

# *In Search of a Right Place?*

*Chinese Nationalism in the  
Post-Cold War World*

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## About the Author

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In the spring of 1988, the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), which had managed the Centre since 1971, and The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) reached an agreement to transfer the responsibility and ownership of the USC to the university. Thus, in that summer, the Centre was moved to expanded and upgraded quarters on the campus of CUHK.

Although field research is possible in China today, the Centre's library remains the most convenient base for documentary analysis. It is also useful as a station for supplementing field work in China. The Centre currently subscribes to 372 newspapers and more than 1,600 periodicals from Mainland China. One unique strength of the collection is a complete set, in bound hard copies, of major national and provincial newspapers published in China since the late 1940s. Other special materials include a complete set of provincial yearbooks and statistical compendia as well as an outstanding collection of local periodicals. Many of them are not found in most overseas collections on China.

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In 1990, the Centre established the Academic Visitors Programme with a startup donation from the Henry Luce Foundation. The USC Seminar Series was subsequently introduced to publish seminars presented by some visiting scholars. Since the end of 1993, the Academic Visitors Programme and the USC Seminar Series have been financed by the South China Programme of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies. We thank Dr. Cheng Yu-tung and Dr. Lee Shau-kee for their generous donations which enabled the establishment of the South China Programme in 1991.

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### **Introduction**

One of the intellectual fashions in the late 1980s made a prediction about the post-Cold War world as an end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of liberal democracy as the final form of human government. Indeed, communist ideology has been in decline since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, liberal democracy has been rejected in the meantime by some leaders of newly industrialized countries on the basis that "democracies can... prevent rapid economic development."<sup>1</sup> Nationalism, instead, is on the ascendancy. This development seems to have prompted Samuel P. Huntington's assertion about a "clash of civilization" in the post-Cold War era. Nationalism has played two different roles in the modern world. At times, it has functioned to free nations from alien rule, give a state its own, and contribute to the whole process of modernization.<sup>2</sup> However, nationalism, especially its extreme versions that are associated with racist arrogance and ignorance, is also responsible for many human tragedies. A new nationalism, or "a nationalistic universalism," as Hans J. Morgenthau called it, has been seen as a bad thing for one state strong enough to impose its will on others

and, hence, become a source of international aggression and confrontation in the late twentieth century.<sup>3</sup>

China is a rising power in the post-Cold War world. When communism's appeal is gone, nationalism has moved quickly to fill in the vacuum and become the driving force of China's modernization. The 1996 National Day editorial of *People's Daily* portrays patriotism (a benign term for nationalism) as part of *guohun* (the national soul) that "reflects state interests and national will." It continues to say that nationalism "can bring into full play the potential of all nationalities, is the most effective way of cementing the strength of all nationalities... to create great undertakings that will shake heaven and earth."<sup>4</sup> An exiled Chinese writer in the US warns that "a mighty wave of Chinese patriotism is sweeping across the globe, uniting Chinese people of all different political stands. The scale of the movement well exceeded the protest movement after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre."<sup>5</sup> Indeed, while thousands of Chinese students staged a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square urging for democracy in a confrontation with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in May 1989, almost all the mainland Chinese showed enthusiastic support to their armed forces seven years after when the PLA launched missiles just off the shores of Taiwan in what they claimed to be an effort to defend China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Nationalistic books, such as *The China That Can Say No*,<sup>6</sup> became instant bestsellers in the summer of 1996. After a right-wing Japanese group erected a lighthouse on Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands over which China claims sovereignty, the Union to Protect Diaoyu Islands rallied ethnic Chinese from all over the world in the fall of 1996. Although most Chinese intellectuals would not say that democracy is less appealing to them in the 1990s, many of them emphasize that they are patriots first. The Chinese people are exhorted to work hard so that China can take its right place in the world and stand up against perceived foreign aggression.

The recent rally of Chinese nationalism is obviously of global importance, but it is neither novel nor surprising in a historical perspective. The modern nationalist doctrines that came into

being with the establishment of the nation-state system in Europe were embraced by the Chinese political elites in the late nineteenth century when the Chinese empire showed its fatal weakness in confrontation with Western powers. The flow of nationalism has ever since steadily engulfed all that stands in its path. Other movements and ideologies wax and wane, but nationalism permeates them all. Then, what makes nationalism today different from that in modern Chinese history? Allen Whiting has tried to explore this issue by asking the following question: is Chinese nationalism affirmative, assertive, or aggressive?<sup>7</sup> In his 1983 study, Whiting discovered that China had experienced a transition from an affirmative nationalism which had emphasized an exclusive but positive "us" to an assertive nationalism by adding a negative "them." At that time, however, Whiting did not find any imputation of belligerence or aggression attached to his concept of assertive nationalism. In a 1987 study, Michel Oksenberg confirmed that "the leaders of modern China have not exhibited the ultra or expansionist nationalism that so many rising powers have manifested."<sup>8</sup> After China has arisen as one of the world economic powerhouses in the 1990s, however, Whiting becomes cautious and is not sure if Chinese nationalism would not become aggressive.<sup>9</sup> In the meantime, other scholars begin to label Chinese nationalism in the 1990s as a new nationalism. Ying-shih Yu says, old Chinese nationalism derived from an instinct of survival and, therefore, was defensive in nature while the new Chinese nationalism derives from China's wealth and power and is aggressive. Yu believes that the Chinese new nationalism aims at "replacing the dominant position of the West in the world and making the twenty-first century a Chinese century."<sup>10</sup> Edward Friedman characterizes the new Chinese nationalism as chauvinism and says, "far from acting in line with Mao's anti-imperialist nationalism... China's 1990s chauvinists who insist on a quick timetable for Taiwan's return to the PRC have self-consciously turned against Mao's nationalism."<sup>11</sup> James Lilley, the former US ambassador to China and Taiwan, states that "there is a rallying cry for Chinese everywhere... that after a century of humiliation

and Mao's social and economic experiments China's time has come... it [China] will rise in the world to the place it deserves."<sup>12</sup>

In view of the dramatic surge of Chinese nationalism, how can China smoothly adjust to the post-Cold War world of nation-states becomes theoretically as well as practically crucial for us to understand international relations at the turn of the twenty-first century. Has the non-aggressive nature of Chinese nationalism, observed by Whiting and Oksenberg in the 1980s, changed? What has caused the surge of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s? Have Chinese leaders begun to promote the ultra-nationalism that so many rising powers have manifested? What is China's right place that Chinese nationalism claims in the post-Cold War world? What is the implication of nationalism for China's foreign policy behavior? This article attempts to find answers to the above questions. It begins with an investigation of the distinctive feature of nationalism in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and goes on to explore the change in the orientation of nationalism from Mao's to Deng's era. It then analyzes a dilemma that nationalist xenophobia has posed to the Chinese regime. A perspective on the implication of nationalism to Chinese foreign behavior is offered in the conclusion.

