USC Seminar Series No. 8

Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement

The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization

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ISBN 962-441-708-3

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Few observers of the political upheaval of 1989 have failed to remark on the massive popular response to student protests throughout the country. Some have argued that the primary novelty and political significance of 1989 lie in the scope of this popular response, and not in the student movement itself.[1] Yet even those who have emphasized popular participation in 1989 have portrayed ordinary citizens primarily as players in a national media drama centered on the student movement, especially the hunger-strike of mid-May. Workers and other ordinary citizens lined the streets by the tens of thousands during the pivotal Beijing student marches of April 27 and May 4, cheering the students on and clearing police and soldiers out of the students' path. They filled Tiananmen Square and its environs by the hundreds of thousands through much of mid-May, and over 700 work units sent organized delegations to march in the massive street protests of May 17 and 18 alone, which by official count at that time both numbered over one million. And after the declaration of martial law, ordinary citizens manned street barricades at intersections

throughout Beijing and prevented martial law troops from entering the city for two weeks. These activities were duplicated on a smaller scale in dozens of cities throughout the country.

The idea that popular protest played a key supporting role in student demonstrations is not without foundation, but it neglects a very important phenomenon: ordinary urban citizens were not simply mobilized by students into public demonstrations; they were extremely active in organizing themselves into a wide variety of associations with broad array of purposes. While on the one hand, 1989 saw a groundswell of popular sympathy with student protests, on the other hand, it also brought an explosion of explicitly political organizing efforts on the part of ordinary urban citizens. Within a mere seven weeks from the death of Hu Yaobang on April 15 to the military operation of June 4, thousands of citizen associations were formed by workers and other "city people" (*shimin*).[2] Some of these organizations were self-defense groups, designed to keep order at demonstrations, protect students and other protesters from police suppression and, if necessary, confront the military and police. Others were protest brigades formed to take part in public demonstrations in support of student demands. Others were political associations and proto-parties, organizations designed to further political ends beyond the mere acceptance of student demands. And still others organized themselves into embryonic labor unions with explicit political and economic demands.

This phenomenon is important not simply because the propensity of ordinary citizens to form political associations has been obscured in the glare of publicity focused upon the students. It is important for another reason: these organized citizens did not merely support student demands; they forwarded distinct demands of their own. Past portrayals of city residents as a strong supporting cast in a national political drama neglect the fact that these actors often were working from a different script. Organized citizens displayed political tendencies that ranged from the kind of small militant fighting group typical of the Cultural Revolution to democratic trade unions calling openly for plant-level representation and collective bargaining. In many of these activities, city people refused to limit themselves to the subservient role of disciplined cheering section, human shields, and generous donors that student leaders had assigned them from the outset. These popular tendencies created some tension with the student movement, and it led some citizen groups explicitly to reject the elite-dominated game that they felt the students to be playing.

This neglected substratum of politics during the 1989 upheaval is difficult, but not impossible, to research. Citizens' organizations left a trail of handbills and manifestos, many of which are now available abroad. Some of the political activists have left China and have published their accounts or submitted to interviews. Official accounts published immediately after the military suppression offer the expected denunciations, but often provide enough factual information to support more than one interpretation. In this paper I shall draw on these sources to describe the pattern of popular political organization, and the mentalities that accompanied it. To anticipate the conclusion, we shall see that these movements represent a brand of politics quite at odds with party reformism and student and intellectual visions of democracy.

Types of Popular Organization

In the hothouse atmosphere of spring 1989, it appears plausible that many hundreds, perhaps well over a thousand groups of workers or other city people may have formed for political action. More than ten such organizations achieved some publicity in both Beijing and Shanghai. A survey of all province-level newspapers for the month of June 1989 alone yielded a list of 88 separate political organizations of workers or city people in public arrest reports.[3] Autonomous labor unions were reported in 19 provinces, with two or more reported in several cities. These reports make clear that this list is only a minority of the organizations active in 1989, primarily those in provincial capitals targeted by local bureaus of public security. In Hebei it was reported that "various

organizations" in the province had called themselves "autonomous workers' federations,"[4] "various autonomous workers' federations" formed in the factories of Wuhan;[5] and were prominent among the 34 "illegal organizations" broken up by the Liaoning Bureau of Public Security by mid-June.[6] A more extensive survey of the provincial press, and of prefectural and county-level newspapers, would no doubt multiply this number by several times, and probably the majority of protest groups that formed during the period dispersed without leaving a trace on the historical record.

It is nonetheless evident from the sample of organizations we have identified that these groups varied widely in their size, longevity, activities, and aims. They may be categorized into four types. The first, and probably the most numerous, was the self-defense groups that usually referred to themselves as "picket corps" (*jiucha dui*) or "dare-to-die corps" (*gansi dui*). They were established to maintain order at demonstrations, protect students and other political groups from security forces, and later would play an active role in resistance to martial law. A second type of group was the protest organizations, which usually took the names "sympathy brigade" (*shengyuan tuan*) or "petition brigade" (*qingyuan tuan*). They organized to march in demonstrations and display the support of workers and other city people for student demands. A third type was the political associations and proto-parties that sought political ends beyond the expression of support for student protesters. They took a variety of names, including "patriotic democratic alliance" (*aiguo minzhu lianhe hui*), "league" (*tongmeng hui*), or "party" (*dang*). A fourth type was the independent labor unions that were both political associations and union organizing committees. Their names usually included such terms as "workers" (*gongren*), "autonomous" (zizhi), "self-organized" (*zifa*), and "federation" (*lianhe hui*) in various orders and combinations. They were referred to colloquially by the contraction *gongzilian*, which I shall translate here as "workers' autonomous federation." I shall offer a description of the social base, purposes, and political activities of each type of group, to the extent that this can be determined, and provide concrete case illustrations where possible.

Picket Corps and Dare-to-Die Corps: Organizing for Self-Defense

The first type of citizens' group I shall describe might be termed a "self-defense organization" (see the list of identified organizations in Table 1). The distinguishing feature of such a group is that it came together for the explicit purpose of protecting demonstrators or keeping public order around demonstration sites. While the self-defense groups appear overwhelmingly to be composed of single males under the age of 30, they varied considerably in size, duration of existence, formality of organization, and activities. Those established before martial law was declared in Beijing were generally called "picket corps," were formally organized with recognized leaders and, in the larger ones, which in Beijing claimed hundreds of members, formally divided into named sub-units. Those established after the declaration of martial law on May 20 were usually called "dare-to-die corps," were smaller and more informally organized. Some of these self-defense groups were formed by or attached to political associations or independent unions, though many were not. These groups established a continuing presence in the central squares of cities where student protesters were camped or engaged in hunger-strikes, and they sought to keep order in the crowds and protect protesters from arrest. In some cases where protesters were arrested, they confronted public security forces. After the declaration of martial law in Beijing, these groups became more numerous (especially of the "dare-to-die corps" variety) and mobile, shuttling around the city to confront advancing troops or reinforce barricades at intersections. In Beijing, in addition, the resistance to martial law troops was enforced throughout the city by unnamed neighborhood-level organizations that sprung up throughout the city immediately after the declaration of martial law. These organizations set

up barricades at intersections and maintained 24-hour watches. If soldiers or military vehicles were spotted, the watches would sound the alarm (usually by banging pots and pans from the rooftops) and residents would pour out of their homes to their stations at the barricades.[7] After the final advance of troops into Beijing on June 3, the mobile dare-to-die corps helped take the lead in violent resistance to the troops' advance, and in Shanghai, Xi'an, and elsewhere, new dare-to-die corps sprang up to paralyze public transportation and otherwise protest news of the massacre in Beijing.[8]

The organizations that established a presence around the edges of Tiananmen Square during mid-May also created a band of associated picket and dare-to-die corps. The Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation established four separate dare-to-die teams under its direct leadership.[9] One of the union's initial leaders, a 28-year-old worker named Liu Qiang from a military printing plant called Beijing Factory No. 3209, also established an independent "Beijing Workers' Picket Corps," apparently after losing influence within the union and dropping out of its leading group.[10] Another leader of the organization, Bo Weidong, was a worker from Capital Iron and Steel Corporation.[11] When interviewed on the square in mid-May, Liu Qiang claimed a membership of 300 to 400, mostly Beijing workers, with a minority of workers from outside Beijing.[12] This organization cooperated with the union, but was not directly under its leadership.

