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China's Transients and the State

A Form of Civil Society?

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

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Introduction:

Variant Understandings of Civil Society

China's transient population is "floating," unlinked from its legal domicile and set out on the loose. Pouring in waves and swelling in surges or spewed out as flotsam, its very name conjures up variegated images of anomic, atomized particles drifting and wandering without direction, also of aggregations billowing in huge masses and pounding at city walls. Can we call this new formation an instance of civil society; where shall we position it in reference to the state?[1]

Answering this query entails ferreting out the several senses in which the concept of civil society has been coined and used. Those writing on Gramsci, for instance, note that he employs the term to refer to "everything ... that is not strictly part of the state,"[2] but also, as others have deciphered, at times as a category that is "one and the same with the state."[3] In fact, one analyst has extracted from Gramsci three separate relationships between the state and civil society, i.e., in various versions Gramsci has the state contrasting with, encompassing, and standing as identical with civil society.[4]

Thus, political society in some passages was counterposed to civil society, but elsewhere within "the state" political and civil

society are merged, with the "massive structure" of the state cancelling the autonomy of civil society.[5] Put a bit differently, it has also been said that for Gramsci, civil society as a set of cultural institutions function in Western bourgeois systems to reproduce the reality of the dominant classes and to protect the state apparatus.[6]

Another angle from which to appraise the notion of civil society is to see it as Hegel did in the *Philosophy of Right*, as the realm of "economic relations and their spontaneous or voluntary forms of organization."[7] Hegel, unlike Gramsci who associated civil society with culture, centered it around the economic dimension of social life, and in some of his writings set it against the state or political society as an alternate "moment of the superstructure."[8] And yet Hegel too has been interpreted as having joined civil society with the state, in labelling it "the sphere of economic relations together with their external regulation according to the principles of the liberal state ... it simultaneously comprises bourgeois society and the bourgeois state."[9]

It is perhaps only in Marx that we find a really clear resolution of this ambiguity over whether civil society is indeed separate or distinct from the state. Marx offers this resolution in *The German Ideology:*

> The form of relations *determined by the existing productive forces* at all previous historical stages and in its turn determining these, is civil society.... Civil society embraces all the material relations of individuals within a definite stage of the development of the productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage ... [10] (emphasis added)

This identification of civil society as superstructural and thus as determined as the state is by the economic base definitively connects the two concepts. Thus, even as Marx may conceive of civil society as referring to "all non-state institutions,"[11] in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* their connection via the economic base enables their ultimate bond:

> The state machine has established itself so firmly *vis-à-vis* civil society that ... the state enmeshes, controls, regulates, supervises and regiments civil society from the most all-embracing expressions of its life down to its most insignificant motions, from its most general modes of existence down to the private life of individuals."[12]

In short, a return to the derivation of the term "civil society" reveals that its current usage, particularly among scholars of and from Eastern Europe as "a free public sphere and a plurality of independent associations,"[13] is but one formulation.[14] Civil society may be apart from the state or stand against the state; it may also be inextricably ensnared within it. This paper on China's floating population will appropriate the concept of civil society for reaching an understanding of the position of this social group in relation to the Chinese state. In doing so, it will take advantage of this double definition to view these people from the two opposing vantage points indicated above.

The Floating Population and the State

From one perspective, the floating population stands apart from the state; it floats into and about the cities – sagging, overpacked, strained at their seams – where the state's presence is most manifest today, and it appears there as anomic particles, as a kind of flotsam. There it exposes cracks in the state apparatus and flows into them; as it does so it penetrates the state as a separate and alien force, a fragment of society, pulling the state further apart, weakening and corroding. This is the microvision, for its focus is on the relations between individual parts of society and the separate state agencies and institutions with which they interact.

Alternatively, in a second sense, the floaters surge and billow in rhythm with the state and its activities, mutually sustained and mutually reproduced. They stop up the dikes as the state breaks down and thereby arrest a collapse. This is the macrovision, which envisages this section of civil society as supportive of the overall socialist state formation and thus allowing its perpetuation.

From the first perspective, the command economy is in decline, shattering from misguided reform and lost legitimacy into self-serving and unresponsive bureaucracies. The floating population, attaching itself to these fissures, seizes on this weakness and frag-

mentation to find a niche, even as it is in turn manipulated and exploited to serve the separate interests of individual bureaucracies. Here we find illicit hiring and sudden dismissals, low wages and lack of benefits, bribery and extortion, excessive fees, floaters consigned to the arduous and filthy tasks. Here too we uncover *guanxi* leaping outside official bureaucratic boundaries to give country relations and fellow villagers an uneasy and uncertain entry into the state sector.

Here too are the ever-elusive efforts to coordinate the several bureaucracies of the local urban state order which should be cooperatively managing these interlopers, and the incapacity to bring rural offices into common cause with city bureaus, as each separate agency finds its own advantage in handling the transients according to its needs.

And here is the difficulty of getting firms to dismiss the floaters; and of rampant infractions of rules on temporary registration and of quota-driven hiring procedures, problems often proving as severe as limiting the initial intrusion. Stopping with these pictures we would see the individual units of the state in tacit alliance with the floaters, together trading benefits at the expense of the larger state. The conclusion we would draw is that the use of the term "civil society" in its conventional contemporary sense could validly be applied to the floaters, that they appear as a force apart from the state and resistant to its management.

But equally compelling is a perspective that considers the floaters as absorbed into the state's hegemony, that takes note of the socio-economic domination of the socialist state even over a group in motion and seemingly beyond the confines of organized state-directed life, outside the state's normal purview. This domination is rooted in the state's very definition of this group as temporary, semi-legal, unofficial dwellers in the city. For this designation robs them of the rights to stable employment, social welfare and the essential means of livelihood such as rationed food, state-provided housing. The vulnerability lent the transients by the state's power to define their status determines their existence in other ways as well, limiting their freedom and enhancing their dependence.[15]

In this vein, we observe the floating population contributing to

propping up a moribund regime: manning its bankrupt factories cheaply; supplying vegetables to the cities and so working against inflation; stocking its markets and servicing its "proper" city residents; redeeming the reputation of its instruments of repression, as the popularly maligned public security gets a new lease on life combatting the crime that floaters are thought to generate; emptying out the countryside and so solving problems of rural underdevelopment, poverty and rural unemployment while supplying docile and inexpensive labor to state firms in the cities, even as the "out-of-plan" "black babies" of this labor force, being "illegitimate" to the state, need not be cared for at state expense.

Moreover, as many of these people are absorbed into state-owned and state-run units, the presence of this population creates a latent bond between what might otherwise be viewed as antagonistic players,[16] as the interests of the state intersect with those of management in the area of profits and quiescence. In these ways, though the state may be tottering as its individual units enrich themselves on the floaters, still at the same time the overall system is sustained as its constituent parts become bolstered up and ever more entrenched.

The remainder of this paper will first provide some background on the history of what could be considered sojourning in China, the state's treatment of it after 1949, the new impact that economic reform had on this activity, and offer some general material on its current size and demographic, occupational, and residential features. Following that, the last two sections offer two conflicting analyses of the floating population, one which views it as separate from and against the state, in accord with the first meaning of civil society, the other which presents it as an integral part of the state and contributing to the maintenance of the state, in line with the second meaning.

Transience in China:

Its History and Economic Reforms

A Heritage of Sojourning

The concept of a separation between a permanent residence and a temporary abode has an ancient pedigree in China. Sojourning was common in historical times; while the wanderer traveled, and even settled away from home, his family would remain at the old homestead.[17] The term *jiguan* referred to the place of residence which defined a person's origin, and both social custom and governmental policy emphasized this attribute.[18]

Even within the rural areas the term *fuzhu*, or floating residents, was used to single out those individuals who were not original residents of a village and who, sometimes even after as much as a decade of remaining in the place, were not held to be members of the community. They did not receive a regular listing in the village's *baojia* records or in some cases were not listed at all.[19] Likewise, those who ventured into strange urban areas in the Qing were differentiated from permanent residents in the *baojia* residence records.[20]

Besides these official and customary means of segregating outsiders, various activities of the sojourners themselves reinforced these practices and kept these people as a world unto themselves. Because natives of the same locality tended to specialize in the same craft or to trade in the same local products, an "ethnic division of labor" by place of birth was characteristic of migrant enclaves.[21] Not only did *tongxiang* (same native place) fellows share interests as tradesmen, they also formed associations to serve their own interests and lived in concentrated sections of the cities to which they had migrated.[22]

In nineteenth-century Hankow, transient peoples came without families, but lived in clusters at their worksites, and were managed by migrant labor gangs.[23] Thus traditional China bestowed a legacy of transiency according to which immigrants were always "other," typically finding their only integration by bonding with those from their own home regions.

Post-1949, Pre-Reform

Soon after communist takeover household registration books (*huji bu*) were created for each family, one copy of each of which per family was kept on file at the local police station. The point of the system was to check on people attempting to evade the rural land reform campaign.[24] As the new regime established itself, however, migration restrictions became loose, to the extent that more than twenty million rural migrants entered the cities between 1949 and 1957 despite that the First Five Year Plan (1952-1957) only produced one million new nonagricultural jobs a year.[25] As early as 1953, the State Council issued a directive attempting to check peasants "blindly" entering the cities, followed by a second plea the next year signed by the Ministries of Internal Affairs (*neiwu*) and Labor. None of this achieved much effect, however.

Not giving up the effort, in December 1957 the Party Center jointly with the State Council released a new notification again aimed at checking "blind" emigration out of the villages. This was supported by the departments of civil affairs who established organs to send peasants back home and created detention centers (*shourongso*) to gather up the interlopers before shipping them on their way.[26]

One more attempt came in January 1958 when the state promulgated its "Household Registration Regulations of the PRC."[27] But the irrepressible movement of migrants reached its peak only in the Great Leap when central politicians, stupidly believing the grain supply to be abundant, permitted the urban population to shoot up from 99 million in 1957 to 130 million in 1961, with most of the growth occurring in the second half of 1958.[28] The influx was finally halted only by a forcible mass exodus in the early 1960's.

