and working-class families in Hong Kong in the 1970s. Salaff has revealed that in these families "more resources were invariably channeled into the education of [their] young sons and daughters. There were greater sex differences in educational opportunities within poorer families. Sons [of these families] were always encouraged to continue to secondary school even if their exam scores did not merit government financial support, whereas stricter conditions were imposed on the daughters' advancement." Thus she concludes that "each family thus inspired to improve its position in life by means of combining the income of wage-earning members" (Salaff, 1981:263-265). All these studies points unambiguously to a salient feature of Chinese families in Hong Kong, that is, the overriding concern for material and social advancement of the family. To materialize this concern, each family, rich and poor alike, would strive hard to invest whatever human and material resources that it could muster into its project of social advancement.

When this achievement-oriented familism is located within the origin-destination nexus in social mobility contest, it offers a forceful explanation of the persistent association between origin and destination revealed in the preceding mobility-table analysis.

We may further infer that the advancement-oriented familism may have a double-edged effect on relative mobility chances in Hong Kong. In the 1950s and 1960s, the majority of Hong Kong families had just migrated into Hong Kong from China. Most of them had to start economically, socially and culturally "from scratch." Riding on the wave of industrialization and economic development in the 1960s, a considerable number of families had exploited the structural mobility chances available and had made their advancement along the ladder of success in Hong Kong. It was then that achievement-oriented familism asserted its elevating effect on social mobility. However, as those families settled down comfortably in the upper-class positions, the achievement-oriented familism began to assert its conservative effect on the social class structure, that is, those upper- and middle-class families would again muster their familial resources to perpetuate their class position. That may be the main reason why class inheritance began to permeate and why at the same time the relative mobility chances began to shrink. However, the resources that have served as conservative forces for the upper- and middle-class families are not confined to economic capital. They also consist of the cultural capital which constitutes the crux of my second proposition in the thesis on cultural explanation.

By cultural capital, I refer to the attributes which can assist an individual to command authority in the cultural market as the economic capital does in the labour and commodity market (Apple, 1979; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Collins, 1979). One of the major or even predominant cultural markets in modern society is the formal educational system. It has been well documented in the literature of the sociology of education that cultural capital which has been accepted and legitimized by a particular state and its schooling system "reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control within that society" (Bernstein, 1971:47). For example, Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) have identified the linguistic competence and the habitus of the upper- and middle-class as the cultural capital within the French schooling system, while in the schooling system of the US the cultural capital at work is the status culture as well as the life style of the Anglo-Protestant middle-class (Collins, 1979). As for the colonial schooling system of Hong Kong, the predominant cultural capital at work is the colonial culture, more specifically English proficiency. In a study carried out by Ping-kee Siu and me, we have revealed that English proficiency is the major predictor of success in the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE). We have also substantiated that the socio-economic backgrounds of families have significant effect on secondary-school students' English proficiency and subsequently on their HKCEE result (Tsang and Siu, 1993). In light of this finding, we may infer that in the 1950s and 1960s for most of the families in Hong Kong which had just migrated from China, English proficiency was not a common cultural asset in most of the families. Thus, school children had to work their way through the schooling system all by themselves. However, when some of the families had succeeded in the acquisition of this form of cultural capital, they would certainly reinvest it into the familial project of social advancement. Thus, it would upset the equalizing effect of universal schooling. That was because, though all children in the mid-1970s had been provided with more or less equal educational services, yet these services were conveyed through a foreign language. Hence, those children who could get assistance and support from the families' cultural capital would certainly enjoy greater chances in educational attainment. Taken together, English proficiency as major cultural capital in the process of educational attainment may serve as a reinforcement to the overall class inheritance found in Hong Kong society in the 1980s.

To recapitulate, the economic, political and cultural explanations put forth in the preceding paragraphs can, in fact, be located within the origin-destination nexus of inter-generational mobility for further explication. First, the structural and processual effects of economic growth and industrialization on class structure can be located in the destination end of the nexus. It can then be construed as changes in occupational structure and labour market to which young men and women, who began their career in the

1970s and 1980s, were to be destined. Secondly, the effects of achievement-oriented familism and cultural capital on mobility can be located in the origin end of the nexus. They can be viewed as assets which young men and women in Hong Kong were ascribed from their families as they set out to participate in the social mobility contest. Thirdly, the effects of public policies can then be located between the origin and destination ends and be understood as mechanisms facilitating mobility chances and dis-associating the persisting linkage between origin and destination. Taken together, we can see how these factors assert their effects, each in its unique way, on the class structure of Hong Kong and as a result have contributed to the emergence as well as the consolidation of a social class structure within which five definite social closures have persistently prevailed for the last two decades.

In conclusion, in this chapter I have presented the findings of my mobility-table analysis with three sets of census data, namely 1976, 1981, and 1986. The results indicate that the absolute and structural mobility rates in Hong Kong have increased substantially for the last two decades, yet the relative mobility rates, on a whole, have been on the decrease. More specifically, the relative mobility rates increased slightly from 1976 to 1981, but as Hong Kong entered the 1980s, the relative mobility rates have decreased substantially. Furthermore, the study has revealed that in company with the decrease in relative mobility rates, five definite closures of mobility chances have emerged and consolidated themselves within the social structure of Hong Kong over time. In this chapter, three explanations have been put forth to account for the changes in the social classes of Hong Kong. The first is the economic thesis, more specifically the liberal theory of industrialism. The analysis of this study indicates that the two effects of industrialism, namely structural and processual effects, have asserted different, if not contradictory, impacts on the social class structure of Hong Kong. The structural effect has worked in the direction the liberal theorists predicted. However, the processual effect of industrialism, that is, the disassociation between origins and destination, has not emerged as predicted. On the contrary,

the association between origins and destinations has strengthened itself over time. The second explanation which can be characterized as the political thesis suggests that capitalist states in advanced industrialized societies have designed and implemented a line of public policies to promote and reinforce equality of opportunities and as a result have enhanced social mobility chances. In light of this thesis, this study has examined briefly the public policies implemented by Hong Kong government in the last three decades. It suggests that most of them are not in the nature of equalizing opportunities or enhancing mobility chances. In other words, not much has been done politically to relax the persistent association of origin and destination in Hong Kong society. The third and final explanation put forth in this study is the cultural thesis. Two theses have been examined. One is the thesis of the achievement-oriented familism, which underlines the overriding convictions to social advancement found in most of the Chinese families in Hong Kong and their strong commitments to invest whatever resources they can muster into these familial projects of social advancement. Such convictions and commitments may be taken as one of the factors working behind the persistence of class inheritance revealed by this study. The other cultural thesis is the cultural capital thesis which suggests that a kind of "foreign" cultural capital, namely English proficiency, has been at work within the schooling system of Hong Kong. As a result, the mechanism of educational and social selection may have been operating in a way which favours those families and their members who are ascribed with such a foreign cultural capital. Taken together, what we envisage is the emergence and consolidation of a social class structure within Hong Kong society.

Notes

1. I would like to underline at the outset that an analysis of class structure and class structuration is but one aspect of the overall study of class analysis. It is a consensus (mostly between

the Marxists and the Weberians) in the field that class analysis basically comprises at least four areas, namely analysis of class structure (to identify the prominent cleavage lines within a social structure), class formation and class culture (to analyse the formation of class community and a commonly shared system of meanings), class identity and consciousness (to analyse the level of understanding and identification of actors' class interests), and class action and struggle (analysis of practices of actors for the realization of class interest). For further discussion please refer to Wright, 1989:271-278; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993:1-3; Tsang, 1993:5-8. This study will, therefore, be confined to the task of identifying the prominent and sustaining demarcation lines running through the class structure of Hong Kong.

2. For a more detailed explication of the Weberian conception of class, please refer to Tsang, 1992:4-25.
3. For a full discussion of the construction of the 14-category class schema and the mobility table, please refer to Tsang, 1992:52-58.
4. In my previous analyses (Tsang, 1992, and forthcoming), I selected the age cohort of 15 to 27 as subjects of my study. However, a number of my colleagues have pointed out that the majority of school leavers in Hong Kong are Form 5 graduates, i.e. those at the age of 17. And to include those young workers under 17 in my sample may cause a bias in my mobility analysis because those relatively "pre-matured" school leavers would most likely end up in occupations of lower socio-economic status. In order to avoid this plausible sample bias, I have chosen the age group 17 to 27 in this study. However, as the results of the analyses on the 1981 and 1986 data have shown, this change in samples does not affect the major findings or conclusions of my previous analyses.
5. Residual in the log-linear model represents the difference between the observed and expected frequencies of each respective cell in the mobility table. Thus, if a residual is positive in value, it signifies that the observed frequencies are over-represented. For purpose of comparison, standardized residuals can be "obtained by dividing each residual by the square root of the expected count" (Norusis, 1985:330). Furthermore, adjusted residuals can also be "calculated by dividing each standardized residual by an estimate of its standard error" (Norusis, 1985:330). The rule of thumb for the residual evaluation is that if an adjusted residual is larger than 2 in absolute value, the residual will basically be accepted as statistically significant at 0.05 level (Norusis, 1985:330).
6. For the rationale behind the collapse of class categories from 14 to 10, please refer to Tsang, 1992.
7. The exposition of the liberal theory of industrialism can be traced back to Lipset and Bendix's work entitled *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (1959). The work initiated a stream of researches in a number of industrial societies. They include Erikson et al., 1979; Featherman and Hauser, 1978; Goldthorpe, 1987; Hope, 1980; Treiman, 1970.

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4

Social Image of Stratification in Hong Kong

Catherine C. H. Chiu

Introduction

Any account of social stratification must begin with the pictures people have of the society they live in, be they in terms of class, status or power models. That we must be alert to the subjective aspect of social stratification is a principal concern of the Weberian tradition (Saunders, 1990). Following the traditional way the issue of the "image of society" has been discussed in North America: occupational measurement by mass survey, the study on which this paper is based aims to paint a picture of the subjective occupational status structure of Hong Kong. Given the centrality of occupational roles within the structure of industrialized societies, this evaluated status distinction among occupations represents a status model of society. Indeed, much research on stratification has emphasized occupational status (or prestige) as a stratifying dimension. Arguing that people's careers occupy a dominant place in their lives, many stratification researchers assert that occupational structure is the foundation of the stratification system of industrial societies and that social stratification is

rooted in how people perceive and judge occupations (e.g., Blau and Duncan, 1967; Coxon et al., 1986; Horan, 1978; Montagna, 1977). The establishment of a subjective occupational status structure would seem to be time-worn in the West, and already being applied in other Chinese communities, such as in Beijing (Lin and Xie, 1988) and Taiwan (Tsai and Chiu, 1991). Hong Kong, however, to paraphrase Wong T. W. P. and T. L. Lui (1992a:7), has "missed the point."[1] Prior to the research upon which this paper is based, comprehensive work to measure occupational status had not been undertaken in Hong Kong.[2]

The intent of this paper is twofold. First, in addition to presenting an image of society grounded in the status accorded different occupations, it is important to understand the social values underlying people's judgements. To meet this end, the important predictors of occupational status in the eyes of members of Hong Kong society are identified. By presenting this image of society together with the social values attached to it, this paper complements a growing series of sociological work on the objective class structure and status attainment[3] by providing information for discussion on the subjective aspect of stratification in Hong Kong (Wong and Lui, 1992a).[4] Second, to make sense of the dispositions of the people underlying the resultant social image of stratification, we need to explain what contributes to the frame of reference which people employ in occupational status judgements. In suggesting that social inequality is the source determining prestige judgement and that people in general are accepting the inequalities, this paper adds to the discussions which attempt to explain the social stability in spite of the economic and political disparities in Hong Kong.[5]

Image of Social Stratification

Social stratification is rooted in how people perceive and judge occupations (Coxon et al., 1986). In this study a sample of 112 occupations, which were tested to be commonly known in a pilot

study, was drawn up. These occupational titles were divided into three groups (three panels), with each respondent rating thirty-odd occupations. Respondents were asked to rate how high the social status[6] of each occupation by assigning a score between 6 and 1 to each of the occupations presented to them, where 6 = occupation having very high social status; 5 = occupation having high social status; 4 = occupation having fairly high social status; 3 = occupation having fairly low social status; 2 = occupation having low social status; 1 = occupation having very low social status. A total of 1,079 interviews were completed, 356 respondents belonged to Panel 1, 355 to Panel 2, and 368 to Panel 3.[7]

Two points are worth mentioning before I proceed further. First, since the "image of society" approach is concerned with the structure of social meanings and values, the researchers are then necessarily inclined to aggregate the people's judgement and account. They are more likely to highlight the majority views, the more widely-held values than otherwise. Doing so, however, does not necessarily mean that divergent views in the accounts are squeezed out and people's conceptions are distorted in order to produce a consensual account, as some critics would assert (Coxon et al., 1986:1). I recognize the differences and do not wish to deny their existence. Second, while I focus in this paper on the social dimension of stratification, I do not presuppose a generalized one-dimensional concept of stratification nor do I claim that the stratification system is organized according only to prestige (social status) attached to occupations, as said by critics of the status measurement tradition (Mayer, 1972:92, quoted in Coxon et al., 1986:33).

Attributes in the Assessment of the Social Status of Occupations

"What do the occupational scales measure?" is a much debated subject in this field (Coxon et al., 1986; Featherman et al., 1975; Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972; Hauser and Featherman, 1977; Paw-

son, 1982; Wegener, 1992). I follow one of the subjective approaches to occupational rating which adduces evidence from the respondents regarding the factors that they take into consideration when they evaluate the social status of occupations. This question was asked before the respondents were asked to do the occupational ratings. Table 1 shows the factors generally taken into consideration and the most important factor in their assessment.

Table 1 Factors taken into consideration in assessing the social status of occupations (%)

Factors	All responses	Most important factor
Professional training	57	19
Academic qualification	52	19
Salary	52	25
Contribution to society	39	14
Respectability	34	8
Power	29	8
Serving the public	24	6
(N)	(1,079)	(1,079)

As can be seen, in the eyes of a majority of the members of Hong Kong society, professional training, academic qualification and salary are important predictors of occupational status. In terms of the most important factor, "salary" (25 per cent) tops the list followed by "professional training" (19 per cent) and "academic qualification" (19 per cent). Social values such as "contribution to society" (14 per cent) and "serving the public" (6 per cent) are considered important by less people. This is an across-the-board pattern of response with only slight variations among different socio-economic subgroups. If anything, those with lower incomes are more likely to place importance on salary than their better-off counterparts, and those with higher educational attainment are more likely to value professional training than those with less education.

The overall pattern of response bears a close resemblance to the pattern of answers yielded in an earlier study which also delves into the determinants of social status (Wong, 1991).[8] It is also in line with our understanding of the normative orientation of people in Hong Kong: that people place paramount importance on pecuniary well-being (Lau, 1982; Lau and Kuan, 1988; Lau et al., 1991, 1992), that they set great store on education (Wong, 1986), that salary is the most important consideration in choosing a job (Lui, 1992) and that people invest a high degree of trust in professionals (Lau, 1992).

Furthermore, to obtain more information on the assessment criteria, an open-ended question on reasons for giving a certain rating to a certain occupation was asked. As the nature of this study does not allow one to probe into the reason for rating each occupation, one can only randomly select one occupation to ask for the reasons from each respondent. When reference is made to a particular occupation, the pattern of answers shows a somewhat different picture than that painted above. Significantly more people consider qualification rather than salary important when they give a rating, positive or negative, to an occupation. Contribution to society is also important for giving a positive rating. Salary/fringe benefits are factors affecting negative evaluation more than positive evaluation. Note also that quite a substantial proportion of people think of job contents, such as the ability to give orders, role in decision-making, the amount of autonomy enjoyed, etc., in their judgements of occupational status. Tables 2 and 3 show the distribution of answers.

Table 2 Reasons for giving a positive rating (%)

Reasons	Rating 4-6
Requires high qualification	50
Contribution to society	47
Favourable job content	36
Good salary/fringe benefits	21
(N)	(489)

Table 3 Reasons for giving a negative rating (%)

Reasons	Rating 1-3
Does not require high qualification	63
Unfavourable job content	37
Poor salary/fringe benefits	32
Little/No contribution to society	16
Poor work environment	9
Poor prospect	6
(N)	(582)

The above are the bases upon which people confer status to different occupations. In the heads of the people, status is multidimensional in nature. To them, social status of occupations is partly a matter of objective rewards yielded by them and partly a matter of their value to society. The evidence here seems to support Hope's argument that occupational prestige has both a factual and normative component (Hope, 1982). Inequality does exist, and it exists due to inequalities in individual ability (qualification and training), in material advantages (salary/fringe benefits), in individual's contribution to society as well as the desirability of job contents. Certain occupations receive higher

rating because they satisfy higher qualification requirements and because they contribute to society; others are rated negatively because they do not require high qualification, because the job contents are unfavourable and because they do not pay well. Overall, the evaluative criteria reflect prevailing ideas of Hong Kong society. Though the level of abstraction reflected is low (Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972:34), one should not simply dismiss the reflection as of no significance. To a certain extent, these evaluative criteria do carry some sense of implied fairness, in the mind of people, when they judge the social status of occupations.

Subjective Occupational Structure

As mentioned earlier, the social status of occupations are measured on a six-point scale. In order that the scores of the occupational scale be discriminative of the (albeit small) differences, we use the following formula:

$$\text{Status Score} = \frac{\bar{X}i}{\bar{X}max} \times 1000, \quad i = 1, 2, \ldots\ldots 112.$$

where $\bar{X}i$ is the sample mean score of the ith occupation,
$\bar{X}max$ is the highest mean score among the 112 occupations surveyed.

The status scores of the 112 occupations are listed in Table 4.

Table 4 Subjective occupational structure in Hong Kong

Rank	Occupation	Social status score
1	Lawyer	1000
1	Foreign consulate official	1000
3	University lecturer	985
4	Physicist	977
5	Corporate director	972
6	Engineer	960
7	Medical doctor	958
8	Architect	946
9	Lecturer in technical institute	943
10	Post-secondary college lecturer	940
11	Councillor	939
12	Accountant	914
13	Government administrator	908
14	General manager	899
15	Dentist	882
16	Statistician	874
17	Police inspector	863
18	Secondary school principal	862
18	Writer	862
20	Legal assistant	852
21	Secondary school teacher	839
22	Journalist	829
23	Functional manager	822
24	Engineering technician	821
25	Air traffic controller	819
26	Translator	817
26	Computer programmer	817
28	Social worker	814
29	Student guidance personnel in colleges	813
30	Priest	810
30	Teacher of a school for the disabled	810
32	Fashion designer	806
33	Medical laboratory technician	803
34	Veterinarian	783
35	Nurse	781
36	Fireman	775

Table 4 (Continued)

36	Primary school teacher	775
38	Computer operator	766
39	Air hostess	752
40	Pharmaceutical dispenser	746
41	Factory safety inspector	742
42	Policeman	735
42	Social work assistant	735
44	Investment analyst	730
45	Personal secretary	715
46	Herbalist	714
47	Laboratory technician in school	712
48	Estate manager	706
48	Restaurant manager	706
50	Workshop instructor	698
51	Soldier	691
52	Fashion model	690
53	Actor	681
54	Radio equipment operator	663
55	Kindergarten teacher	656
56	Statistical survey interviewer	649
57	Mass Transit Railway driver	640
58	Cook	639
59	Estate agent	632
60	Prison guard	627
61	Traffic warden	626
62	Mining operator	624
63	Life guard	621
64	Electrical appliances repairer	607
65	Clerk	601
66	Plant operator	597
67	Book-keeper	595
68	Insurance representative	593
69	Goldsmith	590
70	Seaman	586
70	Library clerk	586
72	Baker	584
73	Taxi driver	583
74	Bus driver	576

Table 4 (Continued)

75	Hairdresser	570
76	Machine assembler	569
77	Photographic developing machine operator	558
78	Lift truck operator	553
79	Electronic equipment assembler	548
79	Motor repairer	548
81	Paper making machine operator	541
82	Security worker	540
83	Cabinet maker	531
84	Baby-sitter	530
85	Metal moulder	529
86	Sales person	520
87	Printing typesetter	512
88	Glass blowing machine operator	510
89	Blacksmith	509
90	Building-finishing worker	506
90	Receptionist	506
92	Printing pressman	504
93	Shoe-maker	499
94	Plumber	494
95	Fisherman	490
96	Enamelling worker	488
97	Scaffolder	480
98	Automobile painter	478
99	Miner	477
100	Cashier	474
101	Waiter	472
102	Sewer	461
103	Building construction labourer	450
104	Fortune teller	446
105	Farm worker	443
106	Domestic helper	441
107	Plastic toys worker	431
108	Hand packer	404
109	Street vendor	399
110	Transport labourer	393
111	Ballroom dancer	359
112	*Dim sum* salesperson	350

Past research in occupational hierarchy elsewhere reveals that occupational evaluations exhibit many of the properties attributed to cultural or societal values (Kraus and Hodge, 1987). This study also shows there is congruence between the social image of stratification depicted by people and their belief system. Topping the status scale are professional and business occupations such as lawyer, foreign consulate official, university lecturer, physicist, corporate director, engineer, medical doctor, architect, lecturer in technical institute, and post-secondary college lecturer. Occupations which require a minimum of secondary education and/or a certain level of training, such as nurse, fireman, primary school teacher, clerk and electrical appliances repairer, are conferred a middling status. At the bottom are menial and manual occupations such as building construction labourer, farm worker, domestic helper, plastic toy worker, hand packer, street vendor, transport labourer, and *dim sum* salesperson, and two occupations which are traditionally looked down upon, fortune teller and ballroom dancer are regarded as low status occupations.

This image of society with occupations located in a hierarchy of social status is accompanied by overall similarity and particular differences in the status rating. The differences in rating across the following subgroups: sex, occupational groups, educational attainment, most important evaluative criterion, are examined. In each case of the subgroup analyses, scores of most of the occupations are similar while a small proportion of the occupations (ranging from 8 to 14) are statistically different.[9] It is noted that the difference in rating is smallest among individuals with different evaluative criteria. This finding suggests the existence of an underlying and agreed upon structure of occupational social status (Goldthorpe and Hope, 1972:29).

Discussion

The subjective occupational structure developed in this study can be treated as a representation of the manifest social inequality in

Hong Kong. Without doubt, there are glaring economic and political inequalities in society. Despite these inequalities, Hong Kong remains socially stable. At issue here is how to explain this contradiction. It would be easier to do so if people were not aware of the fact that inequalities exist. But the fact of the matter is that people are aware of them, as attested by a study by T. W. P. Wong (1992: 218). To explain the acquiescence, observers allude to the normative orientation of "utilitarian familism" (Lau, 1982), to the positive effect of social ideology which stresses openness and abundance of opportunities (Lau and Kuan, 1988) and to the achievement-oriented mobility strategy (Wong, 1992:231-234). Wong indeed has called for theorizing the widely-held social ethos as aspects of social imageries as well as for approaching the issue of prosperity and stability through an examination of the effect of Hong Kong's social ideology. The following discussion follows the path charted by him.

First, in the above, when we discuss the evaluative criteria used in assigning social status to occupations, we look at the social values that give rise to the status system. Now let us look at what gives rise to these values. The evaluative criteria stated by the people resemble much of the normative orientations of the society. This indicates that the resultant occupational status structure with graded hierarchy is a reproduction of what they have been socialized into accepting. Social status, in fact, follows from and is dependent on power inequalities, both economic and political. People's experiences tell them that certain occupations are economically rewarding and enjoy more political privilege, and they confer higher status to these occupations. While it is quite clear that this is not in support of the functionalist contention of the "inevitability" of social inequality (Davis and Moore, 1945; Berberoglu, 1976), this should not be taken as dismissing the accounts ordinary people give of the perceived status of occupations as misguided. Rather, all that is said is that inequality is entrenched and pervasive in the belief system of people of Hong Kong and the image they have of the society is a reproduction of

this belief system. Seen in this light, the structure of inequalities in society is a source for determining status judgements.

Second, we come to the question of what effect the social ideology underlying these status judgements have on social stability. It has been argued that the social image of stratification reinforces and sustains the economic and political dimensions of stratification. It has the subtle effect of providing a justification of unequal rewards which in turn legitimates any coexisting economic and political inequalities (Parkin, 1971). Vanfossen, in her discussion of the support for and reinforcement of social inequalities, asserts that the prestige pattern justifies economic and political disparities and that prestige is "subjective support of the objective inequalities" (Vanfossen, 1979:216). Past studies have shown that most people in Hong Kong are accepting the existing inequalities (Lau and Kuan, 1988) and that a substantial proportion of them have no doubt about the availability and equality of opportunities (Wong, 1992). Furthermore, in this study, we find that there is a degree of correspondence between the social and the economic dimensions of stratification. As shown earlier, economic rewards are an important evaluation criterion of social status, and the subjective occupational structure is a representation of the inequalities in Hong Kong. This correspondence has the effect of lending aura of rightness to inequalities, and acquiescence is the result. Seen in this context, social stability in Hong Kong has its roots in the acceptable rationalization of social status which is well developed among the members of society.

The above discussion of the social image of stratification is only an early attempt to utilize occupational social status data in explaining stability in Hong Kong. The data suggest that there is a sense of implied fairness in the minds of people when they confer differential social status to different occupations. This indicates that there is subjective support of objective inequalities in Hong Kong. To draw a definitive conclusion in this regard, however, we need further research. Closer investigation should be conducted in areas such as whether people *prefer* an inequalitarian society, whether people think that inequality *ought* to exist in the occupa-

tional structure, what people's criteria of justification for occupational inequality are and what problems would an equalitarian society in which rewards are equally distributed across different occupations present them (cf. Lane, 1978; von Leyden, 1978).

In summary, this paper starts with the aim of depicting an image of society from the vantage point of the people. It is found that people of Hong Kong attribute much importance to salary, qualification requirements, value to society and desirability of job contents when they locate the social status of occupations. The resultant occupational structure is a representation of the manifest inequalities that exist in Hong Kong. When related to the social stability despite the disparities in the political system and the system of economic distribution, the data are indicative of subjective support of objective inequalities in Hong Kong.

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Notes

1. Wong and Lui are in fact referring to Hong Kong missing the point in the studies of subjective occupational structure, status attainment, class and social mobility. These authors have reinstated class into their studies (1992a, 1992b). Studies on status attainment have also been undertaken by Tsang (1992, 1993).
2. Exploratory studies have been conducted by Chung (1977) and by Moore (1981). Due to problems inherent in the methods, the results are neither representative nor generalizable. For a brief critique, see Chiu and Tso (1993).
3. See Note 1.
4. A similar attempt has been made by T. W. P. Wong (1991) to gauge the perceptions of the people of Hong Kong regarding the determinants of social status in general.
5. See T. W. P. Wong (1992) for a review of the major arguments.
6. We are aware of the fact that "prestige" was commonly used in this kind of research as well as the debates in the literature regarding the differences between prestige and status. The decision to use the term "social status" is based on two reasons: (a) as the aim is to establish a subjective occupational structure which represents the dimension of social stratification, the use of the term social status serves the purpose better; (b) it is my judgement that "social status" is a much more commonly used, and hence widely understood, term in Hong Kong than "prestige." In the pilot study and the main survey, there was no reports of queries about the meaning of "social status."
7. For further technical details, please refer to Chiu and Tso (1993).
8. See Note 4.
9. See Chiu and Tso (1993:17-23).

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5

Gender, Class and Employment Segregation in Hong Kong

Chan Kam-wah
Ng Chun-hung

Introduction

In August 1993, the Government published the *Green Paper on Equal Opportunity for Women and Men*. The reception given to this *Green Paper* among women's groups and academics has been at best a mixed one. Many have criticized its continued downplaying of the disadvantaged position of women in Hong Kong society. The *Green Paper* chose to ignore many of the existing signs of gender discrimination and promoted a rather muddled explanation for whatever gender inequalities that were (reluctantly?) acknowledged. The almost unquestioned faith in the ability of the "free market" to do away with systematic gender inequalities may echo many of the common sense perceptions in circulation, but it can never act as the basis for a rigorous understanding of the issues at hand.

Given this scenario, there is obviously a need to re-state some of the ways in which women have been demonstrated to be sys-

tematically disadvantaged in the labour market. In fact, existing statistics by the government itself provides a clear picture on some of the factors adversely influencing women's economic situation and individual life chances. We shall, in Section I and II, by mainly working on published census data and a 1% sample data set[1] of various census years, analyze the factors affecting women's labour force participation and the trend of occupational segregation by sex over time in Hong Kong. We shall also examine some of the possible reasons for these and why a case can be made that women are systematically discriminated against in the labour market.

In a similar vein, academic studies of social stratification have for long ignored women's disadvantaged position and concentrated on men's work and employment experience. However the invisibility of women here comes in a much more subtle shape. In fact, an argument for the "conventional approach" to stratification states that it does not take women's occupational position into the definition of class precisely because it recognizes the inferior labour market situation of women — because women are mostly dependent upon men inside the typical household. We can define the class position of a family's members with reference only to the male household head of the families concerned, and proceed to study the experience and outlook of men only. In Section III, by re-examining existing data and relevant studies, we shall argue that this approach forecloses the possibility that there are various forms of family arrangements not corresponding to such a perception. The "conventional approach" also hides women's specific contribution and plight inside the family of Hong Kong. For this approach can never give us a coherent analysis of women's role in producing and reproducing the existing class structure.

In sum, we shall argue for a serious reconsideration of the complex situations and activities of women in relation to economic participation, occupational allocation and achievement, and how these are mediated by the institution of the household. The study of social stratification in Hong Kong can be infinitely enriched by bringing women back in.

Women's Participation in the Labour Market

This section looks at the changes in women's participation in the labour market and examines the changes in employment opportunities for women of different ages and marital statuses in the past fifteen years.

It is commonly believed that, as a result of Hong Kong's miraculous post-war development, women's labour participation rate has been steadily increasing over the years and that gender inequality in employment opportunities has been gradually diminishing. This assumption cannot stand in the face of hard evidence. Table 1 shows the labour force participation rate of women between 1971 and 1991. It is clear that, after a promising upturn in the earlier period, women's participation has hit a plateau in the last decade. The rate increased from 42.8 per cent in 1971 to 49.5 per cent in 1981, and then remained stable at about 50 per cent over the past ten years. Needless to say, the rate of male participation has been consistently much higher than the female one.

Table 1 Labour participation rate of male and female population, 1971-1991

	Male	Female	Whole population
1971	84.7	42.8	66.1
1976	80.4	43.6	63.6
1981	82.5	49.5	66.8
1986	80.9	51.2	66.4
1991	78.7	49.5	64.3

Sources: Census Reports, various years.

Amidst this pattern of a slight rise and a stable plateau, there are significant variations amongst women of different backgrounds. For one, younger women have had increasingly higher opportunities for employment, while older women have been

displaced from the labour market. In Figure 1, the increasing labour force participation for younger women over the years is obvious. Comparing the census data of 1991 with earlier years, one can see that the labour force participation rate for women aged 20 to 50 has increased, while that for the other age groups has decreased. It is a common observation that the labour force participation rate for those aged below 20 tends to decrease, as a higher proportion of this age group are in full-time education. Similarly, the labour force participation rate for women aged over 50 or 55 is decreasing because of earlier retirement, or older women are being displaced from the labour market.

Figure 1 Labour force participation rate (LFPR) of women by age, 1981-1991



Source: 1991 Census *Summary Result*, p. 52.

A more significant change in relation to age is that in 1991 the labour force participation rate for women aged between 35 and 50 did not show any significant increase over the 30-34 age group, as it had in 1981 (Figure 1). In 1981, women's participation patterns had been of a bimodal distribution, i.e. women's labour participation had peaked around the age of 20 to 25 and then dropped

rather rapidly; at the age around 35 to 45 labour participation for women had risen again. As we shall see, this bimodal pattern can be explained by the changing marriage and childbearing responsibilities of women. The second peak indicates a substantial number of women rejoining the labour market as their children grew up. However, this bimodal distribution disappeared gradually in the 1986 and 1991 censuses. It suggests that there are grounds for the worry about the impact of economic restructuring on middle age women's re-entry into the labour market after they gave up their work to take care of their young children for a period.

All this leads us to take a closer look at the influence of marriage and commitment in child caring for women. In general, married women enjoy much less employment opportunities than their unmarried counterparts. On the other hand, men's labour participation rate is more or less the same no matter whether they are married or not. In Figure 2, we have tried to differentiate never married women from married women. It is apparent that labour participation rate for married women is much lower than for never married women. On the other hand, the labour participation patterns for never married women and all male population are more or less the same. That is, if they are not affected by marriage and child caring duties, the level of labour participation for women and men would be very much similar. More detailed studies on married women's labour market behaviour show that an overwhelming proportion of the respondents cite marriage and child care as the main reason for their leaving employment (AAF, 1993:ch.3).

The level of education that women attain clearly makes a difference in their level of participation. In 1991, women with primary education only had a participation rate of 37 per cent, while the rate for those with tertiary education was 68.4 per cent. In contrast, the difference in participation rate for males for the two levels of education was much narrower (76.4 per cent for primary, 83.9 per cent for tertiary) (Census and Statistics Department, *General Household Survey*, 4th Quarter 1991).

Figure 2 Labour force participation rate by age, sex and marital status, 1991



Source: *Hong Kong 1991 Population Census: Main Report*, p. 90.

From the above, one can see that, although the labour force participation rate for women is increasing in general, there are great variations among women of different backgrounds, such as age, marital status and education. We have shown that younger women are enjoying better chances in the labour market, while middle age and older women (aged 35 and above) may face more difficulties in employment. Moreover, the labour participation of married women is much lower when compared to their unmarried counterparts. We further witness an increasing number of married women in part-time jobs (Census and Statistics Department, *General Household Survey Special Topics Report No. V*, 1989). More opportunities for education generally work for the economic benefits of women. But, equally significantly, at every level, irrespective of age and education attainment, married women did worse when compared with their male counterpart. Given the differential level of labour participation even for women and men of the same age and educational attainment, the possibility of gender discrimination cannot be easily dismissed.

The above patterns of female participation, though suggestive of a number of interesting observations, tell only a part of the story. In fact, the central issue in existing studies of the "gender gap" in employment concerns what occupations and jobs which women end up in once they do overcome the obstacles to gainful participation. The segregation of women and men into different occupations, jobs and ranks has been demonstrated to be the most significant factor that constructs and maintains a gender gap in economic achievement (England and McGreary, 1987; Reskin and Hartmann, 1986). It is here that we can find a more revealing picture of women's disadvantages in Hong Kong society over the years. The next section will hence address the issue of employment segregation.

Employment Segregation

In the previous section, we have seen that women are hindered from participating in the labour market because of various factors such as marriage, child care commitment, age, educational attainment, and possibly discrimination. Furthermore, we shall demonstrate below that, even if women can get a job in this less than open labour market, a lot of them are systematically allocated to relatively low positions in the employment structure. In other words, there is an obvious occupational segregation between male and female in the labour market.

In the following, we shall focus on gender segregation in employment in terms of occupation, job and ranking. First, we are going to examine the degree of occupational segregation in Hong Kong between 1971 and 1991. This helps to shed some light on the question of whether occupational segregation is increasing or diminishing. This segregation of "male's occupations" and "female's occupations" is generally termed horizontal segregation. Secondly, we are going to focus on the segregation within the same occupation, or generally termed "vertical segregation," i.e. whether women are occupying different jobs within the same

occupations as men's, and whether the jobs are of a lower rank or offer worse economic returns even if women are in the same occupations as their male counterparts. Again, by referring to census data of various years, we examine whether this segregation is improving over time.

Horizontal Segregation

In Hong Kong, women and men are clearly segregated into different occupations. Table 2 shows the distribution of occupations amongst the working population in the 1991 census.

Table 2 Occupations of the working population by sex, 1991(%)

Occupations	Male	Female	Male - Female
Manager/Administration	11.8	4.9	6.9
Professional	4.1	3.0	1.1
Associate professional	9.7	11.3	-1.6
Clerk	8.0	28.8	-20.8
Service/Sales	13.7	12.5	1.2
Craft and related workers	21.0	4.4	16.6
Plant and machine operators/ assemblers	13.9	12.7	1.2
Elementary	16.6	21.7	-5.1
Others	1.2	0.7	0.5
Total	100.0	100.0	
(N)	(1,686,366)	(1,028,737)	

Source: Compiled from *Hong Kong 1991 Population Census: Main Report*, p. 93, Table 5.12.

Gender segregation is especially obvious in occupations such as clerical workers and craft and related workers. There are 20.8 per cent more women in clerical work than men, whereas 21 per cent of men are in craft and related work, as compared to 4.4 per cent of women in these jobs, a 16.6 per cent gap. Only 4.9 per cent of the working women are in managerial jobs, as compared to 11.8 per cent of men. The causes for these patterns might be complex but surely social perception plays an important part (AAF, 1993:16-27). The perceived traditional role of women is to provide care and ancillary support, which fits well with the stereotype of clerical work. On the other hand, craft and related work are largely reserved for men because it is widely assumed that these jobs require more skills than what the average woman possesses. Similarly, women are assumed to lack the ability and leadership skill to be managers and administrators, and women find themselves largely out of the running at this level of competition. On the contrary, for elementary occupations which require very little skill, the proportion of women in these jobs is obviously higher than that of men (21.7 per cent to 16.6 per cent).

Common sense observation would have us believe that this pattern of occupational segregation has been improving over the years. Judging from census data for the past fifteen years, this view proves to be unfounded.

From Table 3 we cannot see any trend of decreasing occupational segregation between 1976 and 1986. The more highly valued occupations such as administrative and managerial work have always been dominated by men. The percentage difference between males and females for administrative work has declined slightly from 1976 to 1981 (from 2.5 per cent to 2 per cent); but it has risen again to 3.2 per cent in 1986. For professional occupations, the pattern appears to have been reversed to the advantage of women, but we need to be very cautious in interpreting the data. Such a picture is likely to be an artifact of the way occupations were coded. In the 1986 census and before, occupations such as nurses, teachers in kindergarten and in primary school had been coded as professionals. The inclusion of these generally female-dominated occupations (which command a lower economic and social return than the recognized professional ones) hence swelled the ranks of female "professionals." Consequently, the

proportion of women in professional work was higher than that of men from 1976 to 1986. After 1991, the situation was reversed as these occupations were (more properly) coded as associated professionals in the 1991 census (see Table 2).

Table 3 Distribution of occupation by sex, 1976-1986 (%)

Occupations	1976		1981		1986	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
Professional	4.9	6.3	5.3	5.8	7.6	9.6
Administrative	3.0	0.5	3.1	1.1	4.8	1.6
Clerical	8.3	11.8	8.7	18.4	9.7	22.7
Sales	13.4	7.6	11.4	8.1	13.0	9.6
Service	15.3	14.4	15.8	14.7	16.3	16.1
Agriculture	1.9	1.3	2.7	2.4	2.0	1.8
Production	50.9	56.4	52.1	48.8	46.2	38.4
Others	2.3	1.6	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: 1986 data are based on *Census Main Report 1986*; 1981 and 1976 data are calculated from the 1% sample of census data of respective years.

Thus, the most valued jobs have continued to be disproportionately receptive to men. The segregation has got even worse, over the years, for clerical work. The percentage difference between male and female rose rapidly from 3.5 per cent in 1976 to 9.7 per cent in 1981, and then rose further to 13 per cent in 1986. Similarly, the gender gap in production work has also been widening again after a slight decrease in 1981.

From these data, it is obviously problematic to conclude that gender segregation in occupation has decreased or will decrease gradually as our society develops. On the contrary, we can see a sizable increase of gender segregation in the mid 1980s.

Has the situation improved by the early 1990s? Unfortunately, we cannot compare the census data of 1976-86 with those of 1991. It is because the occupation coding system in the 1991 census has been changed substantially. However, if we look at the gender gap in the occupations in 1991 as indicated in Table 2, we can see that the gap for managerial/administrative work is as high as 6.9 per cent, clerical work is 20.8 per cent, while craft and related work is 16.6 per cent. Even taking into consideration the changes in occupational coding system in the census data, it does not seem that the gender gap is narrowing in any sense.