On the other side of the square, the Beijing City People's Autonomous Federation also established several dare-to-die teams, and gave each of them colorful names. One was called the "Black Panthers" (*heibao gansi dui*).[13] Another such organization, the "Capital Workers' Picket Corps," was established during the student hunger-strike and appears to have been organized by, or to have a close association with, staff or students in the Chinese Workers' Movement Institute under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. It published one handbill, in which it called for nonviolent resistance to troops, the protection of hunger-strikers, and the maintenance of order around the site of the hunger-strike.[14]

In addition to these auxiliary corps with fixed addresses and associations with political organizations, there were a number of unaffiliated, roving self-defense organizations. Easily the most famous of these were the "Flying Tiger Corps" (*Feihu dui*), an informal association of several hundred owners of motorcycles. They were first noticed during the week of the hunger-strike, riding in Tiananmen Square or through intersections in the city in groups of 20 to 60, and sometimes even as many as 300 to 400.[15] They appeared predominantly to have been blue-collar workers and petty entrepreneurs (*geti hu*) from the Beijing area.[16] After milling around the protests for several days, on May 18 they formed a loose-knit command structure and selected a worker from the Beijing Jeep Corporation as their leader. From that point on, they spread news and handbills throughout the city. After the declaration of martial law, their organized columns roared back and forth across the city, spreading news about the location of troop carriers and helping to coordinate the resistance. On one occasion, they took part in an assault on a public security bureau in a suburban county (see below), and on the morning after the declaration of martial law, they roared through the gates of a foundry at the Capital Iron and Steel complex, spreading handbills, shouting for the workers to strike, and apparently scaring the factory's security cadres half to death.[17] Two other apparently unaffiliated corps traveled by foot: the "Changbai Mountain Dare-to-Die Corps" (*Changbai shan gansi dui*) and the "Manchurian Tigers" (*dongbeihu gansi dui*), who were headed by a worker from the Beijing Motorcycle Assembly Plant.[18]

On occasion, Beijing's various self-defense organizations would engage in coordinated action. On May 28, after more than a week of martial law, members of a student picket corps ran to the western reviewing stand in front of Tiananmen, where the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation was located, and informed them that a number of students had been beaten and arrested out in the suburbs, in Daxing County. They asked the workers for reinforcements to go to the village and demand the students'

release. The workers' union sent out one of its picket teams in a truck borrowed for the occasion.[19] In a scene reminiscent of many similar confrontations during the Cultural Revolution, a rescue party set out for Daxing: a brigade of motorcyclists from the Flying Tigers set out in front, and behind them six trucks filled with members of the picket corps of the workers' union and other picket corps of citizens and students. When the procession stopped in front of the county party headquarters and demanded the release of their comrades, the officials denied knowledge of the arrested students. After camping out in front of the building for a period, word was leaked to them that the students were being held elsewhere in town, and the procession rushed off and freed eight imprisoned students. Angered at the officials' lies, they stopped by the local public security bureau on their way out of town, shouted curses and slogans, and pelted the building with stones.

In the provinces, dare-to-die corps formed in response to news of the Beijing killings. A typical example is the "Wild Geese Dare-to-Die Corps," which achieved some notoriety in Shanghai.[20] This was an organization comprised of workers who, after hearing news of the events in Beijing, came together to erect barricades, stop traffic, man checkpoints at intersections, and shout slogans in protest of the massacre. Eyewitness reports from Shanghai and Xi'an have recorded that for as much as a week after June 4 such citizens' groups controlled the streets in much of their city.[21] Fourteen of Shanghai's "Wild Geese" were arrested and sentenced, and three separate newspaper articles chronicled their capture and punishment. In Harbin, a similar organization, the "Harbin City People's Sympathy Brigade" (*Harbin shimin shengyuan tuan*), formed after hearing the news from Beijing, and on June 11, armed with knives, bottles, and stones, commandeered six trucks, drove around to several industrial institutes and factories to incite strikes.[22]

Government accounts after these events sought consistently to attribute such resistance primarily to unemployed urbanites, the rural floating population and to ex-convicts and juvenile delinquents. While this emphasis appears to be exaggerated for political

purposes, it would indeed be surprising if such people did not in fact take to the streets. One apparent example is Harbin's "Taiping [district] Youth Dare-to-Die Corps." After hearing of the Beijing bloodshed, youths from this district banded together to protest, yelling slogans through bullhorns, blocking streets, marching to local colleges, breaking windows, and roughing up passersby. Among their slogans were "overthrow the government," "general strike," and "we want to drink beer." They also shouted "long live knives, guns and bombs" (*dao qiang pao wansui*), reviving the name of a youth gang (*dao qiang pao*) in the neighborhood recently broken up by the bureau of public security.[23]

Table 1. Self-Defense Groups

Name	Source
Beijing gongren gansi dui (Beijing workers' dare-to-die corps)	SEC 1989, p.176
Beijing shimin gansi dui (Beijing city people's dare-to-die corps)	SEC 1989, p.176
Beijing gongren jiucha dui (Beijing workers' picket corps)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-16-89, p.1
Changbai shan gansi dui [Beijing] (Changbai mountain dare-to-die corps)	Interview
Da gou zhihuibu [Lanzhou] (Beat-the-dog headquarters)	*Gansu ribao* 6-13-89
Dongbei hu gansi dui [Beijing] (Siberian tigers dare-to-die corps)	*Tianjin ribao* 6-17-89, p.1
Feihu dui [Beijing] (Flying tigers)	Li Yun 1989, pp.192-3
Gansi dui [Harbin] (Dare-to-die corps)	*Heilongjiang ribao* 6-16-89
Gansi dui [Nei Menggu] (Dare-to-die corps)	*Nei Menggu ribao* 6-14-89

Table 1. Self-Defense Groups (continued)

Name	Source
Gongren jiucha dui [Nanjing] (Workers' picket corps)	*Xinhua ribao* 6-11-89
Gongren jiucha dui [Xi'an] (Workers' picket corps)	*Shaanxi ribao* 6-11-89
Heibao gansi dui [Beijing] (Black panther dare-to-die corps)	*Liaoning ribao* 6-17-89, p.1
Shimin gansi dui [Beijing] (City people's dare-to-die corps)	Interview
Shimin gansi dui [Lanzhou] (City people's dare-to-die corps)	*Gansu ribao* 6-13-89
Shimin gansi dui [Xi'an] (City people's dare-to-die corps)	*Shaanxi ribao* 6-11-89
Shimin jiucha dui [Xi'an] (City people's picket corps)	*Shaanxi ribao* 6-14-89
Shoudu gongren jiucha dui [Beijing] (Capital workers' picket corps)	HKTUEC
Taiping qingnian gansi dui [Harbin] (Taiping youth dare-to-die corps)	*Heilongjiang ribao* 6-9-89
Xianfeng gansi dui [Lanzhou] (Vanguard dare-to-die corps)	GPD 1989, p.289
Ye e gansi dui [Shanghai] (Wild geese dare-to-die corps)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-15, 16, 26-89

Notes: "SEC 1989," see *Jingxin dongpo*, note 26;
"HKTUEC," see *Gongren qilaile*, note 10;
"GPD 1989," see *Hanwei shehui zhuyi*, note 10;
"Interview," see note 7;
"Li Yun 1989," see note 15.