In the course of implementing these various regulations, the state divided the population into two permanent groups according to what has been called a "system of birth-ascribed stratification."[29] By the early 1960's, the system was in place, with one's household registration (*hukou*) sealing his or her fate. Peasants were legally bound by their rural registration and banned from leaving the land.

The result was that, unless a person could find a job in the city

– usually through being designated a member of a production team's construction team on contract with a state industrial enterprise, or else by obtaining permission to leave from commune officials and then turning over a part of one's wages to the collective[30] – he/she had no right to be in a city.[31]

Like the South African pass and influx control laws, the *hukou* system absolutely determined not just where a person could live but along with that the person's entire life chances – his or her social rank, wage, welfare, food rations, and housing.[32] Also like it, this system worked to keep city status sacred and restricted,[33] thereby upholding the fiction that no matter how long a worker had been present in the city he/she would remain only a temporary resident.[34]

Changes with Economic Reform

With the advent of economic reform in the late 1970's, especially with the breakup of the commune system, what had been a massive disguised rural surplus labor force became evident. Just as cultivated acreage was decreasing (and decreased further as peasants grabbed farmland to build new housing)[35] and the level of mechanization was rising, efficiency increased in the countryside as families got more freedom to allocate their labor according to their own dictates.[36] Millions of peasants became redundant in just a few years. It was clear that the countryside alone could not absorb these numbers.

But there was an obvious way out. For simultaneously, new funds in the hands of local urban governments fueled hectic construction in the cities, while urban markets became legitimized and the right was granted to engage in private-sectoral labor. City youths, meanwhile, had new employment opportunities in classy occupations such as tourism and therefore rejected careers in the traditional trades, such as textiles, machinery, the silk trade and building materials;[37] as one source decried, "City people would rather do nothing than this" (referring to such arduous jobs as drilling waterways or repairing roads and bridges).[38] Moreover, income differences between town and country were marked and peasants, aware of the contrast, hoped to better their lot by relocating.[39]

By the late 1970's, peasants responded to these "push" and "pull" factors by heading for the cities to sell their crops or scout for work. Accordingly, the state gradually sanctioned this migration, first with a State Council ruling in April 1983 that permitted rural households, without changing their residence, to embark on "cooperative ventures" in market towns.[40] Behind this new leniency was the hope that by maintaining the distinction between permanent and temporary residents cities, strapped for resources, would be absolved of any obligation to feed, house, or provide security or welfare for these migrants.[41]

This was followed by a 1984 circular letting peasants who could raise their own funds, take care of their own grain rations, who could find a place of abode in the cities and towns, and who had the ability to run a business or serve in rural enterprises enter cities and towns.[42] This second decision amounted to granting official approval for peasants to take up permanent residence in urban areas, though it was intended to apply just to the smaller towns and not to the major cities.

Despite the intention to use these measures to limit the flow of peasants into the major cities, the result was to unlock the spigot, as hordes of peasants arranging for their own food flooded the cities. The numbers of "temporary residents" only increased more with further accommodating policies by the authorities – still unwilling to confer permanent status on them – such as the June 1986 permission given to peasants working in cities to purchase urban grain supplies at negotiated prices.[43]

In historical times, Chinese sojourners lived with a double home, a social situation that their rulers backed up with official residential policies. But after 1949, added to the traditional distinction between abode and residence, the state imposed much more rigorous and restrictive household registration procedures, not just, as in the past to keep track of its population, but to control its movements and to restrain the growth of cities, and, by extension, those for whom city administrations would have to care. Even as economic reforms pushed the state to accept population movement after 1978, these legacies persisted – from dynastic days, dual residential identities for migrants, and from post-1949, governmental efforts to curb the legal urban population.

The Floating Population:

Its Size and Features

Definition and Numbers

Who exactly comprise the "floating population?" An official definition characterizes it as people engaged in partial temporary relocation whose legal residence registration remains in their original place of habitation. Those who fall under this designation cross a set territorial boundary to take up a new abode but are ineligible for permanent residence in the locale into which they have moved.[44] The floater thus differs technically and legally from what the Chinese call a "migrant," for migrants enter a different administrative district (as, for schooling, or to take up a governmentally-assigned job) and do obtain there the right to a permanent change in official address.[45]

As of early 1990 some sixty to eighty millions filled this category.[46] According to public security statistics, at that point one million people floated each day on the average in each of 23 cities with populations of more than one million. In Shanghai, there were reported to be 1.83 million, in Beijing, 1.15 million, and in Guangzhou, 1.1 million.[47] Rapid increases occurred over the 1980's: for instance, Wuhan was absorbing 200,000 visits per day in 1983, a figure which had climbed more than three-fold to 650,000 by 1986 and, probably with ups and downs, to 750,000 in 1990.[48] In general, these people comprised 20 to 25 percent of the permanent populations in the areas to which they had relocated.[49]

Typically the transients hail from nearby areas: as of early 1989, 80 percent of the floating was being done within provinces, not across their borders.[50] In Wuhan, as of 1987 a quarter were from other provinces, 47 percent came from other cities and counties within Hubei province, and just over a quarter originated in the city's suburbs and counties. Of those from outside the province, 80 percent were Central China natives.[51]

Shanghai and Guangdong presented a slightly different picture, with those from Shanghai's immediate environs only accounting for 15 percent of the floaters there;[52] of Guangdong's five million floaters in 1989, only three million were born in the

province (thus, 40 percent of them were from outside provinces as compared to only a quarter in Wuhan).[53] These areas apparently are more magnetic in drawing those from afar.

It should be noted, though, that all these numbers are unstable and subject to sudden changes as well as to seasonal fluctuations, varying with the rhythms of the agricultural calendar and with such traditional customs as family reunions at New Year's time.[54]

Demography and Occupation

Like immigrant labor in other settings, China's transients are eager to earn money at any price, grateful for the chance to live in the city, vulnerable to threats of deportation, subject to enormous competition, and powerless because of the state's unwillingness to offer them rights, welfare, or security.[55] For these reasons, they often present a docile visage, and employers, cognizant of their weakness and their consequent controllability, are quick to exploit them, offering them menial, filthy, arduous, burdensome work, at low pay with no benefits.[56] In short, they occupy the secondary track in a dual labor market, as do migrants the world around.[57]

Studies of the floating population include among their numbers those coming into the city for economic purposes (to earn money in one way or the other), for social purposes (to visit friends or relatives), those on public business, those coming to see doctors, to study, and to engage in tourism. Among these groups, those with earning an income as their goal constitute from two-thirds to three-quarters of the totals in the various studies.[58] It is this group that corresponds to the migrant labor known around the world.

While the periods these transients remain in the city vary from just four days to five years or more, it is interesting to learn that some studies count over two-thirds of them staying on longer than half a year. A national sample survey of 74 cities conducted in 1986 came up with this result.[59] The dominance of males (60 to 70 percent in one Shanghai study;[60] 66.8 percent in Wuhan in one 1989 study,[61] 74.4 percent in another;[62]) along with their youth (over half of the floaters in Shanghai were in the 15-34 age group)[63] supports the view that floaters tend to come as individuals, not as families, and therefore can rely for welfare services on their families back at home.[64]

In most cities their average level of education surpasses that of the native population; in Wuhan, for instance, on the average they boast 7.19 years of schooling while the permanent residents have had only 6.66 years.[65] In Shanghai, however, where the average citizen is better educated, floaters' level of learning falls below that of the natives;[66] in Guangdong, those holding less than a junior high degree account for a hefty 87.3 percent of the migrants.[67] Given these low levels of training it is not surprising that these people suffer exploitation.

The floating population are found in the same menial, manual jobs that are the lot of migrant workers everywhere: they work as maids and housekeepers, bricklayers, painters, repair men, builders, coal deliverers, garbage collectors, road and lavatory cleaners, launderers, miners, mortuary attendants, packagers and haulers. If they go into manufacturing, they end up laboring in the more unpleasant factories, those involved in textiles, chemical production, building materials, or machinery.

Those with skills, who can repair shoes, build furniture, fluff cotton, or make clothing, are in the minority.[68] A sizable proportion also ply their skills at commerce and catering.[69] By and large the migrants find themselves holding jobs that cannot promise advancement and that can easily replace one unskilled laborer with another. Working at them therefore keeps the migrants marginal.

Where they Live

Abode

To begin with their place of abode (using the traditional concept), comparative studies of migrant labor take note of the inadequate, even ramshackle state of housing available to them.[70] China's transients also experience this poverty of dwelling. Though somewhere around half of the outsiders in Wuhan in 1989 lived either in residents' homes (25 percent) or in the housing of organs, groups, and work units (28.4 percent), and another 21.6 percent resided in hotels and hostels, 16 percent were left to stay in work sheds or various dormitories, while another 8.9 percent were categorized as living in "other" places, probably in train stations, on the wharfs, in the streets, or on the water.[71]

In Shanghai the proportions in late 1988 were similar: 60.8 percent slept in residents' homes or in collective units' shelters; 16.6 percent were housed in hotels, hostels or hospitals; 6 percent could be found on the water; and another 16.2 percent lived in work shacks, produce markets, train stations and on the wharfs.[72] Investigators also discovered that of the 294,000 construction workers floating in the city, 67.2 percent lived at their work sites in simple, temporary sheds or on the bottom floor of buildings under construction.[73] Since most construction workers entered the city in gangs, usually under contract with a state work unit,[74] this would suggest that for them any *tongxiang* groupings reminiscent of the past would be organized under the rubric of the state's work system and not autonomously.