To get a clear, overall view, it might be useful here to compare the Index of Occupational Segregation for various years (Treiman and Hartmann, 1981:25). This index of segregation (IS) is developed to measure the degree of segregation in the employment structure. In most studies, it is given as:

$$IS = \frac{1}{2} \sum | X_i - Y_i |$$

where X_i = percentage of male in the ith occupation
Y_i = percentage of female in the ith occupation

Briefly, this index indicates the percentage of males and females who need to shift their categories of occupation in order to result in an identical distribution for the two sexes. If the index is near 100 per cent it indicates near total segregation, where women and men are found in completely different occupations, while an index near 0 per cent indicates near identical distribution of males and females in various occupations.

In Table 4, we list the index of segregation for various census years from 1976 to 1991. One way to calculate the index is to base it on the major occupational groupings. There were eight major occupation groups in the census years before 1986, but these were re-categorized into nine groups in the 1991 census. One can see that the index based on main occupational groups rose from about 10 per cent in 1976 to 15 per cent in 1986, with a marginal decrease

in 1981. Although the 1991 census data are not strictly comparable with data of the previous years, we can see that the index continues to rise rapidly to 27 per cent. This might partly indicate that the 1991 categorization is more effective in revealing gender segregation. However, at the same time, it is also possible that gender segregation in employment is still rising continuously.

The index of segregation based on main occupational groups may not seem particularly high. Only 10 per cent, 15 per cent or 27 per cent of males and females have to interchange their occupations in order to maintain a balance. However, these indexes are inadequate to reveal the actual degree of segregation.

One of the limitations of calculating the index of segregation based on major occupational groupings is that it tends to level off the gender gap. For example, both doctors and nurses, or both lecturers in universities and teachers in kindergarten are classified as professionals. However, the occupational status and life chances of doctors and lecturers are far better than nurses and kindergarten teachers. Doctors and lecturers are predominately male, while nurses and kindergarten teachers are mostly female. These aggregated data even out the gap between males and females by lumping such differentiated occupations into one broad group.

A better way to calculate the index of segregation is to base it on the more detailed sub-groupings of occupations. It has been convincingly shown in studies in the United States that the degree of gender segregation is much higher than commonly allowed when more detailed job classification data from individual establishments are used for calculation (Bielby and Baron, 1984). If the sub-groups are more detailed, the index is more accurately indicating gender segregation. In Table 4, we can see that with the rather more detailed sub-groupings available in the 1976, 1981 and 1986 censuses (154, 147 and 78 sub-groups respectively), the index increases four to five times. Table 4 shows the indexes based on detailed sub-groups for 1976, 1981 and 1986 to be 48.6 per cent, 48.5 per cent and 50.9 per cent respectively. In other words, about half of the males and females have to interchange their occupations before a balance is restored, which is a very high degree of segregation indeed. Particularly for the 1986 census data, the index is standing as high as 50.9 per cent even though the occupations are categorized into 78 sub-groups only. It indicates a surprisingly high degree of segregation. Unfortunately, for the 1991 census data, only 30 sub-groups are available. This has levelled the calculated gender gap substantially. However, the index based on the sub-groups for 1991 is still as high as 39.4 per cent. All in all, it is quite unlikely that gender segregation is diminishing in the early 1990s.

Table 4 Index of segregation (IS), 1976-1991

	1976	1981	1986	1991
IS based on main groups	10.5	10.2	15.1	27.2
No. of main groups	8	8	8	9
IS based on sub-groups	48.6	48.5	50.9	39.4
No. of sub-groups	154	147	78	30

Sources: IS for main occupation groups for 1986 and 1991 are compiled from *Census Main Report 1986* and *Census Main Tables 1991*.
IS for occupation sub-groups for 1991 is compiled from *Census Main Tables 1991*.
All the other IS are calculated from the 1% sample of the respective census data.

Here, we also want to make a brief comment on the census data available to the public. We have seen that aggregated data and highly collapsed categories can be misleading sometimes. However, the quality of data available to the public seems to have deteriorated over the years. For example, the detailed grouping in occupation is not available in the 1% sample data set of the 1991 census as it did in the past census years; only 30 occupation sub-groups are provided (not to mention the fact that data of the 1% sample of the 1991 census are not allowed to be published).

With this highly collapsed categorization, it is becoming more difficult to reveal the extent of gender segregation and social differentiation in other dimensions. Therefore, we need to be very sceptical of and alert for statistics indicating the diminishing gender gap. It may be an indication of the deteriorating quality of data rather than a sign of improvement in gender inequality.

Vertical Segregation

Besides the horizontal segregation in which males and females are being employed in gender stereotyped occupations, vertical segregation is also serious in Hong Kong. In other words, men tend to occupy better jobs and/or get higher pay than women in the same occupation. That is, the index of occupational segregation is only revealing part of the problem. Even if women are employed in the same occupations as men, they may still be in a different occupational job world and trajectory.

Let us look at the difference in wages between males and females for the various occupation groups (Table 5). In 1991, women are only earning 70.8 per cent as much as their male counterparts in the same occupations. Although the income ratio has risen from 62.5 per cent in 1976 to 69.9 per cent in 1986, it has remained static at around 70 per cent since the mid 1980s.

Moreover, we should note that there are quite a lot of variations between different occupations. The ratio in some occupations such as services, agriculture and production work has actually decreased. For example, the gender income ratio for production workers has fallen from 65.2 per cent in 1976 to 59.3 per cent in 1986. The gender gap in income in these occupations has worsened, not improved as commonly believed, over the past fifteen years.

Table 5 Median monthly income ratio, female to male (F/M), 1976-1986

Occupations	Ratio of median income (F/M%)			
	1976	1981	1986	1991#
Professional and technical	72.2	92.3	90.9	–
Administrative and managerial	68.0	68.8	80.0	–
Clerical and related workers	86.0	85.7	86.7	–
Sales workers	60.3	58.6	66.7	–
Service workers	72.0	66.7	67.9	–
Agriculture	42.9	0.0	33.3	–
Production	65.2	62.5	59.3	–
Others	18.8	70.0	75.0	–
All occupations	62.5	64.7*	69.9*	70.8*
Median income of all working population	$700	$1,516*	$2,573*	$5,170*

\# Occupation coding of 1991 census is different from the previous years, and data from the 1% sample are not allowed to be published, therefore these items are left blank.

* Figures with * are from *1991 Census Main Report*, p. 96, all others are from the 1% sample data set of the census of respective years.

Therefore, we are not seeing any substantial narrowing of the income gap between the two sexes over the years. If studies in the West can be a guide, one prominent explanation for this persistent income disparity may lie in the persistence of job segregation of a vertical kind (England and McGreary, 1987; Reskin and Roos, 1990). In Hong Kong, we do have data showing the extent of such vertical segregation in a number of industries and sectors. Table 6 presents the situation of the electronics industry for 1988.

Table 6 Distribution of employees by sex, the electronics industry, 1988*

Job level	Male		Female	
Technologists	5,335	(13.62%)	203	(0.33%)
Technicians	13,900	(35.49%)	1,247	(2.04%)
Craftsmen	6,556	(16.74%)	2,860	(4.67%)
Operatives	12,458	(31.80%)	56,298	(92.00%)
Unskilled	910	(2.32%)	564	(0.92%)
Total	39,159	(100.00%)	61,172	(100.00%)

* The Commission does not regularly publish data with breakdowns in terms of sex. The updating and comparison of data are made more difficult for this.

Source: Hong Kong Manpower Survey Commission, *Report on the Electronics Industry, 1988.*

From Table 6, we can see that a relatively high proportion of male employees in the electronics industry were at the technologist and technician level (13.62 per cent and 35.49 per cent respectively). On the contrary, the overwhelming bulk of the female employees were concentrated at the operative level (92 per cent, compared with 31.8 per cent for males), and only a tiny proportion was employed as technologists. Similar pictures can be discerned for the clothing industry, wholesale and retail, and even in more newly developed sectors like insurance and hotel (AAF, 1993:20-22; see also Levin, 1991).

The above data on female participation patterns, occupational segregation and income gap obviously constitute a case to answer. One might argue that it is due to factors like female's inborn aptitude or abilities, or the differential human capital investment of the two sexes that such a situation exists in Hong Kong. We are not convinced that such factors can explain the sizable and continued gap on the above dimensions. There are studies on aspects of management strategies in labour recruitment and promotion that reflect the existence of systematic gender discrimination, and also studies on women's work motivation that dispel any simplistic

notion that women desire low-paid, dead-end jobs as a rule (AAF, 1993:23-27). Women's work plans and expressed desires are often the complicated result of years of socialization and actual experience of discrimination on the job (England and McGreary, 1987). We have no intention of elaborating on such explanations here. Here it is enough to reiterate that, as far as gender equality in employment in Hong Kong is concerned, we have no ground for undue optimism.

Women and Class Analysis

In the above, we have seen that occupational opportunities are segregated by sex. In fact, besides employment, most of our life chances such as education, housing opportunities, social status are also differentiated along the gender dimension. However, generally gender is neglected in social stratification studies and class analysis. Although gender differentiation is ubiquitous, it is at the same time made to become invisible. And the culprits may include people other than apologists for the government.

In the following, we shall argue that the lack of attention to gender in local social sciences is retarding the study of class and social stratification. By taking illustrations from census data in the past fifteen years, we argue that there are various social changes in the Hong Kong society that make gender an increasingly significant dimension of stratification. We do not aim to advance a full-blown alternative approach to class analysis in this chapter (and precisely how to incorporate gender into class study is a most perplexing problem for which we do not pretend to have an answer, see Roberts, 1993). The purpose is a more negative one. We want to show that the tools of traditional class analysis are inadequate for illuminating the rapidly changing scene of gender differentiation in Hong Kong.

The "conventional" approach, *pace* Goldthorpe, argues that the basic unit of class analysis should be the household. Furthermore, because women typically have an inferior market position

(many do not even work), the class position of the male breadwinner can be taken to determine the position of all members in the family. In other words, women share the same class position as their husbands (or, their fathers, if unmarried). The conventional approach is adamant that including the gender dimension adds nothing of significance to and may even obscure or divert attention from the main focus of class analysis. Here, we are not going to reiterate the arguments in detail; those who are interested can consult the relevant debates (Goldthorpe, 1983; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1988; Heath and Britten, 1984; Leiulfsrud and Woodward, 1987; Stanworth, 1984; Abbott and Sapsford, 1987; Crompton and Mann, 1986; Roberts, 1993). In Hong Kong, most if not all of the significant research on social stratification have focused on the male household head (see Wong and Lui, 1992: especially note 11, pp.83-86, which gives their rationale for adopting such an approach). However, rapid social change, especially in highly volatile societies like Hong Kong, raises serious questions about this conventional position.

There are three basic trends of social change that conventional class analysis fails to take into consideration. Firstly, women's various, but at times significant, contribution to family resources is completely neglected. Secondly, there is an increasing proportion of families which are not dependent on a male breadwinner, such as single women, widowed women and lone mother headed families. Thirdly, with the increasing fluidity of modern society, increasing instances of cross-class marriage will undermine the universal validity of conventional class analysis.

Let us look at these three trends of social change in turn. Firstly, conventional class analysis ignores women's contribution to family resources. By assuming the male breadwinner's social and occupational status determines the class position of the family, it seems to imply that women's contribution to family resources is insignificant as compared to that of the male breadwinner. This assumption is highly questionable. Salaff's study of working daughters in the 1970s testified to the importance of the family economy, where several members of the household, including the husband, wife and elder children maintained gainful employment for a persistent period, both for family survival and advance (Salaff, 1981). Recent studies into the employment patterns and work decisions of married women also confirm the centrality of women's economic contributions to the livelihood of the families concerned (AAF, 1993:ch.1, 3). Census data show that in the past ten years the average number of working members per family is around two: 1.9 for 1981, 1.8 for 1986, and 1.7 for 1991 (*1991 Census Main Report*:62). That is, in general, many families in Hong Kong do not rely on a single earner. Therefore, it is an over-simplification to assume that household resources are mainly determined by the male household head and build this into the definition of class position.

In order to further illustrate the significance of women's contribution to family resources, we have calculated the proportion of individual income to the whole household income; so we can compare the contribution to family resources between male and female family members. Table 7 shows the proportion of individual income to total household income in 1986. Amongst all the female population aged 15 or above, 56.9 per cent receive a cash income to contribute to the household income, as compared to 83.3 per cent for their male counterparts. Although the proportion of women contributing financially to their families is lower than that of men as expected, it is far from insignificant. This will be more obvious if we look at the amount they are contributing (Table 7). On the average, for those who contribute to the family, a man's income is equal to 57.7 per cent of his total household income, while a woman's income is equal to 38 per cent of her total household income. Again, we cannot say that it is not a significant proportion.

By comparing the distribution of male and female contributions to the family (Table 7), we can see that only one-third of the males are having an income equal to 80 per cent or more of the household's income, another one-third's income is equal to 40 per cent to 80 per cent, while the remaining 36.9 per cent only contribute less than 40 per cent to the household's income. Of course, it is

not surprising that women's income is as a whole lower than men's, but there are still 17.4 per cent of the women contributing up to 60 per cent or more, and 35.8 per cent of women contributing to two-fifths or more, of their household's income. Judging from these data, it is obviously problematic to argue that women's contribution to the household resource is insignificant as compared to the males'.

Table 7 Contribution of individual income to the household income, 1986 (%)

Contribution#	Male	Female
Less than 20%	12.5	29.5
20% - less than 40%	24.4	34.7
40% - less than 60%	19.8	18.4
60% - less than 80%	11.2	3.9
80% or more	32.1	13.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(17,167)	(11,305)
Average contribution	57.7	38.0
% of the population contributing*	83.3	56.9

Here "contribution" means the proportion of the individual's income to the whole household income, expressed in percentages. (Also see the following discussion on women's contribution to domestic labour.)
"Individual income" includes incomes from all employments and all other cash incomes.
This table only includes those aged 15 or above and having some income, all those with zero income are excluded.

* This is the percentage of the males/females who have some income to contribute to the household over the total male/female population aged 15 and above.

Source: 1% sample data set, 1986 Census.

Obviously in a substantial number of instances, women's contribution to the household resources is so important that it must affect the class position of the family. Especially for the 17.4 per

cent of women who are contributing to more than 60 per cent of the household's income (Table 7), without their contributions their family could be in a dire situation. Of course, some conventional class analysts may try to maintain that having more than one earner in the family does not necessarily change one's class position. For example, a male factory manual worker is still part of a working class even if his family's income is doubled or tripled because of his wife's and other family members' income. However, this is obviously problematic. If we are concerned with class members as actors who have different material conditions, who may develop into stable collectivities, enjoy a certain pattern of association and become part of certain groups in action, then we cannot casually discount the influence of such resource levels and patterns on their social life and identity (Roberts, 1993; Arber, 1993).

This problem of women's contribution to household resources is expected to be more and more difficult to push aside. From Table 8, we can see that women's financial contribution is becoming more important. More and more of the female population are contributing financially to their household's income. In 1976, only 43.5 per cent of women aged 15 and above were earning an income to contribute to their household resources. This increased steadily to 54.7 per cent in 1986, that is an increase of 11.2 per cent over ten years. On the other hand, the percentage of men contributing was also increasing, but at a lesser rate. For men, it increased from 73 per cent in 1976 to 80 per cent in 1986, that is, an increase of 7 per cent. Moreover, the increase in the amount of contribution from women is more apparent than that from men. Women's contribution to household income increases steadily from 35.6 per cent in 1976 to 37.9 per cent in 1986. In the men's situation, it has fluctuated around 56 per cent to 58 per cent. Certainly, there is a trend showing that women's contribution to household resources is increasing, both in the sense that more women are contributing and a greater amount is being contributed. With this trend, it is becoming more problematic to neglect women in class analysis.

Table 8 Men's and women's contribution to household income, 1976-1986

	1976	1981	1986
% of male population contributing#	73.0	77.9	80.0
% of female population contributing#	43.5	51.4	54.7
Average contribution from males*(%)	58.6	56.4	57.7
Average contribution from females*(%)	35.6	35.7	37.9

This is the percentage of the males/females who have some income to contribute to the household over the total male/female population.

* "Contribution from male/female" is the proportion of all incomes of an individual to his/her household's income, expressed in percentage.
Then, the average of "contribution from male/female" for all the male/female population having some income is taken.
This table only includes those with some income, all those with zero income are excluded.
Since the number of working members in the family varies (it is not always limited to one man and one woman), therefore the percentage for males and females for this item does not add up to 100 per cent.

Sources: Calculated from the 1% sample of census data of respective years.

Before we end the discussion on this point, there are two qualifications to be made to the concept of "contribution" to household resources. Firstly, we use the proportion of an individual's income to his/her household's income as an indication of his/her contribution. It only serves as a statistical indication of the importance of a man's or a woman's income to his/her family. It does not imply literally that an individual contributes all his/her income to the family. However, census data do not allow us to probe into how family members contribute and share their household resources. This question is better dealt with by in-depth qualitative analysis. In fact, recent studies in the Western countries indicate that women are contributing more or sharing less of the household resources than their male counterpart (Pahl, 1990; Arber, 1993). In this sense, it is quite possible that women are

poorer than their husband, or occupy a lower class position than their husband, even though they are in the same household.

Another important qualification of the concept of "contribution" is that using income as an indication is underestimating the contribution of women's domestic labour. It has long been pointed out in the feminist literature that, in general, work in the labour market, which is dominated by man, is classified as "productive" and rewarded by salary. On the contrary, domestic labour, which is mainly done by women, is considered as consumption/reproductive and is unpaid. In essence, these two forms of labour are both essential and "productive" in the creation of household resources. However, the patriarchal value of our society reinforces the importance of men's work, while underplaying women's contribution. Planning and census agents in developing countries have been slow to come around to accounting for such hitherto invisible contribution of women to the household and general economy (Gleason, 1991; Beneria, 1988). Conventional class analysis of the advanced world has not done much better in incorporating domestic labour into their theoretical armoury and empirical research (Stacey, 1986).

In sum, notwithstanding the fact that the significance of women's contributions are underplayed, there is still an obvious trend that more women are contributing to a greater extent to their households. Therefore, the assumption of the traditional approach to class analysis is obviously problematic.

The second important social trend that traditional class analysis has neglected is that there is a significant proportion of women living independently of men. In 1991, 40 per cent of the female population are either never married, widowed or divorced/separated (Figure 3). Yet, conventional class analysis seems to assume that most women are dependent on their husbands.

Figure 3 Marital status of women, 1991



Source: *1991 Census Main Report*, p. 42.

One of the major reasons for this independence is the rapidly rising divorce rate, which results in an increasing proportion of lone mother families. There were 6,295 cases of divorce decrees in 1991 which was more than double the figure in 1982 (2,673 cases) (*Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics*, 1992:20). Unfortunately, systematic official statistics on lone mothers are lacking. Official statistics on the marital status of women in 1991 show that only 1.4 per cent of women were divorced/separated. But this does not reveal the whole picture. Field experience by social work agents has been that in many lone mother families, the husband has just disappeared without going through the proper legal procedures of divorce. These situations are not revealed in census data. In a social indicators survey in 1988, Lee (1991:42) estimated that 6.6 per cent of the families in Hong Kong are single parent families. This is expected to rise further with the rapidly increasing divorce rate. In general, most of these families are headed by females. In addition to these lone mother families, 9.8 per cent of women were widowed in 1991. In many of these cases, the women have to be on their own rather than depending on a male breadwinner.

A further reason why there is an increasing proportion of women independent of men is the delaying of marriage age. More women tend to get married at a later age, or remain single. Census data indicate that the median age at first marriage for women is increasing from 22.9 in 1971 to 26.2 in 1991 (Figure 4).

Figure 4 Median age at first marriage for women, 1971-1991



Source: *1991 Census Main Report*, p. 44.

In 1991, 29 per cent of women had never married. Amongst these never married women, only about half of them were aged 20 or below. Most never married women aged 20 or above were independent and had their own employment. It is problematic to assume that their class position is equal to that of the male household head (in this case, their father). In fact, more and more of these mature unmarried women are living away from their father. Whether they are actually dependent on their father is an empirical matter, not to be assumed and defined out of the question prior to investigation. This phenomenon of a possible drifting in and out of relatively dependent and independent positions for women over their life course also means the static, one-shot definition of

class based on male head's occupation must be a gross simplification of the processes involved.

The third social trend which is neglected by traditional analysis is the proliferation of class heterogeneous marriages. This may result from the higher fluidity or the more diverse nature of work in modern society. With its rapid social changes and diverse life styles, class heterogeneous marriage may be a significant phenomenon in Hong Kong. However, up to the present, there is still a lack of thorough investigation of this phenomenon in social stratification studies in Hong Kong, and the published statistics in this aspect is still lacking. However, pending a more detailed reworking of the census data, we are reasonably open to some of the ideas raised by recent studies in the West that point to the unique material circumstances and cross-pressures of cross-class families in terms of the formation of individual and social identity (Heath and Britten, 1984; McRae, 1986; Leiulfsrud and Woodward, 1987).

In sum, in Western societies, gender and class is fast becoming a major controversial issue in social stratification studies. There is increasing evidence to support the claim that women's involvement in the labour market does make a difference to the issues of material circumstances, the formation of identity and the resultant political inclinations of the members of the household concerned (Heath and Britten, 1984; Dale et al., 1985; Graetz, 1991). Evidence from census data in Hong Kong shows that younger women's participation in the labour market is increasing (see the discussion in section I of this chapter), even though the level of participation varies with the background of the women and the type of occupation. Many also experience discrimination of various kinds in their labour market dealings. This fluid scenario demands painstaking research into how women and men feel and how they might act in the next round of choice and action. We should open corresponding research avenues instead of blocking them off in the name of theoretical elegance or technical viability. Social class research can only be made better by attending to women's situation in family and society.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have tried to intervene into two sets of debates. At the more policy-oriented level, we argue that the existing data reveal some of the systematic ways in which women are disadvantaged in the labour market. We have pointed to some of the factors inhibiting women's economic participation, and further to the patterns of occupational and job segregation in Hong Kong. The alarming verdict is that Hong Kong society has not really made too much progress in reducing the gender gap in participation, income, occupational distribution and advance. We need to pay serious attention to this enduring gap and begin to collect, calculate and make available the requisite data for explaining the current situation. The relevant policy debates can also be initiated on this basis.

At the more theoretical level, we have attempted to point out some of the gaps in the existing class analysis of Hong Kong. The invisibility of women in society should not be a licence to making them invisible at the level of theory and research. Changing trends in society have rendered such blind spots increasingly embarrassing. A more comprehensive schema and programme for analysing social stratification in Hong Kong is badly needed. The consideration of women's plight and achievements must be a central part of this effort.

Note

1. Data from the 1% sample deviate slightly from those in census reports due to sampling error. In that respect, data from published census reports are more reliable. Still, there is a case for making use of data from the 1% sample data set, because the pertinent calculations are not made in published census reports, and we can know much more about aspects of Hong Kong society through such calculations. However, we are not allowed to publish an analysis based on the 1% sample of the

1991 census. Therefore all the 1991 data are from existing census publications, and comparisons with the calculations for previous years have to be read with caution.

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6

The Affluent Migrants as a "Class" Phenomenon

The Hong Kong Case

Ng Sek-hong
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Introduction

Since the middle of the last decade, Hong Kong has witnessed a consistent and increasing outflow of its domestic population emigrating overseas to Canada, Australia, U.K., U.S.A. and Singapore, etc. To some observers, the emigration tide is easily seen as a quasi-refugee "exodus" influenced by Hong Kong's political transition in 1997, when the territory now under British administration is due to revert back to Chinese sovereignty. Understandably, the drain stems from a mass psychology built on the perceived danger of the change of government, hence generating an anxiety either to seek an overseas shelter or, at least, to secure a foreign passport as an "insurance policy" for the future.[1] For other critics, attention is focused, instead, upon the adverse impacts of such an emigration movement upon the economy of Hong Kong, in as much as it is tantamount to a "brain drain" which implies the

withdrawal of both human and capital resources from the territory. It is the purpose of this chapter, given the above differences in perspectives, to suggest the possibility of interpreting this recent emigration phenomenon in a "class" context. In so far as the ability and wish to migrate seem to be associated with the more affluent middle-income strata of society, the question may be asked subsequently whether this so-called "brain-drain" process suggests also the rapid disintegration of the middle-class in Hong Kong or whether it is being replenished by the enlarged opportunities for upward social mobility that the emigration process helps generate.

Chinese Migration: A Brief Historical Note

Hong Kong owes its socio-cultural heritage largely to China which does not lack a history of demographic movement and migration of its people. Historically, Hong Kong as a society was borne and nurtured by emigration waves from mainland China, while the history of Chinese migrant labour in frontier-building America and Australia, as well as in overseas Chinese communities clustering in Southeast Asia, has all been well documented in the relevant literature.[2]

In retrospect, it appears that rural poverty at home was almost consistently the common and pervasive "push" factor causing the overseas migration of Chinese, apart from those waves induced by crises of social upheavals and natural disasters. Lasker, for instance, has interpreted the feature of Chinese emigration in the maritime regions as one resulting from overcrowding and population overflow from their native land: "People were literally shoved off the shores into the sea. Some groups colonized such islands as Formosa (Taiwan) and Hainan. Some, deprived of the right to own land, stayed on the water and still live by the tens of thousands on their boats" (Lasker, 1945:71). Constituting the primary sources for shipments of indentured labour from China — popularized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as "human

cargoes" for the new continents — were therefore largely the lowest strata of the agrarian economies, drawn predominantly from the northern Chinese peasantry and urban destitutes. Richardson, in his study of the "proletarianized" conditions of Chinese indentured workers in South Africa at the turn of the century, notes that their main reason for signing up with South African recruiters to work as "coolies" in the Transvaal gold mines was to obtain an escape from the domestic vicissitudes of endemic pauperism, natural disasters, brigandage, rebellion and war in agrarian China (Richardson, 1984).

However, the mentality of these migrant workers was always that of a "visitor" or a "guest" vis-à-vis the host society. Typically, their "home" consciousness was still attached to China and the aspiration was prevalent amongst them to return home later with their hoarded savings, so as to improve the social status and material conditions of their families. As Lasker points out:

> The indentured labourer in earlier years, when travel was tedious, dangerous, and expensive, often stayed away from home for many years, sometimes forever or until he felt old enough to join his ancestors. Many amassed great fortunes through hard work and thrift, and when they did eventually return, were able to amaze their relatives and neighbours with the magnificence of their style of living and of their benefactions. (Lasker, 1945:75)

On the other hand, the latitude of overseas Chinese communities that have evolved in various Southeast Asian societies appears to have stemmed from a variant but not entirely dissimilar experience of the Chinese emigrants. Specifically, they were more likely to have originated from the settlements of Chinese merchant adventurers from Southern China having landed in the South Seas or Nan Yang (Southeast Asia) before the arrival of the European colonialists. With their enterprise, these early Chinese merchant settlers increasingly identified themselves by interests, attitudes and even languages with the countries of their residence. However, later waves of Southern Chinese coolies and farmers to

Nan Yang, prevented from reaching farther destinations in the West by growing restrictions on oriental immigration, remained outsiders. Moreover, in the late 1920s, anti-Chinese movements in Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines led to the repatriation or voluntary departure of tens of thousands of Chinese. There were also many, especially descendants of mixed marriages, who had previously considered themselves Chinese but now became assimilated into the citizenry of their adopted country — for instance, in Thailand (Lasker, 1945:76-77).

The Class Situation in Hong Kong

It appears that social classes have been more fluid in Hong Kong than in western industrial societies, in light of its socio-cultural background and economic history. Demographically, the society is relatively new, itself constituted predominantly of recent immigrants from China of the first or second generation mixed with a small native group of rural inhabitants. In a sense, the community is an outgrowth of ruptured social ties in mainland China caused by political upheavals and disjointed waves of migration in the first half of this century. People are related by bizarre, interwoven and cross-cutting webs of particularistic affiliations, so that now "a millionaire Peking sympathizer may be related to a Kuomintang seaman" (Turner et al., 1980:9). Perhaps, also endemic to the Chinese tradition is its normative emphasis upon the family institution and lineage-based network of economic particularism — a cultural orientation which hence makes the class system less entrenched than it has been in European societies.[3] Moreover, it has become almost an ethos of Hong Kong "enterprise" that there always prevails here an ardent faith in the efficacy of the open market mechanism and concomitantly, a belief in society's permissiveness to free competition and social mobility.[4] It is a "hybrid" young society where

> social mobility has been high: there are spectacular and exotic instances of meteoric success, and more than a few people in lowly jobs who held status in pre-Revolutionary China.... Partly as a key to personal advancement there is a competitive thirst for education. (Turner et al., 1980:9)

Presumably, the newness of its occupational structure has also made a class system difficult to crystallize firmly in this young society. Hong Kong lacks a stable history of occupational development, partly because of its compressed industrialization experience for just more than thirty years since the 1950s. Before the Second World War, it was essentially an entrepôt with its labour force engaged mostly in transport and communication, trading and maritime-related activities. The bulk of them were low-status manual workers, comprising predominantly stevedores (i.e. colliers), scanners, servants, shop assistants, hawkers, tailors, masons and carpenters. Moreover, they were largely transient migrant labour visiting Hong Kong rather than seeking permanent settlement here. Mirroring readily this "guest" and "alien" mentality of workers from China, an occupation-based working class never took root at that time in this society. The "visitor" mentality was widely enshrined in the practice of the 1930s that certain local associations, instead of employing the words "Hong Kong" in their names used "Kiu Kong," meaning that their members regard themselves as only temporary residents of Hong Kong. Here they have no abiding home (Butters, 1939:108). Such an amorphous state of feeble belongingness to Hong Kong among the mainland-oriented Chinese workers remained virtually unaltered until after the Second World War, when the textile-based manufacturing industry emerged offering semi-skilled employment to a young industrial labour force of both sexes who were native born and ruptured from their mainland ties in the aftermath of the 1949 Civil War.

The recent renewal of Hong Kong as a commercial-cum-financial centre since the turn of the decade, in the advents of China's modernization and the territory's own industrial re-structuring, has stimulated the development of the service occupa-

tions, mainly at the white-collar professional, clerical and technical levels. As old occupations decline and new occupations emerge, there occur concomitant changes in the "relativity" structure of the job market in terms of pay and status differentials among occupations. Such occupational shifts in the stratification of the job hierarchy further complicate the task of making generalizations about the class phenomenon in Hong Kong. Where there are no firmly cemented class strata, "a politically inept conglomerate of numerous "atomistic" individuals or familiar groups" is said to prevail, largely "preoccupied with pursuit of their own interests and suspicious of their social groups" (Lau, 1981:211).

Nevertheless, there have yet been recent signs that a firmer and more stable degree of stratification may be taking root in this new society. In the mid 1970s, Turner and his associates, in their territory-wide study of labouring conditions, detected symptoms of the hierarchical structuration of the labour force which was, however, "far from fully crystallized" at that time. However, a decade later, the research team was able to identify in their follow-up study rather distinctive contours of such stratification in the labour market:

> It seemed clear that there was an "upper crust", including some 15% to 20% of all employees, who enjoyed distinctively superior conditions in terms of income, security, welfare and fringe benefits. This upper stratum was composed largely of workers in public services and big firms (mainly of UK origin): it was predominantly white-collar, but also covered most public service manual workers plus a sizable group of foremen, supervisors and workers with special skills in large firms. It seemed equally clear that there was a more numerous "lower mass": about 30% to 40% of employees who were generally low-paid, had little security of earnings or engagement, and negligible welfare provision.... What seems to have happened between our earlier and recent surveys is not merely that the upper and lower strata's characteristics have become in some ways more definite, but that the process of labour force segmentation has considerably advanced in the intermediate level. (Turner et al., 1991:41)

Moreover, an "in-between" layer has also seemingly crystallized in the formerly fluid occupational structure of the territory. It includes most white-collar employees outside the public or social service sector, much of the commercial sector as well as the predominantly blue-collar workers of the textile, construction, engineering and other industries where medium-sized firms or plants are typical (Turner et al., 1991:92). Paradoxically, in spite of the appearance of a significant narrowing of income differentials among various groups of employees between the mid 1970s and the 1980s, the ratio of profits to labour incomes was ascending — indicative hence of sustained or even intensified overall social inequality.[5]

Adding to all these cues, it may be mentioned that occupation-related variations of class imagery and subjectively perceived differences of "life-chances" do seem to exist within the working population. In the earlier territory-wide attitude survey during the 1970s by Turner and his associates on an employee sample of largely blue-collar workers (69 per cent blue-collar versus 30 per cent white-collar workers), just less than 13 per cent of the respondents expected to "have improved themselves in five years' time either by securing a more prestigious job or by going into business on their own account" (Turner et al., 1980:184, 196). By contrast, in another occupational study of electronics technicians with higher educational background in the early 1980s, the majority of the sample (62 per cent) considered improvements in their life chances quite tenable, except for a minority (one-fifth of the sample) who did not believe it possible for them to improve their future class position (Ng, 1983:239). "Life chance" profiles tend to differ between the "white-collar" technicians and the manual groups, too. In this connection, Turner's study identifies over 70 per cent of the blue-collar respondents to have come from "manual" fathers, a percentage which suggests a "considerable degree of intergenerational stability" in their social background. Con-

versely, the technician study reveals an even higher amount of social mobility experienced by these young technical workers. This was because of the larger share in the sample of the respondents who were upwardly mobile children of parents occupying lower educational and occupational statuses.

This notwithstanding, according to a recent study on the territory's stratification and mobility profile, the dominant social imagery seems to have persisted within Hong Kong society into the present that "the overwhelming majority of our respondents see their society as open, fluid, providing more opportunities," with a widespread belief that "personal endeavours will bear fruit eventually;" yet the same study also conceded to the existence of "a set of real and imminent objective inequalities inside Hong Kong," separating society into its "class divisions" (Wong, 1991:168, 170).

Understandably, one of these objective attributes and criteria for social stratification is the "income" variable, plus its associated considerations. In the study of the Hong Kong electronics technicians mentioned earlier, the respondents' perception of the Hong Kong class structure was largely represented in terms of the hierarchical distribution of education, income and occupational status. Those who emphasized the dimension of "income" or "wealth" were apparently more conscious of the disposal of economic resources while those who selected the factor of "occupation" or "education" were more sensitive to the individual's capabilities and status — as demonstrated by his achievements at work or in education. Obviously, "education" was treated as a primary determinant of class largely because of its vicarious implications in helping determine, in turn, the individual's "occupation" and his "income."[6] Later, the study on social stratification and mobility (as cited in the preceding paragraph) carried out in the late 1980s produced such a pattern of the self-perceived location of the respondents in both "class" and "status" strata, as differentiated according to their respective educational, income and occupational attributes:

Table 1 Self-declared social stratum by educational attainment, income and occupation (%)

	Social stratum						
	Lower	Lower middle	Middle	Upper middle	Upper	Total	(N)
Educational attainment							
Low	40	35	24	1	0	100	(148)
Middle	16	39	40	5	0	100	(191)
High	7	11	64	18	0	100	(94)
Monthly income (HK$)							
Under 3,000	30	38	30	2	0	100	(63)
3,000 - 5,999	30	40	28	2	0	100	(116)
6,000 - 9,999	14	34	38	12	2	100	(50)
10,000 - 14,999	4	26	59	11	0	100	(27)
15,000 and above	6	0	76	18	0	100	(17)
Occupation							
Professional/ Technical and related	20	25	49	6	0	100	(61)
Administrative/ managerial	3	31	56	10	0	100	(29)
Clerical and related	8	44	36	12	0	100	(36)
Sales	6	29	53	12	0	100	(17)
Service	36	33	28	3	0	100	(39)
Production and related	37	40	22	0	1	100	(96)

Note: For educational attainment levels, "low" includes "no schooling/kindergarten and primary school;" "middle" includes "lower secondary, upper secondary, matriculation, technical and commerce institute;" and "high" includes "tertiary education: degree and non-degree."

Source: Thomas W. P. Wong (1991:149).

Table 2 Self-assigned class membership by occupation and income (%)

	Self-assigned class membership				
	Capitalist	Middle	Working	Total	(N)
Occupation					
Professional/Technical	8	38	54	100	(63)
Administrative/Managerial	17	48	35	100	(29)
Clerical	9	37	54	100	(35)
Sales	12	29	59	100	(17)
Service	3	21	76	100	(37)
Production	3	7	90	100	(97)
Monthly income (HK$)					
Under 3,000	3	12	85	100	(68)
3,000 - 5,999	4	22	74	100	(111)
6,000 - 9,999	12	24	64	100	(50)
10,000 - 14,999	11	52	37	100	(27)
15,000 and above	22	67	11	100	(18)

Source: Thomas W. P. Wong (1991:151).

Therefore, no matter how feeble and inconspicious were the subjectively felt sentiments of the "we-they" class dichotomy and consciousness among people in the territory, all the above indications seem to suggest, as in western societies, the relevance of such typical variables as educational background, occupational status and income differentials in denominating the individual's location in the "class" structure or "status" hierarchy of the Hong Kong society. In other words, an emergent young "class" hierarchy appears to be consolidating in this territory along the above divides, as its economy is maturing into a modern and advanced industrial society.

Emigrants from Hong Kong and Class

Ironically, such an embryonic class structure which is about to crystallize in Hong Kong has now been rapidly and heavily emasculated and transformed by the massive tide of emigration of the local population which has become increasingly wary of and apprehensive about the uncertainties of its political future. While a "grassroots" psychology and anxiety to move out of Hong Kong is almost universally felt (in as much as it is associated with a lack of confidence in the territory's future stability and the viability of its *status quo*), the individual's ability and hence propensity to emigrate are understandably constrained and qualified heavily by his/her class position associated with socio-economic attributes like income, education and occupational characteristics. Such a socio-demographic profile of the recent emigrants from Hong Kong has been outlined in a recent territory-wide study of political attitudes within the local community:

> By and large, those with the highest emigration propensity were most likely to be younger, more educated, with higher income and higher occupational status. For example, 25.7 per cent of those below 30 years old, 36.8 per cent of those with high educational level, 44.2 per cent of those with a monthly income of more than ten thousand dollars, 36.9 per cent of the administrative and managerial workers, and 29.5 per cent of the professional and technical workers declared that they were planning to emigrate; while a mere 4.9 per cent of those over 54 years old, 8.6 per cent of those with low educational level, 16.1 per cent of those with a monthly income of less than four thousand dollars, and 12.7 per cent of the production workers reported emigration plans.[7]

It seems fairly clear, therefore, that the present emigration wave has largely been concentrated in the relatively superior and affluent strata of this society. In as much as "those who are the most likely candidates for emigration, the highly skilled and the

cosmopolitan, are also those who have a rather good situation in Hong Kong now" (Emmons, 1991:54), the phenomenon seems to epitomize essentially a "class" syndrome of "high-status emigration" that entails, *inter alia*, the widely and highly publicized issue of a "brain drain" away from the territory.

Of course, the "class" appearance of this emigration phenomenon is to a certain extent inherent in the selectivity of the admission procedures and criteria prescribed by the host societies for receiving these "non-refugee" immigrants from Hong Kong. Almost invariably, the rules adopted by most of these countries to qualify for entry from Hong Kong and other sources are biased in favour of those with either capital or needed human resources skills. In other words, by virtue of the highly discriminatory and preferential rules of recruiting immigrants from Hong Kong, the immigration policies of these host societies contribute to the "class" dichotomization of this society into those "who are able to move" and those "who are unable to." Such selectivity in the capacity to migrate, as partly derived from individuals' self-selection and partly determined by external migration rules, hence becomes an implicit "class" divide. Its repercussions are especially intense where there is vicariously a "prestigious" status attached to emigration and the attainment of a foreign passport, vis-à-vis the relative deprivation felt by those who have to remain behind for want of resources to emigrate. Indeed, the ambivalence harboured by the other "immobile" sector of the local population towards this crop of Hong Kong derived "expatriates" is manifested, in an indirect and subtle way, in the former's low trust and widespread scepticism developed against the emigrants, about which a "split" of identity and interest between the two has been increasingly evident:

> Despite general acceptance of emigration, the political loyalty and creditability of those who "deserted" Hong Kong were nevertheless doubted. Only 17.7 per cent of respondents declared that they would trust Hong Kong people who had foreign passports as Hong Kong's political leaders. Another 68.2 per cent clearly expressed their distrust in "ex-Hong Kongese" while 14.2 per cent could not give definite answers.[8]

Brain Drain in a "Class" Syndrome: The "Withering Away" of a New Middle Class?