Protest Brigades: Demonstrating for the Students

A second kind of citizens' organization is the one I shall label "protest brigades" (see Table 2). The distinguishing feature of such groups is that they came together for purposes of public demonstration in support of student demands or in sympathy with student hunger-strikers. Their characteristic activity was to appear in the public demonstrations or marches that occurred in almost all of the larger Chinese cities from mid-May on. Beyond this distinguishing feature, however, they varied widely in size, duration of existence, and formality of organization. The vast majority of such organizations were protest groups that coalesced within work units in mid-May to march under banners naming their places of work. Others, however, were not expressions of work unit solidarity, but were creatures of the free space created in public squares throughout China by the presence of student protesters and large crowds of onlookers and supporters. In many cities, some citizens organized their own "hunger-strike teams" to sit not far from student hunger-strikers; many others formed "sympathy brigades" to show support for student demands, and others formed "petition brigades" symbolically to request that the government compromise and negotiate. Some of these organizations maintained an organized presence in public squares throughout the period of public protest and took part in many marches and demonstrations. As they did so, they would take on additional aims and activities and come to resemble other types of organizations. Some protest groups in such cities as Shanghai and Xi'an, for example, turned into *de facto* self-defense organizations after June 4, and took to street barricades to resist the impositions of the "fascist regime." Others, in the course of the mid-May demonstrations, developed formal organizations and took on aims beyond the mere support of student demands; a number of important political associations and proto-parties originated in just this way (see below).

Public demonstrations throughout the country were in large measure processions of informally constituted "sympathy brigades" formed in places of work. The delegations typically marched under banners naming their places of work, often using vehicles and material from the work unit. In Beijing, such protest brigades emerged from factories during the week of the hunger-strike. The events in the square reportedly touched off animated discussions at work about the student protests and their meaning.[24] Workers and staff who sympathized with the student movement typically would collect donations from co-workers, draw up banners and request factory vehicles and permission to go to the square. Their managers often met such delegations with open or tacit support, or with an unwillingness to take a stand without clear direction from the evidently divided center.[25] On May 17 and 18 alone, official accounts estimated that over 700 work units of various kinds send such sympathy brigades to the square, at least 160 of which were industrial plants or other enterprises. Beijing Jeep Corporation sent over 3,000 workers in identical uniforms, all marching and shouting slogans in a coordinated fashion. Beijing No. 2 Chemical dispatched a huge delegation riding in 60 trucks, all painted the same color.[26] Among the other work units that sent such delegations were Beijing Heavy Machinery, Beijing Petrochemical, Beijing Gear, Beijing No. 4 Pharmaceutical, Beijing No. 2 Machine Tools. Over 100 garbage trucks joined the procession, and the first two trucks carried a banner reading "Fellow classmates, we sanitation workers have come out too late." Ten large cement mixers from one of the city's construction companies joined the procession, sounding their air horns, reviving their engines, and drawing a lot of attention.[27] Such sympathy brigades made a huge public impression, but they do not appear to have lasted more than the one or two marches in which they took part, and this variety of sympathy brigade disappeared shortly after the declaration of martial law.

Work unit sympathy brigades were common also in the provinces, but away from the glare of the national and international media, the numbers of work units sending delegations, and the

public demonstrations, were not so great as in Beijing.[28] In the provinces, independently constituted protest brigades, formed of citizens from different work units, played a more prominent role. The "Guangzhou Workers," for example, marched through the streets of Canton on June 4 and 5 to protest events in Beijing, blocking a bridge across the Pearl River and engaging in random violence. It was apparently an *ad hoc* group comprised primarily of temporary workers and construction workers with permanent residences outside the city.[29] In Wuhan, the "Bare-chested Demonstration Brigade," comprised of blue-collar workers from the city, marched under the banner "workers sympathy brigade" in public demonstrations. As they marched through the streets without their shirts, they chanted "we want to eat rice and smoke tobacco!", and called to bystanders, "take off your shirt and march with us! We guarantee you rice to eat!".[30] In Tianjin, a "City People's Sympathy Brigade" and a "City People's Petition Brigade," marched through the streets after June 4, making speeches, spreading news about the Beijing massacres, and calling for workers and citizens to shut down industry, commerce, and transportation in protest. The latter group shouted such slogans as "return our freedom, return our jobs, return our city residence, repay the blood debt" and "overthrow, overthrow, overthrow all, 'till not a one is left, the more chaos the better."[31]

In Shanghai, four such organizations attained publicity. The "Shanghai Workers Patriotic Sympathy Brigade" and the "Shanghai City People's Sympathy Brigade" emerged in the public demonstrations in People's Square in mid-May, and eventually merged to form one of the city's several autonomous workers' unions.[32] The "Shanghai Workers' Sympathy Brigade," one of whose leaders was a worker from the Shanghai No. 1 Petrochemical Plant, also participated in the mid-May demonstrations and later played an active role in blockading the streets of Shanghai to protest the Beijing massacre.[33] They were joined in this activity by the "Citizen's Conscience Association," a group of workers who got together to resist martial law: they drove around the streets in a truck to coordinate popular resistance for almost a week after

June 4.[34]

In Taiyuan, the "Feather Duster Brigade," led by workers from the Shanxi Machine Tools Forging Plant "and others like them" emerged on the streets during the student demonstrations of early- to mid-May. They marched through the streets holding feather dusters aloft, and marched to the headquarters of the Shanxi provincial government, where they held a sit-in demonstration, yelling slogans in support of the students and in opposition to corruption. The official accounts do not explain the significance of the feather dusters, but they appear to symbolize a desire to clean out corruption in government.[35] This protest brigade established a continuing organization and eventually transformed itself into a workers autonomous union on May 17, and during the week after martial law was declared on May 20, they formed a "Democratic Patriotic Committee of the Provincial Capital."[36] In Yunnan, the "Kunming City People's Sympathy Brigade" followed a similar trajectory, emerging in the public protests of the second week of May, and eventually developing into the major non-student political association of the Kunming movement.[37]

Table 2. Protest Brigades

Name	Source
Changchun shi shimin zifa shengyuan tuan (Changchun city people's self-organized sympathy brigade)	*Jilin ribao* 6-13-89
Chibo youxing dui [Wuhan] (Bare-chested demonstration corps)	*Qunzhong ribao* 6-11-89
Gongren shengyuan tuan [Harbin] (Workers' sympathy brigade)	*Heilongjiang ribao* 6-16-89
Gongren shengyuan xuesheng tuan [Yinchuan] (Workers' sympathy for students brigade)	*Ningxia ribao* 6-20-89

Table 2. Protest Brigades (continued)