Besides this information on construction workers, there is evidence that incomers into the cities tend to congregate in accord with the purpose of their coming. In Wuhan, for instance, students, merchants, construction workers, handicraftspeople, the sick, and transport workers all select their dwelling sites on the basis of their activities.[75] Researchers have also determined that the transients concentrate in particular districts of Shanghai; that in a certain district of Guangzhou they form a "city" of their own; and that 22 percent of the floaters in Wuhan concentrate in Wuchang district because of the train station and the large free market there.[76]

One writer explained that in general peasants need their own Chinatown (derogatorily dubbed "Trash Village" by the natives) after entering the cities since, because of the differences in their styles of livelihood, background and culture from the legal residents, they can not fit into the cities.[77] As a rule, the migrants live near transport lines along the borders where city meets rural area; here living expenses are cheaper than in the center of town and management is comparatively relaxed.[78] Though migrant neighborhoods could become the springboard for communities living independently from the state, they also segregate these people from the larger society and can underline their weakness.[79]

Demographers have learned that in certain areas of Shanghai, the proportions of Jiangsu people are especially high; elsewhere in the area, the much denigrated Subei people build shack dwellings on the outskirts of the city.[80] All this information could support the

notion of some revival of traditions of sojourning from the pre-communist past. On the other hand, several sources remark that the living site of these people regularly changes along with their shifts in odd jobs;[81] to the extent that this is a widespread phenomenon, it would become difficult to sustain solidary migrant communities.

Residence

The very term "floating population" implies a group in motion. Indeed, floaters often maintain close ties with their families still living in their residences, and frequently travel back and forth.[82] Two scholars assert that as many as 99 percent of these people hold onto their "responsibility fields" in the countryside despite their residence in the city.[83] This makes good sense for a number of reasons. Since even those permitted to take up permanent residence in the towns in 1984 were required to provide for their own grain, many have found it more convenient to be able to draw on their own field than to have to purchase their grain.[84]

Other explanations for keeping an anchor back in the domicile include problems of finding stable work in the city; unequal treatment in the city (lack of food subsidies, the inability to purchase low-price coal, difficulties for their children in obtaining admission to high school); fears of a change in policy; higher expenses in the city; difficulty in locating housing, and being made to feel inferior to ordinary urban residents.[85]

One popular way of handling these rather daunting uncertainties and problems, "train migration," involves the father and adult sons moving first with other family members coming along only after a material foundation has been laid down.[86] While this retention of the custom of preserving double dwellings could form a basis for a revived civil society, it also implies the state's continuing repression of migrants.

A Position of Legal Ambiguity

Just as recently arrived sojourners did in historical times, the floating population awakens distrust and even contempt among the native residents.[87] Two writers from the Shanghai City Party Committee School challenged the morality, consciousness, and

customs of these intruders as "different," and pronounced them to be of "inferior quality" as compared with Shanghai's own.

> When the outside laborers inhabit a region it is very likely to be a dirty place.... They lack a concept of public morality.... There are some who come to Shanghai with the thought of getting rich by foul means.... So behavior that harms the prevailing social customs occurs time and time again.... The city residents are dissatisfied because they disturb normal life and livelihood.[88]

For their part, these newcomers "feel discriminated against and held in contempt."[89]

Is their very presence in the large cities legal or not? The answer is ambiguous. "Temporary residents" are expected to arrive in town with documentation from officials in their home village. This must be presented to the urban public security bureau, which then issues a temporary residence card. Possession of this card is supposedly mandatory before a person can be granted a license to labor or to engage in commercial work.[90]

But the evidence is that the floating population "undergoes myriad changes in a twinkling of an eye," and few apply for temporary residence permits.[91] For those who hope to feign compliance, it is apparently a relatively simple matter to obtain, forge and alter residence certificates,[92] and one way of doing this is to bribe officials responsible for adding newcomers to the household registry.[93]

Going on to the second step, again there is dereliction in requesting work licenses. In 1988 in Wuhan somehow the Labor Bureau learned that 18 percent of the outside labor in use did not register for work, and that only about three quarters of those working in the textile trade did so; there are also reports of construction teams getting into Shanghai without permission, "by using trickery and fraud."[94] Once in town, some extend their stay without properly reporting changes in their work situation.[95]

Wuhan set up a quota system for hiring outside labor in 1987. Since then, the Labor Bureau has allocated maximum target figures to each city district and to each trade on the basis of an all-city plan.[96] But in Wuchang district, to give just one example, the number of outside laborers reportedly surpassed the city's

target for that area by more than three-fold.[97]

But whether these infractions are truly illegal has been a gray area[98] until recently. As one group of Wuhan city officials assured me, "If they don't register, it's not illegal, it's just not acting in accord with regulations (*bufuhe guiding*)."[99] On the other hand, three days later, at another Wuhan unit, I learned that, "not getting licenses is illegal; a lot of the floating population commit this illegal activity."[100] There is a definite flexibility in the use of legal categories, though, so that when the state intends to clamp down on outside workers in the cities, it is capable of suddenly labelling their unlicensed behavior beyond the law.[101]

Looking at the state's circumscription of the existence of the floating population by confining its members to a permanently "temporary" status, its condemnation to lowly occupations and meagre livelihood conditions, and the resultant powerlessness and dependency of this group, along with the ultimate fragility of its position, a case could certainly be made for characterizing it as subordinated to and dominated by the state. Their escalating numbers, their lengthy stays, and their congregation in pockets of the city, and their ability to evade the rules, however, imply a degree of independence from the state, a threat to its total jurisdiction.

The Floating Population as Civil Society I:

Separate from, Against the State

A consideration of the relationship between today's floating population and the sojourners of past eras highlights the intensification of the role of the state today, but also directs attention to continuities in the abiding distinction between residence and abode. Examination of the features of this group as a whole similarly reveals ways in which historical tradition has been maintained, but shows especially the enhanced vulnerability of those called floaters today.

In this section I make a case for viewing the transients of the 1980's as civil society in the first sense described above, as a force unto itself, separate from the state and working against it. I back this argument up by looking at the modes of recruitment of floaters and their organization into groups; the burdens they pose on the city including crime and violence; and the corrosive effect they have on the administrative integrity of local bureaucracies.

Recruitment and Organization

The most common means by which transients find their way to the cities is by word of mouth and personal connection. Story after story tells of countryfolk who have struck their fortunes and then gone on to spread the word to fellow villagers and their kin. In one case a group of carpenters arrived in a small desert town in Inner Mongolia in 1978 and found the climate hospitable for earning money. As this news traveled back to their old home (*guxiang*), a horde of craftspeople and small merchants joined them to try their own luck.[102] In fact, one group of researchers determined that in Wuhan in the late 1980's, three quarters of the outside labor in the city had located their urban jobs via relatives and friends.[103] Nursemaids and sanitation workers from surrounding counties and suburbs are known to go home and recruit fellow villagers into jobs in Wuhan, for example.[104]

Interviewers in the Wuhan train station came upon youths who had found work and high wages at construction, brick making, and road maintainence in the coastal areas in one season and returned with dozens from their villages the next year.[105] Disaster occurred when rumors about great opportunities for wealth and success in such spots as Guangdong, Hainan, and Shanghai escalated into the realm of fantasy during the 1988 and 1989 new year's seasons (*"Yao facai, pao Shanghai;" "Dongxinanbeizhong, facai shang Guangdong,"* or "If you want to make money, run to Shanghai; east west south north, to make money go to Guangdong" were among the popular ditties).[106]

As against word of mouth and personal connections, contracts between state units play a smaller role;[107] still, even when such units as labor service companies contract with county women's federations for nursemaids,[108] the initial recruitees soon drag along their local comrades.[109] Similarly, construction team leaders draw up contracts with urban factories for groups of construction workers from their own counties or villages; even "*chengbao* is based on blood and locale," I was told.[110] In addition, when work

units themselves hire on their own, without official intermediaries, they often utilize introductions from the enterprise's staff and workers.[111]

A last mode of recruitment is through spontaneous, unorganized labor markets, which apparently are controlled by criminal rings.[112] These groups too are based on ascriptive bonds, generally common geographical origin.[113] In this connection there is talk of "urban guerrillas" operating in labor markets with their "black societies."[114]

> Once they have settled in the city, ties with kin and common countyfolk have, as in historical times, become the foundation for group formation. New migrants who retrod the tracks of the first set of transients have been able to build on their connections[115] to find jobs and housing and access to food once in town.[116] Such bonds are especially valuable, given the hopelessness of transients' obtaining essential services from the state.[117]

Since many areas of the country still specialize in particular crafts or deal in special local products,[118] rudimentary same-trade groups do exist. The Inner Mongolian community became home to specialists of various sorts from Wenzhou, from Jiangsu's Taizhou and from certain Sichuan counties. As the researcher explained,

> This kind of geographical linkage has an important position in the outside population's mind. When their body is in an unfamiliar, foreign place, geography becomes for them the only bond for forming into a group and seeking mutual help and protection.[119]

Informal discussions indicated that within the larger cities the most active and evident of these informal associations were those created by nursemaids who band together by place of origin. These women rely on their connections with each other to find jobs and to press their employers for better wages and working conditions.[120]

Other than these unions, groups which take the form of *banghui* (typically translated as secret society or underworld gang) are said to exist among mobile construction teams as loose organizations

largely comprised of relatives and friends.[121] Some *mangliu* (those who wander aimlessly) also form themselves into beggar bands (*qigaibang*), which float among cities and beg at transportation centers.[122]

Styles of recruitment and collective bodies, then, both strengthen an argument that the floating population is emerging as a force capable of acting on its own and having the potenial to slip beyond the control of the state. As they represent the revival of traditional forms of organization, some might identify them as an incipient type of civil society.

A Burden on the Cities

In another way the floating population poses a compelling challenge to the state. As it converges on the already tottering cities, it strains facilities and services to the breaking point, allegedly brings about criminal activities, deposits unplanned babies and joins in demonstrations.

As the numbers of transients in the cities climbed steadily through the 1980's, city residents found it more and more difficult to get on a bus, buy tickets, and, in some instances, find adequate food. Water and electricity became more scarce, sanitation suffered, pollution mounted, and pockets of disease appeared.