Insofar as these recent emigrants are preponderantly drawn from the middle class or middle stratum of this society, it may be useful to explore the "class" ramifications of this demographic movement. Foremost, the question may be asked whether such a massive and consistent drain will serve to weaken and attenuate the presence of a "new middle class" now in the making in Hong Kong. In other words, where as the "middle class" is affected and pervaded by a "transient" migrant mentality and is withdrawing quickly in numbers to overseas destinations of settlement, does this imply an abrasive syndrome for this society that its middle class is now withering away? Of course, an alternative suggestion is to argue for the possibility that the outflow would have created a vacuum allowing an accelerated level and a larger amount of upward mobility for those who remain, so that the "class" structure will still be balanced and kept "intact" after these adjustments. That such an outcome appears to have taken place is evident from a variety of stop-gap measures adopted both by the government and in the private sector, in light of the swift expansion of places in tertiary education as well as the sizable "social replacements" ushered into the middle levels of the territory's occupational hierarchy under the pull of corporate employers anxious to replenish and maintain their manpower.

Indeed, the scale of emigration from Hong Kong has been escalating steadily, According to official estimates, the outflow was 30,000, 45,800 and 42,000 in the respective years of 1987, 1988 and 1989. In 1990 it was 62,000. With an official forecast of an annual level of 60,000 emigrants for the next several years, it is likely for the volume of emigration to total 550,000 people between 1990 and 1997. Thus, emigration has become epidemic ap-

parently, in as much as "territory surveys showed that some 30% of families had at least one member with overseas residential rights already with the proportion among professional people rising to 40%."[9] Yet, this epidemic is clearly more conspiciously affecting members of the more affluent middle-class than their working class cohorts. In terms of the occupational composition of these emigrants, the high "professional and managerial" content of this mobile population suggests their "bourgeoisie" or "middle class" character: as much as 62 per cent of the emigrating families in 1987 were "professional families;" specifically, the occupational profile of the emigrants in 1987 and 1988 shows that the two largest occupational groups amongst them were professionals (33.6 per cent in 1988) and administrative/managerial staff (16.2 per cent in 1988) (Kwong, 1990:303). The attrition rates estimated for the various professionals groups tend to range from 6.5 per cent to 35 per cent. The preponderance of such a drain is also well reflected by these figures:

> In absolute number the loss of general and production managers was the biggest. In two years (1987 and 1988), an estimated total of 5,875 left Hong Kong, constituting 6.5 per cent of the 1986 stock of managers. This percentage, however, is quite small when it is compared with those for the other occupational groups. Some 10 per cent of the 1986 stock of engineers; 11 per cent of the nurses and midwives; 13 per cent of lawyers, judges, medical doctors, and dentists; 22 per cent of the accountants and auditors; and 35 per cent of the programmers and system analysts....[10]

Unsurprisingly, there has been widespread abhorrence of and unease with such a wastage of the "cream" of society felt both by private enterprises and by the government. The whole syndrome of a sustained and large-scale turnover of these personnel, who own the relatively rich resources of scarce specialized skills and capital (including entrepreneurship), from the Hong Kong economy has been labelled popularly as its problem of "brain drain." In this connection, both the private firms as well as the administration have been assiduous at attempting first, to gauge the impediments that the "brain drain" has caused to their operations and second, to search for appropriate prescriptions to help alleviate and address the rising strain on human resources supply. The following narrative is exemplary in mirroring repercussions on this society stemming from the "international mobility" of its echelon members and some of its responses which the "challenge" has triggered:

> All this suggests that around a quarter of HK's population, including many of its most able and qualified people, and a significant proportion of its more skilled employees, are at least affected by an active exploration of overseas prospects, if they are not already involved in plans for removal. And although the administration has increased HK's planned output from higher education, with other agencies making emergency arrangements to train their own local specialists, it is not clear how far such measures would stay the outward flow rather than adding to it. HK has already become a rewarding recruiting ground for other countries that wish to attract scarce skills — or capital. It is this process, incidentally, that makes it rather unprofitable for us to attempt to trace the recent course of employee differentials further than we have; clearly, the upper labour market now has a new element of fluidity.... (Turner et al., 1991:103-104)

Admittedly, evidence is sparse and thin, at least up to now, as to whether this "middle class," which is relatively new, granted the young history of this society, is now shrinking or weakening in the wake of this emigration flow. However, it is suspected that the "popularized" emigration psychology must have transformed substantially the life-style and time horizon of these people, as well as their families, their work and work organization, and their socialization and secondary associations patterns. One obvious illustration is the novelty of the "shuttling" family. Almost analogous to the dislocation often experienced by employees of multinational corporations on overseas assignment, "forced

separation" is now not unusual among these emigrating families within each of which at least one key wage-earner, often the father or husband, has to remain temporarily in Hong Kong so as to maintain a stable income stream for the family "on the move;" often this locally domiciled member of the migrating family has to travel overseas for intermittent reunion with his family.[11]

Not only has the physical drain of this middle social stratum been significant in numerical terms, but the high propensity of this class to emigrate has also attenuated importantly its configurations of economic life chances, pattern of resource commitments (notably, the education of children and investment in home ownership, etc.), as well as its quality of life and life-style.[12] The decisions to leave Hong Kong, whether temporarily or permanently, evidently upset seriously or even rupture the anticipated future, as against it was to stay or plan to stay in Hong Kong. And a further question may be asked: is the middle class itself susceptible, given the number in its ranks who are so affected, to degradation into an amorphous mass again?

Evidently, the ethos and actual experience of emigration must have altered drastically these people's access to and their perception of "life chances" for themselves and their posterity. Understandably, these emigrants' aspirations for upward local advancement and their ethos of "self-striving" in Hong Kong have subsided when they were waiting to move out of Hong Kong. Indeed, it is now not unusual for many of these professional and managerial workers, while on the move, to look at emigration as a stage of their first career in Hong Kong. In this connection, there has been a disproportionate number of these emigrants who have retired "early" (prematurely at the age of say, 40 or 50) in order to retreat to the various societies of their settlement overseas. It has been conspicious, for instance, that "in the public sector many civil servants were reportedly considering emigration in 1986, largely due to a new retirement proposal" (Emmons, 1991:56). While in another survey of the Hong Kong professional and managerial groups on their emigration behaviour, the relatively experienced cohorts seemed most likely to scale down and

curtail their "life chances" expectations in the territory by conceding to retirement-cum-emigration in the later stage of their career. Thus, the study indicates such a correlation between the respondents' length of experience and their propensity to migrate:

> Over 50 per cent of our respondents who had 5 to 30-plus years' of experience were potential emigrants. About 45 per cent of those with less than 5 years' experience indicated their desire to emigrate. People with longer working experience were more decisive in their emigration plan.... In terms of determination to emigrate, again the "30-plus years" category had the highest percentage (33 per cent answered "definitely yes").... Regarding the emigrants who were abroad or have returned to Hong Kong, the majority had 10 to 14 years of experience.... (Kirkbride et al., 1989:23)

In some situations, emigration and professional dilution have clearly reinforced each other, contributing to a self-sustaining process of attrition and erosion of such professional occupations as the medical profession. It has been observed, for instance, that:

> As 1997 approaches, professional groups like the medical professions have been concerned that the departure of the British may leave Hong Kong with inferior standards of accreditation and registration.... Then allegedly lesser qualified persons, trained elsewhere in Asia perhaps, might set up practice in Hong Kong, leading to even greater emigration of local practitioners who feel that the profession has lost status.... (Emmons, 1991:59)

In addition, the predicament of rupturing their career advancements and "life chances" established earlier in Hong Kong is paralleled by the plight of uncertain or even inaccessible "life chances" afflicting these emigrants in the host societies. In this context, the "brain drain" thesis that the present emigration is tantamount to the international transfer or mobility of human resources across societies may be viewed with scepticism, insofar as there is a sizable number of these emigrants who have not been

able to enter the same occupations/professions or to utilize their skills to the same degree of rigour as in Hong Kong. However, evidence is still sparse in this area. Yet, there is at least one study which has illustrated a widespread syndrome of downward mobility experienced by these emigrants when they get overseas, as the following documents:

> Eighty per cent of those emigrants worked in the same profession in their new countries of citizenship.... However, only about 20 per cent of the respondents maintained a similar salary level.... Although 17 per cent enjoyed a salary hike by at least 75 per cent, as many as 51 per cent of the emigrants experienced a drop in salary to varying extents. Apart from suffering from a salary cut, many of them also experienced a drop in rank in their new jobs.... In fact, 55 per cent of them were in such a situation, with one-fifth taking at least three steps down. (Kirkbride et at., 1989:30)

Let alone the above vicissitudes, the same study also yields information on the impoverishment, both expressive as well as material, experienced by these emigrants in their qualities of life in the host societies of settlement. Their affluent standards and status are apparently downgraded, in as much as:

> While about 60 per cent of these emigrants' spouses had no change in their roles after emigration, 12 per cent who previously did not work took up a job after emigration and 26 per cent of them stopped work after emigration.... It seems that emigration caused considerable changes not only to these emigrated professionals but also their spouses. With respect to purchasing power, nearly 60 per cent of the returnees said that they had experienced a drop.... About 32 per cent of the returnees indicated that they were less happy in their new countries; 26 per cent of them said they were happier; and 42 per cent felt the same.... (Kirkbride et al., 1989:33)

A paradox hence appears to characterize this Hong Kong "drama" because of the recent emigration wave. While the relatively high socio-economic status of the middle strata qualifies them for emigration, it is ironically also the same "experience" of emigration which has contributed to their decline in the socio-economic status. In other words, the Hong Kong case offers an interesting illustration of how a "class" of affluent urban emigrants, having been affected by a politically induced psychology of insecurity and neurosis, derive their abilities to emigrate from their advantaged location in the "central class" (middle-income stratum) of Hong Kong society and yet, in turn, erode their own "class" position in Hong Kong and in their society overseas as a result of going through the trauma of the emigration process itself.

Such a "falling-off" phenomenon is further compounded by other ambivalent issues and contradictions, alienation and even antagonism which afflict these "middle class" emigrants. Many have therefore become destitute spiritually and the captives of a variety of social dilemmas. In view of the uncertainties of economic opportunities in many of the host societies, such as Australia and Canada which are still caught in their respective of economic recession, many of those having obtained the credentials to emigrate are ambivalent in their intention about leaving Hong Kong permanently or returning after securing an overseas "right of abode." For those emigrants who opt to commute between the home and host societies as a "stop-gap" answer to the dilemma, it is likely that their affluence and skills would enable them to do so without alienating both societies. Even so, as the numbers increase among these "transient" emigrants, cleavages will inevitably appear when their new loyalty may be doubted by their adopted country, while back in Hong Kong they may also be suspected of and castigated for exploiting the territory's economic opportunities while evading their political responsibilities to contribute to Hong Kong's survival and well-being. The obscure commitments of these transnationally mobile individuals and their families have provoked and nurtured growing sentiments of alienness and suspicion in of Hong Kong vis-à-vis these emi-

grants, as amply evidenced by the widespread distrust found in the territory-wide study on "political attitudes" to which an earlier reference has been made.

On the other hand, the strategy of these individuals to move overseas while continuing to preserve rather than severe their ties with Hong Kong has added possibly to the demographic fluidity of this society under transition. Thus, the territory's "brain-drain" process seems to involve a mix of permanent and transient emigrants as well as a commuting contingent. The varying degrees of commitment to the home and host societies depend upon a shifting complex of variables that range from personal history, ethnic and national sentiments, perception of security in Hong Kong, to their ability of optimizing the economic opportunities and cultural experiences overseas, etc.

The Emigrants as a "Class" In Itself?

Perhaps, we can explore the thesis that the status and economic resources of these emigrants or potential emigrants are likely to become marginalized and fragmentalized as a result of their movements. Clearly, the uprooting of occupational and social affiliations in Hong Kong, the externalization or even alienation of economic interests and social identities, as well as the search for a sustenable form of socio-economic linkage with Hong Kong after overseas resettlement, the apparent privileges of a prospective nationality status overseas are some of the salient features which many of these emigrants share, as distinct from the non-movers who retain domicile in Hong Kong. Virtually, the agonizing experiences which beset these movers in the process of migration and adjustments have further emasculated the special self-imagery of this affluent "middle class" layer, as reflected in a piece of commentary in the *Far Eastern Economic Review:*

> Sandwiched between these extremes are businessmen and professionals who would have to leave established businesses behind, and the younger professionals and civil servants whose careers are just beginning to take off. None of them gain by emigration, though their backgrounds and adaptability may render their prospects less tragic. The extremely wealthy can obtain whatever basic protection they need.... These costs must be measured in terms of what people may be required to do to secure the protection they seek. Must they give up their jobs and uproot their families? Must they surrender their own culture and adopt a Western one? Will their choice of coverage, short of emigration, bring suspicion on them? Will the coverage still be there when they need it? (Davis, 1989)

Virtually, the growing ambivalence in status and identity clouding over this stratum of affluent emigrants is felt not only at the cognitive level of their conflicting subjective class, national and ethnic consciousness but also where these alienative sentiments have been exacerbated by the inhospitabilities of their "alien" reception and experiences overseas in the host societies of settlement; to this, this chapter now turns.

Deprivation and Strains of the Affluent Emigrants Overseas

There is an ample literature documenting the "class" implications of immigrants as new members in the societies of their settlement. One of the common themes featuring these discussions is the phenomenon of "proletarianization" and "marginalization" of the immigrants. Such predicaments stem often from the disadvantages they are susceptible to as expatriate "new-comers" seeking a socio-economic location in the society of their settlement. And even political parties in western industrial societies make no pretense about such recognition of the plights characteristic of alien arrivals from abroad:

> The foreign workers can be designated as a new proletariat because they live on the margins of our society, increasingly form its "lowest class" and because they

> suffer social discrimination through being given mainly the most physically demanding manual jobs. They enjoy neither political nor social equality.... Another special characteristic of the new proletariat is its isolation with regards to both language and housing.[13]

Obviously, these new migrant workers are liable to suffer from socio-economic disadvantages arising from crippling sources like parochial prejudices, ethnic discriminations, market restrictions and their general lack of knowledge of the labour markets etc. They are hence likely to be trapped in the "secondary" employment market,[14] which in turn perpetuates their inferiority and deprivations. Often, their socio-cultural acclimatization to the host society is also problematic, in as much as they are exposed, as new arrivals and strangers, to the diverse problems of housing, children's education, language and other aspects of assimilation in the local society, its culture and mores.[15] While it is suspected that similar vicissitudes would have afflicted the present herd of "cosmopolitan" emigrants from Hong Kong, the analogy seems to be partial rather than complete, in as much as their affluent economic background is recognized in this analysis. Virtually, as new arrivals, most emigrants have, in almost every instance upon landing, to reconcile with a measure of downward occupational mobility and possibly, downgrading in standard of living. However, with their inventory of savings, occupational skills and network ties maintained in Hong Kong and relocated to their new settlements, these affluent emigrants seem to have been relatively immune to the exigencies of urban pauperism in the host societies, and there have been no reports of their widespread dislocation and distress. Instead, their "marginalization" appears to be more an outgrowth of contradictions in the fluid and uncertain social locations of these affluent groups while they are overseas, as the following report reflects:

> There has been growing tension in Canada's largest city about the latest wave of immigration from Hong Kong and most of it centres on money.... Chinese immigrants, lumped together in the press as "yacht people", are alternatively welcomed and regarded with suspicion by Toronto, which now has the fastest-growing Chinese community outside Asia....
>
> Many admit that they do not want to assimilate and lose their sense of being Chinese. The basis of this attitude is partly cultural, partly economic. But it is the size of the Chinese community and its wealth that makes this possible. There are nine daily Chinese-language newspapers in a city of only three English-language ones.... But many of the Chinese newcomers complain that it is difficult to make money in their new home. They are looking back to Asia by establishing trading outfits using their connections there. Usually running their business as family concerns, they encourage their children to retain language skills.... Along with the rich, there are large numbers of immigrants who do not have capital, only a high level of education. These immigrants... are much more interested in assimilating.... (Bradbury, 1990)

Given such cushioning resources, manners of adjustments and responses of these emigrants abroad which the above profile depicts, it looks problematic to characterize these experiences within the same interpretative framework as conventionally applied to the case of the "proletarianized" emigrant/migrant labour in previous analytical models. This is because they are neither pulled by the appeal of improved opportunities in the host society nor are they pushed by the political perils normally besetting *bona-fide* refugees. Those who leave are, instead, the affluent who are already either in the propertied class or among the salaried echelons as the professional and managerial members of the labour force. In essence, their movement is motivated not by the "pull" of economic opportunities afforded in the nations of resettlement *per se*, but by the calculated anticipation of political pressures at home. Even more ironically, they have opted to leave in spite of the careers they have built and established in Hong Kong. Yet, after re-settlement, the assimilation of these Hong Kong immigrants into the economic and social life of the host societies is

often partial, haphazard and inadequate, largely due to the lingering attachment and affiliation (both affective and economic) they still owe to Hong Kong, thanks to their own affluence and versatility. As immigrants who are culturally unskilled in the host societies, they are not immune, however, from the stigma of economic inferiority and difficulties in employment in the host societies even if the latter are able to recognize the need for highly qualified newcomers to assist in the recovery of industry, the expansion of exports, social services and research work.[16] Amongst the new Hong Kong emigrants, it is hardly surprising that many of those who are thus discriminated against have remained culturally detached from their host society, seeking instead "refuge" within their own "sub-cultural" communities in their new host societies or retiring back to Hong Kong as the "returning emigrants," or "returnees" who are to adopt and adjust to a new process of "home-coming."

There are yet little or no direct empirical data to elucidate the pattern of these emigrants' sociability before and since emigration. However, it is natural to expect certain upsetting imprints upon these migrant groups in terms of their networks of peers, relatives and occupational associations caused by emigration. To the extent that such webs of social and economic ties are uprooted in Hong Kong as the home society whilst similar "middle-class" networks cannot be recovered, for various constraints as mentioned earlier, in the new host society of settlement, these immigrants are liable to experience intense strains of status degradation and disenchantment, which in turn result for them in the pathos of alienation, anomie and maladjustments. In this domain, therefore, their social reduction from their former location as an eminent middle-class group in Hong Kong into social marginality, as newly arrived immigrants overseas, suggests a syndrome of socio-psychological deprivations not entirely different from those of the "impoverished" migrant labour in the classic case of poverty-induced emigration.

Hong Kong as an Emigrant Society: Class in "Hybrid" Fluidity

Obviously, it is difficult to make any conclusive observations about the present structure in Hong Kong and its likely "configuration" in the future, amidst such amorphousness and fluidity of its people stemming from the present "emigration" syndrome. It appears that any stable lines of stratification in society are hard to crystallize, insofar as the present mix is increasingly compounded by such factors as (1) the emigrants on their move, (2) the prospective emigrants planning to move, (3) the "commuting" emigrants who shuttle between destinations, (4) the "returning" emigrants, (5) those locals here in Hong Kong who are able to move socially upwards because of the openings left vacant by the emigrants, (6) those locals already in possession of overseas passports without the need of leaving Hong Kong to fulfill the residential requirements, (7) those who are not attracted by the thesis of emigration and opt to maintain their present "citizenship" status and identity in spite of the 1997 political transition, (8) expatriates who are pulled in by the widened opportunities available in Hong Kong, because of the gaps caused to the localization of professional and managerial jobs by the present emigration outflow, and (9) the inflow of immigrants arriving recently from China.

What is apparent, as one of its ramifications, is that such a proliferation of transient and transitory groupings, given their fluidity and plurality, is likely to reverse the process of the 1970s when an embryonic class structure was slowly crystallizing or "maturing" in Hong Kong. At present, any statements about the prospective development of this society in terms of its "class" composition are at best conjectural. For one thing, the present emigration wave has emasculated the composition and stability of the white-collar middle-class in Hong Kong, although the gaps caused by the drain are seemingly to a significant degree mended by the accentuated pace of employers' recruitment, training and upgrading of those from a junior level in the enterprise. In other words, the syndrome of emigration may have itself induced and

sustained a more rapid and widespread process of upward mobility within society, now that the vacancies left open by the "veterans" and "experienced" on the move to other societies have created a spiral of chained "opportunities" and new openings for the younger, less experienced and even the less advantaged ones. One patent illustration is the official administration's response, as a strategy of alleviating the shortage of professional and trained skill, to enlarge significantly the resources and enrollment capacity of universities and related institutions. However, the paradox of such widening of opportunities for advanced education, the access to which hence becomes less "closed," elitist but more "universalistic," is the "creeping" dilution of the quality and "status" value of advanced and professional education. The pivotal mechanism of social placement in this territory is prescribing that strategic "port of entry" into the professional elite, chiefly because education at this level is now less elitist, more widely accessible to people at the "grassroots" level.

Therefore, social class as a notion may at once become vague and amorphous in the Hong Kong milieu, given the growing fluidity of the class boundaries because of accentuated pattern of vertical mobility, both upwards and downwards. Perhaps compounding this situation of "openness" or "structurelessness" is a local phenomenon almost antithetical to the present emigration outflow — that is, the recruitment and intake of expatriate or foreign workers from the international labour and skill market. Where as these "aliens" enter at the lower stratum of the occupational hierarchy, as import labour of general skill, their arrival is more or less analogous to migrant workers elsewhere in displacing local workers socially and occupationally upwards (hence, the consistent shift of the latter from manufacturing and construction employment to tertiary service activities). However, in Hong Kong, it appears that expatriate hiring at the upper echelons of the occupational hierarchy, contrary to the once popularized localization norm in the 1970s and 1980s among large corporations and in the public service, is also now increasing in number as a sequel to the departure of the local "middle-class" bureaucrats and professionals. In as much as admission into these "middle-class" occupational positions becomes more competitive due to its "internationalization," and insofar as foreigners as visitors and "aliens" are less likely to be assimilated into the local "status" and "class" system, the prospect for the Hong Kong "middle class" to perpetuate itself, with adequate local replacements to compensate for the depletion of its number through the emigration "loss," again looks problematic. Given such a truncated "class" situation, does it mean that the issues of "social class" and "class" consciousness have to be re-considered again now in details in terms of its relevance to and salience for social life and society in Hong Kong? Moreover, insofar as Hong Kong has a "withering" or inherently unstable "middle class" under the abrasive impact of the emigration process, it is also likely for the territory's ability to evolve a stable and mature "pluralistic" system of electoral politics and representative government, now in its "nursery" stage, to be gravely impaired as a result. These dimensions are perhaps the key issues which are appropriate for further investigation in the study of Hong Kong's future society.

Conclusions

This chapter argues that the emigration wave from Hong Kong around the turn of the last decade, inspired largely by the looming uncertainties of the territory's political future, has important and interesting "class" implications. The movers are preponderantly the affluent groups in society, largely drawn from the middle class, and whose location and "life chances" are comparatively advantaged. As such, their socio-economic background, value assumptions, "life-chance" aspirations and life-style, all seem to have made them rather distinctive from the refugees who pervaded Hong Kong three to four decades ago, following the Liberation of China in 1949. Nor are they similar in psychology and motivation to the emigrants from the Third World societies who

are looking for improved economic opportunities in the highly industrialized and urbanized nations.

This demographic outflow has affected Hong Kong society directly by draining from it an incessant withdrawal of both human and capital resources. Moreover, the tide appears to constitute a "class" phenomenon itself, to the extent that the ability and wish to migrate seem to be associated with the more affluent middle-income strata in society; thereby it gives rise to a volatile yet popular culture (or sub-culture), partly intrinsic and in part emulative, of a local and widespread aspiration for "high-status emigration." It is argued that the "class" appearance of this emigration phenomenon is also objectively shaped by the selectivity of the admission procedures and criteria prescribed by the host societies in qualifying for entry.

In as much as these emigrants are preponderantly drawn from the middle strata, the question is raised as to whether such a massive and consistent drain of their number will serve to weaken and attenuate a "new middle class" in the making here.[17] Conceivably, an alternative answer is to argue that the manpower vacuum created by the outflow has, instead, made possible an accelerated process of upward advancement and mobility for those who remain, so that the "class" structure is liable to remain "intact" and replenished; the "social replacements" are ushered into the middle levels of the occupational hierarchy by the corporate pull of employing organizations anxious to maintain and recoup their manpower strength.

The "class" ramifications of this Hong Kong phenomenon are therefore mani-fold. First, the emigrants' drain curtails and reduces, at least temporarily, the numerical size of the "middle stratum" or "middle class" in Hong Kong, at a time when an embryonic hierarchy of economic class "strata" or status "layers" has been emerging and crystallizing in this young society. Secondly, such an outflow may have meant, therefore, a weakened "middle class" in the socio-political context of Hong Kong, while it is undergoing a major process of institutional and structural metamorphosis. Alternatively, it may be argued that the middle

class here has remained resilient and visible, since its class boundaries adjoining the lower strata below it have become more fluid, allowing an increased volume of upward social mobility in order to fill the jobs and positions which the emigrants have vacated. However, the situation is compounded now that expatriate hiring at the middle and senior managerial and professional levels seems to be on the rise. All these mixed tendencies may converge now and in the future to bring this society back to its previous hybrid state of structural fluidity in terms of class structuration.

Unsurprisingly, the urban and affluent emigrants are also experiencing the vicissitudes of their social dislocation, in a syndrome not totally unlike the plight of any emigrants and new settlers in the host societies. The frustration and alienation they are liable to feel are perhaps even more intense, since most have apparently opted to waive aside and sacrifice their relatively privileged positions in Hong Kong, say, in terms of income, status and access to "life chances" in favour of their re-settlement overseas.

This gives rise, in turn, to the issue of social "marginalization" of these urban and affluent emigrants who are as a result exposed to the vicissitudes of their social uprooting and maladjustments vis-à-vis both Hong Kong and their host societies abroad. Their problems of adjustment as new settlers in the host societies overseas are probably not overly unique but are in fact rather comparable to the plight of any emigrant groups recorded in the history of human migration. However, what is even more apparent and intricate in this Hong Kong case is the intense alienation they are liable to experience when these emigrants have relinquished their "elitist" positions in Hong Kong for an "enclave" abroad, which purportedly gives them an immunity against a "notional" political risk identified with 1997. Aided partly by the modern technology of global communications and partly by their own affluence, many of these emigrant families have endeavoured to "keep their options open" and to sustain and maintain their networks of social ties and business/occupational affiliations with Hong Kong rather than rupturing them. The most characteristic manifestations of these tendencies are the enhanced use of "international

direct dialing" (IDD) and the highly publicized case of the "commuting" emigrant, or the "astronaut" spouse, in a split family where the father of the household stays in Hong Kong to earn a living for his family members living abroad.

While such adjustment patterns appear to depart from or even reverse the conventional picture of a male migrant labour making regular remittance to his wife at home from overseas, these behaviours are alleged to be associated with a higher propensity of family dissolution due to parental and spouse separation. There is the additional issue, as this chapter argues, of compounding further, in these adjustment processes, the volatility and "amorphousness" of both the "class" and national identities of the emigrants. Conceivably, what is needed is a prolonged phase of acclimatization before these affluent emigrant groups can develop a crystallized and coherent set of self-image and social affiliations epitomising their loyalty and attachment to the host society. Alternatively, their ties and bonds will forever remain indefinitely hybrid, mixed, transient and fluid, if their affiliations and commitments are fragmented and owed to two foci of allegiance, one in Hong Kong and the other in the host society. As affluent migrants with trans-national links, they may then be labelled as a "class" of "cosmopolitan migrants" as well. So long as they are still able to afford the means, the "uprooted" mobile settlers are not highly traumatized in a materialistic sense. However, their existence possibly renders the notion of "national" or "class" boundary less relevant than before, now that they can operate simultaneously in two or more communities which, ironically, may not be incommensurate with an era increasingly heralded as the age of "internationalization."

Notes

1. Speech by Sir David Wilson, the Governor of Hong Kong, reported in the *South China Morning Post*, 14 December 1987, cited in Scott (1989:318).

2. Some examples of this literature are Richardson (1982), Stewart (1970), and Kwong (1987).
3. Of course, the debate on this issue, especially drawing reference from Chinese history, still remains inconclusive.
4. This has always been taken to be the *raison-d'être* of the economy and hence the logic of her survival.
5. Specifically, in terms of the "Gini ratio" (a statistical measure of income (in)equality which would have yielded a ratio of 0.00 if all were shared absolutely equally, or 99.99 if one person monopolized the whole population's income), its value in Hong Kong has risen from 0.43 in the mid 1970s (as given by the 1971 Census and 1976 By-Census) to 0.46 for the mid 1980s (as computed from the 1981 Census and 1986 By-Census). See Turner et al. (1991:16-18, 96).
6. See Ng (1983:239). Virtually, such views were apparently more akin to the Weberian notion of "status groups" that the Marxian concept of "economic classes."
7. See Lau et al. (1991:179). Corroborative evidence is also given by Emmons in what he terms as a process of "selective emigration." See Emmons (1991:65).
8. See Lau et al. (1991:180, also see p. 179, Table 8.6).
9. See Turner et al. (1991:103). On official statistics about recent emigration from the territory, see Hong Kong Government (1991:375).
10. See Kwong (1990:307). Also see Kirkbride et al. (1989).
11. Thus, in colloquial usage, such a shuttling member of the emigrating family has been labelled as the "astronaut." It also carries the additional connotation of the "absentee head of household" for the emigrant family.
12. According to a local study, the variables associated with "social class" were found to have a significant correlation with the subjects' emigration potential. These were first, educational level and second, occupation. See Emmons (1991:66-69).
13. From an article in the German Social Democratic Party, Gunther Bartsch, "Das neue Proletariat," *Vorwarts* (27 November 1963), cited in Castles and Kosach (1973:464).

14. For a critical review of the thesis that immigrant labour is associated with the lesser "secondary" sector of a dual labour market model, see Blackburn and Mann (1981:80-85).
15. For a lucid exposition of these depressive problems and pressures reducing the emigrants into a "proletarianized" subclass, see Castles and Kosach (1973:Chapters III, V to IX).
16. For instance, Britain's Commonwealth Immigration Act allows for the admission of doctors, dentists, teachers and nurses; yet, even in these professions it is invariably at the lower reach that the new arrivals are accommodated. See Krantz (1971:103).
17. This argument is often corroborated by and echoed in the economist's perspective, which generally interprets the "emigration" tide as an outflow away from the economy of resources due to the drain of (1) human capital and (2) monetary capital. See, for instance, Ho et al. (1991:31-32).

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7

Exiting Hong Kong

Social Class Experiences and the Adjustment to 1997

Janet Salaff
Wong Siu-lun

Introduction: Background

> "My sister is a lawyer and her husband is a doctor. My brother is also a doctor. Of course they will get a passport. They have the money" (lecturer).
>
> "How can I leave? I don't have the money!" (secretary).
>
> "What's to be afraid of? There are a billion people in China. They're still alive. Only the rich are scared [of 1997]. For the poor, it's just the same!" (retired shipboard cook).

On July 1, 1997, the red flag of the People's Republic of China will be hoisted in Hong Kong, and the British colony, its lease over, reverts to China. Hong Kong residents will witness their advanced capitalist city absorbed into the less developed People's Republic of China (PRC). In the decade leading up to this political restructuring, many have expressed deep-set anxiety over the future. They have demonstrated loudly in the aftermath of June 4th, they have voiced their concern to public opinion pollsters,

and they have applied to emigrate. This is a study of the effects of the restructuring of Hong Kong's political boundaries on the populace. It is a study of who leaves and who stays, and what motivates them, as they look forward to 1997.

Hong Kong is not the only country whose political and ethnic boundaries are being redrawn. As the 20th century comes to an end, and the East European empire is fragmenting and redrawing its borders, people are flooding to new locales. This international movement presses us to learn more of the processes of migration. Drawing together studies on international migration, Massey (1990) suggests that we look both at household strategies and social structures, by which he means labour demand, political forces and social networks. This chapter looks at labour demand and political forces, while studies of social networks are in press.[1]

We note that community contexts are changeable and relative; decisions are dynamic. For the Hong Kong populace, who have had decades to move about, we need to explore how they evaluate their options, as moods and voices pulsate through the Hong Kong community. In the present chapter, we convey the ways that families assess future changes to their life concerns. Here, we single out the views of families towards the Hong Kong political scene and their place in the local and international economy.

Hong Kong's Emigration Record. Does Money or Politics Talk Louder?

It is widely believed in the West that most Hong Kong families want badly to flee for political reasons. Only lack of funds keeps people in Hong Kong. It is true that money talks loudly in Hong Kong society. The Hong Kong elite is a monied group, and families with funds are quickly propelled into the elite (Chan, 1991; Leung, 1990). The elite not only has status, but it has long been informally influential in politics. When it comes to emigration, money buys an airplane ticket and increases the points needed to get a Canadian or another visa.

Even more, we believe that well before people file emigration applications, their social class experiences shape their views of life in Hong Kong and abroad. In the end, social resources, partly grounded in social class background, decide who chooses to exit, and why, as well as who is able to exit Hong Kong.

The flow of emigration forms an historical and regional pattern associated with the internationalization of Pacific Rim economies (Skeldon, 1991; Ho et al., 1991; Kwong, 1993). Over the past 100 years, many arrived and many left seeking economic improvement. Too, Canada and the United States encouraged immigrant labour. Now the desired skills have changed from the unskilled to well-educated, English-speaking, professionals, technicians or managers with financial means (Richmond and Verma, 1978; Ho et al., 1991; Turner et al., 1991). Thus, while Hong Kong has long been an emigrant colony, unlike earlier years, emigration today consists largely of the business and professional groups.

If economic emigration is not new, neither is political emigration (Ng and Cheng, 1994; Chai, 1992). Politics powered Hong Kong immigration, beginning with the flood from China in the 1950s as individuals voted with their feet. Here, too, the waves of Hong Kong immigrants have changed over the years. Post 1949 immigrants had included many formerly well-off, who had lost property in China. After the Great Leap Forward, immigrants had been impoverished peasants, and in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, they had been professionals and others who had fled the excesses of Chinese politics. All these, however, are Hong Kong people making decisions about their individual and their family's futures. Indeed, some view the current Hong Kong emigration wave of middle-class families as still atomized and largely apolitical, who seek an abode abroad mainly to protect their family earnings.

In contrast, some scholars characterize current emigration politics as common views towards problems. These propose a theory of middle-class mobilization. This scenario stresses that the middle classes form the bulk of emigrants because they have built up a Hong Kong "identity" that cleaves them from China (Choi,

1993). They emigrate as a response to the "disintegration" or restructuring of Hong Kong society as it reverts to China. They leave to protect their democratic, social, and economic guarantees after 1997 (Kwong, 1990; Scott, 1989; Ng and Cheng, 1994). These concerns sharpened when the Chinese government sent troops to put down student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989.

The economic and political meet in status politics, where middle-class groups strive to protect their professional rights. Chinese economic policies and lack of coherent property laws in China contravene many middle-class tenets. Chai (1992) argues that lawyers, architects, dentists and other professionals and workers in the knowledge industries worry that 1997 will affect their positions. Certified by British institutions, professionals worry that they will lose their privileges and livelihood if the PRC does not recognize their qualifications. Those in the learned professions fear that Special Administrative Region (SAR) conditions may threaten the open contention of ideas. College professors and journalists anticipate censorship, barristers the erosion of judicial independence. There are already cutbacks in state spending on social and educational services (Scott, 1989; So and Kwitko, 1992).

Economic and political factors are reflected in the changing numbers of emigrants over time. In 1980, 22,400 people left Hong Kong for overseas. Larger numbers applied after the agreement for Hong Kong to become a SAR of China was signed in 1984. By 1987, the outflow had swelled to 30,000. After June 4, 1989, the number of applicants doubled and seemed "only the tip of the iceberg" (Wong, 1992c:918). From 18 per cent (pre-Tiananmen) to 30 per cent (post-Tiananmen) of surveyed respondents told telephone interviewers that they "hoped" to emigrate (Wong, 1992c:919). Charged by the political climate, about 60,000 emigrated in 1992, half to Canada. By 1993, a record 31,288 immigrant visas had been issued by the Canadian Commission in Hong Kong. Then, in 1992, as the recession deepened in the West, the number of new applicants for visas dropped (Kwong, 1993:160). Economics had taken precedence.

Clearly, the surges and slow-downs in applications cannot easily be explained by a single cause. If people uniformly disliked the prospect of reversion to China, then there would be a flat demand, shaped mainly by Western immigration policies. Further, most of Hong Kong's 5.8 million people are stayers. Instead of looking solely at the outcomes of leaving or staying, we see emigration as a process. We suggest that emigration is a decision based on evaluated options. People negotiate against the background of labour demand and political contexts. In this chapter, we discuss how some people make sense of their experiences, gain perspectives on the past, and approach the next few years. Their social class background is key.

Our Framework

Political and economic reasons to emigrate are shifting configurations. (1) If class politics are primary, people should express these in diverse ways. They will cast their vote in Hong Kong, and rally behind recent government democratic moves. They may organize to express political issues abroad. Political commitment can go the other direction as well. We are entering the "Asia-Pacific century." World markets are beaming attention on China. Does pride in China's coming of age hold people in Hong Kong? We ask our respondent families to rate the colonial regime and evaluate China's role historically. We explore how people take into account their cultural views when they decide to exit or remain in Hong Kong.

(2) Relative earning power counts in emigration decision-making. We ask families to evaluate their family economies in Hong Kong against expected returns if they went abroad. The economical and political integration of Hong Kong with China extends opportunities as well as costs. China gives them a chance. Some invest forward in South China. Others hope to retire there, and enjoy low living costs. These inward seekers are likely to remain close to China. Education and certification are also crucial. Emigrants must balance how far they can go with their credentials

and training. Their ability to achieve in Hong Kong or transfer to a like job abroad may rest on a piece of paper. They also need to consider their control over their professions with an influx of competitors from China (Emmons, 1988:59).

In the end, we propose that political and economic views go together. Firstly, in Hong Kong's monied world, only those with economic resources have political standing. Next, those who have resources try to expand them, but they also are afraid of losing them. These are most conflicted about 1997. Finally, people cannot easily live in conflict and must make choices. The year 1997 in fact forces a choice on them. Choosing means they will bring their political and economic views into line.

In contrast, those without money and/or education are less likely to join the political fray. They are alienated and do not feel represented. If those without money feel little part of the Hong Kong political arena, they may be less likely to fear 1997. Political and economic factors, together with social class background, account for much of the Hong Kong emigration story.

Data Base and Definitions

The Numbers

This two-stage study began with a random survey, conducted in July 1991, of over 1,500 households from the range of Hong Kong social classes.[2] Exploring the intentions of ordinary Hong Kong people towards emigration, the survey found 12 per cent of the respondent families planned to emigrate before 1997; 7 per cent had already applied for visas.

In mid 1992, we chose 30 families from the roster of this survey to interview intensively. While these cases were not randomly selected, we tried to locate people from the range of social classes from that study. The purposive sample of families included both those who intended to emigrate and those who did not. Over a period of a year and a half, we talked with them several times about their intentions to leave Hong Kong.

Emigrants are a selected and self selected group. Our 30 respondents are not representative in a statistical sense. We see them as "types" of respondents with a range of resources. Our concern will be to see how these different people make sense of the dynamic political and economic situation in Hong Kong. In this sense, the decisions they make reflect those made by similarly placed others.

Defining Emigration

Our focus on emigration as a process led us to look at stages of emigration.[3] Many apply for papers, but are rejected. Others have received visas, green cards or landed immigrant papers but have not actually used them. Indeed, the British Right of Abode and the Singapore visa issued to Hong Kong residents allow the holders to postpone their exit. Others get their papers and return, although these are not in our sample. We treat these all as emigrants. Unique as these experiences may seem to Hong Kong today, return migration and multiple entry are important features of international migration.

We distinguished between those who applied to emigrate (*applicants*) and those who had not (*non-applicants*). We interviewed 16 applicants: the earliest applied in 1983, two others in 1987, the rest after 1989. They are in various stages of leaving or remaining. Ten applicants have been granted visas: these are our *emigrants*. Many apply for papers from several countries. Three applicants have already been rejected by all the countries they applied to: we call them *failed applicants*. The remaining three applications have not been processed (*no information*). Even those granted visas may not actually leave. Six applicants have bought houses abroad. But only three of our panel have emigrated (*exiters*). The rest are uncertain. This indecision is central to the Hong Kong emigration story.