### From Ethnic to Statist Nationalism

Before proceeding with the Chinese nationalism, it is necessary to clarify and define the elusive concept of nationalism. Nationalism appeared with the emergence of the nation-state in Europe. It has spread to the rest of the world only with the creation of modern nation-states. Nation and state are not same. A cursory look at the literature suggests that a nation refers to an ethnic or cultural group and a state is a sovereign political community.<sup>13</sup> The concept of a nation-state in which ethnic and political boundaries are the same is more ideal than real. Nations fluctuate as to boundaries, and states change in ethnic nationalities. Most states today

include more than one nation or potential nations, with complex overlapping or competing national claims on their citizens. The lack of fit between nations and states is a significant source of international and domestic conflict and, also, leads to two different definitions of nationalism. State nationalism defines the nation as a territorial-political unit and sees nationalism as a sense of essential political identity, involving an aspiration for self-government. Ethnic nationalism, which has received the most media headlines in the early 1990s, sees the nation as a large, politicized ethnic group defined by common culture and alleged descent, with nationalism turning into a cultural movement.<sup>14</sup>

Defining nationalism in ethnic terms needs a clarification as ethnicity can exist before there is the nation-state. Nationalism involves only those ethnic sentiments that provide the basis for the loyalty of a people to their nation-state. Nation as such is an ethnic group or a cultural community that seeks or has acquired a certain degree of political recognition and become a political community as well. The core idea of nationalism proposes that nations should become states and states should become nations. As Ernest Gellner says, nationalism strives to "make culture and polity congruent."<sup>15</sup> Ethnic sentiments may be part of a modern nationalist movement only if there is a distinct set of ideals, aspirations, heroes, and symbols that are associated with a political community in the larger nation-state system. However, the identification of nationalism cannot be limited merely to the sentiment associated with a political party or regime. Nationalism is more than loyalty to political parties or leaders, although leaders and parties may identify themselves with nationalistic sentiments and some may ideologically commit more than others to strengthening the ideals of nationalism. If a political party claims that nationalism is associated only with supporting its policy positions and everyone else is unpatriotic, this can only be seen as an example of politics and a manifestation of a lack of content in its nationalism.

Using the above definition, we can distinguish the sense of ethnic and cultural identity of the Chinese from their attitudes toward the PRC as a state and the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP). It is self-evident that the Han Chinese people share the same blood, the same physical characteristics, the same ancestry and culture and the same written language. These cultural and ethnic realities are critical factors in shaping Chinese political behavior and, at every turn of modern Chinese history, national leaders always politically explored Chinese ethnicity. However, nationalism is a modern sentiment. The traditional Chinese Middle Kingdom complex or the concept of Han chauvinism are not the same thing as Chinese nationalism, although the contemporary sentiments and imagery of nationalism can have their tap-roots in past identities. James Harrison observed that "the traditional Chinese self-image has generally been defined as culturalism, based on a common historical heritage and acceptance of shared beliefs, not as nationalism, based on the modern concept of nation-state."<sup>16</sup> Culturalism was distinguished from nationalism by its refusal to acknowledge a world of formally equal states and its insistence that legitimate rule rested on adherence to Confucian norms. Its essential integrity as a world view, supported by the size, wealth and power of the empire, gave it great lasting power to bridge periods of disunity and infuse new governments, whether Chinese or alien, with values supportive of the tradition.

Chinese culturalism fell when Western powers penetrated China in the late nineteenth century. With culturally-based confidence and identity in doubt from setbacks administered by these avowed challengers, imperial China disintegrated. The crisis led to the rejection of culturalism and to the development of a nationalism that would provide a new basis for China's defense and regeneration. Joseph Whitney analyzed China's shift "from cultural entity to political entity" as the Confucian idea of the state was being replaced by an imported nationalism.<sup>17</sup> The paradigm that governs this perspective is the culturalism to nationalism thesis,<sup>18</sup> which proposes that a set of traditional Chinese ideas, labeled culturalism, has been incompatible with modern nationalism and has yielded, under the assault of imperialism and Western ideas, to a new nationalist way of thinking. The history of

modern China, then, is one in which nationalism replaces culturalism as the dominant Chinese view of their identity and place in the world. The years following the Sino-Japanese War (1895) were the critical transition period when explicit nationalist doctrines and movements emerged. The Boxer Rebellion xenophobia and anti-Manchuism at the turn of the century blended into the more fully developed May Fourth movement (1919), with its dedication to anti-imperialism and national salvation and regeneration. After the May Fourth Movement, nationalism replaced or at least overshadowed culturalism as the proper model for the Chinese political community. China accepted the norms of the nation-state system, acknowledging the formal equality of other states and asserting vigorously its own territorial sovereignty in front of foreign imposition and humiliation.

Once triumphant in Chinese political identity, nationalism placed its stamp on each departure in modern Chinese history. The PRC itself was a product of a movement with strong nationalist credentials, as indicated by the classic studies of Benjamin Schwartz and Chalmers A. Johnson.<sup>19</sup> The "new China" established by the CCP in 1949 had little distinctively Communist or Socialist characters as its policies and programs were ones which any strong national government would have undertaken under the circumstances, and indeed, in large measures, ones which the Nationalist regime had attempted or promised to pursue, albeit with futility. The PRC continued the nationalist quest for greatness and modernization that had begun in the early twentieth century as the quest for "wealth and power." Its restoration of national unity and central power to a degree unknown since the mid-Qing dynasty, coupled with a strong organizational reach into the grassroots of Chinese society, enabled it to mount a vigorous development program. The resulting rise in Chinese power and international status satisfied nationalist aspirations and raised awareness at home and abroad of possible Chinese pursuit of expanded nationalist ambitions.

Nationalism in the PRC has a clear statist feature as it portrays the Communist state as the embodiment of the nation's will, seek-

ing for its goals the kind of loyalty and support granted the nation itself and trying to create a sense of nationhood among all its citizens. This statist feature contrasts with the Chinese nationalism in the early twentieth century which displayed a strong ethnic strain in opposing imperialism and Manchu rule. Particularly telling was the late Qing adoption of the principle of *jus sanguinis*, confirming the Nationality Law of 1909, granting citizenship to all Chinese anywhere and, later, allowing “dual nationality” for ethnic Chinese of other countries who would also retain Chinese citizenship.<sup>20</sup> Ethnic nationalism also placed its mark on the formative years of the Republic of China, witnessed in extensive mobilization of overseas Chinese communities in support of the anti-Manchu cause and the later granting of representation to these communities in Republican national assemblies. The adoption of state nationalism by the PRC is largely due to the decisive military triumph of the PLA which extended PRC sovereignty quickly into most of the old imperial territories and faced the CCP to the reality of a multinational state: approximately 92 percent of its population consisting of Han Chinese, the other 8 percent non-Chinese divided officially among 55 minority nationalities. The total area of the minority nationalities amounts to 64 percent of China’s territory. To avoid ethnic conflict within the PRC, the CCP has committed itself to state nationalism as a doctrine for creating a single Chinese nation.