City governments lacked the resources to refurbish and replenish these pressured goods, and yet were forced to increase the subsidies they put out to stock the restaurants and markets with food for the intruders.[123] By early 1988, the water supply in Beijing was falling 150,000 to 200,000 tons short of demand at peak times, and electrical power supplies were deficient by three to four hundred thousand kilowatts in periods of highest demand.[124] According to one disgruntled critic,

> Especially when the migrants want to go back to their original homes, they even more want to gain great advantage within a short time, so they often destroy the ecological balance they drain the pond to get all the fish.[125]

There is also the constant nuisance of the *mangliu*, that purportedly 1.33 percent of the floaters who exist with the "three withouts" (no legal certification, no proper profession, no fixed

living place).[126] These people, beg, glean and collect scraps to eke out their existence. They are particularly in evidence in Shanghai, where some are genuine waifs, some are mentally ill, and others, "disguised as street performers, get a foothold in Shanghai by begging."[127] In 1988, vagrants were counted as having collected scraps and begged 13,480 person-times in the city.[128]

This behavior again is matched by that of migrant labor elsewhere, as among the Mexicans in the United States where "active gathering of surplus and waste materials by all members of the household" is commonplace.[129] The *mangliu* draws attention as more than an annoyance when their collecting shades into theft.[130] There are statistics to show that beggar-committed crimes constituted 32 percent of Beijing's total offenses in 1988.[131]

In general, like immigrant workers in other settings, the floating population is viewed as suspect, crime-prone. The following remark is typical of observers' perceptions: "Illegal elements mixed into the outside laborers take the opportunity of an invigorated economy and the great flow of population to flee hither and thither committing crimes."[132]

One-tenth of one percent of all the floaters in the country were arrested for criminal acts in 1987.[133] Supposedly these people were responsible for 30 percent of the crimes in Wuhan in 1986;[134] and committed 32.2 percent of the robberies, 33.7 percent of the swindling, and 22 percent of the looting, rapes, and murders in Shanghai in 1987.[135] Floaters are also held for scalping transportation tickets and selling pornography; but larceny is the most frequent charge. As of 1988, the Beijing public security arrested as many as forty to fifty of them daily.[136]

And yet, as scholars of immigration have noted, these people are more likely to attract police suspicion and arbitrary treatment than are natives, are concentrated in the demographic group (young, male), most apt to commit crimes and so have disproportionately high criminal rates, and are understandably desperate, given their meagre incomes and negligible prospects.[137]

Another serious headache for the urban administrators are the excess babies, outside the plan, born to the floaters. "This is the most difficult point in birth planning work, because they have no fixed unit managing them and they frequently move about," admitted staff at the family planning office in Wuhan.[138] Indeed, where birth control is managed well, out of plan births constitute as much as 90 percent of the excess births. The author offering this statistic commented as well that the transients "slip out of control. We need to spend too much effort and money to uncover pregnancies in a timely manner."[139]

Of the floaters in Wuhan in 1989, those with one child represented 42.2 percent, those with two were 34.7 percent, and as many as 23 percent had three or more.[140] Whereas among the ordinary city residents, the rate of unplanned births amounted to six-tenths of a percent, among the floaters it went as high as four percent, or nearly seven times more.[141] Put another way, of the 9.6 million babies born "underground" each year, one million are children of the floating population.[142] Given the regime's stringent efforts to control the size of its total population, these infractions are highly vexing.

Yet one more area in which transients pose a threat is in the realm of urban violence. Several analysts have claimed that the floaters took part in street riots and protests in June 1989.[143] To the extent that they did so, it is reasonable to assume that they were lashing out at the insecurity of their positions in a period of economic austerity and lay-offs; it is also true that their anonymity and segregation from the regular unit-bound urban mass made them not just more desperate but also more daring. In the end they became victims of the suppression,[144] a true testament to their ultimate vulnerability.

Administrative Havoc

A third basis for arguing that the floating population are battering the state is the administrative havor they occasion. Because they serve a variety of functions for individual units, their presence invites a host of illicit behavior. It is proving impossible to coordinate bureaucratic agencies around their control, challenging to dismiss them from the city, and difficult to coerce units into following rules about their usage.

It is so common to read of failed efforts to bring about coordinated management of these people, whether among offices within individual cities, between cities, or between urban and

rural jurisdictions, that it becomes clear that these offices stand to gain from their presence.[145] User units emphasize their own "autonomy" and refuse to submit to the leadership of the city Labor Bureau, which has been charged with synchronizing the handling of outside labor.

At the level of the bureau, offices managing the various trades seek to preserve their own power to regulate the numbers of migrant workers in their sector, rather than relinquishing overall management to the labor office, claiming "unclarity" about why they should give over what they see as their own responsibility.[146] Some construction companies resist following regulations, maintaining that their unit does not belong to the city's sphere of management jurisdiction; other bureaucracies emphasize that their own trade is special and should be given an exemption.[147]

There have been reports about clearing the cities of floaters in 1989 and 1990 in the wake of a stringent economic austerity program.[148] And yet despite the State Council's issuance of urgent circulars and the array of measures attempted by various municipal administrations to forcibly sweep clear their premises, a large number of workers somehow still managed to stay on.[149] These difficulties can be explained in part by the roles they serve for production posts, but also by the "countless ties" that exist between the outsiders and city people. As one report revealed, dismissing the workers has implications for personal relationships and affects people's interests, so many (successfully, apparently) plead for mercy.[150]

The units served by the floaters range from management departments to urban governments at various levels, to the banks, labor departments and even the public security offices. As in any situation where bureaucratic rules are present, those with the power to oversee these rules are in a position to collect.[151] Bribery is common, and its beneficiaries include not just the managing departments which excessively demand payments, but also offices not authorized to take fees, such as the public security[152] and the labor department itself.[153]

Enterprises where wages are linked to results find ways to contravene the control quota figures handed them.[154] Those attempting to benefit financially from the opportunity to hire outside labor also underreport their numbers to evade paying their proper user fees.[155] Others, calculating that fees are worth the price of the cheaper, dispensable labor, claim that the outsiders they have hired are the city's own unemployed youth.[156] In turn, management departments knowingly wink their eyes rather than prohibiting the hires, in order to earn some income.[157] Obviously, someone profits when punishments that should be meted out are not.[158]

The final check on hiring floaters should be exercised by the banks, which make money for wages available to enterprises on the basis of each firm's approved quota of workers.[159] Some units are able to evade this control though, by setting up several accounts in different banks. Meanwhile, the banks, eager to solicit savings, are slack on management and control.[160]

These examples suggest the motives of individual city buraucracies in their noncompliance and the strategies they use. But full control of the movement of peoples across borders entails cooperation not just within cities but between geographical jurisdictions as well. Other reports indicate why places experiencing the floaters' outflow are reluctant to halt the leak, or to take them back once they have drifted away.

There is a story of Wenzhou authorities who are very glad to see them leave, as their departure helps the county control its own planned birth rate.[161] Officials in other rural areas appreciate the alleviation of their problems of unemployment and underemployment that the departure of the transients permits;[162] rural counties find that income earned in the city comes back into their counties in the form of remittances.[163] Indeed, when Beijing tried to clear out its transients in the recent austerity program, provincial governments in Hebei, Henan, and Shanxi appealed to the central government in protest, criticizing Beijing city's "local protectionism."[164]

In sum, the floating population manages to survive by activating particularistic, ascriptive bonds beyond the state's control, they overwhelm the cities, and their presence plays havoc with the administrative system. For all these reasons, it could be said that they represent at least a fraction of an inchoate civil society in formation in China today.

The Floating Population as Civil Society II:

Supportive of the State, Reinforcing the State, A Part of the State

But I want to make another argument, one that draws upon civil society in its second sense, as spelled out in the introduction to this paper. According to this line of analysis, I would contend that the floating population actually *contributes* to the Chinese state – by reinforcing the fundamental formation of this regime, for the present – as least as much as it eats away at it. This is so both *manifestly,* as many writers in China have often noted, but also, more interestingly, in a *latent* fashion. As commentary on China's transients generally emphasizes either its manifest contribution or its negative, destructive aspects, this latent function exercised by these people has not been explicitly addressed in most of documentary material I have found, either official or nonofficial.

Manifest Functions

Manifestly, the floaters assist the state in a number of ways. In the cities, they provide labor: In 1987, the city of Wuhan hired several tens of thousands of peasants to supplement the city's brick, carpentry, painting, repair, and other trades.[165] Other areas in which they made a difference were in tranport, packaging, foundry work, textiles, construction, and sanitation and environmental work.[166] The sore lack of personnel in the service trades, though greatly ameliored since the late 1970's, was still outstanding; in early 1989, one author claimed, the number of nursemaids in Beijing met only half the need.[167]

In Shanghai in late 1988, the floating population was said to serve what were still considered to be "the city's weak services;" 300,000 people were engaged in the building trade alone, working on large buildings, pavement, shops and homes, while another 240,000 were holding temporary jobs in the textile and sanitation trades at that time.[168] Even if the floaters may have been despoiling the environment in the opinion of some observers, they were also laboring to clean it up.