Defining Class

To link economic position and political views with emigration strategies, we group the survey families into affluent-middle-class, lower-middle-class, and working-class families, based on the occupation and labour market standing of the respondent (Tsang, 1992).[4] We choose occupation of the applicant, not joint income, because the nature of the job is crucial in the emigration process. In applying for visas, applicants need to testify they can get jobs abroad. As well, occupational-class position and career path imply a set of views that may affect emigration decisions.

Table 1 Social class and emigration decisions

Social class	Respondents[5] Applicants	Non-applicants
I. Affluent: Professionals, administrators & managers, Total 10.	8 [rejected 0; accepted 8; exiters 2]	2
II. Lower-middle: Routine non-manual labourers, supervisors, foremen, clerical and sales, lower level professionals, Total 9.	4 [rejected 1; accepted 2; n.i. 1; exiters 1]	5
III. Working class: Skilled manual labourers, technicians, craftsmen, semi- & unskilled manual labourers, Total 11.	4 [rejected 2; accepted 0; n.i. 2; exiters 0]	7
Total 30	16 [rejected 3; accepted 10; n.i. 3; exiters 3]	14

While we tried to choose "applicants" from the range of people from varied social classes of the 1991 survey, emigration was closely tied to economic standing. We could not easily find equal

numbers of applicants and non-applicants in each social group. Most of our affluent-middle-class families were applicants, and none had been rejected. In contrast, it was hard to find lower-middle-class applicants. Our working-class sample was sizable, and we were able to talk with equal numbers of applicants and non-applicants. Many were failed applicants, however. The reason for the social class imbalance in decision-making formed part of the Hong Kong emigration story.

Social Class and Emigration

In Hong Kong today, people with money are more likely to apply for visas to emigrate than those without funds. The better-off respondents in the 1991 survey wished most to exit before 1997: 21 per cent of those who hold management jobs, 31 per cent of the professionals, but only 15 per cent of the clerks and 6 per cent of the working class respondents planned to apply to emigrate before 1997. And this was not just empty talk: 15 per cent of those in management, 18 per cent of the professionals and 3 per cent of the working class had already applied for a foreign visa.[6] Those that intended to emigrate had higher educational levels than the rest. Those who actually submitted applications were the best educated and had the highest status of all.[7]

Political concerns about the imminent reversion to China are also class linked. Three governments bear on Hong Kong's political future: the Hong Kong government, Britain, and China. At the time of our 1991 survey, few expressed confidence in the British and Chinese governments. The Hong Kong government enjoyed somewhat more confidence. The level of confidence was associated with the emigration plans of our respondents. In the 1991 survey, only 5 per cent of those with confidence in the Chinese government planned to emigrate; 37 per cent of those that lacked confidence planned to exit.[8] And those with more resources worried the most (Wong, 1992b:Table 6.3, p.29).

Once they apply, they find that immigration policy is class based. The poor are least eligible, since the major receiving nations look for well-funded and trained emigrants. The better-off applicants can easily get the capital they need to invest abroad. House owners can sell or value their homes to boost their capital worth and get more points. In these ways, the better-off are more likely to get papers to other countries. Even those who apply for family reunification need other assets. (The main exception are those Hong Kong residents with sensitive civil service jobs, that include working-class jobs in the correctional and police services, who apply for Right of Abode in Great Britain.) As a result of the class bias, 56 per cent of the principal immigrants to Canada from Hong Kong, 1988-1990, had more than secondary level education. Half could speak English when they landed. Over three times as many self-declared entrepreneurs and investors as production workers entered Canada in those years.[9] This was the case for Australia as well.[10]

I. The Affluent Middle Class: Accepted, But Not Leaving

Political and economic structures underlay the urge to emigrate as well as the ability to get papers. Emigration was a real possibility for these middle-class families: eight couples had applied. They had many choices: it was possible to apply to more than one country. The eight affluents applied for 20 visas, and were turned down only once. Yet, applying and exiting are distinct. Our task is to understand why the majority applied, but most remained. We propose that the affluents applied from political concerns, but will exit only if the economics are right.

Political Views and Emigration

Politics takes command

The affluent are relatively sophisticated and have much to say about politics. They have had many contacts with the Chinese

government, often negative. Such contacts have begun long ago, to couples with well-off parents that had lost property and status under the communist regime. These fear that the cycle will be repeated under the SAR.

A site engineer and his wife bought a house in Vancouver in 1988. They applied for papers that year. "Why did we apply? We were once upon a time rich people in China," he says. "We don't trust the Chinese, they are liars!" protests his wife.

The affluent fear that the Joint Declaration cannot offer enough protection. The Tiananmen massacre reinforced their concerns. None bank on the British government or Hong Kong's nascent electoral process to protect their interests. These Hong Kong people do not perceive politicians as independent spokesmen (Wong, 1992d). Although some democratic reforms have been introduced in Hong Kong recently, most affluents feel the reforms are too late, and the governor and the new political organizations too weak.

These concerns led a factory manager to apply for papers for his family to emigrate. Born to a poor craftsman, he put himself through the polytechnic, and he married a classmate, with a struggling family business. Now, managing director of the thriving family concern, he believed that the British government did not support Hong Kong people. "If Britain really is concerned about the interests of Hong Kong people, the airport should have been built ten years ago when Kaitak was already overloaded. The plan should not be postponed until this last moment when the government is prepared to leave." He felt that the British were mainly interested in cornering the China market for their firms, not in Hong Kong's security.

He worried how his family would live under communist rule and an ideology so different from that in Hong Kong today. Comparing his meteoric improvement of living standards in Hong Kong with those in China, he felt that "China was so backward. The country's economic development was stagnant for years, and I expected little change in its ideology and practice." The outbreak of the June 4th incident further disillusioned him. "The govern-

ments and rules of the two countries are totally incompatible. My friends had similar views. I determined that what has to be done, has got to be done." He sped up his emigration plan.

Politics as public administration: the affluents' career lines

The affluents, with real estate and cultural assets, are concerned about the sanctity of property after the reversion to China. They have come to expect laws to uphold property ownership. They also expect predictable careers as an outcome of their lengthy education. Consistent effort should achieve an expected outcome. All note that China lacks a secure legal framework, and they most worry about the rampant corruption.

An estates manager complains, "The Chinese government rules according to people, not law. The same law can be interpreted differently by different people. Once I brought some books and pamphlets to China, for a short course I was giving administrators there in housing management. The books were not allowed in. After questioning, it was decided that the books were to be kept in customs and money paid as insurance. But no one could decide how much I should pay. Some said 500 dollars, some said 1,000 and some said that it should be decided by the weight of the books! The legal system of China is so incomplete that everyone can decide the law and everyone can reject it too!" The Hong Kong media report daily how the immense profits in China tempt people in Hong Kong. The estates manager mentioned a conference held in China in which Chinese and Hong Kong policemen met to discuss how to solve the problem of smuggling cars from Hong Kong. Just outside the venue, there were several smuggled cars parked which belonged to the policemen.[11] "This shows that those who have to fight crime had transactions with the crime-makers. How can we trust them?" As business or community figures, their dealings with China left them dissatisfied. The confidence of the estates manager in the Chinese government dipped the lowest when the Basic Law was being drafted. Lu Ping[12] brought together members of the Professional Institute to get their opinions. As a member, the estates manager raised a question about who could

be the first Chief Executive of the SAR of Hong Kong. "This question was not sharp at all. But I was immediately pushed aside. Whether we have confidence in the future depends on whether the Chinese government does what she has promised. His refusal to answer made me lose confidence and conclude that the Chinese government does not sincerely respect the opinion of Hong Kong people." He has applied for papers to three countries, out of concern for loss of legal rights.

Yet, none are eager democrats. It is not the vote that counts. They do not believe they can seize control of their political future. They distrust party politics. In their view, members of the political organizations care more about their own businesses than about the well-being of the people.

Although fearful of losing his basic rights in Hong Kong, the estates manager sought papers to emigrate, he did not support Hong Kong political organizations. "Power corrupts. If the Chinese government takes a stronger stand, politicians make concessions in fear. Even the United Democrats of Hong Kong will shut up, and the newspapers' editors will stop criticizing the Chinese government because they all want to have a safe position."

The factory manager finds politics "dirty" and the political arena vested with different interests. "Politicians are not fighting for the interests of Hong Kong people but rather for their own. They are only the loudspeaker of their supporters who hide behind the scenes. While the political system in Hong Kong seems to be characterized by many different voices, it is controlled by only two main parties." He noted several apparent exceptions among the liberal democrats. However, "Whether they really work for Hong Kong people's interest remains doubtful. The rest are all bribed by the big capitalists or the Chinese government. They do not support Hong Kong people's interest, but pursue the economic interests of their supporters."

Our affluent middle-class respondents cannot depend on local democratic processes to solve the problems 1997 will introduce.

A vocational college lecturer looks forward to the transition to China's role. He is most scornful, "The British are entering the neo-colonial phase and are trying to get a foothold in post-colonial Hong Kong. Their political reforms are a manoeuvre."

A computer analyst ranks the British Hong Kong inter-regnum as economically fruitful, but non-democratic. (Have you heard about the Chinese and British political arguments?) "Yes, but I think politics is dirty. I don't take sides. There's no justice." (How do you evaluate British rule in Hong Kong?) "Economically speaking, it's good. But there's so far no democracy. Overall, the strategy is right. In a small company, there'd better be a small group of elite leading the company. Democracy is a waste in a certain sense. It only means all people agree with the decision. Britain has been a strong empire. Her philosophy works well. Like I said, it's totally undemocratic. The members have no say. But Hong Kong develops well and quickly."

Underlying the affluents' political worries is their families' fate under the new political structure. In 1991, they anticipated chaos. But this is changing. As time passes, they perceive that the China scene has improved.

The dynamism of the political

Political confidence is easily redefined. Even as they worry about the political future, most are proud of China's new found voice. As well as cultural pride, respondents see China's economic strength as leading to political stability, both in China and in Hong Kong. This dampens our affluent respondents' emigration plans.

For some, the process of a positive evaluation of China began with heady student politics in the 1970s. Reevaluation of Hong Kong's colonial political structure followed. "What kind of freedom did we have under the colony anyway?" (lecturer).

Others are gradually revising their views. They gain confidence in China's evolutionary prospects as time passes. With time, they come to accept the Joint Accord. "We're getting used to it."

Some see the June 4th massacre as an extreme response. While they do not expect it to reoccur, nearly all prefer political toughness to chaos. All have come to accept China's current rulers they know. They acknowledge the risk that the Chinese government will change its economic direction.

The site engineer hopes that patriarch Deng Xiaoping can maintain his power or influence over the country or else the effects would "be disastrous. China could easily repeat the story of the disintegration of the USSR if the leadership is not stable through 1997, the critical moment."

Many would agree with a London-trained computer programmer. "As long as Hong Kong still makes money for China, Hong Kong will be okay." It is true that when they turn to the future, they add that "China is still autocratic. Throughout the reform period there has been no change in the power structure. All power remains in a few hands."

The affluent hope that China will reform politically. This gives them confidence in China's economy. Most will themselves profit from the strong economy. They decide not to be rigid and to adapt to reality. This accounts for their decision to stay in Hong Kong.

"You can stop your research now. I tell you, nobody is going to emigrate in 1997. Everyone will stay here. You can already reach that conclusion!" the site engineer's wife pronounces. Worried in 1988, the family applied for Canadian immigration as independents. The husband now has come around to the view, "China is even richer than it was in 1989. They want to sustain that and won't give it up because of politics." He expresses optimism about China's politics after the end of the Deng Xiaoping regime. He hopes that even with the death of the current leadership, China will not revert to political chaos. The site engineer negotiates contracts in China, based on the verbal agreement of his Chinese partners. He boasts of mainland connections, the precious asset for anybody hoping to do business in China's fluid and often lawless conditions.

China's toughing it out in Hong Kong has piqued the pride of the factory manager, who applied but will not exit. Having moved the family firm to China, he needs a strong political order. He applauds China's tough stance during the Sino-British negotiations, proud of China's strength against the British Hong Kong establishment. "I saw how China, weak and feeble for so long, now resisted its opponents."

In contrast, the estates manager couples his "love" for China with a jaundiced eye: "Love of China does no good, they won't let us help them. It will take 40 years for the needed reforms [that protect personal rights] in China." He applied for four visas. Yet, he remains in Hong Kong as well.

In 1991, when we first surveyed the affluent middle class, they lacked confidence in the post-1997 political scene. Their concerns were family centred. They mainly worried that the impending political change would harm their economic position. Fewer dwelt on political and social rights. As the years passed, and China opened to the world economy, the affluent we met worried less that political chaos would impair their family livelihood. And so, while many still express political concerns, they have not acted upon them. Economic realities dampen their eagerness to emigrate.

Most fall firmly on the side of atomistic familism (Lau, 1985; Lau and Kuan, 1988). They fear politics and want to secure their property. Even if they are proud of China's political strength against the colonial authorities, they will not have to stay and suffer China's lack of legal guarantees. They are not in the forefront of societal change, which they feel is useless in Hong Kong now. But as individuals they work hard, improve their business or family economies. Since they have the opportunity to be accepted overseas, they apply as insurance. But, increasingly their prosperity and even property is tied up in China. There are great opportunity costs to leaving.

Family Economies

If couples apply for visas out of political concerns, economics delays their exit. With salaries that top HK$40,000 a month, these middle-class couples do well in Hong Kong. Their lines of work are expanding. Their flats are worth several million Hong Kong dollars, and they have paid them off.

At the same time, they are under-credentialed. Many came from poorer backgrounds. It was common for Hong Kong youth to leave secondary school to support their families. But, when post-secondary education expanded in the 1970s, many continued in evening school. They extended their training in small spurts. Only three of our respondents hold credentials that are recognized abroad. At best, the rest are recognized only in Hong Kong. They do well in their Hong Kong posts, because they have experience and contacts. But as independent emigrants, their ability to transfer to a like job abroad requires paper credentials. Balancing their achievement here with what they expect given their credentials and training, they fear they cannot easily go far abroad. This keeps them in Hong Kong for the time being, some permanently.

Integration with South China

Instead of emigrating, they turn to the Asian market. Investment in the Asian market demands much labour and attention. It is a road hard to travel, but one that promises high rewards. Going abroad would place them far from this market. For economic reasons, then, affluent emigrants falter on the emigrant step.

The site engineer deploys his skills and contacts to contract to build a hotel in Shenzhen.

A young graduate with an American MBA turns to the Hong Kong–China trade in fax machines, portable phones and other electrical equipment.

A non-applicant managing director of an Asian branch of a medical supplies firm looks to expand into Asian trade.

Another non-applicant, a lecturer, bought a comfortable flat in Guangzhou.

The factory manager relocated the family firm from Hong Kong to South China, in 1989, distinguishing China's politics from economic reforms. That year the family applied for Singapore visas. In 1992, while he felt secure that they would not lose their Shenzhen investment, he still felt he would emigrate to protect his family. "From a businessman's point of view, I hope China's economic performance can continue to excel. However, I don't think its ideology and the political system will change, and the government certainly will not provide as much freedom as Hong Kong now enjoys.... Whether I will move back from Singapore depends on many factors. But it is safer to have business dealings with China from Singapore than Hong Kong. We'll have a haven to fall back on."

By 1993, his views of China had moderated, "I'm more understanding of China's situation. It's impossible to expect such a big country to change everything overnight. In fact, the country is improving and fares much better than Vietnam and Kampuchea." He is certain China will not go back to its old path, since most Chinese now enjoy the fruits of development. "The Chinese officials or cadres, such as Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, whose children have been sent abroad to study, also benefit from the economic reform. They don't want their children to suffer. China's economic policy is unlikely to change, but political reform is difficult to foretell." If he emigrates to Singapore, he has no plan to invest in his adoptive society, with its small established market, a new environment to him. His wife is unsure whether she would return to Hong Kong with her husband. "It depends. Definitely, I will not want to leave my children alone. Sometimes we think of abandoning the emigration plan." They worry about family separation. "Some men may be happy to become 'astronauts,' to leave their children and wives abroad and come back to Hong Kong, so they can fool around. Others become 'astronauts' out of their wife's anxiety. Their wives are so scared of 1997. They don't mind their husbands travelling around as 'astronauts' as long as foreign citizenship is guaranteed. When we first thought of emigration, the family was our greatest concern. I don't want to leave my wife

and daughters alone in a foreign country. I want my family to be together all the time. If I had gone abroad for further study, that would be different; I'd only be temporarily separated from my children. But emigration is different.

"I'm not willing to give up my business. It's natural to want the business to prosper, and to pass the assets from one generation to another. But if your family is broken down, why emigrate? If we have to die, we have to die together," he joked. Having spoken with Chinese officials, he feels, "For sure, people have to emigrate. China does not have any guideline, principle or pattern to follow. Any policy can change overnight. But a foreign passport may not necessarily be an advantage to those Chinese staying behind in Hong Kong after 1997. The Chinese government can still accuse you of anything as long as you are yellow [Chinese]."

Temporizing, they are applying to extend their Singapore visas. "I'm training someone to look after the business. But we want to stay in Hong Kong till 1997 and see the situation. If possible, we may not need to emigrate. But if the situation is unbearable, I don't think it will be so hard to get a flight to leave. I think I can have half of my fortune transferred to another country. If the situation in Hong Kong is worse at that time, we will then leave. You can do this as long as you have money. It is always easier for the rich to leave even after 1997."

The affluents' decision to delay depends on the rapid economic growth they all share in Hong Kong, due to Hong Kong's special entrepôt relationship with China. This contrasts to the sharp decline in earnings they expect in North America. So long as China is enjoying an economic bubble, they maintain confidence. They hope China's economics will dictate political reform and stability. Gradually, many are no longer separating politics from economics as they redefine the political costs of staying. For most, this is the future vision.

The Affluent Compromise: Applying, But Not Leaving

The affluents have strong family earning power, which increases the opportunity costs of leaving. They are concerned about weak foreign economies. The political factor is dynamic. Their fears are weakening. Those that can do so put off emigration. Although in 1991 the affluents we spoke with were determined to leave, many have changed their minds.

The exiters

Only two affluent couples have exited. For them, economic and politics have joined forces. They have downgraded their economic prospects in Hong Kong in favour of North America. Their lack of firm economic ties to Hong Kong is decisive. Unlike most other middle-class folk we have met, they no longer hold a prosperous place in Hong Kong. Their circumstances are quite special.

A self-made businessman, an early "astronaut," set up stakes in Toronto several years ago. His children, gone to school in Toronto, married and settled down there. Commuting back and forth for years, finally in 1993 he cut his ties to Hong Kong when he was able to retire as chairman of the board of a prosperous transportation business. It is not a family firm, and he will not leave the firm to his children. In the several years he took to wind up his affairs, he modernized the firm, and feels confident that he has left it in good shape. Life cycle explains part of his move. As an older businessman, he is in a choice position. He can live comfortably in a cheaper clime. Apart from its harsh weather, slow paced, spacious Canada is a welcome contrast to bustling, frenetic competitive Hong Kong. Canada has solid social supports for the aging, ideal for retirees.

In contrast, a younger man with substantial earnings disengaged from the Hong Kong economic boom to try a new career abroad. Despite a middling education, he had a series of lucky promotions. Using his accumulated knowledge and contacts, he moved from special assignment to special assignment, until he landed a highly paid, temporary contract. He invested his substantial earnings in the Hong Kong housing market. When his assignment drew to a close, he sold his property. Fearing that he could not find another job as good as this, and that he had blocked mobility, he exited. The family's savings will enable them to live and invest in North America. As a younger exiter, who has turned away from Hong Kong, he bucks the trend. Ending their Asian careers at a young age is a distinct minority reaction. The other respondents remain in Hong Kong to develop their economic interests.

Non-emigrants

The final two middle-class couples have not even applied to emigrate. Although they would likely be eligible, they state decisively that since they do not intend to leave for economic reasons, they need not take out papers.

Emigrants

The majority of this group, six applicants, are ambivalent about exiting. They applied to emigrate for political reasons, and remain for economic reasons.

Many have deliberately applied for those papers that let them delay. Those that hold Singapore papers and British Right of Abode travel documents can remain in Hong Kong until the last moment. For them, the decision to apply is easy.

In contrast, those that have applied for travel documents to the United States and Canada are more conflicted. Few can exit without some cost. They must make their move or give up their documents. Many are bringing their political views into line with their economic needs. They redefine their views of China's politics, while holding onto their view of China's economics. China's strong economic position, as well as Hong Kong's central role in this position, increases confidence in China's future political evolution. They hope China's economic strength will moderate Chinese politics. They downplay the likelihood of a problematic Hong Kong. If the problematic becomes real, they can use their

papers to leave. Since this is a decreasing possibility to them, they remain here.

The longer they stay, the more they invest in the belief in China's rational polity. We thus find that only those with consistent economic and political expectations about post-1997 life in Hong Kong can easily make their decision to exit or remain. But most are in conflict. They may wish to exit for political reasons, but to remain in Hong Kong for economic reasons. This is the affluent-middle-class story.

II. Lower-Middle-Class Routine Employees: Non-applicants

Views of 1997 and of emigration turn on economic place. For this reason, exiting Hong Kong is a slim possibility to the lower-middle class. They include white-collar employees in large and small organizations, technicians and civil servants. These routine employees own no productive property, so they do not worry overmuch that in 1997 chaos will harm their economic base. Few identify with Hong Kong politics, in which people like them play little role. They have little basis for trying to leave and little basis for being accepted. This explains why of the few who apply for visas, few succeed. Four of the nine cases applied for seven visas. One has been refused three times and has given up hope entirely; two families applied for visas as insurance and will probably not exit.

Political Views and Remaining in Hong Kong

Political concerns motivate fewer of the lower-middle class to exit. When we encourage them to voice their opinions, the dominant view is acceptance of China's rule. Few lower-middle class respondents have been well off in China. Several emigrated from China as legal immigrants, not from political disenfranchisement. Nor have they much recent experience with Chinese cadres. Many deny that they care about Hong Kong politics. They distinguish

themselves from the wealthy in many ways, and most maintain that Hong Kong politics are the realm of the wealthy only. Those who claim that people like them do not enjoy political benefits of British rule, do not feel they will lose much after 1997.

An owner of a small car maintenance shop, "I think voting is not so useful because those who had been elected are mostly rich or have recognized social status. Thus, those like us with lower-middle class interests will remain unattended."

A bookkeeper brought up in Amoy has immigrated to Hong Kong to rejoin his father. His views of China's politics are becoming more positive. Originally, he thought the outcome of June 4th would differ from the Cultural Revolution. "The students were the hope of the country. The Communists were not right to suppress the movement with violence. There shouldn't be any trouble from the students, they were only being patriotic." He was saddened with the outcome. At that point, he felt, "The Communist Party seemed to be as autocratic as before." Since then, however, he feels there seems to be more freedom. "Many dissidents in the June 4th incident were released. I think the Party is changing for the better every day, but I still worry." (Would you choose the British or the Chinese government as the ruling class?) "The British government is cunning. They only take account of their own interests. Unification of country should be a good thing." He is not afraid there will be mass imprisonment in Hong Kong. "The Chinese consider Hong Kong as a free society," he says. He believes in 50 years of *status quo*. He is confident in the future — "One country two systems should work. I do identify with Hong Kong, where I took ten years to adapt. When we are deprived of our freedom, I'll think about emigrating, although it could be too late. I won't think about it before 1997."

In contrast, those who are engaged in maintaining the moral order (a civil servant, a primary school teacher) believe that the British will be better at maintaining law and order than the Chinese. The two who voice concern for their freedoms under the SAR both applied for emigration papers.

A civil servant: "I know that in China it's common that there is no law except that of the officials. If a high official says you made a mistake, you'll be charged. It's different in Hong Kong, where you have to go to court to be proven guilty. I worry about this part, not about the financial aspect."

Concerned about future freedoms under the SAR, a primary school teacher applied to emigrate. (Why did you apply for emigration in the beginning?) "Fear! I am afraid of China's governing of Hong Kong after 1997. No one knows what will happen. Although Deng said there will be no change in 50 years, who knows? Who can guarantee that? For example, now we can protest and demonstrate when we're unfairly treated. But later, people may not be allowed to demonstrate. We'd have no power to negotiate with the government, so how can we express ourselves when we're dissatisfied? Take the recent case of truck drivers [protesting over the border conditions]. They only dared to demonstrate in Hong Kong, but not on the mainland China side. The Chinese authorities can do what they want and don't need to consult people's opinion. But Hong Kong people have been used to such freedom, and we may feel helpless when we're ruled autocratically."

Yet, he feels China is changing. "I think China is more democratic; the recent incident of peasant demonstrations showed that. The peasants were not arrested, and China took a more accepting attitude. The most important thing is to get people enough to eat. If you cannot have enough to eat, how can you talk about democracy? China is trying to achieve this objective first. As long as China does not change its direction, economically China will not return to its original place. So I think they will not do anything harmful to the economy, and there will not be a great problem in Hong Kong. That's why I dropped the idea of emigration. The Chinese will exert greater control over our freedom to express ourselves and think politically. But in fact even under the Hong Kong government, people are most concerned about living. Not many people are concerned about political reform although there seems to be a lot of arguments about that. Politically, China is

quite strict and Hong Kong is not likely to have great change. After Deng is out of the scene, those new persons in power, who know what's happening in the outside world, will be even more open. I don't think they support drastic change but will adopt gradual development."

Not an active democrat, he cannot spell out a means of securing civil rights. He is suspicious of American proposals for more democratic reform in China as well as those proposed by the British colonialists for Hong Kong. "I think China cannot turn to the US model at once. Its change will be slow. The US has asked China to follow its standard but it's not fair. I think their underlying motive is a matter of interest. The US want China to open its market for its benefit. As said by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, of Singapore, China has a 5000 year history. It's impossible to make it into a Western country.

"About political change in Hong Kong? I think the issue now is just negotiation between Britain and China. Although the superficial issue is about political reform, in fact, the issues involved are economic interests. The new airport — everyone knows many contracts have been assigned to English companies. The English want to get more before they leave Hong Kong. China knows that too. Chris Patten proposed political reform — I think it's just a game. Why not promote democracy years ago, why now? The English ruled Hong Kong for so many years. I think Britain is more concerned about their interest than other things, even though they talk about democracy. Britain has lost its status in Europe and its economy is bad, Hong Kong is the only place that they can make profit. So they are trying to make the most of these few years. Indeed, Hong Kong has never been democratic. Everyone knows that Executive Council makes the major decisions, but all members there are appointed.

"On the other hand, I don't think China would give way, because she is afraid that other places in the country would follow. China doesn't want any turmoil and any drastic change is likely to arouse instability. In fact, it's inappropriate to amend the Basic Law which sets out the pace of political reform in Hong

Kong. If the Basic Law can be amended now, then how about it being changed again later? Britain knows that and its underlying motive is not so pure."

(How do you feel about [liberal democrats] Martin Lee and Yeung Sum who are asking for more democracy?) "They know that the political reality is to have a good relationship with China. I am not very good at politics. As you know, the population of Hong Kong is over six million. But this place doesn't have much resources and its development depends on manpower. If we're talking about democracy, one of the changes will be in the rights of workers. But if workers are given more rights, it will harm the economy. Just like in Western countries, where labour unions can ruin the economy, so the Hong Kong government has never wanted the growth of labour unions."

Most make a similar argument on the need to continue authoritarian government in Hong Kong for economic prosperity.

Family Economies

Their dependence on wages puts them out of the range of most categories of emigrants. They lack the higher education, specialized training and funds to qualify as independent emigrants to Canada and Australia, the countries to which most Hong Kong people emigrate, and where their friends and relatives live. Still, few pine to leave. Their acceptance of the Hong Kong future turns on their comparison of their relative earnings in Hong Kong and abroad. Their middling economic position gives them very little incentive to emigrate. Like others, they have enjoyed a spurt of income improvement in recent years, which they fear they cannot match abroad. Routine employees depend on decisions of others in their firms. Lacking property, they do not fear that their assets will be taken. Comparing their current improved economic position against past poverty, most are hopeful for their future in Hong Kong.

With help (a civil service subsidized flat, a substantial annual bonus, loans from family members), these couples all bought flats

of their own. Their homes greatly appreciated in value. A few have recently sold their first flat and bought a larger one. Even less than the affluent middle class could they match their relative position abroad. While they have few grand economic hopes for themselves, they are not eager to reject the solid living standard they enjoy for an uncertain life abroad.

Both husband and wife must contribute to maintain this solid household economy. In eight of the nine couples, wives also earn wages, but only two were high earners. Wives worked as a civil servant, a teacher, factory workers, nurses, a cleaning lady, and a part-time shop helper. These believe they could not qualify for any better jobs abroad.

Lack of certification is part of their problem. Most have secondary or post-secondary technical education. They pursued their studies part time, in polytechnical institutes, often at night. The lower level supervisory civil servants have only acquired skills. The accountants, not having taken the accountancy diploma examinations, worked their way up. Their income has grown several times in the past years. None qualify for the same level jobs abroad. They also worry that North American ethnic politics would create hardships for them as employees.

A nurse with a nursing diploma inferior to that of Registered Nurse (RN), married to an engineer with a diploma from a polytechnical institute, never considered emigrating. Neither of their credentials would be recognized outside Hong Kong. Indeed, even if she had the desired RN credential, "because of racial discrimination, they will not place you in a good ward. For instance, you can only work in the AIDS ward. [Emigration is] forever a choice — give and take. Like the documentary television programme produced by Radio-Television Hong Kong last Saturday with a 1st Honours Medical degree holder. He is a doctor, but he couldn't find a job in Britain. I think this discrimination cannot be avoided. If you were to compete for my rice bowl, I'd resist too. Also, you should put in lots of effort and spend a long time so that you can settle. But your life may not be as good as here. I've

thought about this for a long time. Staying in Hong Kong is better for me."

A lower-middle-class applicant family applied as if on a shopping trip. In the wake of the international outcry over the June 4th incident, the civil servant responded to the media drum of invitations to apply for the Right of Abode in Great Britain. "Try and see" was her motto. Even if the British response to their application is positive, the couple does not seriously entertain leaving unless they are sure of equally good opportunities in Great Britain. As civil servants, they see themselves as planners, not risk takers. They bank their family economy on their stable jobs and slow ladder of success. Their niche is not portable. These are strong practical reasons for staying in Hong Kong.

The primary teacher applied first to Australia, where his sister lives. While those authorities turned down his application on economic grounds, he was accepted in Singapore. His good job keeps him in Hong Kong, and he holds on to the Singapore option in case of a sharp deterioration of the political order. His sister had encouraged him to reapply, this time through an emigration lawyer. When we asked him about his expected future economic situation outside of Hong Kong, he was negative. "I don't know what jobs are available in Australia, and what I can do. What can I teach? My degree is not recognized there. The unemployment rate in Australia is high. Even local people who have a good education have difficulty finding work. (Has your sister ever given you any advice about job?) No, she also said do whatever's available. She doesn't have a business there. So how can she help? After being rejected I gave up on Australia. At first I thought may be the children can have better education there. But now I think even though the education system in Hong Kong has lots of problems, it's not that bad. Why don't I let my daughters stay here?

"After that, I applied for Singapore and was accepted. It was when many people went to get a form and one of my classmates suggested I get one, too. It's just insurance. I've never thought of going to Singapore. I was accepted because it's easy, as long as

you paid a couple of thousand Hong Kong dollars. (But there's a time limit, isn't there?) I don't know. My classmate said that some people received a letter asking whether they want to delay. I haven't received anything from them yet, and I haven't asked. So you can say I am not too anxious, and I don't plan to go. If I can delay, I will do it, otherwise, I will give it up."

A third couple harbours both political and economic concerns, and most urgently tries to emigrate. The telecommunications technician and his wife recall their families' political suffering in China. The husband's father owned a gold and silver shop; the wife's father was a dentist. When she was young, her father returned to China from Thailand. "He wanted to contribute to the building of a New China at that time. He opened a factory manufacturing tooth brushes. The Communist government regarded him as a capitalist and sent him to labour in the countryside. Father was treated worse than a beggar. He just took one wrong step to return to China, and our family suffered a lot." She and her elder brother, adopted by their uncle, fled their home and came to Hong Kong. "Once China condemned someone as guilty, that person cannot have a new life again." To both of them, the June 4th Tiananmen showdown was an omen. "How could Hong Kong live under such government!" Since both sets of parents had lost property and status in China, and the husband's local position had worsened, both economic and political worries prompted them to leave. They chose Canada, to join relatives. Yet, short of points to enter as independent professionals, they were rejected. The husband faced blocked economic mobility in the telecommunications firm. When this firm became competitive and restructured, his position became uncertain. He blames the changes in the firm "to the 1997 issue, which is forcing some companies to move out and challenges the monopoly of our communications industry." He resigns himself to a difficult time after 1997, economically as well as politically. "Hong Kong will never be fully democratized like other Asian countries. The political scene is very special. China will not give concessions on this issue.... The British government is not standing on the side of the Hong Kong

people.... It doesn't do anything for our benefit, only for the capitalists and the businessmen. The big companies generate huge profits, but nothing has been done for workers like me. I really can do nothing to make Hong Kong a better place to live. Our Telecom Labour Union once organized a rally to fight for our rights but without any result." No longer protected, Wong may be fired anytime. His friends in other British hongs also worry that the material quality of life will be further downgraded after 1997.

The majority of our lower-middle class group have not applied, however. An accountant, who has no formal training and had not passed any examinations, thinks of himself as having few abilities. He has not changed jobs or companies since joining the present firm, where he has seniority. He likes Hong Kong's living style. He has heard that "many people, like some in my company who had been to other places, say Hong Kong is better." He knows that they come back after emigration procedures are completed. He cannot see how he could do better abroad.

Limited Integration with China

Most lower-middle-class employees whom we met see their firms as stable or even improving during the transition. Those whose income have steadily improved over their working lives, do not seek the opportunity to leave. And they seek in the changing economic situation in China hope for their firm's continued betterment in Hong Kong.

Few of the lower-middle class invest much in China. They offer technical advice to kin and hope to buy a retirement home. But most, without capital or skills to work outside a bureaucracy, have not integrated their family economies with China. And so, it is less the direct profitability of China's Hong Kong outreach that supports their Hong Kong roots. Rather, they feel that their position is good enough.

Lacking a real choice of leaving, holding high hopes in Hong Kong, the lower-middle class do not wish to exit for political reasons, and they wish to remain in Hong Kong for economic

reasons. Few are in conflict. Most have consistent economic and political expectations about post-1997 life in Hong Kong, and can easily decide that remaining is fine with them.

III. Working-Class Families: Failed Applicants

The Hong Kong working class can only exit with considerable family support. They are the ones who apply on family reunification grounds. It is less the fear of Chinese rule that propels them, but some see a real opportunity to emigrate and reunite with an overseas family as an economic opportunity. Of the four in our working class sample of 11 that applied, none has been accepted. Two families have already been rejected and the two remaining cases expect to be turned down as well. Their limited emigration possibilities can further be seen in the numbers of visas they applied for. Each family applied to only one country, since their application was tied closely to the invitation by others, notably kin, to join their family economies abroad. If our hypothesis that the realistic ability to emigrate shapes views towards 1997 is borne out, then these families are likely to accede to Chinese rule.

Political Views

We find that the workers generally acquiesce to the prospects of Chinese rule after 1997. Their past is not the tragic one of being deprived of political and economic rights by the Communist regime. These Hong Kong poor had rarely fled politics. Instead, they had fled their South China poverty-stricken villages, sometimes hidden on fishing boats. Never having had political clout, they have few political rights to lose. They do not hold strong negative views of reversion to China. Labourers' views towards politics range from cynicism, to feelings of incompetence, and to fatalism. If the affluent felt they wished to flight not fight, the labourers see little in politics worth fighting for.

"Last [election] time, candidates visited us. But I am not concerned. I don't know what they are doing. We were forced to

register. Someone visited our home and asked us to register. I did not vote in the last election, but my husband did. I don't know which one he voted for." (A part-time *dim sum* waitress, married to a truck driver).

A driver attributes her fatalism towards politics to her low education and lack of experience. "To do politics is not my business. I am not qualified." Compared with the attitudes of students in the June 4th, "Maybe for those students with a lot of education, there is something to do. But still they died. Sometimes I think why should we be afraid to live here? There are so many people, millions. How could each of us be afraid? It is ridiculous to worry that the Chinese can punish us and send us to the countryside to farm, there is no farm here! Sometimes I think there's no point fighting the mainland Chinese. You can't win. Maybe this is the personality of us Chinese. You just live on. Let it be. We are not the kind of people who 'do politics.' People can die when crossing the road. It is meaningless to protest. (Have you ever been afraid of what China will do?) I have no such kind of experience. (When you saw the June 4th event on television, didn't you feel frightened?) It doesn't matter! Life is just the same, it passes by. There is no point to fear. You can choose not to go out [to the street]. No one forces you to go out."

Construction labourer: "Since I don't know politics, I only can watch and listen to the reporting from television and radio." His elder brother expresses a similar view that he can do nothing about politics. "As a common citizen, I don't know the 'inside part' of politics." While he does not welcome the take over of Hong Kong by China, "It's best not to take back Hong Kong," he has confidence in the future. "According to my friends' opinions, there should be no great change after 1997." About the recent debate between China and Britain? "It's no big thing. This won't make Hong Kong disorderly."

A retired shipboard cook: "The British in Hong Kong? It's just like renting a room. After the lease is up, they have to give it up."

These folk are concerned about public security, corruption and graft. They worry that China has few social services, which

they use. They speak of the need for more parking and services for the handicapped. But they do not feel empowered to make a difference. They cannot throw their weight behind any one political group or faction.

Only one working-class couple we met (a garment factory sub-contractor and his homemaking wife) worried about post-1997 political assurances. Like the others in other classes that worry about politics, the husband had known better days and had a comparative framework to refer to. He had been brought up in an intellectual family, that worked in the film industry. His father had suffered from China's political controls over those intelligentsia who were part of the politically crucial area of the mass media. Father deserted his young family, and withdrew his economic support; they plummeted into the working class. Nevertheless, they inherited father's political views. With few resources to emigrate, our respondent couple adjusts to the local life here. They are among the few we met who votes and are keen to exercise their new-found freedoms of expression.

The changes they have witnessed in China give working-class couples confidence in Hong Kong after 1997. After recent visiting and investment restrictions relaxed, many have renewed ties with South China kin. When they visit their mainland homes, they see that recent economic reforms have raised people's livelihood. They ask rhetorically, if mainlanders do well, how could the Communist regime harm their standard of living in Hong Kong?

They credit the mainland system with the desire and hence the ability to sustain this economic progress. While they acknowledge that Hong Kong has become prosperous under British rule, they stress that workers like themselves did the work. Since people like themselves will remain after 1997, they do not believe that the economy will collapse when the British leave. They expect the SAR will sustain their recent modest prosperity.

Family Economies

It is generally believed that Hong Kong is a land of opportunities, with a high rate of social mobility. Intellectuals trumpet it in the media. The dozen working class families we met believe in mobility as well (Wong, 1992d:15). Satisfied with Hong Kong life, they base their optimism on the constant improvement of their livelihood. However, they respond to economic opportunity. When they think they can do better in working class jobs abroad, they seek the emigrant option. Then there are "opportunity" migrants. Although without concrete plans to leave, they applied when emigration was in the air.

Workers cannot apply as independent or business emigrants. They apply under family reunification or the special circumstances of British Right of Abode. With few resources, their applications depend on one outlet. If they are not accepted, they have no other means to emigrate. And for most, their first choice depends on others.

None of the four labouring families who have applied to emigrate have the luxury of choice. Two, applying through family reunification, hope to work in family working-class enterprises; a correctional officer applied for the British Right of Abode, while the fourth couple applied to Singapore as a worker.

A truck driver applied to follow his parents and three older brothers to Canada, some of whom had been there for a decade, but failed. All had worked with the family food enterprise. Their wholesale meat store had sold to local *dim sum* restaurants. As their business wound down, the family sold the firm and applied to emigrate to Canada. The business belonged to the father and the respondent's status was like a wage earning employee. Even his small flat was owned by his father. He was mainly eager for better economic opportunities abroad. He also liked the quiet Canadian way of life. Finally, he was concerned about possible civil disorder in 1997. He wanted social freedoms, not democratic representation. Nor did he stress the political stability that was necessary for the business. "Without a lot of money, we can still

live. The most important thing is freedom. We Hong Kong people are used to speaking freely. If you don't like the boss, you can attack him directly. It's not sinful. But in China, you may commit a sin without knowing you're doing it." He wanted to have the freedom to speak his mind and to step out of line. He also stressed the importance of public facilities, "I visited China as a tourist, and found it disorderly; people don't follow traffic and other rules." Knowing no English, afraid to leave her kin in Hong Kong, his wife was not keen on depending on her husband's family for their livelihood. "If you have a day's life, just live it. It's not bad in Hong Kong. If you can work and can eat, let it be." Their sole emigration outlet was the family firm in Canada. Family feuds and a bad Canadian economy split him from a share. Once that connection fell through, he was content to remain in Hong Kong. Staying here was "fate." He accounted for the rejection in positive terms; they will do better in Hong Kong after all. Working with the family is a common exiting strategy for the working class without much resources to invest. Only if the family can truly work hard together and work out their emigration strategy, can they exit.