State nationalism asserts that the Chinese nation includes all PRC citizens, irrespective of their nationality. It acknowledges the ethnic differences among its population but insists that all are members of a large nation that binds them together to the Communist state. State nationalism calls for concentration of political loyalty on the state led by the Communist Party and repudiation of the idea that Chinese history and culture are purely a Han affair. At the broadest level, state nationalism and its nation-building aspirations invest state policy with a nationalistic tone. Development becomes a national cause. Transformation into a powerful and modernized country is a collective effort involving all of the state’s territories and peoples. Economic, political, and social pol-

icy making and implementation, all accompanied by or infused with official propaganda, emphasize national unity, goals, and accomplishments. It is from this perspective that James Townsend asserts that “the real nationalist revolution in China came after 1949 in the building of an infrastructure that reached all of the state’s citizens and regions.”<sup>21</sup>

State nationalism accords closely with norms of a modern nation-state system, emphasizing the indivisibility of territorial sovereignty and citizenship. PRC pronouncements support these norms vigorously. A key illustration is PRC’s retreat from the principle of “dual nationality” for overseas Chinese that emerged during the flowering of Chinese ethnic nationalism earlier in the century. After many partial or *ad hoc* compromises on the issue after the early 1950s, the PRC Nationality Law of 1980 explicitly rejected dual nationality, provided for the naturalization of aliens as Chinese nationals and the renunciation of Chinese nationality by ethnic Chinese, and it stated that children born of Chinese nationals settled abroad could not hold Chinese nationality if they had acquired foreign nationality by birth. In keeping with this principle, the PRC has generally urged Chinese settled abroad to choose the nationality of their country of residence, giving up Chinese nationality.

## The Orientation of Chinese Nationalism

State nationalism in the PRC has been largely defensive and internal in orientation, particularly during the Mao era. Mao relied on deterrence and defense in depth in an attempt to wall out enemies. Mao even accepted as a premise for peace in the Pacific not trying to militarily take Taiwan after the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, since that would make a larger war likely, as occurred after North Korea’s invasion of South Korea and Moscow’s overplaying its hand in Berlin. The Boxer Rebellion style xenophobia that prevailed during the Cultural Revolution was largely due to Commu-



nist internationalism “promoting a world revolution” rather than to the pursuit of national interests. Chinese nationalism turned outward beginning in the Deng Xiaoping era, notably in the speeches given by Deng and Hu Yaobang at CCP’s 12th National Congress in 1982. Playing down Communist internationalism, Deng emphasized that “the Chinese people value more their sovereignty that has been obtained through a long period of struggle.”<sup>22</sup> Hu said, “being patriots, we do not tolerate any encroachment on China’s dignity or interests.”<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, the outward Chinese nationalism was not regarded as a threat to the Western countries in the 1980s when China was opening up to broad contacts and communications with the outside world. Michel Oksenberg described it as a “patient and moderate nationalism rooted in confidence that over time China can regain its former greatness through economic growth, based on the import of foreign technology and ideas.”<sup>24</sup>

Whether or not a virulent nationalism will emerge from China’s “century of shame and humiliation” has become a serious concern of the international community only after the sudden recognition of China as a rising power in the post-Cold War world during the 1990s. Because of the success of the economic reform, China’s record of economic growth astonished the world, with a breakneck pace of 9.6 percent average growth rate from 1980 to 1993. Deng Xiaoping hoped to quadruple the economy from its 1978 level by the year 2000. This goal was advanced at the end of 1995. This output in turn is to be doubled by 2010. Within a generation or so, optimists predict, China could have the largest economy in the world. China, a rising power that has 1.2 billion population with a nuclear arsenal, suddenly had made it to the center of the post-Cold War security calculations. The oldest problem in diplomacy was raised: how could the international community manage the ambitions of a rising power? The expression of a new containment has been applied increasingly to China.<sup>25</sup> It is believed that Chinese nationalism may have profound implications for unresolved territorial claims and a modernized China may use its power to seek its desired place in the world. To

understand the new orientation of Chinese nationalism, it is important to analyze the factors at state, society, and international levels that have shaped its surge in the 1990s.

At the state level, resorting to nationalist appeals is an effort of the Chinese Communist regime to bolster faith in a system in trouble after the decline of Communist ideology. In 1992, a widely circulated article, “*Sulian jubian zhihou Zhongguo de xianshi yingdui yu zhanlue xuanze*” (Realistic Responses and Strategic Choices for China after the Disintegration of the Soviet Union), written by a group of young political elite, known as *taizidang* (crown princes, mainly, the children of CCP elders), emphasized the urgency of protecting national interests after the abortive coup in the former Soviet Union. The authors argued that Marxism-Leninism were no longer effective in mobilizing loyalty and legitimating the state, rather it was necessary to develop a new ideological vision that drew selectively from China’s traditional culture and Western rationalism. The CCP should base itself firmly on Chinese nationalism and such a patriotic appeal would be more effective than traditional socialist ideology in opposing Western “peaceful evolution,” which in any case was said to be more based on the economic self-interest of Western nations than on their ideology.<sup>26</sup> Deng Xiaoping and his successor, Jiang Zemin, moved quickly to stimulate Chinese nationalism and sought to position themselves as the representatives of the Chinese nation after the Tiananmen Incident which had resulted in sanctions against China by the Western countries. The clearest example of Deng’s effort at identifying his regime with Chinese national pride was his bid for Beijing to become host to the year 2000 summer Olympic games. Although it failed to get the games, the Chinese popular resentment was directed at foreign countries and human rights groups whose bullying was blamed for the failure. As much as it can, the Beijing government presents itself as the guardian of pan-Chinese economic interests, including China’s entry into the WTO (World Trade Organization) and the maintenance of the low-tariff treatment on exports to the US, known as most favored nation (MFN) status.

At the international level, the leadership's effort at identifying the Communist regime with the Chinese nation can be particularly effective when it faces challenges from perceived hostile foreign countries. The PRC's international conflicts always stimulate nationalist sentiments. The Korean War was the prototype, with its use of force in support of state objectives, backed by a *kang Mei yuan Chao* (Resist America, Aid Korea) campaign that mobilized popular energies for the war effort through a variety of nationalistic anti-American claims and appeals. No subsequent conflict quite matched this one's intense concentration of military action, domestic mobilization, and popular emotion, but some other military actions on disputed territories coupled with nationalistic rhetoric and supporting popular demonstrations can be found in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, the Sino-Vietnam border conflict in 1979, and the Chinese seizure of the Xisha Islands (the Paracels) in 1974 followed by occasional Sino-Vietnamese skirmishes around those islands and more assertions of PRC claims to the Nansha islands (Spratly) in the South China Sea. The continuing drama of PRC efforts to regain Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan also ensures a steady diet of nationalistic themes in the official media. Since the end of the Cold War, China has been under heavy pressure from Western countries. In particular, Sino-US relations are entangled in issues of human rights, intellectual property rights, trade deficits, weapon proliferation, and especially the Taiwan issue. The voice of containment of China reached its peak in Western media when China launched military exercises in the Taiwan Strait following Lee Teng-hui's visit to the US in May 1995. Suspicion of the US has prevailed among many Chinese people after the US sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to "protect" Taiwan in March 1996. They believe that China is mistreated by the US, which hurts the national pride. Following the example of their Asian neighbors, Chinese political elites have decided that they have to say "no" to the US pressures.