Another of the obvious functions served by the floating

population is its donation of agricultural products, especially but not only vegetables, to urban free markets. In 1987 in Wuhan the turnover from these markets was 1.34-fold of that in the state-operated markets;[169] in 1990, researchers found that of the meat, vegetables, and eggs sold in these marts, 74 percent were managed by the floaters while 89 percent of the vegetables came from them.[170] Another statistic making a similar point is that by 1987 each 13,700 city residents had one free market available to them on the average, whereas a few years earlier, there had been one market for only every 26,400 people.[171]

Also related to marketing, transients act as a consumer market themselves, stimulating commerce with their purchasing power. In Shanghai in 1988 they were said to account for 17 percent of the city's 31.180 billion *yuan* social commodity retail volume.[172] And yet one more point is the indirect assistance they provide to promoting reform of the urban system, by introducing more flexibility in management, offering competition to the state sector, and breaking down the state's monopoly and official workstyle.[173]

Not just the cities derive manifest good things from the floaters. They also bring a set of positive effects to the countryside. There most obviously their departure alleviates problems of rural unemployment and underemployment. Articles dating back to the mid-1980's, but sounding the same refrain near the end of the decade, allude to the urgent need to find an outlet for the hordes of surplus labor power of the rural areas by transferring it to other areas, especially to the cities.[174] The countryside also benefits from the remittances sent back home by those who leave, not to mention the relief afforded to poverty-stricken areas or indeed to any rural areas with high population density just by the simple fact of having some people go elsewhere to live.[175] Eventually, too, the population movement could narrow income gaps among rural areas and between city and country.[176]

Some analysts hold that the removal of peasants from the villages can raise the technical, cultural, and educational level of this class, and thereby promote the development of the countryside generally.[177] It is also possible that the shift of people could assist not just urbanities but country people as well in marketing; one commentator alleges that the transients could cart

out stockpiled agricultural goods that could find buyers in the cities.[178]

Latent Functions

Less apparent than the functions listed above are the covert contributions that the floating population makes to the ongoing viability of the socialist system, its instruments of repression, and its financial well-being. As is the case in many contexts where migrant labor exists, these workers act as a prop for regimes in economic difficulty. Some have viewed this support as crucial for capitalist economies in the throes of crisis: laborers who can be dismissed summarily are said to be capable of "cushioning the impact of the expansion and contraction of capital."[179] Along the same line, an analyst looking at the United States economy surmised that it was possible that "illegals" could "provide the margin of survival for entire sectors of the economy."[180]

There are several spinoffs from this perspective: that the availability of large amounts of cheap and vulnerable labor releases employers from pressure to upgrade their jobs or to carry out any technical restructuring;[181] that it absolves the state (or business) from solving its housing problems, since transients jerrybuild their own shanties at their own expense;[182] and that, because of their low dependency rates (with the family back on the farm), they demand fewer social services than natives of the area would do.[183] Thus, even though many have noted that the floaters in China put a strain on urban infrastructure and services, in fact, given their contribution, this strain comes cheap compared with what the state would have to pay regular labor – in addition to the benefits it would have to provide them with – to do the same job.

This reasoning, though developed in appraising the role of Mexican American, Caribbean and South American labor in capitalist America or guest workers in capitalist Western Europe applies just as well to socialist China, where, of course, state and capital are even more tightly linked. Indeed, following this logic, there are a number of ways in which China's transients may be said to underwrite the state.

Floaters have been charged with causing crime, as we have explained above. But it is also possible that the heightened responsibility they thereby place on the public security strengthens the popular acceptance of these normally disliked organs[184] and their personnel. At times of recession, when jobs are scarce, it is the police who act as last resort in pushing these people out of the cities;[185] it is also the police, of course, who clean up urban crime, satisfying the public's yearning for social order. One source even claims that criminal floaters are in league with the police, insuring that no incidents occur at new year's day and helping them to crack big cases. The police get recognition for merit and the floaters continue to float.[186]

As for the million "black babies" per year that the floating population conceives outside the plan in the cities and decried by official voices, these too in the short run save the state funds. These youngsters, who are not permitted to register their *hukou*, will have difficulty obtaining rations, education, and jobs.[187] This is true of the illicit offspring of regular city residents; it must be even more the case for the children of floaters. So as their parents venture into the cities and towns and sign up for scantily compensated work, by labelling these babies illegal, the state is freed of the need to care for them. Here at a minimum the floaters save the state money.

Another practice in the gray area concerns the relatives of overseas Chinese. Although it is against regulations to change a person's *hukou*, the state attracts foreign exchange from these wealthy peoples' investments by tacitly permitting them to employ and house their rural relations and also to set up urban registration for them.[188] In all these ways activities that superficially seem to threaten the state – criminal behavior, unplanned births, and illegal household registration – from a different perspective work to support it.

The most blatant facet of the floating population's contribution to the state is the one it makes to particular economic sectors. I have commented above about its supplying labor to supplement the cities' needs. But more than mere supplementing is going on. In Wuhan, for instance, the floating population is said to have become an "indispensable part of the urban staff and workers."[189] The malpractices of employers indicate the severity of their need: in Wuhan some workshop and department chiefs would rather drop off two regular workers and put one out-of-plan outside

worker to his/her task;[190] in Shanghai, there are firms that have sent 70 percent of their regular staff and workers home with reduced pay while letting outside laborers become the main workforce.[191]

The situation is evidently urgent, especially, probably, for the one-third of firms operating in the red in today's China. This is borne out by a number of statements in recent books on the subject of the floating population. In recent years in Beijing, for instance, "the textile trade relied on rural labor ... if they were all dismissed, normal production would be *hard to sustain*," reads one document;[192] in Wuhan, enterprises are "forced to depend on outside labor *in order to go on*," since city residents refuse to perform the work involved, states another;[193] "if we let them go, there's a fear that there would be heavy jobs *with no one to do them*," warns a third.[194] Just as in capitalist countries, in socialist China these desperate "units with poor conditions ... need to hire peasant workers but are not capable of properly solving the various problems concerning their living."[195] (Emphasis added)

Some figures illustrate this dependence. In Wuhan in 1990, there were as many as 310,000 peasants at work to the knowledge of the city's Labor Bureau.[196] Of these, as many as 90,000 were employed in state and collective enterprises, factories, and other departments, including 10,000 in the textile industry; others were engaged in the chemical, building materials, machine-building and sanitation trades. Another 120,000 were working as members of construction teams.

Those in textiles alone could well amount to more than a fifth of the total textile workers in Wuhan, since in 1988, the city's six large state-owned factories alone were said to be employing 8,000 outside workers, who at that time accounted for 19 percent of the workers in these six firms.[197] And as of the late 1980's, 73 percent of the enterprises in the building materials system were using outsiders, who amounted to 28 percent of the total staff and workers there; in some enterprises, they added up to a full half of the total regular labor.[198]

In Shanghai, the Bureau of Labor did a sample survey in 1988 of 77 enterprises, and found that 44 of them, well over half, were using outsiders. The 6,000 laborers involved accounted for 5.2

percent of these enterprises' total staff and workers.[199] As far as was known, more than 200,000 workers from outside were at work in state enterprises in that city as of late 1988.[200] In short, that portion of China's transients who take up employment in several crucial but nearly bankrupt sectors of the national economy may well be assisting to sustain their firms, thereby helping to prolong the life and the shape of a system in breakdown.

A last, but potentially crucial contribution is the fiscal one. Not just particular sectors, but the economy of China as a whole has benefited from the funds collected in various forms from the floaters. One Chinese researcher made the bold claim that these people increase the total urban social output value and the national income as well.[201] A sizable portion of this input must come from charges on the migrants. Both the employing units as well as the floaters themselves are assessed monthly fees according to the type of labor being performed.[202] Although ideally the monies are to go for urban infrastructure and other services upon which this population draws, it is possible that cities are raking in more than they are spending on improvements.[203]

Besides these so-called "management fees," the migrants also provide several kinds of tax income to the state.[204] One source is the construction teams, which are taxed.[205] Another is the free markets: in Wuhan in 1987, the annual taxes from this trade amounted to 14.27 million *yuan*;[206] much of this was the result of the activities of the transients, as noted above. An advocate of the floaters asserted that the private businesses some of them set up in the cities are instrumental in bringing down the inflation rate.[207] And in the category of saving the state money, the transients encourage the financially strapped factories to neglect technical renovation, by their ready offer of masses of hands to do manual labor.[208]

Looking at the floating population from the vantage point of civil society's second sense, its members should be viewed as an undivided entity that pours into crevices in a shaky state. In this vein, we see it enriching the cities with much-needed labor, services, and vegetables; working to alleviate inequities between city and countryside; enhancing the questionable prestige of the agents of repression; drawing in foreign exchange; working for a pittance

even while keeping its offspring off the welfare rolls of the state; allowing the textile and other key trades to carry on; and acting as a new source of funding for a regime much in need of financial assistance. It is these facets of the floaters that permit one to picture the phenomenon as supportive of the state, reinforcing it, and ultimately joined together with it.

Conclusion

Is the floating population properly labelled "civil society," after all? Those who employ the term in its most popular contemporary usage, the one that emphasizes separation from the state, at first glance might pinpoint this group as a kind of sprout of civil society. They are recruited into the cities largely by private, personal agents. They organize themselves in a rudimentary way by locale of origin. They burden the city and its facilities, cause crime and (very occasional) violence, bring excess offspring. And they tamper with the administrative integrity of the city, making hay of urban bureaucratic coordination and inciting graft.

But in truth these transients pose no serious challenge. They contribute at least as much to the state as they take from it, in both manifest and latent guises. Inasmuch as they perform a whole array of functions for the state, several of its most critical constituent institutions have been given a new lease on life. As they have, the socialist state itself – with its officials and its employers united on the significance of saving money and keeping labor docile, with its bankrupt state-owned enterprises, its technically backward and labor-intensive trades, its slipshod housing, its welfare benefits just for the elite workers, its farmers slipping into the urban centers to dump out their unplanned, officially "illegitimate" babies, and its repressive security personnel policing the premises – lumbers forward, its essential form intact.

Notes

1 I will be using "state" as a shorthand term to refer to the coercive, extractive and provisioning apparatus of the Chinese nation.

2 Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison*. Selected, translated from the Italian and introduced by Lynne Lawner. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 42.

3 *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), pp. 207-08.

4 Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," *New Left Review*, No. 100 (1976-77), p. 13.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 33, 13.

6 "Introduction," in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*. (London: Verso, 1988), p. 23.

7 Norberto Bobbio, "Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society," in Keane, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

8 Hoare and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

9 See Bobbio, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

10 As quoted in Bobbio, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

11 Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

12 As quoted in Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 12. Here of course Marx is referring to the state under capitalism. The same to at least as great an extent, as we will see, exists in the Chinese socialist state.

13 Andrew Arato, "Civil Society Against the State: Poland 1980-81," *Telos*, No. 47 (1981), p. 23.

14 I would place within this same category writing that draws upon the ideas of Jurgen Habermas and his concept of the "public sphere," such as the very stimulating papers by William T. Rowe, "The Public Sphere in Modern China: A Review Article," *Modern China*, (July 1990), pp. 309-329 and David Strand, "'Civil Society' and 'Public Sphere' in Modern China: A Perspective on Popular Movements in Beijing 1919/1989," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 39, No. 5 (May/June 1990), pp. 1-19.