Name	Source
Gongren shimin lianhe tuan [Shenyang] (Workers and city people's brigade)	Gunn 1990
Guangzhou gongren (Guangzhou workers)	*Nangang ribao* 6-8, 9, 11, 25-89
Hangzhou shimin zifa shengyuan tuan (Hangzhou city people's self-organized sympathy brigade)	*Zhejiang ribao* 6-23-89
Harbin shimin shengyuan tuan (Harbin city people's sympathy brigade)	*Heilongjiang ribao* 6-9-89
Jimao danzi dui [Taiyuan] (Feather duster corps)	*Shanxi ribao* 6-17, 21-89
Lanzhou shimin tuan (Lanzhou league of city people)	*Gansu ribao* 6-13-89
Lanzhou shimin shengyuan tuan (Lanzhou city people's sympathy brigade)	*Gansu ribao* 6-13, 20-89
Shancheng gongren shengyuan tuan [Chongqing] (Mountain city workers' sympathy brigade)	Chan and Unger 1990
Shanghai gongren aiguo shengyuan tuan (Shanghai workers' patriotic sympathy brigade)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-12-89
Shanghai gongren shengyuan tuan (Shanghai workers' sympathy brigade)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-16-89

Table 2. Protest Brigades (continued)

Name	Source
Shanghai shimin shengyuan tuan (Shanghai city people's sympathy brigade)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-12-89
Shimin dui [Yinchuan] (City people's corps)	*Ningxia ribao* 6-20-89
Shimin jueshi tuan [Beijing] (City people's hunger-strike team)	Interview
Shimin liangxin hui [Shanghai] (City people's association of conscience)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-13-89
Shimin qingyuan tuan [Harbin] (City people's petition brigade)	*Heilongjiang ribao* 6-16-89
Shimin qingyuan tuan [Tianjin] (City people's petition brigade)	*Tianjin ribao* 6-12-89
Shimin qingyuan tuan [Xi'an] (City people's petition brigade)	*Shaanxi ribao* 6-11-89
Shimin shengyuan tuan [Chongqing] (City people's sympathy brigade)	*Sichuan ribao* 6-14-89
Shimin shengyuan tuan [Tianjin] (City people's sympathy brigade)	*Tianjin ribao* 6-12-89
Shimin shengyuan tuan [Xi'an] (City people's sympathy brigade)	*Shaanxi ribao* 6-11-89
Shimin taoxue tuan [Xi'an] (City people's brigade to denounce bloodshed)	*Shaanxi ribao* 6-11-89
Taiyuan shimin shengyuan tuan (Taiyuan city people's sympathy brigade)	*Shanxi ribao* 6-21-89

Table 2. Protest Brigades (continued)

Name	Source
Xi'an gongren qingyuan tuan (Xi'an workers' petition brigade)	*Shaanxi ribao* 6-13-89
Wuhan gongren shengyuan tuan (Wuhan workers' sympathy brigade)	SEC 1989, p.131

Notes: "Gunn 1990," see Anne Gunn "Tell the World About Us: The Student Movement in Shenyang," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 24 (July 1990), pp.243-258;
"Chan and Unger 1990," see Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger; "Voices from the Protest Movement, Chongqing, Sichuan," *ibid.*, pp.259-279;
"Interview," see note 7;
"SEC 1989," *see Jingxin dongpo*, note 26.

Political Associations and Proto-Parties: Organizing for Political Change

The third kind of popular political organization is the political association or proto-party (see Table 3). The distinguishing feature of this type is that it is formally organized and that it has political aims that go beyond the mere expression of sympathy for student demands. Some of these organizations grew out of the activities stimulated in public squares by the student demonstrations. Others were in fact established earlier in the spring, or in some cases before, and experienced a spurt of growth during the period of street protests. Some of the groups were in fact little more than loose-knit alliances of protest brigades that declared themselves to be in favor of democratic reform. Others were formally constituted political parties that had formal programmes, a hierarchy of of-

fices, met in secret, and even made plans for armed resistance to Communist Party rule.

The most informal type of political association we have uncovered might be called a "masses political salon," the ordinary citizen's equivalent to the political discussion groups that emerged on many college campuses in the late 1980s. In late April, as the student movement took to the streets in Beijing, a small group of workers and other ordinary citizens began to meet nightly not far from Xinhuamen. They discussed political matters, corruption, the meaning of the student movement—political discourse at a somewhat higher level of abstraction than they were normally accustomed. As they became a nightly fixture on their street corner, they decided to designate themselves as (for lack of a better translation), the "Big Talkers Association" (*kanye xiehui*, or more literally, "Master Talkers"). These city people took their "association" with a dash of self-deprecating humor (no self-righteous moral posturing here), it was all part of the street carnival that was developing around the protest movement. Various "master talkers" began to assign themselves and one another such tongue-in-cheek titles as "master talker, ninth category" (*kanye jiuduan*). Beneath the humor, however, was a serious purpose: at least two members of this group went on to become pivotal figures in the city's autonomous workers' union.[38]

Various city people's political associations, however, did establish themselves in public squares throughout China in the midst of the student demonstrations. A fairly representative example is the "Kunming City People's Patriotic Democratic Sympathy Brigade," which had an organized presence on East Wind Square from May 19 until early June. Also calling itself at various times the "Kunming City People's Autonomous Association," and the "Kunming City People's Democratic Patriotic Committee," it had a formal organizational structure with a chairman and vice-chairmen. During its 20-day career, the organization established a broadcasting station on the square, organized protest marches and sit-ins in front of government offices, and later took the lead in setting up street barricades, paralyzing traffic throughout the city for days.[39]

Its resistance to martial law reportedly reached a "high tide" on June 9 when, with the student protesters in East Wind Square down to a very few, they attacked the Communist Party in a number of radical speeches, called for a general strike and the burning of military and police vehicles, chanted "Long live the Guomindang," organized two protest marches, and got into nasty arguments with students who now counseled everyone to clear the square. The next day they marched to two college campuses to call out the students to protest. At one, the students reportedly yelled back that they would have nothing to do with such "hooligan" (*liumang*) and "dregs of society" as them; to which the group responded with curses and bricks.[40]

In addition to the political associations that formed in the public squares during May, and confined their activities primarily to the streets, there also emerged a significant number of militant proto-parties. These organizations are noteworthy for the surprising directness with which they expressed their anti-party mentalities and aims, and for a militant rhetoric whose style, if not content, hearkened back to the Cultural Revolution. Many of the political entrepreneurs who started such proto-parties in fact were middle-aged veterans of the struggles of the late 1960s. In Lanzhou, there was the "City People's Sympathy Brigade," led by a 56-year-old "Jin XX," an assistant engineer in a factory, former leader of a rebel organization during the Cultural Revolution. It appears from the arrest report that he had suffered imprisonment for three years as a result of his activities in the Cultural Revolution. In 1989, he established his organization on East-Is-Red Square, organized demonstrations, gave fiery speeches during which he was quoted as saying "China today has no choice but to invite Taiwan's Li Denghui back, nobody else can lead the country," and "only when East-Is-Red Square is awash in blood will our task be complete." He set up a "Chinese Human Rights Alliance Central Committee," reportedly organized a 100-person "urban guerrilla unit," sent out emissaries to make contact with like-minded organizations throughout the country, and sought to purchase arms, saying this was the best opportunity there would

be for decades to overthrow the communists.[41] In Shanghai, a veteran of the "Revolutionary Rebel Brigade of Sent-down Workers" of the Cultural Revolution named Xu, a 51-year-old employee of a district real estate management company, formed the "Chinese Autonomous Association for Human Rights." He gathered together a group of followers at the west side of People's Square in late May and proceeded to make "reactionary" speeches and recruit members. During this period he was quoted as calling for a general strike, and as saying "We should have large demonstrations every May," "Unite and overthrow this corrupt government," and "the imposition of martial law in Beijing is nothing but White Terror, the suppression of a people's movement."[42]