Most do not expect to emigrate. They apply on a wager. They are not greatly disappointed if they do not exit. They have experienced economic betterment. Poor while growing up, none are now impoverished. Those that left China fled a low standard of living. The trip stops in Hong Kong, where their livelihood has much improved. They account for emigration plans only in economic terms. Since they cannot expect to improve their living standard abroad, they will not exit.

While they have little property, nearly half have bought a flat, although with difficulty. (One has a subsidized civil servant flat, and four share costs with family members.) Few young couples have large families and they can live on their earnings. They prize their children's access to school places in secondary and higher institutions. They can buy material goods. This hold hope for their family's future.

Expectations of Life Abroad

Labourers have some idea about conditions in the West. However, few have ever been there. They have few kin and friends abroad. Still, while they have no concrete experience, they try to imagine themselves living abroad. They stress the important factors to them: jobs, food, communications (both language and transportation), and what they can do in their spare time abroad.

Working-class families stress how hard they labour. Their new solid income comes from steady and overtime work, with few days off. They have low education, no credentials, and cannot do other jobs. Most got their jobs based on close personal contacts. They also work with kin. For them, any job they could get in the West would also be based on such contacts. World recession or not, they have few transferrable skills. They would find it hard to be accepted abroad. Without the personal contacts abroad that they have here, they cannot earn a living. They are certain they will not do well in the West.

Working-class respondents also stress their lack of communication skills. Only one has studied English in secondary school. Travelling to a strange land frightens them. Language is one of many barriers.

When she thinks of life in Boston, reunited with her brothers, sisters and parents, a *dim sum* waitress stresses the basics of life. (Have you been to America?) "No, the air ticket is expensive and there is no reason for us to go there." (What do you know about life there?) "I think the food is similar. You can eat rice there. My mother can adjust, so I think it's not hard. At first, she didn't know English. But she's clever. She can go to the bank and get money now, much better than my father. Mother can talk with others. She makes friends with people living in the senior citizens home." But she worries about emigrating. (Have you learned English?) "My mother suggests that I learn English, but I'm not eager to; I expect the chance to go is very small. If I really go there, I'll be anxious. I don't know how to start the whole family again." (Will your brother help?) "Certainly, my brother will help us to find jobs and

a house, but I still worry. Life is not bad here. I've heard that many people in America are unemployed. Now so many people go, it will be very difficult to find work. Even in Hong Kong, our salary is low. I used to work in garments, you can hardly find a job now. I can't earn more than HK$100 a day." These are the basics of life for them. They fear that their hard labour will not pay off in the West.

In 1991, a construction worker, once an illegal refugee to Hong Kong, now with local papers, picked up an application for the Right of Abode, which he heard about on the radio and television. But he never filled it out. He stresses that he does not know English. Once he went abroad, he could not communicate with other people. He focusses on concrete powers of communication, the ability to get help, to express himself directly. "In Hong Kong, I can scold people as I like, and I can understand others' scolding, because we have 'the same voice'." "No money" is another reason for not emigrating. In his view, an emigrant family would need at least HK$100,000 (a sum far lower than reality). He also feels that since the economy of foreign countries is not so good, he could not even get a job washing dishes.

But he is satisfied with the life in Hong Kong, the main reason for not emigrating. He says he has far to go to achieve his material goals. Nevertheless, "Nowhere can we find a better place." Working-class people do not have cars, and they often stress that living in Hong Kong is convenient and comfortable; most places are nearby. "There are many choices of entertainment, like going to restaurants, playing *mahjong*, and playing the horses." He again stresses the personal link. "Here people take care of each other." He thinks that he would be treated poorly by foreigners in other countries. But in Hong Kong, "As we are also Chinese, there should be no maltreatment by each other." For such working-class men, politics gives no cause to emigrate. Unless migration brings economic opportunities, they remain in Hong Kong.

Conclusion

Since China began the open door policy, the economies of Hong Kong and China have become more integrated (Sung, 1991). Hong Kong capitalists are the foremost investors in China, and their investments have perked up the Hong Kong economy. The two political systems are in subtle ways also becoming integrated (Loong, 1993; Lau, 1993). These events shape the views of people about life after 1997, and how they will prepare themselves for reversion to China.

Our indepth study of 30 families, both emigrants and stayers, focussed on political and economic motives for emigrating. By political concerns, we centred on democratic and social freedoms, and political administration. By economic motives, we refer to relative economic position in Hong Kong compared with what the families expect abroad. We locate in the experiences of people from different positions their views towards the reversion to China. The affluent and working-class families come to terms with 1997 in different ways.

Most affluents apply out of political concerns. They refer less to democratic freedoms than to the future political economy: administration, public security, and legal consistency. They ask: How will the political order seen in China be transferred to Hong Kong? In the wake of June 4th, the issue is volatile, and their reaction is flight, not fight. Flight is possible since they are acceptable abroad. The well heeled invest in travel documents. More recently, the Hong Kong affluents who apply to leave because of political concerns, remain for economic reasons. This tension is central in the high ratio of applications to delay of middle-class emigrants: two exiters of eight applicants. At the same time, those that stay change their political views to accommodate the economic.

Fewer routine employees apply to emigrate. Partly this is because they are not eligible. They also do not appear in conflict about the onset of 1997. Most take pride in their economic future, and home of their own. If they left, they could not easily set up

their family economy abroad. They feel reunification with China is inevitable. While reunification has contradictory results, it should not harm their economic place. So, most accept Hong Kong's return to China with a "wait and see" approach.

Workers fear the political future less. The political system is not a matter they can comment about, although some are cynical and negative about Chinese politics. The workers see little in politics worth fighting for. They are more likely to see leaving as an economic issue only. They apply if there is an economic advantage abroad. People like them are likely to have only one such promise, and this promise often falls through. Not many are acceptable to the authorities of the receiving countries. This is reflected in the large numbers of unsuccessful applications among them. Those among them who have applied have mainly been rejected, and they accept this.

Our examples of class-linked emigration challenge the assumption that everyone wants to leave — only money stands in the way. People we have met with different class backgrounds express a common phenomenon in their own ways: they respond in mainly an economically rational manner. Concerned to protect their family economies, the likelihood they can do so in Hong Kong seems surer than ever. The better off may voice political concerns, but few in our sample take such large and sudden steps of emigration mainly over an uncertain political future.

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the many families that cooperated with us in providing details of their lives and hopes.

Notes

1. See Janet W. Salaff, Eric Fong, Wong Siu-lun. Using social networks to exit Hong Kong. In *Networks in international perspective*, ed. Barry Wellman. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, in press; Janet Salaff, Eric Fong, Wong Siu-lun. Kin networks and the plan to leave Hong Kong. In *Emigration from Hong Kong: tendencies and impacts*, ed. Ronald Skeldon, pp. 273-304. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, in press.
2. The 3,098 addresses were drawn by systematic sampling in April 1991. From the information got from the first meeting, we chose only one household and one adult as a respondent. Another visit was often scheduled, in order to interview this person. Thus, the person interviewed was not the one who happened to be home at the time the interviewer called on them. More information on the sampling design and selection process and questionnaires are available upon request.
3. We focus on those leaving for the main receiving nations, the old and new commonwealth countries of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States. While some of our respondents have overseas Chinese backgrounds, none seek to return to countries poorer and more unsettled than Hong Kong.
4. In doing so, we classify the families according to the higher of the spouses' occupation. In nearly all cases, this is the husband's. Over half of the wives hold full or part-time jobs, but only one earns more and has a higher status job than her husband.
5. Tsang (1992) bases his work on the 1981 census occupational categories. He combines an initial 153 occupational groups into 14 class groups, and further groups them into five major classes. Tsang's ranking captures the sense of social class, status, property and market position by including average earnings and education.
6. For the social characteristics of Hong Kong emigrants, see Skeldon (1990).
7. The correlation coefficients are: .2236 ($p<0.05$) between those desiring to emigrate and higher education; .3040 ($p<0.05$) between those applying to emigrate and having received higher education. High status occupations = 1, low = 6. The mean occupational status for all respondents was 4.41 (s.d.=1.7). Those who desired to emigrate scored a mean of 3.65 (s.d.=1.11); those who did not desire to emigrate had lower status occupations (they scored above the overall mean, 4.48). Those who applied to emigrate scored 3.55 (s.d.=1.85); those who did not submit an application, 4.53 (s.d.=1.65). Thanks to Prof. Eric Fong for preparing these calculations.
8. Other surveys also find that those without confidence in the future of Hong Kong after 1997 are most likely to emigrate (Emmons, 1988; Wong, 1992a, 1992b).
9. Upon arrival, however, they cannot always earn as much as they expect. A survey of recent Hong Kong immigrants to Toronto found that only 30 per cent admitted to earning middle-class salaries or higher (C$38,000 or more a year). These data come from a 1990 Hong Kong Institute of Personnel Management telephone survey of 440 Toronto Hong Kong immigrants, who had entered Canada between 1980 and 1990. Often more than one person in a family worked; household income was over C$50,000/year for 37 per cent of immigrant Chinese residents in Metro Toronto in 1992 (Chinese Information and Community Services survey; cited in Luk, 1992).
10. Hong Kong, with 5,006 professionals, managers and administrators, contributed more than twice as many skilled people in the past financial year as Australia's largest migrant source, Britain (2,270). Most common were computer programmers, teachers, engineers, managers, and accountants (Bureau of Immigration Research report, cited in Sue Green, Migrants

leaving the work behind. *South China Morning Post*, 18 May 1993.

11. He referred to a Hong Kong policeman jailed for three years for car theft. See *South China Morning Post*, 3 June 1993.
12. Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Bureau of the Chinese State Council.

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8

Social Class Disparity between Chinese and Malays in Singapore and Malaysia, 1957-1990

Chiew Seen-kong

This chapter examines the social class attainment of Chinese and Malays in both Singapore and peninsular Malaysia in the context of economic development. It attempts to examine the complex relationships among ethnicity as an independent variable, affirmative action of the state as an intervening variable, and social class attainment as the dependent variable in the context of economic development.

Ethnicity, Economic Development and State and Group Intervention

Industrialism

H. Blumer (1965) argues that when an economy develops through industrialization, status allocation by ascription steadily gives way to status allocation by achievement, particularistic relationships yield eventually to contractual relationships, and traditional

leaders such as village headmen, priests and noblemen are slowly replaced by new leaders such as industrialists, professors, and unionists.

As status is increasingly being allocated by achievement instead of by ascription, such as ethnicity or race, Blumer argues that social class differentiation between ethnic groups in a polyethnic society will be reduced eventually.

However, Blumer overlooks one very important fact of ethnic stratification which invariably exists in a polyethnic society with a history of racism. In such a caste-like society, proportionately more members of the dominant group are better educated or qualified than members of minority groups. Thus, when employers hire and pay workers on the basis of educational attainment or work experience, proportionately more of the better-paid jobs go to the dominant group. Consequently the existing system of ethnic stratification will be maintained, instead of breaking down as Blumer expected.

In my view, social class differentiation between ethnic groups may decrease only when three conditions are met. Firstly, the economy develops so rapidly that many jobs, especially higher paid jobs, are created. As the incomes of workers rise, fertility declines. This affects the higher income groups more than the lower income groups, and thus affects the dominant group more than the minorities. Secondly, the fertility rate of the dominant group decreases more than that of the ethnic minorities. When the dominant group is not able to supply enough workers needed by the expanding economy, employers begin to hire more and more minority workers. Thirdly, when the economy grows faster than the supply of labour, employers will bid against one another for minority labour, and thus bid up their wages, leading to rises in the mean or median incomes of minority groups. When this occurs, the income difference between the dominant and minority groups will decrease.

The Split Labour Market

Adna Bonacich (1975) argues that in the United States, white labour is paid much more than black labour. The latter tends to be unskilled labour. White labour is protected by strong unions, and the racism of white unions and employers maintain them as two separate labour forces. This split labour market keeps the black workers down. Hence, the split labour market maintains the social class inequality in American society. In the absence of state intervention, the inequality will be maintained.

Culture and Economic Motivation

Weber's thesis on the Protestant Ethic is well known. Briefly, he observes that some poor countries are more able to accumulate capital for economic development while other poor countries are less able to do so. He argues that some religions (or cultures) such as Calvinism seem more able to predispose its members to work hard, lead a frugal and pious life, save for the future, and when opportunity knocks invest the savings. In Calvinism, success in this life is viewed as a sign of God's grace.

Economist Ayal (1963) views these Calvinist behaviours as "behavioural propensities" which are conducive to capital accumulation, which in turn is a prerequisite for economic development. These "behavioural propensities" can be found in other religions or cultures. Ayal argues that Japan has more of them than Thailand, and argues that the difference accounts for the higher rates of economic development of Japan compared with Thailand over the last few decades.

In a comparative study of two Indonesian towns, anthropologist Geertz (1962) also argues that some cultures have a wider distribution of Ayal's behavioural propensities than other cultures or cultural groups.

Psychologist McClelland (1961, 1963) argues that some peoples such as the Chinese have higher levels of economic motivation which he terms "n Ach" or "need for achievement." The literature on rural-urban and international migration provides

endless documentation of the strong economic motivation of migrants in search of higher standards of living.

The role of the state has been either not given any attention or very little attention in the writings of the above scholars. Modern states cannot afford to be idle observers of the momentous economic and social changes, which are often initiated by them.

A Proposed Synthesis

When the ideas of Weber, Ayal, Geertz and McClelland are viewed in the context of a polyethnic society, then, when the culture of one ethnic group has a wider distribution of Ayal's behavioural propensities among its members and a higher level of "n Ach" than other ethnic groups, the former group will eventually achieve a higher mean or median income than the latter, provided that the state does not intervene on behalf of the latter (Chiew, 1987).

The difference between ethnic groups in terms of the distribution of Ayal's propensities and "n Ach" can be viewed at a few "levels," from national to micro levels. At the macro level (say, in the peninsula of Malaya in the 19th century), the Chinese chose to settle more on the west coast while the Malays were spread throughout the peninsula. The Chinese migrants searched everywhere for opportunities to make money. They found and operated tin and other mines, pooling their meagre capital and labour power together and working long hours. They avoided subsistence farming and engaged instead in cash crops farming. Thus at the macro level, there was industrial specialization between the Chinese migrants and the indigenous Malays.

In the towns, the Chinese migrants searched for economic opportunities and eventually concentrated in commerce and international trade, finance and so forth, while the Malays were concentrated in government and personal service and other areas.

Even in the same occupational category such as "salesworkers," some sales jobs (selling cars) pay more than other

sales jobs (selling eggs). The difference in "n Ach" and behavioural propensities will find different expressions in the choice of or search for occupations between ethnic groups.

The industrial and occupational distributions of the Chinese and Malays in both Singapore and peninsular Malaysia in the last few decades show ethnic specialization between them. The Chinese have higher proportions of managers, professionals and technicians than the Malays, who in turn have higher proportions of agricultural and production workers than the Chinese.

Thus, given the differences in behavioural propensities and "n Ach" between the Chinese and Malays, and even though the Chinese migrants in the 19th century were poorer than the indigenous Malays, the Chinese are hypothesized to eventually overtake the Malays. When the Chinese eventually achieve mean or median incomes which are higher than the Malays, the Chinese community will have greater spread and depth of wealth than the Malays. That is, the Chinese will use their new-found wealth to give their children more education than the Malays in order to prepare them for better paid jobs (beside other cultural goals such as Chinese identity). Higher educational attainment will provide them an advantage over the Malays. Wealth begets more income and wealth, and the economic advantage of the Chinese over the Malays is thus maintained. As more and more Chinese families become wealthy, some families pass on their advantage to the next generation. Some Chinese are rich, and have rich parents, and even rich grandparents. Thus, over the generations, the Chinese have greater depth of wealth compared with the Malays. The economic disparity between the Chinese and Malays will then widen with time. As the social class gap between them gets bigger and bigger, the disparity becomes more and more obvious and politically sensitive, inviting the attention and concern of political leaders, including the government, as well as the leaders of the Malay community.

Economic development creates opportunities as well as risks. The ethnic group which has a higher level of "n Ach" and Ayal's behavioural propensities are likely to be better able to seize the

opportunities so created and to take the risks than other ethnic groups which have less of both. Thus, economic development is unlikely to distribute economic benefits equally among the ethnic groups. Instead, it is likely to benefit the former ethnic group more than others. Thus, economic development is hypothesized here to **increase** the social class disparity between ethnic groups.

The modern state tends to be interventionist. Either due to moral consideration or political necessity to maintain power, the government (or ruling party) cannot remain passive when the social class disparity between ethnic groups increases over a period of time. It has to redress the disparity before it becomes a political force, leading minority groups to protest against what they view to be social injustice. As the economic disparity increases in size and reaches a point which is considered to be politically unacceptable to the leaders of the disadvantaged group, the government has to act in order to redress the real or "perceived injustice" of the social system which distributes the benefits unequally.

It is hypothesized here that ethnic groups which place greater emphasis on material well-being will find a "small" economic disparity unacceptable to them, while ethnic groups which stress more religious piety and contentment will tolerate a greater social class gap between ethnic groups. Those cultures which stress economic attainment are likely to do better. Hence, the economically disadvantaged ethnic group is likely to be the one which stresses economic attainment less. Consequently, the disparity is likely allowed to increase to quite a large degree before it is "felt" by leaders of the disadvantaged group to be politically unacceptable.

As hypothesized earlier, the state will intervene in terms of proposing and implementing affirmative action in education, employment, low-interest loans and assistance in business in favour of minorities. In order for these policies to succeed in helping the disadvantaged ethnic group, the state tries to manipulate its culture such as exhorting its members, both adults and the young, to take their education or occupational training more seriously, to

place material attainment and comfort as a higher priority, and to have higher material aspirations (i.e., "n Ach"). Thus, values and norms of contentment at work, in school or even leisure are placed lower on the scale of desirable values in the culture of the disadvantaged ethnic group. There will be some resistance, and cultural change will be slow.

Gradual value change coupled with sustained state affirmative action (e.g., more positions in universities or the civil service are reserved for members of ethnic minorities) will slowly raise the mean or median incomes of the disadvantaged ethnic group over a period of time. Consequently, the social class disparity between ethnic groups will diminish.

However, economic development has its own momentum. As the economy develops and real incomes rise with it, business costs also rise along with them. It will then require more and more capital outlay to operate an enterprise or to start a new one as wages, rents, utilities, etc. increase. There will be increased automation and computerization in order to save on labour costs as well as to enhance productivity. When this stage of economic development is reached, it is hypothesized that the ethnic group which has greater spread and depth of wealth will be better able to exploit the economic opportunities available and to take more risks than others as their members can pool their capital and manpower resources and utilize their business networks. Even in the event of financial setbacks, the former ethnic group is better able to contain them. This stage of economic development is hypothesized to give rise to a temporary increase in the social class disparity between ethnic groups. And the government will intensify its affirmative action again, developing new ways to cope with new situations.

A Summary

Figure 1 sums up the main points. C_1-C_2 represents the Chinese and is inclined more steeply than M_1-M_2 which represents the Malays to denote their difference in "n Ach" and Ayal's behaviou-

ral propensities at time t_1. C_1 is placed below M_1 to denote the historical fact that the early Chinese immigrants arrived in the peninsula of Malaya in the previous centuries penniless and were poorer than the indigenous Malays.

At t_2, the Chinese reached parity with the Malays as their behavioural propensities and high "n Ach" paid dividends. After this point in time, the Chinese overtook the Malays in terms of mean or median incomes (or standards of living). The disparity between them widens and reaches the threshold of tolerance, i.e., the disparity is now viewed as "too large" by Malay leaders. Political processes of community mobilization and interest articulation begin and the government has to act to redress the disparity before it gets out of control. Affirmative action on the part of the government and leaders and organizations of the disadvantaged ethnic group (such as the Muslim Council (MUIS) and Mendaki in Singapore) as well as cultural manipulation in the form of exhortations to excel in education, etc. will take place.

These are time-consuming processes. Eventually, the disparity between groups diminishes while the mean or median incomes of both groups rise, but that of the disadvantaged group rising faster. The relative income gap is expected to decrease while the absolute gap between them may remain or even increase somewhat. But in the long-run, both the relative and absolute income gaps will diminish as the mean or median incomes of both groups become close to one another. This is represented by M_2 tilting upwards to M_3.

As the income gap between the Chinese and Malays diminishes over a period of time, the economy may reach the next "phase" of development which requires high capitalization to maintain an enterprise or to start a new one. When it reaches this point, the income gap begins to widen again. This is represented by M_3 tilting down to M_4. The state and self-help groups intervene again, developing new coping strategies, in an attempt to close the gap again, represented by M_4 tilting upward to M_5, and so on.

As the real incomes of the Chinese rise higher and higher, a point will be reached when their economic motivation and

behavioural propensities will slacken as leisure becomes more highly valued than working an extra hour in order to earn a few more dollars. This is represented by the Chinese line turning downwards from C_2 to C_3.

Some of these ideas and hypotheses will be tested below using population census data from Singapore and peninsular Malaysia. Before this is done, it is necessary to give at least a brief historical and social background to this comparative study for the benefit of those who are not familiar with these two polyethnic societies.

Figure 1 Culture, n Ach, government intervention and mean or median monthly income



Brief Historical and Social Background

Both Singapore and peninsular Malaysia were colonized by the British. The British came to trade and to establish their enterprises here. As a result of economic opportunities created by British economic expansion, the Chinese from the southern provinces of China and Indians from the southern provinces of India came in large numbers.

Consequently, the Chinese in Singapore out-numbered the Malays, while the Malays remained numerically the majority in pensinsular Malaya.

These developments provide an interesting opportunity for a comparative study of the Chinese and Malays in Singapore and peninsular Malaya (or Malaysia since independence in 1957). The Chinese now consitute about three-fourths of the total population in Singapore (1990 census: 78 per cent) but less than one-third in peninsular Malaysia (1990 census: 31 per cent). The Chinese are numerically a minority in Malaysia.

Stemming from the majority group, the economic success of the Chinese in Singapore is often taken for granted. Yet, as a minority group in numerical strength, the Chinese in peninsular Malaysia have higher economic attainment than the more numerous and politically dominant Malays. These two groups of Chinese separated by only a short causeway have done better than the indigenous Malays whether they are a majority or a numerical minority. Their success cannot be due to their numerical strength.

The Chinese in Singapore are also politically dominant since independence in 1965. There is status consistency among the Chinese in Singapore as their economic power more or less matches their political power. The Malays in peninsular Malaysia have greater political power than the Chinese as they hold most of the cabinet positions and the most powerful cabinet positions (e.g., Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Finance, Defence, Education, etc.) in the coalition government.

The economic success of the Chinese in both peninsular Malaysia and Singapore cannot be due to their political power as the

Chinese in Malaysia are politically a minority although they share some ministerial positions in the Malaysian cabinet. The Chinese in Malaysia experience status inconsistency: high in income and wealth but low in political power.

Given the above patterns, explanations of Chinese economic success must be sought from sources outside their numerical strength or political power in the polyethnic society. It is proposed here that they have a wider distribution of Ayal's behavioural propensities and "n Ach" compared with the Malays.

Cultural and Motivational Differences between Chinese and Malays

Employer : Employee Ratio: Chinese vs Malays

In the absence of survey data on behavioural propensities and "n Ach" on the Chinese and Malays in Singapore and peninsular Malaysia, population census data on economic activity and occupations are used as surrogates or indices for them.

The first to be used in this chapter is the employer : employee ratio. It is postulated that the Chinese are more enterprising and more risk-taking than the Malays. If this is true, then it is hypothesized that there are more Chinese employers per 100 Chinese employees than there are Malay employers per 100 Malay employees in both Singapore and peninsular Malaysia over a period of time.

Table 1 shows that there were 5.68 to 4.20 Chinese employers per 100 Chinese employees in Singapore in 1980 and 1990, compared with only 0.34 to 0.68 Malay employers to 100 Malay employees.

Comparing the Chinese ratio with that of the Malays in Singapore, there were 6.18 to 16.71 times as many Chinese employers as there were Malay employers per 100 employees in 1980-1990.

Table 1 Number of employers per 100 employees by ethnic group, Singapore and peninsular Malaysia, 1980 and 1990

Employers per 100 employees	Singapore		Peninsular Malaysia	
	1980	1990	1980	1990
Chinese	5.68	4.20	9.11	8.56
Malays	0.34	0.68	4.75	2.49
Chinese/Malays rate	16.71	6.18	1.92	3.44

Sources: Lau Kak En (1993:xvi); Khoo Teik Huat (n.d.:580, Table 6.2); and Malaysia (1991:123, Table 83.10).

During the same period in peninsular Malaysia, there were 8.56 to 9.11 Chinese employers per 100 Chinese employees compared with 2.49 to 4.75 Malay employers per 100 Malay employees. Comparing the two rates, there were 1.92 to 3.44 as many Chinese employers as there were Malay employers per 100 employees.

Comparing Singapore with more rural peninsular Malaysia, the Chinese rates were higher in the peninsula than in the island society: 8.56 to 9.11 in Malaysia compared with 4.20 to 5.68 in Singapore. The Malays in the peninsula had also higher rates than the Malays in Singapore: 2.49 to 4.75 compared with 0.34 to 0.68 only. This could be the result of the encouragement of the Malay-dominated government in peninsular Malaysia to create a Malay middle class of entrepreneurs. However, the difference in the Chinese to Malay ratio was much higher in Singapore (6.18 to 16.71) than in peninsular Malaysia (1.92 to 3.44).

Chinese and Malay Managers

The second surrogate index to be used is the percentage of the labour force who are managers. While they may or may not be risk-takers, they do participate in commercial or industrial enterprises owned by entrepreneurs and share the fortunes with the rise or fall of these enterprises. Table 2 shows evidence which is consistent with the above hypothesis that Chinese are more venturesome than Malays in both Singapore and peninsular Malaysia.

Table 2 Managers as percentage of labour force by ethnic group, Singapore and peninsular Malaysia, 1980 and 1990

Ethnic group	Singapore		Peninsular Malaysia	
	1980	1990	1980	1990
Chinese	6.8	10.0	2.0	10.9
Malays	0.7	1.1	0.5	1.4
Chinese/Malays rate	9.7	9.1	4.0	7.8

Sources: Lau Kak En (1993:xvii); Haji Mokhtar Shamsuddin (1986:104, Table 3-6); and Ghazali bin Jani (1991:36, Table 1-11).

In 1980 and 1990 in Singapore, 6.8 to 10.0 per cent of the Chinese were managers while only 0.7 to 1.1 per cent of the Malays were managers. The ratio of these rates show that there were 9.1 to 9.7 times as many Chinese managers as there were Malay managers per 100 workers.

During the same period in peninsular Malaysia, there were 2.0 to 10.9 per cent Chinese managers in the Chinese labour force while among the Malays, managers constituted only 0.5 to 1.4 per cent. Comparing the Chinese and Malay rates, there were 4.0 to 7.8 times as many Chinese managers as there were Malay managers per 100 workers.

Thus, in both years in Singapore and peninsular Malaysia, there were more Chinese managers than Malay managers per 100 workers. The difference is somewhat higher in Singapore (9.1 to 9.7) than in the peninsula (4.0 to 7.8).

Economic Development in Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia

Singapore has been set up by the British since 1819 as a free port. It depended greatly on entrepot trade, importing primary produce from Southeast Asian countries and re-exporting them to Britain and the rest of Europe, the United States and elsewhere, and importing from these countries industrial products which were re-exported to Southeast Asia. It was a "middle man." In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, its neighbouring countries decided to trade directly with the industrialized economies, thus bypassing Singapore. Consequently, Singapore's GDP dropped drastically by about one-fourth, and unemployment rose to 9-12 per cent. Three years after Singapore's independence (1968), the British government unilaterally decided to close down all its military bases situated to the east of the Suez canal. British troops were to be withdrawn from Singapore in 1971, causing further unemployment (30,000-40,000 workers in the bases lost their jobs).

As a result of British action, the Singapore government embarked on a course of rapid industrialization from 1968 onwards since its trade was declining rapidly, and it had very little land for agricultural expansion. Industrial estates were built with small and large factories as well as living quarters for workers and executive flats for managers and professionals. Several financial incentives such as tax holidays and tax reliefs were offered to investors. The educational system was revamped in order to produce disciplined blue-collar workers, relatively cheap engineers, managers, accountants, etc. The Employment Act was legislated to protect management from "unnecessary" strikes by workers. The unions were won over by the government. Consequently, the economy grew rapidly at 10 or more per cent per year throughout the 1970s and 1980s, except 1973-74 and 1985-86, earning Singapore the reputation of being one of the few NIEs in the world.

The 13 May 1969 race riots in peninsular Malaysia was interpreted by the Malay-dominated government and scholars to be an expression of Malay unhappiness over the growing economic gap

between them and the non-Malays, especially the Chinese. From 1970, the government pressed on the implementation of the New Economic Policy or NEP (Faaland et al., 1990; Ishak and Jomo, 1984). The NEP had two inter-related goals: to eradicate poverty, especially rural poverty, and the narrowing and ultimate elimination of the economic gap between Malays and non-Malays. Even as recently as 1990, the majority of the Malays live in rural areas. The rates of poverty are highest in rural areas, and Malay poverty is most serious in the rural areas of the peninsula. Regarding the second goal, the government wanted and still wants to create a Malay middle class of entrepreneurs, managers, professionals and technicians. It aimed at achieving ownership of 30 per cent of corporate wealth by Malays and Malay agencies by 1990.

Between 1980 and 1990, the Malaysian GDP increased by 69 per cent from M$44,702 million in 1980 to M$75,599 million in 1990 (both in 1978 prices), making Malaysia one of the forthcoming NIEs in the world.

Thus, both Singapore and peninsular Malaysia underwent economic development during the same period, with Singapore growing at a faster rate.

Affirmative Action in Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia

Singapore

Since the 1960s, the Singapore government has been very sensitive to the disruptive power of "racial" issues such as language, religion, etc. It has also understood the potential threat to political stability if the Malays lagged economically behind the Chinese and continued to do so. It has, therefore, implemented policies of affirmative action to help the Malays with free education from Primary 1 to university education, and the promotion of Malay interests through the MUIS and, from 1980, the setting up of Mendaki with government financial and other support. Mendaki has been headed by a Malay cabinet minister (who retired in

1993). It provides a wide range of programmes to assist the Muslims (99.8 per cent of the Malays are Muslims and about one-fourth of the Indians are also Muslims) from "cradle to grave," such as tuition, job training, launching a business or making a pilgrimage to Mecca.

Peninsular Malaysia

To achieve the twin NEP goals, the government implemented a wide range of policies of affirmative action in favour of the Malays. Some of these are: (1) increasing the Malay share of positions (about 75 per cent) in the institutions of tertiary education with financial support, (2) reserving about 80 per cent of the senior positions in the government administration for Malays so that they will implement these pro-Malay policies with enthusiasm, (3) giving low-interest loans to Malays for business and housing, (4) distributing more state land to Malay farmers, (5) requiring employers to hire more Malays in order to reflect the ethnic distribution of the population, (6) issuing licenses and awarding government contracts to Malays, etc.

In regard of the Chinese-dominated government of Singapore and the Malay-dominated government of Malaysia, the latter has been more vigorous in its implementation of affirmative action programmes favouring the Malays. It has also a wider range of such programmes to assist the Malays in peninsular Malaysia (Haji Mokhtar Shamsuddin, 1986:116-117, Table 3-12).

It is tempting to postulate that the economic disparity between the Chinese and Malays in peninsular Malaysia is likely to diminish faster in Malaysia than in Singapore.

However, the problems of disparity are far more difficult to resolve in Malaysia than in Singapore because (1) the peninsular Malays are harder to reach, especially those living in the less accessible states (provinces) such as Kelantan, Trengannu and Pahang, (2) the federal government cannot reach out to the Malays in states which are governed by the opposition party, PAS (a Muslim Party), which is more fundamentalist in religious orientation, (3) Malays are concentrated in rural areas and are poorer than the urban poor Malays, and (4) the sheer size of the Malay population in the peninsula. In contrast, Singapore is an island state, compact in geography, without any rural areas, and the Malays are "modern" in orientation, more outward-looking and are keener on learning from the Chinese Singaporeans.

State Intervention: Education

Educational reforms (e.g., The Razak Report and the Talib Report on education) make Malay the only medium of instruction from primary to tertiary levels, thus favouring Malays while non-Malays have to grapple with a non-mother tongue. Allocation of more places in universities and technical colleges for Malays has been implemented to produce more Malay graduates who will pull up the average Malay incomes.

Table 3 shows that in 1980, 2,338 Malays were enrolled in certificate courses increasing 5.75 times to 13,445 Malays in 1985. The Chinese who were enrolled in certificate courses rose only 2.05 times from 8,287 students in 1980 to 16,955 students in 1985. By 1985, there were slightly more Chinese students than Malays in certificate courses.

Malay diploma students multiplied 1.97 times from 13,809 to 27,151 students during this five-year period. Chinese diploma students increased only 1.45 times during this period from 7,636 to 11,066 students. By 1985, there were 2.45 times as many Malay diploma students as there were Chinese students.

Malay students in degree courses increased 1.59 times from 18,804 to 29,875 students from 1980 to 1985, while Chinese students grew only 1.34 times from 18,381 to 24,647 students. By 1985, Malay students in degree courses out-numbered Chinese students. In 1965/66, Malay students formed only 25.4 per cent of the total student population in the University of Malaya (the only university then), while Chinese students formed 58.9 per cent of the total. In 1980, Malay students in degree courses accounted for

45.4 per cent, rising to 49.4 per cent in 1985 while the Chinese share dropped to 44.3 per cent in 1980 and to 40.7 per cent in 1985.

Malays numbered 34,951 among all tertiary students taking certificate, diploma and degree courses in 1980, rising to 70,471 in 1985, while Chinese tertiary students grew from 34,304 to 52,668 during this five-year period. The Malays had surpassed the Chinese in tertiary education by 1985 as a result of government affirmative action and the efforts of Malay students.

Table 3 Enrolments in universities and technical colleges, 1965/66-1985, Malaysia

Types of tertiary education	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others
1980 Certificate				
Number	2,338	8,287	1,205	128
Per cent	19.6	69.3	10.1	1.0
Polytechnics	1,468	459	93	10
Tunku Abdul Rahman College	0	448	3	0
MARA Institute of Technology	122	0	0	0
Local private institutions	554	3,029	455	54
Institutions overseas	194	4,351	654	64
1985 Certificate				
Number	13,445	16,955	4,072	476
Per cent	38.5	48.5	11.6	1.4
Polytechnics	4,236	907	196	34
Tunku Abdul Rahman College	6	1,189	27	0
MARA Institute of Technology	283	0	0	0
Local private institutions	8,694	9,804	3,091	368
Institutions overseas	226	5,055	758	74
1980 Diploma				
Number	13,809	7,636	1,563	175
Per cent	59.5	32.9	6.7	0.8
Polytechnics	148	55	6	0
Tunku Abdul Rahman College	0	409	3	0
MARA Institute of Technology	7,492	0	0	0
Agriculture Univ. of Malaysia	1.566	71	42	2
Univ. of Technology Malaysia	2,215	180	54	19
Local private institutions	577	4,358	943	90
Institutions overseas	1,811	2,563	515	64
1985 Diploma				
Number	27,151	11,066	2,355	235
Per cent	66.5	27.1	5.8	0.6
Polytechnics	368	104	22	1
Tunku Abdul Rahman College	0	951	4	0
MARA Institute of Technology	16,889	0	0	0
Agriculture Univ. of Malaysia	2,940	29	34	2
Univ. of Technology Malaysia	3,363	229	96	14
Local private institutions	1,491	6,786	1,602	144
Institutions overseas	2,100	2,967	597	74
Univ. of Malaya, 1965/66 student population (%)	25.4	58.9	13.9	1.8
1980 Degree				
Number	18,804	18,381	3,928	341
Per cent	45.4	44.3	9.5	0.8
Tunku Abdul Rahman College	6	1,687	59	0
MARA Institute of Technology	725	0	0	0
Univ. of Malaya	4,063	3,124	677	181
Univ. of Science Malaysia	1,612	1,073	195	17
National Univ. of Malaysia	4,896	628	189	13
Agriculture Univ. of Malaysia	1,431	221	88	12
Univ. of Technology Malaysia	877	115	44	11
International Islamic Univ.	0	0	0	0
Northern Univ. of Malaysia	0	0	0	0
Institutions overseas	5,194	11,533	2,676	107

Table 3 (Continued)

1985 Degree				
Number	29,875	24,647	5,581	419
Per cent	49.4	40.7	9.2	0.7
Tunku Abdul Rahman College	3	2,099	42	2
MARA Institute of Technology	1,560	0	0	0
Univ. of Malaya	5,041	3,374	841	126
Univ. of Science Malaysia	3,996	2,509	657	45
National Univ. of Malaysia	6,454	1,914	468	64
Agriculture Univ. of Malaysia	3,652	603	253	17
Univ. of Technology Malaysia	2,284	567	154	26
International Islamic Univ.	363	14	14	0
Northern Univ. of Malaysia	488	161	44	3
Institutions overseas	6,034	13,406	3,108	136
1980 Total				
Number	34,951	34,304	6,696	644
Per cent	45.6	44.8	8.8	0.8
1985 Total				
Number	70,471	52.668	12,008	1,130
Per cent	51.7	38.7	8.8	0.8

Rate of change	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Others
1985/1980 Certificate	5.75	2.05	3.38	3.72
(Institution overseas)	(1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16)
1985/1980 Diploma	1.97	1.45	1.51	1.34
(Institution overseas)	(1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16)
1985/1980 Degree	1.59	1.34	1.42	1.23
(Institution overseas)	(1.16	1.16	1.16	1.27)
1985/1980 Total	2.02	1.54	1.79	1.75

Sources: UNESCO (1967:365-366, Tables 24-25); and
Haji Mokhtar Shamsuddin (1986:490-491, Table 19-3).

Credit, Contracts, Training and other Assistance

The state lent more to Malays than non-Malays. Table 4 shows that BPMB, MARA and MIDF lent M$297.2 million to Malays while MIDF (Malaysian Industrial Development Finance) lent M$135.1 million to non-Malays in 1981. In 1985, all three lent only M$128.4 million to Malays and MIDF lent M$68.1 million to non-Malays. Non-Malays depended on financing from private banks and finance companies: M$23,782.5 million in 1981, rising to M$44,032.6 million in 1985. These private financial institutions also lent to Malays M$6,324.9 million in 1981, rising rapidly to M$17,266.3 million in 1985.

Thus, Malays received more credit from the government or statutory bodies than non-Malays in 1981 and 1985. Non-Malays relied on private financial institutions. Despite their small numbers in the population, they obtained more credit from them than the Malays, indicating their greater entrepreneurial activities than the Malays and their trust by these financial institutions.

In 1981, the Telecommunications Department of the government allocated M$111.9 million worth of contracts to the non-Malays, compared with only M$43.4 million to Malays. But in 1985, there was a drastic reversal: it awarded M$248.6 million to Malays but a mere M$100,000 to non-Malays. Contracts from FELDA and DID showed the same pattern, favouring Malays more in 1985 than in 1981. PWD showed the reversed pattern, awarding contracts worth M$269.4 million in 1981, rising to M$405.1 million in 1985 to non-Malays, compared with M$280.9 million in 1981 to Malays, declining to M$198.5 million in 1985. RISDA showed a somewhat different pattern: it awarded M$158.4 million in contracts to Malays in 1981, dropping drastically to a mere M$7.8 million in 1985. On the other hand, it awarded M$51.4 million to non-Malays in 1981 but increased it to M$99.1 million in 1985.