15 In this I am influenced by Alejandro Portes, "Migration and Underdevelopment," *Politics and Society*, 9,1 (1978), pp. 1-48; Saskia Sassen-Koob, "Immigrant and Minority Workers in the Organization of the Labor Process," *Journal of Ethnic Studies*, 8,1

(1980), pp. 1-34; Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); James D. Cockcroft, *Outlaws in the Promised Land: Mexican Immigrant Workers and America's Future.* (New York: Grove Press, 1986); Michael Burawoy, "The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor: Comparative Material from Southern Africa and the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, 81, 5 (1976), pp. 1050-87; Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 2nd ed.; Larissa Adler Lomnitz, *Networks and Marginality: Life in a Mexican Shantytown.* (New York: Academic Press, 1977); and Gay Willcox Seidman, "Labor Movements in Newly-Industrialized Countries: South Africa and Brazil, 1960-1985." (Ph.D. dissertation, UC Berkeley, Department of Sociology, 1990).

16 Here I refer to the accounts of enterprises, with their excessive profit retention and burgeoning extra-budgetary funds, cheating the central treasury out of monies central officials believe to be theirs.

17 G. William Skinner, "Mobility Strategies in Late Imperial China: A Regional Systems Analysis," in Carol A. Smith, *Regional Analysis Volume One.* (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 335.

18 Wong Siu-lun, *Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong.* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 110.

19 Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 208.

20 William T. Rowe, *HANKOW: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City 1796-1895.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 50.

21 G. William Skinner, "Introduction: Urban Social Structure in Ch'ing China," in G. William Skinner, ed., *The City in Late Imperial China.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), p. 544.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 538-539.

23 Rowe, *HANKOW: Conflict and Community*, pp. 77, 217, 231ff.

24 Lynn T. White, III, *Policies of Chaos.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 88-90.

25 Sulamith Heins Potter, "The Position of Peasants in Modern China's Social Order," *Modern China*, 9,4 (1983), p. 467 quoting Mark Selden. Zhang Qingwu, "A Sketch of Our Country's Household Migration Policy," *Zhongguo Renkou Kexue* [Chinese Population Science] [hereafter *ZRK*], No. 2, (1988), p. 35 states that in the 1950's there was an annual average of 2.5 million people a year migrating nationally. This article traces the history of population movement over three decades. The article is on pp. 35-38, 15.

26 Zhang Qingwu, *op. cit.*, p. 36. Centers of the same name still exist and serve the same function in the cities of China today.

27 Zhang Qingwu, *op. cit.*, p. 36. See also Potter, *op. cit.*, pp. 476-78.

28 Thomas P. Bernstein, "Stalinism, Famine, and Chinese Peasants," *Theory and Society*, 13,3 (1984), p. 351.

29 Potter, *op. cit.*, p. 465.

30 Andrew G. Walder, "The Remaking of the Chinese Working Class, 1949-1981," *Modern China*, 10, 1 (1984), pp. 30-31.

31 Potter, *op. cit.*, p. 479.

32 Guan Xikui, "Perspective on China's Present Household Registration System," *Shehui kexue* [Social Science] [hereafter *SHKX*], No. 2, (1989), pp. 32-36.

33 This situation could be compared as well to the intent of immigration laws in the United States which have aimed to prevent the emergence of large numbers of unemployed Mexicans who could become public charges. On this, see Burawoy, *op. cit.*, p. 1070.

34 Seidman, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

35 A recent report cites the total acreage of arable land as having declined from 1.5 billion *mu* in 1952 to 1.4 billion in recent years, while rural labour increased from 173.17 million in 1952 to 323.08 million, making for a surplus of 150 million agricultural workers. This is in *Wen Wei Po*, April 18, 1990, p. 4, translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* [hereafter *FBIS*], April 27, 1990, p. 39.

36 *China Daily* [hereafter *CD*], May 3, 1988, p. 4 in *FBIS*, May 3, 1988, p. 34 and Chen Jiyuan, "A Study on Transferring China's Surplus Agricultural Labor," *Nongye jingji wenti*, No. 1, (1988), pp. 24-27, translated in *Joint Publications Research Service-China Area Report* [hereafter *JPRS-CAR*]-88-029 (June 13, 1988), p. 36.

37 Feng Lanrui and Jiang Weiyu, "A Comparative Study of the Modes of Transference of Surplus Labor in China's Countryside," *Social Sciences in China*, 9,3 (1988), p. 73.

38 Wuhan Shi Laodongju bian [Wuhan City Labor Bureau, ed.], *Chengshi wailai laodongli guanli* [The Management of Outside Urban Labor]. (Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 1990) [hereafter *CWLG*], p.106. This phenomenon is typical of situations in which

outside labor is used. See Sassen, *op. cit.*, p. 39, Sassen-Koob, p. 28, and Castles and Kosack, *op. cit.*, p. 112 for discussions of immigrant labor being consigned to unattractive jobs which native workers eschew.

39 Various sources bear this out. For instance, *CWLG*, p. 60 states that, "The income of a four-person rural household working for a year can't match that of one young person working half a year in the city." Jeffrey R. Taylor and Judith Banister, "China: The Problem of Employing Surplus Rural Labor," CIR Staff Paper No. 49 (July 1989), p. 41 notes that in 1987 the average urban per capita income was 916 *yuan* while that in the countryside was 463; in Shanghai in the late 1980's the ratio of the average urban income to the average rural income was about 2.7 to 1 (this is in Shanghai Shi Tongjiju bian [Shanghai City Statistics Bureau, ed.], *Shanghai liudong renkou* [Shanghai's Floating Population]. (Shanghai: Chinese Statistical Publishing House, 1989) [hereafter *SLR*], p. 67.

40 Judith Banister, "Urban-Rural Population Projections for China," Center for International Research Staff Paper, No. 15, (March 1986). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census, p. 9.

41 Wang Xiangming, "The Influence of Population Migration Flow Toward The Process of Population Urbanization," in Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Renkou Yanjiusuo [Chinese Social Science Academy, Population Research Institute, ed.], *Zhongguo renkou qianyi yu chengshihua yanjiu* [Chinese Population Migration and Urbanization Research]. (Beijing: Jingji xueyuan chubanshe, 1988), p. 54; see also Ezra F. Vogel, *One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 404.

42 Liaowang Overseas, No. 2 (January 8, 1990), pp. 16-17, in *FBIS*, February 9, 1990, p. 19.

43 Taylor and Banister, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

44 From *Renkou yu jingji* [Population and Economy] [hereafter *RKYJJ*], No. 3, (1990), pp. 53-55, 27, translated in *JPRS-CAR*-90-073 (Sept. 28, 1990), p. 43.

45 Zhang Qingwu, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

46 Xinhua, in *FBIS*, February 15, 1990, p. 12.

47 *Wen Wei Po*, April 18, 1990, p. 4, translated in *FBIS*, April 27, 1990, p. 39. It should be noted that that figure included those present in cities where they did not have registered residence whose purpose was to carry out short-term public errands, personal business or tourism.

48 Huang Hongyun and Chen Xianshou, "Report on an Investigation of Wuhan City's Floating Population's Situation," in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Population Research Institute, *Zhongguo Renkou Nianjian 1987* [Chinese Population Almanac]. (Beijing: 1988), p. 685 for the earlier figures; interview on September 19, 1990 with the Wuhan City Labor Bureau for the 1990 figure.

49 Cui Lin, "Questions in Our Country's Urban Tertiary Sector's Development and Urban Population," *RKYJJ*, No. 1, (1989), p. 46.

50 This figure comes from a CASS national survey and is reported in *FBIS*, February 15, 1989, p. 30.

51 Huang and Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 685.

52 Mao Zongwei and Zhou Zugen, "The Situation of Shanghai's Floating Population," *ZRK*, No. 6, (1989), p. 62.

53 Liao Shitong and Liao Shitian, "The Trend of Population Mobility and Its Guiding Direction in Guangdong Province," *ZRK*, No. 6, (1989), p. 7.

54 Gao Qingxu, "A Superficial Discussion of Certain Questions in the Investigation and Research of the Floating Population," *RKYJJ*, No. 2, (1989), p. 62.

55 The following readings alerted me to the essential sameness between China's floating population and migrant labor: Sassen, *op. cit.*, Cockcroft, *op. cit.*, Castles and Kosack, *op. cit.*, Lomnitz, *op. cit.*, Portes, *op. cit.*, Sassen-Koob, *op. cit.*, Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Nestor Rodriguez and Rogelio T. Nunez, "An Exploration of Factors that Contribute to Differentiation Between Chicanos and Indocumentados," in Harley L. Browning and Rodolfo O. de la Garza, eds., *Mexican Immigrants and Mexican Americans: An Evolving Relation.* (Austin: Center for Mexican American Studies Publications, 1986), pp. 138-156; and Bryan R. Roberts, "Migration and Industrializing Economies: A Comparative Perspective," in Jorge Balan, *Why People Move: Comparative Perspectives on the Dynamics of Internal Migration.* (Paris: UNESCO Press, 1981), pp. 17-42.

56 On their "docility," see *CWLG*, pp. 19 and 156 (I was also informed of their docility by the Wuhan Labor Bureau at an interview on September 19, 1990; there the explanation given was their gratitude for the chance to live in the city); on their willingness to

take up disagreeable jobs, see Feng and Jiang, *op. cit.*, p. 73 and Taylor and Banister, *op. cit.*, p. 37; on the awful work conditions to which they submit, see *CWLG*, p. 138 (the examples given are working in furnaces and crushing stone for 9 to 14 hours a day) and Xie Bailing, "An Exploration of Questions on the Urban Floating Population," *SHKX*, No. 2, (1990), p. 74.