Such political militance was not simply the last hurrah of the 1960s generation; young workers formed similar organizations. The "Red Clan" emerged from the Xinjiang Auto Assembly Plant No. 3, and was led by a 20-year-old worker named Gu Xiangyang who was the "general secretary" of the organization. The group sprung up in response to reports of the massacres in Beijing, printed several handbills, pasted up wallposters around the factory which contained such statements as "take revenge for the martyred students of Beijing" and "the government is incompetent, seize power," and sought to halt production. Its handbills included such statements as "the ten years of reform have been ten years of corruption, ten years of hardship for the people," and "Beijing is awash in blood, the Capital has been massacred, the Red Clan will awaken the people, and is willing to sacrifice everything."[43] In Chengdu, several young white- and blue-collar workers ranging in age from 20 to 27 formed the "Chinese Justice Brigade" out of their "City People's Sympathy Brigade" after a demonstration against martial law on May 20. They reasoned that a sympathy brigade could only be a temporary organization: a more permanent organ was needed to move China from a single party dictatorship to a multiparty system. They made plans for a secret organization, designed a seal, an emblem, official colors, and discussed contents of a charter and programme, and sources

of funding.[44]

Martial law, and especially news of the Beijing bloodshed, radicalized politically active citizens and stimulated the formation of many of these parties. The "Jinan Autonomous Alliance of Various Circles" was formed out of the combination of the "Jinan Autonomous Workers' Union" and the "Jinan Workers' Democratic Alliance" sometime in late May or early June. It called for general strikes, sought to block traffic, took part in street demonstrations, distributed "reactionary" handbills, and tried to incite people to rebellion. When news of the Beijing massacre reached Jinan, they made plans to establish an underground guerrilla organization, store up arms, create a rural base area, seek foreign financial and military assistance, and overthrow the government. They also made plans to carry out "urban guerrilla warfare" and raid military depots for arms.[45] No such organization was more blunt about its aims than the one formed in Xining in response to news of martial law in Beijing by a cadre in the Bureau of Archives of Qinghai Province: the "Chinese People's Democratic Anti-party League." The group's handbills were simply an elaboration of its name.[46]

Some of these proto-parties, however, were established even before the emergence of the student movement, and had sought to remove the Communist Party from power well before the martial law and killings that radicalized so many others against a government increasingly termed "fascist." The "Chinese League for Democratic Supervision" was established in Shanghai in March 1989 by Li Zhiguo, an employee of the engineering department of the Shanghai Railway Bureau. Originally known as the "Freedom Society" (*ziyou she*), this party declared that it was open to any non-party member under the age of 50. The group pasted up handbills and distributed party membership applications at universities and railway stations. In May the group became more active, acquiring their own printing presses, sending out delegations to many major cities including Beijing, and passing out handbills announcing the formation of their "League." They also laid plans for an underground organization, secret meetings and

liaisons, for taking up arms, establishing base areas, and to usher in a "great empire of freedom" after the overthrow of the Communist Party. They even attended to such details as designing a seal and national flag, designating a new national flower, and deciding upon new names for the government and national currency.[47] The "Chinese Democratic Youth Party" was established as early as 1986, also in Shanghai, by a clothing *geti hu* named Wang Zhengming. Its purpose from the beginning was to abolish the Communist Party's monopoly on political power. The group had an organizational structure, charter, regular procedures for developing new members. In May 1989, they decided to coordinate political activities with the student movement, and marched in street demonstrations under the banner "City People's Sympathy Brigade."[48]

Table 3. Political Associations and Proto-Parties

Name	Source
Beijing shimin zizhi lianhe hui (Beijing city people's autonomous alliance)	SEC 1989, p.176
Hongse zu [Wulumuqi] (Red clan)	*Xinjiang ribao* 6-13-89
Jinan shi gejie zizhi lianhe hui (Jinan autonomous alliance of various circles)	*Qunzhong ribao* 6-16-89
Kunming shi shimin aiguo minzhu shengyuan tuan; Kunming shi shimin zizhi hui (Kunming city people's patriotic democratic sympathy brigade; Kunming city people's autonomous association)	*Yunnan ribao* 6-13, 14, 17-89

Table 3. Political Associations and Proto-Parties (continued)

Name	Source
Shanghai gongren zizhi lianhe hui; Shanghai zizhi lianhe zonggong hui (Shanghai workers' autonomous union)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-10, 12-89
Shengcheng minzhu aiguo weiyuan hui [Taiyuan] (Democratic patriotic committee of the provincial capital)	*Shanxi ribao* 6-21-89
Tianjin aiguo minzu zizhi hui (Tianjin patriotic people's autonomous association)	*Tianjin ribao* 6-12, 13-89
Yinchuan shimin gongren lianhe hui (Yinchuan city people's and workers' alliance)	*Ningxia ribao* 6-20-89
Zhengzhou shi gejie aiguo lianhe hui (Zhengzhou alliance of patriotic circles)	*Henan ribao* 6-11, 16-89
Zhongguo minquan zizhi lianhe hui [Shanghai] (Chinese autonomous association for democratic rights)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-15-89
Zhongguo minzhu jiandu tongmeng hui [Shanghai] (Chinese alliance for democratic supervision)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-12-89; *Qunzhong ribao* 6-12-89
Zhongguo qingnian minzhu dang [Shanghai] (Chinese democratic youth party)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-11-89; *Qunzhong ribao* 6-12-89
Zhongguo renmin minzhu fandui dang tongmeng [Xining] (Chinese people's democratic antiparty alliance)	*Qinghai ribao* 6-27-89; *Ningxia ribao* 6-30-89

Table 3. Political Associations and Proto-Parties (continued)

Name	Source
Zhongguo renquan tongmeng zhongyang weiyuan hui [Lanzhou] (China human rights alliance central committee)	*Gansu ribao* 6-20-89
Zhongguo zhengyi tuan [Chongqing] (Chinese justice brigade)	*Sichuan ribao* 6-22-89
Zhonghua gejie aiguo minzhu lianhe hui [Tianjin] (Chinese alliance of patriotic democratic circles)	*Tianjin ribao* 6-16-89
Zhonghua minzheng dang [Dalian] (Chinese democratic politics party)	*Liaoning ribao* 6-15-89

Note: "SEC 1989," see *Jingxin dongpo*, note 26.

Workers' Organizations: Union Organizing and Political Protest

A final variety of popular political organization is the "workers' autonomous federation" (see Table 4). Many of these appear to have grown out of protest brigades that coalesced in public squares early in the student movement. Their distinguishing feature is that they declared themselves to be workers' organizations interested in furthering the interests of that constituency, and this usually meant at the same time democratic reform that would permit collective representation of workers' interests. These organizations distributed handbills, published manifestos and charters, and participated in street demonstrations, but they do not appear to have had branch organizations extending into factories. Most of them appear to have called for political strikes in late May and early June, but with little apparent success.