At the societal level, thus, Chinese people, particularly the best educated, tend to concur with the official position that the US

is a "black hand" behind Taiwan and a "liar" about China's human rights. The frequent and wide exchange with the US has allowed many intellectuals to take a closer look at the US, which has helped demythify the West and give them the courage and ammunition to criticize it. Chinese intellectuals have become the articulators of the new tide of nationalism in the 1990s. The instant bestseller, *The China That Can Say No: Political and Sentimental Choices in the Post-Cold War Era*, was written by five young reporters, poets and free-lancers. In spite of its extremely nationalistic tone, the book did make some pertinent points about the US's China policy. The authors pointed out the contradictory attitudes of some Western countries, especially the US and Japan, toward China — fearing China's strength, but also fearing China's weakness; fearing China's wealth, but also fearing China's poverty; fearing China's stability, but also fearing China's chaos. In a sense, the book was no more than a list of grievances that China had with these Western countries, ranging from the annual scrutiny of China's MFN status by the US to sexual harassment in foreign companies in China, from Lee Teng-hui's visit to the US to the search of a Chinese ship on the high seas by the US Navy. The book carried a simple yet heavy message to the Chinese people: a morally corrupted and over-stretched imperialistic US had been plotting against the rising China in a new cold war, with the help of the non-repenting Japanese and some "disgusting Chinese" who took slavery by the West as something "noble and happy." As a result, it was necessary and almost mandatory for China to stand up and say no to the US clearly and loudly. China should adopt a counter-containment strategy and prepare for a long-term resistance against the American hegemony. The Russians and many other Asian nations, the Southeast Asians in particular, were natural allies to the Chinese. Some dissenting Europeans, the French in particular, could also be friends in the Chinese resistance against the US. The book claimed that "the United States cannot be the leader of anyone else, it can only be its own leader; Japan cannot be the leader of anyone else, it sometimes cannot even be its own leader; and China does not want to be the leader

of anyone else, it wants only to be its own leader."<sup>27</sup> Another bestseller, *A Depiction of Trials of Strength between China and the United States*,<sup>28</sup> was written by five Chinese scholars of foreign affairs. In an interview, the main author, Chen Feng, said, what they had written was a "series of facts about the US government's hegemonic behavior toward China."<sup>29</sup> The book fanned the flames of nationalist feelings against US intervention in China by tracing Sino-US relations from the Korean War in 1950-53 to Lee Teng-hui's trip to the US. It told details on how the US pressure on China had resulted in conflicts over issues such as Taiwan, textile trade, human rights, the MFN status, and arms sales. The authors had tried to show that it was the US that had forced China time and again into a series of confrontations with it and warned Washington that any containment effort was certain to fail since China was much stronger than it had been during the Cold War.<sup>30</sup>

The fact that many well-educated intellectuals give voice and even become the driving force behind the tide of nationalism is a new development deviating from Lucian Pye's classic statement that China's "political power, and hence the advantaged position for shaping nationalism, was never firmly in the hands of the best educated or the most modernized people."<sup>31</sup> To a certain extent, the nationalist wave in the 1990s can be seen as an intellectual movement in response to anti-traditionalism that once dominated China in the 1980s. Looking back to the 1980s, Chinese national pride had suffered a heavy blow by the self-condemnation on the Communist domestic policy since 1957 and sudden awareness of China's economic backwardness after opening up to the outside world. There was a rising concern about the spiritual as well as the identity crisis. Many Chinese intellectuals adopted a totally hostile view toward their own traditional culture, calling for the complete rejection of the past and a boundless adoption of Western culture. They openly denounced China's cultural heritage, even calling Chinese people the "ugly Chinese." The widespread reactions to the "River Elegy" and the need for the party leadership to denounce it as boosting nationalistic nihilism, suggested that many Chinese had arrived at a time of soul searching about

their national identity. However, after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, anti-traditionalists were criticized for their "romanticizing understanding of Western culture," and they vanished quickly.<sup>32</sup> There has grown a great appreciation of the value of the Chinese cultural legacy which the party had so relentlessly attacked for so long. There is a new awareness of the need among intellectuals to articulate a more vivid sense of collective identity of the Chinese people. The authors of *The China That Can Say No* confessed that back at college they had craved for Western culture and things but they began to really think after Beijing's being defeated in the year 2000 Olympics site competition and the US sending aircraft carriers to defend Taiwan in March 1996. Before the Chinese could say no to the Americans, they have to say no first to themselves, to their lack of nationalistic spirit and to their blind worship of the US.

The rising Chinese nationalism has thus laid special emphasis on arousing what is called "consciousness of suffering" from disorder and humiliation in the hands of foreign powers and on recapturing the past glory of the Chinese history. The Communist government has begun to embrace Chinese historical figures that once were considered symbols of oppression. As a result, a "Zeng Guofang fever" occurred within the Chinese political elite circle in 1994-95. Zeng was a late Qing official from Hunan who was instrumental in putting down anti-Qing revolts, including the 1850-64 Taiping Rebellion. A reactionary official who had once been criticized for suppressing peasant revolution, suddenly became a national hero. A two-volume biography of Zeng became a bestseller, and it was followed by many hagiographic novels and television shows. Another significant event is that, in April 1995, China reopened a refurbished mausoleum reputedly built for Huangdi (the Yellow Emperor), the legendary founder of the Chinese race. The renovations began in 1992 at a cost of 58 million yuan (US\$7 million). According to the official *China Daily*, the plaza grounds include 5,000 cobblestones to symbolize China's 5,000 years of history and provide a place for all Chinese people to worship their ancestors.<sup>33</sup>

To this extent, Chinese nationalism in the 1990s is still largely defensive and internal in orientation. It is a defensive choice of the regime to use nationalism in an attempt to re-establish its legitimacy after Communism has lost appeals. It is also a reactive action to foreign pressures in spite of the fact that Chinese nationalism may have emphasized “us” in more positive terms while defining “them” with more negative connotations in the post-Cold War world, as Chinese intellectuals rediscover the value of their heritage and national pride in a perceived more hostile international environment.

### A Double-edged Sword

Defensive and reactive in nature, it would be difficult for the Communist regime to mobilize popular support of nationalist xenophobia unless there is no choice left for the regime. As a matter of fact, nationalism is a double-edged sword and the cost to promote ultra-nationalism could be disproportionately high.