57 Dual labor markets are discussed in Piore, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

58 In Wuhan in 1989, 74.23 percent of the floaters were engaged in economic activity; see Wuhan Nianjian Bianzuan Weiyuanhui Zhubian [Wuhan Yearbook Compilation Committee General Editor], *Wuhan Nianjian 1989* [Wuhan Yearbook 1989]. (Wuchang: Wuhan Daxue chubanshe, 1989) [hereafter *Wuhan Nianjian*], p. 62. In Shanghai in 1988 an investigation came up with a figure of 67.5 percent having come to the city for doing economic activity. On Shanghai, see Mao and Zhou, *op. cit.*, p. 62. This difference must reflect the many attractions Shanghai holds relative to Wuhan, whose chief drawing power comes from its position as a transport node and commercial center.

59 Wang Xiangming, *op. cit.*, p. 50. These numbers must be difficult to count. Wuhan has variously cited 65.28 percent in this category in Huang and Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 687 and 50 percent in a study carried out in 1990 by the Wuhan Policy Research Office (recounted to me in an interview on September 14, 1990); reports from Shanghai claim about 50 percent as of 1988 (Wang Jianmin and Hu Qi, "Policy Research on Emphasizing Readjusting the Outside Floating Population's Structure," *ZRK*, No. 6, (1988), p. 73). But another study of Shanghai cites only 41.2 percent in this category (this is Mao and Zhou, *op. cit.*, p. 62).

60 Wang and Hu, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

61 *Wuhan Nianjian*, p. 62.

62 Gu Shengzu, "Research on Population Migration and Floating," *Wuhan Daxue Xuebao* [Wuhan University Bulletin], No. 2, (1989), p. 45.

63 Wang and Hu, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

64 Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 37 makes this point in discussing migrants in Lima, Spain. Sassen, *op. cit.*, p. 39 notes that migrant workers demand few social services.

65 Gu Shengzu, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

66 Wang and Hu, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

67 Liao and Liao, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

68 *CWLG*, p. 153.

69 The material in this paragraph, along with related statistical data, can be found in the following: Feng and Jiang, *op. cit.*, p. 72; Huang and Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 688; *CWLG*, p. 59; *SLR*, p. 55; and my interview at the Wuhan Labor Bureau, September 19, 1990.

70 For instance, Castles and Kosack, *op. cit.*, writing about Western European migrants, speak on p. 57 of poor housing in rundown neighborhoods and on pp. 249-252 describe wooden huts provided by employers, "bare and inhospitable, lacking even simple things."

71 *Wuhan Nianjian*, p. 62.

72 *SLR*, pp. 47-48.

73 *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.

74 Interview with Wuhan Policy Research Office on September 14, 1990; also see Alan P. L. Liu, "Economic Reform, Mobility Strategies and National Integration in China," *Asian Survey*, 31, 5 (1991) p. 403.

75 Huang and Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 686. It has also been noted, in *SLR*, p. 98 that the purposes of coming to Shanghai are correlated with the area of that city in which the floaters live.

76 Wang and Hu, *op. cit.*, p. 73, *SLR*, p. 63, and Mao and Zhou, *op. cit.*, p. 62 on Shanghai; *CWLG*, p. 111 on Guangzhou; and for Wuhan, my interview with the Family Planning Bureau of Wuhan on September 14, 1990.

77 Shao Jun, "The Great Army of Migrants is Shaking the Roots of the Public Ownership System," *Zhongguo zhi Chun* [China's Spring], No. 8, (1990), p. 48.

78 Xu Miaofa, "From Population Flows See the Household Registration Management System's Reform Trend," *SHKX*, No. 2, (1989), p. 37 and Xie Bailing, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

79 This is suggested in Castles and Kosack, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-63.

80 *SLR*, p. 112 and Emily Honig, "Pride and Prejudice: Subei People in Contemporary Shanghai," in Perry Link, Richard Madsen, and Paul G. Pickowicz, eds., *Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic.* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 152-53.

81 Gao Qingxu, *op. cit.*, p. 61 and Shao Jun, op. cit., p. 49.

82 *SLR*, p. 136.

83 Taylor and Banister, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

84 Ma Xia, "The Big Migration of China's Rural Population Toward the Cities in the Present Era," *ZRK*, No. 3, (1987), p. 14; Zhu Paoshu, "The New Trend and New Issues in Urbanization – A Survey of Peasants who have Moved into Towns in Shanghai's Suburbs," *ZRK*, No. 6, (1989), p. 61; and Wang Guixin, "Research into Questions of Population Migration Between Different Districts and Levels," *ZRK*, No. 1, (1989), p. 45.

85 Wang Guixin, *op. cit.*, p. 45; and Zhu Paoshu, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

86 Ma Rong, "Population Migration's Main Reasons and Conditions," *ZRK*, No. 2, (1989), p. 48. This system goes by the name of "relay migration" in the comparative literature. See, for instance, Lourdes Arizpe, "Relay Migration and the Survival of the Peasant Household," in Balan, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

87 On the historical reactions to outsiders, see Peter J. Golas, "Early Ch'ing Guilds," in Skinner, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 556; and Rowe, *HANKOW: Conflict and Community*, p. 218.

88 Wang and Hu, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

89 *CWLG*, p. 139

90 An explanation of the official procedures for registering for temporary residence in Wuhan appears in *CWLG*, pp. 5-6. Other documents in this volume show similar procedures in other cities.

91 Huang and Chen, *op. cit.*, pp. 685, 688. The writers here are referring just to those who stay in residents' households, but other sources corroborate the low rate of registration generally. In Shanghai, allegedly 43.7 percent do not report their temporary living (in *SLR*, p. 56); of course, one wonders how such accuracy can be obtained about negative activity. At the family planning office in Wuhan on September 14, 1990, I was told that only 36 percent go through proper registration procedures. On September 12, 1990, at CASS Institute of Sociology, researchers affirmed that "a majority don't go through the registration process."

92 Xu Miaofa, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

93 Richard Kraus, in "China as a Proletarian State," Paper for the Conference on China's Quest for National Identity, Princeton University, January 25-27, 1990, on p. 21 in a footnote, tells of an isolated case of a Guangdong official executed for accepting a bribe to add peasants to the registry. Presumably there are others who were not caught.

94 *CWLG*, pp. 51, 149 for Wuhan. On Shanghai, *SLR*, p. 135.

95 *CWLG*, pp. 37, 207. Transients are not permitted to change jobs and remain in the city once the team of which they are a member has completed the job for which it has contracted, unless they re-register. See *CWLG*, p. 203. Castles and Kosack, *op. cit.*, p. 99 mention that restrictions on changing jobs are common for immigrant workers in Western Europe.

96 Details were provided to me by the Labor Bureau at an interview on September 19, 1990, where I was informed that Wuhan permits a maximum of 90,000 outside laborers to enter the city yearly. There is also an explanation in *CWLG*, p. 68. Each of the city's seven districts, and the enterprises under 22 different bureaus, as well as four large specialized schools, as well as enterprises located in Wuhan that belong to ministries and to the province received quotas.

97 *CWLG*, p. 175.

98 Interview at CASS Institute of Sociology on September 12, 1990.

99 Interview at the Wuhan City Policy Research Office on September 14, 1990.

100 This was at the Wuhan Academy of Social Science on September 17, 1990.

101 *CD*, June 19, 1990, p. 3, in *FBIS*, June 20, 1990, p. 25. The statement here is that, "Workers without certificates will be deemed illegal." Agence France Press reported on May 29, 1990 that hundreds of "illegal" city residents without residence permits in Tianjin had been arrested in night raids and that more than 5,000 of them had been sent home in advance of the September Asian Games to be held in Beijing. This is reprinted in *FBIS*, May 30, 1990, p. 67.

102 Fang Ming *et. al.*, "A Model of Western Development and Floating-Style Population Migration," *ZRK*, No. 5, (1988), pp. 20-26.

103 *CWLG*, p. 115. This finding was backed up impressionistically in conversations at the Wuhan Academy of Social Science on September 17, 1990. It is interesting to note that this is just the percentage of introductions via kin and friends cited in reference to migration into the cities of Taiwan in Susan Greenhalgh, "Networks and Their Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan," *China Quarterly*, No. 99 (1984), p. 535.

104 Interview at the Wuhan Academy of Social Science on September 17, 1990.

105 *CWLG*, pp. 108, 152-53.

106 Wu Cangping, Hu Xin, and Du Peng, "The Mighty Population Torrent All Over the Earth," *Dili Zhishi* [Geographical Knowledge], No. 5, (1990), p. 2.

107 A Beijing study done in 1986 found that 29.7 percent of the transient workers there were recruited by local labor contractors, or agents, while 42.8 percent came under the influence or via recruitment by relative or friends. This is reported in Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

108 Nursemaids are also contacted, again through the country women's federation, by residents' committees and by the city Labor Bureau. This information came from interviews at the Wuhan Academy of Social Science on September 17, 1990 and at the Wuhan Labor Bureau on September 19, 1990.

109 Shao Jun, *op. cit.*, p. 20. See also *CWLG*, p. 109, which mentions that labor departments in the countryside may contract with user units in Guangzhou.

110 Interviews at Wuhan Policy Research Office on September 14, 1990 and at the Wuhan Academy of Social Science on September 17, 1990.

111 *CWLG*, p. 137.

112 *CWLG*, p. 106 refers to these as being run by those with "evil intentions."

113 According to *SLR*, p. 79, some criminals use *tongxiang* [same-place] clans to form criminal gangs, of which four prominent ones have frequented Shanghai. These hail, respectively, from Xinjiang, Guiyang, Wenzhou, and Baoying. *FBIS*, July 26, 1990, p. 46 (from Shenyang Provincial Radio Service, July 17) refers to criminal rings having been discovered by Shenyang and Dandong city authorities during the census.

114 Shao Jun, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

115 Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

116 This of course is an international phenomenon. See Lomnitz, *op. cit.*, on Mexican shantytowns, pp. 208-10.

117 See Rodriguez and Nunez, *op. cit.*, p. 151 for this point *vis-à-vis* Mexican migrants.

118 On the specialties of various areas of the country, at both county and provincial levels, see Liu, *op. cit.*, pp. 396-402; Taylor and Banister, *op. cit.*, p. 36; and Xu Tianqi and Ye Zhendong, "Inevitable Trend and Major Course of China's Agricultural Labor Force Shift," *Renkou Yanjiu*, No. 5, (1985), pp. 16-20, translated in *JPRS-CPS*-86-033 (April 25, 1986), p. 21.