Overall, these government and statutory bodies awarded altogether M$844.5 million in contracts to Malays in 1981, increasing their awards to them to M$989.1 million in 1985. Conversely, they awarded M$1,021.3 million to non-Malays in 1981, declining

rapidly to M$679.4 million in 1985, which was less than the Malay award in 1985.

Government and Malay-interest agencies provided entrepreneurial training almost exclusively to Malays: 6,743 Malays received training in 1981, increasing rapidly to 20,751 Malays in 1985. Only NPC provided training to a token 15 non-Malays in 1981, declining further to a mere 11 non-Malays.

The value of supplies contracts awarded to Malays multiplied from M$417.6 million in 1981 to M$751.5 million in 1985, while that for non-Malays dropped by one-third from M$1,405.2 million to M$1,027.5 million between 1981 and 1985. The Malays were catching up fast, but the non-Malays were still ahead.

Table 4 Selected indicators of participation in commerce and industry, Malaysia, 1981 and 1985

Value of credit assistance (M$m)	1981		1985	
	Malays	Non-Malays	Malays	Non-Malays
BPMB	150.0	0.0	68.4	0.0
MARA	90.0	0.0	46.8	0.0
MIDF	57.2	135.1	13.2	68.1
Sub-total	297.2	135.1	128.4	68.1
Commercial banks & finance companies	6,324.9	23,782.5	17,266.3	44,032.6
Sub-total	6,622.1	23,917.6	17,394.7	44,100.7
Value of work contract (M$m)				
PWD	280.9	269.4	198.5	405.1
RISDA	158.4	51.4	7.8	99.1
FELDA	109.1	289.7	405.3	118.5
DID	113.4	203.5	33.7	32.7
UDA	93.7	2.1	27.3	5.2
KETENGAH	14.8	1.2	3.4	14.1
Telecoms. Dept.	43.4	111.9	248.6	0.1

Table 4 (Continued)

DARA	6.7	17.3	6.5	0.2
KEJORA	6.8	12.6	4.7	0.2
KESEDAR	4.6	19.1	32.1	1.9
NEB	12.7	43.1	21.2	2.3
Sub-total	844.5	1,021.3	989.1	679.4
Value of supplies contract (M$m)	417.6	1,405.2	751.5	1,027.5
Number of participants in entrepreneurial training (persons)				
PWD	222	0	398	0
BPMB	134	0	343	0
BBMB	0	0	1,109	0
MARA	0	0	15,000	0
Pernas Edar	1,447	0	1,000	0
NPC	4,940	15	2,901	11
Total	6,743	15	20,751	11
Number of licences issued				
Road transport	3,428	3,396	2,718	1,532
New housing developers	74	176	79	184
Logging	678	348	332	120
Printing	195	1,099	182	943
Private agency	52	48	84	69
Export	NA	NA	82	6,557
Import	NA	NA	675	7,903
Advisory service	12,117	0	6,915	0
Approved permits	372	1,346	1,406	3,132
Registered businesses	78,965	237,602	154,215	351,661
Other distributors	2,239	8,592	2,622	14,860

Source: Haji Mokhtar Shamsuddin (1986:116-117, Table 3-12).

All in all, the government, statutory bodies and Malay-interest agencies provided more credit assistance, contracts and entrepreneurial training to Malays than to non-Malays between 1981 and 1985. They also increased the supplies contracts to Malays and decreased them to non-Malays. It must be stressed that non-Malays also derived substantial benefits from them. As expected, the Malay-dominated government cannot be seen to support only the Malays exclusively as it cannot sustain its political dominance without the non-Malay votes and the support of its non-Malay partners in the polyethnic alliance.

Mean and Median Monthly Incomes of Chinese and Malays

Singapore

Income data on the Singapore population are available for 1980 and 1990 only. Table 5 shows that the mean monthly income of the Chinese workers was S$595 in 1980 increasing 2.52 times to S$1,497 in 1990. The mean monthly income of the Malays was S$388 in 1980 multiplying 2.70 times to S$1,049 in 1990. As a result of the faster rate of increase of the Malays within the decade, the mean Malay monthly income in 1980 was equal to 65.2 per cent of that of the Chinese, rising to 70.1 per cent in 1990. The relative income gap between the Singapore Chinese and Malays has thus decreased. However, the absolute gap has widened from S$207 to S$448 per month during the decade. The absolute gap is expected to diminish when the two mean incomes are close to one another.

Table 5 Working persons aged 15 years and over by monthly income from work and ethnic group, Singapore, 1980 and 1990 (%)

Monthly income from work (S$)	1980		1990	
	Chinese	Malays	Chinese	Malays
Below 500	60.2	81.7	6.9	9.4
500 - 999	26.6	15.7	36.8	47.8
1,000 - 1,499	6.7	1.8	24.5	27.0
1,500 - 1,999	2.9	0.5	12.4	9.4
2,000 - 2,999	2.1	0.2	10.2	4.6
3,000 and over	1.5	0.1	9.2	1.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Average (S$)	595	388	1,497	1,049
Malays/Chinese	65.2%		70.1%	
Chinese-Malays ($)	207		448	

Source: Lau Kak En (1993:17, Table 13).

Malaysia

The monthly income gap between the Chinese and Malays in peninsular Malaysia has also decreased. Table 6 shows that in 1973, the gross monthly income of the Chinese stood at M$534 growing 2.96 times to M$1,582 in 1989. The Malay mean monthly income was only M$242 in 1973 rising 3.85 times to M$931 in 1989. Resulting from the faster rate of increase in the Malay incomes, the income gap between the Chinese and Malays diminished between 1973 and 1989. During this period, the mean monthly Malay income rose from 45.3 per cent of the mean Chinese monthly income in 1973 to 58.8 per cent in 1989. However, the absolute monthly income gap between the Malaysian Chinese and Malays rose from M$292 to M$651 during this period.

Table 6 Mean gross monthly incomes by ethnic group, peninsular Malaysia, 1973-1989 (in current prices, M$)

Ethnic group	1973	1976	1979	1984	1987	1989	1989/73
Chinese	534	787	1,094	1,502	1,430	1,582	2.96
Malays	242	345	513	852	868	931	3.85
C minus M	292	442	581	650	562	651	NA
M/C (%)	45.3	43.8	46.9	56.7	60.7	58.8	NA

Sources: Mokhtar bin Haji Shamsuddin (1981:56, Table 3.9); Haji Mokhtar Shamsuddin (1986:99, Table 3-4); and Department of Statistics (1993:33, Table 11.1).

In both Singapore and peninsular Malaysia, the relative monthly income gap between the Chinese and Malays has decreased while the absolute gap has increased. The relative gap between the Chinese and Malays has diminished faster in Singapore where the Malay mean monthly income was equal to 70.1 per cent of that of the Chinese in 1990, while the Malay mean monthly income in peninsular Malaysia was only equal to 58.8 per cent of that of the Chinese in 1989. The Malays in Singapore have still to bridge a relative gap of 29.9 percentage points while the Malaysian Malays have still to bridge a gap of 41.2 percentage points in the years to come.

Summary

Both the economies of Singapore and Malaysia have grown rapidly, with the former growing at a faster rate. Singapore is well known as one of the few NIEs in the world while Malaysia is expected to join their ranks soon.

In the midst of economic growth, both governments are concerned about the growing social class disparity between the Chinese and the Malays, and both governments have implemented policies of affirmative action in favour of the disadvantaged Malays. Between them, the Malay-dominated government in Malaysia has a wider range of affirmative action programmes to help the Malays and implements them with greater vigour than the Singapore government.

The Malays in both societies have responded positively to state intervention. Consequently, the relative disparity in the mean monthly incomes of the Chinese and Malays in both societies has diminished over the last one or two decades. However, the absolute income gap between the two ethnic groups has widened during this period. It is expected that, in the future, as the relative gap becomes very small, the absolute gap will also diminish as well.

Unfortunately, income data on the Chinese and Malays in both Singapore and Malaysia in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as annual income data for the 1970s, 1980s and the early 1990s are not available. Their absence makes it impossible to test whether (1) between 1950 and 1970 the mean monthly incomes between the Chinese and Malays in both Singapore and the peninsular Malaysia had in fact increased as hypothesized, and (2) between 1980 and 1985 the monthly income gap between the two ethnic groups in Singapore, and between 1990 and 1993 the monthly income gap between these two groups in peninsular Malaysia had widened again due to these two economies reaching a higher stage of development as hypothesized.

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9

Labour Market Segmentation and Gender Inequality in Singapore

William K. M. Lee

Gender inequality is an issue that is under research in Singapore. Much of the literature deals with issues from descriptive data with little or no theoretical assumption. This study examines gender inequality in the manufacturing sector using the dual economy theory. Specifically, this study examines the relationship between economic structure and gender income inequality in Singapore's manufacturing sector. Data come from the 1983-1988 Report of the Census of Industrial Production and the Labour Force Survey.

A Dual Economy and Gender Inequality

The emergence of a dual economy is associated with the consequential economic trends associated with the formation of monopolistic capitalism (Edwards, 1975). The drive for capital accumulation and profits by firms leads to the break down of the competitive market. The magnification of this trend leads to the formation of two industrial sectors, the core and the periphery (Averitt, 1968). Firms in the core are large, unionized and rela-

tively indifferent to oscillating product demand because they control a huge share of the product market. They are capital-intensive and enjoy a large profit margin. This sector commands economic characteristics that demand a stable and trainable workforce. Further, these economic qualities allow core firms to offer higher pay, better working conditions and job stability (Kalleberg and Berg, 1981, 1988; Hodson, 1978, 1984, 1987).

However, competitive capitalism does not dissipate. Smaller entrepreneurial firms dominate production activities where large-scale productions are not possible. These firms operate under competitive conditions. Firms in this competitive sector, called the periphery, are small, labour intensive and sensitive to shifts in the product market. Periphery firms have low profit and limited product line. In contrast to core firms, periphery firms require a workforce that accepts inferior, if not adverse, working conditions, lower pay and greater job instability (Beck et al., 1980a, 1980b; Tolbert et al., 1980; Boston, 1990). Hence, the workers with the weakest positions in the workforce, such as females, are often disproportionately channelled into the periphery sector.

The analysis of gender inequality is a major theme of the dual economy theory. Income differences between gender groups are attributed to the unequal distributions of gender groups over core and periphery. Accordingly, discrimination channels females into the low paying periphery sector, and it is their concentration in the periphery that explains their lower incomes (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Reich et al., 1973; Beck et al., 1978, 1980a, 1980b; Tolbert et al., 1980).

If the dual economy theory is useful in explaining gender inequality in Singapore's manufacturing sector, then we expect males to be concentrated in the core while females are concentrated in the periphery. This does not mean that the human capital factors of workers are not important, just that they are incomplete. Females in the periphery will still earn lower incomes, even after controlling for human capital differences, reflecting the disadvantaged positions of females that are independent of human capital factors (Kalleberg and Sorenson, 1979; Wallace and Kalleberg, 1981; Kalleberg and Berg, 1987).

Empirical Evidence: Testing the Dual Economy Theory on Gender Inequality

Studies that have examined the positions of females are not unanimous in their conclusions that females are more likely to be channelled into the periphery. For instance, Beck et al. (1978) and Tolbert et al. (1980) find that females are over-represented in the periphery. Conversely, Bridges (1980) and Boyd and Humphreys (1979) find little support for the hypothesis that females are more likely to be concentrated in the periphery.

Another theoretical premise of the dual economy theory is that the concentrations of females in the periphery explain their lower incomes. Again, the findings on this issue are conflicting. Beck et al. (1980a) find that females are more likely to be in the periphery, and their concentration in the periphery explains their lower incomes. In support of Beck et al. (1980a), Boston (1990) finds that a portion of the gender income gap is attributed to the disproportional location of females in the periphery. Contesting these findings, Ward and Mueller (1985) find that females are indeed disproportionately channelled into the periphery, but their concentration in the periphery does not account for the income gap between males and females. Similarly, other studies such as Hodson (1978), Dasko (1982), Denton (1984) and Coverdill (1988) find that females are over-represented in the periphery, but their differential distributions over industrial sectors provide little explanation to the difference in earnings between males and females.

The above studies show that the findings on dual economy theory explanation of gender inequality remain contradictory in North America. One reason for this contradiction may stem from the fact that white males in the core have not been entirely successful at excluding females from the core. They might have only

been successful at excluding females from high paying jobs in the core. If this is true, then structural analysis within industrial sectors, which involves examining the firms' internal labour markets, rather than an analysis between industrial sectors would provide a better explanation of racial and gender income inequality.

Data Source and Research Procedure

The data source for this study came from longitudinal aggregate data collected by the Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Ministry of Labour of Singapore. Economic indicators that include capital intensity, economy of scale, sales, output, value added, size, export and foreign investment are factors analysed to establish core and periphery sectors.

The central dependent variable, income, refers to all fixed annual income from the worker's main occupation. In addition to descriptive statistics, this study uses multivariate analysis, specifically Multiple Classification Analysis, to determine the effects of several independent variables (education, skill and work experience) on a single dependent variable (income).

Finally, the Blinder's decomposition technique is employed to examine the extent of discrimination between gender groups (Jones and Kelley, 1984). This technique decomposes wage models to show how much income differences between groups are due to human capital differences, and how much is due to discrimination. The following describes the decomposition technique.

Base Wage Model:

$$YMale_{it} = a_m + b_m MaleEduc_{it} + e_{it} \quad (1)$$

$$YFemale_{it} = a_f + b_f FemaleEduc_{it} + e_{it} \quad (2)$$

Decomposition:

$$YFemale_{it}^* = a_m + b_m FemaleEduc_{it} + e_{it} \quad (3)$$

$$YFemale_{it}^* - YFemale_{it} = (a_m - a_f) - (b_m - b_f) MaleEduc_{it} + e_{it} \quad (4)$$

$$YMale_{it} - YFemale_{it}^* = b_m(MaleEduc_{it} - FemaleEduc_{it}) + e_{it} \quad (5)$$

$$YMale - YFemale = \text{equations (4) + (5)} \quad (6)$$

Y is earning for respective male and female groups, b is the vector of regression coefficients, *Educ* is human capital endowment for the respective gender groups, i represents cross-section units, and t represents time periods. If females were to retain their human capital endowments but be paid according to males' pay structure, b_m, then females' hypothetical earnings without wage discrimination would be reflected in equation (3). The difference between females' hypothetical earnings and actual earnings reflects wage discrimination, and this is expressed in equation (4). Income difference between males' actual earnings and females' hypothetical earnings reflects income differences due to differences in human capital endowment, and this is reflected in equation (5). Overall gender income difference would be obtained by adding equations (4) and (5).

Findings

The division of core and periphery industries in Singapore manufacturing sector after factor analysis is shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Ranking of industries by factor scores, 1983-1988

1983		1984		1985	
F.S.	Industries	F.S.	Industries	F.S.	Industries
-.55060	Leather	-.65236	Footwear	-.65559	Footwear
-.51213	Footwear	-.63497	Leather	-.54334	Leather
-.44561	Rubber	-.55741	Rubber	-.52002	Rubber
-.44540	Furniture	-.53231	Furniture	-.48010	Wearing app.
-.42935	Textiles	-.53007	Textiles	-.47577	Other manuf.
-.41168	Other manuf.	-.50963	Wearing app.	-.47499	Timber
-.40290	Plastics	-.49719	Timber	-.46812	Rubber prod.
-.39989	Timber	-.48596	Other manuf.	-.44731	Precision eq.
-.39502	Wearing app.	-.46167	Plastics	-.43732	Textiles
-.38631	Printing	-.46056	Rubber prod.	-.41162	Furniture
-.34448	Rubber prod.	-.41921	Printing	-.37442	Non-metallic
-.33837	Paper prod.	-.40861	Pottery	-.34059	Food
-.32637	Fab. metal	-.36902	Non-metallic	-.30156	Indus. mach.
-.31031	Food	-.36598	Fab. metal.	-.30101	Transport.
-.30233	Brick	-.32635	Paper prod.	-.28552	Pottery
-.30139	Non-metallic	-.30240	Indus. mach.	-.27137	Non-ferrous
-.22719	Indus. mach.	-.26814	Food	-.27121	Elec. mach.
-.21039	Transport.	-.24502	St. cement	-.26742	Plastics
-.20547	Pottery	-.24006	Transport.	-.26504	Fab. metal
-.15548	Non-ferrous	-.23622	Precision eq.	-.13882	Printing
-.15013	Precision eq.	-.21604	Non-ferrous.	-.11538	Paper prod.
-.13423	Indus. chem.	-.17137	Brick	>	
-.12770	St. cement	-.14744	Elec. mach.	.01934	Cement
-.12342	Elec. mach.	>		.05009	St. cement
>		.32007	Pharmac.	.10503	Pharmac.
.01103	Beverages	.36294	Beverages	.10708	Iron & steel
.01422	Pharmac.	.46443	Iron & steel	.22019	Electronics
.22992	Iron & steel	.50710	Cement	.23111	Brick
.38168	Tobacco	.60092	Electronics	.40619	Beverages
.40826	Electronics	.64502	Indus. chem.	.58229	Tobacco
1.69590	Cement	1.38718	Tobacco	1.15065	Indus. chem.
4.89511	Petroleum	4.75031	Petroleum	4.97454	Petroleum

Table 1 (Continued)

-.67082	Pottery	-.86861	Wearing app.	-.75295	Wearing app.
-.66040	Footwear	-.75527	Precision eq.	-.65317	Precision eq.
-.66030	Leather	-.62268	Rubber	-.47616	Other manuf.
-.64511	Rubber	-.59417	Timber	-.44462	Elec. mach.
-.62372	Wearing app.	-.51300	Furniture	-.41108	Furniture
-.61038	Timber	-.51299	Other manuf.	-.40785	Non-metallic
-.47092	Other manuf.	-.50624	Footwear	-.40198	Timber
-.45667	Furniture	-.47511	Leather	-.38887	Electronics
-.44143	Rubber prod.	-.45708	Transport.	-.36602	Transport.
-.39442	Plastics	-.40213	Elec. mach.	-.34777	Rubber prod.
-.38034	Textiles	-.36714	Non-metallic	-.31815	Footwear
-.35691	Non-metallic	-.36408	Food	-.30433	Indus. mach.
-.34884	Food	-.26513	Indus. mach	-.30007	Rubber
-.31871	Indus. mach.	-.26489	Pottery	-.29667	Food
-.29542	St. cement	-.25854	Textiles	-.28853	Leather
-.28383	Brick	-.16597	Rubber prod.	-.24243	Textiles
-.28333	Fab. metal	-.15702	Printing	-.18371	Fab. metal
-.27938	Printing	-.14870	Non-ferrous	-.12968	Printing
-.23837	Paper	-.13259	Fab. metal	-.12251	Plastics
-.23040	Transport.	-.11513	Brick	-.10670	Paper prod.
-.10548	Precision eq.	-.07396	St. cement	-.06502	Brick
>		-.02413	Paper prod.	-.03100	Non-ferrous
.00428	Elec. mach.	-.02387	Plastics	-.02108	Pottery
.05133	Iron & steel	>		-.01914	St. cement
.14457	Cement	.20315	Electronics	>	
.24297	Pharmac.	.27886	Cement	.02415	Pharmac.
.29759	Beverages	.32314	Tobacco	.05283	Cement
.62286	Non-ferrous	.37476	Beverages	.12488	Iron & steel
.69203	Tobacco	.41691	Pharmac.	.22713	Tobacco
.93311	Indus. chem.	.45061	Iron & steel	.49084	Beverages
.98030	Electronics	1.12151	Indus. chem.	1.10497	Indus. chem.
4.78615	Petroleum	4.89598	Petroleum	5.05467	Petroleum

Note: F.S. = Factor scores for FACTOR1.

To summarize, the industries in the core include: Petroleum; Beverages; Tobacco; Industrial Chemicals; Pharmaceuticals; Electronics and Computers; Cement; and Basic Metals. Industries in the periphery include: Food; Textiles; Wearing Apparels; Leather; Timber and Wood; Furniture and Fixture; Paper Products; Printing; Natural Rubber; Rubber Products; Plastics; Pottery; Brick and Clay; Structural Cement; Non-Metallic Products; Non-Ferrous Products; Fabricated Metal; Industrial Machinery; Electrical Machinery; Transportation; Precision Equipment; and Other Manufacturing.

Table 2 shows that core industries' economic characteristics are much superior than those in the periphery.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics by industrial sectors, 1983-1988

		1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Capital intensity (CAPINTS)							
Core	M	46,384	27,962	26,174	13,693	17,811	34,629
	SD	38,456	13,588	24,533	10,131	14,622	45,622
Periphery	M	7,275	5,516	5,255	4,086	6,005	6,955
	SD	4,528	3,357	4,577	2,116	4,559	4,723
Economy of scale per firm (ECOSCALE)							
Core	M	8.3m	4.5m	4.4m	2.5m	3.6m	7.9m
	SD	8.1m	3.9m	5.3m	3.6m	5.0m	13.0m
Periphery	M	55,163	295,300	302,000	264,000	369,000	411,000
	SD	457,974	210,000	280,000	263,000	340,000	363,000
Sales per firm (SALES)							
Core	M	270m	154m	175m	110m	132m	142m
	SD	501m	346m	351m	228m	251m	253m
Periphery	M	5.8m	5.0m	6.6m	5.4m	6.0m	7.1m
	SD	4.3m	3.3m	6.5m	5.3m	4.6m	5.6m

Table 2 (Continued)

Output per worker (OUTPUT)							
Core	M	963,060	653,980	732,685	967,100	603,773	664,900
	SD	1.4m	1.1m	1.2m	1.3m	770,751	822,088
Periphery	M	96,573	94,974	111,336	97,508	110,433	128,270
	SD	54,306	58,771	80,874	55,459	56,862	74,742
Value added per worker (VALUE)							
Core	M	151,500	105,665	115,659	119,518	151,946	187,185
	SD	133,315	70,540	71,729	63,933	76,508	116,266
Periphery	M	34,815	32,707	35,492	35,465	38,762	42,312
	SD	20,237	13,013	14,950	16,749	15,472	17,602
Size*							
Core	M	206	167	178	152	172	187
	SD	125	108	113	125	121	116
Periphery	M	61	56	55	53	54	58
	SD	33	30	31	32	33	37
Foreign investment per firm (FORINVES)							
Core	M	50.8m	30m	42m	35m	36m	30m
	SD	104m	75m	86m	83m	76m	60m
Periphery	M	1.2m	902,000	1.1m	1.4m	1.2m	1.6m
	SD	2.0m	1.5m	1.3m	1.7m	1.8m	2.4m
Exports per firm							
Core	M	160m	91m	107m	63m	78m	86m
	SD	331m	230m	226m	141m	158m	162m
Periphery	M	2.6m	2.2m	2.4m	2.4m	2.7m	2.1m
	SD	2.2m	1.9m	2.6m	2.5m	2.9m	3.0m

Notes: m = values in million Singapore dollars.
* = number of workers.

Table 3 shows that core workers earn a higher income than periphery workers. Table 4 highlights the point that income difference remains large even after controlling for human capital differences.

Table 3 Mean income and income differences by industrial sectors, 1983-1988

	Core	Periphery
Overall mean income	24,478	14,048
Standard deviation	8,985	3,985
Overall income difference	10,700	

Note: All values in Singapore dollars.

Table 4 Multiple classification analysis of education on income levels by industrial sectors, 1983-1988

Industrial sectors	N	Unadjusted deviations	Adjusted for education difference
Core	48	7,975	7,810
Periphery	138	-2,774	-2,716
Grand mean		16,822	

Note: All values in Singapore dollars.

Table 5 shows that the overall income difference between males and females is very large. Females earn only 62.8 per cent as much as males.

Table 5 Overall income and income inequality between gender groups, 1983-1988

Gender groups	Mean income	Standard deviations	Income difference
Males	12,866	3,779	
Females	8,087	3,222	
Males - Females			4,779
t-value: 20.11***			

*** P < .001.
Note: All values in Singapore dollars.

Table 6 shows that there are small differences in years of education between gender groups.

Table 6 Average years of education between gender groups, 1983-1988

Gender groups	Mean education	Standard deviations	Difference
Males	8.09	1.12	
Females	7.78	1.69	
Males - Females			0.3
t-value: 2.54***			

*** P < .001.

Table 7 shows that Multiple Classification Analysis shows that income difference remains large even after controlling for human capital factors. This suggests that income difference between male and female cannot be due to human capital differences, but to structural factors.

Table 7 Effects of education on mean income by gender groups

Gender groups	Unadjusted deviations	Adjusted deviations
Males	-2,119	-2,031
Females	2,853	2,700
Overall difference	4,972	4,731

Note: All values in Singapore dollars.

Dual economy theory argues that due to structural reasons uneven distribution of gender groups over core and periphery explain gender inequality where males dominate the higher paying core and females are concentrated in the lower paying periph-

ery. Table 8 shows that males are not more likely to be in the core and females are not more likely to be in the periphery.

Table 8 Distribution of gender groups over core and periphery sectors, 1983-1988

Gender groups	Percentage in core	Percentage in periphery	Total
Males	24.4	75.6	129,946 (47%)
Females	44.3	55.7	144,345 (53%)

Hence, this concludes that dual economy theory is not useful in explaining gender inequality. The finding that neither dual economy theory nor human capital differences explain gender inequality suggests that factors such as wage discrimination may offer some explanation to the large income gap between gender groups.

Table 9 presents results from GLSE technique of pooled time-series regression analysis of the base wage models (Stimson, 1985).

Table 9 Regression analysis on income levels with education levels of gender groups

	Males	Females
Constant	6,063	4,744
B	840***	429***
R-square (adjusted)	0.037	0.064
RHO (0.5)		

*** P < .001.

It is apparent for Table 9 that males have greater returns to human capital factors than females. Further, holding education constant, males earn higher incomes. With these estimates and the overall education levels in Table 6, we can now decompose gender income difference. The decomposition of income equations, in Table 10, shows that, with 8.09 years of education, male earns S$12,858. With 7.79 years of education, female earns S$8,081. Using males' wage structure, females earn a hypothetical income of S$12,598. Wage discrimination is S$4,517 (S$12,598 - S$8,081). Income difference that is due to human capital differences is S$260 (S$12,858 - S$12,598). The overall income difference is S$4,777 (S$4,517 + S$260). Of the S$4,777 advantage a male worker has over a female worker, only 5.4 per cent or S$260 is due to the male's greater human capital, and 94.6 per cent or S$4,517 is due to wage discrimination.

Table 10 Decomposition of earning differentiation between males and females

Decomposition	Equations	Values
Male actual earnings	$a_m + b_m$ $MaleHC_{it}$	12,858
Female actual earnings	$a_f + b_f$ $FemaleHC_{it}$	8,081
Females earnings with no discrimination	$a_m + b_m$ $FemaleHC_{it}$	12,598
Discrimination	$(a_m - a_f) + (b_m - b_f)$ $FemaleHC_{it}$	4,517
Endowment differences	b_m $(MaleHC_{it} - FemaleHC_{it})$	260
Overall income difference	YMale – YFemale	4,777

Note: All values are in Singapore dollars.

It is clear from the above findings that a very small portion of the income difference between male and female is due to human capital differences. The findings show that gender income inequality is due to discrimination. A possible source of this dis-

crimination is the concentration of females in low paying industries and occupations.

Dualists argue that females' late entry in the labour market, cultural perception of gender roles and males' success in preventing females from operating in males' dominated labour markets are causes for greater females' concentration in the periphery. It is possible that these structural processes are operating within sectors at the industry level. To test this assumption, it is necessary to examine the distribution patterns of gender groups within sectors.

Table 11 shows the distribution patterns of gender groups within core industries. The 94 per cent of female workers in the core are found in the lowest paying core industry, Electronics and Computer industry. In all core industries, females earn less than males. This would suggest that females are concentrated in lower paying occupations.

Table 11 Overall mean income of core industries and mean income and distribution of gender groups by core industries, 1983-1988

Industries	Overall mean income	Male income/ Dist. (%)	Female income/ Dist. (%)
Petroleum	44,156	21,905 (9.7)	17,122 (0.5)
Beverages	17,674	11,824 (5.1)	8,145 (1.1)
Tobacco	26,584	19,111 (0.9)	11,557 (0.4)
Industrial chemicals	27,425	16,723 (7.9)	11,015 (1.0)
Pharmaceuticals	22,772	16,978 (8.9)	10,146 (2.6)
Electronics/Computers	13,522	15,325 (61.0)	6,275 (94.0)
Cement	21,885	12,333 (1.3)	10,527 (0.1)
Basic metal	24,355	13,285 (4.2)	8,571 (0.2)

Notes: Values in brackets are percentages of gender groups in the various industries. Average total males in core are 31,736. Average total females in core are 63,896. Average total workers in core are 95,632.
All income values are in Singapore dollars.

In the periphery, Table 12 shows that females are concentrated in the second lowest paying periphery industry, Wearing Apparels. Of female workers in the periphery, 30 per cent are concentrated in this industry. In the high paying periphery industries, Industrial Machinery and Transportation, 14.1 per cent and 19.5 per cent of male workers are in these respective industries. An important point to note is that in all periphery industries, female workers earn less than their male counterparts. Hence, the lower average income of female workers in the periphery is due to female concentration in lower paying industries as well as lower paying occupations within industries.

Table 12 Overall mean income of periphery industries and mean income and distribution of gender groups by periphery industries, 1983-1988

Industries	Overall mean income	Male income/ Dist. (%)	Female income/ Dist. (%)
Food processing	14,879	11,112 (6.3)	7,134 (4.8)
Textiles	12,430	12,692 (1.2)	5,954 (2.7)
Wearing apparels	9,058	10,509 (3.2)	5,136 (30.0)
Leather	10,268	9,169 (0.4)	5,396 (0.4)
Footwear	8,047	9,026 (0.5)	5,484 (0.5)
Timber and wood	11,835	10,992 (2.5)	6,826 (1.9)
Furniture	10,308	8,403 (4.7)	6,365 (3.3)
Paper	15,803	11,763 (2.2)	8,877 (1.7)
Printing	17,949	13,221 (7.7)	9,788 (7.5)
Natural rubber	18,979	12,353 (0.09)	5,400 (0.05)
Rubber products	12,880	11,222 (0.9)	7,446 (0.4)
Plastics	11,994	12,016 (4.4)	5,673 (0.8)
Pottery	15,234	9,988 (0.4)	6,949 (0.1)
Brick and clay	16,003	11,421 (0.4)	6,573 (0.09)
Structural cement	15,744	14,930 (3.3)	9,134 (0.2)
Non-metallic prod.	14,845	12,721 (1.0)	10,750 (0.6)
Non-ferrous prod.	18,675	13,718 (0.5)	12,901 (0.2)

Table 12 (Continued)

Fabricated metal	15,019	10,508 (14.1)	7,293 (8.9)
Industrial mach.	18,674	14,312 (15.7)	9,270 (5.9)
Electrical mach.	13,741	13,224 (6.5)	6,301 (13.0)
Transportation	19,502	11,936 (19.5)	9,588 (2.7)
Precision equip.	12,934	14,125 (1.9)	6,817 (4.8)
Other manuf.	11,364	12,008 (2.2)	6,136 (3.8)

Notes: Values in brackets are percentages of gender groups in the various industries. Average total males in periphery are 98,210. Average total females in periphery are 80,454. Average total workers in periphery are 178,664.
All income values are in Singapore dollars.

In summary, the distribution patterns of gender groups in the core and the periphery show that not all core industries and jobs have high incomes and not all periphery industries and jobs have low incomes. However, females are disproportionately clustered in lower paying industries as well as in lower occupations in both core and periphery sectors.

Discussion

Why are females over-represented in the lower paying industries and occupations in both core and periphery? Manufacturing in Singapore is a male dominated activity. Since industrialization, females have been successful in penetrating into males' controlled jobs, but the bulk of females are still in jobs that are sexually defined. These jobs are often an extension of women's domestic role as housewives which does not require much physical strength, but in tasks that require manual dexterity and patience. These perceptions of the female's role have segregate females in assembly line work such as electrical and electronic assemblies. Skilled work in both core and periphery industries are retained for males because females are assumed to lack the required skills. On

the other hand, most female entrants to manufacturing enter the ranks of unskilled and semi-skilled production workers where pay is low. The emergence of such segregation may be due in part to employers using statistical discrimination. Employers do not always make hiring decisions on rational grounds. Patriarchal traditions narrowly define female roles around child rearing and home-making. Women may be kept out of jobs that require "male" characteristics or work with male coworkers. Employers may also segregate females to low-paying jobs because females are perceived as less productive and as not serious in pursuing a career. Thus, cultural beliefs which perceive females as less economically productive, better in manual repetitive tasks and not serious in pursuing a career may also be responsible for segregating females to lower paying jobs. Further, females' entries into manufacturing may be seen as a threat by males. To protect their economic positions and prevent downward effects of females on wages, males have successfully segregated females into less desirable jobs and lower paying industries. The consistent findings of females earning lower wages in all industries support these conclusions.

In the foreseeable future, women will still be segregated in low-paying jobs that have been termed "women's job" or jobs suited for women. This will persist as long as culture continues to stereotype what constitute a "man's job," and what constitutes a "female's job." As long as this continues, gender inequality will not see a narrowing trend. Further, as long as the newly valued industries such as Electronics, Industrial Chemicals and Pharmaceutical industries continue to employ young inexperience females for assembly line work because of cost benefits, gender inequality will remain large.

Conclusion and Theoretical Implications

The study shows that dual economy theory is not useful in explaining gender inequality in Singapore's manufacturing sector.

Dual economy theory must move away from the assumption of direct parallelism between core and periphery sectors and labour market segments. That is, dual economy theory must rethink the assumption that all core jobs are good and high-paying jobs and all periphery jobs are bad low-paying jobs. In fact, there are high- and low-paying jobs in both core and periphery sectors. The findings suggest that, in attempts to lower cost, firms in both the core and the periphery are trying to isolate less stable, low-paying jobs to females. Thus, it would be fruitful for dual economy theory to move away from a sectoral distribution of groups and focus on job structures within sectors and industries. The focus then should be on how dominant groups maximize their own interests by creating structural barriers to high-paying industries and occupations. Such barriers may result in different on-the-job training, wages, terms of employment and promotion. The criteria for the execution of these barriers may be based on race, gender and cultural differences. Thus, the focus on job structures and structural barriers would require dual economy theory to include a theory of internal labour markets and the Weberian concept of "social closure." The former will allow greater examination of the mechanism within job structures, the latter will provide an explanation as to why certain social groups experience different job structures. From a Weberian perspective, one could say that males in Singapore's manufacturing sector have practised exclusionary social closure successfully. If it is true that exclusionary social closure exists in manufacturing, then the experience of discrimination is an institutional one. Institutional discrimination stems directly from the fact that a gender group has control over an area of institutional activity and has thus established structures, procedures and rules of behaviour that are in accordance with its own cultural imperatives and interests. A possible future research agenda following these theoretical arguments would be to conduct a survey to gather detail information on hiring procedures, promotion, employees' work ethics, employers' perception of gender groups' work ethics and mobility patterns of gender groups.

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10

Economic Reform and Restratification in Urban Guangdong

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Along with the global collapse of communist systems in the 1980s, two types of distinctively different post-communist transition societies have emerged. The formal Soviet Union and a number of East European countries represent one category, where the collapse of the political system has greatly affected the prospects for economic reforms. China represents a different type of the transition society, where drastic changes in the economic system have been under way but the political system has more or less maintained its Leninist nature.

The latter category, represented by the Chinese case, presents interesting puzzles for social scientists who are interested in social restratification during the transition to a market economy. On the one hand, political stability may imply less chaotic changes and a smoother transition. On the other hand, the same political system also breeds opportunities for those who have access to power to translate political influence into economic gains. Economic reform in the absence of democratic political reform has been argued by some to have benefited disproportionately more those who have

access to political power. To what extent and at what pace the society restratifies, therefore, have a direct impact on social movement and unrest in these societies. The 1989 mass movement in Beijing and several other urban centres in China, for example, not only involved students and intellectuals, but also workers and ordinary urban residents (Walder, 1991). A major resentment of the urban residents was targeted at the increased corruption of the government officials and their children, not at the individual entrepreneurs.

Evidence of social restratification in urban China so far are predominantly based on government statistics and journalistic reports. Government statistics tend to emphasize the overall positive improvement in income and standard of living after the reform, but they do not offer any information of changes by social groups. Journalistic reports, on the other hand, tend to focus on spotted corruption cases, which may have the effect of exaggerating the degree of the increased inequality since they do not inform us on the prevalence of such cases. As such, both government statistics and journalistic reports are inadequate to provide information to examine the restratification in urban China.

In this study, we use representative survey data from urban sectors of Guangdong province to trace changes in income inequality and in structural forces of restratification. Restratification here means both the rise of new social classes or strata, which are based on new forms of economic and political power bases, and shifts in stratification principles. There could be drastic changes in social mobility, and at the same time, changes in the rules governing social mobility. Criteria that were important before the reform may have become irrelevant today. In this chapter, we address changes in stratification principles, not the rise of new social classes.

Economic Reform and Restratification in Urban China: An Analytic Framework

The Pre-Reform Stratification System: Sector, Region, and the Individual

The pre-reform stratification system in state socialist societies is fundamentally an outcome of the redistributive economic system, where the State's bureaucratic concerns overrule market coordination (Szelényi, 1978). Underneath the general income equality achieved in urban China before the economic reforms, inequality nevertheless existed, not so much in nominal income, as measured by wages or salaries, but more profoundly in benefits received by different people in housing, working conditions, child care facilities, schooling, and health care, which are not readily reflected in reported incomes.[1] Unlike stratification processes in industrialized market economies, where major determinants are individuals' and familial background characteristics, either ascribed or achieved (Treiman, 1970), in state socialist societies, the stratification processes are determined by redistributive economies in which bureaucratic powers make decisions regarding resources allocation and rewards distribution (Szelényi, 1978, 1982, 1983). Within such a system, an individual's economic and social position depends on this person's location in the state allocation system.

An important question is, then, *what are the major structural dimensions of a redistributive economy which affect an individual's position in the society*? In the West, students of social stratification in state socialist societies have long noticed inequalities associated with individuals' political backgrounds, performances, and views. Cultivating personal connections (*guanxi*) within one's work unit, especially vertical connections with one's superiors (patron-client relationships), forms an important strategy for upward mobility (Walder, 1986; Wang, 1991). Chinese sociologists have concurred with these views and emphasized that the unique feature of the Chinese urban stratification system is the vast *differ-*

entiation across groups along with a high degree of *equality within the group* (Xiao et al., 1990). Group here is defined as either an enterprise or an agency. The formation of these groups was an extension of the Chinese family tradition, but it is reinforced and facilitated by the state socialist practice, a form of communist neo-traditionalism (Walder, 1986). In addition, many studies have pointed to the importance of such factors as region (mega-city, large city, or small city or town), sector and type of ownership segmentation (state-owned, collective-owned, and privately owned), as well as education, seniority, and gender (Whyte and Parish, 1984; Whyte, 1986; Lin and Bian, 1991; Peng, 1992; Walder, 1986, 1990, 1992; Bauer et al., 1992).

Our examination of restratification in urban China in this study is based on a multi-dimensional model. Within this model, we examine the independent as well as the interacting roles of four important dimensions in stratification. These four dimensions are: sector, region, and individual's political capital and human capital. *Sector* refers to the position of an individual's employer, an enterprise or institution, in the state-collective ownership hierarchy of the society. Enterprises and institutions owned by the state are at the core and those owned collectively and privately (the latter two account for 25-30 per cent of all employees in China in the late 1970s) are at the periphery. Students of state socialist societies have paid great attention to the importance of segmentation in the redistribution in these societies (Szelényi, 1978, 1982; Walder, 1986, 1990, 1992; Lin and Bian, 1991). *Region* has two sub-dimensions: position in the urban hierarchical system, classified by mega-cities, large cities, and small cities, and geographical location such as coastal versus inland, by which economic reform policies were implemented in different stages. In this particular analysis on Guangdong province, we classify locations by capital city (Guangzhou), regions with more economic and political freedom (such as special economic zones), and regions that fall outside of these two categories. Controlling for sector and region, there are differences in income and benefits associated with *individuals' characteristics*. These characteristics include *political capital*, measured by occupation (those who have access to the redistributive power, such as cadres and staff members of the state institutions and enterprises), and *human capital* factors, such as education and seniority.