On the positive side, nationalism has the function of re-enforcing Chinese national confidence and pride and turning the past humiliation and current weakness into a driving force for China’s modernization. When patriotic intellectuals say that China has been bullied and humiliated frequently by the US, they also indicate that “being backward is apt to be beaten” and China’s backwardness in economic development should share some blame for China’s past humiliations. Thus, Chinese nationalism calls upon the Chinese people to work hard and to build a prosperous and strong China so that China’s international status would be improved and nobody would dare to bully China any more. In addition, when Communism’s appeal is gone, the Chinese people need a unifying force to hold the country together during its turbulent transformation period. The attacks on the US hegemonism and discussion of the social-political problems in the Western countries also help the Chinese leadership to divert atten-

tion from many new problems, such as crimes, corruption, and inequalities, caused by economic reform, to the old devil of foreign intervention in general and Hollywood in particular. Moreover, the Communist government has been proud of its success in fighting against the US during the Korean war and the Vietnamese War and in defending the country by defeating the superpowers both on the battlefields and at the negotiation table. The systematic exposition of the confrontations between China and Western powers, especially the US, can certainly help the Chinese leaders stand up against various threat from the US and provide a thread to the past with which the Chinese people can identify. That is why China’s official news agency Xinhua released news about *The China That Can Say No* immediately after its publication in June 1996. An article in Shanghai’s *Wenhui bao* praised the book as a work that “should have been published a long time ago” and said that the book “expressed the braveness of the younger generation: China can stand firmly on its national interests. It is the national interests that appealed to the emotion of the Chinese people.”<sup>34</sup>

On the other hand, however, once unleashed, nationalism can easily cause a serious backlash and place the government in a hot-spot facing challenges from both domestic and international sources. Domestically, the rising nationalism has broken the taboo surrounding Chinese foreign policy and run into a criticism of current policy, especially the seemingly too “soft” stance toward the US and Japan. It is certainly an embarrassment for the Chinese leadership when the authors of *The China That Can Say No* openly claim that “we need China’s Zhirnovsky” and propose to take back Taiwan by force at any cost and a confrontation approach to the US and Japan while China’s modernization continues to depend on cooperation with these two countries. When the nationalist issues have fired up the general public about the conduct of the US and Japan, they often do more harm than good to the Communist government. The CCP rose to power partly because it gained nationalistic credentials by fighting the Japanese invasion during the war time. Now, being widely criticized as too chummy with a

Japan that has failed to provide more compensation for wartime injuries, laid claim to Diaoyu Islands, and allegedly waged economic imperialism by flooding China with Japanese products, the party suffers from losing some of its dwindling legitimacy. The Chinese leadership worries about the patriotic movement against Japan that may evolve into a protest movement against the Chinese government itself by those people who are jobless or angry about the corruption in the government. In addition, coming at a time when China urgently needs Japanese trade and investment, the government does not want to see the surge of nationalism jeopardizing the Sino-Japanese economic relations. Ironically, when Chinese patriots blame Japan for economic imperialism, *China Daily* reports that "Chinese products have edged their way into the Japanese market so steadily." According to the report, the trade between China and Japan hit a record \$57.47 billion in 1995, up 19.9 percent from 1994. Of the total, China's exports soared 31.7 percent to stand at \$28.46 billion. China's trade deficit was narrowed. While Chinese statistics claimed a \$540 million trade deficit with Japan, Japan reported a \$13.99 billion trade deficit with China in 1995.<sup>35</sup>

The rising nationalism has appealed largely to the Han history and nation. This could be dangerous due to the existence of at least three different Chinese nations. The first is the PRC, officially defined by state nationalism. The second, defined by ethnic nationalism, is the PRC's Han nation, composed of the core Han population, distinct from non-Han nations within the PRC. The third, a product of ethnic nationalism and the vagaries of Chinese political and migratory history, consists of the PRC plus the compatriots (*tongbao*) of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau presently under different political authorities.<sup>36</sup> Ethnic division has always been a source of tension since the founding of the PRC. In spite of the dominance of state nationalism, ethnic nationalism, particularly Tibetan nationalism, with stirrings among the Uighurs, other Muslims, and Mongols, has never been suppressed. No doubt, many Han Chinese, and some minorities, accept the idea that Chineseness is shared among all the nationalities, but most of the

movement toward integration of this nation results from the assimilation of the non-Han into Chinese culture. Although the Chinese government has granted minorities various kinds of special representation and autonomy and has been relatively effective at resisting open espousal of Han Chinese ethnic nationalism, all manners of manifestations of ethnic identity continue to endure. Ethnic consciousness in China is often conflictual and violent, most notably in Tibet where ethnic nationalism has triumphed over the state's version of Han-Tibetan relations. Ethnic nationalism among minorities makes it clear that some may choose greater differentiation and autonomy over integration into the PRC nation, a trend that on all sides can only strengthen awareness of the distinctiveness and dominance of the core Han Chinese nation. The third nation of compatriots is also troublesome. For many years after 1949, the gulf between the PRC and the three territories was so great that the nation existed only as a legal fiction. Growing contacts with the mainland in recent years have rekindled awareness of one Chinese nation. For Hong Kong and Macau, reunification is now a virtual reality. However, Taiwan shows no signs of yielding to the PRC version of reunification, while the Taiwan independence movement has gained momentum in recent years. Nationalism in the case of the second and third Chinese nations is in rise as a challenge to the PRC government.

Internationally, the rise of Chinese nationalism has coincided with a presumption in the international community that nationalism has assumed an irrational and dangerous quality that might distort a state's true interests and threaten other states in the late-twentieth century. Many analysts, sobered by two centuries of imperialism, revolution, and war, have taken a negative view on nationalism. Hans J. Morgenthau's classic study found the nationalism of the late twentieth century "essentially different from what traditionally goes by that name and what culminated in the national movements and the nation-state of the nineteenth century." According to Morgenthau, "traditional nationalism sought to free the nation from alien domination and give it a state of its own," while the nationalism of the late twentieth century

"claims for nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standards of action upon all the other nations."<sup>37</sup> Because it is thought to unite and strengthen a nation internally, traditional nationalism is often thought a rightful one for a country fighting for unity and independence. Because it claims universal dominance and enhances misunderstanding of external forces, the new crusading nationalism is often seen as a bad thing for one state strong enough to impose its will on others. In this context, although there is a tendency to see the absence of nationalism in imperial China as a fatal weakness, the new tide of Chinese nationalism has caused anxiety in Asia and the rest of the world in the 1990s. The rise of Chinese nationalism is seen as "a potent force in a country that is striving to shake off its image as the sick man of Asia and regain ancient glory."<sup>38</sup> Chinese military exercises in March 1996 may have fired a shot across the bow of Taiwanese independence, but, in the meantime, they set off alarms all over East Asia, causing a series of moves that were against China's national interests. The Japan-US relationship was strengthened. The American military withdrawal from Okinawa was shelved temporarily. Indonesia was drawn closer to Australia, and it protested China's claim to gas fields in the South China Sea. The Philippines strengthened its military and improved relations with Taiwan.