The best documented case of an independent labor union is the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation (hereafter Beijing *gongzilian*). At least three people involved in some way with its leadership have escaped abroad to publish their accounts and submit to interviews, and over 30 of their handbills, including their charter, are available in American archives.[49] The union's leaders came together on the square in late April, and did not know one another before the movement began. The leading group of around 12 people was comprised primarily of young workers from medium or large scale state enterprises, and between 25 and 30 years of age.[50] It had a legal advisor, a graduate student from Beijing University's Law Department, and two non-workers participated in its leading group at various times: a lecturer at an industrial institute, and Zhou Yongjun, a student leader who had lost power to Wuer Kaixi in mid-May. When it registered members (it claimed some 20,000 on paper by early June), it required that they show identification proving that they were permanent employees in a Beijing workplace.

At its highest point of development after mid-May, Beijing *gongzilian* had between 100 and 200 activists at its location in front of the western reviewing stand at Tiananmen, organized into departments for logistics, organization, and propaganda. They also established a liaison department to maintain communication with various large factories (notably Capital Steel) and university campuses, a workers' picket corps and four dare-to-die corps. They set up a broadcasting station on the square that operated continuously, and had at least one printing press at a separate location. Their broadcasting station became a "democratic forum" every evening, to which listeners could write down statements or turn over purloined "internal" (*neibu*) documents to be read out to large and appreciative audiences. They did not establish branch organizations inside factories, a strategy that would cripple their ability to organize strikes later on, but one that was settled upon as prudent after debate among the leaders. The union issued a continuous stream of handbills and pronouncements, from April 21 through early June. It participated in all of the major demonstra-

tions after May 11, and took an increasingly active and visible role after the declaration of martial law on the 20th. It confronted the security forces on two separate occasions before June 4: in Daxing county (see above), and in front of the Ministry of Public Security at the end of May in a demonstration for the release of arrested members that gained international publicity. Like many other city people's organizations, it became progressively radicalized by martial law, and resisted the military operation of June 3 and after.

From its very first handbills, Beijing *gongzilian* directly challenged the party leadership, especially the reformers seen as responsible for inflation and falling living standards. While they supported the student movement wholeheartedly, they also insisted that the movement did not belong to the students—a position that created tensions with student leaders from the outset and would in the end lead to open antagonism. Their consistent demand, stated repeatedly in their handbills and laid out carefully in the organization's charter, was simple and clear. They wanted both national and plant-level representation of worker interests by an independent union. At the national level, the organization would "supervise" the making and implementation of labor policy by the Party. At the plant-level, the union would negotiate with management on an equal basis, and be empowered to take "any legal measures" to enforce workers' rights. All union leaders were to be elected by secret ballot, from the factory to the very top, and were to be subject to recall votes.

While this democratic trade unionism was stated in fairly modest terms, it was of course a direct challenge to the Party's monopoly on political power. In other handbills, however, Beijing *gongzilian* maintained a consistently militant rhetoric that sometimes appeared to draw on the iconoclasm of the Cultural Revolution. The group denounced repeatedly the "corrupt oligarchy" and poured scorn on the special privileges of officials and their families. It stated repeatedly its desire to "sweep away this last remnant of Stalinist dictatorship into the dustbin of history." Inevitably, as martial law continued into late May the adjective "fascist" began to be attached to the Party and government with

greater frequency, and the group settled on the theme of "sacrificing" themselves "for the sake of the freedom of a future generation."

We know very little about the activities of the more than two dozen such workers organizations we have identified in the provinces, and it is possible that none of them developed as far as Beijing *gongzilian*. But brief official accounts from the provinces do make clear that many of these groups appeared to fit the same pattern of activities as their Beijing counterpart. Similarly named workers' organizations in Changsha, Shaoyang, Nanchang, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Hangzhou also established themselves in the main square and protested alongside the students, passing out handbills and broadcasting speeches. The organizations in Changsha, Hangzhou, and Shanghai also had organization, propaganda, and logistics departments and picket corps. The workers groups in Changsha, Shaoyang, Nanchang, Huhehaote, Shanghai, Xi'an, Taiyuan, and Tianjin also played a pivotal role after the declaration of martial law, coordinating street barricades and calling for general strikes.[51]

Perhaps the most striking feature of the 1989 protests was the emergence of this embryonic labor movement. There were scattered attempts at organizing independent unions in 1980 and 1981, but no other period of protest since at least the Hundred Flowers period has seen such an upsurge of incipient union activity. This is the single most common type of organization among those we have been able to identify—28 of them on our list, from 19 different provinces. The rapid emergence of such militant and independent organizations throughout the country was probably very influential in pushing China's leaders toward martial law and a military solution.

Table 4. Workers' Organizations

Name	Source
Angang gongren zizhi hui (Anshan steel workers' autonomous union)	*Liaoning ribao* 6-21-89
Beijing gongren zizhi lianhe hui; Beijing gongren zizhi hui; Shoudu gongren zizhi lianhe hui (Beijing workers' autonomous union)	
Changsha shi gongren lianhe zizhi hui (Changsha workers' autonomous union)	*Hunan ribao* 6-10-89
Gongren lianhe zizhi linshi weiyuan hui [Huhehaote] (Workers' autonomous union organizing committee)	*Nei Menggu ribao* 6-14-89
Guangzhou gongren zizhi lianhe hui (Guangzhou workers' autonomous union)	HKTUEC, p.239
Guiyang shi gongren zizhi lianhe hui (Guiyang workers' autonomous union)	*Guizhou ribao* 6-16, 22-89
Hangzhou shi gongren minzhu lianhe hui (Hangzhou workers' democratic association)	*Zhejiang ribao* 6-13-89
Hangzhou shi gongren zizhi hui (Hangzhou workers' autonomous union)	*Zhejiang ribao* 6-11, 13, 23-89
Harbin shi gongren zizhi lianhe hui (Harbin workers' autonomous union)	*Heilongjiang ribao* 6-16-89
Hefei shi gongren zizhi hui (Hefei workers' autonomous association)	*Anhui ribao* 6-12, 15-89

Table 4. Workers' Organizations (continued)

Name	Source
Hefei shi gongren lianhe hui (Hefei workers' alliance)	
Hefei shi gongren zifa dui (Hefei workers' self-organization team)	
Hengyang shi gongzilian [Hunan] (Hengyang workers' autonomous federation)	*New York Times* 9-22-91
Jinan shi gongren zizhi lianhe hui (Jinan autonomous workers' union)	*Qunzhong ribao* 6-16-89
Jinan shi gongren minzhu lianhe hui (Jinan workers' democratic alliance)	*Qunzhong ribao* 6-16-89
Lanzhou gongren zizhi lianhe hui (Lanzhou workers' autonomous union)	*Gansu ribao* 6-13-89
Nanchang shi gongren zizhi lianhe hui (Nanchang workers' autonomous union)	*Jiangxi ribao* 6-15, 22-89
Nanchang tuanjie gonghui (Nanchang solidarity union)	*Jiangxi ribao* 6-11, 14-89
Nanjing gongren zizhi lianhe hui (Nanjing workers' autonomous union)	*Xinhua ribao* 6-11-89
Shanghai aiguo gongren shengyuan tuan (Shanghai patriotic workers' sympathy league)	*Jiefang ribao* 6-15-89
Shanghai minzhu gongren xiehui (Shanghai democratic workers' association)	HKTUEC, p.206
Shaoyang shi gongzilian [Hunan] (Shaoyang workers' autonomous union)	*Hunan ribao* 6-14, 16-89

Table 4. Workers' Organizations (continued)

Name	Source
Shengcheng gongren zizhi hui [Taiyuan] (Workers' autonomous union of the provincial capital)	*Shanxi ribao* 6-14-89
Shougang gongren zizhi hui [Beijing] (Capital steel workers' autonomous union)	Interview
Tianjin aiguo gongren lianhe hui (Tianjin workers' patriotic association)	*Tianjin ribao* 6-11, 12-89
Xi'an gongren minzhu lianhe zizhi hui (Xi'an workers' democratic union)	*Shaanxi ribao* 6-11, 13-89
Zhengzhou shi gongren zizhi lianhe hui (Zhengzhou workers' autonomous union)	*Henan ribao* 6-11, 16-89
Zhongguo chengjian gongren zifa lianhe hui [Beijing] (Chinese urban construction workers' autonomous union)	HKTUEC, p.240
Zhongguo Tianjin gongren zizhi lianmeng [Tianjin] (Chinese workers' autonomous league)	*Qunzhong ribao* 6-14-89

Notes: "HKTUEC," see *Gongren qilaile*, note 10;
"Interview," see note 7.