Reform and Changing Stratification Structure

The urban economic reform is redefining the relative importance of each of these dimensions affecting inequality. Collective and privately owned enterprises, though less favoured by the state before the reform, are less constrained by state regulations and, therefore, can respond more quickly to the new economic environment. So, the reform may benefit more organizations previously at the periphery. The Chinese urban reform started earlier in Guangzhou and the Pearl River Delta than in peripheral Guangdong. Regional differences, therefore, may tend to become greater. The capital city Guangzhou may no longer occupy the most privileged position as it had before the reform. Along with the transition to market economy, individuals' human capital resources, such as their education, may become more important, as the importance of political capital may decline. On the other hand, it may also be the case that individuals occupying important positions in the redistributive economy can take better advantage of their political capital, converting it into material gains.

The net result of these structural changes of different directions on inequality, however, is by no means clear-cut. Whyte has argued that the pre-reform China was not as equal as it had been perceived and reform programmes did not necessarily lead to increased inequality (Whyte, 1986). Walder's analyses of income determination in Tianjin found that, as recent as 1986, urban reforms had not resulted in an increased inequality. On the contrary, for urban residents working in state and collective sectors, "there has been a decisive equalizing trend" (Walder, 1990). More recent studies, however, point out that in the latter half of the 1980s, while the rise in standard of living slowed down, income inequality increased (Chai, 1992). More studies on urban inequal-

ity, therefore, are needed in order to examine the effects of reform on inequality.

The Difficulties in Measuring Social Inequality in Socialist Societies

The first difficulty we run into in studying social stratification and inequality in socialist societies is what to use as stratification criteria. In other words, how do we measure inequality? Or inequality of what? In a market society, income and wealth is used widely as an applicable indicator. But in a socialist society, as is well known, nominal income does not fully represent one's true income, and personal economic wealth accumulation is often restricted by socialist policies and does not represent a person's true power in the society. The most important indicator of one's position in a socialist society is what has been called the access to the redistributive power. Such "access," however, is very difficult to measure. The redistributive economies place great importance on an individual's loyalty to the political system and increasingly, technical abilities which are needed for the functioning of the redistributive system (Konrad and Szelényi, 1979). But ultimately the rewards from the system appear in the forms of both actual and potential materials comforts. Under the redistributive system, these material rewards are not only manifest in the form of higher nominal income, but more importantly, in the forms of more benefits in housing, transportation means, working conditions, free domestic and international vacations trips, and ability to provide to family members better education, better housing, and better employment positions. To come up with a summary index of all these forms of material rewards under a redistributive system is certainly not possible without special studies of complex designs. In this chapter, our goal is not to develop such better measures of inequality. Rather, we examine only two dimensions of these rewards, nominal income and housing. We bear in mind however the limitations of these partial indicators of status in a socialist society.

Household Income and Expenditure Survey for Urban Guangdong

We base our empirical analyses in this study on the annual Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey data collected by China's State Statistical Bureau (SSB). This data set is uniquely valuable in several ways. First, the survey started in 1984, and it is the only known representative longitudinal survey in China which allows us to follow changes over the course of the urban reform and its impact on inequality. In this chapter, we are able to use data for two years, 1986, when the urban reform was at a relatively early stage, and in 1991, when the urban reform had taken much deeper roots in Guangdong five years later. Second, this data set contains detailed information on household members' characteristics (up to nine members per household), such as age, gender, education, occupation, employer's ownership type, and year starting employment, as well as detailed information on levels and sources of income, conditions of housing, ownership of consumer durable, and expenditures. Income, housing, and expenditure information together allow us to examine data quality and construct better income measures. Available information on household members' characteristics allow us to construct measures representing sector and individual characteristics important to income determination. The survey is a probability sampling survey, stratified to cover cities of different sizes. These city codes can be used to create a variable representing the individual's location in the urban hierarchical system. Third, since this survey is the only nation-wide survey of this type sponsored by the government to collect key socio-economic information, careful sampling design and interviewing procedures are implemented to achieve the highest quality.

Like all large scale income and expenditure surveys, this survey also runs into difficulties when collecting information from the extremely rich and the high political position individuals and households. Therefore, this data set is not equipped to examine who are very rich and powerful in urban China. Having stated

this deficiency, however, this data set is still highly valuable because it is the bulk of the urban population which this data set represents that typified the redistribution process in urban China.

In this preliminary analysis we restrict our work on only the individuals who have the status of household head at the time of the survey. This is so mainly due to time constraint at the moment. Using the head of household tends to give us an older sample, which will under-represent the young and the possibly more upwardly mobile. In other words, the individuals included in our preliminary analysis may under-represent the individuals who started working more recently and in non-state or collective owned units. Results from this restricted sample, therefore, may understate the rapid changes in the stratification system.

The two major factors we focus analyses on are nominal income (total yearly income, which includes income from all sources) and housing condition. It is well known that in a redistributive economy a significant proportion of one's true income is not presented in the format of nominal income or wages. Rather, it is distributed in the form of benefits. While benefits are many and vary in forms, housing is no doubt a major item. Therefore, we include housing as a separate factor.

Variables and Method

Our stratification variables include region, sector, individual's political and human capital characteristics. For region, we differentiate urban Guangdong into three categories: Guangzhou, the capital of the province, the Pearl River Delta region, which experienced the most rapid change, and other urban areas which are not political and economic centres of Guangdong and have not had the more relaxed policies. We expect that in the early stage of the reform, such as in 1986, Guangzhou city stands out as the most privileged location, but its relative status declines along with the reform. For sector, we differentiate an individual's employer by its ownership type. We have three types, state owned, collective

owned, and other forms (individual and joint venture). As shown in Table 1, for both years, our sample contains very few cases of "other forms." Comparisons therefore cannot be made with this group. We focus our comparison on state versus collective owned. The most relevant indicator for political capital of the individual is occupation. We have five occupational categories: cadre, staff members, technical personnel, sales and service, and production workers. Cadres are certainly the most powerful group. Staff members, while having low positions, also have more access to the redistributive process. Technical persons are also in a more privileged position due to the technical abilities they possess that are important to the system. Sales and service and production workers, on the other hand, fall outside of the centre of the redistributive process. In our sample, as shown in Table 1, about half of all cases are in the sales, service and production categories. For human capital, we use an individual's educational attainment as the indicator. There are four categories, university educated, which accounts for 9 per cent in 1986 and 16 per cent in 1991, special middle-level education, regular middle school, and below middle school. In our sample, less than 20 per cent of all individuals belong to this lowest educational category. In addition to the variables above, we have included a variable representing a person's seniority in the labour force, length of employment. We expect that in pre-reform and early reform days, in addition to other factors, seniority played an important role in determining income and housing. The economic reform, on the other hand, shifted the importance from seniority to other factors, such as human capital.

The two major research questions in this study are: (1) Has the pattern of income inequality been transformed as a consequence of economic reforms in urban China? and (2) What are the structural changes in the stratification system that are affecting income inequality? In other words, has the core-periphery hierarchy in segmentation been reversed or modified? Has the reform changed the pattern of regional differentiation? Has there been a change in the importance of human capital factors in the reform era in urban

Table 1 Basic characteristics of the head of household, urban Guangdong, 1986 and 1991

	1986		1991	
Item	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
Region				
Guangzhou	42%		17%	
Delta	16		43	
Other	42		40	
Sector				
State	75%		79%	
Collective	24		20	
Other	1		1	
Occupation				
Cadre	11%		12%	
Staff	20		25	
Technical	15		17	
Services	10		11	
Production	44		35	
Education				
University	9%		16%	
Special education	14		10	
Middle school	58		58	
Primary and other	19		16	
Seniority				
Length of employment (year)	20.3	8.3	22.8	7.5
Gender				
Female	45%		29%	
Male	55		71	
Income				
Total yearly income (*yuan*)	3,484.6	1,016.7	5,263.4	2,150.1
Housing				
Per capita housing space (square metres)	11.2	5.4	16.4	10.2
Mean age of head	40.9	7.9	42.2	7.6
Number of cases	393		515	

China? Has there been a change in the importance of political capital in determining income level?

To answer these questions, we use the Ordinary Least Square regression method, using the natural log form of yearly income and per capita housing as dependent variables and variables described above as independent variables. We proceed with our analyses in the following fashion: first, we regress income and housing separately on the variable "region" only. We then add to this variable each of the other dimensions, sector, political capital, human capital, and seniority.

Results and Discussion

Between 1986 and 1991, both nominal income and housing conditions for the individuals in this study improved significantly. The mean annual income increased by 50 per cent, from 3,485 *yuan* in 1986 to 5,263 *yuan* in 1991. Since this increase is not adjusted for inflation (which ran at double-digit figure in 1988), the increase in real income is much more modest than it appears. Improvement in housing conditions, as measured by per capita housing space, is more impressive. Between 1986 and 1991, average housing space for these households increased by close to 50 per cent, from 11.2 square metres in 1986 to 16.4 in 1991 (see Table 1).

Along with the general improvement in the standard of living, more differentiation in income and housing conditions also emerged in urban Guangdong. In 1986, the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) for income was 0.30 and for housing was 0.48. In 1991, they were 0.41 and 0.62 respectively. A larger value of coefficient of variation means a wider distribution and a greater differentiation.

Determinants of Income

In Table 2, we present results of a regression analysis on income. In Model 1, we include only the variable "region." Initial examination of the data reveals that among the urban Guangdong cases

Table 2 Regression analysis of total yearly income, urban Guangdong, 1986 and 1991

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4			
	1986		1991		1986		1991		1986		1991		1986		1991	
Variable	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β
Region																
Guangzhou	-0.0022	-0.0039	0.1794**	0.1579	-0.0102	-0.0183	0.1803**	0.1588	-0.0127	-0.0227	0.1795**	0.1581	-0.0153	-0.0275	0.1781**	0.1568
Delta	-0.0734*	-0.0977	0.3514**	0.4131	-0.0791*	-0.1052	0.3666**	0.4309	-0.0697*	-0.0957	0.3706**	0.4357	-0.0733**	-0.0975	0.3731**	0.4386
(Other)																
Occupation																
Cadre					0.1163**	0.1317	0.3097**	0.2375	0.0934**	0.1057	0.2036**	0.1561	0.0003	0.0003	0.1926**	0.1476
Staff					0.0959**	0.1400	0.1162**	0.1201	0.0899**	0.1312	0.0598	0.0618	0.0507	0.0742	0.0545	0.0564
Technical					0.1271**	0.1623	0.2038**	0.1795	0.0775	0.0989	0.0818	0.0721	0.0483	0.0616	0.0719	0.0633
Services					-0.0516	-0.0572	-0.0724	-0.0535	-0.0507	-0.0562	-0.0759	-0.0561	0.0106	0.0117	-0.0725	-0.0535
(Production)																
Education																
University									0.0495	0.0518	0.2839**	0.2465	0.0757	0.0792	0.2982**	0.2587
Special education									-0.0197	-0.0247	0.2008**	0.1398	0.0046	0.0058	0.2164**	0.1506
Middle school									-0.0848**	-0.1513	0.1510**	0.1769	-0.0524	-0.0936	0.1629**	0.1909
(Primary and other)																
Seniority																
Length of employment (year)													0.0111**	0.336	0.0026	0.0469
Constant	8.1282**		8.3028**		8.0871**		8.2041**		8.1452**		8.0982**		7.9124**		8.0305**	
Adjusted R^2	0.0042		0.1415		0.0459		0.2129		0.0637		0.2339		0.1559		0.2345	
No. of cases	393		515		393		515		393		515		393		515	

Notes: Yearly income is the natural log form of yearly income.
* indicates significant at 0.10 level, and
** indicates significant at 0.05 or higher level.

included in the analysis, there is no significant difference in income and housing between employees of state and collective owned institutions. Also, there is no significant difference between the two sexes. We exclude them from our subsequent analyses. In Model 2, we add to the variable "region" the "political capital" variable, namely occupations. Here, both region and occupation variables are categorical variables. The coefficient of each category under each of the variables means the effect of being in that particular category compared with the reference category. The reference category is given in parentheses. For the variable "region," the reference category is "other" (areas other than Guangzhou and the Pearl River Delta regions) and for occupation is "production workers." In Model 3, we add to Model 2 the human capital dimension, represented by educational attainment. This is again a categorical variable, with the reference category being "primary education and other." Lastly, in Model 4, we include the variable "seniority," measured by the years of being employed. For each model, we give the results for 1986 and for 1991. In addition to the regular regression coefficients, B, which reveal amount of changes in the dependent variable associated with one unit change in the particular independent variable, we also give the standardized regression coefficient, β, which tells us the relative importance of different variables or categories.

Increasing regional differentiation

Between 1986 and 1991, regional differences in income among urban residents increased drastically in urban Guangdong. In 1986, region did not have much influence on income level. Guangzhou was not different from the other areas, and the Delta region was only marginally worse off than other regions. In 1991, residents in both Guangzhou and the Pearl River Delta regions had much higher income than those in other areas of urban Guangdong. Region alone explains 14 per cent of variation in income. Such regional difference persists after controlling for individuals' characteristics (see Models 2 to 4 for 1991 in Table 2).

Increasing importance of political power

One of the most intriguing questions in market transition societies is to what extent the pre-reform stratification system is interrupted or modified by the reforms. Studies of rural Chinese communities have suggested that a significant decline of the redistributors' power, the power of former cadres in the rural collectives (Nee, 1989). Our analyses of urban Guangdong data, however, suggest that the power of cadres in obtaining more income not only persisted, but also increased. This can be seen from results in Model 2 of Table 2. In Model 2, we add the variable "occupation" (with five categories) to Model 1 which included only the "region" variable. In 1986, compared with production workers (the reference group), cadres, staff members, and technical personnel all had higher incomes. People working in services and sales had about the same income level as the production workers, as the regression coefficient is not significant. Technical personnel and cadres had the highest income. To translate the regression coefficients into normal numbers, being in the cadre group meant 12 per cent more income than production workers. In 1991, the same division between cadre, technical, staff as one group, and services, sales, and production workers as another, persisted. But the income advantage of cadres and staff members further increased. Being in the cadre category meant 36 per cent higher income than workers, in technical personnel category 23 per cent higher, and in staff category 12 per cent higher.

One may suspect that such income differences across occupations is caused not by political status but by the educational credentials of the individuals. Cadres, staff members, and technical personnel earned more because they had more human capital investment, or more education. In Model 3, we test this hypothesis. For both 1986 and 1991, political position brought in more income even after controlling for education. After controlling for education, the technical personnel no longer had a significantly higher income than production workers. In other words, the observed higher income of the technical personnel was mostly due

to their higher education. This is, however, not the case for cadres. Controlling for educational attainment, cadres had 10 per cent more income than workers in 1986, and 23 per cent more in 1991.

Increasing returns to human capital

We have seen in many journalistic reports that education has become less valuable in the context of commercialization. Stories abound in which private businessmen with little formal education are turning into millionaires. While such cases do exist, not only in China, but also elsewhere, it is important for us to turn to the bulk of Chinese urban labour force, to examine whether the economic reform has made human capital more valuable or not.[2] In Model 3, we examine this issue by introducing the "educational attainment" variable into our analyses of income. Data for urban Guangdong show that between 1986 and 1991, the relationship between education and income has become much stronger. In 1986, with the puzzling exception of those with middle school education having lower income than those with primary education (the reference group), education was not an important factor in determining income, once region and occupation were controlled for. In 1991, there was a strong and clear positive relationship between educational attainment and income. The university educated and people with special vocational training and middle school education were all making more money as groups than those with only primary education. Furthermore, the more education one had, the greater likelihood there was for that person to have higher income (university education had the largest positive coefficient). Compared with individuals with only primary education, university educated had on average 33 per cent more income, special education 22 per cent more, and middle school 16 per cent more.[3] These are income differences by education *after controlling for region and occupational status.*

Declining importance of seniority

In the pre-reform socialist decades, seniority played an important role in income determination. While factors such as political power status were no doubt very important in pre-reform China, the predominant income equalizing force was the length of service in the labour force. In Hu et al.'s analyses of Tianjin data for 1984 and Walder's for 1976 and 1986, years of work was by far the most important factor in income determination (Hu et al., 1988; Walder, 1990).[4] In urban Guangdong, this was also clearly the case in 1986. In Model 4, we add the variable "seniority" (length of employment) into Model 3. Once this variable is introduced, the force of seniority was so dominant in 1986 that neither occupational nor educational variable was statistically significant. Seniority alone explains about 16 per cent of the variation in income. One of the most interesting results of our analyses is that in 1991, five years apart, *the importance of seniority in income determination disappeared totally.* Other factors such as occupation and education, became much more important. This shift in the importance of seniority indicates two kinds of changes: first, seniority becomes less important because individuals with longer employment history are no longer the ones who automatically get higher income, or many people with shorter employment history are making more money; and second, the link between seniority and occupation has become much looser. Cadres are no longer the ones who have stayed in the labour force the longest. There has been a shift in the age and length of employment composition of the cadres.

These results together reveal important changes in the stratification principles in urban China during the latter half of the 1980s. These changes are by no means in the one direction of dismantling the pre-reform stratification order. On the one hand, regional differences are enlarged, human capital investment returns increase, and the effect of the most important pre-reform income determinant, seniority, diminishes. On the other hand, people who occupy the positions of redistributors in the reforming econ-

omy are not losing out. So the reform has resulted in both change and continuity.

Determinants of Housing Conditions

Housing for most urban residents remains the largest welfare benefit item. Distribution of public housing reveals more the nature of the pre-reform stratification order than other indicators. Changes in this area consequently are also important to our understanding of the impact of reform on urban inequality. We carry out the same kind of regression analyses as presented in Table 2, with per capita housing space in square metres (including both living and auxiliary space) as the dependent variable. In Table 3, we present the results of these analyses.

Determinants of housing conditions in both 1986 and 1991 confirm the endurance of the socialist redistributive system. Under such a system, people who have access to the system — cadres and staff members — enjoy much better housing provisions. Cadre and staff status is consistently the most important factor in determining housing space. In 1986, controlling for region, households headed by cadres on average had 30 per cent more per capita housing space than ordinary households with heads working in production, sales and services. In 1991, the difference remained the same (Model 2). While the staff members had not gained more advantage in income generation during the reform (in Model 3 of Table 2, once education is controlled for, staff members do not have more income than production workers in 1991), they had been able to harvest more gains in housing in a major way. In 1986, controlling for education, households headed by staff members had on average the same housing space per capita as households headed by other non-cadre individuals. In 1991, their per capita housing space was 22 per cent above other non-cadre groups.

Unlike with income generation, where reform has resulted in increased returns to human capital investment, more education has not led to the same kind of improvement in housing, where

bureaucratic redistributive power plays a greater role. Controlling for occupation, in 1986, households headed by university or special vocational school trained individuals had better housing conditions than the less educated. In 1991, once region and occupation are controlled, education is no longer a significant factor (Model 3). Another interesting difference between determinants of housing and income is that seniority had never been important, even in 1986. As shown in Model 4 of Table 3, the variable seniority is not significant for both years. Also, reflecting scarcity of land in Guangzhou, by 1991, controlling for other factors, households in Guangzhou had much less housing space than households in other areas. On the other hand, compared with non-delta medium sized cities (the comparison group), there was a marked improvement in housing condition in the Pearl River Delta region between 1986 and 1991. In 1986, households in the Delta region had less space than in both Guangzhou and other urban areas of Guangdong province; by 1991, the Delta region had caught up with other areas, and households in Guangzhou had become the clear losers.

Conclusion: Endurance and Change during the Reform Era

The process of social restratification during China's economic reform, seen from changes in the various stratification principles among the majority of urban employees, involves both continuity and change.

As the results of this study show, there has been a clear endurance of the pre-reform stratification order. Individuals close to the redistributive centre have not only maintained their advantage but have been able to gain more. Cadres and staff members of the bureaucratic apparatus, who were important in maintaining the functioning of the bureaucratic system, and technical personnel enjoyed significantly more income than ordinary production and service workers. Moreover, in the second half of the 1980s, at

Table 3 Regression analysis of housing conditions, urban Guangdong, 1986 and 1991

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4			
	1986		1991		1986		1991		1986		1991		1986		1991	
Variable	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β
Region																
Guangzhou	-0.3759	-0.0343	-7.5068**	-0.2919	-0.3256	-0.0297	-7.2951**	-0.2838	-0.3424	-0.0313	-7.3137**	-0.2845	-0.3537	-0.0323	-7.3296**	-0.2851
Delta	-3.4933**	-0.2371	-0.5028	-0.0261	-3.3084**	-0.2245	-0.2741	-0.0142	-3.3765**	-0.2291	-0.2157	-0.0112	-3.3916**	-0.2302	-0.1871	-0.0097
(Other)																
Occupation																
Cadre					3.3576**	0.1938	5.0623**	0.1714	2.7885**	0.161	4.6267**	0.1566	2.3969**	0.1384	4.5015**	0.1524
Staff					1.2767*	0.0951	3.6496**	0.1665	0.8932	0.0665	3.2824**	0.1498	0.7291	0.0543	3.2238**	0.1471
Technical					1.0009	0.0652	1.4757	0.0574	-0.0663	-0.0043	1.0065	0.0392	-0.1892	-0.0123	0.8951	0.0348
Services					-0.8929	-0.0505	0.2947	0.0096	-0.8329	-0.0471	0.2634	0.0086	-0.5751	-0.0325	0.3018	0.0098
(Production)																
Education																
University									2.0729*	0.1106	1.5509	0.0594	2.1830*	0.1165	1.7119	0.0656
Special education									1.8754*	0.1194	1.227	0.0377	1.9782*	0.1259	1.4037	0.0431
Middle school									0.839	0.0764	1.3864	0.0717	0.9751	0.0888	1.5206	0.0786
(Primary and other)																
Seniority																
Length of employment (year)													0.0468	0.0721	0.0299	0.0234
Constant	11.8956**		17.7215**		11.1634**		15.7839**		10.5322**		14.8217**		9.5529**		14.0557**	
Adjusted R^2	0.0463		0.0764		0.0826		0.1083		0.0844		0.1057		0.0864		0.1044	
No. of cases	393		515		393		515		393		515		393		515	

Notes: * indicates significant at 0.10 level, and
** indicates significant at 0.05 or higher level.

least in urban Guangdong, individuals in these groups were able to achieve a greater income increase. In Table 4, we present comparisons of income and housing conditions between 1986 and 1991 by occupational groups. As a group, cadres had the largest increase in income (65 per cent) during this five-year period. Similarly, in housing conditions, what separated cadres as a group from other occupational groups, including staff members and technical personnel, was their better housing conditions. In 1986, household headed by cadres had 40 per cent more per capita housing space than production and service workers, and about 25 per cent more than staff and technical personnel. By 1991, even though there had been a general improvement for all groups in housing, cadre headed households still had about 25 per cent more space per capita than other groups, with the exception of the staff group. What is interesting is that although staff members were not able to experience the same monetary income increase as cadres and technical personnel, they were compensated by a significant improvement in their housing conditions. This was because most housing so far was still constructed and allocated through the bureaucratic redistributive system. By comparison, technical personnel, while being able to improve their monetary income level, had not enjoyed the same privilege in better housing conditions. In 1991, cadres and staff members are separated from other groups by having much better housing conditions in the urban sector of Guangdong province.

This endurance of the redistributive nature of the income and housing distribution process in urban China contributes to both the success and potential problems of the urban reforms. On the one hand, unlike in the private parts of the Chinese economy, including those engaging in agricultural production in rural China, urban reforms in the state and collective controlled sectors rely on motivated and cooperative cadres and staff members for its success. The very fact that China has been able gradually to implement a new economic system in its urban sector successfully testify to the importance of such cooperation from the bureaucratic power system. On the other hand, if China is going to

Table 4 Changes in yearly total income and per capita housing by occupation, urban Guangdong, 1986 and 1991

Occupation	Income						Per cent change	
	1986			1991				
	Mean	Coefficient of variation	N	Mean	Coefficient of variation	N	Mean	Coefficient of variation
Cadre	3683.4	0.19	43	6090.8	0.33	61	65.36	73.12
Staff	3647.1	0.29	80	5404.9	0.43	131	48.20	45.61
Technical	3710.2	0.23	57	5776.8	0.34	85	55.70	47.69
Services	3241.9	0.42	41	4619.9	0.51	57	42.51	19.36
Production	3342.4	0.32	172	4889.3	0.41	199	46.28	26.37
Total	3484.6	0.30	393	5266.3	0.41	533		

Occupation	Housing						Per cent change	
	1986			1991				
	Mean	Coefficient of variation	N	Mean	Coefficient of variation	N	Mean	Coefficient of variation
Cadre	14.2	0.47	43	19.3	0.43	61	35.92	-9.92
Staff	11.7	0.42	80	18.4	0.61	131	57.26	44.55
Technical	11.3	0.44	57	15.9	0.45	85	40.71	1.14
Services	9.4	0.46	41	15.0	0.47	57	59.57	2.55
Production	10.6	0.51	172	14.7	0.76	199	38.68	50.10
Total	11.2	0.48	393	16.4	0.62	533		

transform its urban economy into a more efficient one, greater motivation is needed from all of its urban labour force. The endurance of the pre-reform stratification order which favoured the cadre and staff personnel at the expense of the greater urban work force may therefore generate much social dissatisfaction among the urban population and jeopardize the reform.

The noticeable changes in the stratification order, as revealed from this study of urban Guangdong, may play a role in lessening the potential dissatisfaction among urban employees associated with the endurance of the pre-reform stratification order. An increasing proportion of the urban labour force is able to enter the non-state owned sectors and is able to gain higher incomes; employees in state and collectively owned enterprises and institutions are experiencing changes associated with greater returns to their human capital credentials and less reliance on seniority. Such changes are by no means trivial. They signify a transition in the stratification order from a uni-dimensional to a multi-dimensional one, from a system in which rewards were distributed exclusively or mostly on political criteria, to a mixed system, where both political and non-political factors, such as human capital, bring in returns. The income differences associated with realigning the importance of different regions also reinforce the breaking of the old stratification system.

Notes

1. These welfare benefits amount a large proportion of total real income. Based on a 1988 survey, Khan et al. (1992) calculated that, on average, 39 per cent of urban household income is provided by government in the form of net subsidies and income in kind.
2. Note that the sample in this analysis only includes heads of households and does not represent many of the younger individuals for whom the relationship between education and income may be different.

3. These percentages are calculated from the regression coefficients by taking the exponential of the constant plus a particular variable of interest, and comparing it with the exponential of the constant.
4. In terms of relative importance of years of work versus other variables in affecting monthly salary, in 1976, it was five times as important as gender, nine times as Party membership. In 1986, it had six times the importance of gender, eight times of Party membership, and five times of years of education. These numbers are drawn form Walder, 1990, Table 8.

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11

Assortative Mating in Taiwan

Tsai Shu-ling

Introduction

The association between ascribed and achieved statuses has been well acknowledged as an indicator of "openness" of society. Traditionally, the rigidity of the status hierarchy and the importance of class boundaries are investigated through analyses of the association between the occupations of fathers and sons. Recent researchers (e.g., Hout, 1982; Sixma and Ultee, 1984; Mare, 1991) employ another important measure which is conceptually similar but empirically distinct, i.e., the strength of the husband–wife association.

Historically and globally, marriage has been the major institution which has legitimized a long-term intimate social relationship between a man and a woman, and in most cases between two families. Marriage selection is normative and constrained by residential propinquity, class boundary, as well as the structure of the marriage market. Patterns of marital mobility are closely linked to stratification systems of society, reflecting social structure and social life. There is no measurement more appropriate than "who is marrying whom" in applying the concept of social distance

(Bogardus, 1959). "Like marries like" is a long standing hypothesis in sociological inquiries into mate selection. In practice, the prevalence of homogamy has been observed with respect to a variety of social attributes, such as age, race, ethnicity, religion, and socio-economic achievements, in Western societies.

The present chapter examines Taiwan's assortative mating patterns, with a focus on status homogamy. Marriage choice is a multidimensional phenomenon, which involves a distinction between ascriptive- and achievement-oriented characteristics (Kalmijn, 1991). On the one hand, ascriptive status homogamy is indicated by the similarity of spouses with respect to their social origins, such as ethnicity and socio-economic backgrounds. On the other hand, the achieved dimension of status homogamy is measured by the similarity of spouses' socio-economic achievements, such as educational attainment and occupational achievement. All of these aspects of status homogamy are empirically examined by using data from recent islandwide social surveys conducted in Taiwan. After a review of relevant theories and a discussion of data sources and methods, empirical analyses will be presented.

A Selective Review of Theories

In the literature on social stratification, two general hypotheses guide the discussion on mate selection in human society. They are: (1) the "class" hypothesis which holds that persons tend to marry those of similar social standing; and (2) the "prestige" hypothesis which postulates that persons tend to marry those of a somewhat higher socio-economic status than themselves (Laumann, 1966). In what follows, I review several theories which provide distinct explanations for marriage into an equal or higher social status group.

First of all, Parsons (1949) approached the tendency towards hypergamy from the perspective of functionalism. An asymmetry hypothesis was formalized in his discussion of the articulation of

the family and the stratification system. This asymmetry hypothesis maintains that inequality in occupational status between husband and wife is functional. A typical asymmetry relation of the marriage pair to the occupational structure has consequences for the labour force participation patterns of married women. Parsons' hypothesis is based on his argument that the nuclear family is a unit of diffuse solidarity and that, as a result, the members of a given family must share a common status in the system of stratification. A dual linkage with the occupational system on the part of both spouses is detrimental to the marital relationship due to the introduction of competition in an expressive relationship. This competition is introduced because the spouses will probably have unequal income, prestige, and power. Disruptive effects would result from comparing each other's status. Since the preferred role of the husband in the nuclear family is instrumental, while that of the wife is expressive, the ideal model becomes one in which the family is linked with the occupational system only through the husband's work. In this way, both spouses have the same status in terms of income and prestige.

The adequacy of Parsons' hypothesized asymmetry between husbands' and wives' relations to the occupational structure has been challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds. For instance, Acker (1973, 1980) raises critical theoretical objections, and Ritter and Hargens (1975) provide empirical evidence against the asymmetry hypothesis. Indeed, Parsons' theory tends to imply that the institutions of marriage and family are inherently good or "functional." And the sociologist must ask the critical question, "functional and dysfunctional for whom?"

This question is approached by social exchange theories in terms of people's rational choices. The basic psychological propositions of social exchange theory are set out most clearly by Homans, who presents them as an interlocking deductive system. Homans (1974) has attempted to provide an alternative to Parsonian functionalism, yet his attempt has been subjected to counter attacks from a variety of schools. Homans takes affects and values as given. He believes that a love relationship can be explained by

the basic propositions of social exchange: the human rationality proposition, the deprivation-satiation proposition, and the aggression-approval proposition. Marriage is a form of social exchange. Not only is money exchanged, but also approval, esteem, compliance, love, and affection. Homans claims that exchange does not exist to integrate and reaffirm social organizations, but rather to satisfy the needs of individuals. Though people do not attempt to maximize profits, they seek to make some profits in the exchange relation. According to Homans, the norm of reciprocity states a return should be made to people. And the rule of distributive justice explains this by specifying that the return must be related to both the contributions and the investments involved.

Whereas Homans has consistently argued that satisfactory explanations of social phenomena must ultimately be psychological explanations, Blau seeks to incorporate many of the assumptions and concepts of functional, conflict, and interactionist theories. Blau's (1964) social exchange theory differs from Homans' psychological reductionism not only in its concern with institutions, but also in its emphasis on what Blau terms the "emergent" properties of social structure. By this, he means characteristics that belong only to social institutions and not to individuals. Blau is more explicit about the underlying norms of social exchange than Homans. He argues that the need to reciprocate for benefits received serves as a "starting mechanism" of social interaction. He analyses price determination by borrowing the concept of elasticity of demand and supply from economics. His discussion clarifies some of the distinctive social factors that affect price in non-economic exchanges. For example, he points out that some social associations are intrinsically valuable.

Blau's discussion of marriage follows directly from the assumption that people are rational value maximizers, plus the further assumption that they value commonly recognized attributes, such as physical beauty and earning capacity. In the marriage market, it is successful and wealthy men who, on the average, have the prettiest wives, according to Blau. Besides, Blau maintains the assumption that people value status. Similar to

Homans, Blau defines status as the common recognition by others of the amount of esteem and friendship that someone receives. This, he argues, implies that marriage generally occurs among those whose social standing is roughly equal. Exchange considerations apply to the most romantic of love relationships. Blau argues that equality of status is important to love relationships. He discusses the effect on love relationship of an imbalance such that one partner contributes more than she or he receives, with a conclusion that the relationship must be less important and valuable for one than the other. Just as what Homans does, Blau connects an exchange imbalance of this type to the essence of power.

In this context it is worth comparing Blau's analysis with Becker's description of "like marrying like." Becker's economic theory of marriage (1973, 1974) is based on the assumptions that each person tries to do as well as possible and that the marriage market is in equilibrium. He argues that the marriage market exists and that persons marrying expect to raise their utility level above what it would be were they to remain single. In his view, love and desire to have one's own children are two major motivations for marriage. Thus, each marriage partner gains by teaming up with the other. Against the gain must be set the costs of marriage, such as loss of independence, wedding ceremonies or license fees, and more importantly, the costs of searching further for an appropriate mate, or of learning more about existing candidates. The larger the net gain, the larger the fraction of people who marry. Becker's explorations demonstrate that the net gain to a man and woman from marrying compared to remaining single depends positively on their income, human capital, and relative difference in wage rates. Although Becker "successfully" analyses marriage within the framework provided by modern economics, his failure in taking the powerful non-monetary variables into account has been pointed out by Goode (1974).

A note has to be made here. Exchange theories have frequently been used not only to account for homogamy, but also to explain the departures from it. As Schoen and Wooldredge (1989)

indicate, exchange theories can be extended by recognizing exchanges between different attributes relevant to marriage choice. For instance, Becker (1981) argues that a negative assortative mating on economic status prevails over a positive one. The central assumption underlying Becker's theory is that the rewards of marriage stem from the division of outside paid work and domestic labour within the household. A marriage "bargain" might result from a balance of pluses and minuses in different characteristics, such as a female emphasis on male economic characteristics and a male emphasis on female non-economic characteristics (Schoen and Wooldredge, 1989). Such exchanges are to be expected because husbands and wives have traditionally different sex roles.

From the perspective of sex roles, Lipman-Blumen (1976) conceptualized sexual stratification with a theory of homosociality. She argues that the stratification system systematically places males in more highly valued roles than females. Men have virtually total and exclusive access to the entire range of resources available within the society. This is a male homosocial world, according to Lipman-Blumen. Men can and commonly do seek satisfaction for most of their needs from other men. The one basic need that men cannot meet for other men is paternity. On the other hand, women are forced to seek resources from men. Women derive their status vicariously through their relationships with men. This imbalanced relationship of exchange between the sexes makes it apparent that men are the most valued social beings. And women unwittingly help preserve this imbalance by marrying men of higher status than themselves.

Men and women do have different sex roles. Unlike men whose masculine role is mainly an occupational one, women play multiple roles: the wife–mother role, the career or job role, the glamour girl role, and the humanistic role (Parsons, 1949). Another dimension, cross-cutting these components of feminine roles, added to the list by Kluckhohn (1969) is women as the husband's or father's status symbol. Without doubt, traditional gender-role ideology introduces asymmetry into the process by

which husbands and wives decide how to respond to achievement opportunities (Bielby and Bielby, 1992). But, Lipman-Blumen's (1976) homosocial theory of sex roles explains a very limited range of social phenomena. The application of the theory of homosociality beyond the private sphere is still in its early stage.

To summarize the preceding discussion of classic theories of marriage: marriage might be dysfunctional for female achievement in the labour market, but it is functional for society (according to Parsons) and for individuals (according to exchange theories). Whereas exchange theories argue that equality of status is important to spouses, Parsons suggests that inequality in occupational status between husband and wife is necessary. When status heterogamy occurs, it has frequently been assumed that hypergamy for women is more prevalent than hypogamy (see Tsai, 1984 for a detailed discussion). In other words, females tend to marry males of a higher social rank more often than males tend to marry females of a higher social rank (Zelditch, 1964), a phenomenon well known as the mating gradient (Burchinal, 1964).

Preliminary Considerations

In the previous section, I have reviewed some relevant theories formulated by sociologists, social psychologists, economists, and feminists. Despite their differences in conceptual apparatus, they consent to a common observation: the mating of human population is highly systematic and structured.

Although some analysts have divided mate choice systems into two broad categories: marriage with a free market, and preferential marriage (Goode, 1982:51), in Western societies and in many analytical approaches, it is assumed that marriage is voluntary, based on a love relationship. In practice, the prevalence of homogamy has been observed with respect to a variety of social attributes, such as age, race, ethnicity, religion, and socio-economic achievements (e.g., Burgess and Wallin, 1943;

Hollingshead, 1950; Blau and Duncan, 1967; Michielutte, 1972; Rockwell, 1976; Carter and Glick, 1976; Blau, 1977; Coleman, 1977; Johnson, 1980; Hout, 1982; Hendrickx, Lammers and Ultee, 1991; Mare, 1991).

In traditional Chinese society, however, marriage was ideally arranged by the elders in the family through match-makers, with little thought to the preferences of the mates themselves. Norms governing marriage arrangements can be summarized in the idea of "*Mendang, hudui*" ("matching doors"). This old Chinese saying emphasizes the social desirability of marriage between families with similar social standing. Homogamy — especially, class endogamy — is intended to govern the marriage market, no matter who decides the marriage.

Arranged marriage, still not uncommon, was the Taiwan norm until after World War II. According to Wolf and Huang (1980), three forms of marriage existed in rural Taiwan from 1845 to 1945: major marriage, minor marriage, and uxorilocal marriage, which Wolf and Huang describe as follows:

> people... gave their daughters out in marriage shortly after puberty and took in their place wives for their sons [major marriage]. The exceptions were a few people who adopted a girl at an early age and reared her to be a son's wife [minor marriage], and a few others who, lacking male children, called in a husband for daughter and employed him as a substitute son [uxorilocal marriage]. (Wolf and Huang, 1980:1)

Marriage practices in Taiwan are by no means the simple reflections of a uniform ideal. A variety of factors, such as demographic, economic, and psychological mechanisms, interact to create a peculiar marriage market at a particular time. As Becker (1973:814) correctly points out, "marital patterns differ among societies and change over time in a variety of ways that challenge any single theory." Testing the relevance of competing theories discussed earlier is of interest in its own right, but it is not a major concern of this research. Rather, the present study focusses on trends in assortative mating patterns within the social and historical context of post-war Taiwan. I formulate some hypotheses to be empirically tested in the remainder of this chapter. The feasibility of testing the hypotheses proposed here hinges on the availability of the data used. Next, I discuss available data sets.

Data Sources

The analysis of assortative mating patterns requires mobility data on both of the mating pairs. Attempts to collect marital mobility data are few in Taiwan. Fortunately, two recent islandwide social surveys provide some relevant, though not rich, data for the present purpose of analysis. They are: Tsai–Chiu (1988) survey, and a series of surveys on social changes in Taiwan, 1990-1994 (hereafter SSC).

Tsai–Chiu (1988) survey was originally designed to carry out a research project on "constructing occupational scales for Taiwan" (Tsai and Chiu, 1991). It was an islandwide social survey using a representative sample. In order to select 1,800 respondents representative of the adult population age 20 and older, Tsai and Chiu applied a two-stage stratified random sampling design. Their primary sampling units (PSU) pertained to 7,280 basic administrative units of community — tsun and lin, respectively — in all counties and cities of Taiwan. Sixty PSU were selected through a procedure for sampling differing sizes of clusters with probabilities proportionate to size. Each of 60 college students who had been trained in the use of their interview schedule went to the location of a selected cluster and interviewed at most 30 respondents, under the supervision of 12 graduate and senior students of whom each was in charge of five clusters. They were successful in locating 1,771 cases in total.

Among these samples, 1,391 respondents were married; they provided complete information on self's and spouse's birth year, ethnicity, and education. These cases form a part of the analysis sample used in this study.

On the other hand, SSC is a series of islandwide longitudinal surveys conducted by a large group of more than 26 social scientists, under the directorship of Hei-Yuan Chiu. It is an on-going five-year project designed to collect data sets on topics of special salience for Taiwan's changing society, based on samples representative of the adult population. At present, data collected from the fieldwork carried out during the first two years of the project are available to the scientific community. In total, four sets of SSC data exist, since two types of questionnaire (Type I and Type II) were used each year. Type I data collected in 1991 (hereafter SSC (1991-I)) asked a set of questions on marital mobility, suitable for the present purpose.