Balancing the positive side and the negative backlash, the Chinese leadership has been very cautious and ambivalent toward nationalism. In an official statement, a Foreign Ministry spokesman sought to play down the impact of *The China That Can Say No*, saying that the book was just the work of a few young people and "purely a personal matter."<sup>39</sup> Those intellectuals who are close to the policy-making circle have talked about the book, using such words as simplistic, emotional, ill-founded, and extreme. After the book caused an international repercussion, the bad taste, bad writing, obvious commercial objectives, laughable errors, childish ignorance, and radical nationalist assertions of the book have been sharply criticized in some official Chinese newspapers. A book review by Zhang Jianjin in *Zhongguo jingji shibao*

notes that China is witnessing an up-surge of ultra-nationalist emotions that is leading the country astray. Zhang criticized *The China That Can Say No* for being "full of artificial angers."<sup>40</sup> A *Nanfang ribao* article by a commentator pen-named Yan Lieshan says the book was "produced in a crude and slipshod way" and contains "too many low-class mistakes, which made the Chinese press so embarrassed and ashamed."<sup>41</sup> While *People's Daily* editorial on the 1996 National Day spelled nationalism as the theme of celebration, it also published a color photograph of Beijing appointed 10th Panchen Lama on the front page emphasizing Tibet's union with the rest of the nation. In the picture, the Tibetan boy handed a traditional white silk scarf to Premier Li Peng. Meanwhile, on the front page of *China Daily*, a photograph of two Japanese friends amidst a group of celebrating Chinese students signaled Beijing's eagerness to put the Sino-Japan disputes on Diaoyu Islands behind. On Tiananmen Square, a portrait of Sun Yat-sen was set up, brightened by two huge traditional red lanterns. Sun led the 1911 revolution which overthrew the Qing, the last imperial dynasty — a piece of history to remind the Taiwan people.

### Chinese Patriotism and Its Problems

As a matter of fact, the PRC government has never officially endorsed nationalism. The sentiments of the Chinese people have not been described as nationalistic but *aiguo* or patriotic, which in the Chinese language literally means loving the state. The terms "nationalism" and "chauvinism" have referred in official discourse to reactionary attachments to nationalities, whereas "patriotism" is the desired love and support for China, always indistinguishable from the Chinese state and the CCP. A Hong Kong scholar indicates that "nationalism is a less acceptable term to Beijing leaders, as it may arouse nationalistic fervor among the 55 minority groups, each clamoring for its own identity. Patrio-

tism is a more acceptable non-political notion to the Chinese central government as it helps the people focus on problems and challenges they share in common."<sup>42</sup>

However, the Chinese government has not defined patriotism as a non-political notion. *People's Daily* editorial on the 1996 National Day gives the latest official view about the content of Chinese patriotism. The editorial states that "patriotism is specific. China is a socialist country; we have a socialist system; and we are constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics. Patriotism requires us to love the socialist system and the road chosen by all nationalities in China under the leadership of the Communist Party."<sup>43</sup> This official view had been made clear by Deng Xiaoping as early as in 1981 when he said that "some people say that not loving socialism is not the same thing as not loving our motherland. Is motherland an abstract concept? If you do not love the socialist new China led by the Communist Party, what else can you love?"<sup>44</sup> In his National Day Speech of 1989, Jiang Zemin also said, "in China today, patriotism and socialism are unified in essence."<sup>45</sup>

Patriotism is thus closely associated with the Communist state and specifically identified with the support to the CCP and its current policies. By confessing *aiguo*, Chinese should express loyalty to and a desire to serve the state as it is or as it will be in its renovated form.<sup>46</sup> For this purpose, the CCP has launched one after another campaigns of patriotic education. The "Outlines for Patriotic Education," which was issued by the State Education Commission and relayed down to all educational institutions from universities to kindergartens in June 1994, stipulated that the guiding principles of patriotic education were official party lines and Deng Xiaoping's theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics in particular. It also provided that patriotic education must work toward the construction of China's socialist modernization and support economic reform, as the CCP leadership had staked much of its legitimacy on the market-oriented reforms and forged prosperity by steering China's economy sharply away from orthodox Marxism. The goals of patriotic education were defined as

seeking to rejuvenate China's national spirit, strengthen the unity of all people of different ethnic groups, reconstruct the sense of national esteem and dignity and build the broadest possible coalition under the leadership of the CCP.<sup>47</sup> The patriotic education also stresses national unity and territorial integrity. Wang Jisi, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, says that the objective of Chinese patriotism education is to build a "politically, economically and culturally unified nation-state when foreign and largely Western influences are seen as eroding the nation-state's very foundation."<sup>48</sup> For this purpose, China's Foreign Ministry and other government agencies, such as Hong Kong and Macau affairs and Taiwan affairs offices, have provided figures, statistics, pictures and articles in support of the patriotic education effort that can be disseminated for public consumption. With this strategy, the regime has created a sense of crisis among the people, in an attempt to convince them that international "hostile forces" are doing everything they can to take these territories away from China, or to prevent China from taking them back.

This way of defining patriotism confirms Pye's observation that Chinese nationalism has a "problem of lack of content," as it is reduced to the expression of a political party's current policies.<sup>49</sup> In no country can nationalism be reduced to merely the sum of current policy preferences. What is missing for the expression of any substantial form of nationalism is the collective ideals and shared aspirations which have to be coherently expressed in meaningful symbols and myths. The ideals of nationalism, with all of their myths and symbols, should have their own domain, well above the arena of contemporary policy programs of a political party. Nationalism should express how a people share their collective memories that form much of the content of their nationalistic identity and should embrace the ideals of a society and a people of how they are distinctive and precious in contrast to other peoples. In modern Chinese history, Sun Yat-sen sought to articulate an early version of Chinese nationalism by establishing *San min zhuyi* (Three Principles of the People). But, these principles soon became merely the orthodoxy of the *Kuomintang* regime.

Mao Zedong boasted that China “stood up,” but his proletarian dictatorship also turned Chinese nationalism eventually into a subordinate to the CCP regime. A 1994 Chinese bestseller, *Disanzhi yanjing kan Zhongguo* (Looking at China Through a Third Eye) tried to render a positive reevaluation of Mao’s legacy in a nationalistic fashion. As it ran into a critique of Deng’s reform program, it was not officially endorsed by the government.<sup>50</sup>

The recent effort to restore Chinese traditional culture may be a pragmatic way of promoting nationalism, but there is a void as to the cultural ideals that can provide the substantive content for Chinese nationalism because the historical legacies of Chinese tradition have been so harshly attacked for so long since the May Fourth Movement. In particular, 40 years of sustained attacks by the Communist regime on traditional Chinese culture has left China with a relatively inchoate and incoherent form of nationalism without a substantive core which can be readily articulated. This problem can be easily illustrated by looking at the curriculum spelled out in the “Outline for Patriotic Education.” Chinese history is simplified largely as the CCP history. To become patriotic, students are required to learn China’s characteristics and realities and their incomparability to Western values; CCP’s legend and heroic stories and revolutionary martyrs; the party’s fundamental principles and policies; the great achievements of the party rule in China’s modernization process, and some other items about national security issues in the context of preventing a peaceful evolution and fighting against external hostile forces. The patriotic education campaign has included a peculiar effort to name a hundred prominent Chinese figures (heroes), a hundred patriotic books, a hundred patriotic songs, a hundred patriotic films, a hundred patriotic education bases (historical sites).<sup>51</sup> The patriotic education campaign has also gone hand in hand with the so-called moral education, which is focused on “socialist values” and “collectivism.” In both patriotic and moral education, the CCP is always at the center.