Conclusion: Straws in the Wind?

One striking feature of this pattern of popular political organizing is that it drew on the participation of ***all*** sections of the urban population. Official accounts have taken great pains to emphasize that the "disturbances" of May and June were the work of the unemployed, delinquent youth, people with criminal records, and the floating population of rural residents temporarily in cities, and they appear to have concentrated upon such people in the public security crackdowns in the provinces. However, even the official reports from the provinces indicate, on balance, that such people were most active in the random street violence that occurred early on in places like Xi'an and Changsha, and in the violent resistance after June 3 in Beijing and the provinces. To the extent that such people did participate in organizations, they did so as part of small groups of the variety we have termed "self-defense organizations." As one reflects even on official accounts of the more organized and politically articulate groups, it is apparent that the leaders and members were predominantly workers from large state-owned industrial enterprises. The more organized and articulate the group, it appears, the greater the representation from important state enterprises and institutions. However, it is clear that all sectors of urban society played an active role in the kinds of associations we have described.

Another striking feature of this popular activity is that a huge number of diverse and very small organizations sprang up very rapidly. For several weeks in 1989 China's cities teemed with a variety of micro-organizations—very active, very vocal, and often highly militant. No progress appears to have been made in any city toward larger associations. At best, loose alliances of small worker and citizen groups achieved some tenuous existence for a short period, but were little more than names bestowed upon meetings among their leaders. The urban population appears to have an enormous capacity for organizing, naming, and energizing small

political groups, but so far very limited capacity for creating larger or more coherent citizen associations or alliances. It is possible that such may have formed had they been given more freedom and time. However, it also is very possible that more time and freedom may simply have led to a greater profusion of competing micro-organizations. If the latter proves to be the case in a future recurrence of popular protest, the resulting mass activity, with several political centers in each city, would prove extraordinarily difficult to either lead or control.

A third striking feature is the gulf between students and reform intellectuals, on the one hand, and these popular organizations, on the other. The gulf is even more striking in light of the fact that most of the citizen and worker organizations sprung into being out of sympathy with the student movement, and protested vigorously on its behalf. The gulf was evident in the tendency for the politically active to form associations identified with occupations and workplaces, and in the complete absence of any organization that sought to unite intellectuals, students, and workers. Except for such veterans of past political movements as Ren Wanding,[52] pitifully few intellectuals appear to have had any contact whatsoever with politically active city people. Student leaders in Beijing eventually, and reluctantly, came to coordinate their activities with their workers' counterparts, but the divergences in political mentalities and aims were so great that they led to serious frictions and even active resentments.

A fourth striking feature, which may be both an expression and a cause of the third, is the gulf in the political mentalities of students and intellectuals, on the one hand, and ordinary citizens and workers, on the other. The popular organizations were more direct in their demands and rhetoric; they moved more quickly and easily to denunciations of party leaders, to open opposition to the Party, to demands for economic concessions, union representation, calls for strikes, and other things that students leaders felt violated the purity of "their" movement, and that many reform-minded intellectuals find excessive and counter-productive. Students and intellectuals played an elite game of dissent and

protest; in the end, they sought to strengthen one faction within the government at the expense of another. The popular organizations more commonly took an "us" versus "them" attitude toward the nation's leaders. They were generally unwilling or unable to make distinctions among factions, and addressed their demands and curses to the leadership as a whole. Theirs was a populist rhetoric that in its more direct expressions was openly anti-party.

Were the popular organizations and mentalities of 1989 a hint of things to come? If China's current political deadlock turns out to be part of an irreversible process of political decay, or if a future attempt to push forward reform involves an opening up of China's political process beyond its narrow elite, such popular expressions shall once again be given a chance to surface. Should they do so for a sustained period of time, the face of Chinese politics could be remade in short order, and the heretofore closed elite game of political dissent and reform may yield to a strange new world of mass populism, outspoken anti-elitism, endemic small scale protest, and political trade-unionism. This is a world for which China's political and intellectual elites are wholly unprepared, and fear of such a world of "chaos" may, in the end, unite them in some common program of controlled economic and political reform. Should the Communist Party fail to maintain its unity and to reform its rapidly eroding and increasingly anachronistic system of rule, we should not be surprised at the suddenness with which political change may occur. For the popular protests of 1989 afforded us a glimpse of the political energies and mentalities that lie just beneath the surface of Chinese urban society, and that may play a much more important role in the country's near future.

Notes

* An earlier version of this paper was presented to colloquia at Berkeley, Stanford, UCLA, Australian National University, Harvard, and The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The author expresses thanks to the participants of those seminars for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks are due to the Universities Service Centre, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, for providing me with a period of free time to complete revisions of this paper.

1. See Tony Saich, "The Rise and Fall of the Beijing People's Movement," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 24 (July 1990), pp.181-208, and Andrew G. Walder, "The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989," *Problems of Communism* 38: 5 (September-October 1989), pp.30-40.
2. I defer to the usage of David Strand, in his *Rickshaw Beijing* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
3. The newspapers were examined in the library of the Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong.
4. *Hebei ribao*, 11 June 1989.
5. *Hubei ribao*, 16 June 1989.
6. *Liaoning ribao*, 21 June 1989.
7. This was described to me in an interview with an activist in the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation, and it is described vividly in a memoir written by an army officer shortly after his participation in these events. See Zongzheng wenhua bu zhengwen bangongshi, ed., *Jieyan yiri (shangji)* (A Day of Martial Law, volume 1) (Beijing: Jiefang jun wenyi chubanshe, 1989).
8. See, for example, Shelley Warner, "Shanghai's Response to the Deluge," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 23 (January 1990), pp.121-132, and Joseph W. Esherick, "Xi'an Spring," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 24 (July 1990), pp.209-235.
9. Interview with former activist in the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation. See Andrew G. Walder and Gong Xiaoxia, "Workers in the Tiananmen Protests: The Politics of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (January 1993), forthcoming.
10. *Ibid.*, and *Gongren qilaile: Gongren zizhi lianhehui yundong 1989* (Hong Kong: Xianggang gonghui jiaoyu zhongxin, 1990), pp. 152-154; Beijing Bureau of Public Security, Transcript of interrogation of Liu Qiang, March 31, 1990 [Held in China Information Center archives, Cambridge, Mass., material presented to Japanese courts in extradition case of Zhang Zhenhai for air piracy]; and Zong zhengzhi bu, xuanchuan bu and jiefang junbao bianji bu, eds., *Hanwei shehui zhuyi gongheguo* [Defending the socialist republic] (Beijing: Changzheng chubanshe, 1989), pp.247-248.
11. He was subsequently arrested in Shanghai; *Jiefang ribao*, 16 June 1989.
12. *Gongren qilaile*, p.152.
13. *Liaoning ribao*, 17 June 1989.
14. Chinese Workers Movement Institute, Committee to Support the Students, and Temporary Headquarters of the Capital Workers' Picket Corps, "Zhi shoudu gongren shu [A letter to the workers of the capital]," Undated wallposter, but contents establish date as May 13, 1989. Reprinted in *Zhongguo minyun yuan ziliao jingxuan (1)*, p.31. (Hong Kong: Shiyue pinglunshe, 1989).
15. Li Yun, *et al.*, eds. *Diankuang de shenian zhi xia* [The Tumultuous Summer of the Year of the Snake] (Beijing: Guofang keji daxue chubanshe, 1989), pp.189-193.
16. A member of the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation, who had regular contact with some of the members, claimed in an interview that almost all were workers and *geti hu*, but he could not say which group was more numerous. The authorities would later claim, with suspicious precision, that 76 percent of the members were *geti hu* or unemployed, and that of these, 34.2 percent were ex-convicts. *Ibid.*, pp.192-193.
17. See *ibid.*, the New China News Agency dispatch cited in Wu Mouren, *et al.*, eds., *Bajiu zhongguo minyun jishi* [A record of