Information ascertained from SSC (1991-I) is comparable to the one by Tsai–Chiu (1988) in several ways. Since this study intends to analyse accessible information on marital mobility as much as possible, both data sets are used. The selection and usage of data sets depend on the analytical purpose specific to each section of the empirical analysis.

Methods

There is a long history of development of social stratification and mobility research, which is commonly divided into three generations (e.g., Featherman, Hauser, and Sewell, 1974). The third and new generation of mobility study is partly characterized by the development of multivariate log-linear models, among which the levels model introduced by Hauser (1978) is dominant (see Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee, 1991:286-287 for a relevant discussion).

Hauser (1978, 1979, 1981) illustrates the "why" and "how" of applying levels models in the analysis of the structure of social relationships, such as marriage. To be brief, studies of marital mobility often analyse square tables of counts, where marriages are classified by the ethnicity, education, occupation, or other characteristics of each mate. Traditionally, social scientists used

the ratio of the observed frequency in each cell of a mobility table to that frequency expected under "statistical independence" as an index of mobility, in order to eliminate the influence of origin and destination distributions on the observed pattern of mobility. Nevertheless, by definition, assortative mating is "a social process whereby marriage partners who are similar in some character or characters are chosen more frequently than would be expected by chance" (Coleman, 1977:17). In regard to socio-economic characteristics, there prevails homogamy; "that is, spouses tend to resemble each other more closely than would be the case under random rating" (Blau and Duncan, 1967:347). Therefore, a model of simple independence "does not" and "should not" fit the assortative mating pattern, both conceptually and empirically. We should avoid using measurements based on a simple independence model as an index of the husband–wife association. Otherwise, the measure and interpretation of interaction effects in marriage tables are very likely to mislead and mis-inform.

On the other hand, Hauser's (1978) model specification for square tables is not only useful in locating cells where counts are relatively dense or sparse but is also able to eliminate the confounding of prevalence and interaction effects. Besides, levels model yields a parsimonious set of parameters which describe the table, and goodness of fit can be assessed with standard inferential procedures. Hauser's approach allows us to test hypotheses about patterns of social mobility.

Meanwhile, the methodological lessons of research on social mobility have been absorbed into the research on marital selection (e.g., Shavit, 1978; Johnson, 1980; Hout, 1982). Recent researchers develop theoretically informed log-linear models to measure various types of social distance latent in the structure of assortative mating. For instance, "crossings models," which belong to the larger class of Hauser's levels model, have been successfully applied to the analysis of assortative mating with respect to religion (Johnson, 1980), education (Mare, 1991), and occupation (Chang, 1992).

Both levels models and crossings models are applied in this chapter. Since these two types of models have been discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g., Hauser, 1978; Johnson, 1980; Mare, 1991), I shall not elaborate on them further. In what follows, I empirically examine ascribed and achieved dimensions of status homogamy in Taiwan. Ascriptive status homogamy is measured by the similarity of spouses with respect to ethnicity and father's occupational class. On the other hand, the achieved dimension of status homogamy is evaluated by the similarity of spouses' educational attainment and occupational achievement. The following empirical analysis falls into these four major parts. Next, I report the results of each of these four aspects of assortative mating in turn.

Assortative Mating by Ethnicity

Taiwan's current population of twenty million mainly comes from four ethnic groups: Aborigine, Hokkien, Hakka, and Mainlander. The above order is in sequence of timing when collective migration to Taiwan occurred.

The ancestors of Aborigine, who for the most part spoke Malayo-Polynesian tongues, moved to Taiwan from mainland Asia six or seven thousand years ago (Hsu, 1987). Taiwan's Aborigines are not a homogeneous group; they differ not only in geographic distribution, but also in pheno-typical as well as sociocultural characteristics. With 1.6 per cent of the total population in 1989 (Department of Civil Affairs, 1990), Aborigines scatter on the central mountain region and remote area of eastern Taiwan.

During the period of the Dutch occupation (1624-1662), Chinese peasants first came to Taiwan in large numbers. The second wave of Chinese migrants arrived at the end of the Ming dynasty, when the Ming general, Cheng Ch'eng-Kung, defeated the Dutch and used Taiwan as a base for operations to recover the mainland of China. In 1683, Taiwan was conquered by the Manchu regime. The Ch'ing dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895 as part of the treaty which ended the Sino–Japanese war. Following Japan's

defeat in the Second World War, Taiwan was retroceded to China in 1945. In 1949, the Nationalist government (KMT) withdrew to Taiwan as it lost the Chinese Civil War to the Communists in mainland China. More than a million and a half of Chinese fled to Taiwan during the period of 1948-1949. The vast majority of Mainlander immigrants were single men, or men severed permanently for decades from the wives they had left behind.

In postwar Taiwan, Taiwanese and Mainlanders are the two major ethnic blocs. Descended from early Chinese immigrants, Hokkien and Hakka form the group of Taiwanese. They are differentiated primarily by dialect and ancestral continental origin. Originally from Fukien province of China, Hokkiens are the overwhelming majority group (over 70 per cent of Taiwan's population). Early migrants from Guangdong province were mostly the Hakka people. Hakkas were an ethnic minority in China, and as such they occasionally were targets of organized abuse in history (Barclay, 1954:4). Currently, Hakkas comprise about 12-14 per cent of Taiwan's population. On the other hand, post-Second World War immigrants and their Taiwan-born offsprings are Mainlanders, constituting less than 14 per cent of the total population.

The mating of marriage partners is shaped by historical conditions as well as social developments. Because of Taiwan's recent historical experience, political factors appear to be a key element in generating ethnic consciousness. The contrast between Taiwanese and Mainlanders is the main line on which cleavages in political support and national identity occur (Chang, 1989; Wu and Lin, 1990). Nowadays, there is an argument over whether the problem of ethnic conflicts in Taiwan would be solved gradually by natural processes, in which inter-marriage is an important mechanism for ethnic integration. For instance, Johnson (1992:78) provides a 1987 estimate indicating "that about 80 percent of the population is not opposed to inter-marriage."

As a matter of fact, inter-marriage is not only a cause, but also a consequence of the assimilation of the descendants of different ethnic origins (Alba and Golden, 1986). The extent or tendency

towards ethnic endogamy reflects the status accorded to each ethnicity, the strength of social pressures, and the structure of ethnic cleavages in the society (Lieberson and Waters, 1985). Therefore, ethnic inter-marriage has fundamental importance as a measure of status homogamy.

Although inter-marriage is a long-standing topic of central interest in the study of ethnic relations, assortative mating with respect to ethnicity (or other social origins) has been little studied in Taiwan. Gates' (1981) research is one of the very few studies that pay special attention to inter-marriage in contemporary Taiwan. According to her calculation:

> Of the 755 marriages, over 57 percent were Taiwanese-Taiwanese marriages, 20 percent were mainlander-mainlander marriages, and slightly over 22 percent were mixed mainlander-Taiwanese marriages; however, nearly 92 percent were between mainlander men and Taiwanese women; just over 8 percent were between Taiwanese men and mainlander women. Inequality between ethnic groups is clearly revealed by these statistics. (Gates, 1981:265-266)

Gates' data came from the 1974-75 household registers in twelve neighbourhoods within three Taipei wards (administrative units of community), namely, Ku-ting, Ta-an, and Chung-shan. These neighbourhoods were chosen for their relatively high proportion of Mainlanders and for their relatively high proportion of middle-class residents.

The present analysis uses two random samples drawn from recent islandwide social surveys in Taiwan: Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991-I). I cross-classify husband's ethnicity by wife's ethnicity for families in which only one member was interviewed. A four-category classification — Aborigine, Hokkien, Hakka, and Mainlander — is used for ethnicity. Before we go into a detailed examination of assortative mating with respect to ethnicity, we consider the possibility of merging data from different sources. If Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991) surveys were nominally comparable, their data would provide a sufficient number of sample

sizes, especially for the category of Aborigine, permitting meaningful analyses of comparisons across ethnic groups and cohorts.

Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991-I) surveys employed similar two-stage stratified random sampling designs, but they were conducted independently and separated by three years. A careful examination of the detailed sampling procedures applied by both surveys reveals that among the 60 PSU used in Tsai–Chiu (1988) research, four communities appeared repeatedly in the sampling list of the SSC (1991-I) survey. To eliminate the possibility that some respondents might have been interviewed twice, I exclude from SSC (1991-I) data 41 cases located in the four overlapped PSU, when I compile the two data sets together. As a result, the compiled data pertain to information ascertained from 1,763 male and 1,470 female respondents, yielding a total of 3,233 pairs of husbands and wives.

Table 1 presents observed counts for inter- and intra-ethnic marriages in the compiled data. Percentages of endogamous and exogamous marriages for different ethnic categories by gender are given in Table 2. While Panel A of the table pertains to all marriage pairs analysed, the other panels report percentages for husbands born before and after the Second World War separately.

The percentages conform to four generalizations with exceptions. First, for males and females alike, the in-marriage rates are generally higher than inter-marriage rates. Usually, people prefer endogamy to exogamy. Second, the in-marriage rates are generally higher among men than among women. Under the existing patriarchal system, it is easier for females than males to marry out of their ethnic origins. Third, among categories of Chinese ancestry, Hokkien have almost the highest in-marriage rates. Hokkien's high tendency towards endogamy is understandable given their overwhelmingly large size. Fourth and finally, the tendency towards endogamy generally decreases across cohorts. Post-war generations had more freedom than their older counterparts in the selection of marriage mates.

The exceptions to these generalizations occur mostly in the cases of Aborigine and Mainlander couples. With less than 2 per

Table 1 Observed frequencies for assortative mating with respect to ethnicity

Husband's ethnicity	Wife's ethnicity 1	2	3	4
A. Total pairs (N=3,233)				
1. Aborigine	37	2	0	0
2. Hokkien	11	2,134	82	73
3. Hakka	3	114	246	18
4. Mainlander	14	240	55	204
B. Husband born before 1946 (N=1,420)				
1. Aborigine	10	0	0	0
2. Hokkien	3	868	20	6
3. Hakka	0	43	151	1
4. Mainlander	13	144	35	126
C. Husband born after 1946 (N=1,813)				
1. Aborigine	27	2	0	0
2. Hokkien	8	1,266	62	67
3. Hakka	3	71	95	17
4. Mainlander	1	96	20	78

Sources: Compiled data from Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991-I).

Table 2 Percentage of endogamous and exogamous marriages by ethnic category

Ethnicity	Husbands % In-married	% Inter-married	% of sample	Wives % In-married	% Inter-married	% of sample
A. Total pairs (N=3,233)						
1. Aborigine	94.9	5.1	1.2	56.9	43.1	2.0
2. Hokkien	92.8	7.2	71.1	85.7	14.3	77.0
3. Hakka	64.6	35.4	11.8	64.2	35.8	11.8
4. Mainlander	39.8	60.2	15.9	69.2	30.8	9.1
B. Husband born before 1946 (N=1,420)						
1. Aborigine	100.0	0.0	0.7	38.5	61.5	1.8
2. Hokkien	96.8	3.2	63.2	82.3	17.7	74.3
3. Hakka	77.4	22.6	13.7	73.3	26.7	14.5
4. Mainlander	39.6	60.4	22.4	94.7	5.3	9.4
C. Husband born after 1946 (N=1,813)						
1. Aborigine	93.1	6.9	1.4	69.2	30.8	2.2
2. Hokkien	90.2	9.8	77.4	88.2	11.8	79.2
3. Hakka	51.1	48.9	10.3	53.7	46.3	9.8
4. Mainlander	40.0	60.0	10.8	48.1	51.9	8.9

Sources: Compiled data from Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991-I).

cent of the total population, Taiwan's Aborigines clearly show differential marriage patterns for the two genders. While 95 per cent of male Aborigines married a woman of their own group, about 40 per cent of female Aborigines married a man with different ethnicity. Differential marriage patterns by gender exist in the post-war cohorts, but the gender gap has decreased with more young Aborigine women marrying Aborigine men. The opposite is the case for Mainlanders, who are special in two ways. First, the out-marriage rate is higher than the in-marriage rate among men, whereas the reverse is true for women. And second, female percentages of endogamy have decreased almost one-half across cohorts, while the percentage of in-marriage remains about the same among men.

The general picture given above is based on percentages calculated for husbands and wives separately. Clearly, the sample distributions of husbands and wives by ethnic category are different, and these differences may be strongly implicated in observable differences in ethnic marriages between the genders. I now examine patterns of ethnic marriages in a more systematic way.

My analytic strategy is to concentrate on three aspects of assortative mating with respect to ethnicity. I first examine differential tendencies towards in-marriage by ethnicity. I then introduce some hypotheses in the model in order to assess inter-marriage patterns. Last, I analyse trends in ethnic assortative mating over time.

Table 3 reports the fit of several log-multiplicative models about which I am most concerned. Design matrices for these models are displayed in Table 4; cells sharing a numeric value within a matrix are assigned the same interaction parameter in the corresponding model.

Models 1 to 5 in Table 3 are hierarchical models. Among them, Model 1, conditional independence model, provides a baseline statistic representing the association to be explained by subsequent models. Model 2 posits a uniform endogamy parameter to four ethnic groups. It can account for 89 per cent of the association under the model of independence, indicating the prevalence of

Table 3 Summary of fit of selected multiplicative models of ethnic assortative mating

Model[a]	G^2	df	BIC
1. (H*A)(W*A)	1,713.6	18	1,566.0
2. (H*A)(W*A)(ETH2)	182.4	17	45.1
3. (H*A)(W*A)(ETH3)	90.4	16	-38.9
4. (H*A)(W*A)(ETH4)	80.1	15	-41.2
5. (H*A)(W*A)(ETH5)	80.0	14	-33.2
6. (H*A)(W*A)(ETH6)	77.1	14	-36.1
7. (H*A)(W*A)(S1)	77.4	12	-19.5
8. (H*A)(W*A)(ETH6*A)	6.9	10	-73.9
9. (H*A)(W*A)(ETH7*A)	8.0	11	-80.9

[a]Model terms: H = husband's ethnicity.
W = wife's ethnicity.
A = age cohort.
ETH2 - ETH6 and S1 = design matrices displayed in Table 4.
ETH7 = see text for explanations.

endogamy over exogamy. But, it does not fit the data to a satisfactory extent; the assumption of homogeneous endogamy across ethnic groups can be rejected at the 0.05 significance level. Model 3 is nested into Model 2 in the way that the former allows a unique in-marriage parameter for Aborigines. The contrast between these two models yields a value of $G^2 = 92$, with 1 degree of freedom, indicating the significance of the Aborigine distinction. Similarly, from line 3 to line 4 of Table 3, I test whether the in-marriage tendency for Hakka is significantly different from those of the other two categories of Chinese ancestry. Hakka's uniqueness is demonstrated by the significance in the contrast of Model 4 and Model 3, which yields a value of $G^2 = 10.3$ with 1 degree of

Table 4 Parameter displays describing the structure of association for selected models of ethnic marriage

Model	Husband's ethnicity	Wife's ethnicity 1	2	3	4
ETH2	1. Aborigine	2	1	1	1
	2. Hokkien	1	2	1	1
	3. Hakka	1	1	2	1
	4. Mainlander	1	1	1	2
ETH3	1. Aborigine	2	1	1	1
	2. Hokkien	1	3	1	1
	3. Hakka	1	1	3	1
	4. Mainlander	1	1	1	3
ETH4	1. Aborigine	2	1	1	1
	2. Hokkien	1	3	1	1
	3. Hakka	1	1	4	1
	4. Mainlander	1	1	1	3
ETH5	1. Aborigine	2	1	1	1
	2. Hokkien	1	3	1	1
	3. Hakka	1	1	4	1
	4. Mainlander	1	1	1	5
ETH6	1. Aborigine	2	1	1	1
	2. Hokkien	1	3	1	1
	3. Hakka	1	1	4	1
	4. Mainlander	5	1	1	3
S1	1. Aborigine	1	2	3	4
	2. Hokkien	2	5	6	7
	3. Hakka	3	6	8	9
	4. Mainlander	4	7	9	5

freedom. On the other hand, the contrast between Model 5, which posits a distinct endogamy parameter to each ethnic group, and Model 4 is negligible ($G^2 = 0.1$ with 1 degree of freedom). This implies that the assumption of invariance in the tendency of in-marriage between Hokkien and Mainlander cannot be rejected.

The results just reported suggest that Model 4 fits the data better than the other models. But, all the models presented so far assume random inter-marriage across ethnic boundaries, and constrain the association of spouses' ethnicity to be constant over time. Next, patterns of exchange marriages between ethnic groups are introduced into the model.

Considering demographic and socio-economic factors as well as daily life experience, I anticipate that "Mainlander men marrying Aborigine women" will be most notable among inter-marriages in post-war Taiwan. On line 6 of Table 3, I include a parameter measuring this propensity in Model 6, which is nested into Model 4. Model 6 explains a significant portion of association under Model 4; the contrast between these two models yields a value of $G^2 = 3$ with 1 degree of freedom. Alternative to Model 6, Model 7 assumes that inter-marriage patterns are symmetric, once the disparate marginal distributions of husbands' and wives' ethnicity are taken into account. By the BIC criterion, Model 7 fits the data worse than Model 6. Therefore, I use Model 6 to capture patterns of assortative mating with respect to ethnicity.

Remember that Model 6 constrains assortative mating to be invariant over time. At this point, one might be tempted to ask questions about temporal change. Are the pattern and strength of the husband–wife association stable over time? Shall the phenomenon of Mainlander men marrying Aborigine women pertain only to the first-generation Mainlanders, most of whom came to Taiwan either without a wife or left their wives behind in mainland China? To answer these questions, I carry out further analyses of trends in ethnic assortative mating.

Model 8 augments Model 6 with parameters for change in assortative patterns across male cohorts. The corresponding contrast yields a value of $G^2 = 70$ with 4 degrees of freedom, confirm-

ing significant cohort change. On the other hand, Model 9 differs from Model 8 on one specification: Model 9 deletes the only one inter-marriage parameter in the post-war cohort. Comparison across Models 8 and 9 detects whether the phenomenon of Mainlander men marrying Aborigine women pertains only to older Mainlander males. And the answer is "yes." Among all the models considered, Model 9, which yields a value of $G^2 = 8.0$ with 11 degrees of freedom, can best describe Taiwan's changing patterns of ethnic marriage. Since this is the preferred model in this part of analysis, I shall consider its implications in some details. Table 5 reports its parameter estimates.

First of all, Table 5 reveals that there is a strong association between husband's and wife's ethnicity in Taiwan. Aborigines have the strongest propensity for in-marriage, Hakkas next, while Hokkiens and Mainlanders share the same degree of tendency towards endogamy. The strength of the association has decreased in all ethnic group across male cohorts examined, but in-marriages are still more significant than out-marriages. With respect to inter-marriage patterns, the disappearance of Mainlander men's high tendency towards marrying Aborigine women is a major change across cohorts. Among older cohorts, Mainlander men's propensity to marry Aborigine women is $\beta = 1.3$, about 4 times higher than their tendency to marry Hokkien or Hakka women. When inter-marriage occurs in the post-war cohorts, the chance of marrying each other is about the same for each ethnic group. In the long term, one consequence of ethnic inter-marriage would be the disappearance of the existing ethnic distinctions. Nevertheless, for the time being, endogamy continues to prevail over exogamy.

Table 5 Parameter estimates in the preferred model of ethnic assortative mating

Parameter description	Estimate	Standard error
A. In-marriage parameter		
1. Aborigine	13.9	31.5
2. Hokkien	2.4	0.2
3. Hakka	2.7	0.2
4. Mainlander	2.4	0.2
B. Inter-marriage parameter between Mainlander husband and Aborigine wife	1.3	0.6
C. Cohort change in in-marriage parameter		
1. Aborigine	-7.2	31.5
2. Hokkien	-1.0	0.2
3. Hakka	-0.9	0.3
4. Mainlander	-1.0	0.2

Assortative Mating by Class Background

My second task is to demonstrate the occurrence of assortment with respect to class background. Traditionally, stratification researchers view classes as aggregates occupying similar positions in relation to the means of production or similar positions in one or more hierarchies of wealth, power, or prestige. In this study, the concept of class background is measured by father's occupational status. I employ a five-category classification to sort father's occupation title. The five categories (in order of hierarchical status) are: (1) upper non-manual workers; (2) lower non-manual workers; (3) upper manual workers; (4) lower manual workers; and (5) farmers.

This part of the analysis uses data drawn from SSC (1991-I), since among the available data sets, SSC (1991-I) is the only survey which asks questions on fathers' occupations of both spouses at marriage. The total analysis sample pertains to 1,020 pairs of husbands and wives. Table 6 presents the observed frequencies for cross-classification of father's occupation of husband by father's occupation of wife. Table 7 summarizes the fit of a variety of log-linear models to the data.

On line 1 of Table 7, I report the fit of conditional independence model, which is obviously rejected. The second model in the table is the model of uniform endogamy, which posits a single inflation factor for the main diagonal. This model says that all occupational strata share a uniform propensity for in-marriage. Yielding a value of $G^2 = 58.2$ with 31 degrees of freedom, Model 2 fits the data better than Model 1. From line 2 to line 3, I test a model of quasi-perfect marital mobility. This model fits a distinct in-marriage parameter to each diagonal cell and posits independence among the remaining cells off the diagonal. I contrast the quasi-perfect model with the uniform model, confirming substantial variability among in-marriage parameters. The quasi-perfect mobility model implies quasi symmetry in a five-by-five table. In a marital mobility classification, quasi-symmetry means that upward and downward marriages are equally likely, net of differences between husbands and wives in the prevalence of fathers' occupations. Next, various patterns of out-marriage are introduced into the model.

Model 4 in Table 7 allows for unrestricted association between the class background of husbands and wives, but constrains this association to be invariant over time. This model accounts for 88 per cent of the association under the independence model. Models 5-7 include alternative restrictions on the husband–wife association but also assume no change in the pattern of assortative mating across cohorts. Model 5 assumes that patterns of class assortative mating are symmetric, once the differences in marginal distributions of husbands' and wives' class background are taken into account. By the G^2 criterion, Model 5 fits the data better

Table 6 Observed frequencies for assortative mating with respect to class background

Father's occupation of husband	Father's occupation of wife				
	1	2	3	4	5
A. Total pairs (N=1,020)					
1. Upper non-manual	43	22	5	18	34
2. Lower non-manual	22	29	12	11	58
3. Upper manual	5	3	6	13	20
4. Lower manual	14	11	10	22	37
5. Farm	41	63	26	44	451
B. Husband born before 1946 (N=361)					
1. Upper non-manual	11	8	2	2	12
2. Lower non-manual	7	9	4	1	15
3. Upper manual	0	2	1	1	6
4. Lower manual	3	4	2	8	8
5. Farm	12	20	5	12	206
C. Husband born after 1946 (N=659)					
1. Upper non-manual	32	14	3	16	22
2. Lower non-manual	15	20	8	10	43
3. Upper manual	5	1	5	12	14
4. Lower manual	11	7	8	14	29
5. Farm	29	43	21	32	245

Source: SSC (1991-I).

Table 7 Summary of fit of selected models of class assortative mating

Model[a]	G^2	df	BIC
1. (H*A)(W*A)	182.4	32	-39.3
2. (H*A)(W*A)(U)	58.2	31	-156.5
3. (H*A)(W*A)(Q)	43.7	27	-143.3
4. (H*A)(W*A)(H*W)	21.5	16	-89.3
5. (H*A)(W*A)(S)	26.3	22	-126.1
6. (H*A)(W*A)(S)(P)	24.9	21	-120.6
7. (H*A)(W*A)(C)(P)	38.6	26	-141.5
8. (H*A)(W*A)(S*A)	12.8	12	-70.3

Model terms: H = husband's class background.
W = wife's class background.
A = husband's age cohort.
U = uniform endogamy parameter.
Q = quasi-perfect parameter.
S = symmetry parameter.
P = hypergamy/hypogamy.
C = crossings parameters.

than Model 4; the contrast between these two models yields a value of $G^2 = 4.8$ with 6 degrees of freedom. Similarly, Model 5 fits better than Model 6, which includes an additional parameter for asymmetry (P) — a uniform tendency for women to marry up (or down) (hypergamy or hypogamy) across combinations of spouses' class background. Model 7 also allows for asymmetry but replaces the symmetric association parameters with the crossings parameters for the class barriers to inter-marriage. Model 7 fits the data worse than Model 6, indicating that the crossings model does not explain Taiwan's pattern of class assortative mating to a satisfactory extent.

I now release the restriction of constant husband–wife associations over time. Model 8 includes the same parameters as

Model 5 plus cohort-specific parameters for symmetric association. Model 8 does not fit the data better than Model 5; the contrast between them yields a value of $G^2 = 13.5$ with 10 degrees of freedom. This result suggests that patterns of class assortative mating are invariant across age groups. Parameter estimates in Model 5 are given in Table 8.

Table 8 Parameter estimates of class assortative mating

Parameter description	Estimate	Standard error
A. Class endogamy		
1. Upper non-manual	1.7	0.3
2. Lower non-manual	1.6	0.5
3. Upper manual	1.2	0.3
4. Lower manual	2.6	0.3
5. Farm	—	—
B. Exchange marriage between		
1. Upper non-manual and lower non-manual	1.4	0.2
2. Upper non-manual and upper manual	0.9	0.4
3. Upper non-manual and lower manual	1.5	0.2
4. Upper non-manual and farm	—	—
5. Lower non-manual and upper manual	0.8	0.3
6. Lower non-manual and lower manual	0.7	0.3
7. Lower non-manual and farm	—	—
8. Upper manual and lower manual	1.6	0.3
9. Upper manual and farm	—	—
10. Lower manual and farm	—	—

Educational Assortative Mating

From the above analysis, we know that marriages in Taiwan tended to be ethnically and class homogamous. We now ask the question, Did they tend to be educationally homogamous as well?

This part of the analysis uses data from different sources: Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991-I). Table 9 reports observed frequencies for cross-classifications of husband's education by wife's education (and by age cohort of husbands) in the compiled data. The total analysis units pertain to 3,233 pairs of married couples. Among them, 48 per cent of the mates attained similar levels of education. Table 10 presents the likelihood-ratio statistics for several log-linear models of assortative mating with respect to education.

As in the previous section, I start with the conditional independence model, the uniform homogamy model, and the quasi-perfect marital mobility model, which are all rejected. Then, I consider a model which allows for unrestricted association between spouses' schooling but which constrains this association to be invariant across male age cohorts. This is Model 4 in Table 10. With a value of $G^2 = 12.2$ with 16 degrees of freedom, this model fits the data well; it accounts for most (99 per cent) of the association under the model of independence.

Next, I apply a set of log-linear models similar to those used by Mare (1991) in his analysis of trends in educational assortative mating in the United States. Alternative restrictions on the association between the schooling of husbands and wives are included in Models 5-7. Model 5 assumes symmetric patterns of assortative mating on educational attainment. Model 6 includes the same symmetric parameters (S) as Model 5 plus a parameter for asymmetry (P). This parameter indicates a uniform tendency for women to marry up or down. Model 7 includes the asymmetry parameter (P) plus four crossings parameters for barriers to intermarriage. Different from Mare's American findings, Model 7 fits the data better than Model 6, while the latter fits better than Model 5, similar to what Mare reports. This result suggests that the

Table 9 Observed frequencies for assortative mating with respect to education

	Wife's education				
Husband's education	1	2	3	4	5
A. Total pairs (N=3,233)					
1. Illiterate or self-educated	175	66	7	3	0
2. Elementary school education	269	582	79	28	4
3. Junior high school education	29	244	208	71	2
4. Senior high school education	25	158	234	338	41
5. Some post-high school education	12	53	83	266	256
B. Husband born before 1946 (N=1,420)					
1. Illiterate or self-educated	166	53	3	1	0
2. Elementary school education	229	321	19	5	1
3. Junior high school education	22	96	45	9	0
4. Senior high school education	23	82	69	43	7
5. Some post-high school education	10	35	43	93	45
C. Husband born after 1946 (N=1,813)					
1. Illiterate or self-educated	9	13	4	2	0
2. Elementary school education	40	261	60	23	3
3. Junior high school education	7	148	163	62	2
4. Senior high school education	3	78	166	296	34
5. Some post-high school education	1	16	39	174	209

Sources: Compiled data from Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991-I).

Table 10 Summary of fit of selected models of educational assortative mating

Model[a]	G^2	df	BIC
1. (H*A)(W*A)	2,185.8	32	1,927.0
2. (H*A)(W*A)(U)	1,244.9	31	994.4
3. (H*A)(W*A)(Q)	1,015.9	27	797.7
4. (H*A)(W*A)(H*W)	12.2	16	-117.1
5. (H*A)(W*A)(S)	36.6	22	-141.2
6. (H*A)(W*A)(S)(P)	19.5	21	-150.2
7. (H*A)(W*A)(C)(P)	28.4	26	-181.7
8. (H*A)(W*A)(CR)(P)	29.0	28	-197.3
9. (H*A)(W*A)(CR*A)(P)	24.2	26	-185.9
10. (H*A)(W*A)(CR)(P*A)	27.5	26	-182.7

[a]Model terms: H = husband's schooling level.
W = wife's schooling level.
A = husband's age cohort.
U = uniform endogamy parameter.
Q = quasi-perfect parameter.
S = symmetry parameter.
P = hypergamy/hypogamy.
C = crossings parameters.
CR = crossings parameters with equality constraints (see text for explanation).

crossings model is sufficient to capture Taiwan's patterns of educational assortative mating.

The inspection of crossings parameters estimated in Model 7 reveals that the log odds of marriage across the three lowest educational barriers are similar to each other. On the other hand, the log odds of marriage across the fourth and highest schooling barrier considered (i.e., across some post-high school < senior high school) are apparently different from the others. Accordingly, Model 8 in Table 10 augments Model 7 with equality constraints on parameters for the three lowest barriers to educational inter-marriage. Model 8 fits the data better than Model 7; the contrast between them yields a value of $G^2 = 0.6$ with 2 degrees of freedom, obviously not statistically significant.

Crossings parameters estimated in Model 8 are given in Table 11. Columns 1 and 2 show the parameters and standard errors for the log odds of marrying across educational barriers, respectively. Column 3 lists the corresponding odds. The inspection of these estimates reveals that all the log odds of marriage across educational barriers are negative. The negative sign indicates that it is less likely for two persons with unequal schooling to marry than for those with the same levels of education. Educational homogamy is most apparent for marriage in which one spouse has some post-high school education and the other has high school education. Thus, we learn that in Taiwan most serious crossings barriers occur at the upper end of the schooling distribution.

Table 11 Crossings parameters for educational assortative mating

Schooling barrier	Estimate	Standard error	Corresponding odds
1. Elementary school < Illiterate or self-educated	-1.22	0.08	0.30
2. Junior high school < Elementary school	-1.22	0.08	0.30
3. Senior high school < Junior high school	-1.22	0.08	0.30
4. Some post-high school < Senior high school	-1.62	0.12	0.20

Note: Parameters for marrying across schooling barriers 1, 2, and 3 are constrained to be equal.

To analyse trends in educational assortative mating, Model 9 in Table 10 contains the same parameters for the husband–wife association as Model 8 but relaxes the assumption that the association between spouses' schooling has been invariant across cohorts. Model 9 does not fit the data better than Model 8, neither does Model 10, which augments Model 8 with parameters for cohort-specific levels of hypergamy or hypogamy. This finding implies that the association between the schooling of husbands and wives is stable across cohorts.

A note shall be made here. Consistent to cultural ideals that women shall not outshine their husbands educationally, parameter estimates for Model 8 (not shown here) indicate that Taiwan's women are less well educated than the men they marry. This finding is also consonant with the American case reported by Mare (1991:22).

Occupational Assortative Mating

My final task in this chapter is to examine the association between husbands' and wives' occupations in two-earner families. As in the analysis of class assortative mating, a five-category classification is used for occupation. The five categories (in order of hierarchical status) are: (1) upper non-manual workers; (2) lower non-manual workers; (3) upper manual workers; (4) lower manual workers; and (5) farmers.

This part of the analysis uses the compiled data from Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991-I). Table 12 presents the effective counts for the five-by-five cross classification of husband's occupation by wife's occupation (and by age cohort of husband) for 1,219 pairs of couples who were both in the labour market when the interview was done.

Table 13 summarizes the fit of a variety of log-linear models to the data. These models are similar to those used in the analysis of class endogamy earlier.

Table 12 Observed frequencies for assortative mating with respect to occupation

	Wife's occupation				
Husband's occupation	1	2	3	4	5
A. Total pairs (N=1,219)					
1. Upper non-manual	119	109	18	44	15
2. Lower non-manual	42	172	16	52	14
3. Upper manual	6	27	50	52	4
4. Lower manual	14	46	37	142	13
5. Farm	2	15	11	27	172
B. Husband born before 1946 (N=444)					
1. Upper non-manual	28	32	4	11	9
2. Lower non-manual	8	47	3	18	11
3. Upper manual	1	7	14	11	1
4. Lower manual	1	12	14	44	6
5. Farm	1	11	5	16	129
C. Husband born after 1946 (N=775)					
1. Upper non-manual	91	77	14	33	6
2. Lower non-manual	34	125	13	34	3
3. Upper manual	5	20	36	41	3
4. Lower manual	13	34	23	98	7
5. Farm	1	4	6	11	43

Sources: Compiled data from Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991-I).

Table 13 Summary of fit of selected models of occupational assortative mating

Model[a]	G^2	df	BIC
1. (H*A)(W*A)	788.2	32	560.8
2. (H*A)(W*A)(U)	211.3	31	-8.9
3. (H*A)(W*A)(Q)	101.6	27	-90.3
4. (H*A)(W*A)(H*W)	15.9	16	-97.8
5. (H*A)(W*A)(S)	23.8	22	-132.5
6. (H*A)(W*A)(S)(P)	21.1	21	-128.2
7. (H*A)(W*A)(C)(P)	33.1	26	-151.6
8. (H*A)(W*A)(S*A)	11.5	12	-73.8

[a]Model terms: H = husband's class background.
W = wife's class background.
A = husband's age cohort.
U = uniform endogamy parameter.
Q = quasi-perfect parameter.
S = symmetry parameter.
P = hypergamy/hypogamy.
C = crossings parameters.

On line 1 of Table 13, I report the fit of the conditional independence model, which obviously fails to fit the data. The second model I consider is the uniform association model, which posits a single inflation factor for the main diagonal. This model says that occupational strata share a uniform propensity for in-marriage. This model yields a value of G2 = 211.3 with 31 degrees of freedom. From line 2 to line 3 of Table 13, I test the assumption of quasi-perfect marital mobility. This model fits a distinct inheritance parameter to each diagonal cell and posits independence among the remaining cells off the diagonal. The contrast between Model 3 and Model 2 confirms substantial variability among in-marriage parameters. The quasi-perfect mobility model implies

that upward and downward marriages are equally likely, net of differences between husbands and wives in the prevalence of the occupational distribution. There is a significant drop in G^2 values from Model 3 to Model 4, which allows for unrestricted husband–wife associations, reflecting that husbands' and wives' occupations are related to a certain extent in some ways. Now, let's take inter-marriage patterns into account.

Similar to the analysis reported earlier, I use three sets of parameters to estimate the pattern of assortative mating with respect to occupations. They are: (1) symmetric parameters (S), representing the assumption that the association between husbands' and wives' occupations is symmetrical; (2) asymmetry parameters (P), indicating that women share a uniform tendency towards hypergamy or hypogamy; and (3) crossings parameters (C), measuring which occupational differences between mating partners are serious barriers to inter-marriage and which differences are relatively permeable boundaries. The corresponding results are presented in Models 5-7 in Table 13. By the G^2 criterion, Model 5 fits the data relatively better. Model 5 posits symmetry associations, net of the disparate marginal distributions of husbands' and wives' occupations. Estimates for symmetry parameters are reported in Table 14.

Finally, I examine if patterns of occupational assortative mating have changed over time. Model 8 in Table 13 includes the same parameters for the association of spouses' occupations as Model 5 plus cohort-specific symmetry effects. The contrast between these two nested models yields a value of $G^2 = 12.3$ with 10 degrees of freedom, which is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. It is evident that marital patterns in Taiwan are stable across cohorts.

Table 14 Parameter estimates of occupational assortative mating

Parameter description	Estimate	Standard error
A. Occupational homogamy		
1. Upper non-manual	5.5	0.5
2. Lower non-manual	4.7	0.4
3. Upper manual	4.7	0.5
4. Lower manual	3.9	0.3
5. Farm	—	—
B. Exchange marriage between		
1. Upper non-manual and lower non-manual	4.3	0.3
2. Upper non-manual and upper manual	3.1	0.4
3. Upper non-manual and lower manual	3.0	0.3
4. Upper non-manual and farm	—	—
5. Lower non-manual and upper manual	3.3	0.4
6. Lower non-manual and lower manual	3.2	0.3
7. Lower non-manual and farm	—	—
8. Upper manual and lower manual	3.7	0.3
9. Upper manual and farm	—	—
10. Lower manual and farm	—	—

Conclusion and Discussion

This chapter has explored four aspects of status homogamy: Taiwan's assortative mating patterns with respect to ethnicity, class background, educational attainment, and occupational achievement have been empirically examined. Throughout the analysis, my central hypothesis has been that persons tend to marry those of similar social standing, whether ascribed or achieved status. In addition, I have postulated that when heterogamy occurs, it is usually the case that women tend to marry those of somewhat higher socio-economic status than themselves.

The empirical results show that for the four indicators of social status examined, there is a clear tendency for people to marry homogamously. Besides, high degrees of status homogamy have remained stable in post-war Taiwan, once changes across cohorts in the distribution of characteristics dealt with have been taken into account.

On the other hand, a significant and interesting change in inter-marriage patterns over time is found. That is, Mainlander men's high tendency towards marrying Aborigine women has disappeared in the post-war cohorts. Among them, the chance of inter-marriage between each other is approximately the same for four ethnic groups in Taiwan. This implies that the existing ethnic distinctions will disappear in the long term, if the current trend in inter-marriage continues. But, for the time being, the association between husband's and wife's ethnicity in Taiwan is significantly strong. Endogamy continues to prevail over exogamy.

With respect to educational homogamy, the tendency for persons to mate assortatively by level of educational attainment has been well documented by many studies in different societies: Michielutte (1972), Rockwell (1976), and Mare (1991) in the United States; Hendrickx, Lammers, and Ultee (1991) in the Netherlands. The present analysis adds Taiwan to the list; the data suggest a fairly high degree of assortative mating by education. In addition, American studies cited above indicate that trends in the proportion of marriages in which spouses have the same educational attainment over time appear to result mainly from changes in the distributions of spouses' schooling rather than in the association between spouses' attainments. Similarly, the present analysis suggests stability in the pattern and strength of assortative mating with respect to education over time, once cross-cohort changes in the level of educational attainment have been taken into account.

In regard to occupational status, a careful reader would have noticed that the results of the association between spouses' occupations are similar to those derived from the analysis of class endogamy, in which fathers' occupations of the spouses are compared. Indeed, this is an interesting finding which remains to be examined more carefully in the future.

A final note has to be made here. When we compare the association between husbands' and wives' occupations, we have to limit our analysis sample to couples in two-earner families. In such a way, women as housewives are excluded from the analysis, mainly because there is no appropriate way to allocate them in the occupational hierarchy.

The housewife role is characterized by Parsons (1942) as a "pseudo occupation." It is an occupation with no income, economically dependent on the husband. Yet, housework is also a possible occupation outcome for women whose socio-economic background and education span the whole range of possible levels. Among the total 3,233 pairs of marriage mates included in the compiled data from Tsai–Chiu (1988) and SSC (1991-I) surveys, 1,619 women are housewives. The distribution of their husbands' occupations is given here:

	Sample size	Percentage
1. Upper non-manual	319	19.7
2. Lower non-manual	419	25.9
3. Upper manual	244	15.1
4. Lower manual	378	23.3
5. Farm	259	16.0
Total	1,619	100.0

The percentage distribution of housewives is, of course, affected by the occupational distribution of husbands. But still, we can see that housework is a possible outcome of status attainment

for women, irrespective of whom they are married to. The inclusion of housewives may represent an important addition to studies of marital mobility. My future study will make efforts to bring housewives back into the analysis.

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