In this case, the patriotic education has appealed most to somewhat simplified or idealized Chinese history and traditions.

Between the two extremes of either nihilistically denouncing Chinese past or romanticizing it, the Communist government has not created a sense of Chinese nationalism that combines elements of tradition with appropriate features of the modern world culture. As a Western correspondent in Beijing describes, Chinese nationalism in the 1990s has become “a mix of militarism, Maoism, Confucianism; one part modern, one part traditional, one part belligerent and one part lounge act.”<sup>52</sup> Paradoxically, although China produced one of the world’s greatest civilizations and still has a powerful and tenacious culture, it now has in modern time a “relatively contentless form of nationalism.”<sup>53</sup> When the content of contemporary Chinese nationalism is compared with nationalism in other countries, it appears to be exceedingly thin. There is little to compare with the substance of American nationalism with its mystique about George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Pledge of Allegiance. Similarly, there seems to be no counterpart to the Japanese feelings about the monarchy and the British pride in the parliament.

## Conclusion

The above study shows that the surge of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s has resulted from a mix of factors at the state, society, and international levels. The Communist regime has tried to use nationalism to fill the void created by the collapse of Communism. In the meantime, the harsh criticism of China by Western countries in the post-Cold War world has generated harsh reactions from the Chinese people at the society level and prompted the new wave of nationalism which shows the strong influence of the international rivalries of the past.

In the PRC history, nationalism has not made China’s international behavior particularly aggressive or inflexible but rather cautious and opportunistic. Communist leaders have pursued na-



tional interests vigorously, backing them with force on several occasions, but have maneuvered and even retreated on many issues involving nationalistic concerns. In the 1970s, the PRC demonstrated a great deal of pragmatism in abandoning its earlier demands for severance of American relations with Taiwan as a condition for US-China rapprochement, accepting *de facto* relations with the US between 1972 and 1978 by establishing a "liaison office" in Washington even as formal American recognition of and support for Taiwan continued. A Taiwan reporter cited this case as an example of "dual representation" which reflected Beijing's "pragmatic spirit."<sup>54</sup> PRC's position on Hong Kong has been nationalistic, as it has always insisted on its sovereignty there. However, the formula of "one country, two systems" for Hong Kong and Macau involves important concessions on matters of local autonomy, although the PRC insists on the formalities of its sovereignty over these areas. According to the formula, residents in these areas do not have to love Beijing's socialism to be called patriotic. As Deng Xiaoping said, "With regard to patriotic compatriots in Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and other overseas areas, we should not expect them all to approve of socialism."<sup>55</sup> Particularly significant is China's position on the nationality of Hong Kong residents, expounded in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which implies that all ethnic Chinese residents are automatically Chinese nationals. The suggestion that Hong Kong's ethnic Chinese will automatically acquire PRC citizenship in 1997 disregarding the fact that some of them may still keep their foreign passports contradicts the principle of state nationalism expressed in the PRC Constitution and Nationality Law.

In the post-Cold War era, while wary of the weary nationalism could turn against them, the Chinese Communist leadership has found that it has little alternative but to press ahead and cultivate national pride in the name of patriotism. Its main goal is to hold the country together during its rapid, turbulent transformation. The recall of suffering, past or contemporary, establishes a common denominator of bitter experience which can binds the nation together and provide roots of identity. When Chinese lead-

ers warn people against foreign forces that want to subvert their government by the policy of containment, they can easily strike a responsive chord among a people that have periodically struck out against those external forces which earlier penetrated China in one form or another. Thus, imbedded in Chinese nationalism are certain traditional feelings that can be revitalized, including anti-foreign sentiments.

However, inciting nationalist xenophobia is like to ride a tiger, it is hard to dismount.<sup>56</sup> While international conflicts may define PRC's goals in nationalist terms, mobilization of popular support against foreign threats may cause a domestic backlash, about which the Chinese leaders have plenty of lessons from history. The Boxers helped bring down not the foreigners but the Manchu Dynasty; the Anti-Japanese War ended not only the Japanese aggression but also the *Kuomintang* regime; and, the Red Guards destroyed much of the Chinese Communist leadership. In addition, nationalist mobilization often appeals to Han history and nation, not the multinational community portrayed in state nationalism. The Han-minorities relationship is conflictual, despite the state's emphasis on the Chineseness of its minority population. Ethnic nationalism among minority nationalities has been the focus of national sentiments and more spontaneous, volatile and potent than state nationalism that it often challenges. State nationalism is weaker than official communications proclaim; ethnic nationalism is more powerful than the state likes to admit. Nationalism in the 1990s has been on the rise most among Tibetans, other ethnic minorities, and Taiwan independence movement and, in these cases, is directed against the PRC government. Moreover, the Chinese Communist leadership has failed to develop substantive contents of Chinese nationalism that can go beyond being merely an expression of current policy preferences and provide a basis for the regime to inspire Chinese people for collective tasks. Because the building blocks for a coherent nationalism are missing as a result of the damage to the collective symbols and ideals of the culture in the PRC history, the party hagiographers are not sure where to turn to find the essence of Chinese national-

ism. In this case, the political support of nationalism in China is not as solid as it is on the surface, and popular nationalism in China is less intense than the state may want people to believe. As a Chinese scholar indicates, although nationalistic books, such as *The China That Can Say No*, have gained a relatively enthusiastic audience, they cannot find lasting acceptance: "In reality, once a book is supported and praised by the party leadership, there is a contrary reaction among many people on the mainland, and they end up ignoring it."<sup>57</sup>

In this context, the Chinese government has been cautious, sober-minded and well calculated about the overall and long-term national interests. While calling for patriotism among all Chinese, the official discourse has continued to condemn all nationalist, chauvinist, or racist ideas and actions. China's cooperation with its neighbors and Western countries has continued in spite of the worrying among China's neighbors who fear a growing assertiveness on territorial claims, especially in the South China Sea, and among some Western countries who are afraid of a rising nationalism that can translate into an anti-Western backlash in foreign policy and an even tougher Chinese line on the issues ranging from Tibet to trade disputes. China's official policy has emphasized domestic stability and international peace while nationalism is rising. One scholar, who was in China at the peak of the nationalist fever in summer 1996, pointed out that the criticism of the US from the Chinese public only provided "the second voice" different from the official tone, which had been long absent.<sup>58</sup> Another scholar, who conducted interviews in China in the summer of 1996, found that, for the first time since the Sino-US diplomatic normalization in 1979, the Chinese public had become radical but the leadership had stayed cautious. He indicated that "the Chinese government, sharing the nationalism with the public, has not used the public feeling to push for an anti-American policy."<sup>59</sup> In the official discourse, the US has not been consistently defined as a threat or enemy except on occasions during the Taiwan Strait crisis in early 1996. Chinese leaders have been clearly aware of common economic and security interests with the US. The Chi-

nese government has reiterated the "16 character principle" for developing Sino-US relations, "enhancing confidence, reducing troubles, expanding cooperation, and avoiding confrontation," that was proposed by Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1993.<sup>60</sup> In the relations with Japan, although angry young Chinese demanded that China stand up to Japan on the disputed Diaoyu Islands in fall 1996, the Chinese leadership, anticipating big loans from Japan, only quietly rebuked Japan for crimes during World War II. This pattern of behavior shows that while Chinese nationalism may become more assertive with its growing economic and military power and fear of containment, Chinese foreign policy has not been particularly aggressive or inflexible. This does not mean that nationalism lacks conviction. Rather, it suggests that China cannot simply appeal to nationalist xenophobia to rise to the place it desires in the post-Cold War world.