the 1989 Chinese democracy movement] (New York: Privately published, 1989), pp.506-507; and *Hanwei shehui zhuyi gongheguo*, pp.262-64.

18. This man, Cao Zhihui, was arrested in mid-June in Tianjin, and was accused of leading attacks against soldiers and military vehicles in the capital; *Tianjin ribao*, 17 June 1989.
19. This account draws on an interview with a member of the union who also participated in this raid, and also on the NCNA dispatch reprinted in Wu Mouren, *et al.*, pp.506-507.
20. *Jiefang ribao*, 15, 16, 26 June 1989.
21. See the accounts of Warner and Esherick cited in note 8.
22. *Hanwei shehui zhuyi gongheguo*, pp.291-292, and *Heilongjiang ribao*, 9 June 1989. It appears that under interrogation many of the 38 arrested sought to minimize their punishment by claiming that they had no political aims or conceptions whatsoever (*mei you shenme xiangfa*) and that they were just out having some fun and were in fact planning to visit a whorehouse afterwards.
23. *Heilongjiang ribao*, 9 June 1989; the members were reported to be primarily unemployed youths, or youths with jobs who had been absent without leave for long periods, and workers from state factories who had disciplinary records.
24. Interview with worker from a Beijing factory who moved to Boston in 1990. The impact of the student demonstrations was felt immediately after the large demonstration of April 27. At an April 28 meeting called by the Municipal Trade Union headquarters of Beijing, a cadre from Guanghua Lumber Company complained that all workers wanted to do as soon as they arrived at work was to talk about "rumors." Xuan Yan, ed., *Jingdu xuehuo: xuechao, dongluan, baoluan, pingbao quan guocheng jishi* [The Capital in Blood and Flames: A Factual Record of the Entire Process of Student Movement, Turmoil, Rebellion, and Pacification] (Beijing: Nongcun duwu chubanshe, 1989), p.62.
25. See Andrew G. Walder, "Workers, Managers, and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989," *China Quarterly* 127 (September 1991), pp.467-492.

26. *Ibid.*, and Guojia jiaowei sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo si, ed., *Jingxin dongpo de 56 tian* [A Soul-Stirring 56 days] (Beijing: Dadi chubanshe, 1989), pp.128-138.
27. *Diankuang de shenian zhi xia*, pp.114-129.
28. *Jingxin dongpo de 56 tian*, pp.135-137.
29. *Nanfang ribao*, 8, 9, 11, and 25 June 1989.
30. *Qunzhong ribao*, 11 June 1989.
31. *Tianjin ribao*, 12 June 1989, p.1.
32. *Jiefang ribao*, 12 June 1989.
33. *Jiefang ribao*, 16 June 1989, p.2
34. *Jiefang ribao*, 13 June 1989, p.1.
35. Another possible interpretation is that feather dusters are commonly used to spank children; therefore to reprimand wayward officials.
36. *Shanxi ribao*, 17 June 1989, p.1; 21 June 1989, p.1.
37. *Yunnan ribao*, 13 June 1989, p.1.
38. Interviews with two Beijing *gongzilian* activists.
39. Similar organizations took part in the same activities in Jinan and Shanghai (see Table 3).
40. *Yunnan ribao*, 13 June 1989, p.1. Most of the fifteen members arrested on 11 June were said to be a variety of criminal types: former red guard leaders, murderers, *geti hu* with criminal records, juvenile delinquents, workers from outside Kunming. This, however, was evidently a sizable organization in May; the public reports give no information about the other members. It appears, however, that many "respectable" citizens had joined the organization earlier, since this article states that the evil ringleaders had "hoodwinked" many of the masses into joining them.
41. *Gansu ribao*, 20 June 1989. By that date, 43 "backbone elements" of Jin's organization had been arrested.
42. *Jiefang ribao*, 15 June 1989, p.2. Another veteran of a Cultural

Revolution rebel organization, 56-year-old Shen Zhigao, formerly the leader of the "Wujiaochang rebel brigade of sent-down workers" and now working in the warehouse of the Shanghai Toy Company, found the old flame rekindled. On June 8 and 9 he took to a street corner, stood atop an immobilized bus at the entrance to Tongji University, and made a series of incendiary speeches about the "fascist party, fascist government," and the "fascist massacre in Beijing;" he called on all workers to join the autonomous union and "overthrow the communist government," and declared that "the prestige of the party has fallen to the ground, it can no longer lead the people." After his arrest, Shen admitted that he had made similar speeches in People's Square and at the College of Finance and Economics throughout the movement. *Jiefang ribao*, 12 June 1989, p.1.

43. *Xinjiang ribao*, 13 June 1989, p.1. Under interrogation by the police, Shen claimed that he was the only member of the organization, but the authorities said that this was "still under investigation."

44. *Sichuan ribao*, 22 June 1989, p.1.

45. *Qunzhong ribao*, 16 June 1989, p.1.

46. *Qinghai ribao*, 27 June 1989, p.1.

47. *Jiefang ribao*, 12 June 1989, p.1, and *Qunzhong ribao*, 12 June 1989, p.3.

48. *Jiefang ribao*, 11 June 1989, p.1.

49. I have interviewed two of these people; the third, Yue Wu, is in Paris, but has published a brief account of his short-lived involvement in the federation: Yue Wu, "Wo shi zenyang tiaoli zhongguo dalu de: gongzilian zongzhihui Yue Wu zishu [How I Escaped from the Chinese Mainland: The Account of the Workers' Autonomous Federation's General Commander Yue Wu], *Zhongguo zhi chun* [China Spring] (January 1990), pp.31-32. Despite the article's title, Yue Wu was never, according to the two other activists interviewed, the leader of the organization, and as his own account makes clear, he left Beijing around the time that martial law was declared. The summary of the activities of Beijing *gongzilian* offered here is based on Walder and Gong, "Workers in the Tiananmen Protests."

50. Of the backgrounds we are able to verify, three came from the Beijing railway yards, one from the Fengtai Crane Plant, one from Capital Steel, another from one of the city's construction companies, and one from a printing plant that appears to have been operated by the army.

51. See the respective sources cited in Table 4.

52. See the transcript of the speech he gave at the heroes' monument in Tiananmen Square on April 21, in which he called upon workers and students to create a united movement for democracy: *Gongren qilaile*, pp.158-165.