119 Fang Ming, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

120 Information from interviews at CASS's Institute of Sociology on September 12, 1990 and at the Wuhan Academy of Social Science on September 17, 1990.

121 Interview at Wuhan Academy of Social Science on September 17, 1990.

122 Interview at Wuhan Academy of Social Science on September 17, 1990.

123 Zhang Qingwu, "Thoughts on Problems of the Urban Floating Population," *ZRK*, No. 3, (1989), pp. 53-54.

124 Xinhua Overseas, January 21, 1988.

125 "Zhongguo Renkou Qianyi yu Chengzhenhua Xueshu Taolunhui Zongshu" [A Summary of an Academic Forum on Chinese Population and Urbanization], *ZRK*, No. 3, (1988), p. 62.

126 *SLR*, p. 77-78. Another article in the same volume counts them as 4 percent of the floating population in Shanghai. See *ibid.*, p. 92.

127 Wang and Hu, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

128 *Ibid.*, p. 55. [The Chinese do keep statistics, don't they?!]

129 Lomnitz, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

130 Shao Jun, *op. cit.*, p. 48, claims that the items "collected" could be as valuable as car batteries and large lamps.

131 "Poorest of China Take to the Roads," in *Law and Life*, No. 4, (1990), pp. 38-39, translated in *Inside China Mainland*, July 1990, p. 26.

132 Xu Miaofa, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

133 Xinhua Overseas, April 9, 1988.

134 *Wuhan Nianjian*, p. 62.

135 *SLR*, p. 55.

136 Xinhua Overseas, August 19, 1988.

137 On this, see Portes, *op. cit.*, p. 32 and Castles and Kosack, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-345, 372.

138 Interview on September 14, 1990.

139 Ni Jia, "The Management of the Floating Population's Planned Birth," *RKYJJ*, No. 1, (1989), pp. 34-35.

140 *Wuhan Nianjian*, p. 62.

141 Xie Bailing, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

142 Xinhua Overseas, March 29, 1989.

143 See Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "Voices from the Protest Movement, Chongqing, Sichuan," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 24 (July 1990), p. 274; *New York Times*, May 14, 1990; Clemen Stubbe Ostergaard, "Citizens, Groups and a Nascent Civil Society in China: Towards an Understanding of the 1989 Student Demonstrations," *China Information* IV, 2 (Autumn 1989), p. 34; and Edward Friedman, "Deng Versus the Peasantry: Recollectivization in the Countryside," *Problems of Communism*, 39, 5 (September-October 1990), pp. 36-37.

144 Chan and Unger, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

145 To give just one example among dozens, *CWLG*, begins with a charge of the lack of coordinated management. See p. 3.

146 *Ibid.*, pp. 112, 51, 30.

147 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

148 For such reports from various cities, see *FBIS*, December 28, 1989, p. 41 ("Beijing Expels Over 150,000 Outside Workers"); January 12, 1990, pp. 16-17 ("State Attempts to Curb Labor Influx into Cities"); January 22, 1990, p. 31 ("Rising Unemployment Forces Labor Permit Issuance"); February 20, 1990, p. 34 ("Guangdong Discourages Unemployed Newcomers"); March 9, 1990, p. 38 ("Guangdong Efforts to Check Rural Transient Flow"); and March 9, 1990, p. 40 ("Hainan Meeting Views Transient Laborer Problem").

149 *CWLG*, pp. 56-57.

150 *Ibid.*, pp. 128, 145.

151 Vogel, *op. cit.*, p. 410 explains this process for Guangdong. David Zweig, "Urbanizing Rural China: Bureaucratic Authority and Local Autonomy," in David M. Lampton and Kenneth G. Lieberthal, eds., "Bureaucratic Politics and Policy Process in China [Working Title]," (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming), p. 34, tells of officials in county-town governments charging fees for access to the town or for work permits.

152 Shao Jun, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

153 *CWLG*, pp. 37, 134, 184. This volume, edited by the city's Labor Bureau, contains a piece charging that the labor department itself is rife with graft, embezzlement, favoritism, malfeasance, dereliction of duty, and contravention of the control figures passed down by the city government. It seems that its staff accepts bribes in exhange for approving the unauthorized (extra-quota) use of outside labor. See pp. 69, 70, 244.

154 *Ibid.*, p. 128.

155 *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 33.

156 Units needing extra labor are legally supposed to ascertain that the city itself has no acceptable but currently unemployed personnel to do the work; if it has, these people must be hired before outsiders. See *CWLG*, pp. 184, 194.

157 *Ibid.*, p. 72.

158 *Ibid.*, p. 36.

159 *Ibid.*, pp. 187, 195.

160 *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

161 Miao Hongxun, "An Elementary Analysis of Wenzhou's Floating Population and Planned Birth," *RKYJJ*, No. 2, (1989), p. 17.

162 Taylor and Banister, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

163 Xu and Ye, *op. cit.*, p. 21. There is a report that Yongjia county in southern Zhejiang in 1985 approved the depature of 36,000 people to work in other places. This accounted for more than 15 percent of the total rural labor force in the county, and their earnings came to more than 56 million *yuan*, or 48.9 percent of the total agricultural income of the entire county.

164 Li Xiaohua, "The Legacy of the Asian Games in Beijing," *Zhengming* [Contend], No. 158, (1990), p. 19. The other side of the picture is presented in a fascinating article on Guangdong, charging that outside workers upset their statistical achievements in planned birth work and their management of the supply and demand of provincially-based labor, and that they lower the province's own urbanization rate by filling up places that could otherwise be taken by the rural population of Guangdong itself. This is Liao and Liao, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

165 *Wuhan Nianjian* 1987, p. 688.

166 Zhang Qingwu, "Thoughts," p. 53.

167 Cui Lin, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

168 *SLR*, pp. 149, 44.

169 *Wuhan Nianjian* 1987, p. 688.

170 Interview at Wuhan Academy of Social Science on September 17,

1990.

171 Huang and Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 688.

172 *SLR*, p. 90. On p. 137 in the same book a writer notes that they "open a market for Shanghai's products."

173 Zhang Qingwu, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

174 *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily] [hereafter *RMRB*], December 6, 1984, p. 2, translated in *FBIS*, December 10, 1984, p. K7; and Chen Jiyuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-27.

175 Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 8 in the manuscript makes the case that areas with especially high person-to-land ratios provide most of the out-of-province migration.

176 Taylor and Banister, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

177 These arguments appear in Xie Bailing, *op. cit.*, p. 3 and Zhang Qingwu, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

178 *RMRB*, December 6, 1984, p. 2.

179 This is in Buroway, *op. cit.*, p. 1065, quoting M. Castells, "'Immigrant Workers and Class Struggles in Advanced Capitalism' The Western European Experience," *Politics and Society* 5, 1 pp. 33-66. Buroway, *op. cit.*, pp. 1051 and 1056 himself speaks of the economic benefits for state and capital of a system of migrant labor. Similarly, Catles and Kosack, *op. cit.*, p. 98, comment that these workers are "a mobile labor potential at the disposal of employers and officials, to be expelled in times of recession." And Cockcroft, *op. cit.*, p. 115 calls underpaid migrant workers "an important resource for employers to combat economic woes."

180 This is a quotation from the *Wall Street Journal* from June 18, 1976 that appeared in Cockcroft, *op. cit.*, p. 130. There is a similar formulation on p. 37 in Sassen, *op. cit*. Their flexibility and willingness to use hazardous equipment can be "significant for firms operating on narrow profit margins," she opines on p. 40.

181 Sassen-Koob, *op. cit.*, p. 26 and Sassen, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

182 Lomnitz, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

183 Sassen, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

184 On their unpopularity, see Xinhua Overseas, February 26, 1991 translated in *FBIS*, February 27, 1991, p. 25, which states that, "Some law-enforcement personnel dare not boldly assume administrative responsibility because they fear vengeful counterattacks."

185 The Guangdong provincial government "urged local labor and public security departments to take action to see that no enterprise will employ laborers from other provinces" in early 1989, reported Guangdong Radio on March 1, 1989 (translated in *FBIS*, March 3, 1989, p. 50).

186 Shao Jun, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

187 Xu Miaofa, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

188 Xu Miaofa, *op. cit.*, p. 39, and Kraus, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

189 *CWLG*, p. 59.

190 *CWLG*, p. 158.

191 *SLR*, p. 216.

192 *Ibid.*, p. 105.

193 *Ibid.*, p. 140.

194 *Ibid.*, p. 156; see also *SLR*, p. 144.

195 Feng and Jiang, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

196 This number amounted to 41.33 percent of the outside labor in Wuhan in late 1990. This and the following figures in this paragraph come from an interview at the bureau on September 19, 1990.

197 *CWLG*, p. 59.

198 *Ibid.*, p. 137.

199 *SLR*, p. 77.

200 *Ibid.*, p. 216.

201 Cui Lin, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

202 In Guangzhou in 1986, the fee was two *yuan* per worker per month, both for the firm and for the worker him/herself for factory work; one *yuan* for construction labor. This is in *CWLG*, p. 184.

203 Xinhua Overseas, October 13, 1989. Banister, "Urban-Rural Population Projections," introduction, p. 2 states that, "new urban residents ... may be taxed disproportionately to pay for the expanding urban infrastructure." Also see Huang Hongyun, *op. cit.*, p. 19. Given the analyses of Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 32 and Sassen, *op. cit.*, p. 39, it would not be surprising to learn that the cities were not using the monies collected to better the lives of urban workers.

204 Zhang Qingwu, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

205 Interview with Wuhan Labor Bureau on September 19, 1990.

206 Huang and Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 688.
207 *CD*, December 21, 1989, reprinted in *FBIS*, January 12, 1990, p. 16.
208 *SLR*, p. 216.