## Notes

1. Kisbore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Way," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January / February 1995, p. 103.
2. For a recent discussion on nationalism and its historical role in the West, see Liah Greenfield, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
3. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993, pp. 272-73.
4. *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily), October 1, 1996, p. 1.
5. Liu Binyan, "Big Drama about Small Islands," *China Focus*, Vol. 4, No. 10, October 1, 1996, p. 1.
6. Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian, *Zhongguo keyi shuo bu* (The China That Can Say No), Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996.
7. According to Whiting, affirmative nationalism fosters patriotism, and its implications for foreign policy are minimal.

- Aggressive nationalism arouses anger and mobilizes behavior targeted against foreign enemies. Assertive nationalism lies between the two, sharing attributes of each and tending towards either depending on its intensity. See Allen Whiting, "Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 8, August 1983, pp. 913-33.
8. Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 3, 1986-87, p. 504.
  9. Allen Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," *The China Quarterly*, No. 142, June 1995, pp. 295-316.
  10. Ying-shih Yu, "Minzhu zhuyi de jiedu" (Interpretation of Nationalism), *Minzhu Zhongguo* (Democratic China), No. 35, June-July 1996, p. 59.
  11. Edward Friedman, "Chinese Nationalism, Taiwan Autonomy and the Prospects of a Larger War," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 6, No. 14, 1997, p. 16.
  12. James R. Lilley, "Nationalism Bites Back," *New York Times*, October 24, 1996, p. DP-ED 1.
  13. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977; and Louis L. Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1954.
  14. To make the distinction, some scholars use ethnonationalism to refer to ethnic nationalism. See, for example, Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism," in Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington, eds, *Understanding Political Development*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1987, pp. 196-220.
  15. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 43.
  16. James Harrison, *Modern Chinese Nationalism*, New York: Research Institute on Modern Asia, Hunter College, 1969, p. 2.

17. Joseph B. R. Whitney, *China: Area, Administration and Nation-Building*, Chicago: Department of Geography Research, University of Chicago, 1969, pp. 26-29, 160-62.
18. James Townsend, "Chinese Nationalism," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 27, January 1992, pp. 97-120.
19. Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951; and, Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
20. Harley Farmsworth, *The Chinese Abroad, Their Position and Protection: A Study of International Law and Practice*, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1925.
21. Townsend, "Chinese Nationalism," p. 119.
22. *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 1975-1982* (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), Beijing: People's Press, 1983, p. 372.
23. Hu Yaobang, "A New Epoch of Construction for a Socialist Modernization," in *Shiyijie sanzong quanhu yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* (Selected Important Documents since the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee), Beijing: People's Press, 1987, p. 502.
24. Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," p. 505.
25. See, for example, "Containing China," *The Economist*, July 29, 1995, pp. 1-2; Karl W. Eikenberry, "Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability," *Parameters*, Spring 1995, p. 82; and, Gideon Rachman, "Containing China," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 1996, pp. 129-39.
26. This article was first published in the name of the Ideology and Theory Department of the *Zhongguo qingnian bao* (China Youth Daily) as an internal circulating article in September 1991. It quickly leaked abroad and was reprinted in the December 1992 issue of *Zhongguo zhichun* (China Spring) in New York City. I interviewed one of the authors of this

article in Beijing during the summer of 1994. He confirmed the above speculation that it was written based on the proceedings of a meeting held in *Zhongguo qingnian bao* and the participants were a group of party and government officials active in policy analysis and consultant for the post-Tiananmen leadership. For one study of the significance of this document, see Joseph Fewsmith, "Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXV, No. 7, July 1995, pp. 642-43.

27. Song Qiang et al., *Zhongguo keyi shuo bu*, p. 3.
28. Chen Feng, Zhao Xingyan, Huang Jiaoyu, Yang Mingjie, and Yuan Xixing, *Zhong Mei jiaoliang daxiezheng* (A Depiction of Trials of Strength between China and the United States), Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1996.
29. "Successes Amidst Challenges: An Interview with Chen Feng, Editor of the Book *A Depiction of the Trials of Strength between China and the United States*," *Dangdai guojiguanxi* (Contemporary International Relations), Vol. 6, No. 8, 1996, p. 13.
30. In addition to the two bestsellers, several other less publicized books have also been written by young intellectuals and share similar themes. Among them are Hong Yonghong et al., *Zhong Mei jun shi chong tu qian qian hou hou* (US-China Military Confrontations: Before and After), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1996. Xi Laiwang et al., *Da yang ji feng: liangge shijie da guo de boyi guize* (The Oceanic Wind: The Games of Two World Class Nations), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1996, 2 volumes. Zhang Shan and Xiao Weizhong, *Ezhi Tai du: bu chengnuo fangqi wuli* (Stop Taiwan from Independence: No Promise on Not Using Force), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1996.
31. Lucian W. Pye, "How China's Nationalism Was Shanghai," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 29, January 1993, p. 112.

32. For a critique of Chinese anti-traditionalism, see Gu Xing, *Zhongguo fanchuantong zhuyi de pingkun* (The Poverty of Chinese Anti-traditionalism), Taipei: Fengyun shidai chubanshe, 1993.
33. *China Daily*, April 11, 1996, p. 2.
34. See *Wenhui bao*, June 26, 1996, p. 4.
35. Gao Bianhua, "Chinese Products Find a Home in Japan," *China Daily (Business Weekly)*, April 1, 1996, p. 2.
36. Townsend's study puts forward a fourth Chinese nation, including other overseas Chinese who retain some idea, however attenuated, of dual nationality. The fourth nation cannot take unified political form, as most of its external members have primary obligations to non-Chinese states. Nonetheless, it has contributed both politically and economically to the PRC and Taiwan, continuing to nurture the idea that important community bonds remain. See Townsend, "Chinese Nationalism," p. 128.
37. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, pp. 272-73.
38. Steven Mufson, "China's New Nationalism: Mix of Mao and Confucius," *International Herald Tribune*, March 20, 1996, p. 1.
39. Xinhua News Agency, August 29, 1996.
40. *Zhongguo jingji shibao* (China Economic Times), August 8, 1996, p. 8.
41. Zhou Yi, "Before and After the Publication of China Can Say No," *China Strategic Review*, Vol. 1, No. 7, 1996, p. 21.
42. Kao Chen, "Patriotism Different from Nationalism," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), July 17, 1996, p. 11.
43. "To Construct the Motherland More Beautiful and Better," *Renmin ribao*, October 1, 1996, p. 1.

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